U.S., SOVIETS WAGE AIR-WAVES WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706980001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 29, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/14 :CIA-RDP90-009658000706980001-4
LOS ANGELES TIMES
29 March 1987
U.S., Soviets Wage Air-Waves War.
Pentagon Spends $5 Billion a Year oa Radar Technology
By RALPH YARTABIDUtAI,
?Ymea Stajy Writer
WHIDBEY ISLAND, Wash.-In
the stormy seas off the Puget
Sound, Soviet trawlers make an
occasional cruise, fishing not for
Pacific king salmon but a catch of
stray electronic signals from a
nearby U.S. naval air station.
The trawls are actua v soehis-
ticated listenintr s iva trvina to
Qbtein elect*ocL~ irate tia~c- a htrat
will help Soviet a Qineera devise
e~ment to ism Naw radar or
th will revent the Nav
The activities are art of a
monumen aft e o tec polo
wa e a moat
th n t d States. sown
-
eta e o aa' a ect
io war are. t is an arcane name of
e i e and industrial innova on
intended to win suoerio ty e
au' waves.
Awewm~ liCbetroaie Pev~er
Overhead at Whidbey ~ Island,
specially equipped Navy radar-
jamming jets. called Prowlers, op-
erate with such awesome electron-
ic broadcasting power that a single
airplane could auddeNy knock out
pictures on television screens
across much of Southern Califor-
nia.
"I like to say what we do is goof
up the other guy," said Lt. Cmdr.
John Cryer, one of the Navy's
electronic wizards whose job is W
punch buttons and twirl dials in the
back seat of a Prowlrr jet. "We
want to cause confusion."
Cryer and a small band of ra-
dar-jamming aviators like him are
the ultimate hackers, doggedly
studying the design and operation
of Soviet radar systems to exploit
their weaknesses. In a real battle,
they would fool enemy radars with
bogus signals and blind them with
powerful electronic bloats from
high-energy pods slung below
their aircraft's wings. Or they
would deploy electronic decoys the
siu of a small bird that look lilts a
10-ton airplane to a radar.
The Pentagon spends an esu-
mated =b blllion annually on the
abWty to deny the Soviet Union use
of the air waves through jamming,
deception and decoys. While not
new, electronic warfare capability
has grown in recent years into an
absolutely essential military re-
quirement that can result in over-
whelming victory or humiliating
defeat.
But electronic warfare has also
grown into a painful headache for
the Pentagon. Many of the pro-
grams to build the high-technology
equipment of electronic warfare
have encountered technical prob-
lems, giant coat overruns and
missed schedules.
The Air Force's B-1 bomber
recently became embroiled in a
national controversy becattae of
notable technical deficienMd with
its defensive electronics equip-
ment, the ALQ-161 system -pro-
duced by Eaton Corp. of New York.
It consists of 118 black boxes of
electronic gear and other compo-
nents.
The. B-1 could be shot down by
the Soviet Union's newest
surface-to-air tnisailes because the
jamming system is unable to pro-
tect the H-1 as it should, Air Force
officials recently disclosed. Aa a
result, the Air Force eapecta to
spend at least 1600. million to
improve the system.
The problem with the B-1, how-
ever, is hardly unique. Many ob-
scure electronic warfare programs
experience such trouble. Only a
few weeks ago, the Air Force had
to cancel a program to equip its
F-111 aircraft with a new electron-
ic self-protection system because
bide from industry were 3046. to
7096 higher than the program's
i1.Z-billion budget.
No fewer than a dozen electronic.
warfare programs have experi-
enced similar budgetary and tech-
nical problems, crea~ng an atma-
phere of urgency in the industry
and the military. Aa coats and
technical difSculty tnotmt, many
experts indicated in interviews that
they worry about the ability of the
United States to keep abreast of
Soviet progress in the field.
"The Soviet defenses have ad- _
vanced faster than our abiity to
counter them," said Thomas H.
McMullen, a recently retired Air
Force general who commanded
3evelopment of aircraft and their
electronic wazfaze equipment. "It is
a tough challenge."
