MOSCOW'S RESPONSE TO THE DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of -
Intelligence
SOV 84-10069X
May 1984
Copy 488
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in Southern Africa
Moscow's Response to
the Diplomatic Challenge
An Intelligence Assessment
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 Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Acting Chief, Policy Analysis
Division, SOYA,
Secret
SOV 84-10069X
May 1984
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Directorate of
Intelligence
in Southern Africa
Moscow's Response to
the Diplomatic Challenge
contributions from
Analysis Division, Office of Soviet Analysis, with
This paper was prepared b~ Policy
Office of African and Latin American
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Secret
Moscow's Response to
the Diplomatic Challenge
in Southern Africa
Key Judgments Moscow is clearly apprehensive that South Africa's recent agreements with
Information available Angola and Mozambique may weaken the Soviet position in these key
as of 2 May 1984 southern African states and undermine efforts to support Namibian and
was used in this report.
South African insurgents. Soviet commentary has focused on Angola
rather than on Mozambique, because the USSR has more at stake in
Luanda and a greater ability to affect developments there.
While criticizing US and South African motives for arranging it, the
Soviets have not criticized the Angolan cease-fire itself. We believe this
reflects their belief that (1) aSouth African withdrawal from southern
Angola will improve the worsening military position of the ruling Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and (2) the disengage-
ment is unlikely to lead to an overall settlement of the Namibia question.
If the Soviets believed the MPLA leaders were moving toward a Namibia
accord that included a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, they would
bring pressure to bear on them, as they have done in the past. As a last re-
sort, Moscow might try to protect its interests by promoting a coup by
MPLA hardliners. Given the risks inherent in coups, however, and given
MPLA determination to resolve the Namibia question, we believe the
Soviets would ultimately accede to Luanda's wishes. Moscow would
continue to work behind the scenes to maintain its influence within the
MPLA and to sustain Luanda's suspicions of Washington and Pretoria.
Although the Soviets have less ability to influence events in Mozambique
and are evidently dismayed by the extent of President Machel's accommo-
dation with South Africa, they have not written off Mozambique. Moscow
almost certainly will seek to exploit Machel's continued need for military
assistance in an effort to limit his turn to the West, but we do not believe it
is any more willing than in the past to subsidize Maputo's economic
development.
Elsewhere in southern Africa, the Soviets will try to foment and exploit
new tensions to undermine South African diplomacy and to sustain the
struggle against white minority rule in Pretoria. They will seek to channel
additional assistance to the Namibian and South African insurgents
wherever possible. Without the traditional conduits in Angola and Mozam-
bique, however, they are unlikely to enjoy much success.
Secret
SOV 84-10069X
May 1984
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Secret
Contents
Key Judgments
Moscow's Response to South Africa's Agreements With Angola and Mozambique
1
Angola
Mozambique
Soviet Prospects and Options
5
In Angola
5
In Mozambique
8
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Figure 1
Southern Africa
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
GABORONE
PRETORIA*
Indian
Ocean
5?0 Kilometers
500 MIIes
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Secret
Moscow's Response to
the Diplomatic Challenge
in Southern Africa FI
Moscow's position in southern Africa rests primarily
on its role as the region's leading arms supplier. In
February and March 1984, however, its key allies
there, Angola and Mozambique, concluded agree-
ments with South Africa. These are clearly designed
to reduce the military pressures that have made the
two countries so dependent upon Soviet military
assistance. This paper discusses Moscow's response to
the challenges posed by Pretoria's initiatives toward
Luanda and Maputo.
The Soviets have made a sizable commitment in arms
and money to the socialist-oriented regimes in Angola
and Mozambique: the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Mozambique
Liberation Front (FRELIMO). From the mid-.1970s
to the end of 1983, the Soviets and the East Europe-
ans provided some $2 billion in military assistance to
Luanda and some $700 million to Maputo. They have
also extended economic credits and grants totaling
some $535 million to Luanda and $355 million to
Maputo-but much of this aid has not been drawn.
