SOVIET BLOC, NEUTRAL/NONALIGNED AND NATO COUNTRY STATEMENTS AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD) 9 JUNE - 28 AUGUST 1987 VOLUME I

Document Type:

CREST

Collection:

General CIA Records

Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):

CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0

Release Decision:

RIPPUB

Original Classification:

Document Page Count:

490

Document Creation Date:

December 22, 2016

Document Release Date:

April 25, 2012

Sequence Number:

Case Number:

Publication Date:

December 1, 1987

Content Type:

REPORT

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Attachment	Size
CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0.pdf	21.59 MB

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Directorate of Intelligence Soviet Bloc, Neutral/Nonaligned and NATO Country Statements at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) 9 June - 28 August 1987 Volume I Reference Aid Secret 022 IR 87-10031L December 1987 Copy Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Directorate of Intelligence Secret Soviet Bloc, Neutral/Nonaligned and NATO Country Statements at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) 9 June - 28 August 1987 Volume I Reference Aid Secret IR 87-10031L December 1987 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Soviet Bloc, Neutral/Nonaligned and NATO Country Statements at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) 3 February - 30 April 1987 FOREWORD This reference aid contains a chronological history and index of topics discussed during the 1987 summer session of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, which commenced in Geneva on 9 June and recessed on 28 August 1987. It is indexed according to subjects and countries. Furthermore, the forum in which the statement(s) occurred is noted. The conference record has been retained in straight chronological order. The index, located at the beginning, is designed to guide the user to pages for specific topics and countries. The index covers the cables from Geneva on both the multilateral talks (pp. 1-283) and the bilateral negotiations (pp. 284-358). By using the type of entry key located at the front of the index, users can determine whether the references are from cables reporting on the plenary, post-plenary, or Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) meetings and limit their searches by these types of references when desired. Users interested in statements by a particular country are directed to the country index where each country has its own subject index. Statements made by the following countries are indexed: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, India, Japan, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). All statements made by participating countries during plenary meetings are summarized in the "Statement Summaries" section of this reference aid The summaries are from the CD/PVs, located on pages 359-833. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Soviet Bloc, Neutral/Nonaligned and NATO Country Statements at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) 9 June - 28 August 1987 CONTENTS FOREWORD DELEGATION LISTS STATEMENT SUMMARIES SUBJECT INDEX Main Subject Index Pages 1-39 1-5 COUNTRY INDEXES Argentina 1-2 Australia 3-4 Belgium 5-6 Brazil 7 Bulgaria 8-9 Canada 10-11 China 12 Czechoslovakia 13 Federal Republic of Germany 14-15 France 16-17 German Democratic Republic 19-19 Hungary 20-21 India 22 Japan 23-24 Mexico 25-26 Mongolia 27-28 Netherlands 29-30 Pakistan 31-32 Poland 33-34 Sweden 35-36 United Kingdom 37-38 USSR 39-41 Session Cables 1-358 CD/PVs 358-818 nni-laccifiinri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT 8 July 1987 Original: ENOLIZ:-!/ FRENC'H/SPAN:SH LIST OF MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (Second Part 1987 Session) Algeria Adresse : 308 route de Lausanne, 1293 Bellevue, Geneve. Tel:74.19.85 M. Kemal Hacene Ambassadeur Representant permanent aupres de l'Office dei Nations Unies a Geneve Chef de la delegation M. Abd-El-Naceur Belaid Deuxi? Secretaire ? Mission permanente de l'Algerie aupres de l'Office des Nations Unies a Geneve M. Abdelghani Amara Troisieme Secretaire Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres M. Larbi Alioua Expert chimique Argentina Direccion:110 avenue Louis-Casai, 1215 Geneve 15. Tfno.: 98.59.59/52 *Sr. Mario Cimpora Sr. Roberto Garcia Moritan Embajador Representante Especial para Asuntos de Desarme Mision Especial pare Desarme, Ginebra Jefe de la Delegaci6n Ministro Plenipotenciario Misi6n Especial para Desarme, Ginebra Representante Alterno *Sr. Gabriel Parini Secretario de Embajada Mision Especial pare Desarme, Ginebra Sr. Raul Fernandez * Spouse present E. 87-62620 Coronel Experto armas quimicas Ministerio de Defense Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18 Page 2 Australia Address: 56-58 rue de Moillebeau, 1211 Geneva 19. Tel. No. 34.62.00. *Mr. Richard Butler Ambassador Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations for Disarmament Matters Head of Delegation *Mr. Richard A. Rowe Counsellor Deputy Head of Delegation and Alternate Representative of Australia to the Conference of Disarmament Ms. Martine Letts Second Secretary Alternate Representative of Australia to the Conference on Disarmament Dr. Shirley Freeman Mr. Robert Mathews Expert (Chemical Weapons) Materials Research Laboratories Department of Defence, Australia Expert (Chemical Weapons) Materials Research Laboratories Department of Defence, Australia BelKium Adresse: 58 rue de Moillebeau, 1211 Geneve 19. Tel.: 33.81.50 *M. C. Clerckx Ambassadeur Representant permanent de la Belgique i la Conference du desarmement *M. Ph. Nieuwenhuys Conseiller Representant permanent suppleant de la Belgique aupres de la Conference du desarmement *M. R. Gernay Deuxi? Secretaire Representation Permanante de la Belgique aupres de la Conference du desarmement i Geneve Major Dr. H. De Bisschop Expert (Chimique) Ministers de la Defense Nationale Mlle. M. De Becker Expert (Seismologie) Observatoire Royal de Bruxelles * Spouse present Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R0001001400n1_n Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18 page 3 Brazil Address: 17 rue Alfred Vincent, 1201 Geneva. Tel. No. 32.25.56/7 Mr. Fernando Moura Fagundes Minister Counsellor Charg?'affaires Bulgaria Address: 16, chemin des Crets de Pregny, 1218 Grand-Saconnex, Geneva Tel. No. 98.03.00 *Mr. Konstantin Tellalov Mr. Valentin Bojilov *Mr. Radoslav Deyanov Mr. Gueorgui Savoy Mr. Anguel Anastassov Mr. Krassimir Stankov Dr. Lyudmil Hristoskov Col. Nicolay Mihaylov * Spouse present Ambassador Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office and International Organizations at Geneva Head of Delegation Minister Plenipotentiary Deputy Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office and International Organizations at Geneva First Secretary Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office and International Organizations at Geneva Second Secretary Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office and International Organizations at Geneva Third Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs Attache Ministry of Foreign Affairs Seismology Expert Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia Chemical Weapons Expert Ministry of Defence, Sofia Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18 Page 4 Burma Address: 47 avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva. Tel. No. 31.75.40 U Tin Tun U Pe Thein Tin U Mya Than U Hla Myint U Than Tun Ambassador Permanent Representative of Burma to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation Deputy Permanent Representative of Burma to the United Nations Office at Geneva Representative and Secretary of the Delegation First Secretary Permanent Mission of Burma to the United Nations Office at Geneva Representative Third Secretary Permanent Mission of Burma to the United Nations Office at Geneva Representative Third Secretary Permanent Mission of Burma to the United Nations Office at Geneva Representative Canada Address: 10A, avenue de Bude, 1202 Geneva. Tel. No. 33.90.00 *Mr. J. Alan Beesley Ambassador Permanent Representative of Canada to the Conference on Disarmament *Mr. A. Despres Counsellor Deputy Representative *Mr. P. MacKinnon Counsellor and Consul Mr. G.K. Vachon Adviser Mr. P. Lockwood Adviser Mr. R. Sutherland Adviser Mr. P. Basham Adviser Mr. R. North Adviser Ms. Lucie Stojak Adviser * Spouse present Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-n Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18 Page 5 China Address: 11 Chemin de Surville, 1213 Petit-Lancy, Geneva. Tel. No. 92.25.48 *Mr. Fan Guoxiang Ms. Wang Zhiyun Mr. Tan Han Mr. Liu Zhongren Mr. Yu Zhongzhou Ms. Zou Yunhua Mr. Sun Xiangyin Mr. Hua Than Mr. Zhang Weidong Mr. Li Daozhong Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary for Disarmament Affairs Head of Delegation Counsellor Permanent Mission of China at Geneva Counsellor Permanent Mission of China at Geneva Counsellor Permanent Mission of China at Geneva Official Ministry of National Defence Officer Ministry of National Defence Expert Ministry of Chemical Industry Third Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs Attache Permanent Mission of China at Geneva Officer Ministry of National Defence Cuba Direcci?n: 100 Ch. de Valerie, Case Postale 59, 1292 Chambesy.Tfno.:58.23.26 *Sr. Carlos Lechuga Hevia Embajador Representante Permanente ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas en Ginebra Jefe de la delegacidn *Sr. Humberto Rivero Rosario Primer Secretario Mision Permanente ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas en Ginebra Representante Suplente Sr. Jorge Luis Garcia Experto *Spouse present nprdaccified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18 Page 6 Czechoslovakia Address: 9, chemin de l'Ancienne Route, 1218 Grand-Saconnex, Geneva. Tel. No. 98.91.82 *Mr. Milos Vejvoda *Mr. Andrej Cima Mr. Petr Kubes Mr. Bohumil Bednir Mr. Jiri Bajgar Mr. Jaroslav Fiedler Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Geneva Second Secretary Permanent Mission of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Geneva Third Secretary Permanent Mission of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Geneva Special Adviser Permanent Mission of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Geneva. Expert Expert fttat Adresse: 72, rue de Lausanne, 1202 Geneve. Tel. 31.65.30 M. Saad Alfarargi Ambassadeur Representant Permanent de la Republique Arabe d'Egypte i Geneve Dr. Sayed Anwar Abou Ali Ministre Plenipotentiaire Mission Permanente d'Egypte a Geneve *K. Marawan Badr Conseiller Mission Permanente d'Egypte i Geneve N. Fend Monib Troisieme Secretaire Mission Permanents d'Egypte I Geneve * Spouse present Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18 Page 7 Ethiopia Address: 56, rue de Moillebeau, P.O. Box 204, 1211 Geneva 19. Tel. No. 33.07.50 *Mr. Kassa Kebede *Mr. Tadesse Terrefe Miss Kongit Sinegiorgis *Mr. Fesseha Yohannes Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative of Socialist Ethiopia to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations at Geneva Head of Delegation Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Federal Republic of Germany Head of Delegation (for the month of July 1987) Counsellor Deputy Permanent Representative Permanent Mission of Socialist Ethiopia to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations at Geneva Representative First Secretary Permanent Mission of Socialist Ethiopia to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations at Geneva Alternate Representative France Adresse: 36, route de Pregny, 1292 Chambesy, Geneve. Tel. 58.21.23 *M. Pierre Morel Ambassadeur, Representant de la France i la Conference du Desarmement *M. Olivier de la Baume Conseiller Representant adjoint *M. Hubert Unlit Premier Secretaire *M. Jean d'Amecourt Sous-Directeur du Desarmement Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres *M. le Colonel Bernard Gesbert Ministers de la Defense *M. Claude Eon Minister de la Defense *M. Eric Danon Sous-Direction du Desarmement Ministers des Affaires Etrangeres * Spouse present Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 uu/Lcdr.10 Page 8 German Democratic Republic Address: 49, rue de Moillebeau, 1209 Geneva. Tel. No. 33.67.50 *Dr. Harald Rose Ambassador Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation *Dr. Walter Krutzsch Minister Plenipotentiary Permanent Mission of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva Deputy Head of Delegation Mr. Peter Bretfeld Lieutenant Colonel Ministry of National Defence *Mr. Reinhard Stollberg Dr. Dieter Felske Third Secretary Permanent Mission of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva Professor Academy of Sciences of the German Democratic Republic Dr. Manfred M. Schneider Academy of Sciences of the German Democratic Republic Dr. Wolfgang Kubiczek Institute of International Relations Dr. Thomas Stock Academy of Sciences of the German Democratic Repubic Mr. Jens-Peter Barnewitz Ministry of Foreign Affairs Germany, Federal Republic of Address: Case postale 171, 1211 Geneva 19. Tel. No. 31.97.70/79 *Dr. Paul Joachim von Stillpnagel *Mr. Radiger Ludeking Ambassador Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament Deputy Head of Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament *Dr. Wilhelm-Nikolai Germann Colonel Permanent Military Adviser to the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament *Spouse present Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18 Page 9 Germany_, Federal Republic of (continued) *Mr. Helmut Herzbruch Counsellor Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament *Dr. Heinz Peters Second Secretary Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament Prof. Dr. Johannes Pfirschke Adviser Federal Ministry of Defence Prof. Dr. Hans-Peter Harjes Expert (Seismologist) Institute of Geophysics Ruhr University Dipl. Geophys. Manfred Henger Expert (Seismologist) Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources Hungary Address: 81 avenue de Champel, 1206 Geneva. Tel. 46.03.23 *Mr. David Meiszter Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Hungarian People's Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation *Mr. Csaba Gyorffy Counsellor Permanent Mission of the Hungarian People's Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva Deputy Head of Delegation *Dr. Gy?rgy SzenAsi First Secretary Permanent Mission of the Hungarian People's Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva Dr. Laszlo Mite Colonel Expert of Ministry of Defence Mr. Tibor Toth Deputy Director Ministry of Foreign Affairs Colonel Gy?rgy Szentesi Expert Institute for Foreign Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs *Spouse present Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18 Page 10 India Address: 9, rue du Valais, 1202 Geneva. Tel. No. 32.08.59 *Mr. Jaskaran Singh Teja *Mr. Jayant Prasad *Mr. Rakesh Sood Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation First Secretary Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations Office at Geneva First Secretary Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations Office at Geneva Indonesia Address: 16, rue Saint-Jean, 1.211 Geneva 2. Tel. No. 45.33.50 *Mr. Agus Tarmidzi Ambassador Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation *Mr. Hadi Wayarabi Minister Counsellor Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations Office at Geneva *Mr. Arizal Effendi Second Secretary Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations Office at Geneva Representative Mr. Handryo Xusumo Priyo Official Directorate of International Organizations Department of Foreign Affairs Representative Mr. Sudjadnan Pharnoadiningrat Official Directorate of International Organizations Department of Foreign Affairs Representative *Mr. All Masbar Akbar *Mr. Rezlan Ishar Jenie *Spouse present Third Secretary Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations Office at Geneva Representative Third Secretary Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations Office at Geneva Representative Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Indonesia (continued) *Mr. Imron Cotan Brigadier General Haryo Mataram Colonel Fauzy Qasim Colonel Silaban Iran (Islamic Republic of) CD/INF.17 Page 11 Attach? Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations Office at Geneva Representative Department of Defence and Security Adviser Department of Defence and Security Adviser Department of Defence and Security Adviser Address: 28 chemin du Petit-Saconnex, 1209, Geneva. Tel. No. 33.30.04 Mr. Nasrollah Kazemi Kamyab Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation Mr. Ataollah Shafii Mr. Hassan G. Mashhadi Mr. Amen i Saghafi Mr. Morteza Khoramian Kermanchah *Spouse present Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Page 12 Italy Address: 10, chemin de l'Imperatrice, 1292 Pregny, Geneva. Tel. No. 33.47.50 *Mr. Aldo Pugliese Ambassador Permanent Representative of Italy to the Conference on Disarmament Head of Delegation *Mr. Fabrizio Piaggesi First Counsellor Permanent Mission of Italy to the Conference on Disarmament Deputy Head of Delegation Mr. Giovanni Adorni Braccesi First Secretary Permanent Mission of Italy to the Conference on Disarmament Mr. Basilio Cottone General Military Adviser Ministry of Defence Mr. Michele Pavese Brigadier-General Military Adviser Ministry of Defence Mr. Mario Gabriele Captain Military Adviser Ministry of Defence Mr. Roberto di Carlo Lieutenant-Colonel Chemical Weapons Expert Ministry bf Defence Mr. Rodolfo Console Seismic Expert Central Geophysical Observatory Japan. Address: 35, avenue de Bude, 1202 Geneva 19. Tel. No. 33.04.03 *Mr. Chusei Yamada Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Head of the Delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament Dr. Shigeji Suehiro Expert Special Assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs *Mr. Sadaaki Numata Counsellor Deputy Head of the Delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament *Mr. Kimiaki Kudo Counsellor Delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament *Spouse present Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Japan (continued) Mr. Yuji Miyamoto Director Disarmament Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs *Mr. Masabumi Sato Counsellor Delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament *Mr. Akira Tateyama *Mr. Tsutomu Ishiguri CD.INF.18 Page 13 First Secretary Delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament First Secretary Delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament Mr. Seiji Baba Disarmament Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kenya Address: 80, rue de Lausanne, 1202 Geneva. Tel.No. 32.70.38 - 32.72.72 *Mr. Denis Daudi Afande *Mr. Harrison Bismack Ndoria Gicheru Mr. Daniel Mepukori Koikai Ambassador Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations Office at Geneva Counsellor Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations Office at Geneva Second Secretary Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations Office at Geneva Mexico Direcci?n: 13 avenue de Buda, 1211 Geneve. Tfno. 34.57.40 *Sr. Alfonso Garcia Robles Embajador Representante Permanente de Mexico ante La Conferencia de Desarme Jefe de la Delegacion Sra. Zadalinda Gonzalez y Ministro del Servicio Exterior Reynero Representante Alterno Sra. Maria de los Angeles Segundo Secretario del Servicio Exterior Romero Asesor *Sr. Pablo Macedo Segundo Secretario del Servicio Exterior Asesor Sra. Luz Maria Chablais Garcia Secretaria de la Delegacion *Spouse present Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18 Page 14 Mongolia Address: 4 chemin Aes Mollies, 1295 Bellevue, Geneva. Tel. No. 74.19.74 Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation Mr. G. Lkhagvajav Attach? Permanent Mission of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva Representative Colonel Shijeegiin Palamdorj Expert Ministry of Defence Morocco Adresse: 18A, chemin Francois Lehmann, 1218 Grand-Saconnex, Geneve Tel. 98.15.35/36 *M. El Ghali Benhima Ambassadeur Representant Permanent A Geneve *M. Omar Hilale Conseiller M. Seddik Sbiti Premier Secretaire Netherlands Address: 56, rue de Moillebeau, 1209 Geneva. Tel. No. 33.73.50 *Mr. Robert J. van Schaik Mr. Dirk T. Schuurman Volker *Mr. Robert Milders Dr. A.J.J. Ooms *Spouse present Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation Counsellor Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Mations Office at Geneva Deputy Head of Delegation First Secretary Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Mations Office at Geneva Expert (Chemical Weapons) Director of the Prins Maurits Laboratory, TNO, Delft Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Netherlands (continued) Mr. B. ter Haar Dr. A.R. Ritsema Mr. G. Houtgast Mr. J.A. van Bodegraven CD/INF.17 Page 15 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Non-Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament Section, The Hague Expert (Seismologist) Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute, De Silt Expert (Seismologist) Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute, De Bilt Expert (Seismologist) Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute, De Bilt Nigeria Address: 1, rue Richard Wagner, 1211 Geneva 2. Tel. No. 34.21.40/49 *Hr. B. O. Tonwe Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation *Mr. B. A. Adeyemi Ambassador Deputy Permanent Representative Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva Alternate Delegate *Mr. A.A. Ella Snr. Counsellor for Disarmament Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva Alternate Delegate Mr. U. A. Baraya Second Secretary Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva Member Pakistan Address: 56, rue de Moillebeau, 1211 Geneva 19. Tel. No. 34.77.60 *Mr. Mansur Ahmad Ambassador Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva *Mr. Asif Ezdi Minister Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva Mr. Shaheen A. Gilani Counsellor Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva *Spouse present Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18 Page 16 Peru Direcci?n: 63 rue de Lausanne, 1202 Geneve. Tfno. 31.11.30 Sr. Jorge Morelli-Pando Sr. Felix Calderon Sra. Ruth Saif Embajador Delegado Titular Consejero Delegado Alterno Consejero Mision Permanente ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas en Ginebra Poland Address: 15 chemin de l'Ancienne Route, 1218 Grand-Saconnex, Geneva Tel. No. 98.11.61 *Mr. Stanislaw Turbanski Ambassador Permanent Representative of Poland to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation Mr. Andrzej Towpik Counsellor Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy Permanent Representative of Poland to the United Nations Office at Geneva *Mr. Janusz Rychlak Counsellor Permanent Representation of Poland to the United Nations Office at Geneva Deputy Head of Delegation Col. Janusz Cialowicz Ministry of Defence *Mr. Gromoslaw Czempinski First Secretary Permanent Representation of Poland to the United Nations Office at Geneva Romania Adresse: 6 chemin de la Perriere, 1223 Cologny, Geneve. Tel. 52.10.90 M. Gheorghe Dolgu M. Gheorghe Chirila M. Sandu Dan *Spouse present Ambassadeur Representant permanent de la Republique Socialiste de Roumanie A Geneve Chef de la delegation Conseiller au Ministere des Affaires Etrangires Adjoint du Chef de la delegation Premier Secretaire Mission Permanente de la Republique Socialiste de Roumania aupres de l'Office des Nations Unies a Geneve Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18 Page 17 Sri Lanka Address: 56, rue de Moillebeau, 1211 Geneva 19. Tel.No. 34.93.40/49 *Mr. C.R. Jayasinghe Miss C. Amaratunga Second Secretary Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the United Nations Office at Geneva Second Secretary Embassy of Sri Lanka Rome Sweden Address: 62, rue de Vermont, 1202 Geneva. Tel. No. 34.44.00 Mrs. Maj Britt Theorin *Mr. Rolf Ekeus *Mr. Johan Molander *Mrs. Elisabet Bonnier *Mr. Robert Rydberg *Mr. Hans Berglund *Dr. Johan Santesson Dr. Annmari Lau Dr. Jan Prawitz Dr. Ola Dahlman Mr. Stig Alemyr Mrs. Anita Brakenhielm Mr. Sture Ericson Mrs. Gunnel Joning Mr. Rune Angstram Ambassador Member of Parliament Chairman of the Swedish Disarmament Commission Head of Delegation - ex officio when in attendance Ambassador Head of Delegation Counsellor Deputy Head of Delegation First Secretary Head of Section Ministry of Foreign Affairs Colonel Military Adviser Scientific Adviser National Defence Research Institute Scientific Adviser National Defence Research Institute Scientific Adviser Ministry of Defence Director of Research Scientific Adviser National Defence Research Institute Member of Parliament Member of Parliament Member of Parliament Member of Parliament Member of Parliament * Spouse present narinccifipri in Part - Sanitized Com/ Approved for Release 2012/06/12 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18 Page 18 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Address: 4 chemin du Champ de Ble, 1292 Chambesy, Geneva. Tel. No. 58.10.12 *Mr. Youri K. Nazarkin *Mr. Sergei B. Batsanov Mr. Viatcheslav V. Jarkov Mr. Alexander A. Titarenko Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR to the Conference on Disarmament Head of Delegation Deputy Head of Delegation Head of Division of the Department on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Outer Space Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Head of Delegation Department Chief Directorate of International Organizations Ministry of Foreign Affairs Executive Secretary of Delegation Ministry of Foreign Affairs *Mr. Vitali M. Ganja Adviser Ministry of Defence *Mr. Andrei Granovsky Adviser Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. Boris I. Korneenko Adviser Ministry of Foreign Affairs *Mr. Alexander P. Koutepov Adviser Ministry of Defence Mr. Oleg Kuzmin Adviser Ministry of Chemical Industry *Mr. Igor N. Scherbak Adviser Permanent Mission of the USSR to the Office of the United Nations and other International Organizations in Geneva Mr. Nikolai S. Kriukov Press attach?f Delegation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. Oleg Kedrov Expert Academy of Sciences Mr. Arlen F. Kouznetsov Expert Ministry of Defence Mr. Vladimir K. Levkovski Expert The State Committee for Hydrometeorology and Environment Protection Mr. Vladimir I. Malinovsky Expert Ministry of Defence *Spouse present Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18 Page 19 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (continued) Mr. Youri M. Novosadov Mr. Vladimir Ovchinnikov Expert Ministry of Defence Expert Academy of Sciences Mr. Evgeni K. Potiarkin Expert Ministry of Foreign Affairs *Mr. Youri N. Schischemorov Expert Permanent Mission of the USSR to the Office of the United Nations Office at Geneva Mr. Nikita P. Smidovitch Expert Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. Oleg E. Starovoit Expert Academy of Sciences Mr. Valery A. Tsyganov Expert Permanent Mission of the USSR to the Office of the United Nations and other International Organizations at Geneva Mr. Grigori N. Vashadze Mr. Victor I. Zhoukov Mr. Evgueni V. Bykov Mr. Sergei A. Malinin Mr. Sergei V. Nemtchinov * Spouse present Expert Ministry of Foreign Affairs Expert Ministry of Defence Expert Ministry of Foreign Affairs Expert Ministry of Foreign Affairs Expert Ministry of Foreign Affairs im,,ninecifiori in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18 Page 20 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Address: 37-39 rue de Vermont, 1202 Geneva. Tel. No. 34.38.00 *Dr. R. Ian T. Cromartie CMG Ambassador Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament *Mr. Richard J.S. Edis Counsellor Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations Office at Geneva *Mr. Richard B. Dearlove First Secretary Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations Office at Geneva *Mr. Jean Francois Gordon First Secretary Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations Office at Geneva *Mr. John Ryde First Secretary Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations Office at Geneva Dr. Graham H. Cooper Ministry of Defence Dr. Peter Marshall Ministry of Defence Dr. Roy Lilwall Ministry of Defence Mr. Bernard G. Whiteside Third Secretary Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations Office at Geneva Mr. Adrian F. Bedford Third Secretary Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations Office at Geneva United States of America Address:1-3 avenue de la Paix, 1202 Geneva. Tel.No.32.09.70 *Mr. Max L. Friedersdorf Ambassador U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament *Mr. Thomas Barthelemy Permanent Mission of the United States to the United Nations Office at Geneva Deputy Representative *Dr. Pierce S. Corden Permanent Mission of the United States to the United Nations Office at Geneva Executive Secretary * Spouse present Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R00010014non1_n Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 United States of America (continued) Colonel Ray Bills Mr. Jack Blasy Ms. Carol Lee Christensen Mr. Sigmond Eckhaus Colonel Charles Gobrecht Dr. Robert Gough Col. James Granger *Mr. William W. Henoch Mr. Clarence Hudson Dr. Robert Levine Col. Guy Lovelace Mr. Robert L. Luaces Ms. Sherry Stetson Mannix CD/INF.18 Page 21 US Army, Bureau of Multilateral Affairs United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Adviser Department of Energy Bureau of Multilateral Affairs U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Bureau of Multilateral Affairs U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency U.S. Air Force Joint Chiefs of Staff Department of Defense Sandia National Laboratory Department of Energy Adviser U.S. Marine Corps, Joint Chiefs of Staff Department of Defense Adviser Department of Energy Bureau of Multilateral Affairs U4ted States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Adviser Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Department of State Adviser U.S. Army, Office of the Secretary of Defense Department of Defense Adviser Bureau of International Organization Affair Department of State Bureau of Multilateral Affairs United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Adviser Dr. Robert Mikulak Bureau of Multilateral Affairs U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency *Mr. Michael Morgan Second Secretary Permanent Mission of the United States to the United Nations Office at Geneva *Spouse present neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18 Page 22 United States of America (continued) Dr. Ronald Nelson Mr. William Parsons Mr. Michael Ra'Anan Lt. Colonel James Sullivan Office of the Secretary of Defense Department of Defense Adviser Office of the General Counsel U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Office of the Secretary of Defense Department of Defense U.S. Air Force Office of the Secretary of Defense Department of Defense Mr. Benjamin Tua Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Department of State Venezuela Direcci?n: 18A chemin Francois-Lehmann, 1218 Grand-Saconnex, Geneve. Tfno. 98.26.21 *Sr. Adolfo Raill Taylhardat Embajador Representante Permanente de Venezuela ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas y los Organismos Internacionales en Ginebra Jefe de la Delegacion *Sr. Enrique ter Horst ? *Sr. Hector Cassy Azocar Embajador Representante Alterno de Venezuela ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas y los Organismos Internacionales en Ginebra Consejero Mision Permanente ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas en Ginebra Sra. Jenny Clauwaert Gonzalez Segundo Secretario Mision Permanents ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas en Ginebra * Spouse present Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001_n Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Yugoslavia Address: 5 chemin Thury, 1206 Geneva. Tel. No. 46.44.33 *Mr. Marko Kosin Mr. Dimitrije Culafic Mr. Ivan Mrkic Mr. Vojislav Suc CD/INF.18 Page 23 Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation Minister Counsellor Permanent Mission of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations Office at Geneva Deputy Head of Delegation Adviser at the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs Member of Delegation Third Secretary Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations Office at Geneva Member of Delegation Prof. Dr. Dusan Minic Expert (Chemical Weapons) Zaire Adresse: 32 rue de l'Athenee, 1206 Geneve. Tel. 47.83.22 M. Monshamvula Omvuane Ntangu Premier Conseiller Charg?'affaires a.i. Mission permanente de la Republique du Zaire aupres de l'Office des Nations Unies i Geneve * Spouse present Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT 4/ CD/INF.18/Add.1 7 August 1987 Original: ENGLISH/ FRENCH/SPANISH LIST OF MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT Addendum Delegation of Brazil Mr. Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja Ambassador Representative to the Conference on Disarmament Head of Delegation Mr. Fernando Jose Moura Fagundes Deputy Representative Delegation of Canada Delete: Ms. Lucie Stojak Delegation d'Egypte Amend: ? M. Marawan Badr Ministre Plenipotentiaire Mission Permanente d'Egypte a Geneve Delegation of Mongolia Add after Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart: *Mr. Zagaryn Erendo Delegation of Nigeria Delete: Mr. B.O. Tonwe Mr. B.A. Adeyemi Delegation de la Roumanie Add after M. Sandu Dan: First Secretary Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations Office at Geneva M. Vasile flies Expert Militaire */ Re-issued for technical reasons. GE. 87-63082 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18/Add.1 page 2 Delegation of Sri Lanka Insert before Mr. C.R. Jayasinghe: Mr. D.E.N. Rodrigo Delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Delete: *Dr. R. Ian T. Cromartie CMG Amend: *Mr. Richard J.S. Edis Delegation of the United States of America Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Democratic Socialist Repbulic of Sri Lanka to the United Nations Office at Geneva Charge d'affaires a.i. Add after Address: Mailing address: 11 route de Pregny, 1292 Chambesy, Geneva Amend existing entries to read: Colonel Ray Bills U.S. Army, Bureau of hilltilat-enl Affairs U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Adviser Mr. Jack Blasy Department of Energy Adviser Ms. Carol Lee Christensen Mr. Sigmond ickhaus Col. Charles Gobrecht *Mr. William W. Henoch Mr. Clarence Hudson Bureau of Multilateral Affairs U.S. Aram Cat:rol and Disarmament Agency Adviser Bureau of Multilateral Affairs U.S. Arms Control and Disarm:rent Agency Adviser U.S. Ain Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff Department of Defense Adviser Department of Energy Adviser Bureau of Multilateral Affairs U.S. Arms Control and Disarmmmnt Agency Adviser Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18/Add.1 page Delegation of the United States of America (continued) Mr. Robert L. Luaces Ms. Sherry Stetson Mannix Dr. Robert Mikulak 'Mr. Michael Morgan Mr. William Parsons Mr. Michael Ra'Anan Lt. Colonel James Sullivan Mr. Benjamin Tua Etreau of Internatialal Organization Affairs Department of State Adviser Bureau of Multilateral Affairs U.S. Arms Caitrol and Disamment Any Adviser Bureau of Multilateral Affairs U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Adviser Second Secretary Permanent Mission of the United States to the United Nations Office at Geneva Adviser Office of the General Counsel U.S. Arms Caltrol and Disannacent Awry Adviser Office of the Secretary of Defense Department of Defense Adviser U.S. Air Force Office of the Secretary of Defense Department of Defense Adviser 'Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Department of State Adviser Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CD/INF.18/Add.2 24 August 1987 Original: ENGLISH/ FRENCH /SPANISH LIST OF MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT Delegation of Burma Delete: U Pe Thein Tin Replace by: U Mya Than Delegation of Japan Add after Mr. Seiji Baba: Mr. Toshihiro Kikukawa Addendum MEMBER STATES First Secretary Deputy Leader of the Delegation Permanent Mission of Burma to the United Nations Office at Geneva Representative Expert Defence Agency, Tokyo Mr. Shigeo Mori Expert Meteorological Agency, Tokyo Delegation of Poland Add after Mr. Gromoslaw Czempinski: Mr. Krzysztof Paturej GE.87-63255 Expert Ministry of Foreign Affairs Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.J_B/Add.2 Page 2 NON-MEMBER STATES (articles 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure) Austria Address: 9-11 rue de Varembe, 1211 Geneva 20 Tel: 33.77.50 Mr. Georg Reisch Mr. GUnter Birbaum Mr. Christian Clausen Mr. Josef Marolz Mr. Josef Drimmel Ambassador Permanent Representative Minister Deputy Permanent Representative Counsellor (Disarmament) Counsellor (Disarmament) Expert Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18/Add.2 Page 3 Bangladesh Address: 65 rue de Lausanne, 1202 Geneva Tel: 32.59.40 Mr. A.H.S. Ataul Karim Ambassador Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the United Nations Office at Geneva Mr. M. Motahar Hossain Counsellor Mr. Liaquat All Choudhury First Secretary Denmark Address: 58 rue de Moillebeau, 1211 Geneva 19 Tel: 33 71 50 Mr. Carsten Sode Mogensen Dr. Joergen Leerhoej Mr. Joergen Hjelme Minister Counsellor Director of Department State Seismologist Finland Address: 149a Route de Ferney, 1218 Grand Saconnex Tel: 98.03.03 Mr. 011i Mennander Ambassador, Permanent Representative Mr. Pasi Patokallio Counsellor Ms. Riitta Resch Second Secretary Ms. Pdivi Laivola Attache Greece Address: 2 rue S. Thalberg, 1201 Geneva Tel: 32.33.56 Mr. Athanasios Petropoulos Ambassador, Permanent Representative Mr. Nicolaos Couniniotis Deputy Permanent Representative Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18/Add.2 Page 4 New Zealand Address: 28A, Chemin du Petit-Saconnex, 1211 Geneva 19 Tel: 34.95.30 Mr. Graham Fortune Dr. Kennedy Graham Mr. Allan Bracegirdle Dr. Warwick Smith Ambassador Permanent Representative New Zealand Permanent Mission, Geneva Counsellor New Zealand Permanent Mission, Geneva First Secretary New Zealand Permanent Mission, Geneva Expert (Seismologist) New Zealand Seismological Observatory Wellington Norway Address: 58 rue de Moillebeau, P.O.Box 274, 1211 Geneva 19 Tel: 34.97.30 * Mr. Martin Huslid * Mr. Sten Lundbo Dr. Frode Ringdal Ambassador Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations Office at Geneva Minister Counsellor (Disarmament) Deputy Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations Office at Geneva Expert (Seismology) Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) Dr. Bjdrn Johnsen Expert (Chemical Weapons) Norwegian Defence Research Establishment Mr. Svein Mykkeltveit Expert (Seismology) Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) Portugal Adresse: 1 rue Richard Wagner, 1202 Geneve Tel: 33.32.00 M. AntOnio de Mello e Castro Conseiller Senegal Adresse: 93 rue de la Servette, 1202 Geneve Tel: 34.53.00 M. Alioune Sene Ambassadeur Representant permanent du Senegal aupres de l'Office des Nations Unies a Geneve M. Samba Mademba Sy Conseiller, Mission permanente du Senegal aupres de l'Office des Nations Unies, Geneve M. Saliou Fall Conseiller, Mission permanente du Senegal aupres de l'Office des Nations Unies, Geneve Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/INF.18/Adt.2 Page 5 Spain_ Direccidn: 72 rue de Lausanne, 1202 Geneve Tel: 31.22.30/39 Sr Don Jose Manuel Lacleta Sr. Don Manuel Perez del Arco Sr. Don Jose Maria Fuente Embajador Ministro Plenipotenciario Consejero de Defensa Switzerland Adresse: 9-11 rue de Varembe, 1211 Geneve 20 Tel: 33.52.00 M. Richard Ochsner Divisionnaire Turkey Address: 28 Chemin du Petit-Saconnex, 1211 Geneve 19 Tel: 34.39.30 Mr. Metin Ornekol Deputy Permanent Representative Mr. SUphan Erkula First Secretary Viet-Nam Adresse: 34 Chemin Francois Lehmann, 1218 Grand Saconnex, Geneve Tel: 98.24.85 M. Nguyen Thuong M. Nguyen Van Son Ambassadeur Representant permanent de la Republique Socialiste du Vietnam a Geneve Troisieme Secretaire Mission permanente de la Republique Socialiste du Vietnam a Geneve Zimbabwe Address: 250 Route de Lausanne, 1292 Chambesy, Geneve Tel: 32.04.34 Dr. A.T. Mugomba Ambassador Permanent Representative/Head of Delegation Mr. N.D. Kitikiti Counsellor (Advisor) Mr. J. Mhondiwa Counsellor (Advisor) Mr. T. Nhengu First Secretary (Advisor) Mr. S. Chisorchengwe First Secretary (Advisor) Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 PLENARY STATEMENTS 9 June 1987 USSR -recalls the meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Organization Pol- itical Consultative Committee which called for a prohibi- tion on tests of nuclear weapons, -submits, on behalf of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact member states, a document titled, "Main Provisions of a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Tests," (CD/756) -calls for the creation without delay of an ad hoc committee on a CTB, -further calls for large-scale verification measures, in- cluding an international inspectorate, for enforcement of a CTB, -declares that multilateral efforts at a test ban treaty do not conflict with US-Soviet bilateral talks but com- pliment them, -calls for a partial or complete US-USSR moratorium on nuc- lear explosions as a first step toward a CTB, -criticizes the concept of nuclear deterrence as outmoded and promoting international tension and instability. SWEDEN -welcomes progress made so far in US-Soviet INF negotiations, -calls for progress on the chemical weapons negotiations, -criticizes the Conference for lack of progress on NTB issues, -calls for a legally binding and verifiable ban on ASAT's and ASAT warfare. GDR -recalls the Warsaw Pact meeting in Berlin and the proposal for a nuclear test ban outlined there, -praises the Soviet committment not to produce any more chemical weapons and to construct a CW destruction facil- ity, -further calls for Warsaw Pact and NATO states to enter Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 into consultations regarding military doctrines. FRG -defends the doctrines of nuclear deterrence and flexible response as necessary for the maintenance of stability in Europe, -criticizes the attitude that seeks disarmament for its own sake, -further criticizes the Soviet INF proposal calling for the retention of 100 LRINF warheads in the eastern USSR and the US, -calls attention to the serious imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in conventional forces, -rejects the inclusion of West German Persing IA missiles in a double zero solution. FRANCE -refutes arguments calling for nuclear disarmament for its own sake, -argues that security, not arms limitation for its own sake, Is the real goal of states. 11 June 1987 ARGENTINA -criticizes the theory of nuclear deterrence as being in- comprehensible and dangerous, -reiterates the request of the Six-Nation Initiative for Peace and Disarmament for a moratorium on nuclear tests and non-militarization of outer space. USSR -criticizes statements made by the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Soviet position on the INF talks, -asserts that the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact is strictly defensive, -declares the existing division of Europe into opposing power blocs to be unnatural. 2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 JAPAN -denies the Soviet assertion that there are US nuclear weapons in Japan. 16 June 1987 HUNGARY -calls attention to the communique of the Political Consul- tative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization meeting held in Berlin, -recalls the Budapest Declaration of the Warsaw Pact states, -maintains that the Warsaw Pact states are prepared to dis- cuss the conventional imbalance in Europe and take steps to reduce it, -reiterates Hungary's support for a CTB as a step towards nuclear disarmament, and calls for the creation without delay of an ad hoc committee on a CTB, -calls attention to various provisions of the Warsaw Pact proposal on a CTB, -emphasizes the importance of negative security assurances for strengthening the security of non-nuclear weapons states. BULGARIA -highlights those statements made in the Berlin communique of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, circulated as CD/756, calling for practical measures in the field of nuclear dis- armament, -declares that the Warsaw Pact states reject the doctrine of of nuclear deterrence as amoral and dangerous, -stresses the importance of a comprehensive test ban as an initial step towards complete nuclear disarmament, -recalls the commitment made by the Warsaw Pact states in the recent Berlin communique calling for a ban on chemical weapons. FRANCE -emphasizes the concern for security underlying the French Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 security stockpile proposal, CD/757, -reiterates the theme that the 10 year destruction period must not become a period of diminished security, -states that equal security for all states must prevail during as well as after the 10 year period, -notes the current highly inequal distribution of CW and the tendency of linear destruction schedules to exacerbate this -proposes alternatives to security stocks, including the ap- plication to the first 5 years of the destruction period to the US and USSR only, or a delay in the entry into force of the convention until US and Soviet stocks are reduced to levels comparable to others, -proposes criteria for security stocks so that they are op- tional, limited, identical for all parties, homogeneous, verifiable, and supported by a single national production facility, -notes that the issues of locations and numbers of storage sites, and access in case of challenge inspection, will pose difficult but not unresolvable problems for the veri- fication regime, -believes that CW proliferation fears arising from the secu- rity stockpile proposal are unfounded, since nothing can compel a sovereign state to accede to a CW ban, and the security stock plan helps equalize risk and strengthen credibilty of the convention. PAKISTAN -believes that issues blocking agreement on challenge in- spection of CW facilities are difficult but not insurmount- able, -dismisses the fear that excessive frivolous challenges will be made under a convention as unfounded, -calls for early and detailed declarations of chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities, -argues that the convention must propose stern sanctions on states that violate the convention, -opposes the French security stockpile proposal, -calls for an effective mandate for the ad hoc committee on outer space, and regrets that the draft mandate of the Group of 21 was rejected, -argues that the militarization of space must be stopped before weapons are deployed there, -welcomes proposals for international satellite monitoring of arms control agreements. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 18 June 1987 INDONESIA -recalls the decisions of the first General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament, -reminds the delegates of the upcoming third Special Session, -deplores the failure of the Conference to conclude an agreement on a single agenda item, -calls for renewed efforts to conclude a chemical weapons treaty, -further calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on a comprehensive test ban treaty. 23 June 1987 MEXICO -recalls the joint statement by the leaders of the Six Nations Initiative welcoming the resumption of the Nuclear and Space Talks between the US and USSR, circulated as CD/758. 25 June 1987 MOROCCO -expresses concern at the continuation of nuclear testing by the nuclear powers, -recalls the UN General Assembly resolution 41/46 A calling for the Conference to create an ad hoc committee to nego- tiate a comprehensive test ban treaty, -expresses hope that an arms race in space may be prevented through the work of the ad hoc committee on outer space, -further hopes that a treaty banning all chemical weapons will soon be adopted. MONGOLIA -praises the document submitted by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovsky on a nuclear test ban, 5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 -notes the readiness expressed by the Soviet Union to place a moratorium on all nuclear testing, -discusses the working paper CD/CW/WP.162 which proposes an order of elimination of CW stocks, -argues that a formula for destruction based on comparative equivalents would be more complicated to apply, -welcomes the results of the Berlin meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, especially the announced willingness to redress the military imbalance in Europe, -announces the completion of the withdrawal from Mongolia of one Soviet motorized rifle division. GDR -reiterates the call made by the Warsaw Treaty Organization at its Berlin Political Consultative Committee meeting for a nuclear test ban, -draws attention to the verification procedures contained in CD/756. PRC -calls on the USSR and USA, as possessors of the largest nuclear arsenals, to take the lead in halting testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and in drastically reducing and destroying nuclear weapons they already possess, -recalls UN General Assembly resolution 41/59 F on nuclear disarmament calling for the US and USSR to take the lead on disarmament, -urges the US and USSR to agree on the global elimination of all INF missile systems, -calls on all nuclear weapons states to declare a no-first use policy regarding nuclear weapons, -further calls for an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non nuclear states. 30 June 1987 NORWAY -introduces documents CD/761 and CD/762, dealing with veri fication of alleged CW use, -highlights proposed procedures for inspectors outlined in Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CD/762 which call for on-site inspection within 48 hours after receipt of a request by the Technical Secretariat, -discusses CD/763, which examines recent seismological re search at the large-aperture Norwegian Seismic Array, NORSAR, and the small-aperture NORESS, and the implications of such efforts for verification of a comprehensive test ban. USA -defends the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, stating that it is designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear or con- ventional war, -reiterates the statement of the NATO foreign ministers made at Reykjavik reaffirming NATO's commitment to the policy of deterrence, -calls upon the Soviet Union to agree to the global elimin- ation of INF missiles, -discusses the state of US-Soviet negotiations on nuclear testing, -notes especially US-Soviet discussions of joint experiments on verification, using both direct hydrodynamic and remote seismic methods, and the inconsistency of calls for a mor- atorium with joint testing, -extends congratulations to the Spanish Parliament for its ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, -extends an invitation to the Soviet CD ambassador and to appropriate Soviet experts to the US chemical weapons fac- ility at Tooele, Utah, IRAN -notes the continued use of chemical weapons worldwide, in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, -further notes that use of CW by Iraq has been independently confirmed by specialists sent by the UN Secretary General, -accuses the government of Iraq of recently attacking civil- ian areas of the city of Sardasht with chemical weapons, -calls for an immediate strengthening of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, including a total arms embargo on any state found guilty of violating it. USSR -criticizes the doctrine of nuclear deterrence as presented 7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 by the US, -declares that there is no guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used in the future merely because they have not been used in the past, -defends Soviet deployment of 55-20 missiles in Asia by pointing out the alleged build-up of nuclear weapons in Asia by the US, -points to the document (CD/755) adopted by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact at its Berlin meeting which describes Warsaw Pact military doctrine as strictly defensive, -calls for joint NATO-Warsaw Pact consultations to analyze their military doctrines and attempt to make them strictly defensive, -recalls the proposal put forward by General Secretary Gor- bachev for a ban on nuclear explosions above one kiloton, -contrasts this with the US goal of a 150 kiloton thresh- old -questions the alleged shift in US policy of advocating a CTB as an immediate goal to advocating a CTB only as a long term goal linked to cuts in strategic weapons, -welcomes the US invitation to Tooele, Utah as a confidence- building measure, but criticizes US plans to field binary chemical weapons as undermining confidence. 2 July 1987 NETHERLANDS -asserts the need to consider arms control in the context of overall security policy, -stresses the need for continued nuclear deterrence in Europe, -discusses the role that confidence-building measures can play in reducing the level of tension and distrust, -notes the growing consensus on the legitimacy of on-site verification in arms control, -welcomes the progress in the US-USSR INF negotiations, -declares that there is an increasing need for arms control on conventional weapons in Europe, -calls for the Conference to pursue with determination nego- tiations for a complete ban on chemical weapons, -hopes that an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban will soon be established, -asserts that some military uses of outer space, such as early warning, communication, and observations, are stabi- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 lizing in nature, and calls to prohibit them are unreal- istic. CZECHOSLOVAKIA -claims that the Warsaw Pact military doctrine is defensive and calls for the prevention of an arms race in space, -claims a positive link exists between anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile technologies, -applauds the Soviet moratorium on the testing of ASAT weapons, -denounces the broad interpretation of the US-Soviet ABM Treaty of 1972, -declares that all weapons deployed in space are destabi- lizing, -emphasizes the need for appropriate verification measures to ensure that weapons are not deployed in space, -calls for discussion of a CTB in an ad hoc committee with an appropriate mandate, -draws attention to the East Bloc proposal on a CTB, CD/756, and the verification measures it calls for, including on site verification. USSR -repeats the statement of the Warsaw Pact Political Consul- tative Committee declaring the member states' preparedness to ban chemical weapons and their production, -calls for clarification of US positions on a chemical weapons ban, including issues of inspection and responsi- bilities of multinational corporations operating on terri- tories of non-Party states, -criticizes the US plan to begin production of binary chemical weapons while a ban is being negotiated, -decries the lack of progress on several key issues, includ- ing Article IV, activities not prohibited by the Conven- tion, and verification of the elimination of CW stocks, -declares that the main focus of the Conference should be resolving problems on which there is no basic agreement yet, such as on-site inspection and non-production of CW by commercial industries, -expresses alarm at the implications of the French proposal for security stockpiles introduced in CD/757, which would allow chemical weapons production to continue and non-CW states to acquire chemical weapons, -declares that security can be insured through adequate in- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 spection and monitoring provisions, which would prevent removal of CW stocks from declared sites except for de- struction. 7 July 1987 FINLAND -condemns the use of chemical weapons in war, and welcomes the efforts of the UN Security Council to bring the Iran Iraq war to an end, -supports a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons, -calls for prompt declaration of chemical weapons stocks after to conclusion of a CW ban, -calls attention to the latest Finnish Blue Book, CD/764, on chemical weapons verification, discussing techniques of air monitoring of chemical weapons agents, -discusses the report of a workshop in Helsinki on automatic monitoring systems for CW verification, presented as CD/765. NORWAY -introduces, on behalf of Norway and Canada, CD/766, on procedures of verification of chemical weapons use, -discusses the provisions of CD/766 which call for inter- national inspection teams to verify use of chemical weapons. JAPAN -recalls UN General Assembly resolution 1884 which "calls upon all states to refrain from placing in orbit...nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction," -reiterates the statement made in UNGA 41/59 B of 1986 call- ing for a better flow of objective information on military capabilities, especially as they relate to outer space, -stresses the importance of the principle of immunity for satellites used for peaceful activities, -calls attention to the complexity of defining the term "space weapon" adequately, -expresses interest in the proposal for an International Satellite Monitoring Agency. 10 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 POLAND -calls attention to CD/754, which outlines a plan for nuc- lear and conventional disengagement in Central Europe, -recalls the outline of CD/754, which calls for the with- drawal of short range nuclear weapons, the reduction of conventional forces, the redefinition of military doctrines to a strictly defensive orientation, and verification and confidence-building measures in Central Europe, -reiterates the Eastern Bloc proposal for a comprehensive test ban as outlined in CD/756, -calls for more intensive work on articles IV, V, and VI of the proposed chemical weapons convention, -calls for a reconsideration by France of CD/757 which pro- poses security stocks of CW and continued production beyond the conclusion of a CW convention. 9 July 1987 CANADA -deplores the repeated use of chemical weapons in the Iran Iraq war, -expresses alarm at the increasing number of countries seek- ing chemical weapons capabilities, -declares that Canada, in coordination with several other countries, has placed export controls on chemicals useful in CW manufacture, -announces that Canada will shortly release a paper titled, "Verification: Development of a Portable Tricothecene Sen- sor Kit for the Detection of T-2 Mycotoxin in Human Blood Samples," -joins with Norway in submitting an annex to Article IX on "General Procedures for Verification of Alleged use of Chemical Weapons." FRANCE -attempts to clarify CD/757 on security stockpiles, -declares that non-CW states would be at an immediate dis- advantage vis a vis CW possessor states at the moment the convention comes into force until the end of the 10 year destruction period, . -further declares that if a state were to withdraw from the li Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 convention and cease destroying its stocks, other states would also be forced to withdraw from the convention to protect their interests, -notes that states not possessing CW but wishing to keep open their options have no incentive to join the con- vention, -rejects the Soviet claim that CD/757 would automatically result in CW proliferation, but would in fact protect states' security interests during the 10 year destruction period. 