BLIND MEMO ON VISIT OF ROMANIAN DEFENSE MINISTER MILEA (25-31 OCTOBER 1986)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000404440001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 20, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: Blind Memo on Visit of Romanian Defense
Minister Milea (25-31 October 1986)
The attached Blind Memo was written by
20 October 1986
the Office of European Analysis at the
request of Lt. Col. Kevin Culhane of the European
Division, Policy and Plans Directorate. It is intended
for inclusion in a briefing book for the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
EURA/EE/CE/
Distribution
Original
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Eastern Europe Division
European Analysis
(20 October)
OD/EURA
PS
CPAS/IMC/CB
AC/EURA/EE
C/EURA/EE/CE
SOURCING
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Visit of Romanian Defense Minister Milea
(25-31 October 1986)
Colonel-General Vasile Milea, the first Warsaw Pact Defense
Minister to pay an official visit to the US, arrives a mere 11
months after he succeeded Constantin Olteanu in that post. He
represents the most independent-minded member of the Warsaw Pact.
Since the 1960's, the government of President Nicolae Ceausescu
has followed a foreign policy which, within the limits of Soviet
tolerance, differs at times from Moscow's. Romania has tried to
distinguish itself by pushing a number of arms control ideas
which at times are at variance with those of the USSR. Milea can
be expected to make some of these arms control proposals a
centerpiece of his Washington discussions. Ceausescu has also
tried to maintain good relations with the US and China as a way
of counterbalancing the influence of his enormous Soviet
neighbor,
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Romanian Foreign Policy
Since the early 1960's, Romania has distinguished itself by
pursuing a nationalistically-minded foreign policy that sometimes
deviates from the Soviet line while retaining an orthodox
Stalinist internal regime. Such highly visible acts of defiance
as its refusal to break relations with Israel following the 1967
War, support for Chinese and Yugoslav challenges to Soviet
supremacy in the world Communist movement, and open opposition to
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslavakia have occasionally strained
Romania's relations with its Soviet ally. Bucharest also has
advocated Third World positions in international fora even when
they opposed both both US and Soviet interests, supported the
Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, and joined the US in
opposing name-calling resolutions in the UN.
In recent years, however, Romania's severe economic
difficulties have decreased its room for maneuver in foreign
policy. Increased reliance on Soviet energy supplies and the
inability to rapidly expand its trade with the West have made
Bucharest more reluctant to antagonize Moscow, and more willing
to seek out areas of possible agreement. Additionally, harsh
economic times at home have reduced domestic enthusiasm for
Ceausescu's foreign policies. Nonetheless, Bucharest continues
to try to stake out unique positions on arms control and other
issues, and has attempted through symbolic gestures, such as its
defiance of the Soviet boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics,
to demonstrate its independence.
o Romania's policies stem from a flinty, sometimes
xenophobic nationalism which has made alliance with
traditional enemies Russia and Hungary difficult.
o These tendencies have been accentuated by the personality
of Ceausescu, Romania's leader since 1965. A strong
nationalist as well as a committed Communist, Ceausescu
desires to carve out a role for himself as a major
international statesman, especially on arms control
issues.
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o Ceausescu tries to maintain good relations with the US and
China, to counterbalance the Soviets, and with the Third
World,
He encourages
similar divergence where possible by the other Warsaw Pact
governments.
o Romania's relations with the West (especially the US), and
thus its ability to keep up this balancing act, have
suffered in recent years from Western abhorrence of its
abysmal human rights record.
Romanian Defense Policy
While a full member of the Warsaw Pact, Romania's military
policies, particularly since the 1968 Soviet invasion of
Czechoslavakia, have been essentially defensive. They are geared
towards discouraging and delaying an invasion of the
country--particulary by its ostensible ally the Soviet Union--and
towards minimizing participation in offensive Warsaw Pact
operations. In the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war, Romanian
forces would be limited to protection of internal lines of
communication. Bucharest's military doctrine, officially known
as "The Total Defense of the Homeland by the Entire People," is
based on Chinese and Yugoslav models. It is aimed at raising the
cost of an invasion for any potential aggressor by fighting a
prolonged guerrilla war in the country's partially mountainous
terrain. Romania's economic troubles, however, have limited its
forces' preparedness and potential effectiveness. Bucharest has
sold some of its best equipment abroad in order to raise hard
currency, and skimps on equipment maintenance and training. The
widespread use of troops for such economic tasks as road building
and crop harvesting has seriously weakened morale.
