LAROUCHE DENOUNCES TASS RELEASE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000100310006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 5, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Executive Intelligence Review
304 West 58th Street, New York, N.Y. 10019, [phone]
1010 16th St. N.W. Washington, D.C. [phone]
LaRouche Denounces TASS Release
Sept. 5 (NSIPS)-The following statement was released
today by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.
There is strong circumstantial evidence to suspect that
Soviet agents-perhaps the Soviet air command resident
unit based in Anchorage, Alaska-caused the Korean
Airlines flight 007 to stray into Soviet airspace, by tamp-
ering with the navigational instrument programming.
As the Soviet TASS statement of Sept. 4, 1983 stresses,
the 747 does employ flight-programming devices con-
sisting of one principal unit coupled to two back-up units.
The programming is accomplished for each flight by aid
of a magnetic tape reel inserted into the devices before
the devices are emplaced prior to take-off.
I was briefed on this by experts at about the same time
that Secretary Shultz was delivering his first statement
on the incident. I obtained this information in response
to my query: how was it possible that the first contact
with the flight from Japan included a pilot's report of his
plane's position nearly three hundred miles off its actual
position? The pilot could make such an honest error only
if he was deceived by errors in the programming of his
navigational instruments.
As Admiral Bobby Inman has detailed the implications
of such programming errors in his published interview
in the Sept. 4 Washington Post, under such circumstances
it is probable that a 747 flying over Soviet territory by
night would not have known it was over Soviet territory.
There are two places a programming error for the sec-
ond leg of the flight could have been accomplished. Either
at the origin of the flight, in New York City, or in the
stopover at Anchorage.
QUESTION: Was the flight plan for the Anchorage to
Seoul leg of the flight programmed in Anchorage? This is
verifiable. It is important this be investigated. If so, who
had access to the programming in Anchorage? If not, who
had access to the programming in New York?
SECOND QUESTION: Who benefitted from the flight's
entry into Soviet airspace? Certainly not U.S. intelli-
gence, which has access to better information from space
than can be obtained from placing electronic eavesdrop-
ping equipment in a civilian airliner. Perhaps the KCIA
wished information it is not listed to share from U.S.
sources? That is at least an outside possibility. Soviet
behavior during a span of slightly more than two and a
half hours points strongly toward Soviet interest in hav-
ing the overflight occur.
FACT ONE: There is no indication that the Soviet
Union contacted either Tokyo or Washington through
regularly available channels, to notify authorities of an
overflight in progress-even though they had two and a
half hours to do so. There is no cause for suspicion that
the U.S.A. or Tokyo received such notification, since the
Soviets, who are claiming every malfeasance under the
sun against the U.S.A. and Japan, have not claimed that
such contact was attempted.
FACT TWO: The Soviet command ordered its military
aircraft to destroy a civilian airliner at the point the air-
liner was leaving the vicinity of Soviet airspace-not while
the aircraft was entering Soviet airspace. They waited two
and a half hours to shoot down the airliner, after any
damage which might allegedly have been done might
have been prevented. Furthermore, clearance for this
command came from Moscow command, and was not a
local commander's initiative.
CONCLUSION: At the point the Soviet command or-
dered the plane shot down, they had a) taken no earlier
action available to them to have the plane pulled out of
overflight by radio from the U.S.A. or Japan, and thus
prevented any remote possibility of electronic eaves-
dropping by the airliner over Sakhalin, but, instead b)
shot down a civilian airliner cold-bloodedly as it was leav-
ing the vicinity of Soviet airspace.
ADDITIONALLY, they never took any action, accord-
ing to their own claims, appropriate to determining
whether or not the pilot knew he was in an overflight.
THEREFORE, by the measure of their own actions and
omissions of available courses of action, the Soviet com-
mand had no reasonable military reason for shooting down
the airliner. CONCLUSION: They shot it down because
they wished to shoot it down as an act of terrorism, pure
and simple. This is an action out of Hitler's strategic pol-
icy of Schrecklichkeit, nothing different.
QUESTION: Does this mean that the Soviet command
wished to shoot down this airliner perhaps even before it
entered Soviet airspace? I strongly suspect that this is the
case. Here are the immediate facts which point my sus-
picions in that direction.
FIRST, the action taken was an act of strategic
Schrecklichkeit (terror), for reasons indicated above.