14 July 1987 UK -calls attention to the Warsaw Pact communique issued in Berlin which calls for "openness, transparency, and trust in international relations," -calls further attention to the 5 million refugees driven from Afghanistan by the fighting there, -lists the arms control priorities set by the North Atlantic Council, which include an INF agreement, a US-Soviet agreement to reduce strategic offensive weapons by 50%, to eliminate all chemical weapons, and to establish conven- tional stability in Europe, -contrasts the security Europe has enjoyed for the last 40 years to the 150 wars fought worldwide over the same period, and maintains that nuclear weapons have played a key role in keeping the peace, -welcomes progress in the US-Soviet INF negotiations, and calls for a global ban on LRINF weapons, -declares that the UK supports US SDI research as prudent, fully consistent with the ABM Treaty, and paralleled by Soviet activities in this field, -addresses the need for further work on verification of a comprehensive test ban, -asserts the continuing need for nuclear deterrence to redress the imbalance of conventional forces in Europe, -calls on the Warsaw Pact countries to put into action their pledge to work for a redress of conventional imbalances, -expresses disappointment in the lack of progress at the MBFR talks in Vienna, -introduces the UK paper, "Making the Chemical Weapons Ban Effective." 12 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 VIETNAM -criticizes the concept of nuclear deterrence and calls for new thinking on security, -reiterates the call of Soviet leader Gorbachev for the total abolition of nuclear weapons by the end of the century, -reiterates Vietnam's wish to become a member of the Confer- ence on Disarmament. NIGERIA -calls attention to the Nigerian proposal CD/768 titled, "Proposal for the Immediate Conclusion of Effective Inter- national Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear Weapons States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons," -argues that States which have signed the NPT deserve bind- ing international guarantees from nuclear weapons states that they will not be subject to use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. MEXICO -recalls Article IX of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con- vention, which calls for negotiations to reach an agreement banning chemical weapons, -welcomes the Soviet concession to divulge locations of CW stockpiles once a convention is signed, and calls on other states to make similar concessions, -calls for efforts to shorten the proposed 10 year destruc- tion period, -holds that the composition of the proposed Executive Coun- cil of the international verification organization should be based, like other UN bodies, on the criterion of equi- table political and geographical distribution, -further holds that decision-making in this body should be on the basis of a two-thirds majority USSR -rises in rebuttal of UK criticism of Soviet and Warsaw Pact statements on Warsaw Pact defensive military doctrine, -accuses NATO states of accumulating all types of armaments and threatening stability, -highlights the Soviet withdrawal of six regiments of troops 13 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 from Afghanistan as proof of Soviet desire to settle the conflict there, -recalls the offer of the Warsaw Pact states to discuss with NATO the military doctrines of the two alliances and the lack of response from NATO to this offer. 16 July 1987 SPAIN -emphasizes the importance to Spain of disarmament by point- ing out the establishment of a new General Directorate for Disarmament Affairs in the Spanish Foreign Ministry, -asserts that a strong interrelationship exists between conventional and nuclear stability, -highlights the efforts being made through the CSCE mechan- ism to negotiate conventional stability in Europe, -declares that Spain will soon announce its formal accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, -expresses Spain's desire for a comprehensive test ban, -welcomes positive developments in the US-USSR INF and START negotiations, -favors a complete prohibition of the manufacture or posses- sion of chemical weapons, -views favorably CD/715, the UK proposal on challenge in- spection, -favors an approach to destruction which assesses "equal gradients of risk," -declares the existing legal regime for space to be inade- quate to prevent destabilizing militarization of space, -notes with interest document CD/768 submitted by Nigeria on negative security assurances, -hopes that the conference will expand its membership and that Spain will be admitted to the Conference as a full member. MEXICO -introduces a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, CD/772 21 July 1987 14 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 AUSTRALIA -welcomes the upcoming meeting of the Group of Scientific Experts in Geneva, in preparation for a second global seismic monitoring experiment, -describes the work done in Australia on seismic monitoring including cooperative work with the US and New Zealand, -introduces the Australia-New Zealand Seismic Monitoring Agreement, -calls for the Conference to adopt the proposal presented in CD/717, establishing a global seismic monitoring network, -declares that such a network would help quiet worries re- garding verification of a nuclear test ban. ARGENTINA -calls for a statement by the space Powers represented at the Conference declaring that they have not permanently deployed weapons in space, -rejects the view that the legal regime for space should mirror the legal regime for the high seas, -notes that no physical or technical barriers restrict ver- ification of a ban on weapons in space, all that is needed is the political will of the space Powers to allow on-site inspection of all space launches. INDIA -recalls that numerous international and bilateral agree- ments exist prohibiting the militarization of space, -condemns interpretations of these agreements which would permit "non-aggressive" military uses of outer space as tantamount to sanctioning the militarization of space, -calls for a strengthening of the Registration Convention of 1975. CANADA -tables a summary report of the Outer Space Workshop held in Montreal, and a Compendium of Arms Control Verification proposals, -notes the central importance of verification in assuring compliance with arms control agreements. 15 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 NEW ZEALAND -joins with Australia in submitting the Australia-New Zealand Seismic Monitoring Agreement. PRC -condemns the increased efforts of the two major space Powers to develop space weapons, -recalls UNGA resolution 41/53 which specifically enjoins the US and USSR to work towards the prevention of an arms race in space. INDIA -introduces, on behalf of the Group of 21, CD/515/Rev.3, a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on the prevention of nuclear war. 23 July 1987 USA -criticizes the pessimism displayed by some delegations re- garding a CW convention, noting that delegates should ex- pect the negotiation process to be lengthy and difficult, -responds to comments made by the Soviet representative re- garding the US position on CW, -rejects criticism of the US binary weapons program, noting that Soviet CW production continued for 19 years following the unilateral US moratorium announced in 1969, -notes that only 2 states, the US and the USSR, have stated that they possess chemical weapons, while 15 states are believed to possess or seek to possess CW, and calls for greater openness on this issue. JAPAN -calls for all delegations to maintain the momentum of the spring session's negotiations on CW, -declares indispensable for the security of non-chemical weapons states the strict international control of all existing chemical weapons and production facilities during 16 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 the 10 year destruction period, -calls for all states to declare their possession or non- possession of CW. BELGIUM -notes that progress on arms control is dependent on the International situation, and the relations between the superpowers in particular, -highlights Belgium's arms control priorities, and notes that a chemical weapons convention should be the priority goal of the Conference, -notes the dependence of the West on nuclear deterrence due to the conventional imbalance in Europe, and the impossi- bility of total denuclearization, -notes that the issue of challenge inspection remains cru- cial to the success of a CW convention, -further notes that the need for undiminished security of states requires that the marked imbalance between the chem- ical stockpiles of nations be taken into account, -favors an eventual nuclear test ban linked to significant reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles, -sees a possible ceiling on nuclear tests as a helpful measure. NEW ZEALAND -condemns strongly the continued use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iran, -calls for renewed impetus towards a chemical weapons ban, -welcomes progress made in the US-USSR INF negotiations, -highlights New Zealand's committment to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, and declares that alternatives to nuclear deterrence do exist. HUNGARY -criticizes the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, declaring that it generates mistrust and a spiralling arms race, -calls for efforts to reduce the level of arms and strength- en the confidence and security of states, -argues that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is especially important because weapons have not yet been deployed there, -highlights the consensus developing on the need for 17 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 protection of satellites. 28 July 1987 IRAN -declares that Iranian civilians in the city of Sardasht were subjected to chemical weapons attacks by Iraq, -questions if the political will exists to prohibit CW pro- duction if the use of CW against civilians cannot be pre- vented, -criticizes the UN Security Council and especially the United States for tacitly condoning Iraqi atrocities by failing to take action, -states that progress towards nuclear disarmament is essen- tial if nuclear proliferation is to be stopped. BULGARIA -calls for greater efforts in the areas of negative security assurances, -further calls for all nuclear weapons states to pledge no first use, -praises efforts to establish nuclear weapons free zones, such as the Tlateloco and Raratonga treaties, and the work being done on a Balkan nuclear-free zone, -notes the increasing tendency of nuclear weapons states to adopt a no-first-use doctrine as a positive sign, -concurs with the basic thrust of CD/768 on NSA proposed by Nigeria, -calls for intensified work on agenda item 5, prevention of an arms race in outer space, -declares that the time is ripe for an agreement on an ASAT ban, -views an agreement assuring immunity of satellites and their ground stations as an important step towards an ASAT ban, -calls for the ad hoc committee to consider seriously the Soviet proposal for an international inspectorate for the purpose of assuring the non-deployment of weapons in space. GDR 1 fl Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 -praises the most recent Soviet offer of a global double zero option in the INF talks, -notes the importance of this change to the people of Asia, -elaborates goals that a treaty banning ASAT weapons should seek to achieve, including: a) a ban on the use of force in space, b) prevention of the deliberate destruction or damaging of space objects, c) prohibition of the inter- ference with the normal functioning of any space object, d) proscription of the development, production, or deploy- ment of ASAT weapons, and e) provision for the destruction under international control of any ASAT weapons that already exist, -calls for the Conference to fully examine the Soviet proposal for an international inspectorate, the French pro- posal for an international satellite monitoring agency, and Canada's PAXSAT concept as possible elements of a full fledged system of international verification of an ASAT ban. BELGIUM -opposes, on behalf of the Western Group, the reintroduc- tion of CD/515/Rev.3, a draft mandate for an ad hoc com- mittee on the prevention of nuclear war. PRC -expresses support, on behalf of the Group of 21, for CD/515 /Rev.3. BULGARIA -supports, on behalf of the Socialist countries, the draft mandate CD/515/Rev.3 for an ad hoc committee on PNW. INDIA -expresses regret, on behalf of the Group of 21, at the failure of the Conference to set up an ad hoc committee on PNW, emphasizing the importance of the issue for non nuclear states. 30 July 1987 19 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 YUGOSLAVIA -notes the recent improvements in the international climate with respect to disarmament, -examines the role of the Conference in the field of disarm- ament, -calls for a critical evaluation of the Conference mechanism to expedite its important work. AUSTRALIA -emphasizes the high priority Australia places on the nego- tiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty, -notes the remarkable convergence of views regarding nuclear testing displayed at the General Assembly last year, -criticizes a small handful of delegations which continue to block consensus on the creation of a CTB ad hoc committee, -notes the progress made by the Group of Scientific Experts on the technical aspects of CTB verification, -criticizes Soviet statements denouncing nuclear deterrence, stating that Soviet nuclear arsenals and doctrines consti- tute de facto acceptance of the validity of deterrence, -acknowledges the significant responsibility of the two superpowers in the field of nuclear disarmament, -holds that the existing legal regime for space is not a foolproof guarantee to prevent an arms race in space, -supports the concept of an international mechanism to veri- fy the non-deployment of weapons in space, -recognizes the importance of the work on a chemical weapons ban, and the vital role of agreement on challenge inspec- ion, -calls for states to declare openly their possession or non- possession of chemical weapons, -calls for the Conference to apply the suggestions of the Group of Seven relating to the drafting of the annual report and the formation of the ad hoc committees. CZECHOSLOVAKIA -relates the progress made on CPD since the first Special Session on Disarmament, -notes the lack of agreement on priority measures such as a nuclear test ban and the prevention of nuclear war, -notes the Soviet proposal of 15 January 1986, which would 20 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 create a three stage program eliminating chemical, nuclear, and other mass destruction weapons by the end of the century, -accuses the US and other western states of backing away from previously agreed texts in the draft CPD. USA -refutes the charges made by the Iranian ambassador accusing the United States of condoning Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iran, and repeats the US condemnation of Iraq's violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, -notes the controls established by the United States on the export of chemicals that could be used for weapons, -calls upon the international community to strongly condemn the use of chemical weapons, -notes the recent activity in the UN Security Council seek- ing an end to the Gulf War. 4 August 1987 GDR -calls for the Conference to devote more attention to prac- tical measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, -introduces, on behalf of the GDR and Mongolia, a working paper, CD/777, suggesting the main provisions of a future treaty prohibiting ASAT's and on immunity of space objects. ROMANIA -notes the joint statement issued in Bucharest by the Presi- dent of Romania and the Prime Minister of Greece which urges the leaders of the USA and USSR to intensify their efforts towards an agreement eliminating intermediate range missiles, -recalls the statement issued at the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee calling for a strict- ly defensive military doctrine, which Romania co-sponsored, -favors the consideration of a nuclear test ban by the Con- ference along the lines of document CD/743 of 4 March 1987, -also favors the mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1 as presented in CD/772 of 15 July 1987. 21 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 MONGOLIA -praises the Soviet offer to eliminate INF missiles from Asia as well as Europe, -recalls the proposals made by the Socialist states on the prevention of an arms race in space, -expresses regret that Japan has decided to allow Japanese firms to participate in SDI programs, -declares Mongolia's position on the order of CW destruction as presented in CD/CW/WP.162, -opposes the creation of so-called security stocks of CW during the 10 year destruction period. USA -reminds the representative of Mongolia that the global double-zero proposal was first made by President Reagan in 1981. 6 August 1987 USSR -criticizes the doctrine of nuclear deterrence as dooming mankind to live in constant fear, -declares Soviet acceptance of the global double-zero solu- tion in the INF negotiations, -declares that the German Pershing IA missiles, with Ameri- can warheads, are an obstacle to an INF agreement, -declares invalid the argument that the Pershing IA missiles are "third country systems," since the Federal Republic of Germany is forbidden under the NPT to possess nuclear weapons, -calls upon the United States and West Germany to clarify the status of the Pershing IA missiles and to remove them as a stumbling block to arms control, -declares Soviet goals towards achieving a comprehensive system of international security, -calls for strict and wide-ranging national and internat- ional means of verification of arms control agreements, -recalls the Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and the failure of the United States to join in that mora- torium, -calls for the Conference to establish a special group of 22 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 scientific experts to determine the structure and function of a system of verification for any possible nuclear test ban, -further calls for an international system of radiation safety monitoring, -advocates an international inspectorate to verify that ob- jects launched into space are not weapons, -criticizes as immoral and contradictory the US negotiating a CW ban while simultanously building binary weapons, -calls for the completion of a CW ban as soon as possible, -declares that the Soviet Union supports the principle of mandatory challenge inspection without right of refusal, -invites the participants in the CW negotiations to the Soviet chemical weapons facility at Shikhany, -calls for an intensification of the work of the Conference, including year-long sessions with two or three recesses. ARGENTINA -calls for an intensified effort towards concluding a CW ban, -declares that any chemical weapon treaty must be non- discriminatory, unlike the NPT which creates two classes of states, - -argues that any chemical weapons treaty must not be allowed to interfere in the development of chemical industries for peaceful purposes. FRG -declares that the Pershing IA missiles are owned and con- trolled by West Germany and are therefore "third country systems, but that their nuclear warheads are under US con- trol, so that West Germany is in full compliance with the NPT. PERU -declares that the anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima should become a day for meditation and reflection on peace and disarmament throughout the world, -criticizes those delegations which have impeded progress towards establishing an NTB ad hoc committee, -further criticizes France for its continued nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific, allegeding that this 23 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 testing constitutes a danger to the environment, -states that a distinction must be made between the placing of objects in orbit with a hostile military intent and the placing of objects in orbit with a non-hostile military intent, -supports an amendment to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to extend the prohibition against nuclear or other mass des- truction weapons to all weapons, -realizes that such a proposal would not limit ASAT weapons firing from the earth or air, and recognizes that further work must be done to limit these weapons, -questions whether the Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum for a ban on attacks on nuclear facili- ties. USA -notes with satisfaction the convergence of views of Confer- ence members regarding a CW convention, -calls for study of the issue of non-compliance with the Convention of CW possessor states, -declares with regard to the Pershing IA missiles in West Germany that these truly are third country systems com- pletely outside the US-USSR bilateral talks. USSR -questions the true status of the Pershing IA missiles in the FRG by noting statements by the US and FRG delegations that the Pershing IA's are West German missiles but also that the warheads are US-controlled. 11 August 1987 USSR -recalls the initiatives put forth by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at the 6 August CD plenary, -accepts the need for legally binding mandatory challenge inspection without right of refusal, -supports the UK proposal on challenge inspection presented in CD/715, -holds that alternative measures for conducting inspections may be necessary in certain cases to minimize the danger of 24 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 disclosure of sensitive data not related to chemical weapons, -considers that some penalties for abusing challenge inspec- tions might be included in the treaty as a deterrent to such abuse, -insists that all states parties to a CW convention have equal rights to demand inspections without an intervening filter or fact-finding panel, -questions the US position on challenge inspection as con- tained in CD/500, Article XI, and CD/685, dealing with article X of CD/500, -invites all CD delegations participating in the CW ad hoc committee to the Soviet military facility at Shikhany, -accepts the US invitation to the chemical weapons destruc- tion facility at Tooele, Utah, -proposes that a CW treaty enter into force after 30-40 nations have signed and ratified it. JAPAN -holds that the draft mandate in CD/521 and draft program of work IN CD/621 provide a viable framework for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban, -praises the initiative shown by Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia during his term as President in proposing a draft mandate, -criticizes those delegations which blocked consensus on this issue, -rejects the mandate proposed in CD/772. MEXICO -advocates the draft mandate for an NTB ad hoc committee as proposed in CD/772. GDR -declares its support for an NTB ad hoc committee mandate as proposed in CD/772. AUSTRALIA -calls attention to the lack of response of certain dele- gations to the initiative on an NTB ad hoc committee pro- 25 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 posed by Czechoslovakia in April. 13 August 1987 SWEDEN -decries the lack of progress made towards a ban on attacks on nuclear facilities, -notes that a precise and satisfactory definition of "nuc- lear facility" has not been agreed upon, -proposes four categories of facilities that should be in- cluded in an agreement, -dismisses reservations held by some delegations concerning military nuclear facilities, arguing that weapons pro- duction plants are not covered, and that the necessity of preventing mass destruction should have priority over mili- tary interests, -calls for continued work at preventing an arms race in outer space, -further calls for work on preventing the deployment of ASAT weapons. USSR -criticizes the US for its alleged retreat from support for a nuclear test ban, . -proposes as a basis for discussion of a comprehensive test ban document CD/756, "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests," introduced by Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Petrovsky on July 9, 1987, -recalls the proposal made by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to the CD on 6 August for the establishment of a special group of scientific experts charged with pre- paring recommendations on the structure and functions of a verification system for any possible nuclear test ban, -notes the current work in this field being done in the US and USSR by scientific experts from both countries, -further recalls the proposal made by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze for the establishment of a global radiation safety monitoring system, which could aid in verification of an NTB or detect radiation leaks from possible nuclear power plant accidents, -declares that the Soviet Union considers the prevention of an arms race in space as one of the most urgent tasks of 26 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 our time, -supports the document CD/777 on main provisions of an anti-satellite prohibition, sponsored by Mongolia and the GDR, -states that verification for such a prohibition could be provided by an international inspectorate a proposed by the Soviets on 17 March of this year. MEXICO -recalls the statements made by Japan and Australia calling for practical work to be undertaken towards a nuclear test ban, and for the creation of an ad hoc committee for that purpose, -emphasizes the fact that the only draft mandate for an NTB ad hoc committee submitted in 1987 was CD/772, -repeats his earlier arguments in favor of CD/772, -calls upon the delegation of Australia to state its posi- tion on CD/772. AUSTRALIA -declares that the Australian delegation finds CD/772 to be acceptable to Australia, -states that the position of Australia is not the issue, that of a consensus mandate is, -expresses gratitude that Mexico is willing to consider the draft mandate proposed by Czechoslovakia in April. MEXICO -states that Mexico would consider the informal proposal by Czechoslovakia if it were made into a formal CD docu- ment, like CD/772. AUSTRALIA -questions what difference the form of the proposal makes when no response had been made to it by Mexico since April, -expresses gratitude that it may become possible to discuss the April proposal. 27 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 VENEZUELA -notes that the substance of Ambassador Butler's remarks in- dicate that consensus can only be achieved on the terms of the Western Group of States. AUSTRALIA -states that the perceptions of the Western position as stated by Mexico and Venezuela are not correct, that the Western group prefers CD/521 but is prepared to negotiate on the basis of the April President's proposal, which is far from a "take it or leave it" position. MEXICO -calls for the April proposal to be presented as a formal document. USA -responds to the Soviet question regarding the change in American position since 1980 by citing the Presidential election and the election of President Reagan on a platform which called for the strengthening of American security in the face of an increased Soviet threat. SWEDEN -introduces the results of the recent meeting of the ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts, contained in CD/778, -describes the work being done by the group and the work being done on a national level in several countries towards establishing a network of global seismic monitoring sta- tions. USSR -responds to the statement by the US ambassador by noting that nuclear, deterrence has been an explicit doctrine in US strategy since 1946, yet previous administrations have supported the conclusion of a nuclear test ban. 28 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 USA -responds to the Soviet Ambassador's remark by stating that President Reagan was elected after explicitly pledging to modernize US nuclear forces, that this requires nuclear testing, and while the US is committed to disarmament the US goverment is also committed to maintaining the security of the American people. 