OIL MARKET OUTLOOK: SOFTNESS TO CONTINUE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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a' ~rF\ 1J11CL:LVIHLC ON
1.71 11 L
Oil Market Outlook:
Softness To Continue
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
GI 82-10035
January 1982
copy 4 14
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Oil Market Outlook:
Softness To Continue
Information available as of 5 January 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This assessment was reared b
f the Office of Global
the Management
and Analysis Support Staff. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
Energy Markets Branch, OGI
It was coordinated with the Office of European
Analysis and the Office of Near East-South Asia
Analysis
Secret
GI 82-10035
January 1982
25X1
25X1
2 A11
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Secret
Oil Market Outlook:
Softness To Continue) 25X1
Key Judgments Weak oil demand and surplus production capacity in OPEC countries
should cause a further erosion in real oil prices in 1982 and perhaps into
1983. The extent of market softness will depend largely on oil consumption
trends and the level of exports from Iran and Iraq.
A fairly rapid economic recovery in the OECD countries combined with
the momentum of price-induced conservation and fuel switching would
keep demand for OPEC oil at roughly 23.5 million barrels per day (b/d) in
1982-about the same as the 1981 level:
? Non-Communist oil consumption will fall slightly below 1981 levels to
about 46 million b/d.
? Although Iran and Iraq have economic incentives to increase exports
significantly, there is still no end in sight to the war there.
? An end to the current round of inventory reductions will boost demand
for OPEC oil by 1-2 million b/d above the current depressed level of
about 22 million b/d.
At this level of demand, the OPEC benchmark price probably can be
maintained. This would not preclude further minor price reductions by
some members during early 1982
The market, however, could get softer. Should e onomic growth fall below
the moderate recovery we now expect, demand for OPEC oil could be
reduced by I million b/d or more in 1982, making it much more difficult
and perhaps impossible for OPEC to prevent a sharp decline in nominal
prices.
On balance, we believe the Saudis and other OPEC members will be
successful in preventing a substantial price drop. Oil prices adjusted for
inflation will almost certainly fall sharply over the next 12 to 18 months,
however, if the benchmark price is maintained through 1983, as we believe
it will be. Given the outlook for global inflation, real oil prices may decline
20 to 25 percent through 1982-83. No significant upward price pressures
are likely in this time frame even with a fairly rapid economic expansion.
Secret
GI 82-10035
January 1982
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Despite the supply cushion and prospects for a soft oil market, several
factors could alter this outlook:
? The political conditions in the Middle East could deteriorate and supply
disruptions cannot be ruled out.
? At the current rate of destocking, surplus oil stocks will be depleted in
early 1982, leaving the market vulnerable to another supply disruption or
sudden increase in demand.
? The steady erosion in real oil prices will almost certainly slow conserva-
tion, dampen fuel-switching efforts, and perhaps delay energy-related
capital investments more than we expect. In that case, our estimates of
oil demand could prove to be too low.
Secret iv
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Oil Market Outlook:
Softness To Continue
Recent Developments
Falling oil consumption, efforts by companies to trim
excess stocks, and high Saudi output softened the oil
market in 1981 and helped produce the recent OPEC
pricing accord. Oil consumption in 1981 was 46.4
million barrels per day (b/d), about 5 percent below
the 1980 level. The rate of decline slowed to about 3
percent during the third quarter, particularly in the
United States and Japan, but accelerated again dur-
ing the fourth quarter:
? US consumption fell by 7 percent in October and
November, largely reflecting the deterioration in
US economic activity. November residual oil sales
were more than 30 percent below last year's levels.
? France and Italy registered a 12-percent and 7-
percent drop, respectively, in oil sales during Octo-
ber and November. Heavy fuel sales were down 21
percent in France and 14 percent in Italy
Oil Inventory Trends
Favorable supply prospects and high short-term
financing costs led the oil industry to pare excess oil
inventories by roughly 2 million b/d during second-
half 1981. At midyear, primary stocks stood at 4.4
billion barrels, roughly 500 million barrels above
normal historical levels. During the third quarter,
commercial stocks held steady and may have declined
slightly instead of accumulating at the normal rate of
more than 2 million b/d. By forgoing any inventory
accumulation, roughly half of the commercial inven-
tory surplus was wiped out by the end of September.
Given estimated consumption levels and preliminary
production data, the fourth-quarter stock drawdown
approximated 2-3 million b/d compared with a nor-
mal drawdown of about 1.3 million b/d. At this rate,
yearend stocks probably stood at near normal histori-
cal levels.