FACT: The action occurred within hours of the anni-
versary of the outbreak of World War II and on the same
day as the launching of the Soviet-directed hot autumn in
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Western Europe. This was also the eve of a new wave of
adventures by Soviet puppet Qaddafi and by Soviet asset
Jumblatt in Lebanon. It occurred following two major
Soviet violations of treaty provisions concerning nego-
tiation of indicated unlawful sites in the Soviet Union.
DISCUSSION: The Soviet command perpetrated a
strategically significant action on a date of strategic sig-
nificance. The question is, therefore, was the decision made
entirely within the two-and-a-half-hour time frame al-
legedly the interval of the overflight, or had some section
of the Soviet command made the decision before the air-
liner left Anchorage? Farfetched? Look more deeply.
THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTION: The action of destroy-
ing the airliner at the point it was leaving the vicinity of
Soviet airspace had the pre-calculable effect of shooting
down the peace movement internationally. Since the de-
cision to shoot the airliner down was deliberated at the
highest levels in Moscow before the command was exe-
cuted, this pre-calculable implication was taken into ac-
count before the order to destroy was issued. Would the
Soviet command have wished to be placed in the position
of making such a decision before the beginning of the two-
and-a-half-hour interval?
HYPOTHESIS: Suppose, in their view, the time had
come to scrap the peace movement as having outlived its
usefulness? That was implicitly the policy decision made
in Moscow before the airliner was shot down. It was a
decision to restrict the "peace movement's" activities to
the capabilities of the hard-core terrorists, to dedicated
fanatics allied to Moscow come what may.
DISCUSSION OF HYPOTHESIS: It is only a myth
that the Soviet leadership viewed the hot autumn as pre-
venting the installation of Pershing Its in Germany. So-
viet sources have repeatedly acknowledged that the hot
autumn actions would tend to have exactly the opposite
effect and that in any case, the demonstrations would
have no effect on the placing of the missiles. The purpose
of the hot autumn was solely to make Germany "ungov-
ernable," and was never anything but that. Therefore,
the peace movement was seen only as a short-lived weak-
ening of the will of western governments and as a cover
for building up capabilities of fanatics to be deployed even
after the peace movement had been demoralized by Soviet
aggressive action. If the Soviets, as of Sept. 1, 1983, were
committed to unleashing some gross aggressive action,
and were seeking an orchestrated confrontation about
that time, this would be the time to scrap the mass-based
peace movement. Therefore, the hypothesis depends upon
some Soviet action of strategic significance to occur shortly
after the incident. Where, then, is the next strategic blow
intended to occur?
RECIPROCAL HYPOTHESIS: The importance of as-
sessing whether or not the Soviets desired to have this
incident, even before the beginning of the two-and-a-half-
hour interval, is of determining whether or not they are
about to unleash some major strategic incident-whether
to put the Atlantic alliance forces on a state of full alert.
In other words, the whole matter reeks of the Polish-
German-Czech border during late August 1939.
If a Soviet agent tampered with the navigational pro-
gramming in New York or Anchorage, Atlantic alliance
forces must quickly go to a state of strategic alert. We must
assume, if the hypothesis is correct by this test or similar
tests, that Moscow was not merely bluffing when it issued
repeat threats of possible preemptive strike. Refusal of
treaty meetings is indicative.
CAPABILITIES: Did the Soviets have the capabilities
for altering the programming of the airliner in either
New York or Anchorage? Flatly, yes. This sabotage ca-
pability is under the direction of the relevant sections of
the Soviet air command. One such unit monitors every
flight out of Anchorage. The Soviet command knew what
aircraft was in the slot in question from the beginning
of the two-and-a-half-hour segment and probably had also
a complete passenger manifest as well.
OTHER EVIDENCE: The additional evidence which
tilts my judgment to the indicated line of thinking about
the stopover at Anchorage, is the content of the latest
TASS release referencing the navigational programming
of the flight. I have had personally some experience with
political lying by agents of covert services, including be-
havior of "sleepers" controlled by such services planted
into or recruited from my own circles. When such people
lie, their very selection of lies sometimes gives away much
more than the liars imagine they are revealing inad-
vertently. The principles applicable to such lying are most
appropriate in the case of the indicated TASS release.
No liar makes up a fable entirely out of whole cloth.
He fabricates from materials already in his own mind,
using what is on his mind to compose the lie. Lies of that
sort are usually intended to be diversionary by essence,
and often project the liar's own motives upon the persons
he accuses. The TASS statement in question reveals pre-
cisely such distinctive features.