Moscow's basic aims in southern Africa are to under-
mine or supplant Western and Chinese influence and
to promote leftist change. More specifically, it seeks
to consolidate the emerging leftist, pro-Soviet regimes
in Angola and Mozambique, to bring the South-West
Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) to power in
Namibia, and ultimately, to undermine the white
minority regime in South Africa. Angola is central to
these objectives because it positions the USSR to
support and influence Namibian and South African
insurgents and to exploit potential instability in neigh-
boring Zaire. Through their unqualified support of
black African self-determination, the Soviets have
also exploited-with some success-black African
antipathy toward Pretoria to promote suspicion and
distrust of the United States, which Moscow portrays
as South Africa's major "ally."
The Soviets also seek access to southern African
landing fields and ports for their air and naval forces.
Soviet long-term objectives may also include denial or
obstruction of Western access to the region's strategic
mineral resources. Even if white minority rule in
South Africa ended, however, such a "denial strate-
gy" would encounter serious obstacles, such as the
reaction of Western nations and resistance from
African leaders who dependeon the hard currency
Moscow's Response to South Africa's
Agreements With Angola and Mozambique
General Secretary Chernenko offered the most au-
thoritative Soviet comment on recent developments in
southern Africa during a dinner speech on 29 March.
He implicitly expressed grudging approval of the
accords, while criticizing Washington and Pretoria for
exploiting African desires for peace and stability to
impose their solutions on the region and indicating his
doubts as to whether Angolan security and Namibian
independence are "truly" guaranteed.
Soviet media commentaries reflect the ambivalence
with which Moscow views the Angolan and Mozambi-
can accords with South Africa. On 18 March on
Soviet television, political analyst Aleksandr Bovin
candidly cited the factors and benefits that had
induced Luanda and Maputo to reach agreements
with Pretoria. Nonetheless, he criticized the accords,
saying it was "naive" to think that Pretoria's destabi-
lization efforts could be stopped by "treaties and
agreements." He concluded by noting that the re-
gion's fundamental problems were all linked to the
existence of the white minority regime-implying a
need for continued armed struggle. A 30 April Pravda
from mineral sales.
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Figure 2
The Angolan-South African Disengagement
Poin
Nine
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Congo
BRAZZAVI
Zaire
Malanje ";`
C,
Namibe
oc2medes)
Porto Alexandre
MogAmedes Ra'Iroa
Lubango
Disengagement area
* National capital
Railroad
0 100 200 Kilometers
I i
0 100 200 Miles
Okavango
Swamps
Botswana
eoun tlaryrapresentation is
L. Ngami not necessarily authoritative.
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Secret
The 16 February 1984 agreement between Angola
and South Africa calls for the staged withdrawal of
South African forces from southern Angola in ex-
change for an Angolan commitment not to allow the
Namibian guerrillas of the South-West Africa Peo-
ple's Organization (SWAPO) to operate in the area
vacated by Pretoria. Both sides agreed to establish a
Joint Monitoring Commission to police the disen-
gagement area and prevent S WAPO infiltration of
northern Namibia
Background
In our judgment, Angola views the cease-fire as an
opportunity to improve its capability to deal with its
own insurgency problem-the increasing threat posed
by Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA). UNITA has grown
steadily stronger since the civil war began in 1975. In
recent years Savimbi'sforces have ranged far beyond
their traditional stronghold in southeastern Angola,
devastating the Angolan economy-already weak-
ened by the preindependence departure of Portuguese
managers-and now threatening politically sensitive
areas of central and northern Angola.
The MPLA regime has not been able to devote its full
military resources to combat the UNITA insurgency.
Approximately 15,000 Angolan and Cuban troops
have been tied down in the south to guard against
South African intervention. The South Africans have
occupied a large chunk of southern Angola since mid-
1981 and have staged repeated incursions deep into
Angolan territory in search of SWAPO guerrillas. F_
Pretoria agreed to the withdrawal for a variety of
reasons. US pressure for a gesture of good faith on
Pretoria's part to break the stalemate in the Namib-,
ian negotiations was important. Moreover, Pretoria
probably views the risk as acceptable-inasmuch as
the disengagement agreement requires Luanda to
keep SWAPO out of Namibia. The agreement also
benefits Pretoria domestically as it eases public
concern about South African casualties and the high
economic costs of the seemingly endless war
Prospects
The first three months of disengagement have been
successful, but we believe that building on them to
achieve a broader regional settlement will be diffi-
cult, because:
? Pretoria continues to link the implementation of the
UN plan for Namibia to the withdrawal of Cuban
combat troops from Angola.