18 August 1987 GDR -questions whether there is a connection between the slowed pace of CW negotiations and preparations for production of binary chemical weapons, -calls for all chemical weapons stocks to be place under international control from the time the convention comes into force, -asserts that East Germany does not posses chemical weapons, -requests that work on jurisdiction and control issues be dealt with during the intersessional period, -notes the progress made toward agreement on challenge inspection, -declares the importance of defining precisely the roles of the inspectors and the Executive Council, -recommends that the organization to be created by the con- vention should have the character of an international org- anization with a seperate leagal status comparable to that of other international agencies within the UN system, -declares the doctrine of nuclear deterrence to be inimical to practical work toward global nuclear disarmament, -recognizes that bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations must interact with each other meaningfully, and that the special responsibility of the superpowers in nuclear disarmament matters cannot be used to exclude the Conference from commencing practical work, -criticizes the US for its opposition to a negotiating man- date for an ad hoc committee on an NTB. HUNGARY -presents the report of the ad hoc committee on Radiological Weapons, and the reports of the contact groups on "tradi- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 tional" RW and attacks on nuclear facilities. INDIA -expresses regret that little progress has been made on the comprehensive program of disarmament, -decries the breakdown of consensus on previously agreed texts, -criticizes the Western Group for its rejection of CD/772, a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban -laments the lack of progress made on agenda item 5, preven- tion of an arms race in outer space, and calls for a more concrete and purpose-oriented mandate, -notes the growing consensus in favor of a ban on ASAT wea- pons, and calls for such a ban as a practical step towards preventing an arms race in space, -notes that remarkable progress has been made in the area of chemical weapons, -calls for the CW convention to include provisions relating to unhindered development of chemical industry for peaceful purposes, with special emphasis placed on the needs of developing countries, -calls attention to the report of the Group of Seven, CD/WP.286, dealing with proposals to improve the effective functioning of the Conference, and regrets the lack of attention showed to the document by the Conference. AUSTRALIA -joins with the Indian Ambassador in expressing regret at the haste with which the Conference dealt with CD/WP.286, -disputes the notion held by the Indian ambassador that CD/WP/.286 does not deal with two seperate subjects, report writing and subsidiary bodies, -notes that the Group of Seven had hoped that the Conference could agree on the report writing recommendations of the Group in time for the drafting of the final report of the Conference this year. INDIA -maintains that CD/WP.286 is one document, reflecting the organic link between how the Conference conducts its busi- ness and how it then reports on that work. 36 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 PRC -expresses hope that the CD will give CD/WP.286 positive consideration in a future plenary. USA -responds to remarks made by the East German delegate on US binary CW by reminding the Conference of the 17 years of unrestricted Soviet CW production during the US unilat- eral moratorium, -further responds to remarks about the Pershing IA missiles by noting that they are third country systems, and not properly included in bilateral talks, -states that nuclear testing is necessary to maintain the credibility of nuclear deterrence, -charges the Soviet's with venting radioactive debris into the atmosphere during a recent nuclear test explosion, in violation of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty. GDR -asserts that his statement regarding the US position on a CTB is correct. USSR -declares that the amount of radiation released by the Soviet nuclear test at Novaya Zemlya, which was conducted under appropriate safeguards, was insignificant and poses no health risk. 20 August 1987 SWEDEN -praises the efforts of the superpowers to eliminate one class of nuclear weapons, -warns that arms limitation in one area should not lead to an arms race in other areas, -notes with alarm the growing naval arms race, particularly 31 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 in northern Europe, -calls for renewed efforts towards achieving a nuclear test ban -welcomes recent proposals at the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna for European disarmament negotiations between the two military alliances within the CSCE framework, -welcomes confidence-building proposals in the region, such as a nuclear weapons free corridor between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and a Nordic area Nuclear Free Zone. USA -reviews the progress made at the Conference in 1987, -notes the substantial progress made in the field of arms control verification, in particular seismic monitoring, -further notes the progress made on a comprehensive program of disarmament, and acknowledges that disagreement still exists regarding certain items of the draft program, -assesses the progress made toward a CW treaty, -points out those areas where work remains to be done on a CW agreement. BRAZIL -declares that a convention on chemical weapons should necessarily include provisions related to the unfettered development of chemical industry for peaceful purposes. POLAND -introduces document CD/780, "Memorandum of the Government of the Polish People's Republic on Arms Reduction and Confidence-building in Central Europe," -declares unsatisfactory the progress achieved at the Conference in 1987, noting the lack of practical results on the nuclear items on the agenda and recent developments threatening to militarize space and undermine the ABM Treaty, -calls for the US and USSR to reaffirm and strengthen the ABM Treaty by committing not to withdraw from it within a certain period of time, -declares the existing legal regime for space to be inad- equate to prevent an arms race in space from occuring, -welcomes the Soviet proposal for an international inspec- torate to verify that no weapons are deployed in space, 32 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 -expresses appreciation for Canada's contributions, especially the Outer Space Workshop and the Paxsat research program -declares that the draft report of the chemical weapons ad hoc committee does not adequately reflect the advanced state of the CW negotiations, -welcomes the statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevard- nadze in support of mandatory challenge inspection, -calls for maximum use of the intersessional period for re- solving problems relating to a CW agreement. EGYPT -laments the lack of progress made by the Conference, -criticizes those states which have blocked the creation of an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban, -claims that reliance on nuclear deterrence by the major powers encourages horizontal nuclear proliferation, -notes that many of the questions holding up the conclusion of a CW ban are political rather than technical, and that a special or extended session on CW would be worthless if the political will needed to reach an agreement were absent, -insists that mandatory challenge inspection not be abusive, -notes that the problem of non-adherence to a CW ban has not been adequately addressed, -calls for states to refrain from producing new generations of chemical weapons during the negotiating period, -notes the lack of substantive progress made towards agree- ments on outer space, CPD, and radiological weapons. SRI LANKA -welcomes the progress made in the US-USSR CW and INF talks, and praises the complimentary role of the CD in these areas, -believes that a CTB would be the single most effective step in strengthening the NPT, -urges the conference to adopt measures aimed at preventing an arms race in space, -notes the urgent need for unambiguous and unequivocal negative security assurances for non-nuclear states, -reflects sadly on the lack of progress towards a draft CPD. AUSTRALIA 33 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 -calls for the establishment of a global seismic network, -suggests that the 70 national and 4 international data centers to be used by the GSE in their upcoming global seismic experiment be left in operation to form a permanent global seismic network. JAPAN -welcomes the latest report of the Group of Scientific Experts, -recalls the initiative made in April by the President for that month for an NTB ad hoc committee, -regrets that this initiative has not obtained more support. PAKISTAN -regrets the lack of progress made by the Conference on nuclear-related questions, -states that the US-USSR bilateral talks on nuclear testing are an inadequate substitute for a comprehensive test ban agreement, -hopes that greater attention will be focused on Articles X and XI of the draft CW convention, which deal with assist- ance and economic and technological development, -calls attention to the Pakistani proposal, CD/752, which would offer assistance to any state party threatened by chemical weapons from any source, -calls for concrete work on negative security assurances, declaring that states which have voluntarily renounced nuc- lear weapons have a right to unconditional assurances from nuclear weapons states, -criticizes the Swedish proposal on military attacks on nuc- lear facilities, arguing that the legal basis for a ban on such attacks should stem from the international norm against the use of force, not from concern about mass des- truction by radiation, pointing out that under the Swedish formula the 1981 Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facil- ity would be allowed because no radiation was released. GDR -expresses appreciation for the important work of the ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts, 34 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 -supports the Soviet proposal that a special group of scien- tific experts be set up which would be assigned the task of submitting recommendations on the structure and functioning of a system of verification for a possible NTB. CZECHOSLOVAKIA -objects to the US assessment of Ambassador Vejvoda's re- marks of 30 July concerning the CPD, -maintains that the US has retreated from previously agreed positions on the CPD and the Final Document of the SSOD-I. 25 August 1987 FRG -presents the report of the ad hoc committee on NSA, CD/784, -notes that little progress has been made towards developing legally binding assurances against the use of nuclear wea- pons on non-nuclear states. CANADA -comments on the progress rade in international disarmament since 1983, -maintains that this progress attests to the validity of the principle of mutual security instead of unilateral advan- tage, -argues that the international climate for arms control and disarmament has improved tremendously, pointing to the INF talks, the successful outcome of the Stockholm Conference, and the progress on the chemical weapons negotiations, -holds the issue of verification to be the key to arms con- trol agreements, -welcomes the statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevard- nadze calling for strict and foolproof verification of a CW ban, including mandatory challenge inspection, -reports, with Norway, on verification of CW use in CD/766, -calls upon all delegations to declare openly their posses- sion or non-possession of CW, -declares the conclusion of a CTBT to be a major priority of the Canadian government, -hopes that the Conference will establish an ad hoc committee on NTB as soon as possible, using the proposal 35 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 made by the April President, Ambassador Vejvoda, as the basis for discussions, -recognizes that progress on outer space issues is not as evident as progress in other areas, but asserts that some advancement on space issues has been achieved, -declares that better working methods would help the Confer- ence conduct its business more efficiently, -regrets that the proposals of the Group of Seven have not been put into practice. ALGERIA -expresses hope that the current negotiations between the superpowers would help initiate a genuine dynamic of dis- armament, -notes the lack of agreement on forming ad hoc committees on agenda items 1, 2, and 3, -expresses frustration at the lack of agreement on the Group of 21's proposal contained in CD/515/Rev.3 on an ad hoc committee on PNW, -notes the progress made in the chemical weapons negoti- ations, adding that certain problems related to verifi- cation and compliance will be difficult to resolve, -expresses hope that forthcoming consultations on Articles X and XI of the draft convention will lead to fruitful work on international cooperation on the peaceful develop- ment of chemical industry, -calls for more practical work to be undertaken in the ad hoc committee on outer space, -regrets the apparent backward step taken regarding the CPD. 27 August 1987 BULGARIA -asserts that the security of one state cannot be achieved at the expense of others, -notes the contrast between the slow pace of disarmament negotiations and the rapid pace of the arms race, -declares that the Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating body, has a special place in the disarmament process, -considers that agreement on a global double zero solution should be reached in the USSR-US negotiations as soon as possible, 36 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 -criticizes the US for placing obstacles in the path of an agreement, emphasizing the US stand on the Pershing IA missiles, -accuses the US and Group of Western States of maintaining that negotiations on nuclear disarmament should only be conducted on a bilateral basis, excluding the CD from nuc- lear matters, -favors the creation of an ad hoc committee with a nego- tiating mandate on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, -draws attention to the document submitted by the Socialist countries on a nuclear test ban, -calls for the creation of an ad hoc group of scientific experts to recommend a verification system for a possible nuclear test ban, -asserts the urgency of preventing an arms race in space, -calls for an additional session in 1987 devoted to CW, -criticizes as counterproductive the CW negotiations plans to build binary weapons, -criticizes the US for the extensive bracketing of text in the CPD. ITALY -submits to the Conference the report of the ad hoc Commit- tee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, CD/786. SWEDEN -presents the report of the ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, CD/782. MEXICO -presents the report of the ad hoc Committee on the Compre- hensive Program of Disarmament, CD/783, -criticizes those delegations which have insisted on brack- eting large parts of the text of the draft CPD. POLAND -expresses dissatisfaction with the rolling text adopted by the CW ad hoc Committee, 27 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 -expresses hope that consensus can be achieved on further issues during the intersessional period. AUSTRALIA -declares that the adjustments to the draft CPD recommended by the Western Group were needed to produce a practical and realistic guide for the international community in working for disarmament, -argues that grafting language from the Final Document of SSOD-I onto the CPD is not always the optimum solution, and that the Conference should not be afraid to use other language, -welcomes the level of agreement achieved on the draft CPD in light of the complex task facing the committee. 28 August 1987 FRG -observes that significant progress has been made in 1987 in a number of areas, -points out the real possibility of concluding a chemical weapons ban in the near future. FRANCE -objects to the singling out of France for criticism by the Chairman of the ad hoc committee on CW, -notes that France does not object, as was implied, to the declaration of all CW facilities and stocks, but believes that some special consideration should be given regarding security stockpiles as a hedge against non-compliance, -notes that the Chairman himself conceded the importance of the order of destruction of stocks to fundamental secu- rity concerns. ALGERIA -notes the progress made towards concluding a CW convention, -remains hopeful that future work on other agenda items will also be successful. 32. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 PRC -notes the substantive progress made in the chemical weapons negotiations, -expresses disappointment in the lack of achievement in other areas, particularly those dealing with nuclear weapons. a 39 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 I I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 MAIN SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p - plenary a - U.S. - U.S.S.R. bilaterals b - other bilaterals c - post-plenary or informal meeting d - western group e - AHC on CPD f - AHC on RW g - AHC on CW h - AHC on OS ABM SYSTEMS: 20hc, 102h, 103h, 104h, 105h, 128p, 137p, 146p, 238ch ANTISATELLITE CAPABILITIES: General reference to: 136p, 137p, 148p, 158p, 169h, 171h, 182p, 207p Antisatellite weapons: 18h, 104h, 168h ASAT: see ANTISATELLITE CAPABILITIES. ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR FACILITIES General reference to: Legal protections against: 210P BINARY WEAPONS: 77pb, 181pg, 225p, 293a, 300ab, 307ab, 308ab, 309a CD: General references to: 127p, 233p, 234p Expansion of Membership: 127p Expression of Dissatisfaction: 127p, 165p, 174p, 224p, 230p, 232p 1 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET Scheduling Matters: 111d, 124d, 181pg, 252p CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW): General reference to: 25d, 54d, 77p, 93d, 99, 110p, 127p, 145:, 147p, 157p, Proposed Conventions: 7p, 58g, 82d, 88p, 107p, 111d, 185p, 187g, 215b, 224p, Ad Hoc Committee on: 139d, 221g, 230p US - USSR Bilateral Data Exchange, 73ae, 304ab, 306ab, 312-313a, 315-316ad, 319ad, 325, 336ab, 341ab CHEMICAL WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 95d. CIVILIAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY: 92g, 147p, 224p Multinationals: 80b, 88pb, 293a, 301ab, 323ad Production threshholds for inspection: 189g COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT: General references to: 23p, 126d, 176p, 224p, 252p Ad Hoc Committee on: 27d, 253p COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY: 36ca COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: General reference to: 5p, 7p, 23p, 25d, 41p, 43p, 90p, 110P, 146P, 148p, 175p, 231p, 232p, 252p Verification of: 76p, 137p, 228p DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES: General reference to: 80b, 316a,d, 321ad, 336ab Definition of CW Production Facility: 316ad Recycling/Conversion for permitted use: 73ae DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKS: General reference to: 2d, 15g, 31g, 32gd, 43p, 73ae, 80b, 89pb, 92g, 114c, 131g, 145p, 182p, 190g, 205pb, 302ab, 304ab Verification of Destruction: 160g 2 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET DISARMAMENT: 7p, 10p, 26d, 41p, 43p, 55d, 127p, 175p, 228p, 233p GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 107p, 157p GLOBAL SEISMIC DATA NETWORK: 138p, 142d, 194-196, 231p GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS: General reference to: 194-195, 210p, 321p, 233p Seismological technical tests: 194-196 INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE: 118? 25X1 INF NEGOTIATIONS: 7P, 11P, 11PB, 44P, 104H, 117P, 127P, 148P, 158P, 180PG, 182P, 184P, 232P, 235B, 238CH INSPECTION: General reference to: 58G, 211G Alternative methods of inspection: 45-53G, 204PG, 216B, 219GB Challenge on-site: 16g, 22p, 25d, 33d, 73ae, 80b, 88p, 88pb, 95-98, 107p, 114g, 115c, 118p, 125d, 128p, 130g, 139g, 187g, 301ab, 304ab, Manadatory challenge on-site: 5pa, 17g, 45g, 204pb, 216b, 211gb, 336ab Periodic on-site: 324a Protection of sensitive facilities: 49-53g, 73ae, 231p Right of refusal: 16g, 216b LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE: General references to: 18h, 20h, 137p, 146p, 148p, 168h, 171h, 182p 230p, 232p Adequacy of: 23p, 103h, 104h, 109p, 169hc, 172hc, 176p, 231p Proposals for additions: 102h, 104h, 136p, 164b, 168h, 185p MILITARIZATION OF SPACE: General reference to: 108P, 171H MILITARY DOCTRINE: 77pb SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET MISCELLANEOUS CABLES: CD-136 - CW Negotiations: Industrial Experts Meeting, pp. 120-123 CD-183 - CW Negotiations: Summer Wrapup, pp. 270-281 Bilat-37 - US Questions on the Soviet MOU on Data Exchange, pp. 329 Bilat-41 - CW Bilats: Wrapup and Analysis, pp. 343-347 Bilat-46 - CW Bilats: Round VI Telegram List, p. 358 MONITORING: 148P, 324A NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES: 27d, 44p, 119p, 158p, 233p NONPRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS: 88pb, 114g, 212g, 303ab, 304ab NONPROLIFERATION: 26d, 127p, 184p NTB: seeNUCLEAR TEST BAN: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: 6pa, 76pb, 87p, 117p, 145p, 148p, 175p, 230p NUCLEAR TEST BAN: General references to: 8d, 54d, 117p, 118p, 128p, 176p, 180pg, 184p, 205p, 207pb, 210p Ad Hoc Committee on: 6p, 8d, 23p, 23p, 43p, 83d, 88p, 112d, 125d, 129p 141d, 175p, 229p OUTER SPACE: General references to: 3h, 6p, 11p, 18h, 19hc, 41p, 43p, 55d, 108p, 128p, 137p, 146p, 148p, 150b, 158p, 163-164b, 171h, 180pg, 209pb, 229p, 233p Ad Hoc Committee on: 23p, 26d, 83d, 85, 90p, 105h, 136p, 170h, 182p, 231p, 232p, 262p PAXSAT PROGRAM: 3h, 172h, 230p, 233p PETROVSKY: 5p PRECURSORS: General reference to: 99, 324a, 341ab PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR: General reference to: 43p AD Hoc Committee on: 137p SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: General reference to: 128p, 146p, 210p Ad Hoc Committee on: 27-28d SECURITY STOCKPILE: 1d, 8d, 15g, 21p, 22p, 74b, 79b, 88pb, 101b, 111d 215b, 222b, 253p, 293a,302ab SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT: 22p, 175p, 224p, 233p STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: 18h, 20hc, 37ca, 10311, 117p, 235b, 238h SUPER TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS: General reference to: 92g, 112g, 130g, 176p Proposed limits on: 324a TREATY OF RARATONGA: 23p, 148p VERIFICATION: General references to: 3h, Spa, 21p, 23p, 58g, 87p, 130g, 138p, 145p 148p, 180pg, 233p, 326a Verification of alleged CW use: 34c, 76p, 107p, 157p, 187g, 212g 5 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Type Key p- - plenary plenary statement ARGENTINA SUBJECT INDEX a - US-USSR bilateral meeting b - other bilateral meeting c - post-plenary or informal meeting d - Western Group e - AHC on CPD f - AHC on RW g - AHC on CW h - AHC on OS ANTISATELLITE CAPABILITIES: General references to: 169h COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: Verification of: 137p DISARMAMENT: 8p GLOBAL SEISMIC DATA NETWORK: 137p INF NEGOTIATIONS: 9p LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE: 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 General references to: 136p Proposals for additions: 136p, 168h OUTER SPACE: General references to: 9a Ad Hoc Committee on: 106h, 136p, 170h 2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 AUSTRALIA SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p - plenary statement a - US-USSR bilateral meeting b - other bilateral meeting c - post-plenary or informal meeting d - Western Group e - AHC on CPD f - AHC on RW g - AHC on CW h - AHC on OS CD: Expression of Dissatisfaction: 167d CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW): General references to: 176p COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT: General references to: 176p Ad Hoc Committee on: 253p DISARMAMENT: 175p Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 GLOBAL SEISMIC DATA NETWORK: 231p GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS: General references to: 231p INSPECTION: Challenge on-site: 176p LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE: Adequacy of: 18-19h, 176p Proposals for additions: 18-19h NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: 175p OUTER SPACE: General references to: 172h, 176p PAXSAT PROGRAM: 172h SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT: 175p SUPER TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS: General references to: 176p Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 BELGIUM SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p - plenary statement a - US-USSR bilateral b - other bilateral meeting c - post-plenary or informal meeting d - Western Group e - AHC on CPD f - AHC on RW g - AHC on CW h - AHC on OS ABM SYSTEMS: 146p CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW): General references to: 145p DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKS: General rdferences to: 2d, 32g, 145p Verification: 145p DISARMAMENT: 145p INSPECTION: Challenge on-site: 145p 5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE: Proposals for additions: 146p OUTER SPACE: General references to: 146p RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: General weapons to: 146p r_. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Type Key p- - plenary plenary BRAZIL SUBJECT INDEX a - US-USSR bilateral meeting b - other bilateral meeting c - post-plenary or informal meeting d - Western Group e - AHC on CPD f - AHC on RW g - AHC on CW h - AHC on OS NUCLEAR TEST BAN: Ad Hoc Committee on: 229p 7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET BULGARIA SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p - plenary meeting a - US-USSR bilateral meeting b - other bilateral meeting c - post-plenary or informal meeting d - Western Group e - AHC on CPD f - AHC on RW g - AHC on CW h - AHC on OS ANTISATELLITE CAPABILITIES: CD: General references to: 158p Scheduling Matters: 252p COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT: General references to: 252p LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE: Proposals for additions: 169h SECRET r Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 gFCTIRT 25X1 NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES: 158p NUCLEAR TEST BAN: General references to: 252p OUTER SPACE: General references to: 18h, 158p SECRET C' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Type Key p- - plenary plenary statement CANADA SUBJECT INDEX a - US-USSR bilateral meeting b - other bilateral meeting c - post-plenary or informal meeting d - Western Group e - AHC on CPD f - AHC on RW g - AHC on CW h - AHC on OS CD: General references to: 233p Expression of Dissatisfaction: 167d CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW): Proposed Conventions: 233p DISARMAMENT: 233p GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS: General references to: 233p 10 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 INF NEGOTIATIONS: 233p INSPECTIONS: Challenge on-site: 233p NUCLEAR TEST BAN: General references to: 233p OUTER SPACE: General references to: 3h, 138p PAXSAT PROGRAM: 3h, 233p SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT: 234p VERIFICATION: General references to: 3h, 233p Verification of alleged CW use: 110bp, 138p. 11 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CHINA SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p - plenary statement a - U.S. - U.S.S.R. bilaterals b - other bilateral c - post-plenary or informal meeting d - Western group e - AHC to CPD f - AHC to RW g - AHC to CW h - AHC to OS INF NEGOTIATIONS: 44p NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES: 44p - 1'2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CZECHOSLOVAKIA SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p - plenary statement a - US-USSR bilateral meeting b - other bilateral meeting c - post-plenary or informal meeting d - Western Group e - AHC on CPD f - AHC on RW g - AHC on CW h - AHC on OS COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT: General references to: 177p COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: General references to: 90p NUCLEAR TEST BAN: General references to: 177p OUTER SPACE: Ad Hoc Committee on: 90p Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET FRG SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p - plenary meeting a - US-Soviet bilaterals b - other bilaterals c - post-plenary or informal d - Western Group e - AHC on CPD f - AHC on RW g - AHC on CW h - AHC on OS ABM SYSTEMS: 105h INF NEGOTIATIONS: 7p, 184p LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE: Adequacy of: 103h NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES: 233p NONPROLIFERATION: 184p SECURITY SToCKPILE: 1d SECRET 14 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: 103h Challenge on-site: 95c, 168d, 210-211b, 221p, 248c NUCLEAR TEST BAN: General References to: 221p Ad Hoc Committee on: 221p, 224c PRECURSORS: General reference to: 178p RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: General References to: 193c Ad Hoc Committee on: 139Cc SUPERTOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS: General Reference to: 9b, 28c, 33-34, 36c, 56p Proposed limits on: 3g, 20g SECRET 15 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET FRANCE SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p - plenary meeting a - US-Soviet bilaterals b - other bilateral c - post-plenary or informal d - Western Group e - AHC on CPD f - AHC on RW g - AHC on CW h - AHC on OS ABM SYSTEMS: 103h ANTISATELLITE CAPABILITIES: General reference to: 104h CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW): Proposed Conventions: 110ap, 160d, 215b, 222b COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: General References to: 7p DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES: General References to: 216b SECRET 16 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKS: General References to: 228b, 232-236c, 277p Verification of Destruction: 228b, 232-236c DISARMAMENT: 7p INSPECTION: General references to: 160d Alternative methods of inspection: 160d, 216b Challenge on-site: 216b Right to refusal: 216b LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE: Adequacy of: 104h OUTER SPACE: General References to: 19h, 173h SECURITY STOCKPILE: 1d, 21p, 10ap, 215b, 222b, 253p VERIFICATION: General References to: 22p SECRET 17 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET GDR SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p - plenary meeting a US-USSR bilateral meeting b other bilateral meeting c post-plenary or informal meeting d Western Group e AHC on CPD f AHC on RW g - AHC on CW h - AHC on OS ANTISATELLITE CAPABILITIES: General references to: 168h, 183p BINARY WEAPONS: 225p COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: General references to: 43p, 232p ANTISATELLITE CAPABILITIES: General references to: 168h, 183p SECRET 10 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET BINARY WEAPONS: 225p COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: General reference to: 43p, 232p Verification of: 43p, 232p GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS: General Reference to: 232p INF NEGOTIATIONS: 158p, 225p LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE: Adequacy of: 168h Proposals for additions: 168h, 170h NUCLEAR TEST BAN: General reference to: 225p SECRET 19 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 HUNGARY SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p plenary statement a US-USSR bilateral meeting b other bilateral meeting c post-plenary or informal meeting d Western Group e AHC on CPD f AHC on RW g - AHC on CW h AHC on OS ANTISATELLITE CAPABILITIES: General references to: 148p COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: General references to: 23p, 148p Verification: 23p LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE: Proposals for additions: 148p, 171h NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: 148p NUCLEAR TEST BAN: L'O Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Ad Hoc Committee on: 23p OUTER SPACE: General references to: 148p, 171h VERIFICATION: General references to: 23p 21 I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 INDIA SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p - plenary statement a - U.S.