FACT: It accuses the U.S. of pre-staging the incident
as a provocation, and lays heavy emphasis on the infal-
libility of the flight recorder in the effort to prove this
case. As we noted, it was the Soviet act of killing the
passengers as the plane was leaving the vicinity of Soviet
airspace-after a delay of two and a half hours-which
was a deliberate act of strategic terror. They accuse the
U.S. of not notifying the aircraft, when the crucial fact
is that the Soviets did not notify the U.S. or Japan. They
raise the issue of premeditation. Since their lies are prob-
ably projections of their own behavior, and therefore mo-
tives, upon the U.S. and Japan, must we not also suspect
the idea of premeditation has the same significance? This
is exactly what Hitler used to do under similar circum-
stances.
I have learned over years to know the Soviet mind in
some respects better than it knows itself. I can see that
mind ticking. I know in what direction they are presently
thinking. I say, be fully alert. The other shoe, the big
shoe, is about to be dropped somewhere. They are com-
mitted to a confrontation perhaps as big as the 1962 crisis.
Be fully alert to this probability.
Meanwhile, find out quickly, who re-programmed the
navigational instruments in New York, or probably An-
chorage. If that question can be answered, the answer is
implicitly a big one.
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) P:::99M
Executive Intelligence Review 304 West 58th Street, New York, N.Y. 10019, [phone]
LaRouche on Qaddafi Interview
by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.
The political-intelligence specialist, and average citizen must
study the Qaddafi interview in Wir Selbst-and Qaddafi's Hitler-
like operations against the nations of Africa-as reflecting the
mental state of Moscow's tool. We must judge the mental state
of the presently ruling combination in Moscow from such ac-
tions as the brutal murder of 269 airliner passengers, and Mos-
cow's choice of partners.
Qaddafi, like the forces behind the separatist and terrorist
movements, is essentially a Nazi. He has certain resemblances
to Adolf Hitler in the manner he conducts foreign policy, but
he is not so much a Hitler follower as a Sufi variety of "national
bolshevist," a follower of the cult of dionysian chaos of the
ultra-fascist Friedrich Nietzsche. The Conservative Revolution
of the Siemens Stiftung's Dr. Armin Mohler is the most compact
reference-source available on the roots of both the Nazis and
today's "universal fascists."
The Soviet leadership has no illusions about its Nazi Inter-
national and similar qualities of allies today. Although Moscow
continues, so far, to honor a special relationship to governments
such as that of India, the general trend of the past fifteen years
has been Soviet preference for allies from among those it itself
earlier denounced as the most unspeakable scoundrels. This is
the case in the Middle East, in Western continental Europe, and
in the case of Qaddafi. This pattern of choice of allies is of one
piece with the Moscow command's orders to destroy a civilian
airliner over the Sea of Japan.
The significance of Qaddafi's interview in Wir Selbst, to-
gether with the destruction of the airliner, is that these reflect
the political-philosophical outlook of the presently ruling com-
bination in Moscow. True, Moscow played with the "national
bolshevist" variety of fascist from the early 1920s, and was
more deeply involved with use of Nazi and related instruments
throughout the post-war period than most observers not inti-
mately informed of the facts would wish to believe. That is
nasty, but it is not the same thing as Moscow's openly asso-
ciating itself with such forces as political allies, and using Mos-
cow's own resources to build up the strength of Nazis and other
sordid elements in the West and developing sector.
A very profound change in Moscow's political-philosoph-
ical outlook has occurred, most noticeably over the recent fifteen
years. Three features of this process of change are broadly ev-
ident.
First, from about the middle 1960s, reliance upon Soviet
Leninism as a guiding philosophical outlook for policy-making
has vanished. Much of the vocabulary persisted, but the content
was shifted to an increasingly pragmatic sort of cynical real-
politiking. Essentially, from their vantage-point, "Leninism"
had failed in both the industrialized and developing nations,
and had degenerated to posturing by aging, increasingly corrupt
bureaucrats inside the Soviet Union itself.
Second, this collapse of faith in Leninism was accompanied
by a resurgence of old Russian culture from Czarist days, sig-
nalled by a resurgence of mass attendance at Russian churches
and growing political power of the Russian Church apparatus
within the Soviet domestic and foreign-policy apparatus.