? Luanda maintains that Cuban troops will not begin
to leave Angola until all South African troops have
left Angola, all outside aid to UNITA has stopped,
and the UN plan for Namibia has been implement-
ed.
Many South Africans believe that Luanda will not
agree to a Cuban troop withdrawal until it can deal
with the UNITA threat. Consequently, they argue
that a regional settlement is possible only if the
MPLA and UNITA reconcile, thus permitting a
Cuban troop withdrawal and Namibian independ-
ence. MPLA leaders, including moderates, still flatl
reject the idea of an accommodation with Savimbi.
report on Mozambique highlighted Maputo's contin-
ued commitment to socialism and noted somewhat
skeptically of the nonaggression pact that "time will
show how events will develop."
Soviet media have focused on the Angolan-South
African disengagement. No mention was made of
Mozambique's nonaggression pact with South Africa
until 16 March, the day it was signed
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some Soviets in the region I expressed
concern over Angola's failure to consult fully with
Moscow and Havana as the talks pro ressed. To
remedy this, Ango-
lan President dos Santos (head of the MPLA) was
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invited to Havana in mid-March to present a full
account of the negotiations. The MPLA's pro-Soviet
hardline General Secretary, Lucio Lara, went to
Moscow at the same time, ostensibly for a private
vacation but presumably to discuss the state of play in
the talks with South Africa
Despite Moscow's uneasiness, we have seen no evi-
dence of a Soviet effort to stop the Angolan-South
African dialogue since the cease-fire was signed.
While castigating Washington and Pretoria, Soviet
media have not condemned the agreement itself.F_
The Soviets may feel there currently is little reason to
sabotage Angola's talks with South Africa. The cease-
fire and the South African withdrawal from southern
Angola have diminished the security threat to the
MPLA government-a threat that had prompted the
Soviets to send record levels of arms to Luanda in
1983. Moreover, if the cease-fire holds, the Angolans
and Cubans could focus all of their energies toward
the UNITA insurgency. The Soviets may have mis-
givings about temporarily leaving the Namibian
SWAPO guerrillas in the lurch, but preserving the
regime in Luanda is a more important priority.)
Moscow has not changed its overall position on Na-
mibia. It continues to call for a unilateral withdrawal
of South African forces from Namibia and for imple-
mentation of UN Resolution 435.' It also continues to
criticize any formula that links the South African
presence in Namibia to the Cuban troop presence in
Angola, stating that the Angolans and Cubans can
consider the issue of Cuban withdrawal only after
Namibia is independent and the security threat to
Angola is eliminated. The Soviets presumably were
pleased with the Angolan-Cuban joint statement is-
sued on 21 March, which reaffirmed that the Cubans
would not withdraw until after South Africa ends its
support of UNITA, withdraws from both Angola and
Namibia, and implements the UN plan for,the inde-
pendence of Namibia.
' UN.435 calls for a cease-fire, a phased withdrawal of South
African forces from Namibia, and the establishment of a UN force
Figure 3. Angolan President dos Santos and
Cuban President Castro signing a joint communi-
Mozambique
In contrast to the publicity it has accorded the
Angolan cease-fire, Moscow only belatedly acknowl-
edged the security accord between Mozambique and
South Africa. We believe the delay reflects Soviet
displeasure with FRELIMO leader Samora Machel.
The Soviets have grounds for concern over Machel's
about-face. His rapprochement with Pretoria clearly
undercuts Soviet interests and prestige and opens up
new opportunities for Western inroads in Mozam-
bique. More importantly, from Moscow's perspective,
it diminishes the already limited capabilities of the
African National Congress (ANC)-the South Afri-
can insurgent group in exile-and thus obstructs the
USSR's long-term objective of undermining the white
minority regime in Pretoria.
