WHY I QUIT THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000903820014-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: January 2, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Office- Of Current Production and Analytic Support
The Operations Center
ligence Officer for Latin America because of
the pressure put-on me by the Director of: Cen We need an . in ormal council a
11 f elders to sit with
f
telligence Estimate , on' Mexico that would sati- the director when ne.:is. beleaguerea. oy.
because the estimates on Southeast Asia that *-more influence than one', of the 'representatives Sometimes they don't care what intelligence says
were being written under his, direction 'were from CIA;, from State or Army or Navy or Air, as'long as it doesn't get in their way. Attempts to'
not pleasing to, the policy-makers at the time- ? Force or the Marines, or from the Defense Intel-;' squelch displeasing intelligence reports or judg- {
.the estimates didn't say that, our policy in Viet hgence Agency. It may not: But the result should ments that don't back up an administration's poll-
nam was working. In my own-case,.it was,, not `reflect the views of all the agencies and differ ties' have a, nonpartisan provenance. William(.
that the policy-makers were putting pressure;- :,ences in their views." It is not or should not be Casey,, the current director, most differs from!.
on the director, but rather . that. the pressure on blandly unanimous, and it should reflect doubts as previous directors of Central Intelligence in that
me and others working on the Mexico estimate . well as disagreements:`: he is a part :of the policy making group where;.,
came from the director himself. . . -In 1976 - a distinguished intelligence 'officer;` Central America is involved as much as he is the
Nothing will get an intelligence officer's back-, in testifying before the l Senate; spoke of. the president's chief intelligence officer:
up faster than a sniff of that kind of pressure in .. , "natural tension ! between intelligence :officers His particular case has led to talk of a'bill to
his nostrils. It is a matter of principle that he not , , and policy-makers and said, ' Policy;makers must ensure the selection of future directors from the
slant intelligence judgments to make them more'` assume the integrity of. the intelligence provided; career services to prevent politicians' being put
palatable to his superiors or to shower the glory and avoid attempts to get materials suited to , in the job. That may appeal to us intelligence offi-?
of approval on an administration's policies. A Na- their tastes:" Much has been said-and no doubt:' cers who have an unhealthy respect for our own
tional Intelligence Estimate is not simply an intel- much more will be said-about the motives of " virtue, but no legislation can ' ensure.that a direc-
ligence report or a bit of analysis, nor should it be 'policy-makers for disputing or disliking the intelli- ` tor,' no matter how experienced in our work, will
any one man's opinion. It is the product of'the , gence'they receive. The point to understand and not buckle under pressure.
:',deliberation of representatives of all the intelli- . '. to accept is that this has happened, in the past, Ambition or the desire to go along with the'
gence agencies dealing. with foreign affairs. As a and it can be expected in the future.
member of the National Intelligence Council, the Strong-minded officials-Republicans, Demo-
national intelligence officer chairs the writing of oats, career people of no partisan bias-often
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gang-to be on the team'=can lead us to ig-'
nore the warnings 'of conscience or of col-1
leagues. ' Proposals for dealing with this prob-
 Approved For Release 2011/07/29: CIA-RDP88B00443R000903820014-8
lem discussed on a moral plane usually dissolve by the president. Two 'other organizations
in empty righteousness. Legislation inoculates charged with oversight of the intelligence com
us against the disease from which we have just munity are the Senate and House intelligence
recovered without. coping with the next set of 's 'committees. The informal exchange of infor-
symptoms. We should face the expectation that mation and views among _ these groups would
even men of good will and integrity my be in- provide an immense improvement.:
tolerant of opinions they consider to be wrong
or inconvenient. A. taste of power may make us
If we accept this, as' inevitable, our aim should
be to soften the collision. I propose that we d o so
y
, g
g
g
pa
s
since intelligence. matters cannot by their nature.., that too often accompany public arguments
of the CIA in particular. area of consensus that seems .so far from our
,
performance of the intelligence community and 'chasms, define real differences and increase the
up of members of the four different organizations' plifications. A tribal council; talking over intelli-
already charged with the task of examining the: gene judgments
could build bridges over petty
not worth the candle. The council would be made grievously from partisan exaggerations and sim-
be thrown open to public scrutiny and since the The rhetorical sharpness of incoming adminis-
early discussion of policy does not benefit from . trationswould sooner. be honed by.the stark-
speech-making. The council would sit with the di , ness of the confrontation. with real 'problems
rector when he is beleaguered by the politicians, . ?: and their. obdurate nature: The 'capture of
hold his hand when temptation beckons him from policy strong points by wrongheaded little ideo-
the path of duty, and talk quietly with other par- logical factions would be less likely.: .
ties to see if the differences, be minor or major ^ Good intelligence is vital to our security. Our
and to sound warnings if the risks to be run seem discussion of foreign and defense'policy suffers
President's, Foreign Intelligence Advisory to 1975 and served on the National Intelligence
ombudsman for employee complaints. The The writer was a CIA operations officer from 1948
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What would begin as a pragmatic approach
officials-from State, from Defense. The discus-
sion of other differences in foreign affairs in
more than the nois
and
rud
e-makin
s
t