Third, as I assessed the course this process was taking as
early as 1972, the deepening of Soviet commitment to Nuclear
Deterrence and Detente was reflected in shifts in Soviet foreign-
policy posture, in the direction of building a Russian (Eastern)
division of a Byzantine-like world-empire. This I described at
the time as a "New Constantinople" perspective visible in Soviet
foreign-policy. Criton Zoakos published a summary of the pic-
ture of this "New Constantinople" shift during 1973. I later
discovered that this was precisely the policy agreed upon be-
tween certain Western and Soviet leaders through the Pugwash
Conference back-channel beginning no later than 1958. The
Willy Brandt Ostpolitik, the signing of SALT I, and the signing
of the 1972 ABM treaty had consolidated this new, imperialist
foreign-policy outlook in Soviet policy.
These three factors-cultural pessimism, reversion to old
Raskolniki varieties of beliefs, and revival of Russian imperial
perspectives modelled on the "Third Rome" tradition-pro-
duced in the Soviet leadership and elsewhere an emergence of
what is best described as a Soviet Dostoeveskian mentality.
It is early to say that the Soviet Union will become a full-
fledged fascist state in the sense of Mussolini's Italy or Hitler's
Germany, however, the tendency is present and pronounced.
There are prominent, identifiable points of coincidence between
the direction of political-philosophical developments in the So-
viet leadership today and, most emphatically, the "national
bolshevist" currents within German Nazism. The fact that the
"Third Reich" ideology of the Nazis was copied directly from
Dostoevsky's "Third Rome" ravings is one. When "solidarism"
was adopted as the model of socio-economic policy by the Stras-
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ser and Rosenberg currents of the Nazis, the argument was
explicitly and emphatically made that German Nazi solidarism
and the Tolstoyan solidarism of the Russian Mir were essentially
identical. The German "blood and soil" doctrines of the Nazis
and the Nazis' leading fascist competitors of that same period
of German history were then explicitly represented as akin to
the Russian "blood and soil" cultural model. Nazism was largely
the introduction of Eastern values of this sort against the Judeo-
Christian rationalism of Schiller's and Humboldt's Germany.
The Moscow clearance to order the shooting-down of the
Korean airliner is a characteristic expression of a world-outlook
akin to the Nazis' Nietzschean philosophy of the Triumph of
the Will, the anti-rationalist conception of Will associated with
William of Ockham, Bernard of Clairvaux, and others. To deal
with the West by display of a terrifying exertion of the Russian
Will, is the essence of the airliner incident.
It was a Hitler-like expression in foreign-policy, a charac-
teristically brutal expression of a "Third Rome" state of mind.
It is the same state of mind which prompts the Soviet com-
mand to deem a beast as morally and mentally depraved as
Khomeini to impose its "dark age" upon the people of Iran, to
unleash Qaddafi against the nations and peoples of Africa. It is
that same wicked state of mind which prompts the Soviet lead-
ership to adopt the cause of the forces of a new dark age in
Germany, the Green Party, and which brings Soviet asset Qad-
dafi, the Nazi-linked international separatist movement, and the
Green Party into convergence within Germany today.
We must recognize this political-philosophical outlook in
Moscow, not only as a matter of evaluation pertaining to our
own practice in related matters. Unless the Soviet Union is
confronted with our knowledge of the cultural degeneration in
progress in the Soviet leadership, men and women of conscience
in the Soviet Union will not be encouraged to change the di-
rection of things.
This is not to propose that Marxism and Soviet Marxism in
particular are in any sense desirable ideals. I have dealt with
these matters amply in numerous published locations, and do
not propose to repeat that analysis here at this moment. The
working-point here is that the formal commitment to techno-
logical progress, and to recognizing as "progressive" nations
and political forces committed to delivering the benefits of ra-
tionality and technological progress as what the Soviets called
"progressive forces" was a kind of morality, a morality which
they have repudiated in their present foreign-policy and related
practice.
We could have hoped to persuade them that our conceptions
of the role of the individual in an environment of technological
progress was superior in performance and implications to their
own conception of this policy. This rabid, fanatically xeno-
phobic disregard for the sanctity of life of defenseless airliner
passengers, and the promotion of their asset Qaddafi, bespeaks
an immoral irrationalism which is a thermonuclear menace to
all civilized life.
They will clamor that we have influential and evil fellows
in the West. Who could disagree with that honestly! Yet, the
fellows who perpetrated the offenses to which Moscow will
now point liberally, have been recently the Soviets' preferred
political allies through such back-channels as Pugwash. In con-
demning the West for the wickedness of such fellows, the So-
viets merely more completely condemn themselves. We know
them by the company they keep.
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