Delays, Coat Overruns
So far, nobody is suggesting that
the militazy should settle for less-
sophisticated electronic warfare
geaz, because equipment that can-
not do the job is considered worse
than none at all. But overly ambi-
tious goals often lead to technical
problems, schedule delays and cost
overruns.
"What you do about the situa-
tion, that's the hard part," Brig.
Gen. John A. Corder, the Air
Force's director of electronic com-
bat, acknowledged. "The develop-
ment of electronic combat equip-
ment is as difficult a thing as there
is to do. We are pushing everything
with the latest technology."
Corder, a fighter pilot who was
shot down by a Soviet missile in the
Vietnam War, worries that, if it
does not make a major commitment
to have the best electronic warfare
equipment, the United States could
"get caught cold-footed."
That clearly is what happened to
Syria and its Soviet advisers in
1982, when a coordinated Israeli
force attacked Syrian missile sites
in Lebanon's Bekka Valley and
destroyed them. In an ensuing air
battle, Israeli fighter pilots report-
edly shot down 93 of Syria's, Sovi-
et-built jets and lost only' ot~e of
their own U.S.-built jets.
In the military world, the event
cleared the air of lingering doubt
about the importance of electronic
countermeasures in the ability of a
fighter jet to survive and carry out
its mission.
' It is a life-and-death situa-
lion-that's why we go so far out
on the limb technologically," Nata-
j lie W. Crawford, an electronic
~ warfare expert at Rand Corp., said.
"We are talking about something
STAT
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/14 :CIA-RDP90-009658000706980001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/14 :CIA-RDP90-009658000706980001-4
that is trying kill you and kill
democratic way of life."
One key cause of the problems in
electronic warfare h8s been the
Pentagon's insatiable demand for
geaz. Spending on electronic waz-
fare by all the military services has
grown from 31 billion in 19$0 to the
current level, which Robert Hani-
see, ananalyst at Seidler Amdec
Securities, estimates at 35 billion.
In recent years, the small commu-
nity of contractors that produce the
equipment could hardly keep up
with the demand.
The mazket shows few signs of
slowing down. The Air Force, for
example, now spends about 32.1
billion annually on electronic war-
fare equipment but it projects chat
within five years its budget will
increase to 32.6 billion, according to
Corder.
Such growth in a small and
specialized military mazket almost
always leads to problems, because
there aze oNy so many engineers in
the nation who can design elec-
tronic warfare equipment and only
so many trained workers who can
produce it.
"The government has been
strongly encouraging entry of new
players into the business to address
some of these chronic problems,"
said David W. Gingery, a manager
at TRW, a recent entrant into the
business. "The industry had grown
to be a tightknit community where
everybody knows everybody else."
In practice,. electronic warfare
programs are started with exces-
sive optimism by industry and they
attempt to push technology too faz,
according to the findings of a
recent study by the Assn. of -Old
Crows, a technical fraternity of
military and civilian individuals in
electronic warfare.
Some critics fault the industry
for being incestuous and unneces-
sarily secretive, a chazge that Old
Crows are sensitive about.
"We are starting to go talk to
Rotary Clubs, Lions, Kiwanis," said
Gus Slayton, the Old Crows' execu-
tive director. "The general public
needs to understand these kinds of
esoteric things."
Congressional critics place part
of the blame on the military itself
for failing to promote leaders who
understand electronics.
In the Air Force, for example, all
of the 13 four-staz generals Are
pilots, even though two-thirds of
Air Force officers have non-flying
jobs, according to former Air Force
Secretary Verne Orr. "It gets very
discouraging to the best ... engi-
veers and who drift out as colo-
nels,"Orr said.
Others complain that electronics
generally is regarded as a "third
cousin" when it comes to the
competition for funding. "It is not
the will of the people that is
lacking, it is the amount of money
that can be applied," said the Old
Crows' president, Albert A. Gallot-
ta, aretired rear admiral.
Such concerns are not a recent
development. Electronic warf#~
has been fading in and out - o!