EXPORTING IDEALISM: THE RIGHT KIND OF INTERVENTION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00806R000201180071-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 19, 2010
Sequence Number:
71
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 1, 1985
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
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CIA-RDP90-00806R000201180071-1.pdf | 63.03 KB |
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00806R000201180071-1
A"Tlr%l [t^^~I+CD 1
WASHINGTON MONTHLY
April 1985
exporting Idetwsmi
The Right Kind
of f Intervention
By Harden Smith
"Meddling in the internal affairs of other
countries." American foreign policymakers usual-
ly take pains to deny such intentions. Yet the
economic assistance we provide, the development
projects we sponsor, and, above all, the military
aid we give to Third World countries are anything
but neutral. These programs inevitably affect the
internal dynamics of a country, propping up the
existing government or setting in motion political
changes that may eventually undermine it. The
real question is not whether we are interfering in
the political life of the Third World. Rather, it's
whether our intervention is effective.
Vietnam, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Iran, El
Salvador, Lebanon-the list of countries that
have given us grief despite American aid is a long
one' Our ostensible purpose in providing aid to
these countries has been twofold: to contain the
spread of Soviet influences and to promote
democracy by encouraging such democratic insti-
tutions as a free press, fair elections, trade unions,
and representative assemblies. We spend billions,
sacrifice both international prestige and countless
American lives-and often end up with little to
show for it.
Why do we keep failing? While second-
guessing is easy, I think a major reason is our
Harden Smith is a retired foreign service officer
failure to do enough meddling in these countries'
internal affairs. Or, more precisely, we restrict our
intervention to economic and social programs,
hoping that well-fed people will not turn to the
Soviets and that grassroots social programs will
build responsive political institutions at the na-
tional level.
Economic aid obviously can be helpful, and
not only in feeding malnourished villagers or
building a new school or hospital. The economic
and social assistance undertaken by John F. Ken-
nedy's Alliance for Progress in Latin America,
for example, helped solidify the democratic in-
stitutions of Costa Rica. But when such efforts
go unaccompanied by the right kind of political
action, they can produce results contrary to what
we seek. Ethiopia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and
Libya all have received extensive economic
assistance; but because we did not work as hard
to strengthen the political institutions in these
countries, the results have tended to be negligible
at best and sometimes even destructive.
To be sure, some of the problems come with
the territory. Economic aid can produce rising ex-
pectations among a populace that the nations in
question cannot meet. (See "Great Expectations:
The Real Cause of Revolution," October 1983.)
But we make matters worse when we neglect a
developing country's need for institutions that
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP90-00806R000201180071-1