The Soviets evidently tried to dissuade Machel from
his rapprochement with Pretoria, reportedly alternat-
ing the threat of oil cutbacks with offers of free oil. In
the past, however, Moscow's aid commitments have
not matched Maputo's economic needs, and we be-
lieve the Soviets are still unwilling to increase eco-
nomic assistance enough to dissuade Machel from
talking with the South Africans
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Signals From Havana?
Amidst the flurry of diplomatic activity in southern
Africa, a number of signals suggested that Havana
was reevaluating its position on the Cuban troop
presence in Angola. An article that appeared in the
Cuban daily Granma on 22 February 1984 discussed
the Angolan-South African disengagement, prompt-
ing speculation that Castro was preparing the way for
a Cuban withdrawal from Angola. Cuban officials
also began telling Western diploma
they were resigned to a withdrawal. Cuban Vice
President Rodriguez, for example, said that if an
acceptable agreement were reached on Angola's secu-
rity, Cuba would be likely to withdraw its troops.
therefore, is not linked as closely to the survival of the
Machel regime. Moreover, the Soviets have less influ-
ence in Maputo than in Luanda.
Moscow has not written off Mozambique, however.
President Machel was accorded high-level attention at
the Andropov funeral in mid-February; the Pravda
account of his meetings with Politburo member Tik-
honov and Deputy Foreign Minister Il'ichev noted
that prospects for further development of bilateral
relations were favorable. Moreover, deliveries of Sovi-
et military equipment have continued since the accord
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Although the 21 March joint communique issued
during the dos Santos visit seems uncompromising on
the preconditions for a troop withdrawal from Ango-
la, it may be designed more to protect Havana's
public image than to halt progress on the Namibia
question. The fact that Havana has risked raising
domestic expectations on the sensitive withdrawal
issue indicates that its private posture is not as rigid
as the communique suggests.
Whatever Castro's thoughts on the Angolan situa-
tion, we believe Havana would ultimately accede to
Moscow's wishes, whether they be to send additional
combat troops or to disengage from Angola entirely.
Although tensions could emerge if Castro felt the
USSR had sold out in Angola or had used the Cuban
troop issue as a pawn in the bigger game of US-Soviet
relations, the Soviet-Cuban relationship would re-
main largely unchanged, because Havana's economic
and military dependence upon the Soviet Union is so
great.
The Soviets have acquiesced in Machel's policy shift,
at least partly because they have less at stake in
Mozambique than in Angola. A Soviet and Cuban
intervention brought to power-and sustained-the
MPLA in Angola, but the Soviets did not play a
comparable role in Mozambique. Soviet prestige,
with South Africa was signed.
Soviet Prospects and Options
In both Angola and Mozambique, Moscow's immedi-
ate objective is to ensure that the accords concluded in
February and March do not lead to broader agree-
ments with South Africa.
In Angola
Moscow's major concern in Angola is that there be no
agreement on a Cuban withdrawal that would serious-
ly diminish Soviet influence. It probably feels that the
current talks are unlikely to lead to such a withdraw-
al-given the deep-seated nature of regional tensions,
the UNITA threat, and the Soviet belief that South
Africa remains unwilling to relinquish Namibia. Pub-
lic statements by Lucio Lara and his fellow MPLA
hardliner Paulo Jorge suggest that some in Luanda
see the current cease-fire and South African with-
drawal as an end in itself and that no decision has
been reached on any steps beyond a cease-fire. We
believe Moscow shares this assessment
/the
USSR does not foresee Angola caving in to South
African or US pressure. The Soviets therefore may
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Mozambique's Uneasy Detente
With South Africa
In a formal ceremony on 16 March 1984 at the
border town of Nkomati, Mozambique and South
Africa signed a nonaggression pact stating that nei-
ther government would allow its territory to be used
to prepare acts of violence against the other. In
practical terms, Pretoria agreed to stop supporting
the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO)
insurgents in return for Maputo's pledge to prevent
guerrilla attacks against South Africa by the African
National Congress (ANC).