Production Trends
OPEC took the brunt of the production cutback. By
September, OPEC output bottomed out at 21 million
b/d, a remarkable 11 million b/d below mid-1979
levels. Preliminary data indicate fourth-quarter out-
put rebounded slightly to about 22 million b/d. This
production level should increase by at least 1 million
b/d by mid-1982 following an end to the current
round of destocking by oil companies.
By late October, these production cuts and soft spot
prices forced OPEC members to agree to Saudi
demands for price realignment around a $34 bench-
mark and a subsequent price freeze through 1982. At
the recent December meeting, members reaffirmed
this commitment and announced price adjustments
for some crudes. Agreement on the range of differen-
tials around the benchmark influences company lift-
ings and is a tacit way of apportioning production.
Although not all of the new prices are yet fully
competitive in the present market and some further
adjustments may be forthcoming, most of the mem-
bers of the organization (except Saudi Arabia) should
be able to raise exports somewhat.
Indeed, the weak market has forced several OPEC
producers to lower prices to boost sales in early 1982:
? Nigeria cut prices by as much as $1.45 per barrel on
its medium-grade crudes. Lagos apparently is mak-
ing an all-out attempt to reach its production capac-
ity of 2.2 million b/d. Production had fallen to a low
of 700,000 b/d in August before returning to the
current level of about 1.8 to 1.9 million b/d.
? Algeria also shaved $0.50 off its crude prices to at
least maintain production of about 800,000 b/d.
Condensate sales of about 200,000 b/d could fall
off, however, unless Algeria lowers prices further.
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Figure 1
Rate of Adjustment for Non-Communist Primary Oil Stocks'
Million b/d
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
-6 I II III IV 1 II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
? Tehran has retreated from its militant pricing
stance by lowering official sales prices on most of its
oil by $3.70 per barrel since 1 November in an
effort to boost crude exports by about 500,000 b/d
from current estimated levels of 800,000 b/d.
? Iraq has dropped the price of oil delivered to the
Mediterranean by $0.70 to $0.90 per barrel and
settled differences over transit fees charged for use
of the Syrian and Lebanese pipelines. Resumption
of exports through the port of Tripoli in Lebanon,
along with increased deliveries to Syria's Banias
port, could conceivably allow Iraq to boost exports
to 1.5 million b/d from the present level of I million
b/d. In order to build sales, Baghdad has also eased
stiff boycott and destination restrictions on its oil.
Kuwait, on the other hand, has refused to ease
nonprice conditions in its oil contracts. While elimi-
nating premiums and dropping oil prices by $3.20 per
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
II III IV 1 II III IV I II III IV 1 II III IV
1978 1979 1980 1981
barrel in line with recent OPEC decisions, Kuwait
continues to insist on:
? A requirement that 70 percent of the oil must be
transported on Kuwaiti ships.
? Bunker fuel must be purchased from Kuwait at
inflated prices.
? A certain amount of crude must be processed in
Kuwaiti refineries.
? Reservation of the right to substitute lower grades
of crude at any time. These stipulations add an
estimated minimum of $0.50 to the cost of each
barrel of oil and have caused Japanese customers to
prepare a tough bargaining position for 1982 con-
tract talks. Since they have no pressing need for
revenues, the Kuwaitis may be willing to wait out
the market.
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Secret
Non-Communist Oil Supply, 1981 a
Total
47.8
46.3
43.6
43.8
45.4
OPEC
25.9
24.3
21.8
21.7
23.4
Natural gas liquids
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
OPEC crude
25.0
23.5
21.0
20.8
22.6
Algeria
1.0
0.9
0.6
0.6
0.8
Ecuador
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
Gabon
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
Indonesia
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
Iran
1.6
1.6
1.2
1.0
1.4
Iraq
0.8
1.0
1.1
1.1
1.0
Kuwait
1.4
0.8
0.8
0.8
1.0
Neutral zone
0.5
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.4
Nigeria
Qatar
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
Saudi Arabia
9.9
10.0
9.8
8.8
9.6
United Arab Emirates
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.4
1.5
Venezuela
2.2
2.1
1.9
2.0
2.1
Non-OPEC
21.9
21.9
21.8
22.2
22.0
United States
10.2
10.2
10.2
10.3
10.2
Canada
1.6
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
United Kingdom
1.9
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
Other OECD
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
Non-OPEC LDCs
6.2
6.5
6.3
6.6
6.4
Egypt
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
Mexico
2.5
2.7
2.5
2.8
2.6
Net Communist exports
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
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Factors Affecting Demand
OECD Business Cycle. Near-term economic projec-
tions point to only a moderate economic recovery in
1982. Most forecasters are calling for around 1.5- to
2-percent real economic growth in the OECD this
year. Because of the traditional uncertainties sur-
rounding projections of economic activity at a turning
point in the business cycle, we have analyzed oil
demand under two scenarios. The first assumes a 2-
percent real growth in 1982. This slightly optimistic
scenario provides a likely upper bound for oil demand.