-U.S.S.R bilaterals b - other bilaterals c - post-plenary or informal meeting d - Western Group e - AHC on CPD f - AHC on RW g - QHC on CW h - AHC on OS ANTISATELLITE CAPABILITIES: General references to: .136p CD: Expression of Dissatisfaction: 224p CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW): Proposed Conventions: 224p CONPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT: General references to: 224p MILITARIZATION OF SPACE: Lasers: 102h SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT: 224p Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 JAPAN SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p - plenary statement a - U.S. - U.S.S.R. bilaterals b - other bilaterals c post-plenary or informal meeting d - Western Group e - AHC on CPD f - AHC on RW g - AHC on CW h - AHC on OS CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW): Proposed Conventions: 147p CIVILIAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY: Production threshholds for inspection: 147p COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: General references to: 25d GLOBAL SEISMIC DATA NETWORK: 231p GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS: General references to: 231p Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE: Proposals for additions: 108p MILITARIZATION OF SPACE: General references to: 108p MONITORING: 148p NONPRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS: 212g NONPROLIFERATION: 26d NUCLEAR TEST BAN: Ad Hoc Committee on: 205p OUTER SPACE: General references to: 108p VERIFICATION: General references to: 108p, 148p 24 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 MEXICO SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p - plenary statement a - U.S. - U.S.S.R bilaterals b - other bilaterals c - post-plenary of informal meeting d - Western Group e - AHC on CPD f - AHC on RW g - AHC on CW h - AHC on OS CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW): Proposed Conventions: 246c CIVILIAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY: Production threshholds for inspection: 92g COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT: Ad Hoc Committee on: 253p COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: General references to: 41p DISARMAMENT: 41p 25 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 NUCLEAR TEST BAN: Ad Hoc Committee on: 129p, 210p OUTER SPACE: General references to: 141p SUPER TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS: Proposed limits on: 92g Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 MONGOLIA SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p - plenary statement a - U.S. - U.S.S.R bilaterals b - other bilateral c - post-plenary or informal meeting d - Western Group e - AHC on CPD f - AHC on RW g - AHC on CW h - AHC on OS ANTISATELLITE CPAPBILITIES: General references to: 172h, 182p COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: Verification of: 43p DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKS: General references to: 31g, 43p, 182p INF NEGOTIATIONS: 182p LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE: General references to: 182p 27 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Proposals for additions: 20h, 172h OUTER SPACE: Ad Hoc Committee on: 182p ZB Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 NETHERLAND SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p - plenary statement a - U.S. - U.S.S.R bilaterals b - other bilaterals d - post-plenary or informal meeting e - AHC on CPD f - AHC on RW g - AHC on CW h - AHC on OS CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW): General references to: 25d, 82d, 93d Proposed Conventions: 88p Ad Hoc Committee on: 82d INSPECTION: Alternative methods of inspection: 45-53g Challenge on-site: 16g, 33g, 45-53g, 88p Protection of sensitive facilities: 45-53g Right to refusal: 16g, 45-53g LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE: General references to: 164g 29 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Proposals for additions: 164g NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: 87p NUCLEAR TEST BAN: General references to: 88p OUTER SPACE: General references to: 163-164b Ad Hoc Committee on: 163b VERIFICATION: General references to: 87p 30 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 PAKISTAN SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p - plenary statement a - U.S. - U.S.S.R. bilaterals b - other bilaterals c - post-plenary or informal meeting d - Western Group e - AHC on CPD f - AHC on RW g- - AHC AHC on CW h - AHC on OS ANTISATELLITE CAPABILITIES: CD: General references to: 23p Expression of Dissatisfaction: 232p CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW): General references to: 232p COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT: General references to: 23p COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: 31 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 General references to: 232p INSPECTION: Challenge on-site: 22p LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE: General references to: 232p Adequacy of: 23p Proposals for additions: 23p NUCLEAR TEST BAN: Ad Hoc Committee on: 232p OUTER SPACE: Ad Hoc Committee on: 23p, 232p SECURITY STOCKPILE: 22p SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT: 22p 0^ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 POLAND SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p - plenary statement a - U.S. - U.S.S.R bilaterals b - other bilaterals c - post-plenary of informal meeting d - Western Group e - AHC on CPD f - AHC on RW g - AHC on CW h - AHC on OS BINARY WEAPONS: 110p CD: Expression of Dissatisfaction: 230p Scheduling Matters: 253p CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW): General references to: 110p, 253p Ad Hoc Committee on: 230p COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: General references to: 110p Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE: General references to: 230p Adequacy of: 230p OUTER SPACE: General references to: 230p PAXSAT: 230p SECURITY STOCKPILES: 110p 34 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SWEDEN SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p - plenary statement a - U.S. - U.S.S.R. bilaterals b - other bilateral c - post-plenary or infofmal meeting d - Western group e - AHC to CPD f - AHC to RW g - AHC to CW h - AHC to OS ANTISATELLITE CAPABILITIES: General references to: 210p ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR FACILITIES: Legal protections against: 210p CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW): General references to: 235b Proposed Conventions: 7p COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: Verification of: 228p 35 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 DISARMAMENT: 228p INF NEGOTIATIONS: 235b INSPECTION: Alternztive methods of inspection: 151-156g Challenge on-site: 95-98b, 151-156g Protection of sensitive facilities: 95-98b, 151-156g Right to Refusal: 95-98b, 151-156g NUCLEAR TEST BAN: General references to: 228p Ad Hoc Committee on: 6p OUTER SPACE: General references to: 6p, 210p, 235b RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: General references to: 210p SECURITY STOCKPILE: 222b STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: 235b Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 UK SUBJECT INDEX Type Key p - plenary statement a - US-USSR bilateral b - other bilateral c - post-plenary or informal meeting d - Western Group e - AHC on CPD f - AHC on RW g - AHC on CW h - AHC on OS ANTISATELLITE CAPABILITIES: General references to: 18h, 171h CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW): Proposed Conventions: 58-71 DISARMAMENT: 118p INF NEGOTIATIONS: 117p INSPECTION: General references to: 58-71 Challenge on-site: 118p LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE: 37 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Adequacy of: 171h Proposals for additions: 171h NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: 117p NUCLEAR TEST BAN: General references to: 117p OUTER SPACE: General references to: 18h, 150b STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: 18h, 117p VERIFICATION: General references to: 58-71 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 USSR SUBJECT INDEX Type Key Personalities p - plenary meeting a - Petrovsky a - US-Soviet bilaterals b - Nazarkin b - other bilateral c - Zharkov c - post plen or informal d - Batsanov d - Western Group e - Smidovitch e - AHC on CPD f - Granovskiy f - AHC on RW g - Shevardnadze g - AHC on CW h - Obukhov h - AHC on OS ABM SYSTEMS: 21hc, 103h, 238ch, 240ch, ANTISATELLITE CAPABILITIES: General rererences to: 104H BINARY WEAPONS: 77pb, 293a, 300ab, 307ab, 309ab CD Scheduling Matters: 179PG CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW): General references to: 179pg, 215bb, 320ad Proposed Conventions: 215bb, 300ab, 306ab, 320ad SECRET 39 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET US - USSR Bilateral Data Exchange: 73ge, 245a, 304ab, 306ab, 308ab, 319ad, 320ad, 325a, 336ab, 341a CIVILIAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY: Multinational: 80b, 88pb, 293a, 301ab, 323ad COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY: CSIS: 36 - 40 COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: General references to: 5pa, Verfication of: 5pa DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES: General reference to: 80b, 131g, 190g, 321ad, 336ab Recycling/Conversion for permitted use: 73ge DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKS: General references to: 32gd, 73ge, 80b, 89pb, 92c, 204pb, 216bb, 249b, 302ab, 304ab Verification of Destruction: 160gf DISARMAMENT: 238ch INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE: INF Negotiation: 11pb, 104h, 178pg, 238ch, 240ch INSPECTION: Alternative methods of inspection: 204pb, 216bb, 219pb Challenge on-site: 73, 80b, 88pb, 216bb, 219pb, 301ab, 304ab, 306ab Mandatory challange on-site: 204pb, 336ab Periodic on-site: 324a Protection of sensitive facilities: 73ge SECRET 4n Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET Right to refusal: 216ab, 219pb LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE: General references to: 104h Adequacy of: 169hc, 172hc MILITARY DOCTRINE: 77pb MONITORING: 324a NUCLEAR DETERENT: 77pb NUCLEAR TEST BAN: General references to: 178pg, 209pb OUTER SPACE: General references to: 19hc, 169hc, 178pg, 209-210pb PRECURSORS: General reference to: 324a, 341a SECURIT/ STOCKPILE PROPOSED: 74b, 79b, 88pb, 215bb, 293a, STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: 21hc, 103h, 238ch SUPER TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS: General reference to: 324a VERIFICATION: General references to: 178pg, 326a SECRET 302ab, 306ab 25X1 Al Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS: ALLIED REACTIONS TO FRENCH CW SECURITY STOCKPILES PROPOSAL 1. THIS IS CD-102. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY -- -- FRENCH PRESENTATION OF PROPOSAL ON SECURITY STOCKS TO WESTERN GROUP RECEIVED A RESOUNDING NEGATIVE RESPONSE. DELS REQUESTED FURTHER CONSULTATIONS AND, THEREFORE, DELAY IN FRENCH PLAN TO TABLE THE PROPOSAL IN THE CD ON JUNE 11. FRENCH DID DELAY TABLING. END SUMMARY. 3. -- AT JUNE 9 CW WESTERN COORDINATION MEETING, FRENCH AMB MOREL GAVE A THOROUGH PRESENTATION ON THE FRENCH PROPOSAL (REVISED VERSION). HE STATED THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO TABLE IT QUICKLY, POSSIBLY JUNE 11, BUT TO ALSO REPORT TO PARIS ON WESTERN REACTION AT THIS CW WESTERN GROUP MEETING. HE NOTED THAT IN LIGHT OF THE REGRETTABLE, EMBARRASSING PUBLIC CRITICISM THE PAPER RECEIVED IN OSLO (FOLLOWING "PRIVATE" FRENCH PRESENTATION TO AMB EKEUS) IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PROLONG ITS INTRODUCTION. WHILE THE PAPER HAS NOT BEEN I ` CIRCULATED BEYOND THE WESTERN GROUP, IT WAS DISCUSSED IN MOSCOW WITH NAZARKIN AND PETROVSKY, WHO WERE "NOT NEGATIVE A PRIORI" BUT INTERESTED IN DETAILS FOR CONSIDERATION. -- ALLIED (ALL BUT ITALY SPOKE) REACTION WAS VERY NEGATIVE, CRITICIZING THE PROLIFERATION EFFECT, BUILDING SECRECY INTO THE CONVENTION AND POSING VERIFICATION PROBLEMS BY UNDECLARED STOCKPILES, AND PERCEIVED NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. MOST WANTED INTRODUCTION OF PAPER DELAYED TO ALLOW FURTHER WESTERN DISCUSSION AND CONSIDERATION IN CAPITALS. AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN REPS DID NOT BELIEVE THEIR CAPITALS HAD RECEIVED THE PAPER, ALTHOUGH AMB MOREL NOTED THAT THOSE CAPITALS WERE ON HIS DISTRIBUTION LIST. FRG AMB VON STULPNAGEL REACTED MOST NEGATIVELY. HE SAID FRG CHANCELLOR HAD ADDRESSED BUNDESTAG ON THE STATE OF CW NEGOTIATIONS, STATING THAT "NOW IS NOT THE TIME FOR NEW INITIATIVES" AND THE FRG "IS A POTENTIAL MAIN TARGET OF CW AND EXPECTS THAT ITS OPINION WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT." ACTING ON INSTRUCTION, HE PASSED OUT DETAILED FRG COMMENTS ON THE PAPER. UK REP COMMENTED THAT, IN VIEW OF SUBSTANTIAL UK OBJECTIONS, HE WOULD WELCOME A STAY OF PRESENTATION. U.S. REP COMMENTED THE U.S. IS STILL REVIEWING THE PROPOSAL BUT HAD CONCERNS ABOUT UNDECLARED STOCKPILES AND PROLIFERATION EFFECT. 1 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- BELGIAN REP (ALSO CLUSTER I CHAIRMAN) NOTED THAT CLUSTER I (CHEMICAL WEAPONS) DISCUSSION WAS SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 15-19 AND THE TOPIC WAS EXPECTED TO BE THE ORDER OF DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. HE BELIEVED THAT DISCUSSION IN THE CD WOULD NOT FOCUS ON THE FRENCH PAPER PER SE BUT DEAL WITH ITS ELEMENTS PIECE BY PIECE. HE ALSO NOTED, PERSONALLY, THAT REGARDING PRODUCTION CONCERNS, THE RECENT U.S. PAPER ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES CALLED FOR SUCH FACILITIES TO BE CLOSED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BE INOPERABLE. POSSIBLY, IF THINGS WENT WRONG WITH THE CONVENTION, SUCH EXISTING FACILITIES COULD BE PUT BACK INTO OPERATION. 4. AT REGULAR WESTERN GROUP MEETING MORNING OF JUNE 10 (DETAILS IN SEPTEL), MOREL, AS MONTHLY CHAIRMAN FOR JUNE, POLLED HIS COLLEAGUES AGAIN ON THEIR REACTIONS. MOST DELS REPEATED COMMENTS OF 9 JUNE. IN ADDITION, JAPANESE AMB YAMADA SAID TOKYO'S INITIAL VIEW WAS ONE OF MOST SERIOUS MISGIVINGS, AND THAT HE WOULD PUBLICLY DISAGREE WITH FRANCE IF PAPER WERE TABLED NOW. AUSTRALIAN AMB BUTLER SAID CANBERRA WAS THINKING ABOUT THE PROPOSAL, AND ITALY FAVORED A SHORT POSTPONEMENT PENDING INSTRUCTIONS. UK SAID ITS RESERVATIONS WERE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL. WITH ALL EIGHT OTHER ALLIES ON RECORD AS REQUESTING DELAY IN TABLING OF FRENCH PAPER, U.S. AMB FRIEDERSDORF SAID THAT IN LIGHT OF EXPRESSED VIEWS IN FAVOR OF FURTHER CONSIDERATION, HE WOULD SUPPORT A SHORT POSTPONEMENT. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS ALSO UNINSTRUCTED ON THE PROPOSAL. 5. UPDATE: LATE JUNE 10, U.S. DEL WAS ADVISED BY FRENCH AMB MOREL THAT THE FRENCH WOULD NOT TABLE THEIR PAPER JUNE 11, BUT IN NO CASE DELAY BEYOND NEXT WEEK. HE SAID PARIS URGES THE U.S. TO NOT REMAIN SILENT BUT TO PROVIDE OUR VIEWS ON THE REVISED PAPER, WHICH THEY VIEW AS HAVING TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT EARLIER U.S. CRITICISMS. THE FRENCH HAVE REQUESTED A CW WESTERN COORDINATION MEETING FRIDAY AFTERNOON JUNE 12 TO RECEIVE FURTHER COMMENTS OR COMMENTS FROM DELS WHO HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS EARLIER. THEN THEY WILL GO BACK TO PARIS ONE MORE TIME. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN qPrAPT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 06390 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CANADIAN CD PAXSAT BRIEFING REF: STATE 160912 1. THIS IS CD-103. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY -- -- OFFICIALS FROM CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND SPAR AEROSPACE CORPORATION DELIVERED PRESENTATIONS ON JUNE 9, 1987 TO CD AHC ON OUTER SPACE AND TO CD WESTERN AMBASSADORS AND ADVISORS ON ANTICIPATED CAPABILITIES OF PROPOSED PAXSAT A (SPACE TO SPACE) AND PAXSAT B (SPACE TO EARTH) REMOTE SENSING SATELLITE VERIFICATION SYSTEMS. CANADIANS STRESSED VIABILITY OF PAXSAT AS POTENTIAL VERIFICATION SUPPLEMENT TO SYSTEMS AND CAPABILITIES POSSESSED BY SUPERPOWERS. PRESENTATIONS REITERATED MAJOR POINTS OF MAY 1987 CANADIAN CD OUTER SPACE WORKSHOP (REF) AND DEVELOPED SELECTED TOPICS IN GREATER DETAIL. END SUMMARY. 3. REGARDING PAXSAT A, CANADIAN BRIEFERS, LED BY RALPH LYSYSHIN OF DEA, ELABORATED ON MONTREAL PRESENTATIONS BY STATING THAT SPACE OBJECTS ARE IMPLICITLY OPTIMIZED TO FULFILL THEIR MISSIONS. THUS, PAXSAT A SYSTEM COULD BE DEVELOPED TO DETERMINE ACCURATELY THE MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF SUCH OBJECTS FOR VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. ACCORDING TO THE BRIEFERS, THE TECHNOLOGY EXISTS IN NONSUPERPOWER NATIONS (NOT FURTHER NAMED) TO DEVELOP A PAXSAT SATELLITE WITH THE FOLLOWING CAPABILITIES: A. OPTICAL: OBSERVE GENERAL CONFIGURATION OF SPACE OBJECTS, PROPULSION SYSTEM DETAILS, PRESENCE OF APERTURES AND ANTENNAS AND THEIR DIMENSIONS, AND INFER THE FREQUENCY BANDS OVER WHICH ANTENNAS OPERATE: B. THERMAL: DETERMINE SPACECRAFT POWER UTILIZATION; AND C. RADIO FREQUENCY EMISSIONS: DETECT COMMUNICATIONS, CONTROL SIGNALS, AND DATA BACKHAUL. 4. BRIEFER STATED THAT PAXSAT B SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADAR SYSTEM,* WITH A RESOLUTION OF SEVEN METERS, COULD BE AVAILABLE BY THE MID- 1990S. SUCH RESOLUTION, HE SAID, WOULD PERMIT DETECTION OF "TANK-LIKE OBJECTS." A PAXSAT OPTICAL SATELLITE, WITH A RESOLUTION OF 1.5 METERS, COULD BE FUNCTIONING BY THE MID-TO- LATE 1990S. BRIEFER ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET TECHNOLOGY FOR THESE SYSTEMS COULD BE DEVELOPED BY THE NONSUPERPOWERS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED, IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, THAT CANADIANS HAVE DONE LITTLE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND DISSEMINATION OF DATA COLLECTED BY SYSTEMS. 5. AHC GAVE POLITE RECEPTION TO CANADIANS, BUT MEETING WAS PORRLY ATTENDED, WITH APPROXIMATELY HALF OF CD MEMBERS ABSENT. EASTERN BLOC WAS ATTENTIVE AND TOOK NOTES BUT SAID NOTHING. COMMENT: CANADIANS ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THEIR POINTS IN CD AND RELATED FORA IN EFFORT TO DEVELOP REPUTATION OF BEING CREDIBLE REPOSITORY OF TECHNICAL VERIFICATION EXPERTISE AND INFORMED ON BROAD SPECTRUM OF SUBJECT AREA. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN t. APPRPT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 __) Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 / C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 06391 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): OPENING PLENARY OF SUMMER PART OF SESSION, JUNE 9, 1987 1. THIS IS CD-104. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY -- -- CD PRESIDENT FOR JUNE, EGYPTIAN AMB ALFARARGI, OPENED SUMMER PART OF 1987 SESSION WITH EXPRESSION OF CONCERN FOR CD'S FAILURE TO REACH ANY DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS. USSR DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER PETROVSKY TABLED PROVISIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY AND INDICATED USSR WILLINGNESS TO LIMIT NUCLEAR TESTING TO 1 KILOTON AS AN INTERMEDIATE STEP. SWEDISH AMB THEORIN GAVE TRADITIONAL TOUR D'HORIZON, STRESSING THE NEED FOR COMMITTEE WORK ON A NUCLEAR TEST BAN, AND PRESSED FOR THE EARLY CONCLUSION OF A CW CONVENTION. GDR AMB ROSE INTRODUCED WARSAW PACT DOCUMENTS FROM THE MAY BERLIN MEETING. FRG AMB VON STULPNAGEL STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE TO NATO OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND PRESENTED FRG VIEWS ON THE SOVIET INF PROPOSAL. FRENCH AMB MOREL BRIEFLY RESPONDED TO PETROVSKY TO POINT OUT THAT A NUCLEAR TEST BAN IS ONLY ONE COMPONENT OF DISARMAMENT AND THAT DENUCLEARIZATION OF EUROPE WOULD ENHANCE WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ADVANTAGE. (USSR STATEMENT AND TREATY PROVISIONS, SWEDISH STATEMENT AND FRG STATEMENT DATAFAXED TO ACDA/MA. GDR STATEMENT TO BE POUCHED.) END SUMMARY. 3. USSR -- -- PETROVSKY TABLED EASTERN PAPER, "BASIC PROVISIONS OF A TREATY ON THE COMPLETE AND GENERAL PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON TESTS," AS SOVIET INITIATIVE SUPPORTED BY ITS ALLIES AND REITERATED SOVIET SUPPORT FOR A COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN. HE CITED NEW PROVISIONS FOR LARGE SCALE VERIFICATION MEASURES RANGING FROM DECLARING THE LOCATION OF TEST RANGES TO PARTICIPATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORS. HE SAID THAT MAJOR IMPORTANCE IS ATTACHED TO ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AND THAT, IN THE SOVIET UNION'S VIEW, THE STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED A REQUEST FOR AN ON-SITE INSPECTION WOULD HAVE TO ALLOW UNCONDITIONAL ACCESS TO THE LOCATION DESIGNATED IN THE REQUEST ON A MANDATORY, NOT VOLUNTARY BASIS. (FYI: U.S. DEL REQUESTED CLARIFICATION FROM SOVIET DEL REP BATSANOV, HEAD OF SECTION, DEPT OF NUCLEAR AND OUTER SPACE, MIN. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AS TO WHETHER THE OBLIGATORY ACCESS TO A SUSPECTED Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SITE, PROVIDED FOR IN SECT. V PARA 2, APPLIED TO ONLY "DECLARED" TEST SITES OR TO "ANY" SUSPECTED SITE. BATSANOV SAID THAT IT APPLIED TO "ANY" SUSPECTED SITE. END FYI) PETROVSKY CALLED FOR CD INVOLVEMENT IN ELABORATING A CTB AS A COMPLEMENTARY EFFORT TO THE U.S.-SOVIET NTEM BILATERALS; HE SAID SUCH INVOLVEMENT IS ESSENTIAL BECAUSE THE BILATERAL TALKS ARE STALLED. PETROVSKY ALSO INDICATED SOVIET READINESS TO AGREE ON A GRADUAL SOLUTION THROUGH INTERMEDIATE NUMERICAL AND YIELD LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE USSR PREFERS A COMPLETE MORATORIUM IT WOULD BE READY TO AGREE TO LIMIT THE YIELD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TO ONE KILOTON AND REDUCE THEIR NUMBERS TO A MINIMUM. THIS MIGHT ALSO BE DONE THROUGH LEGISLATIVE ACTS ADOPTED BY THE U.S. CONGRESS AND THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET. -- IN WHAT THEN APPEARED AS A SEPARATE SECTION OF HIS STATEMENT, PETROVSKY SHIFTED GEARS INTO A POLEMICAL ATTACK ON WESTERN RELIANCE ON THE DOCTRINE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, STATING AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT IT MEANS UNPREDICTABILITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND, IN ESSENCE, BRINKMANSHIP, WHICH IN TURN SERVES TO BUILD UP GLOBAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS. 4. SWEDEN -- AMB MAJ BRITT THEORIN REPEATED SWEDISH PLEA FOR THE FORMATION OF A NUCLEAR TEST BAN AD-HOC COMMITTEE. SHE STATED THAT A NUCLEAR TEST BAN WOULD PUT A BRAKE ON THE QUALITATIVE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND BOOST THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME. THEORIN DID NOT PRESS FOR A NEGOTIATING MANDATE BUT URGED THE COMMITTEE TO DEAL WITH ISSUES INCLUDING "SCOPE AND CONTENTS," AND "VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE." CONFIDENTIAL THEORIN SPOKE IN FAVOR OF THE CD'S REVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK RELATED TO THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE TO DISCOVER AND FILL LOOPHOLES. SHE ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NST BILATERALS FOR SOLVING "SOME" OUTER SPACE AMRS CONTROL ISSUES BUT ARGUED THAT THERE WAS A GROWING MULTILATERAL INTEREST IN ISSUES SUCH AS SDI AND ASAT. THEORIN ENDORSED ESTABLISHMENT OF A CD GROUP OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS TO ADDRESS OUTER SPACE ISSUES. -- CALLING A CW CONVENTION THE FOREMOST Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 (Th Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CHALLENGE TO THE CD, SHE REPORTED ON PROGRESS TO DATE IN 1987 AND HIGHLIGHTED SOME ISSUES REQUIRING RESOLUTION, I.E., ORDER OF DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, MONITORING THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION OF NON-DECLARED FACILITIES. 5. GDR-- -- AMB ROSE INTRODUCED THE CLOSING COMMUNIQUE OF THE WARSAW PACT MEETING HELD IN BERLIN ON 28 AND 29 MAY 1987, AND WTO STATEMENT ON MILITARY DOCTRINE ALSO ISSUED AT THAT MEETING (CD/755). ROSE CLAIMED THAT THESE DOCUMENTS DEFINE WARSAW TREATY MEMBERS' MILITARY DOCTRINE AS STRICTLY DEFENSIVE IN NATURE. 6. FRG -- -- DURING AN INTERVENTION COUCHED AS A RESPONSE TO PETROVSKY'S REMARKS ON DETERRENCE, AMB VAN STULPNAGEL POINTED OUT THAT THERE IS PRESENTLY NO ALTERNATIVE TO FLEXIBLE RESPONSE FOR NATO BECAUSE OF THE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IMBALANCE. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON INF DOES NOT MEET THE FRG'S NEEDS BECAUSE 100 LRINF WARHEADS WOULD REMAIN IN THE ASIAN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION AND COULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR FOR "TRAINING PURPOSES". ALSO,THE ELIMINATION OF SHORTER RANGE INF (500 - 1,000 KM) IN EUROPE WOULD LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION WITH A PREPONDERANCE IN EVEN SHORTER RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS WELL AS IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. 7. FRANCE -- -- AMB MOREL RESPONDED BRIEFLY TO PETROVSKY, POINTING OUT THAT A CTB IS NOT A PRIOR CONDITION FOR DISARMAMENT BUT ONE OF ITS COMPONENTS AND THAT THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF EUROPE GIVES GREATER IMPORTANCE TO THE WARSAW PACT'S CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ADVANTAGE. HE ALSO REJECTED PETROVSKY'S ATTACK ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE DOCTRINE. 8. COMMENT: DELEGATION NOTES WITH APPRECIATION THESE ALLIED RESPONSES TO PETROVSKY'S REMARKS. THEY PROVIDE A WELCOME DEGREE OF SUPPORT TO U.S. POSITIONS ON DETERRENCE/NTB ISSUES (THE FRG RESPONSE ON INF IS MORE COMPLEX). 9. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : aPrRDP92-01168R000100140001-0 NI.A:KKT 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 06417 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): WESTERN GROUP MEETING, JUNE 10, 1987 1. THIS IS CD-105. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- WEEKLY MEETINGS OF WESTERN GROUP RESUMED JUNE 10 WITH CAPSULE REVIEW OF RELATED EVENTS/ ACTIVITIES OCCURRING SINCE APRIL 30 CD ADJOURNMENT AND FOCUS ON CONTINUING AGENDA ITEM ISSUES, MOST NOTABLY CONCERNING CW, NTB AND OUTER SPACE. END SUMMARY. 3. CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- -- DUTCH AMB VAN SCHAIK (WESTERN CW COORDINATOR) CONCENTRATED REMARKS ON THE FRENCH SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL. NO NEW GROUND WAS PLOWED VIS-A-VIS LENGTHY JUNE 9 WESTERN CW GROUP MEETING RESULTS (REPORTED SEPTEL). END RESULT (AGAIN): ZERO SUPPORT VOICED FOR FRENCH. UK AND FRG HAVE MINISTERIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO OPPOSE THE PROPOSAL; JAPAN, NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM GAVE "PRELIMINARY" NEGATIVE RESPONSE; OTHERS AWAIT INSTRUCTIONS BUT OFFERED NO ENCOURAGEMENT. SEVEN, HOWEVER, IMPLORED FRENCH AT LEAST TO POSTPONE TABLING THEIR INITIATIVE, AND REMAINING DELS, ITALY AND U.S. ,ASKED THAT FRANCE ACCOMMODATE THESE REQUESTS. MOREL LISTENED IMPASSIVELY TO ARGUMENTS BEFORE ENDING DISCUSSION WITH STATEMENT THAT PROPOSAL WAS NOT INTENDED TO BE A PANACEA, BUT MERELY AN OPEN-ENDED EFFORT TO ADDRESS VERY REAL AND DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. HE GAVE NO COMMITMENT TO POSTPONEMENT, AND TENDED TO IMPLY THAT IMMEDIATE TABLING WAS INEVITABLE, BUT HE PROMISED TO REPORT TO PARIS. (AS NOTED SEPTEL, TABLING IS NOW LIKELY WEEK OF JUNE 15.) 4. NUCLEAR TEST BAN -- -- JAPANESE AMB YAMADA (NTB COORDINATOR) CALLED FOR A STRATEGY MEETING JUNE 16 TO CONSIDER SOVIET DRAFT TEST BAN TREATY PROVISIONS PRESENTED TO CD JUNE 9 BY SOVIET DEP MIN FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS PETROVSKY (REPORTED SEPTEL), AND INDIAN AND PAKISTANI DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO TESTING, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS VERY DISTURBING. 