Background
Machel's decision to sign the Nkomati Accord-the
first of its kind between South Africa and a neighbor-
ing black state-was hard to make. It stemmed
largely, in our judgment, from the economic collapse
in Mozambique. Beset by three years of drought and
the debilitating attacks of RENAMO guerrillas,
large areas of Mozambique were suffering from fam-
ine (more than 100,000 Mozambicans have died). The
Mozambican security forces-despite large infusions
of Soviet military aid proved incapable of defeating
RENAMO, which focused its attacks on key econom-
ic targets and foreign economic advisers. The insur-
gents roam freely in much of the countryside, disrupt-
ing food production and impeding the government's
provision of drought relief supplies to the peasants.
From a broader perspective, Machel's signing of the
accord represents a major departure from Mozam-
bique's heretofore rigidly pro-Soviet, anti-Western
policies. It reflects Machel's calculation that the
value of new South African investments and possible
increases in Western economic assistance would out-
weigh the risk that the Soviets would cut off their
military assistance-which in any case had not
turned the tide against the insurgents.
We expect both sides to work hard to make their
detente succeed. Mozambican security personnel have
raided ANC facilities in Maputo-showing Pretoria
that Machel is holding up his side of the bargain.
And Pretoria does not want to see its diplomatic
triumph tarnished, as South African businessmen
flock into Maputo with offers of new investment. In
the short. term, therefore, Machel's gamble-dealing
with black Africa's devil, the white minority regime
in Pretoria-appears to be paying off. In the long
term, however, political support for the gamble could
be undermined by continued RENAMO activity, al-
beit at reduced levels once the insurgents' stockpiles
are consumed, and by poor economic conditions, even
if they are better than today's.
believe that it would be premature to begin to sabo-
tage Angola's dialogue with South Africa at this time,
despite their uneasiness over the diplomatic break-
through
Nonetheless, Machel's about-face in Mozambique
probably has shown Moscow that events in Luanda
could also move in a way damaging to Soviet interests.
Should the Soviets become suspicious about dos San-
tos's ultimate aims in dealing with Pretoria, they are
likely to exert direct pressure on him. They have done
this several times in the past.
The Soviets would react more strongly if the disen-
gagement turned out to be the first step toward a
Namibia settlement that included a phased withdraw-
al of the Cubans. With the departure of the Cuban
combat troops, the Soviets would lose much of their
leverage in Luanda. If a settlement actually did cut
UNITA off from its South African supply lines, and
if the MPLA concentrated its military efforts against
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Secret
Figure 4. Prime Minister Botha and President
Machel after signing the Nkomati Accord be-
tween South Africa and Mozambique, 16 March
UNITA, dos Santos would still depend on the USSR
for military support. Moscow would hardly be san-
guine about the MPLA's success, however-given its
inability to defeat UNITA even with 30,000 Cubans
on its side.
If dos Santos assembled a coalition that was prepared
to take action on the US Namibia package and come
to a reconciliation with UNITA, the Soviets could:
? Use disinformation and other active measures to
exploit Luanda's fears that Pretoria and Washing-
ton are working together to force on Angola a
UNITA-MPLA coalition government (or, even
worse, a UNITA seizure of power).'
? Press SWAPO to step up its activities inside
Namibia in hopes of turning Pretoria against a
Namibia settlement.
? Promote a coup in Luanda in hopes that, if the pro-
Soviet hardliners came to power, Angola would take
a more confrontational approach toward South
Africa and the SWAPO issue.
' The Soviets may have already increased the use of active measures
to exacerbate existing suspicions and tensions between Luanda and
Pretoria. In March, Soviet media quoted a purported US document
that described an alleged meeting in Kinshasa of US, South
African, UNITA, and Israeli officials to map out strategy for
Angola. At this meeting, plans allegedly were made for stepped-up
arms support to UNITA, for UNITA infiltration of MPLA
military and political organs, and for destabilization in Luanda
Disinformation might succeed, given the historical
suspicion and distrust between Pretoria and its black
African neighbors. On the other hand, it probably
would be ineffective if both Luanda and Pretoria were
determined to reach a settlement. The Namibian
insurgents would welcome additional Soviet arms
support, to step up their activities, but Moscow would
have difficulty supplying SWAPO without its tradi-
tional Angolan conduit.