To accommodate the possibility of growing repercus-
sions from US recessionary pressures, we have also
considered a scenario in which OECD growth is only
Conservation
The large 1979-80 price increases have provided new
momentum to conservation. Following a 5-percent
drop in the energy-GNP ratio in 1980, the ratio
continued to fall, by 3 percent, in 1981. Efficiency
gains will likely slow this year, in part because of the
impact of falling real oil prices. Moreover, high
interest rates have slowed investment in energy-saving
capital and stretched out the effects of earlier price
The structural change in demand for energy is par-
ticularly evident in the US transport sector. Despite
falling real oil prices last year, the efficiency improve-
ments in the US automobile fleet led to a 4- to 5-
percent drop in US gasoline sales compared with 1980
levels. Higher prices have also held down demand in
the residential/commercial sector
Although a fall in energy demand in the industrial
sector is partly attributable to weak industrial output,
particuarly in key energy-intensive industries, im-
proved energy efficiency has also played a role.
During the first nine months of 1981, for example, US
energy consumption in the industrial sector declined
by 3 percent while industrial output rose by 1 percent.
Nonetheless, we expect a slowing in apparent efficien-
cy gains in this sector. The recession and falling real
oil prices have slowed plans for implementing new
energy-saving capital investments. Moreover, a recov-
ery in industrial output will spur utilization of older,
less efficient equipment and encourage rebuilding in
Our higher growth scenario yields a 2-percent decline
in the energy-GNP ratio in 1982, implying a few
hundred thousand b/d increase in OECD energy
consumption. In our slow economic growth case,
OECD energy demand falls by about 500,000 b/d.
Substitution
Nonoil energy supplies are expected to increase by
about 1.4-million b/d oil equivalent this year in
OECD countries. The bulk of the growth will occur as
coal and nuclear power are increasingly substituted
for residual fuel oil in electricity generation. Natural
gas usage is expected to rise by about 300,000 b/d
and an additional 100,000 b/d oil equivalent is ex-
pected from hydrothermal and geothermal projects.
Oil Demand Projections
Even with our assumptions for conservation and non-
oil supplies, we anticipate a slight decline in non-
Communist oil consumption this year to about 46.2
million b/d under our higher growth scenario. A
I-million b/d drop in OECD oil consumption in 1982
will be partially offset by an 800,000 b/d rise in LDC
consumption, mainly reflecting increased oil usage in
OPEC and other oil-producing countries like Mexico.
In our low growth case, consumption would average
about 45.5 million b/d. Should OECD countries
register zero growth, oil consumption could fall to
slightly below 45 million b/d. In all cases, we assume
that the inventory adjustment process was completed
by yearend 1981 with normal inventory patterns in
1982. It is possible, however, that inventory liquida-
tion will continue into 1982, thus further depressing
demand. The prospect of falling real prices may cause
buyers to allow stocks to fall below normal historical
levels, particularly if stockholders underestimate
near-term oil consumption.
With non-OPEC supplies expected to increase by
roughly 700,000 b/d in 1982, the demand for OPEC
oil in 1982 should total about 23.5 million b/d in our
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Non-Communist Oil Supply and Demand a
1st Qtr
2nd Qtr
3rd Qtr
4th Qtr
Year
1st Qtr
2nd Qtr
3rd Qtr
4th Qtr
Year
Consumption
46.4
- 48.7
44.0
44.0
48.0
46.2
49.0
44.3
44.3
48.6
46.6
Supply
45.4
45.2
45.6
46.7 _
47.0
46.2
45.6
46.0
47.0
47.6
46
6
Non-OPEC
22.0
22.5
22.7
22.8
22.8
22.7
22.7
22.7
22.6
22.6
.