5. OUTER SPACE -- -- ITALIAN AMB PUGLIESE (OS AHC CHAIRMAN) REPORTED THAT THE G-21 (NNA) WAS PRESSING HIM ON THE MATTER OF THE AHC WRITING ITS FINAL REPORT IN STAGES, AS Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 7Th 'Th 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET MAJOR SEGMENTS OF THE WORK PROGRAM WERE COMPLETED (A MISNAMED "ROLLING TEXT"). SUCH WRITING WOULD ALSO BE ACCOMPANIED BY INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN DELEGATIONS IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE THE REPORT- PREPARATION PROCESS AND FACILITATE PROGRESS IN THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE. (COMMENT: PUGLIESE UNDER- STANDS PREVIOUSLY STATED WESTERN AND CHINESE NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TO SUCH A NEW DEPARTURE, BUT WE STILL EXPECT THE G-21 TO PRESS THE ISSUE. U.S. DEL WILL WORK TO ENCOURAGE OPPOSITION TO ANY PROCEDURES LEADING TOWARD OUTER SPACE REPORT WRITING BY STAGES; CONSULTATIONS THEREON; AND ANY NOTION OF A "ROLLING TEXT.") 6. INTERIM SESSION EVENTS/ACTIVITIES -- -- FRENCH AMB MOREL (WESTERN GROUP COORDINATOR FOR JUNE) TOUCHED UPON UNDC RESULTS, MONTREAL SPACE WORKSHOP, OSLO CW SYMPOSIUM, SSOD III PREPCOM AND UNIDIR CONFERENCE AT BAKU. SATISFACTION NOTED AMONG DELS CONCERNING FIRST THREE EVENTS; SSOD III AGENDA RESULTS DREW KUDO FROM AUSTRALIAN AMB BUTLER AS MAJOR WESTERN ACHIEVEMENT; MOREL OPINED (AND OTHERS CONCURRED), INTER ALIA, THAT BAKU REINFORCED WHAT HAS BECOME A PATTERN OF SOVIET PERFORMANCE, I.E., OLD FASHIONED TREATMENT OF 'NEW THINKING.' PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 06460 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY MEETING, JUNE 11, 1987 REF: GENEVA 06391 (CD-104) 1. THIS IS CD-105 . (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY: SPEAKERS AT 11 JUNE PLENARY WERE ARGENTINA, USSR, JAPAN, AND FRG. ARGENTINA ADDRESS (DATAFAXED TO ACDA/MA) BY PRESIDENT HAUL ALFONSIN MARKED THE FIRST APPEARANCE AT THE CD BY A CHIEF OF STATE. ALFONSIN CATEGORICALLY AND AT LENGTH REJECTED THE DOCTRINE OF DETERRENCE AS A TOOL FOR MAINTAINING STABILITY, AND EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR A MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING, THE "NON-MILITARIZATION" OF OUTER SPACE, AND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE FIVE CONTINENTS INITIATIVE (FCI). SOVIET AMB NAZARKIN SAID THAT PRESIDENT ALFONSIN'S AND THE SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE (REFTEL) "COINCIDE", AND RESPONDED TO SUBSEQUENT CRITIQUES OF PETROVSK'S JUNE 9 CD SPEECH BY THE FRG AND FRANCE. JAPANESE AMB YAMADA TOOK EXCEPTION TO ALLEGATION BY NAZARKIN THAT U.S. STORES NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON JAPANESE SOIL. FRG UNDERSCORED WEST GERMAN AND ALLIED SUPPORT FOR THE CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE. END SUMMARY. 3. ARGENTINA -- -- PRESIDENT ALFONSIN DESCRIBED DISARMAMENT AS "THE CRUCIAL QUESTION OF OUR EPOCH." THE ARMS RACE INCREASES NATIONAL ARSENALS, AND DECREASES THE TIME AVAILABLE TO GOVERNMENTS TO PREVENT POSSIBLE CONFLICTS. THEREFORE, SINCE MANKIND COULD "DISAPPEAR" AS THE RESULT OF A NUCLEAR WAR, NATIONS MUST DO AWAY WITH THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS AND RESOLVE DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS. ALFONSIN ASSERTED THAT PROPONENTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE ADVOCATE THE RETENTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CLAIMING THAT THEIR EXISTENCE HAS PREVENTED A THIRD WORLD WAR FROM TAKING PLACE. HE REJECTED THE VALIDITY OF DETERRENCE ON THE GROUNDS THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN ESCAPE CONTROL, AND DISCOURAGE NATIONS FROM SEEKING NON-NUCLEAR ALTERNATIVES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS. INDEED HE ARGUED THAT IT IS DETERRENCE THAT "SUPPORTS" THE CONTINUATION OF THE ARMS RACE. IN AN APPARENT ALLUSION TO THE 1982 FALKLANDS WAR BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UK, ALFONSIN CHARGED THAT, IN THE PAST, "THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS ADVOCATED FOR CONFLICTS WHERE ONLY CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WERE BEING USED." -- ALFONSIN STATED THAT MANY RESOURCES NOW USED TO WAGE WAR COULD BE DEVOTED TO DEVELOPMENT. HE ARGUED THAT INCREASES IN NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGETS ARE 1c' RFCRPT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET IMPERILING THE WORLD ECONOMY, AND THAT LIMITED RESOURCES MANDATE A CHANGE IN GOVERNMENTS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS QUESTIONS OF WAR AND PEACE. ALFONSIN EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR A TESTING. MORATORIUM, THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE, AND THE ACTIVITIES OF ARGENTINA AND THE OTHER FCI COUNTRIES IN THIS REGARD. HE ALSO SAW HOPE IN AND URGED SUPPORT FOR INCREASED U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE, "SUMMIT" MEETINGS, AND THE ONGOING INF NEGOTIATIONS. ALFONSIN (ERRONEOUSLY) DECLARED THAT AN INF AGREEMENT WOULD BE AN "IMPORTANT ADVANCE" IN ARMS CONTROL AS THE FIRST ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS "IN PLACE". It. USSR -- -- AMB NAZARKIN ENDORSED ALFONSIN'S REMARKS ON DETERRENCE, NUCLEAR TESTING AND OUTER SPACE NAZARKIN ALLEGED A SOVIET "READINESS" TO RESOLVE THE INF QUESTION ON A GLOBAL BASIS: THIS WOULD ENTAIL A WITHDRAWAL OF ALLEGED U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, AND THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE REDEPLOYMENT OF U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AWAY FROM ASIAN WATERS. IN RETURN, THE USSR WOULD ELIMINATE ITS ASIAN INF CAPABILITY. NAZARKIN ALSO ASSERTED THAT THE WARSAW PACT WAS PREPARED TO ENTER INTO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH NATO TO ELIMINATE ALL SRINF BELDW A 500-KILOMETER RANGE, AND ACHIEVE RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES "WITHOUT REGARD TO BALANCE". - NAZARKIN DERIDED FRgNCH AND WEST GERMAN SUPPORT, EXPRESSED ON JUNE 9, FOR THE DOCTRINE OF DETERRENCE. WHAT EUROPEAN SECURITY REQUIRED WAS A COMPREHENSIVE REDUCTION OF ALL FORCES TO A LEVEL WHERE NO STATE COULD LAUNCH A SURPRISE OFFENSIVE ATTACK ON ANOTHER STATE. NAZARKIN CONTENDED THAT THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE WARSAW PACT IS STRICTLY DEFENSIVE IN NATURE, AND THAT THE EAST WOULD NEVER RESORT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST. HE ALSO PUT IN A GOOD WORD FOR THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO CREAT A "COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY" (REFTEL), SINCE SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD TIE ARMS REDUCTIONS TO AN IMPROVED POLITICAL CLIMATE IN EUROPE. 5. JAPAN -- -- RESPONDING TO NAZARKIN'S COMMENTS ON ASIAN INF NEGOTIATIONS, AMB YAMADA REMINDED DELEGATIONS THAT "JAPAN ADHERES TO A NON-NUCLEAR POLICY," AND STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT THERE ARE NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS BELONGING TO ANY STATE BASED ON JAPANESE SOIL. 6. FRG-- 11 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- DEP REP BOLEWSKI BRIEFLY REITERATED WEST GERMAN AND ALLIED SUPPORT FOR THE CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE, AND RESERVED THE RIGHT TO RESPOND MORE FULLY TO NAZARKIN'S REMARKS AT A LATER DATE. 7. COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION -- -- FOLLOWING THE PLENARY, ARGETINE CD REP, AMB CAMPORA, TOLD USDELOFF THAT ALFONSIN "DEFINITELY ATTRIBUTES DETERRENCE DOCTRINE TO BOTH U.S. AND USSR." DELOFF RESPONDED THAT IF THAT IS SO, PRESIDENT ALFONSIN SURELY WILL WANT TO KNOW OF THE VERY DIFFERENT PERCEPTION OF MOST LISTENERS, AND OF NAZARKIN'S COMMENTS AFTER HIS SPEECH. WASHINGTON OR EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES MAY WISH TO FOLLOW UP ON THIS POINT, AS WILL U.S. DEL. END COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION. 8. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 12 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIALGENEVA 06553 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): DEVELOPMENTS ON THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT 1. THIS IS CD-107. (CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT). (FOR THE RECORD, GENEVA 6460 SHOULD HAVE BEEN CD-106, VICE CD-105.) 2. THE U.S. DEL BRACKETED THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS OF THE CPD WORKING TEXT (CD/728) DURING THE 11 JUNE SESSION OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE: - A. THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF CHAPTER IV (PRINCIPLES); - B. PARAGRAPHS Al, A4, AND A6 OF CHAPTER V (MEASURES); - C. THE THIRD PARAGRAPH UNDER "OTHER MEASURES" (CHAPTER V); AND - D. THE PARAGRAPHS ON "DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT AND "DISARAMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY" (CHAPTER V). (NOTE: U.S. DEL PREVIOUSLY BRACKETED PARAGRAPH E4 (ZONES OF PEACE) OF CHAPTER V.) 3. COMMENT -- -- A. ONLY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, MEXICAN AMB GARCIA ROBLES, MADE ANY CRITICAL COMMENT ON THE U.S. INTERVENTION. HIS COMMENTS WERE RELATIVELY MILD AND LIMITED TO STATEMENTS OF CONCERN OVER THE EFFECT THE BRACKETING OF WHAT HE CLAIMED WAS "PREVIOUSLY APPROVED TEXT" WOULD HAVE ON COMPLETING THE COMMITTEE'S WORK. IN RESPONSE, THE U.S. WAS SUPPORTED BY THE UK AND AUSTRALIA. DEL EXPECTS A MORE VIGOROUS REACTION WITHIN BOTH THE COMMITTEE AND THE WESTERN GROUP AFTER DELS HAVE TIME TO CONSIDER THE U.S. ACTIONS IN AHC. -- B. U.S. DEL WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITHIN EXISTING CONTACT GROUPS ON VERIFICATION, CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND FORCES (SECTION C, CHAPTER V), NUCLEAR ISSUES (PARA A5-7 CHAPTER V), AND OUTER SPACE (PARA E3, CHAPTER V) TO THIS END. HOWEVER, DEL CONSIDERS THE BALL NOW TO BE IN THE COURTS OF THE EAST AND NNA TO RESPOND TO OUR ACTIONS. DEL WILL, THEREFORE, MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PREVENT THE WESTERN GROUP MEMBERS FROM ATTEMPTING TO DRAFT ANY "COMPROMISE" TEXT UNTIL COUNTER PROPOSALS ARE RECEIVED AND EVALUATED. MOSCOW MINIMIZE PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 12 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 06562 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS: JUNE 8-12, 1987 REF: GENEVA 6363 (CD-102) 1. THIS IS CD-108. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- FIRST WEEK OF SUMMER PART OF SESSION FOCUSSED ON WORK PROGRAM FOR CW, THE FRENCH SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL AND ITS IMPACT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE JULY 6-7 CHEMICAL INDUSTRIAL EXPERTS MEETING. -- WESTERN CW COORDINATION GROUP FOCUSSED PRIMARILY ON THE FRENCH PROPOSAL AND THE CW CHEMICAL INDUSTRIAL EXPERTS MEETING SCHEDULED FOR JULY 6-7. NO ONE IN THE WESTERN GROUP FULLY SUPPORTED THE FRENCH PROPOSAL AND MOST REACTED VERY NEGATIVELY (REFTEL). -- NETHERLANDS CD DEL HAS PRIVATELY ADVISED US THAT THEY ARE PREPARING A CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROPOSAL FOR POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION BY THEIR FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE CD IN EARLY JULY. -- SOVIETS ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE A NUMBER OF INITIATIVES ON HAND TO INTRODUCE, BUT ARE WAITING TO SEE HOW WORK PROGRESSES. ACCORDING TO SWEDISH DELOFF BONNIER (PROTECT), THE SOVIETS RECEIVED CRITICISM IN MOSCOW FOR GIVING A LOT IN THE SPRING WITH SEEMINGLY NO POSITIVE RESULTS. THE SOVIETS HAVE AGAIN RAISED THE ISSUE OF WHAT THEY PERCEIVE TO BE DISCRIMINATORY ASPECTS OF CD/500 ARTICLES X AND XI DESPITE THE 1986 AMENDMENT BY THE U.S. END SUMMARY. 3. CW AD HOC COMMITTEE (AHC) ORGANIZATION OF WORK -- -- IN A CWAHC MEETING ON JUNE 12, CHAIRMAN AMB EKEUS (SWEDEN) ANNOUNCED THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE OF WORK FOR THE SUMMER: --- 15-19 JUNE: CLUSTER I (CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKS) --- 22-26 JUNE: CLUSTER IV (CW CONVENTION ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES AND FUNCTIONS; FACTFINDING AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUES) --- 29 JUNE-17 JULY: CLUSTER III (NON-PRODUCTION OF CW) --- 20-31 JULY: CLUSTER IV --- 3-7 AUGUST: CLUSTER I --- 10 AUGUST-?: TO BE DETERMINED -- (FYI: WORK ON CLUSTER II IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE PENDING U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL DISCUSSION. END FYI). - AMB EKEUS ANNOUNCED HIS PLANS TO HAVE WORK BEGIN IN THE CLUSTERS AND THEN, AS APPROPRIATE, CONTINUE IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THROUGHOUT THE INFORMAL GROUP CONSULTATIONS THROUGHOUT THE SUMMER. 14 SFRRFT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 ?,J Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- CLUSTER I CHAIRMAN PHILIP NIEUWENHUYS (BELGIUM) ANNOUNCED THAT THE WEEK OF 15-19 JUNE WILL FOCUS ON FIVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND AREAS OF WORK RELATED TO CW STOCKPILES. THE FIVE ISSUES ARE: (1) ORDER OF DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS, (2) OLD OR OBSOLETE CHEMICALS FOUND AFTER DECLARATIONS, (3) JURISDICTION AND CONTROL, (4) FURTHER ELABORATION ON PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF DESTRUCTION OF CW STOCKS, AND (5) PAST TRANSFERS. - AMB EKEUS ANNOUNCED THE JULY 6-7 CHEMICAL INDUSTRY EXPERTS MEETING AND SCHEDULED A BUREAU MEETING TO PREPARE PROGRAM OF WORK FOR THAT MEETING AND REVIEW PROGRAM OF WORK FOR SUMMER. L. CW WESTERN COORDINATION GROUP -- -- JUNE 9 MEETING FOCUSSED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON THE FRENCH CW SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL (REPORTED REFTEL). - MOST WESTERN MEMBERS EXPECT TO HAVE TWO OR MORE INDUSTRY REPS IN ATTENDANCE AT THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIAL EXPERTS MEETING SCHEDULED FOR JULY 6-7. FRG AMB VON STULPNAGEL SAID FRG WOULD PREFER FOUR DAYS. OTHER WESTERN DELS, INCLUDING U.S., SAID IT WAS LATE TO CHANGE THE DATES AND TWO DAYS WAS ENOUGH FOR ORGANIZED WORK. A PROGRAM OF WORK IS EXPECTED FROM AMB EKEUS SHORTLY. -- A SPECIAL WESTERN COORDINATION MEETING INCLUDING DELEGATION HEADS WAS HELD JUNE 12 AT THE REQUEST OF FRANCE AS A LAST OPPORTUNITY TO RECEIVE WESTERN COMMENTS ON THE FRENCH PROPOSAL. MOREL SAID HE WOULD PASS THE COMMENTS TO PARIS BUT INDICATED THE PAPER WOULD MOST LIKELY BE TABLED DURING WEEK OF JUNE 15 ANYWAY. THOUGH MOST WESTERN REPS DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE FORMAL INSTRUCTIONS, WESTERN DELS TENTATIVELY SET FORTH THEIR PROBLEM AREAS AS FOLLOWS: --- ITALY (AMB PUGLIESE): NO FINAL POSITION YET, BUT ROME IS INITIALLY NEGATIVE; CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF CW BEING RETAINED AFTER NINEYEARS. --- JAPAN (AMB YAMADA): ALTHOUGH QUALIFYING HIS REMARKS AS PRELIMINARY VIEWS, HIGHLIGHTED CONCERNS ABOUT KEEPING STOCKPILE LOCATIONS SECRET AND CONTINUING TO HAVE A PRODUCTION CAPABILITY. --- CANADA (DESPRES): EXPRESSED PROBLEMS WITH LEGITIMIZING THE ACQUISITION AND RETENTION OF CW, CONTINUED PRODUCTION OF CW AND KEEPING STOCKPILE 15 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET LOCATIONS SECRET. --- AUSTRALIA (AMB BUTLER): ALTHOUGH WITHOUT DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS, EMPHASIZED MAJOR GOALS OF CONVENTION AND WEST; STATED AUSTRALIAN CONCERN THAT CONTINUED PRODUCTION IS CONTRADICTORY TO THE GOAL OF BANNING AND ELIMINATING CW; NOTED "LEGITIMATE" FACETS OF FRENCH CONCERNS; AND THOUGHT "TECHNICAL ADJUSTMENTS" COULD BE WORKED OUT. --- NETHERLANDS (TER HAAR): EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT UNDECLARED STOCKPILE LOCATIONS AND MODERNIZATION OF CW STOCKS. --- UK (EDIS, SITTING IN FOR HOSPITALIZED AMB CROMARTIE): STATED OPPOSITION, NOTING THE DAMAGING EFFECTS ON LIMITING PROLIFERATION AND WEAKENING THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION REGIME. --- BELGIUM (AMB CLERCKX): STATED THAT THEY HAD MIXED VIEWS:? SHARED FRENCH SECURITY CONCERNS AND COULD SEE KEEPING A SMALL STOCKPILE UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL, BUT NOT ALLOWING PRODUCTION. --- FRG (BOLEWSKI): CONTINUED TO OBJECT TO CONTINUED PRODUCTION AND PROLIFERATION AND UNDECLARED STOCKPILE LOCATIONS. ---U.S. (AMB FRIEDERSDORF) COMMENTED ONLY THAT U.S. WAS CONTINUING TO STUDY PROPOSAL. --GENERALLY, WESTERN DELS REGOGNIZED FRENCH SECURITY CONCERNS, BUT BELIEVED THEY COULD BE HANDLED VI 4 THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION SCHEDULE. 5. NETHERLANDS CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROPOSAL -- --ON JUNE 10, DUTCH REPS ROBERT MILDERS AND BOS TER HAAR PRIVATELY TOLD U.S. DEL CHALLENGE INSPECTION IS RECEIVING HIGH-LEVEL HAGUE ATTENTION AND THEY HAVE BEGUN WORK HERE IN GENEVA ON A CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROPOSAL, POSSIBLY FOR THEIR FOREIGN MINISTER TO INTRODUCE WHEN HE SPEAKS HERE ON JULY 2. (NOTE: THE SWEDES ARE ALSO AWARE OF THIS EFFORT.) -- SOME COMPONENTS OF PROPOSAL BEING CONSIDERED ARE: (1) IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE AFTER REQUEST OF INSPECTION TEAM TO THE SITE TO SECURE IT, (2) NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL OF A "SERIOUS" (NOT FURTHER DEFINED) CHALLENGE IN- SPECTION REQUEST AND (3) THE ALTERNATIVE TO "COMPREHENSIVE" ACCESS BEING A "MANAGED" ACCESS WHICH WOULD UTILIZE "TECHNICAL ALTERNATIVES" TO PROTECT SENSITIVE AREAS. 6. SOVIET EXPECTATIONS -- -- IN THE ABSENCE OF BERDENNIKOV (NOW BACKSTOPPING 16 cymovp Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET IN MOSCOW UNDER AMB KARPOV) AND SMIDOVICH, SERGEI BATSANOV (HEAD OF SECTION, DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR AND OUTER SPACE ISSUES, MOFACCORDING TO HIS CARD) IS HEADING SOVIET CW EFFORT UNDER AMB NAZARKIN. - BATSANOV HAS TOLD U.S. DEL THAT HE HAS A "POCKETFUL OF INITIATIVES" BUT THE DIFFICULTY LEES IN DETERMINING THE IFS AND HOWS OF INTRODUCTIONS. WHEN ASKED IF THE LONDON COMMENTS BY KARPOV ON THE MANDATORY INSPECTION OF STOCKPILES WAS A MOVE AWAY FROM PREVIOUS SOVIET INSISTENCE ON ALTERNATIVES, BATSANOV REPLIED THAT IT WAS NOT THE SOVIETS BUT OTHERS AROUND THE TABLE THAT SUPPORTED SUCH ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. -- AT A DINNER HOSTED BY SOVIET AMB NAZARKIN AND VISITING DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER V.F. PETROVSKY, U.S. AMB FRIEDERSDORF AND DEPREP BARTHELEMY PRESSED THE SOVIETS ON THE NEED FOR OPENNESS AND MORE INFORMATION AND ON THE INVITATION TO VISIT TOOELE. - AMB NAZARKIN STATED THAT TECHNICAL EXPERTS HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO IDENTIFY SPECIFIC GAINS THE SOVIETS WOULD ACHIEVE BY ACCEPTING THE TOOELE OFFER. - PETROVSKY REQUESTED THAT IT BE CONVEYED TO WASHINGTON THAT EXPERTS IN MOSCOW STILL BELIEVE THERE TO BE OVERLAPPING AND CONTRADICTORY ELEMENTS IN CD/500 ART X AND XI. WHILE AT FIRST THE SOVIETS THOUGHT THE U.S. 1986 AMENDMENT REMOVED THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERING OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS, SUBSEQUENT U.S. EXPLANATIONS OF THE TEXTUAL CHANGE HAD AGAIN RAISED DOUBTS IN MOSCOW ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS. PETROVSKY STATED THAT THIS ISSUE REMAINS AN IMPEDIMENT TO SOVIET CONFIDENCE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT TAKE LIGHTLY. 7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 17 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 06583 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): OUTER SPACE AD HOC COMMITTEE MEETINGS, APRIL 28-JUNE 11, 1987 REFS: (A) GENEVA 4651 (CD-091) (B) GENEVA 6390 (CD-103) 1. THIS IS CD-109. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY -- -- AD HOC COMMITTEE COMPLETED ITS CONSIDERATION OF FIRST ITEM OF ITS 1987 WORK PROGRAM ("EXAMINATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE"), HEARD PRESENTATION BY CANADIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPS ON PROPOSED PAXSAT VERIFICATION SATELLITE RESEARCH PROJECT, AND BEGAN WORK ON SECOND WORK PROGRAM ITEM ("EXISTING AGREEMENTS RELEVANT TO THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE"). END SUMMARY. 3. MEETING OF APRIL 28 -- -- BULGARIAN REP REITERATED STANDARD EASTERN THEMES: SPACE DOES NOT YET CONTAIN WEAPONS; SOVIETS HAVE PLACED MORATORIUM ON TESTING OF THEIR ASAT SYSTEM; NO RELIABLE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM IS TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE; ICBMS WERE NOT "SPACE" WEAPONS; AND THE CURRENT STATE OF STRATEGIC STABILITY, BASED ON PARITY, SHOULD BE PRESERVED. MONGOLIAN REPEATED USUAL EASTERN CRITIQUE OF U.S. SDI PROGRAM, AND POLISH REP PROFESSED TO SEE "EMERGING CONSENSUS" ON SEVERAL POINTS INCLUDING DEFINITIONS OF SPACE WEAPONS AND THE EVALUATION OF THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF SDI SPACE WEAPONS. --UK REP REMINDED THE AHC THAT BILATERAL AND MULTI- LATERAL EFFORTS IN OUTER SPACE MUST COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER "REALISTICALLY",AND THAT THE BEST WAY TO ADVANCE THE ARMS LIMITATION PROCESS IN THIS AREA WAS THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO CONCERNED POWERS. HE URGED THE COMMITTEE TO USE ITS DISCUSSIONS TO IDENTIFY MEASURES THAT WOULD "GENUINELY" PREVENT AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE WHILE AVOIDING "OVERSIMPLIFIED AND PARTISAN SOLUTIONS." HE STATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION POSSESSED THE WORLD'S ONLY OPERATIONAL ASAT SYSTEM AND WAS CONDUCTING RESEARCH IN THE SAME AREA AS THE U.S. SDI; THIS THEME WAS REITERATED BY AUSTRALIA, WHO ASKED FOR MORE "OPEN AND HONEST" INFORMATION FROM THE SOVIETS ON THEIR SPACE ACTIVITIES, AND JAPAN, WHO CALLED UPON THE USSR TO PROVIDE "DETAILED INFORMA- TION" ON ITS USE OF OUTER SPACE. --AUSTRALIAN REP URGED CD TO SPECIFY OUTER SPACE MILITARY ACTIVITIES PERMITTED OR TOLERATED BY LAW, TO IDENTIFY GAPS IN THE LEGAL REGIME, AND TO ELABORATE CPCRPT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET PROTECTION FOR SATELLITES FUNCTIONING IN "THE COMMON INTEREST." REP ALSO URGED GREATER ATTENTIVENESS TO THE POSSIBILITIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE MONI- TORING AGENCY AND POTENTIAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEA- SURES. VENEZUELA (AMB. TAYLHARDAT) ENDORSED THESE AND POLISH PROPOSALS AND ASKED AHC CHAIRMAN TO INCORPORATE THEM IN A LIST OF SUGGESTIONS THAT WOULD SERVE AS GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT. --USSR (ZHARKOV) STATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S WORK ON SPACE SCIENCE RESEARCH IN THE MILITARY FIELD IS CONNECTED WITH DEVELOPING IMPROVEMENTS IN EARLY WARNING AND NAVIGATION SATELLITES. HE SAID THAT THE USSR WAS NOT CONDUCTING WORK ON SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS, OR SPACE LASERS, AND DID NOT HAVE ANY PROGRAM THAT RESEMBLED THE US SDI. HE REITERATED SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT TO PROHIBIT SPACE WEAPONS UNDER STRICT INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION. US REP RESPONDED BY AGAIN CALLING ATTENTION TO CURRENT SOVIET PROGRAMS IN AREA OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE THAT WERE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF US SDI PROGRAM (REF A). 4. MEETING OF JUNE 9 -- OFFICIALS FROM CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND SPAR AEROSPACE CORPORATION DELIVERED PRESENTATIONS ON ANTICIPATED CAPABILITIES OF PROPOSED PAXSAT A (SPACE TO SPACE) AND PAXSAT B (SPACE TO EARTH) REMOTE SENSING SATELLITE VERIFICATION SYSTEMS. (PRESENTATIONS REPORTED IN REF B). 5. MEETING OF JUNE 11 -- -- AT FINAL MEETING ON ITEM ONE OF WORK PROGRAM, FRANCE (MOREL) DELIVERED SUMMARY STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF WESTERN GROUP WHICH: NOTED THAT THE COMMITTEE'S WORK STILL REMAINED IN AN EXPLORATORY PHASE; REITERATED WESTERN DISPLEASURE WITH "SELECTIVE" AND "VAGUE" APPROACHES PUT FORWARD IN THE COMMITTEE THAT LACK "ACCURACY" AND "OBJECTIVITY"; CALLED FOR MORE ATTENTIVENESS TO THE SUBJECT OF VERIFICATION; STATED THAT TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IS UNAVOIDABLE AND THAT LEGITIMATE RESEARCH CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT BE ? BLOCKED; ASKED THE SOVIET UNION FOR ACCURATE AND MORE COMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT ITS NATIONAL SPACE ACTIVITIES; AND ENDORSED THE NST NEGOTIATIONS, SAYING THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO HINDER THE PROSPECT FOR THEIR SUCCESS. -- MONGOLIAN SUMMARY STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF EASTERN GROUP URGED BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND ENDORSED SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON THE PEACEFUL 1 c: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET USES OF OUTER SPACE, A GUARANTEE OF IMMUNITY FROM ATTACK FOR SPACE SATELLITES, A BAN ON ASATS, A PROHIBITION ON "SPACE-TO-SPACE" WEAPONS, AND AN INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION INSPECTORATE. MONGOLIAN PRESENTATION ALSO SUPPORTED ,SWEDISH PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A SUB-GROUP OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS. -- NO SUMMARY STATEMENT WAS DELIVERED ON BEHALF OF NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED GROUP. -- CHAIRMAN THEN ANNOUNCED THAT DISCUSSION OF SECOND ITEM OF WORK PROGRAM, "EXISTING AGREEMENTS," WOULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AND INVITED PARTICIPATION. USSR REP (ZHARKOV) DELIVERED ANOTHER STANDARD EASTERN DENUNCIATION OF SDI, CLAIMING AGAIN THAT IT WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE ABM TREATY BECAUSE IT WOULD LEAD TO DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF A SPACE-BASED ABM SYSTEM COVERING THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF THE U.S., THE TREATY, HE STATED, PERMITTED DEVELOPMENT TESTING, AND DEPLOYMENT ONLY OF FIXED, LAND-BASED COMPONENTS OF ABM SYSTEMS. HE ACCUSED THE U.S. OF TRYING TO "WATER DOWN" THE ABM TREATY IN ORDER TO "TAILOR" IT TO SDI, AND CALLED FOR "PRACTICAL MEASURES" TO STRENGTHEN THE ABM TREATY TO PRECLUDE SDI. COMMENT: -- THIS MEETING, LIKE CANADIAN PAXSAT BREIFING ON JUNE 9, WAS POORLY ATTENDED, WITH ALMOST TWO-THIRDS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP ABSENT. AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING, CHAIRMAN TOLD U.S. REP PRIVATELY THAT NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED REPS WERE PRESSING HIM TO AUTHORIZE THE DRAFTING AND DISCUSSION IN INFORMAL MEETINGS OF THE AHC FINAL REPORT IN SECTIONS, PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE COMMITTEE'S WORK. THESE INFORMAL MEETINGS COULD ALSO INCLUDE DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANTIVE TOPICS AND THEIR INCLUSION IN THE FINAL REPORT. CHAIRMAN STATED THAT HE RESPONDED THAT SUGGESTED PROPOSAL WOULD BE UNHELPFUL DEPARTURE FROM STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES OF AHC. U.S. REP RECOMMENDED CHAIRMAN IN FUTURE DISCUSSIONS POINT TO POOR ATTENDANCE AT SCHEDULED AHC MEETINGS AND NOTE THAT COMMITTEE WAS NON/NOT MAKING FULL USE OF ITS CURRENT ALLOCATED TIME, SO THAT THE IDEA OF ADDITIONAL MEETINGS TO CONSIDER SEGMENTS OF A FINAL REPORT AND ASSOCIATED SUBJECTS SEEMED PREMATURE. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 2C SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012)06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 \ SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 06738 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT(CD): PLENARY MEETINGS, JUNE 16 AND 18 1987 REF: 1986 GENEVA 6932 (CD-163) 1. THIS IS CD-110. (CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- 16 JUNE PLENARY -- -- FRANCE TABLED WORKING PAPER (CD/757) TO AUTHORIZE RETENTION FOR SECURITY PURPOSES OF SMALL CW PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES AND SECURITY STOCKPILES DURING TEN-YEAR PERIOD UNDER PROPOSED CW CONVENTION IN WHICH CW ELIMINATION IS IMPLEMENTED. PAKISTAN ENDORSED THE PROGRESS TO DATE ON CW BUT SHARPLY CRITICIZED THE FRENCH PROPOSAL; CRITICIZED ABSENCE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND ALLEGED LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE WORK IN THE OUTER SPACE COMMITTEE; AND REBUKED CERTAIN COUNTRIES (READ, U.S.) FOR REOPENING CPD ISSUES THAT ALLEGEDLY WERE AGREED TO PREVIOUSLY. HUNGARY SAID CDE AGREEMENT ON NONUSE OF FORCE OPENED WAY TO AN NSA AGREEMENT, ENDORSED SOVIET CTB PROPOSAL, AND CALLED FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS ESTABLISHMENT OF NTB COMMITTEE. BULGARIA PRAISED THE CD'S CW WORK AND URGED MORE SUBSTANTIVE ACTIVITY IN THE OUTER SPACE ARENA. (FRENCH, PAKISTANI, AND HUNGARIAN STATEMENTS AND FRENCH CW PAPER DATAFAXED TO ACDA/MA.) -- 18 JUNE PLENARY -- -- ONLY ONE DELEGATION SPOKE: INDONESIAN AMB. TARNIDZI. STATEMENT CENTERED ON SOUTHEAST ASIAN NFZ AND ZONE OF PEACE PROPOSALS, AND ALSO DEALT WITH NTB, RW AND CW. END SUMMARY. 3. FRANCE -- -- AMB. MOREL TABLED WORKING PAPER ON THE MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY STOCKPILES DURING THE TEN-YEAR PERIOD OF DESTRUCTION ENVISIONED BY THE CW CONVENTION. MOREL STRESSED THAT THE CW CONVENTION REGIME MUST YIELD EQUALITY AND SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES FROM THE TIME THAT IT ENTERS INTO FORCE AND THROUGHOUT ITS DURATION. HE STATED THAT BECAUSE CURRENT CW CAPABILITIES ARE UNEVENLY DISTRIBUTED, LINEAR DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS WOULD PERPETUATE IMBALANCES, WITH CONCOMITANT SECURITY IMPLICATIONS, THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF REDUCTIONS AND ELIMINATIONS. FRANCE'S REACTION TO THIS SITUATION WOULD BE TO GUARANTEE TO ALL CONVENTION PARTIES MINIMAL CW PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILE CAPABILITIES 21 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL CONTROLS, RESPECTIVELY, WHILE THE OVERALL CAPABILITIES IN THESE AREAS WERE REDUCED. -- SUCH SECURITY STOCKS WOULD BE OPTIONAL, EQUAL FOR PARTIES, AT AS MANY AS FIVE SITES, AND LIMITED TO A TOTAL OF BETWEEN 1,000 AND 2,000 TONS. THESE STOCKS WOULD HAVE TO BE HOMOGENEOUS (TO SIMPLIFY VERIFICATION AND PROTECTION REGIMES), THEIR LOCATIONS COULD BE SECRET OR DECLARED (FRENCH PREFERENCE IS FOR SECRET), AND WOULD BE COMPLEMENTED BY ONE SINGLE PRODUCTION FACILITY. WITH "OTHER" STOCKS AND PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES HAVING BEEN DESTROYED, THESE MINIMAL "SECURITY" AMOUNTS WOULD BE ELIMINATED AS THE LAST STEP OF THE CONVENTION'S TEN-YEAR DESTRUCTION REGIME. -- MOREL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT VERIFICATION OF SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD BE "COMPLEX," BUT STATED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ELABORATE A PROCEDURE FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTION THAT WOULD MEET THE NEEDS OF VERIFICATION WHILE SAFEGUARDING THE SECURITY OF THE STOCKS. HE DENIED THAT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL INVITED CW PROLIFERATION AND SAID A VIABLE CW CONVENTION WAS NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT ASSURANCE OF SECURITY. L. PAKISTAN -- -- AMB. AHMAD ENDORSED THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED TO DATE IN THE CW NEGOTIATIONS, URGED COMPLETION OF A CONVENTION BEFORE SSOD-III, AND CRITICIZED THE FRENCH SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL JUST PRESENTED AS NEGATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CONVENTION._ HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UNRESOLVED CHALLENGED INSPECTION ISSUE BUT STATED THAT FEARS OF FRIVOLOUS CHALLENGES WERE "EXAGGERATED" AND THAT THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL COULD BE ENTRUSTED TO RESOLVE DISPUTES ABOUT ACCESS. HE WELCOMED RECENT SOVIET SHOW OF "FLEXIBILITY" ON THE DECLARATION OF LOCATION OF STOCKPILES, RECALLED PAKISTAN'S PROPOSAL ON TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE UNDER THE CONVENTION, AND URGED CD CONSIDERATION OF COLLECTIVE SANCTIONS BY PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION AGAINST VIOLATORS. -- REGARDING OUTER SPACE, AHMAD CRITICIZED THE "ACADEMIC" NATURE OF DISCUSSION IN, AND THE "INADEQUATE" NON-NEGOTIATING MANDATE OF 22 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET THE AHC. HE HELD THE "INFLEXIBILITY OF ONE GROUP" (READ WESTERN GROUP) RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SITUATION. HE CITED "SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES AND LOOPHOLES" IN THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME, AND CALLED FOR NEGOTIATION OF AN ASAT BAN, A GUARANTEE OF IMMUNITY FOR SATELLITES, AND ULTIMATELY FOR A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON WEAPONS IN SPACE. AHMAD RECALLED PAKISTAN'S 1986 PROPOSAL FOR A MULTILATERAL MEASURE TO SUPPLEMENT THE ABM TREATY REFTEL, AND URGED GREATER ATTENTIVENESS TO PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE MONITORING AGENCY. -- ON CPD, AHMAD CRITICIZED "SOME DELEGATIONS" (READ, U.S.) WHICH HAVE BEGUN TO QUESTION PARTS OF THE DOCUMENT ALLEGEDLY "AGREED UPON BY CONSENSUS", AND TO REOPEN ISSUES WHICH "HAD APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN SETTLED." 