A coup by MPLA hardliners would bring more pro-
Soviet leaders to power and, by alienating supporters
of the ousted leadership, make the new regime more
dependent on Soviet aid to keep itself in power. Yet,
given the complex of factors that shape MPLA
politics-race, tribe, ideology, and personality-Mos-
cow could not be certain that even a successful coup
would have the desired result. Tensions between the
contesting MPLA factions could weaken the mili-
tary-thus strengthening the position of Savimbi and
his UNITA insurgents. If the coup failed, moreover,
Moscow could find itself with no influence in Angola.
A Soviet attempt to subvert a Namibia accord that
enjoyed the support of most Africans also could
jeopardize Soviet credibility and equities among other
black African states.
Disinformation, coups, and similar measures also fail
to take Angola beyond the basic dilemmas that .
prompted it to respond to South African overtures. If
the USSR succeeded in destroying the recent gains,
South Africa could resume its pressure on Luanda by
reentering southern Angola and stepping up aid to
UNITA. This would create another security crisis
much like the one that prompted Moscow to send
record levels of arms to Luanda in 1983. Moscow may
be prepared to up the military ante, as it warned the
South Africans last November, in part because the
expense would not be great. (Luanda's oil earnings
have minimized Soviet and Cuban financial costs in
Angola.) The Soviets are unlikely, however, to pick up
the economic assistance burden if the Angolan econo-
my becomes a total shambles
We believe that, if the Angolans resolve their internal
debate on the Cuban withdrawal and decide to pro-
ceed with the US package settlement-even if it leads
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to a reconciliation with UNITA-the Soviets would
try to dissuade them but would ultimately bow to
their wishes. At a minimum, the Soviets presumably
would seek strong assurances that Luanda would
retain its leftist political orientation and its close
bilateral ties to the USSR. In that case, Moscow
would continue to maintain a stake in Angola through
its military assistance.
Moscow probably would seek to put a positive face on
such a settlement, noting Luanda's continued leftist
orientation, US recognition of the MPLA (albeit in a
coalition with UNITA), and the honorable intentions
of the Cubans, claiming that they had eliminated the
South African security threat and then left when
requested to do so. Moscow might go so. far as to
claim that the Namibia settlement represented a
victory for the Cubans and the MPLA. While con-
tinuing to cultivate Luanda, the Soviets would turn
their attention to independent Namibia-presuming a
SWAPO electoral win-in pursuit of new opportuni-
ties for influence and penetration.
There is some slight evidence that the Soviets may be
preparing for such an eventuality. In December 1983,
officials from the Africa Institute and the Foreign
Ministry told a military
solution was not posse a in Angola and tat peace
could only succeed with the formation of a coalition-
though both officials had doubts about Savimbi's role
in such a scenario
Increasing candor in the Soviet press about Angola's
precarious economic condition also suggests that Mos-
cow recognizes that the MPLA may take some dra-
matic steps to get out of an increasingly untenable
position. Recent articles in New Times, Za Rubez-
hom, and Komsomolskaya Pravda have provided
alarming details about Angola's predicament: that 60
percent of the country's bridges and 90 percent of its
transport facilities have been destroyed by the aggres-
sors; that tens of thousands of teenagers were drafted
in January 1984; that Luanda is experiencing a
shortage of food and other essentials as its population
has doubled due to the influx of refugees from the
south; and that not only the territorial integrity but
the independence of the young republic has been
endangered
In Mozambique
In comparison to Angola, Moscow's options in Mo-
zambique are much more limited since Machel's
dramatic about-face in his dealings with South Afri-
ca. Still, the friendly reception accorded Machel
during his February trip to Moscow reflects the
Soviets' desire to maintain a role and presence in
Mozambique. We believe they will try to sustain the
military assistance relationship-as they have in Tan-
zania and Guinea-despite the recent setback to their
interests. Indeed, deliveries of MIG-21s have contin-
ued apace since the accords with Pretoria were signed.