22.6
OPEC
Lower growth case
23.4
22.7
22.9
23.9
24.2
23.5
22.9
23.3
24.4
25.0
24.0
Consumption
46.4
47.8
43.3
43.5
47.3
45.5
48.4
43.8
44.0
48.0
46.1
Inventory change d
-1.0
-3.6
1.6
2.6
-1.0
-0.1
-3.5
1.7
2.8
-1.0
NECK
Supply
45.4
44.2
44.9
46.1
46.3
45.4
44.9
45.5
-
46.8
47.0
46.1
Non-OPEC
22.0
22.5
22.7
22.8
22.8
22.7
22.7
22.7
22.6
22.6
22
6
OPEC
23.4
21.7
22.2
23.3
23.5
22.7
22.2
22.8
24.2
24.4
.
23.5
a Including natural gas liquids.
b Estimated.
Projected.
d Normal inventory pattern including 200,000 b/d increase in government-owned stocks assumed for 1982-83.
C Including net Communist exports.
higher growth case. Under our second scenario, aver-
age demand for OPEC oil in 1982 would fall below 23
million b/d. Should OECD countries as a group
register zero economic growth, demand for OPEC oil
in 1982 would average 22 million b/d.
Market Implications
Given these demand assumptions and potential OPEC
supply availability, nominal oil prices this year should
at least hold fairly steady and could even fall. A key
factor will be oil supplies from Iran and Iraq:
? If oil exports from Iran and Iraq rise moderately or
remain at current levels the oil market should
remain fairly stable with nominal oil prices holding
relatively constant throughout 1982.
would have a difficult time sorting out production 25X1
strategies and members could resort to competitive
price shaving in an effort to increase sales.
Iran-Iraq Production Potential
In early December, combined output from Iraq and
Iran was about 2.5 million b/d. Although Iraq is
currently unable to export any oil through the Persian
Gulf, it is moving about 1 million b/d through two
pipeline systems-with a combined capacity of about
1.9 million b/d-to the Mediterranean. Iranian ex-
ports could be increased significantly above the cur-
rent level of about I million b/d even while the war
continues. Indeed, Tehran was exporting more than
I million b/d during most of the war until marketing
problems forced reductions in mid-1981. Both coun-
tries combined may be able to produce 3 to 3.5 million
? An attempt to sharply increase oil exports by Iran
and Iraq and a slower-than-anticipated economic
recovery could create strong downward price pres-
sures. Under such circumstances, OPEC countries
b/d this year.
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Estimated OPEC Crude Capacity, First Quarter 1982
2.0
1.2
0.6
2.2
Saudi Arabia d 8.5
UAE d 1.4
Venezuela d 2.2
a Maximum sustainable capacity.
b Iran has announced intentions to produce about 2 million b/d in
early 1982 although some observers believe they possess the
capability to produce 2.5 million b/d with present resources and as
high as 4 million b/d with good management and skilled foreign
workers.
Capacity limited by ability to export via pipelines through Turkey
and Syria.
d Production ceiling as determined by government policy.
Once the war ends, substantial productive capacity
could be brought on line in a relatively short period of
time. Both countries will have the economic incentive
to boost exports rapidly:
? Assuming no additional critical damage to its oil
installations, Iraq could probably restore exports to
its prewar level of about 3 million b/d within
eightmonths to one year.
? Most observers believe Iran still has the physical
capacity to raise exports to 3 million b/d or more.
A significant increase in crude exports would, how-
ever, require sustained good management and the
influx of skilled foreign technicians that is not
expected under the present regime. Moreover, the
Iranians probably could meet revenue needs with
output of about 2 million b/d, at least through early
1982
Pressure on OPEC
If Iran and Iraq maintain crude production at about 2
million b/d in 1982, the oil market should remain
stable with the possibility of some upward nominal
price pressures late in the year. Nonbelligerent OPEC
members now producing at depressed levels could
approach crude capacity or announced ceiling levels
of about 13 million b/d by mid-1982 with Saudi
Arabia balancing the market at about 8 million b/d.'
Under these conditions, however, unused Saudi capac-
ity would tend to discourage price demands. Even a
moderate increase in production by the belligerents
could easily be accommodated by Saudi production
cuts. Saudi Oil Minister Yamani has recently stated a
willingness to reduce production to 7 million b/d
Price Collapse Scenario
Under a less likely but not implausible scenario, a
rapid recovery in production from Iran and Iraq
following an end to the war, combined with a sluggish
economic recovery, would force OPEC members to
sort out production strategies to prevent price dis-
counting and disarray within the organization. Such a
scenario would only leave about 16 million b/d of
crude output to be shared among the nonbelligerents.