5. HUNGARY -- -- AMB. MEISZTER ENDORSED SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A CTB. HE ALSO URGED EXPEDITIOUS ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AD HOC COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN AND RECOMMENDED THAT ITS "PRACTICAL EFFORTS" BE CONCENTRATED IN PARTICULAR ON VERIFICATION ISSUES. HE ELABORATED ON THIS THEME BY NOTING THAT THE SOVIET TREATY PROVISIONS ENVISIONED VERIFICATION BY BOTH NTM AND ON-SITE INSPECTION "ON THE BASIS OF AN APPROPRIATELY SUBSTANTIATED REQUEST, AND THROUGH PROCEDURES TO BE ELABORATED." -- CALLING THE UNILATERAL ASSURANCE APPROACH NOW "OBSOLETE," HE SAID THE CDE AGREEMENT'S TEXT ON NONUSE OF FORCE AND OTHER "NEW THINKING" PROVIDE A BASIS FOR A FRESH APPROACH TO A SINGLE INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT. 6. INDONESIA -- -- NEW AMBASSADOR AGUS TARNIDZI, THE 18 JUNE ZONE PLENARY'S ONLY SPEAKER BEGAN WITH A SHORT CRITIQUE OF DISARMAMENT EFFORTS SINCE THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNGA DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT (SSOD-I). AFTER NOTING THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF VARIOUS BILATERAL, REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL EFFORTS, ESPECIALLY THE TREATY OF RAROTUNGA (SPNFZ), HE TOUTED HIS OWN COUNTRY'S EFFORTS TOWARD ACHIEVING A SOUTHEAST ASIAN NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE (SEANFZ) AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF AN OVERALL SOUTHEAST ASIAN ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM, AND NEUTRALITY (ZOPFAN). 25X1 9, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- TURNING TO THE CD, TARNIDZI POINTED TO THE CW NEGOTIATIONS AND RW COMMITTEE WORK AS THE BEST OPPORTUNITIES TO PRODUCE TANGIBLE RESULTS BEFORE SSOD-III. HE CONCLUDED WITH AN APPEAL TO RECONVENE A NUCLEAR TEST BAN AD HOC COMMITTEE. -- (COMMENT: TARNIDZI'S OBSERVATION THAT THE SEANFZ WOULD CONSTITUTE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ZOPFAN WAS THE CLEAREST EXPRESSION WE HAVE HEARD OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO CONCEPTS. ZOPFAN IS INCLUDED IN A PARAGRAPH OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT DRAFT BRACKETED IN THE SPRING BY U.S. DEL.) 7. PROCEDURAL -- -- ON 16 JUNE CD ADOPTED WORK PROGRAM FOR SUMMER SESSION WHICH, INTER ALIA, SETS AUGUST 28 AS CLOSING DATE OF SESSION. THIS WILL MAKE ONLY THE LAST WEEK OF THE CD CONCURRENT WITH ONE WEEK OF THE DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE IN NEW YORK. FLACK END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NN Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 06792 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): WESTERN GROUP MEETING, JUNE 17, 1987 1. THIS IS CD-111. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- REGULAR WEEKLY MEETING OF WESTERN GROUP FOCUSED ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR TEST BAN (INCLUDING INDIA/PAK DEVELOPMENTS). CPD, OS AND OTHER AGENDA ITEMS WERE ALSO DISCUSSED. -- HIGHLIGHTS FOLLOWING, ALONG WITH STATUS REPORT ON OTHER CD ISSUES. END SUMMARY. 3. CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- -- DUTCH AMB VAN SCHAIK (WESTERN CW COORDINATOR) REPORTED ON EASTERN GROUP CONCERN THAT CW EXPERT DISCUSSIONS ON JULY 6 AND 7 COULD EVOLVE INTO NEGOTIATIONS AND MIGHT IMPEDE NORMAL WORK. HE SAID THAT SWEDISH AMB EKEUS (CW AHC CHAIRMAN) HAD ASSURED EASTERN GROUP THAT THEY WOULD BE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS ONLY AND WOULD NOT AFFECT OTHER WORK. WESTERN GROUP AGREED TO DISCUSS THE FRENCH PROPOSAL ON CW SECURITY STOCKPILES AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL 22 JUNE. -- ?VAN SCHAIK INDICATED HE WANTS TO EXPLORE WITH EKEUS THE MATTER OF LATTER'S INTENTIONS FOR HANDLING CHALLENGE INSPECTION DISCUSSIONS. BELGIAN REP NOTED CLUSTER IV CHAIRMAN (GDR REP KRUTZSCH), WHO HAS COGNIZANCE FOR THIS ISSUE, HAS ALREADY COMPLAINED TO EKEUS FOR BEING UNABLE TO INCLUDE THIS SUBJECT ON HIS AGENDA. (COMMENT: EKEUS PERSISTS IN HIS CLOSED GROUP CONSULTATIONS TO OUTSIDERS' DISCOMFORT; VAN SCHAIK SEEKS TO CORRECT THIS PROBLEM.) 4. NUCLEAR TEST BAN -- -- JAPANESE AMB YAMADA (NTB COORDINATOR) REPORTED, FROM WESTERN NTB JUNE 16 COORDINATION MEETING, GENERAL ASSESSMENT THAT SOVIET CTB TREATY PROVISIONS PRESENTED TO CD JUNE 9 CONSTITUTE PRIMARILY A POLITICAL MOVE RATHER THAN A SERIOUS PROPOSAL AND THAT IT DOES NOT WARRANT A SUBSTANTIVE WESTERN RESPONSE. (COMMENT: FRG REP REPORTED THAT SOVIET AMB NAZARKIN HAD TOLD AMB VON STULPNAGEL THAT PETROVSKY'S INITIATIVE WAS AIMED AT THE WESTERN PUBLIC, PARTICULARLY PEACE GROUPS.) YAMADA ALSO INDICATED AGREEMENT THAT NO FURTHER ACTION ON THE NTB MANDATE PROPOSED BY APRIL CD PRESIDENT VEJVODA IS APPROPRIATE BY THE WESTERN GROUP UNTIL THE G-21 RESPONDS TO IT. -- YAMADA ALSO REPORTED THAT JAPAN HAS MADE DEMARCHES TO BOTH PAKISTAN AND INDIA REGARDING 25 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET THEIR RESPECTIVE NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS. (-- AT 16 JUNE SESSION, YAMADA AND OTHERS RESPONDED IN MORE DETAIL ON THEIR APPROACHES TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN. YAMADA SAID JAPAN IS "SERIOUSLY CONCERNED." JAPANESE FM URGED INDO/PAK NPT ADHERENCE AND REQUESTED INDIAN FM TO CLARIFY GOI POSITION ON HIS 20 MAY TOKYO VISIT. RESPONSE WAS THAT PAKISTAN IS TO BLAME; INDIA HAS NOT DECIDED TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT MUST KEEP ITS OPTION OPEN: A MOD "STATEMENT" DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN; THE NPT IS A NON- STARTER. ON 2 JUNE JAPAN EXPRESSED CONCERN TO PAK DEPFONMIN, AND RECEIVED STOCK RESPONSES BOILING DOWN TO "INDIA IS TO BLAME." TOKYO ANTICIPATES EXPRESSING CONCERN AGAIN DURING AN EXPECTED JULY VISIT BY PAK PM. JAPAN'S ACTIONS HAVE BEEN PRIVATE, THOUGH THEY MAY SAY SOMETHING PUBLIC FOLLOWING THE PM'S VISIT. YAMADA URGED OTHER WESTERN GROUP MEMBERS TO MAKE SIMILAR DEMARCHES. - AMB BUTLER REPORTEE 'NEGATIVE AND ADVER- SARIAL" RESPONSES TO SIMILAR AUSTRALIAN DEMARCHES IN ISLAMABAD AND NEW DELHI, AND STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF PARALLEL EFFORTS BY OTHERS. -- CANADIAN REP MACKINNON REPORTED SIMIJAR EFFORTS AND RESULTS, BUT NOTED THAT AT LEAST BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAD BEEN PUT ON NOTICE, AND HAD TO TAKE THAT FACT INTO ACCOUNT. -- U.S. REP SAID NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS WERE DEALT WITH BY OTHER COMPONENTS OF USG THAN THAT SUPPORTING CD; OTHER WESTERN GROUP MEMBERS WERE UNDOUBTEDLY AWARE, THROUGH THEIR CONTACTS IN WASHINGTON AND CAPITALS, OF U.S. CONCERN AND EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH INDO/PAK PROBLEMS.) 5. CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT -- -- IN RESPONSE TO SEVERAL ALLIED COMMENTS ON THE NEED FOR A RESPONSE TO FRESH EASTERN CRITICISM OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, AMB. FRIEDERSDORF SAID THAT HE INTENDED TO DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE IN HIS INAUGURAL CD STATEMENT. -- COMMENT: WITH REGARD TO CD CONSIDERATION OF THIS ITEM, JUNE CD PRESIDENT ALFARARGI IS CONTINUING TO SEEK TO HOLD ONE OR MORE INFORMAL PLENARY MEETINGS, BUT PROCEDURAL DISPUTES HAVE NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED. 6. OUTER SPACE -- -- ITALIAN AMB PUGLIESE (OS AHC CHAIRMAN) UPDATED WESTERN GROUP ON G-21 REQUEST TO DRAFT AND DISCUSS OS AHC FINAL REPORT IN SECTIONS, NOTING 26 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 - ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET THAT BEYOND SOME REITERATIONS OF ORIGINAL REQUEST THERE HAVE BEEN NO FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. -- WESTERN OS COORDINATOR, AMB MOREL, APPEALED TO THE GROUP TO THINK OF WAYS BY WHICH WEST COULD DEVELOP "A MORE VIGOROUS AND CONCRETE POSTURE" ON CD OUTER SPACE ISSUES. HE NOTED THREE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS BEFORE THE AHC: THE G-21 WANTS TO INITIATE WORK ON THE COMMITTEE REPORT IN SOME WAY PRIOR TO THE NORMAL AUGUST DATE; THE FRG PROPOSES AHC ATTEMPT TO FORMULATE A SERIES OF AGREED QUESTIONS RE THE EXISTING LEGAL REGIME IN SPACE IT WOULD ATTEMPT TO ANSWER OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO; THE UK SUGGESTS THAT THE SECRETARIAT PREPARE A BRIEF INFORMATION PAPER ON THE ROLE AND ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY COPUOS. MOREL SUPPORTED THE GRG AND UK SUGGESTIONS. -- UK (EDIS) INTERJECTED THAT HE ALSO FEELS "INTELLECTUAL AND TACTICAL FRUSTRATION" IN DEALING WITH OUTER SPACE ISSUES AND THAT WESTERN GROUP "HASN'T DONE ENOUGH" TO CREATE "BUILDING BLOCKS." AMB FRIEDERSDORF SAID U.S. REMAINS OPPOSED TO THE G-21 PROPOSAL, MISNAMED A "ROLLING TEXT." HOWEVER, HE SUPPORTED UK PROPOSAL FOR SECRETARIAT PAPER ON COPUOS, AS DID OTHER DELS THAT SPOKE. 7. NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES -- -- BOLEWSKI REPORTED THAT COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN VON STULPNAGEL PLANS TO OPEN FORMAL NSA DISCUSSIONS DURING THE SECOND WEEK OF JULY (FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM CONVALESCENCE),IT WAS ALSO REPORTED THAT PAKISTAN WOULD LIKE TO PURSUE A LIMITED (REGIONAL) NSA AGREEMENT, IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN A GLOBAL BAN. 8. COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT -- -- AUSTRALIAN AMB. BUTLER OPINED THAT WHAT HAPPENS IN CPD WILL HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE DATE OF SSOD-III. HE SEES MEXICAN AMB. GARCIA ROBLES ATTEMPTING TO SCHEDULE SSOD-III TO SUIT HIS NEEDS; BASED ON THE STATUS OF CPD, POSSIBLY SEEKING TO DELAY SESSION BEYOND 1988. HE REPORTED PERCEPTION OF SOME CD DELS, CORRECT OR NOT, THAT U.S. HAS SIGNALED MORE NEGATIVE POSTURE IN THE AHC TOWARD COM- PLETION OF CPD. USDEL STRESSED THAT ANY SUCH PERCEPTION IS INACCURATE. 9. RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS -- -- FRG REP (HERZBRUG) REPORTED THAT RW WORK IS BEING HELD UP BECAUSE MOROCCO IS INSISTING, CONTRARY TO GENERAL AGREEMENT TO A TWO-TRACK TREATMENT, ON A 27 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET UNITARY APPROACH TO ISSUES OF TRADITIONAL RW AND A BAN ON ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR FACILITIES. 10. COMMENT: WESTERN GROUP DID NOT ADDRESS PNW, MDW, OR INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN ANY DEPTH AND NOTHING OF CONSEQUENCE HAS TRANSPIRED ON THESE SUBJECTS. FLACK END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 2C SECRET ' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 06995 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): MEETING WITH U.S. SENATE OBSERVER DELEGATION REF: NST GENEVA 6097 (NOTAL) 1. THIS IS CD-112. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY -- -- CD DEL BRIEFED SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL (D, RI), SENATOR J. BENNETT JOHNSTON (D, LA), AND STAFFERS ON JUNE 21 ON STATUS OF CD WORK. MOST OF BRIEFING AND VIRTUALLY ALL QUESTIONS FOCUSED ON STATUS OF CW NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY. 3. SEN. CLAIBORNE PELL (D, RI), CHAIRMAN OF OBSERVER DELEGATION, SEN. J. BENNETT JOHNSON (D, LA), AND STAFFERS WERE BRIEFED ON JUNE 21, 1987 BY AMB FRIEDERSDORF AND DELOFFS ON THE STATUS OF CD ACTIVITIES. FRIEDERSDORF FOCUSED ON STATUS OF CW NEGOTIATIONS, DESCRIBING FLOOD OF SOVIET GENERALIZED INITIATIVES IN SPRING AS MOVES FROM PREVIOUS UNTENABLE POSITIONS, LACKING ANY ELABORATION OF SPECIFIC DETAILS; JUNE 16 TABLING OF FRENCH SECURITY STOCKPILE PAPER (WITH CON- COMITANT DISMAY AMONG WESTERN ALLIES AND OTHER NATIONS); AND GENERAL MOVEMENT ON THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUE TOWARDS U.S. POSITION. 4. VIRTUALLY ALL CODEL QUESTIONS FOCUSED ON CW ISSUES, AND CAN BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS: -- A. TIMETABLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS: CD DEL POINTED OUT THAT THERE ARE STILL MANY ISSUES TO BE NEGOTIATED; THE PACE OF A MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION IS BY ITS VERY NATURE SLOW; AND THERE IS NO REALISTIC HOPE FOR COMPLETION OF A CONVENTION IN 1987. -- B. SOVIET MOTIVES: A KEY, PROBABLY THE KEY, FACTOR IN SOVIET MOTIVATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CW NEGOTIATIONS IS STOPPING THE U.S. BINARY WEAPONS PROGRAM. -- C. VERIFICATION: GENERAL SOVIET PROPOSITIONS TO ACCEPT CHALLENGE INSPECTION AT DECLARED FACILITIES/SITES AND IN INSTANCES OF USE AS WELL AS SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR SO-CALLED "ALTERNATIVE MEASURES" TO CHALLENGE INSPECTION, WERE SUMMARIZED. CD DEL EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. HAS CONCERNS ABOUT UNDECLARED FACILITIES, AND HAS BEEN UNABLE TO DETERMINE ANY EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO MANDA- TORY ACCESS. THE FUNDAMENTAL PREMISE OF THE U.S. PROPOSED CHALLENGE INSPECTION REGIME FOR CW IS THE ABILITY TO REQUEST AND BE ALLOWED CHALLENGE INSPECTION ANYWHERE AT ANY TIME. 29 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 - D. WHY TEN YEARS ARE NEEDED FOR DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS: IT WAS NOTED THAT TEN YEARS IS A NON-CONTENTIOUS, REALISTIC TIME-FRAME FOR BUILDING NECESSARY DESTRUCTION FACILITIES, IMPLEMENTING NECESSARY VERIFICATION PROCEDURES AND CARRYING OUT WHAT PROMISES TO BE A SLOW PROCESS. - E. SOVIET CW CAPABILITIES: THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR IS LARGE WITH THE SOVIETS POSSESSING SIGNIFICANT DEEP-PENETRATION CW CAPABILITIES FOR WHICH NO U.S. COUNTERPART CURRENTLY EXISTS. BRIEF DISCUSSION ENSUED ON IMPACT OF SOVIET CW ATTACK ON MAJOR NATO SEA AND/OR AERIAL POST FACILITIES DURING REFORGER PERIOD. CODEL WAS ALSO GIVEN A ROUGH ESTIMATE OF THOSE COUNTRIES THAT ARE CURRENTLY SUSPECTED OF PRODUCING AND/OR POSSESSING CW. 5. COMMENT: BRIEFING WAS WELL RECEIVED, AND PROVIDED CODEL WITH GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLORE MAJOR CW ISSUES OF CURRENT CONCERN. 6. CODEL DID NOT SEE THIS MESSAGE PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. FLACK END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 _ SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 06996 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS: JUNE 15-19, 1987 REFS: (A) GENEVA 6738 (CD-163), (B) GENEVA 6562 (CD-102) 1. THIS IS CD-113. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- FOUR MEETINGS WERE HELD ON CLUSTER I (CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKS). THE CHAIRMAN SELECTED SOME ISSUES FOR FURTHER INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. -- FRENCH PROPOSAL ON CW SECURITY STOCKS WAS TABLED IN JUNE 16 PLENARY (REPORTED REF A). ALTHOUGH A TOPIC OF DISCUSSION IN GROUPS AND PRIVATELY; THE PROPOSAL HAS NOT BEEN RAISED OR DISCUSSED IN THE CWAHC. -- DUTCH ARE NOW NOT EXPECTED TO TABLE A CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROPOSAL ON JULY 2 (REPORTED REF B). -- NORWAY PRESENTED PAPER TO WESTERN CW COORDINATING GROUP ON PROCEDURES FOR VERIFICATION OF ALLEGED USE AND ANNOUNCED PLANS TO TABLE PAPER ON JUNE 30 AND TO TABLE A JOINT CANADIAN/NORWEGIAN PROPOSED ANNEX TO WP.167 ART IX ON JULY 7. ACTION REQUEST PARA 6. -- SOVIETS HAVE BEGUN TO PORTRAY THEMSELVES AS ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS IN DISCUSSION, EAGER TO RESOLVE THE KEY ISSUES. -- CHALLENGE INSPECTION CONTINUES TO BUBBLE BEHIND THE SCENES, WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF CLUSTER IV (CW ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES AND FUNCTIONS; FACTFINDING AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION) AND THE DUTCH CW WESTERN COORDINATOR PUSHING FOR DISCUSSION IN BROADER FORMAT THAN THE SPRING SWEDISH "CLOSED GROUP" INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. 3. CLUSTER I -- -- DISCUSSION ON THE ORDER OF ELIMINATION OF CW STOCKS WAS LIMITED DUE TO THE INABILITY TO DETERMINE STOCKPILE EQUIVALENTS. MONGOLIA REITERATED ITS PROPOSAL (CD/CW/WP.162) ON EQUIVALENTS AND SPAIN TABLED A WORKING PAPER ON EQUIVALENTS. BOTH ARE BASED ON TOXICITY (LD 50) CRITERIA. NEITHER THE FRENCH NOR ANYONE ELSE RAISED THE FRENCH SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL; THAT TOPIC WILL BE TAKEN UP IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. -- NO ONE WAS PREPARED TO TAKE UP THE ISSUES OF JURISDICTION AND CONTROL AND PAST TRANSFERS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. CHINA REITERATED UNDESIRABILITY OF BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR ANOTHER COUNTRY'S (READ JAPAN) STOCKS OF WEAPONS LEFT ON THEIR TERRITORY 31 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET AGAINST THEIR WILL. FRANCE NOTED PROBLEM OF REPORTING PAST TRANSFERS SINCE 1946 BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTY THAT COMPLETE, CHRONOLOGICAL RECORDS OF SUCH TRANSFERS WERE KEPT. -- WHEN THE CHAIRMAN RAISED THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE CURRENT CW/WP.167 TEXT ON PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF VERIFICATION OF CW DESTRUCTION NEEDED FURTHER ELABORATION, U.S. DEL REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. SOVIET DELOFF BATSANOV MADE MANY VERBOSE INTERVENTIONS, EMPHASIZING THE NEED TO FOCUS ON KEY ISSUES, AND PRESSING THE U.S. FOR THE DETAIL WE SAY WE NEED. AFTER THE MEETING, U.S. DEL PRESSED BATSANOV FOR DETAILS ON NEW SOVIET DESTRUCTION FACILITY, NOTINGTHAT WE HAD ASKED FOR DETAILS IN THE SPRING. BATSANOV SAID HE HAD NOTHING, BUT HOPED TO HAVE SOMETHING SOON. -- THE SUBJECT OF OLD, OBSOLETE CHEMICAL WEAPONS FOUND AFTER DECLARATIONS OF STOCKS ARE MADE RECEIVED THE MOST DISCUSSION. PROBLEMS STILL CENTER AROUND THE ISSUES OF JURISDICTION AND CONTROL, DEFINITION OF THE TERMS "OLD" AND "OBSOLETE," RETRIEVAL OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS UNDER BODIES OF WATER, MUNITIONS THAT ARE TOO DANGEROUS TO BE MOVED (AND THUS HAVE TO BE DESTROYED IN PLACE), AND THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN SOME CURRENT METHODS OF DESTROYING OLD WAR MUNITIONS (OPEN AIR BURNING, DUMPING IN THE OCEAN) AND METHODS REQUIRED UNDER PROVISIONS OF WP.167. -- IN THIS CONTEXT, SEVERAL SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND EXAMPLES WERE CITED, INCLUDING THE CHINESE- JAPANESE ISSUE OF STOCKS NOTED ABOVE. ALSO, BELGIUM NOTED FINDING BETWEEN 15 AND 20 TONS OF OLD WWI MUNITIONS PER YEAR (AND CONSEQUENT DIFFICULTIES OF DECLARING FINDINGS AS FREQUENTLY AS CD/500 CALLS FOR), BURYING THEM IN CONCRETE IN THE SEA UP UNTIL 1980 AND NOW STORING THEM WITH NON- CHEMICAL MUNITIONS WHILE LOOKING FOR ANOTHER METHOD OF DESTRUCTION. ITALY CALLED ATTENTION TO ITS FINDING SOME DETERIORATED CW MUNITIONS NEAR ITS NORTHEASTERN BORDER. INDONESIA MENTIONED THE JOINT COOPERATION WITH THE NETHERLANDS ON THE DISPOSITION OF OLD CW STOCKS IN INDONESIA AND NOTED THAT SOME OF THE AGENT WAS STILL OF 98 PERCENT STRENGTH. JAPAN CITED FISHERMEN RETRIEVING WEAPONS DUMPTED IN THE SEA FOLLOWING WWII. - U.S CD/500 PROVISIONS FOR OLD, OBSOLETE MUNITIONS WERE INTRODUCED AS A POSSIBLE BASIS FOR DRAFTING PROVISIONS, AND DESPITE DIFFERENCES, THERE WAS 32 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET GENERAL INTEREST IN SEEING WHAT DRAFT TEXT COULD BE DEVELOPED. -- CLUSTER I CHAIRMAN (PHILIP NIEUWENHUYS, BELGIUM PLANS TO PURSUE WORK INFORMALLY ON ORDER OF DESTRUCTION; OLD, OBSOLETE CHEMICAL WEAPONS; AND FURTHER ELABORATION ON VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. 4. FRENCH PROPOSAL -- -- THE ONLY PLENARY STATEMENT CRITICIZING THE FRENCH PROPOSAL WAS AN AD HOC COMMENT BY PAKISTAN ON THE SAME DAY. -- WHILE WESTERN MEMBERS CONTINUE TO EXPRESS CONCERNS, THATHE PROPOSAL WAS NOT A TOPIC FOR FORMAL DISCUSSION IN THE CW WESTERN COORDINATION GROUP, NNA AND EASTERN GROUPS HAVE PRIVATELY EXPRESSED CONCERNS. AT A LUNCH HOSTED BY AMB EKEUS (SWEDISH (WAHC CHAIRMAN) FOR AMB FRIEDERSDORF, THE ENTIRE CONVERSATION WAS FOCUSSED ON SWEDISH CONCERNS ABOUT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL AND ITS IMPACT ON NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN NO PUBLIC DISCUSSION IN THE CWAHC. -- THE U.S. CONTINUES TO BE PRESSED FOR ITS POSITION AND REMAINS UNDER SUSPICION OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROPOSAL BECAUSE OF OUR CONTINUED SILENCE. 5. NETHERLANDS CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROPOSAL -- -- EARLY IN THE WEEK, U.S. DEL WAS SHOWN A ROUGH DRAFT OF A DUTCH PAPER OUTLINING ELEMENTS OF A CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROPOSAL. ALTHOUGH THE PAPER CONTAINED SOME BASIC CONCEPTS SIMILAR TO U.S. VIEWS, IT ALSO ELABORATED SEVERAL UNHELPFUL IDEAS. DUTCH DEL NOTED POSSIBILITY OF INTRODUCTION BY FOREIGN MINISTER ON JULY 2 AND THAT THE PAPER HAD ALSO BEEN SHOWN TO THE UK DEL. -- U.S. DEL PROVIDED INFORMAL COMMENTS ON THE UNHELPFUL PORTIONS OF THE PAPER AND NOTED THAT WE FELT IT WAS PREMATURE FOR INTRODUCTION AS EARLY AS JULY. (FOLLOW-ON CONVERSATION WITH THE UK DEL REVEALED THAT ALTHOUGH THEY THOUGHT THE PAPER WAS BASICALLY GOOD, THEY AGREED THAT IT WAS PREMATURE FOR INTRODUCTION.) -- LATER IN THE WEEK, A REVISED COPY OF THE PAPER WAS PROVIDED, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SOME OF THE U.S. AND UK COMMENTS (PAPER DATAFAXED TO JCS). DUTCH DEL SAID THEY HAD ADVISED THE HAGUE AGAINST INTRODUCTION IN JULY AND DID NOT EXPECT 33 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET IT TO BE INTRODUCED. THEY NOTED THEY ARE NOW CONSIDERING WHAT TO DO WITH IT, E.G. POSSIBLY A PROPOSAL FOR DISCUSSION IN WESTERN GROUP. -- U.S. DEL INTENDS TO DISCOURAGE NOTION OF A NATIONAL PROPOSAL AND ENCOURAGE ITS USE AS A TOOL FOR WESTERN DISCUSSION. 6. NORWEGIAN PROPOSAL ON VERIFICATION OF ALLEGED USE -- NORWAY (STEN LUNDBO) PRESENTED ITS PAPER ON PROCEDURES FOR VERIFICATION OF ALLEGED USE (DATAFAXED TO ACDA) TO THE WESTERN COORDINATING GROUP ON JUNE 16. LUNDBO NOTED THESE PAPERS WERE REVISED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT U.S. AND OTHERS' COMMENTS AND THEY WILL BE TABLED JUNE 30. -- LATE FRIDAY, LUNDBO PRIVATELY GAVE U.S. DEL AN ADVANCE COPY OF THE DRAFT ANNEX PROVISIONS (DATAFAXED TO ACDA) ON VERIFICATION OF USE THAT NORWAY AND CANADA WILL TABLE JULY 7. HE HAS REQUESTED COMMENT BY JUNE 24. REQUEST WASHINGTON REVIEW AND COMMENTS. 7. CW WESTERN COORDINATION GROUP -- -- JUNE 15 DISCUSSION FOCUSSED ON WESTERN PRIORITIES FOR THE SUMMER. ALL AGREED THAT MUCH NEEDED TO BE DONE IN THE AREA OF NON-PRODUCTION: COMMERCIALLY PRODUCED STLCS, DATA REPORTING REGIME FOR SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS AND GUIDELINES FOR SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS. -- ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION, DUTCH COORDINATOR STATED THE NEED FOR FORMAL REGISTRATION OF THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE SWEDISH INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS HELD IN THE SPRING. FRANCE AGREED, NOTING THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE LEFT TO AUGUST AND IT IS TIME TO PROFIT FROM AMB. EKEUS' WORK. U.S. NOTED THAT A WAY OF INTRODUCING THE INFORMAL WORK INTO THE CWAHC MIGHT BE FOR EKEUS TO HIGHLIGHT SOME AGREED ELEMENTS FOR DISCUSSION IN GROUPS PRIOR TO INTRODUCTION INTO THE AHC. (FYI: SOME RESENTMENT EXISTS THAT ALL WESTERN MEMBERS, ESPECIALLY FRG, WERE NOT INCLUDED IN EKEUS' PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS. THUS ANY "AGREED" ELEMENTS IN EKEUS' CONSULTATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE VETTED IN THE GROUPS FIRST, WHICH WILL TAKE SOME TIME. END FYI.) -- FOLLOWING DUTCH COORDINATOR AMB. VAN SCHAIK'S COMMENTS ON THE "KEY ISSUES" REQUIRING RESOLUTION, U.S. DEL NOTED THAT NOT ONLY "KEY ISSUES," BUT ALSO CORRESPONDING IMPLEMENTING DETAILS NEED TO BE WORKED OUT AS WELL. WE NOTED THAT WE INTEND TO MAKE THAT POINT CLEAR TO OTHERS, SUCH AS THE SOVIETS, WHOM WE EXPECT TO PRESS THIS SUMMER FOR QUICK, POLITICAL AGREEMENT ON "KEY ISSUES." AFTER U.S. COMMENT, VAN SCHAIK MENTIONED CONCERN NOT TO BE PERCEIVED AS BLOCKING 34 cproom Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 N SECRET AGREEMENT, AND ONLY BELGIUM WEAKLY SUPPORTED U.S. CONCERNS, NOTING THE DESIRE NOT TO GET CAUGHT IN A "DRAMATIZATION OF ISSUES." -- IN AN ASIDE, AUSTRALIAN DEL ASKED IF U.S. WAS LOOKING INTO THE SUBJECT OF COSTS OF AN INSPECTORATE. THEY ARE INTERESTED IN THIS AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY U.S. THOUGHTS ON THIS SUBJECT. 8. SOVIET ACTIVITIES -- -- SOVIETS ARE CLEARLY OUT TO PORTRAY THEMSELVES AS ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CW NEGOTIATIONS. THEY HAVE BEEN SPEAKING LONG AND OFTEN, ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY SUBSTANTIVELY, HIGHLIGHTING KEY ISSUES NEEDING RESOLUTION, AND PRESSING THE U.S. FOR THE DETAIL WE SAY WE NEED. THEY OFTEN ATTEND MEETINGS WITH THREE OR FOUR EXPERTS IN TOW. 9. CHALLENGE INSPECTION -- -- INTEREST IS GROWING TO MOVE DISCUSSIONS FROM THE SWEDISH INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS HELD IN THE SPRING INTO BROADER, MORE PUBLIC FORUMS. -- U.S. ADVISED SWEDISH DEL THAT WE HAD NOTHING NEW TO SAY ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND WOULD HAVE NOTHING FURTHER TO ADD IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS, IF THEY WISHED TO CONTINUE THEM. WE SUGGESTED IT WAS PREMATURE TO TRY TO PUSH DISCUSSION FURTHER AND THAT THEY MIGHT WISH TO CAPITALIZE ON THE SPRING DISCUSSIONS BY WORKING SOME OF THE AREAS OF AGREEMENT THROUGH THE GROUPS INTO THE CWHC. 10. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NN 3E, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07021 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY (CSIS) REFS: (A) STATE 190374 (NOTAL); (B) GENEVA 06460 (CD-106); (C) GENEVA 06391 (CD-104) 1. (U) THIS IS CD-114. 2. (U) SUMMARY: FOLLOWING UP ON TWO CURSORY REFERENCES TO THEIR CSIS PROPOSAL DURING THE SPRING CD SESSION, THE SOVIETS RAISED CSIS THREE TIMES DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF THE SUMMER CD SESSION. ON JUNE 9, SOVIET DEPFORMIN PETROVSKY TABLED POSSIBLE PROVISIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE TEST-BAN (CTB) TREATY (CD/756) WHICH INCLUDED A REFERENCE TO A CTB AS "AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE CSIS" (REFTEL C). ON JUNE 10, PETROVSKY ADDRESSED A MEETING OF THE UN INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH (UNIDIR) DEVOTED TO CSIS, AT WHICH HE PERCEIVED A NEED TO CREATE NEW MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS TO DEAL WITH OUTER SPACE AND VERIFICATION, AND TO PROVIDE THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) WITH A FORMAL ROLE IN DISARMAMENT. HE ELABORATED EXTENSIVELY ON THE LATTER CONCEPT. ON JUNE 11, SOVIET AMB NAZARKIN TOLD THE CD THAT CSIS COULD PLAY A ROLE IN REDUCING ARMAMENTS AND IMPROVING THE "POLITICAL CLIMATE" IN EUROPE (REFTEL B). THIS MESSAGE REVIEWS PETROVSKY'S COMMENTS ON CSIS AT THE JUNE 10 UNIDIR MEETING. 