Romania participates minimally in Warsaw Pact activities. It
has refused for the past 20 years to allow joint Pact land
exercises on its territory and, while allowing command personnel
to participate in map exercises outside Romania, has not
contributed land forces to joint exercises beyond its borders.
It does, however, take part in joint air defense and limited
naval exercises with its allies, and allows limited and tightly
controlled transit of Soviet troops through its territory. No
large contingent of Soviet troops has been stationed in Romania
since 1958, and Bucharest rarely allows its military officers to
accept any training in the Soviet Union, as is common practice
for other Warsaw Pact states. We believe the Romanians have
resisted Soviet efforts to more efficiently centralize command
and control of Warsaw Pact troops. F_ I
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Romanian Arms Control Initiatives
Ceausecu regards his arms control agenda as bein
paramount importance,
will make these proposals a cep ra focus of his US
presentations. In general, while Romania has almost invariably
supported Soviet arms control initiatives, it has also noted that
the US has made useful suggestions and emphasized that final
agreements will come from a compromise between the US and Soviet
positions. Bucharest has also called repeatedly for the smaller
European states t~sh Washington and Moscow towards such
compromises.
During the European debate over INF emplacement, Romania
called on the US not to deploy INF and on the USSR to "freeze"
new SS-20 deployments and not to prepare "countermeasures."
Bucharest suggested that once Washington had backed down,
discussions should begin on limiting Soviet SS-20 forces. While
this position was far closer to Moscow's than Washington's,
Bucharest also sharply criticized the Soviet pullout from the
Geneva INF talks. Recently, Romania has supported Gorbachev's
nuclear testing moratorium, and called on the US to respond in
kind. It has consistently condemned SDI.
The centerpiece of Ceausescu's arms control policies in
recent years has been the call for the freezing and eventual
reduction of military budgets in both East and West, and for
conventional as well as nuclear disarmament. Romania has
officially frozen its military budget for the past two years at
1983 levels, and announced last month that it would unilaterally
cut its budget next year by five percent, while calling on all
other Warsaw Pact and NATO nations to follow suit. While we
cannot verify that a complete freeze of the budget has been
effected, the Romanian military has clearly cut corners in
training, equipment acquisition and maintenance, and supplies in
recent years. Romania has claimed that it was behind recent
Warsaw Pact proposals for a general agreement on cutting military
budgets.
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Gen. Milea almost certainly
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Romania also has unsuccessfully advocated a Balkan
Nuclear-Free Zone (opposed by Turkey) since 1958. Last year,
Romania and Bulgaria proposed the establishment of a Chemical
Weapons-Free Zone in the Balkans. This has also met Turkish
opposition
Despite its strong advocacy of arms control, Romania has
become a leading second-tier arms exporter to the Third World.
It produces its own tanks, APC's and small arms and has tried
unsuccessfully to develop a light jet fighter/trainer jointly
with Yugoslavia. The Romanians have not followed a strictly
ideological pattern in choosing their customers; they have sold
small arms to both sides in the Iran-Iraq War and have made sales
in the Near East to both moderate and radical states. As
pressures on Romania's economy continue, we expect that it will
seek to expand this activity.
In Romania's highly centralized government, Milea and other
cabinet ministers are executors of policy rather than
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policymakers. Ceausescu ma
kes virtually all important decisions
on his own,
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o Other Warsaw Pact nations noted with concern that Milea's
visit here, in response to an invitation originally issued
to his predecessor, would have been his first official
visit abroad as Defense Minister. In response, a brief
visit to Poland was hastily arranged earlier this month.
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o Besides pushing Ceausescu's arms control proposals, Milea
will want to establish a basis for continuing dialogue
between the US and Romanian defense forces. This year,
following the US air raid on Libya, Romania abruptly
cancelled the annual visit of a delegation of students and
instructors from the National Defense Univeristy; Milea
will probably be receptive to suggestions that this
program of several years standing be resumed.
o Romania's main objective, however, in sending Milea here
is to demonstrate once again its independence from the
Soviets and to strengthen its US ties.
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SUBJECT: Visit of Romanian Defense Minister Milea
(25-31 October 1986)
Distribution
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