A TRAIL OF TANTALIZING QUESTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605040007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 16, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/04: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605040007-3
16 March 1987
ON PAGE P- NEI TSWEEK
A Trail of
Tantalizing
Questions
Did Reagan know?
W hatever else Ronald Reagan may
have accomplished with his dramat-
ic admission of responsibility, he did very
little to advance the nation's knowledge
of just what it was that "happened on
[his] watch." His speech shed no new light
on the principal questions vexing investi-
gators: What happened to the money?
And- what did the president know about
the secret contra network and the diver-
sion of profits from Iranian arms sales?
The Tower commission found no evidence
that Reagan knew of the diversion,
but final reports by the Tower Board and
the Senate Intelligence Committee left
several loose ends-scanty, tantalizing
clues-that seem to suggest the president
may have been told more than he says.
Three investigations-by two congres-
sional select committees and special
prosecutor Lawrence Walsh-are follow-
ing these leads into largely uncharted
territory. The Senate select committee
plans to vote within two weeks on wheth-
er to give former national-security advis-
er John Poindexter and Oliver North
limited immunity from prosecution in
exchange for their testimony. Walsh has
expressed reservations about immunity
and urged the committee to hedge any
deals it makes. In the meantime, all
three panels are following the money
trail. Investigators have been unable
thus far to open the Swiss bank accounts
used by North, but they do have access to
detailed financial records-of some $33
million in cash donations-released last
week by contra leader Adolfo Calero.
If nothing else, the clues in hand make
clear that Reagan shared North's sympa-
thy for the contras and their benefactors.
As early as March 1985, the Tower report
notes, North sent a memo to national-
security adviser Robert McFarlane pro-
posing that the president solicit private
funds; McFarlane wrote "not yet" in the
margin, but Reagan did eventually ap-
pearat several fund-raising dinners. Ever
bolder, in April 1985 North sent another
message (now in the hands of investiga-
tors) to McFarlane suggesting Reagan be
briefed about arms deliveries to the con-
TERRY ARTHUR-THE WHITE HOUSE
A Poindexter briefing: Did he reveal the connection between the contras and Teheran?
tras. Itis not clear if the briefing was held.
The clues surface again in the spring of
1986. Among the most elusive is the Tow-
er report's reference to a "photo session"
in the White House: Reagan posed with
Donald Regan, North, Poindexter, aCIA
field officer (later connected with the
contra effort) and an unidentified couple
(in which the husband turns out to be a
Costa Rican official who reportedly
helped North build a secret airstrip in
that country). No one seems to know
what they discussed.
More suggestive pieces of the puzzle
fell into place the next month. According
to the Senate Intelligence Committee, on
May 15 Poindexter briefed the president
about both McFarlane's delivery of arms
to Teheran and the contras' increasingly
desperate finances. The next day the
Hard to hide: A Nicaraguan contra
JASON BLEIBTREU-SYOMA
president authorized a search for third
countries that might help fund the rebels.
Did Poindexter reveal the diversion of
Iranian profits? A document describing
the McFarlane trip exactly as Poin-
dexter did in briefing the president even-
tually turned up in an NSC file attached
to a North memo about the diversion.
Both the date and the addressee had been
deleted from the memo-North's secre-
tary, Fawn Hall, may have doctored it at
his request-and there is no proof that it
had been shown to the president, in May
or any other time. What is known is that
on the day of his talk with Reagan, Poin-
dexter sent North an anxious message,
cited in the Tower report, suggesting
caution. North himself was uncon-
cerned: "The President obviously knows
why he has been meeting with several
select people to thank them for their sup-
port of Democracy in CentAm."
Where does this leave the investigating
panels? Far too many of their leads were
provided by the hyperbolic North, and it
is not surprising that the investigators
want to make the more credible Poin-
dexter their primary witness. The most
recent clue from North suggests why the
panels are nervous: on Oct. 12, according
to the Tower Board, he reported to McFar-
lane that he had told Reagan he was pro-
viding a lawyer for the mercenary Eu-
gene Hasenfus, who was shot down over
Nicaragua. Does this mean that Reagan
knew about North's secret network?
North's memo suggests exactly that. It
was either his most damaging revelation
or one of his most extravagant boasts.
TAMAR JACOBY with
ROBERT PARRY in Washington
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/04: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605040007-3