If other producers maintain their prewar production
levels, Saudi Arabia would have to cut crude output to
about 3 million b/d to avoid a decline in nominal
prices. More likely, the Saudis would opt for a smaller
production cut, forcing other OPEC members to join
in the effort:
? Kuwait, the UAE, Venezuela, and Libya combined
probably could absorb at least 1.5 million b/d of the
cut.
? Iraq and Iran might also be forced to chip in by
phasing in production gains more slowly than capac-
ity would allow. Indeed, the present Iranian Govern-
ment probably would be satisfied with production of
only 2.0 to 2.5 million b/d, at least in the next year
or so.
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Figure 2
Saudi Arabia: Crude Production and
OPEC Price Trends
? Other OPEC members combined could afford small
cuts totaling 500,000 b/d or more.
? Non-OPEC exporters in Mexico and the North Sea
probably would also lower output to prop up nomi-
nal prices.
The size of a possible supply glut-measured as the
excess of available supply over demand for OPEC
crude-provides an indication of the potential for
downward price pressures. While unused capacity of
perhaps 2-3 million b/d is needed for market stability,
historical incidences of excessive surplus capacity
have caused downward price pressure. During the
first half of 1975, for example, the supply cushion for
OPEC crude oil rose to 7 million b/d. This surplus
capacity led to a decline in the average OPEC crude
sales price of about 40 cents per barrel before rising
demand helped reduce the surplus. An early end to
the Iran-Iraq war and slow economic growth could
produce a similar crude supply cushion by late 1982.
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I III
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981
Comparative Forecasts
Oil companies and oil market analysts generally agree
that supplies will be adequate in 1982 with market
conditions ranging from stable to soft. Most forecast-
ers expect oil consumption to remain flat or fall
slightly with non-OPEC supplies rising by roughly
500,000 b/d to I million b/d. With all forecasters
expecting inventories to hold steady or fall by a few
hundred thousand b/d, the consensus forecast is for
little change in demand for OPEC oil.
Analysts generally expect oil prices to remain weak,
particularly early in the year, and then stabilize in
late 1982. A key uncertainty in the short run is Saudi
Arabia's willingness to support the present price
Prospects for 1983
Even with a fairly rapid economic expansion in 1983,
we expect the market to remain stable. Oil consump-
tion probably will increase only moderately, perhaps
by about 500,000 b/d. Improved energy efficiency
and growing coal use will offset some of the usual
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Figure 3
OPEC: Available Crude Capacity,
Production, and Price Trends
Slow growth
20
I1~~I111I1111111111111111111111111111~~11111
15 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983
increased demand for oil resulting from strong eco-
nomic growth. With relatively stable non-OPEC sup-
plies in 1983, demand for OPEC oil would increase to
about 24 million b/d.2 Barring a major supply disrup-
tion, supplies should remain ample and prevent re-
newed upward price pressure, especially if output
from Iran and Iraq rises.
Uncertainties
While a stable oil market appears likely in the near
term, with perhaps even nominal price declines, sever-
al uncertainties remain.
? As long as the war continues, the supply outlook in
Iran and Iraq remains uncertain, and the potential
exists for spreading the supply disruption to other
regions of the Persian Gulf.
? Forecasters have had limited success predicting oil
conservation and consumption trends during the
past few years. Given the likelihood of a decline in
real oil prices, predicting future trends will be
difficult. At a minimum, weak oil prices could slow
conservation and fuel-switching efforts, leading to a
sharper upturn in oil demand during the mid-1980s.
? The pace of economic recovery and its impact on oil
consumption are unknown. Most forecasters expect
consumption to respond to economic growth as it
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983
a Based on estimates of maximum sustainable capacity or
announced production ceilings. Actual production used
as ceiling level for Arab producers during the 1973/74 Embargo.
bAverage OPEC official sales price.
s2
Secret
has in the past. Structural changes in the economy,
however, may dampen the traditional response.
2 Assumptions for 1983 include:
? GNP growth of 3.5 percent in the OECD.
? Continued slight decline in the energy-GNP ratio.
? Constant nominal oil prices.
? Increases in nonoil supplies of 2 million b/d-mainly coal and
natural gas-mostly in the United States and Europe.
? A slight decline in non-OPEC supplies reflecting a drop in
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