ORR CONTRIBUTION OF PART III (A AND B) OF NIE-60

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001900060003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 10, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

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t~
10 April 1952
I?MORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director
Office of National Estimates
FROM : Chief, Strategic Division
Office of Research and Reports
SUBJECT : ORR Contribution of Part III (?a and b) of NIE-60
1. There seems to have developed a certain amount of misunder-
standing about ORR's contribution to NIE-60 and the kinds of problems
that were to be addressed in this study. Because of this, I thought
it might be helpful to you to recount the history and development,
briefly, of Part III of NIE-60. As I recall Dr. Langer's remarks at
an early ONE Board meeting where the purpose of NIE-60 was outlined,
the three parts arose as follows: Part I was considered as a result
of OSI's concern with the need-for a re-evaluation of the Soviet Air
Defense capabilities, which OSI thought had been materially improved
since the last IAC examination; Part II arose as the result of a di-
rect request from the Department of State which had been examining
various aspects of the US civil defense program; Part III was proposed
by the ONE Board partly as a logical extension of Part II and partly
as a vehicle for bringing before the IAC the official CIA view re-
garding the Soviet strategic stockpiling program.
In the latter part of November, 1951 or the early part of Decem-
ber, ORR was asked to express an opinion as to whether or not the
Office could come up with a sufficiently good paper to justify the
official assignment. ORR accepted the job, and Strategic Division
was designated the responsible coordinating and producing component
in the Office. Shortly thereafter, D/Z drafted a trial Terms of
Reference which accepted the ONE injunction to try to relate all
information on industry dispersion and strategic stockpiling to
Soviet civil defense. It became apparent, after considerable time
was spent going over the problem with the various D/Z analysts who
would be responsible for collecting and analyzing the required in-
formation, that the direct relationship desired by ONE could not
be established on the basis of the information available. In line
with this finding, D/Z forwarded the original Terms of Reference to
ONE with explanatory comments, and requested that the Board meet in
the OCI situation room to hear a presentation of what information
we did have so they could then'decide whether or not the task should
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.M'1!R!TY INFORMJAT1
still be undertaken with the proposed limitations. Dr. Langer and
members of the ONE Board came down and reviewed the Terms of Reference,
listened to the statements regarding, what information we had, and
agreed tohe principle that we should not try to do the original
job of ti.ng up causally Soviet civil defense planning with Soviet
strategic stockpiling and industrial dispersion. It was agreed that
D/Z should concentrate on the job of collecting and analyzing all
available information within the time assigned for the purpose of
establishing the extent and nature of Soviet stockpiling and indus-
trial development, without regard to connecting these activities
with civil or general defense considerations. The thought here was
that we should collect all the information available, making what
tentative judgments our analysis justified, and that we should leave
to the intelligence reader the job of merging all three parts of
NIE-60 and making whatever applications could be made to the more
general problem of estimating overall Soviet capabilities and vul-
nerabilities. There was some talk against this approach, some
rumblings of discontent because the result would give us something
short of the ultimate intelligence estimating base, but the Board
finally agreed that we should do what we could.
During this discussion, Dr. Langer took notes and made altera-
tions on his set of the original Terms of Reference. I did the
same, and checked them with him to make sure they were in agreement.
I cannot recall whether or not it was decided to send out a new Terms
of Reference to the IAC, but I thought no further about this problem
since it was really something for ONE to decide. I seem to recall
that Dr. Langer thought a new set might be a good idea, but that
is the best my memory will do. So much for this.
On the basis of this agreement by the Board to the altered Terms
of Reference, we set about in D/Z drawing up a more detailed set of
specifications for going about what was really a herculean task with-
in the short time allotted. We assigned selected analysts to the
job of pulling information together to give us a couple of examples
of what kinds and what amounts of information we could expect to
collect for our analystic base. This was started in the middle of
the Christmas vacation and required the better part of the first
week or so of January, 1952. On the basis of this preliminary exam-
ination, a new operating Terms of Reference was completed and dis-
tributed the first week of February. The D/Z analysts had already
been working on the project for several weeks, but this new Terms
of Reference officially brought into the project those people who
were needed to provide non-COMINT information which was to be joined
with the COMINT in the two Sections of Part III.