As for economic assistance, however, Moscow is
unlikely to make any new commitments while Machel
continues to accommodate Pretoria. The Soviets have
shown little sympathy for Mozambique's plight dur-
ing the current drought, although they have highlight-
ed their recent food aid commitments to the Sandinis-
ta regime in Nicaragua.
In Relations With SWAPO and the ANC
The Soviets will try to channel additional assistance to
SWAPO and the ANC wherever possible. Moscow's
efforts on their behalf, however, could increasingly
strain its relations with Angola and Mozambique. The
US Embassy in Maputo, for example, reports that
local security officials were surprised and uneasy
about the amounts and quality of weapons uncovered
in recent confiscations of ANC arms caches there;
they suspect that the Soviets and East Germans had
transported this material without approval of the
Mozambican Government.
Both the Angolans and the Mozambicans may well
suspect a Soviet hand in any future actions by
SWAPO or the ANC-such as terrorist attacks or
bombings in Namibia or South Africa-that might
undermine their accords with Pretoria. Moscow's
public emphasis on the need to continue the liberation
struggle is likely to compound such suspicions. Simi-
lar problems for the Soviets could arise in the other
Frontline States, which, despite their public profes-
sions of solidarity with SWAPO and the ANC, are
reluctant to provoke South African reprisals
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SWAPO and the ANC, in turn, are likely to be
concerned that Moscow might sacrifice their interests
in order to strengthen its position in Luanda and
Maputo. Both liberation movements have been up-
grading their ties to the Chinese, but they will
ultimately be more dependent on the USSR as a
result of the Angolan and Mozambican agreements
with South Africa. Indeed, SWAPO and the ANC
probably attach greater importance to Soviet backing
than ever before, in hopes that Moscow's continued
support of the liberation struggle may force Luanda
and Maputo to help them also. Without access to
camps and transit points in Angola and Mozambique,
respectively, SWAPO and the ANC would be serious-
ly hampered in their efforts to continue the armed
struggle.
Elsewhere in Africa
The Soviets may be concerned that the recent accords
with South Africa might be perceived by other Afri-
can states as evidence of the USSR's inability or
unwillingness to protect its allies.
Most
African leaders, however, evidently view the accords
as limited tactical moves and are disinclined to attach
broader significance to them.
As part of its propaganda effort, the USSR will try to
reinforce black African antipathy toward Pretoria by
publicizing the various aspects of South African
apartheid policies. In March
the Soviets promoted a joint ANC-
SWAPO press conference in Mali to discuss the
plight of blacks in Namibia and South Africa. The
Soviets naturally have focused on those issues where
they share a common position with the black African
states. Soviet media, for example, have highlighted
the calls of all the Frontline leaders that South Africa
implement the UN plan for Namibia without linking
it to a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. Similar-
ly, Soviet commentaries have quoted the public state-
ments of Zambian President Kaunda (that South
Africa is using its peace initiative to buy time and
delay Namibian independence) to reinforce the long-
standing Soviet theme that Pretoria is acting in bad
faith.
Black African Response
to the Recent Accords
While many black African leaders have offered
cautiously favorable comments about the recent
agreements with Pretoria, they are reluctant to say
anything that might be interpreted as approving
South African behavior, lest they indirectly relieve
international pressure on Pretoria to reform its do-
mestic policies. At the same time, some Africans,
such as the Ethiopians, have refrained from publicly
criticizing the accords in order to avoid embarrassing
"brother Africans, " according to the US Embassy in
Dakar.
The negotiations with Pretoria have elicited a mixed
reaction from the Frontline States not directly in-
volved. Tanzania and Zimbabwe have only been
lukewarm in expressing support. Zambia and Bot-
swana are more supportive of the negotiations, but do
not trust South Africa and are fearful that the
settlement effort will fail. Many African leaders
outside the immediate region are less interested in
the negotiations, but have indicated their understand-
ing that severe security and economic problems led
Luanda and Maputo to deal with Pretoria. Those
countries that are privately critical of the negotia-
tions often have focused on the risk that the interests
of SWAPO and the ANC will be sacrificed. Even
Zairian President Mobutu has expressed such con-
cerns, according to the US Embassy in Kinshasa. F_
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