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I W SL U I L
SECURITY INFORMATION
It quickly became apparent that the scope of the project was
far too'vast to permit detailed collection and analysis within the
time allotted, so the sampling technique was applied inasmuch as we
decided to work on selected types of industry, rather than all in-
dustries. (Most of the difficulty centered in the section on in
dustry because D/Z had. just completed a study on the Soviet strategic
stockpiling program compiled over 18 months which represented the
sum total of our knowledge on this aspect of the Soviet economy)..
It became apparent to us, in the final stages of analysis, that
we were going to contribute little that was new in the way of knowl-
edge about the USSR, that about all we were going to be able to ac-
complish was a compilation under a single coverAselected samples of
our information on Soviet economic activities and tentative judgments
as to the role of industrial dispersion and strategic stockpiling in
the overall picture of Soviet capabilities and vulnerabilities.
Several senior D/Z analysts suggested during the work on NIE-60
that the Division make #60 a standing project for about 12-18 months
so that all the information available could be collected, carefully
sifted, collated, broken down and examined in the detail necessary
to support anything more than the most general kinds of judgments
regarding the Soviet economy. If ONE feels this job needs to be
done, and is willing to ask ORR to assign a high priority to doing
it, we will be glad to consider assigning such a continuing status
to the project.
1 attachment - copy of altered operating Terms of Reference
and working aids used in Part II, NIE-60.
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D/`Z Special Project Notice t
6 February 1952
Sub,jeott D/Z responsibility within ORR for coordinating and pz ing
the ORR contribution to NIE W.
and Ptuxe of protect:
NIE #60 is divided into. three parts: Io Soviet Air Defense
Capabilities, and II, Soviet Civil Defense Capabilities, for which
OSI has been assigned production responsibility; and, - III0 Soviet
Programs to Disperse Industry and Stockpile Materials, Foods, etc.,
for which ORR has been assigned production responsibility,
Part III was originally tied to civil defenseq but-ORR suggested
to the OI1E Doard that the most pertinent information dealing with Indus-
trial dispersion and Stockpiling could not necessarily be casually
connected with Soviet civil defense considerations. TheDoard then recom-
mended that the analysis of the Soviet stockpiles program and industrial
dispersion be conducted separate from civil. defense considerations, with
whatever overlap or Amer was possible to take place in the minds of
the reader,
There seems still to be some. uncertainty in the minds of various
IAC analysts regarding the nature, functions and purpose of the Soviet
strategic stockpiling program and this Z1 will provide D/Z ORR with
an opportunity to put ford its views at the highest level of
coordination in the inteUigence c tyQ This assignment will also .
provide D/Z ORR with an opportunity to pull together its accumulating
information from all sources on the current industrial trends within
the USSR.
The Problems. in two parts p
1a To exwdme in scan, detail the concept, functions, and purpose
of the Soviet strategic stockpiling program, including w} 'atever informa-
tion we have regarding the present level of stockpiles in the USSR at
the present tom; and,
20 to examine in whatever detail is possible the development of
industry in the USSR since 1900, with special e. dais an trends and
shifts in the Soviet, industrial pattern since 1.9LLOe
for the .purpose of adding to our under-
standing of Soviet defensive capabilities.
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avr &?J2OVZ a
Re~onsibilitiegt
D/Z has been assigned responsibility within ORR for ping the
pertinent information together and producing the ORR contribution to
the third section of ITIE #60. At 3 oast, the third secition of TIIE //60
will be produced and distributed at the TOP SII;RL'T del,
Within D/Ze the following aespo ibil ti a ate ass t StoekP:Tlinga
Services* Branch] Industrial trends,, Industry and ITaterials Branches;
for bringing the two separate studies together into their most mean
ingful relation,-either by summary or by interleavin, Chief, Services
Branch and Chief,, Industry Bran h0 Responsibility for providing general
project guidance is also assigned to Chiefs, Services and Industry
Dranahesn
Procedure:
Considerable amount of the information in regard to stockpiling in
col-lateral, but the most directly collateral information has recently
been included in a published study, this means that virtually no produc-
tion load should be passed to the analysts in the other Divisions of
ORR, However, the responsible D/2 analysts, Section Chief and Ranch
Chief should make sure that the proper analysts in other Divisions in
ORE are consulted and given an opportunity to contribute to the stock.
piling study In whatever way they can.. In connection with the Industry
part of the study for NIE #608 the situation is considerably different,
I?Tueh of the information, especially that dealing with the earlier
period of Industrial development in the USSR will be found in collateral
sources. Most of the recent information will be found in CO?IIIhT. In
view of the magnitude of the project and the limited time available.,
the job of pulling the collateral information together in table form
should be passed to the proper analysts in D/I and D/t1 of ORRQ
Simultaneously with this, D/Z analysts can be pulling together all
available COI EIIT so that the two can be cvnbfned without loss of time,
Tom Young is assigned yes onsibili?ty for coordinating the Industry
effort between D/I and D 8 and that in D/Z Q
ort Form:
For the stockpiling section of the paper$ attached, is . a terms of
reference as a general guides For the more complicated job of pulling
together the collateral and COIIUT Information of Industrial development,
there an a Cached atterms of reference, and a table form to facilitate
the presentation of the pertinent information on Soviet industrial plants,
factories, etc.
Pudlims:
Stockpiling, draft should be submitted to Services Branch Chief not
later than the end of the working day of 23 February 1952 o industry,
analyst or section reports should, be turned into Industry Drench Chief not
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later than end of worktng clay 21 February 1952? -Both these dead1i. s may
be altered at the discretion of the two Drench Chiefs concerned0 Dead.
line for submitting both sections of the paper to D/Z critical review
section is not later than the end of the working day of 26 February 19520
Deadline for deli- very of the final draft to CUE is not -later than the
end of the working day of 28 February 1952,
IiiTB-this assigmwnt takes p dence over all D/Z activity,, except
onrrerit intelligence and Indications support;
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A STUD' OF TIM SOVI STRATLGIC STOCKPILING PROGRAI.1
baEk
1, What are the general characteristics of the Soviet strategic
stockpiling program,
A. Its concept,
B. Its purpose.
C, Its "rational position within Soviet, econ .
(1) What is the status of the program in relation to other
economic activities in the USSR?
2, What-is the nature of the organization responsible for conduct-
ing the Soviet strategic atockniling program?
A, Its authority and jurisdiction over its operations,
B; Its authority and control over the foods and materials
which it stockpiles.
Its authority and jurisdiction over the facilities needed
for the stockpiling program,
What is the nature of the materials stockpiled under the strate=
gio stockpiling program?
Ao Foods,
B. Industrial goods in process,
C. Finished industrial goods"
D. Equipment for Industry.
E. What are the priorities assigned to the various kinds of
items stockpiled?.
4.
Where and& under what cira ssta
stored and maintained,-
A. Facilities are located wher
B. Facil.itiess. owned and contro
Co In what regions are various
D, What is the overall pattern
distributed throughout the
ncesj, are the str
e?
lled by whom?
kinds of reserve
of the stockpile
USSR?
ategic reserves
s maintainedo
storage bases
50
What is considered to be the level of aie n
piling program as of early 1552?
t of the stogy
A,, In foods.
B. In materials.
0. By areas, if there seems to be different levels in different
Soviet regions,
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A STOFS
QuestL ON, Be
ug on
1. What has been ,the origin and development of Soviet industry
f? 1900 to ' 1952?
A. 1900 throe World War 10
R0 World War I to 19.20
Co industrial dispersion patter prior to World War II,'
D. Wartime shifts s 1141?450
E. Resulting pattern after World War 1i0
F0 Post-war relocations.
G, Outstanding developnentaa 1950-51.
20 What is the general dispersion pattern of industry within
the U,S,S,Ra today?
A. Degree of centralization or decentralizatione generally'.
R, Degree of concentration in large acmplem s,
C0 s- 1~agrqe of concentration in regions.
What factors are influencing resent trends in Industrial
devl op rent?
Sources of amply for raw materialso semi--fabricated
units and comnonents,
B. Markets for goods nroduoed0
C0 Defense amaiderations,
(1) Overall economic coordination,
(2) Regional selfsufficiency0
In what # if in ag .does the present industrial pattern
affect Soviet defense capabilities?
A. Overall vulmrability.
B. Comparative vulnerability of regions0
Co Vulnerability of specific Ins trial' oonc entratione or
" . plea~0
N"Us For further details and guidance, see Ohief a e Service
- and - Industwia] he
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Subject: Adjuaot to Terms of Reference, NIJc6O8 Part III (Industry)
Ao What as the early (prior to 1919) Rcssien Industrial pattern?
BO What sienificarat trends or shifts in this patera have occurred
sine. the Gomm'ch in
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