3. (C) THE CD IS BUT ONE OF SEVERAL INTERNATIONAL FORA AT WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE RAISED CSIS THIS YEAR, AND USDEL DOUBTS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL TABLE ANY FORMAL PROPOSAL DIRECTLY RELATED TO CSIS AT THE CD. HOWEVER, PETROVSKY'S REPEATED REFERENCES TO THE IAEA DURING THE UNIDIR MEETING ON CSIS CONCEIVABLY COULD PRESAGE A SOVIET PROPOSAL AT THE NEXT IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE TO CONFER A FORMAL DISARMAMENT ROLE UPON THE IAEA. THEREFORE, WASHINGTON MAY WISH TO INCLUDE GUIDANCE AND TALKING POINTS ON CSIS IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO USDEL TO THE IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY. 4. (U) ON JUNE 10, SOVIET DEPFORMIN VLADIMIR PETROVSKY GAVE AN HOUR-LONG PRESENTATION ON CSIS, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF UNIDIR, TO APPROXIMATELY 120 PERSONS, ONE-FIFTH OF WHOM REPRESENTED SIXTEEN CD DELEGATIONS. HIS AUDIENCE INCLUDED THE CD DELEGATION HEADS FROM MEXICO, PAKISTAN, SRI LANKA, AND ZAIRE, AS WELL AS THE GENEVA PERMREPS OF CYPRUS, ITALY, AND MALTA. THE FOLLOWING WERE THE PRINCIPAL POINTS THAT PETROVSKY ADDRESSED IN HIS SPEECH: 36 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 r ? _; Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET - (U) IAEA: THE AGENCY IS NOT NOW OPERATING AT ITS FULL POTENTIAL. ITS SUCCESS AT NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION SHOULD BE EMULATED IN THE DISARMAMENT FIELD. IF A NEW WORLD ORGANIZATION DEVOTED TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT CANNOT BE CREATED NOW THE IAEA SHOULD ASSUME SUCH A ROLE. FOR INSTANCE, THE IAEA COULD COORDINATE AN INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA SO AS TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE BY STATES WITH A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING. - (U) OUTER SPACE: PETROVSKY REITERATED THE USSR'S SUPPORT FOR A "WORLD SPACE ORGANIZATION" AS PART OF "A BROADER, INTERNATIONAL APPROACH" TO ENHANCE COOPERATION AMONG STATES AND "VERIFY AGREEMENTS TO PREVENT AN ARMS RACE" IN OUTER SPACE. HE ALSO REFERRED IN THIS CONTEXT TO THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR AN "INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE MONITORING AGENCY". - (U) SDI: THE U.S. PROGRAM NEEDLESSLY DESTABILIZES INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. SDI CANNOT BE FULLY EFFECTIVE, AND THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO IT WILL BE "LESS EXPENSIVE," BUT SUFFICIENT. PETROVSKY ADDED THE STANDARD THREAT THAT THE USSR "WOULD NOT NECESSARILY REPLY (TO SDI) IN SPACE". - (U) CBM'S: RATHER THAN RELY ON "MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTIONS," STATES MUST ESTABLISH A NEW "NETWORK OF CONTACTS" TO BRING ABOUT "NOT JUST THE ABSENCE OF WAR, BUT A POSITIVE PEACE". OTHERWISE, NATIONS WILL REMAIN "HOSTAGES TO TECHNOLOGY," DEVELOPING "NEW MEANS OF WAGING WAR" THAT MAN WILL BE UNABLE TO CONTROL. (PETROVSKY CITED THE ACCIDENTS AT THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR REACTOR AND THE "CHALLENGER" SPACE SHUTTLE TO SUPPORT HIS STATEMENT.) A "PROPER TECHNOLOGY" FOR DISARMAMENT WOULD IMPROVE UPON "NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS" BY DEVELOPING NEW APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION AND ON-SITE INSPECTION. FIELD TESTS IN THIS FIELD "DEMONSTRATE ENORMOUS PROSPECTS," WHEREAS THE DOCTRINE OF DETERRENCE, WHICH "CANNOT LAST FOREVER," PERMITS UNNAMED "PEOPLE" TO REFUSE TO "ADOPT" SUCH MEASURES AS THE SALT I, SALT II, AND ABM TREATIES. PETROVSKY CALLED FOR A NEW WORLD ORGANIZATION TO COORDINATE AND IMPLEMENT THE POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON VERIFICATION. HE ALSO NOTED THAT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT COULD RESULT IN "EFFECTIVE GUARANTEES TO PROTECT (EUROPEAN) FRONTIERS". 5. (U) PETROVSKY WENT ON TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING 37 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 OBSERVATIONS ON THE POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF A CSIS: - (U) "PEACE DOES NOT DEPEND ON GOOD WILL, BUT ON PROPER ORGANIZATION." THEREFORE, "NEW LEGAL MACHINERY FOR MANAGING THE UN (SYSTEM)" MUST BE CREATED TO DEAL WITH PROBLEMS IN THE POLITICAL, MILITARY, HUMANITARIAN, AND "ECOLOGICAL" SPHERES. (FYI: IN WHAT USDEL PRESUMES TO BE AN ERROR IN TRANSLATION, PETROVSKY'S SPEECH ALWAYS REFERRED TO "ECOLOGICAL," VICE "ECONOMIC," ISSUES. END FYI) CSIS ALSO COULD ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. - (U) SINCE "STRUGGLE IS INEVITABLE" AMONG STATES, THEY MUST TAKE "PROPHYLACTIC MEASURES" TO PREVENT CRISES. GOVERNMENTS MUST PLACE INTERNATIONAL STABILITY ABOVE THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY. MOREOVER, AS A RECOGNITION OF INTERDEPENDENCE, A COLLECTIVE SYSTEM OF SECURITY MUST NOT ONLY "ELIMINATE EXISTING HOTBEDS OF TENSION," BUT ALSO ADDRESS ECONOMIC AND OTHER PROBLEMS. - (U) THE UN WAS CREATED "BY ONE GROUP OF STATES" (I.E., THE WEST) TO BE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER STATES, WHEREAS A CSIS WOULD BE CREATED BY ALL STATES TO PROVIDE "A NEWER AND HIGHER LEVEL" OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO ALL MANKIND. THE UN WAS MEANT TO PROVIDE A MEANS FOR ALL STATES TO REACT TO THE USE OF FORCE BY A STATE; "CSIS WILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY ELIMINATE PROBLEMS," BUT WILL SETTLE PROBLEMS PEACEFULLY BY ELIMINATING BOTH THE THREAT AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES. THE UN CHARTER PROVIDES FOR THE USE OF FORCE TO BACK UP DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (SC), BUT "RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR FORCE IN ANY WAY WOULD BE FATAL" FOR MANKIND BECAUSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN ESCAPE THE CONTROL OF MAN. UNDER CSIS, THERE WOULD BE "NO MORE NUCLEAR OR SPACE CLUBS". - (U) "EACH SECTION OF THE (UN) CHARTER CONTAINS VAST UNTAPPED MACHINERY" FOR INSTITUTIONALIZING DISARMAMENT. THE UN SHOULD USE "THE FULL POTENTIAL" OF THE SC, THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE (MSC), THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (UNGA), THE SECRETARIAT, AND THE SPECIALIZED TECHNICAL AGENCIES FOR PEACEEEPING. FOR OVER TWO DECADES, CYPRUS HAS PROPOSED A FORMAL ROLE IN DISARMAMENT FOR THE SC AND THE MSC. THE SC IS NOW UNDERTAKING "BUSINESSLIKE CONSULTATIONS" TO ATTEMPT "TO RESOLVE THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR THROUGH A MEETING OF THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS," AND COULD CONDUCT SIMILAR CONSULTATIONS REGARDING OTHER ONGOING CONFLICTS "IN 38 onnovm Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET THE MIDDLE EAST, CYPRUS, AND AFGHANISTAN". (U) REFERRING TO THE ADOPTION BY LAST YEAR'S UNGA OF RESOLUTION 41/92, PETROVSKY DECLARED THAT CSIS IS NOW "ON THE AGENDA OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE". CSIS "COMPLEMENTS" THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UN, UNDER ITS CHARTER, FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY BY INCLUDING THE UN AS "GUARANTOR AND REGULATOR" OF CSIS. HOWEVER, TO BE FULLY EFFECTIVE, CSIS MAY "REQUIRE A RENEWAL OF THE CHARTER IN THE FUTURE". FOR EXAMPLE, THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM) SHOULD RECEIVE FORMAL AND PERMANENT REPRESENTATION ON THE SC IN VIEW OF ITS "CONTRIBUTIONS TO WORLD PEACE". 6. (U) PETROVSKY RECEIVED ONE JOLT DURING "Q&A". AFTER PETROVSKY FIELDED THREE "SOFTBALLS" WHICH PERMITTED HIM TO REITERATE HIS ARGUMENTS, MALTESE PERMREP VICTOR GAUCI ROSE TO DESCRIBE THE SOVIETS' "NEW POLITICAL THINKING," AS DESCRIBED BY PETROVSKY, AS BEING EITHER "OLD POLITICAL THINKING" OR "A NEW REALIZATION" BY THE USSR OF OLD IDEAS. TO PETROVSKY'S EVIDENT DISCOMFORT, GAUCI STATED THAT "MUTUAL FEAR AND SUSPICION" HAD KEPT THE USSR (AND THE US) FROM PRACTICING "PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY" FORTY YEARS AGO WHEN THE UN WAS FOUNDED. BOTH SUPERPOWERS ALREADY ENJOYED "NUCLEAR SUFFICIENCY" WHEN THEY CRAFTED THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, AND OTHER NATIONS HAD ADHERED TO THAT TREATY WITH THE, TO DATE, UNFULFILLED EXPECTATION THAT THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES WOULD REDUCE THEIR ARSENALS. GAUCI DEEMED IT "ENCOURAGING" FOR "A MAJOR POWER" (E.G., THE SOVIET UNION) TO APPEAR TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE CONCEPT OF INTERDEPENDENCE THROUGH SUCH A PROPOSAL AS CSIS. HOWEVER, HE FLATLY REJECTED THE SOVIET IDEA OF A SC MEETING AT THE LEVEL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS TO DISCUSS DISARMAMENT ISSUES, - DECLARING THAT THE SC IS UNEQUIPPED INSTITUTIONALLY TO "PRODUCE RESULTS ON ARMS CONTROL". PETROVSKY FEEBLY RESPONDED THAT CSIS WAS MEANT TO ENABLE THE UN "TO ABANDON STEREOTYPES AND RETAIN GOOD IDEAS" AS IT BUILDS A NEW "GUIDELINE" THAT WOULD ENABLE STATES TO AVOID "THE SAD AND SORRY EXPERIENCE OF CHERNOBYL". CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL; MOSCOW FOR AMB WALTERS 7. (C) COMMENT: OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST ARE PETROVSKY'S REMARKS ON THE FUTURE ROLE AND COMPOSITION OF THE SC. CONSIDERATION OF THE CYPRUS QUESTION BY THE SC COULD ONLY SUPPORT THE SOVIETS' PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYPRUS, WHICH THE U.S. OPPOSES. HOWEVER, WASHINGTON MAY WISH TO PURSUE PETROVSKY'S SUGGESTION Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET THAT THE USSR COULD SUPPORT SC ACTIVITY ON AFGHANISTAN. FORMAL REPRESENTATION ON THE SC IS A NAM "HOBBY HORSE" LAST EVIDENCED IN UNGA RESOLUTION 40/159, WHICH WAS NOT PURSUED LAST YEAR DUE TO CSIS. THIS SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE AMENDMENT OF THE UN CHARTER, AND PROVIDES THE U.S. WITH ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION THAT UNGA CONSIDERATION OF CSIS BELONGS IN THE SIXTH (LEGAL) COMMITTEE, RATHER THAN IN THE FIRST (DISARMAMENT) COMMITTEE. 8. (C) PETROVSKY'S (UNDISTRIBUTED) SPEECH TO UNIDIR WAS DISORGANIZED IN ITS PRESENTATION, BUT GAVE THE FIRST FORMAL INDICATION OF HOW THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE PLANNING TO PROMULGATE CSIS. THE USSR PRESUMABLY WILL CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO INVOLVE ELEMENTS OF THE UN SYSTEM IN DISARMAMENT UNDER THE AEGIS OF UNGA RESOLUTION 41/59D. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO PLUG AWAY FOR CSIS AT THE UNGA WITH A VIEW TO HAVING IT "ENACTED" THROUGH A COMBINATION OF PROPAGANDA AND THE ATTRITION OF ITS OPPONENTS. ONCE ADOPTED, CSIS WOULD BECOME INTERCHANGEABLE WITH "COLLECTIVE SECURITY" THROUGHOUT THE UN SYSTEM, AND BE USED AS THE RATIONALE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW UN AGENCIES SOLELY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT (E.G., "WORLD SPACE ORGANIZATION," "INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE MONITORING AGENCY," ETC.). WASHINGTON WILL WISH TO EVALUATE RECENT SOVIET ACTIVITY ON CSIS WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM AS THE U.S. PREPARES FOR THE 42ND UNGA. 9. (C) USDEL NOTES THE CONTINUING USE OF UNIDIR AS A FORUM FOR DISSEMINATING SOVIET PROPAGANDA. USDEL ALSO CALLS ATTENTION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A MORE SERIOUS SOVIET PUSH ON CSIS AT THE UPCOMING GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE IAEA. PETROVSKY PUBLICLY OUTLINED IDEAS FOR FORMAL IAEA PARTICIPATION IN DISARMAMENT ACTIVITIES, AND THE U.S. SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DERAIL ANY SOVIET PROPOSAL ALONG THESE LINES. WASHINGTON, THEREFORE, MAY WISH TO CONSIDER INSERTING A BACKGROUND PAPER AND APPROPRIATE TALKING POINTS ON CSIS IN THE BRIEFING BOOK FOR THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE. END COMMENT. 10. (U) MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NN 40 ? ccymcwr Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07022 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY MEETING OF TUESDAY, JUNE 23, 1987 1. THIS IS CD-115 . (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY: MEXICO INTRODUCED THE MAY 22 "APPEAL" BY THE FIVE CONTINENTS INITIATIVE (FCI) AS CD/758 (TEXT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED). CD AGREED TO ONE OR MORE INFORMAL PLENARY MEETINGS ON AGENDA ITEM 2 ("CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT"). ON HIS PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY, JUNE PRESIDENT ALFARAGI (EGYPT) READ OUT A SUGGESTED LIST OF TOPICS FOR THE INFORMALS. WESTERN GROUP STATED THAT LIST WAS NON-BINDING, AND REITERATED POSITION THAT IT SETS NO PRECEDENT. END SUMMARY. 3. THE ONLY SCHEDULED SPEAKER AT THE JUNE 23 CD PLENARY WAS AMB GARCIA ROBLES (MEXICO), WHO GAVE A BRIEF PRESENTATION SUMMARIZING, THEN READING INTO THE RECORD, THE MAY 22 "APPEAL" BY THE FCI COUNTRIES (ARGENTINA, GREECE, INDIA, MEXICO, SWEDEN, AND TANZANIA) FOR THE U.S. AND USSR TO END NUCLEAR TESTING AND WORK TO PREVENT AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE. GARCIA ROBLES DESCRIBED THE "APPEAL" AS AN ATTEMPT TO HALT A PERCEIVED RUSH TOWARDS "COLLECTIVE WORLD SUICIDE". 4. IN ENSUING INFORMAL SESSION, CD PRESIDENT ALFARARGI SAID THERE APPEARED TO BE AGREEMENT TO HOLD INFORMAL PLENARY DISCUSSION ON AGENDA ITEM 2, AND TO REFLECT THEM IN THE ANNUAL CD REPORT. 5. ALFARARGI THEN STATED THAT HIS CONSULTATIONS ALSO HAD REVEALED "NO LIKELIHOOD" OF AGREEMENT WITHIN THE CD ON TOPICS TO BE DISCUSSED DURING THE INFORMALS. THEREFORE, ALFARARGI HAD TAKEN IT UPON HIMSELF, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AS CD PRESIDENT, TO CIRCULATE A NON-BINDING LIST OF TOPICS TO "FACILITATE A STRUCTURED DISCUSSION". SINCE ALFARARGI'S STATEMENT WAS "PERSONAL," HIS LIST WAS NOT SUBJECT TO CONSENSUS. HOWEVER, IT WAS "UNDERSTOOD" THAT EVERY DELEGATION WOULD BE FREE TO DISCUSS ANY SUBJECT PERTAINING TO AGENDA ITEM DURING THE INFORMAL MEETINGS ON THE ITEM. THE SUGGESTED LIST OF TOPICS FOLLOWS: "- INTERRELATION BETWEEN BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL CONSIDERATION OF THE CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT; PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT; ROLE OF THE 41 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT. - SECURITY CONCEPTS RELATING TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS; - IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 50 OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT; - INTERRELATION BETWEEN MEASURES FOR THE CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES IN OTHER AREAS; - VERIFICATION IN RELATION TO THE PURPOSES, SCOPE AND NATURE OF AGREEMENTS; - EXISTING PROPOSALS". 6. AT RESUMED FORMAL PLENARY, ALFARARGI FOLLOWED PLANNED SCENARIO. AMB MOREL (FRANCE), ON BEHALF OF THE WESTERN GROUP, THEN UNDERSCORED THE NON- BINDING NATURE OF ALFARARGI'S PROPOSED LIST OF TOPICS, AND STRESSED THAT THE WEST DID NOT CONSIDER ALFARARGI'S STATEMENT AND LIST AS SETTING ANY PRECEDENT. FLACK END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 42 CPMPT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07023 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY MEETING, JUNE 25, 1987 REF: GENEVA 06391 (CD-104) 1. THIS IS CD-116. (CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- MOROCCO DELIVERED UNREMARKABLE TOUR D'HORIZON; MONGOLIA AND GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC ENDORSED SOVIET CTB PROPOSAL; PRC SPOKE ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT (TEXT DATAFAXED TO ACDA/MA). END SUMMARY. 3. MOROCOO -- -- IN TOUR D'HORIZON, MOROCCAN AMB. BENHIMA REPEATED WELL-WORN CALLS FOR AD HOC COMMITTEES ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN, CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR; CRITICIZED "PLANET-THREATENING" ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE; AND BEMOANED THE CD'S INABILITY TO SHOW POSITIVE RESULTS AFTER EIGHT YEARS OF WORK. HE VOICED CONCERN FOR THE DEADLOCK OVER TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS, SAYING HE SAW NO PROSPECT FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT WITHOUT AN NTB. 4. MONGOLIA/GDR -- -- MONGOLIAN AMB. BAYART AND GDR AMB. ROSE GAVE OBLIGATORY AND VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL ELABORATIONS OF SOVIET DEP FOREIGN MINISTER PETROVSKY'S JUNE 19 COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (REF A). BOTH AMBSDWELLED ON VERIFICATION ASPECTS, DRAWING ATTENTION TO NEW, CONCRETE IDEAS AS PRODUCTS OF NEW POLITICAL THINKING. BAYART OPINED HE HAD FULL CONFIDENCE THAT NOT A SINGLE WAVE FROM A NUCLEAR EVENT COULD GO UNDETECTED. ROSE SAID VERIFICATION PROVISIONS RULED OUT ANY TESTS AT MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT LEVELS. BAYART ALSO COMMENTED ON CW NEGOTIATIONS, POINTING OUT HIS DEL'S WORKING PAPER (CD/CW/WP.162) ON THE ORDER OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION. HE DISMISSED EQUIVALENCY AS A COMPLICATED AND TIME CONSUMING ENDEAVOR, INSTEAD ADVOCATING USE OF WEIGHT FOR COMPARISON OF STOCKS GROUPED BY "CHEMICALS OF SIMILAR EFFECT." 5. CHINA -- -- PRC AMB. FAN ADDRESSED NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ISSUES. OF NOTE, HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE SECURITY OF ASIA WAS EQUIVALENT IN IMPORTANCE 43 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET TO THE SECURITY OF EUROPE; HE STATED IT WAS THUS UNFAIR TO SINGLE OUT ASIA AS THE REPOSITORY FOR 100 INF WARHEADS--HE SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE ZERO-ZERO OPTION. HE ALSO REAFFIRMED HIS COUNTRY'S NO-FIRST-USE PLEDGE, RESPECT FOR NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES AND SECURITY ASSURANCES TO NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. 6. IN A BRIEF ANNOUNCEMENT, FRENCH AMB. MOREL REPORTED THAT OUTER SPACE EXPERTS FROM PARIS WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE JUNE 30 OUTER SPACE AD HOC COMMITTEE MEETING. THEIR FOCUS WILL BE ON DEFINITIONAL AND TERMINOLOGY ISSUES. THEY WILL SEEK TO FOCUS CD EFFORTS IN THIS AREA ON MORE "PRAGMATIC AND PRACTICAL" AND LESS "ABSTRACT" APPROACHES. FLACK END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 44 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07142 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS: NETHERLANDS' PAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTIDN REFS: (A) GENEVA 6562 (CD-102), (B) GENEVA 6996 1. THIS IS CD-1I7 . (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. AS REPORTED REFS A AND B, THE DUTCH HAVE DRAFTED APAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION. ORIGINALLY IT WAS TENTATIVELY CONSIDERED FOR INTRODUCTION AT THE CD BY THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER ON JULY 2. -- DUTCH REP ROBERT MILDERS HAS PRIVATELY TOLD US THAT THE DUTCH ARE NOT SURE YET WHAT THEY PLAN TO DO WITH THE PAPER. THE LATEST VERSION TAKES INTO ACCOUNT SOME U.S. AND UK VIEWS, BUT ALSO REFLECTS DUTCH THINKING. -- U.S. REPS HAVE GIVEN INFORMAL COMMENTS TO THE DUTCH ON THEIR PAPER AND HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THEM THAT WHILE THE PAPER CONTAINS SEVERAL USEFUL IDEAS, THERE ARE STILL SEVERAL ISSUES WHICH WE HAVE PROBLEMS WITH AND WE DO NOT FEEL THAT ANOTHER WESTERN PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT WOULD BE HELPFUL. -- THE TEXTS OF THE DRAFT PAPER AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS FOLLOW. THESE PAPERS HAVE NOT BEEN SENT TO THE HAGUE YET AND SHOULD BE TREATED AS CLOSE HOLD. 3. DRAFT PAPER -- CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS -- BEGIN TEXT INTRODUCTION-- DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS SEVERAL PROPOSALS (CD/500, CD/664, CD/715, ) HAVE BEEN MADE FOR AN ADEQUATE ARRANGEMENT FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS. SINCE THE INTRODUCTION.OF THE BRITISH PROPOSALS IN CD/715 THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED HAS BEEN INTENSIFIED AND, AT LEAST IN SOME ASPECTS, A CONSENSUS SEEMS TO BE GROWING. AMONG THE REMAINING PROBLEMS ARE QUESTIONS SUCH AS WHETHER A CHALLENGED STATE PARTY HAS A STRINGENT OBLIGATION TO PROVE THAT ALLEGATIONS ARE GROUNDLESS, WHETHER ALTERNATIVE MEASURE COULD PLAY A ROLE AND, WHO WOULD DECIDE WHETHER THE ALTERNATIVE MEASURES ARE SUFFICIENT. THE NETHERLANDS BELIEVES IT MIGHT BE USEFUL AT THIS STAGE TO TRY TO BUILD FURTHER UPON THE PRINCIPLES THAT ARE STATED IN CD/715 IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS OF RECENT MONTHS. AFTER FORMULATING THE PRINCIPLES THAT SEEM TO BE ESSENTIAL FOR AN ADEQUATE SYSTEM OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS, THIS PAPER TRIES TO COME TO A MORE PRECISE DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES AND 45 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET OF THE COMPOSTION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INSPECTION TEAM. ON THIS BASIS A STEP BY STEP OUTLINE OF A CHALLENGE INSPECTION IS GIVEN. THE GIST OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS -- - A REGIME FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS CAN BE COMPARED TO A FIRE ALARM: VERY PROBABLY IT WILL NEVER BE USED, BUT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT IT WILL WORK WHEN NECESSARY. AND IT IS CRUCIAL THAT ALL STATE PARTIES KNOW IT WILL WORK, BOTH STATE PARTIES THAT RELY ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION AND A STATE PARTY THAT CONSIDERS TO SET THE CONVENTION AFIRE. - THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING SUCH A SYSTEM FOR ALARMING SITUATIONS SEEM TO BE THE FOLLOWING: - A REQUEST FOR A CHALLENGE INSPECTION IS AN EXTRAORDINARY MATTER. IT SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR CASES WHEN A STATE PARTY FEARS AN OTHER STATE PARTY IS PREPARING TO USE OR THREAT TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS. - N.B.: ANY OTHER DOUBTS ABOUT COMPLIANCE SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NORMAL PROCEDURE FOR REQUESTING CLARIFICATION (ART. IX, PARA 1-7). - NO BARRIER SHOULD PREVENT A QUICK AND EFFECTIVE CHALLENGE INSPECTION. - A PRACTICABLE SYSTEM BASED ON THESE PRINCIPLES WOULD REQUIRE A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN FACT FINDING AND POLITICAL DECISION MAKING AND WOULD HAVE TO ENCOMPASS BOTH RULES THAT WARRANT A QUICK AND EFFECTIVE EXECUTION OF A CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND RULES THAT, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, PREVENT MISUSE. IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS THESE POINTS ARE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES -- THERE SEEMS TO BE AGREEMENT AMONG MANY DELEGATIONS THAT A CHALLENGED STATE PARTY SHOULD IN CERTAIN CASES HAVE .THE RIGHT TO DENY FULL AND COMPREHENSIVE ACCESS TO A SUSPECTED INSTALLATION PROVIDED IT IS ABLE TO SUGGEST ALTERNATIVE MEASURES TO DISPROVE THE ALLEGATIONS. HOWEVER, OTHER DELEGATIONS BELIEVE THAT WHILE ALTERNATIVE MEASURES MAY BE PROPOSED IN A VERY SHORT TIME PERIOD, IF NOT ACCEPTED, AT THE END OF THAT TIME PERIOD COMPREHENSIVE ACCESS MUST BE GRANTED. - ALTERNATIVES TO FULL AND COMPREHENSIVE ACCESS ALTERNATIVE MEASURES THAT ARE PROPOSED BY THE CHALLENGED STATE PARTY DURING A CHALLENGE INSPECTION SHOULD BE MEASURES THT DISPROVE THE ALLEGATIONS BOTHER MEANS THAN PROVIDING FULL AND COMPREHENSIVE ACCESS TO ALL PARTS OF THE SUSPECTED FACILITY. - SCENARIO'S FOR DIFFERENT KINDS OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS 46 cprprp Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CPCRPT 25X1 IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO TRY TO WORK OUT SCENARIO'S - SCENARIO'S FOR DIFFERENT KINDS OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO TRY TO WORK OUT SCENARIO'S FOR DIFFERENT KIND OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS LIKE NORWAY HAS DONE ON THE VERIFICATION OF USE OF CW IN ITS DOCUMENT CD/... IN THIS WAY SCENARIO'S COULD POSSIBLY BE DRAFTED FOR INSPECTION OF SUSPECTED STOCKS, SUSPECTED PROHIBITED PRODUCTION. THUS IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ARRIVE AT SOME GENERAL AND SPECIFIC FULES FOR EFFECTIVE MANAGED CONDUCT OF INSPECTION. ONE BASIC RULE SEEMS TO BE THAT ALTERNATIVE MEASURES WILL ALWAYS ENCOMPASS SOME FORM OF ON-SITE INSPECTION. THE INEVITABLE DEGREE OF INTRUSIVENESS OF SUCH ON-SITE INSPECTION WILL PROBABLY BE DEPENDENT ON THE CHARACTER OF THE SUSPECTED VIOLATION AND ON THE DEGREE IN WHICH THE SUSPECTED INSTALLATION HAS THE CAPABILITY FOR THE SUSPECTED VIOLATION. THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLES MIGHT BE ILLUSTRATIVE: AN ELECTRONIC LISTENING DEVICE DOES NOT HAVE THE NECESSARY CHARACTERISTICS TO PRODUCE CW. A NON- INTRUSIVE ON-SITE INSPECTION TO CERTIFY THAT THE LOCATION DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY OTHER FACILITY WOULD PROBABLY BE SUFFICIENT. TO VERIFY THAT A CHEMICAL FACTORY PROCESSING NON- PHOSPHOROUS COMPOUNDS DOES NOT PRODUCE SARIN, A RATHER NON-INTRUSIVE INSPECTION OF THE WASTE WATER SYSTEM AND AN ANALYSIS OF WASTE WATER FOR P-METHYL COMPOUNDS MIGHT SUFFICE. TO VERIFY THAT A CHEMICAL FACTORY PRODUCING P-METHYL COMPOUNDS IS NOT MAKING SARIN REQUIRE MORE INTRUSIVE INSPECTION METHODS. (SUCH A FACTORY WOULD, HOWEVER, ALREADY BE UNDER ROUTINE INSPECTION). - INDIRECT DEMONSTRATION ALTERNATIVE MEASURES COULD BE DIRECTED AT DISPROVING THE ALLEGATIONS DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY. AN INDIRECT WAY TO PROVE THAT A CERTAIN LOCATION DOES NOT CONTAIN CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKS IS TO PROVE THAT IT CONTAINS SOMETHING ELSE. WHEN, FOR INSTANCE, AN ELECTRONIC LISTERNING DEVICE WOULD BE SUSPECTED OF CONTAINING SECRET STOCKS OF CW IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO INSPECT ALL THE ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT. IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO ACCEPT THE EXPLANATION THAT A FEW BUILDINGS WOULD CONTAIN SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INSTALLATION. DISTINCTION BETWEEN FACT FINDING AND POLITICAL DECISION MAKING -- 47 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SFCRET IT IS ESSENTIAL NOT TO CONFUSE THE TECHNICAL TASK OF FACT FINDING WITH POLITICAL DECSION MAKING. - A CLEAR DISTINCTION SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MAKING POLITICAL DECISIONS OF THE POLITICAL ACTORS IN A CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FACT FINDING OF THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT. THE DECISION TO REQUEST A CHALLENGE INSPECTION IS A POLITICAL DECISION THAT CAN BE TAKEN BY ANY STATE PARTY. ON THE BASIS OF SUCH A REQUEST, THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT UNDERTAKES THE FACT FINDING PROCESS VIA A CHALLENGE INSPECTION. - THE QUESTION WHETHER PROPOSED TECHNICAL ALTERNATIVE MEASURES ARE SUFFICIENT TO DISPROVE THE ALLEGATIONS IS A TECHNICAL AND FACTUAL QUESTION THAT CAN ONLY BE DECIDED ON THE SPOT AND SHOULD BE ANSWERED BY THE INSPECTION TEAM (CF THE ANNEX TO CD/715, PARA 6, B, AND C). - BOTH THE CHALLENGED STATE PARTY AND THE REQUESTING STATE PARTY HAVE THE RIGHT TO REACT TO THE REPORT OF THE INSPECTION TEAM. THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ARE POLITICAL DECISION MAKING BODIES. THEIR TASK IS TO TAKE POLITICAL DECISIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE FACTS AS ESTABLISHED BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT. GUARANTEES FOR EFFECTIVENESS -- A CHALLENGE INSPECTION WOULD BE EFFECTIVE IF THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION: - THE REQUEST FOR A CHALLENGE INSPECTION SHOULD STATE CLEARLY BOTH THE NATURE OF THE SUSPECTED VIOLATION AND THE EXACT PLACE WHERE THE VIOLATION IS SUSPECTED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE. N.B.: THE DEGREE OF PRECISION THAT IS REQUIRED ABOUT THE PLACE OF THE VIOLATION IS DEPENDENT ON THE CHARACTER OF THE SUSPECTED VIOLATION. IN CASE OF SUSPECTED USE THE ACCURACY DOES NOT HAVE TO BE VERY PRECISE, BUT IN CASE OF A PRESUMED UNDECLARED PRODUCTION FACILITY THE REQUEST SHOULD BE VERY ACCORATE TO WITHIN, AT LEAST, A FEW HUNDRED METERS. - THE TIME BETWEEN THE ARRIVAL OF THE REQUEST AT THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT AND THE ARRIVAL OF THE INSPECTION TEAM SHOULD BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE. - THE INSPECTION TEAM SHOULD UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT AT LEAST WITHIN 48 HOURS BE ALLOWED TO THE DIRECT VICINITY OF THE SUSPECTED PLACE. N.B.: THE INSPECTION TEAM SHOULD BE ALLOWED SO NEAR THE SUSPECTED PLACE THAT IT IS ABLE TO VERIFY 40 25X1 z" Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 "?\ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET THAT NO EFFORT IS UNDERTAKEN TO WIPE OUT THE TRACES OF A VIOLATION. - IF THE CHALLENGED STATE PARTY IS NOT ABLE TO SUGGEST TECHNICAL ALTERNATIVE MEASURES THAT PROVE THE ALLEGATIONS ARE GROUNDLESS WITHIN .. HOURS AFTER ARRIVAL FULL AND COMPLETE ACCESS WILL HAVE TO BE GIVEN. SAFEGUARDS AGAINST MISUSE -- - THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION HERE IS: WHY SHOULD A STATE PARTY WANT TO MISUSE THE RIGHT TO REQUEST A CHALLENGE INSPECTION? THERE MIGHT BE TWO REASONS FOR SUCH A BEHAVIOUR: A) WISH TO DISCREDIT CHALLENGED STATE: - THE BEST WAY TO PREVENT SUCH MISUSE IS A QUICK AND CLEAR NEGATIVE RESULT OF AN UNSUBSTANTIATED CHALLENGE INSPECTION. THE MORE EFFECTIVE THE SYSTEM IS, THE SMALLER THE CHANCE FOR SUCH MISUSE. B) ESPIONAGE: THE BEST WAY TO PREVENT THE USE OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS FOR ESPIONAGE COULD BE FOUND IN A COMBINATION OF TECHNICAL ALTERNATIVE MEASURES WITH LIMITING THE COMPOSITION OF THE INSPECTION TEAM TO A LIST OF INSPECTORS OF THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT THAT THAT WAS AGREED IN ADVANCE BY THE CHALLENGED STATE PARTY. SUCH A LIST WOULD I.E. CONTAIN THE NAMES OF THE INSPECTORS THAT NORMALLY WOULD EXECUTE THE.ROUTINE INSPECTIONS IN THE COUNTRY INVOLVED, BUT MIGHT ALSO HAVE TO CONTAIN OTHER SPECIALISTS (E.G. IN CASE OF SUSPECTED USE). SUCH A RULE WOULD PREVENT PROBLEMS ABOUT THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CERTAIN INSPECTORS (E.G. BECAUSE OF THEIR NATIONALITY), BUT WOULD REQUIRE THAT ALL PARTIES WOULD AGREE IN ADVANCE WITH A RELATIVELY LONG LIST OF INSPECTORS TO WARRANT THE AVAILABILITY OF SOME OF THEM UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES. - MEASURES TO PREVENT MISUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY TO REQUEST A CHALLENGE INSPECTION SHOULD BE TAKEN, BUT MAY UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES PREVENT JUSTIFIED REQUESTS FROM BEING HONOURED. IN PRACTICE THIS MEANS THAT MEASURES TO PREVENT MISUSE SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH A CHALLENGE INSPECTION AFTER A REQUEST HAS BEEN MADE, BUT SHOULD CONCENTRATE AT DETERRING UNJUSTIFIED REQUESTS, FOR INSTANCE BY &THREAT TO PUNISH SUCH REQUESTS AFTERWARDS. THIS WAY THE POTENTIAL COSTS OF A UNJUSTIFIED REQUEST COULD BE INCREASED WITHOUT DECREASING THE EFFECTIVITY OF A CHALLENGE INSPECTION. 4S Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET - TO PREVENT THAT A CHALLENGE INSPECTION IS REQUESTED FOR ESPIONAGE PURPOSES THE REQUESTING STATE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO HAVE A SPECIALLY DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE IN THE INSPECTION TEAM. - THE REPORT OF THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL BE STRICTLY LIMITED TO THE FACTS THAT ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE CONCLUSION REACHED. - IF A STATE PARTY FEELS THAT GIVING FULL AND COMPLETE ACCESS TO THE SUSPECTED FACILITY OR LOCATION PRESENTS VERY HIGH RISKS, IT CAN SUGGEST TECHNICAL ALTERNATIVE MEASURES TO CLEAR THE MATTER. - N.B.: HOWEVER, WHEN THE CHALLENGED STATE PARTY IS NOT ABLE TO SUGGEST ALTERNATIVE MEASURES THAT DISPROVE THE ACCUSATIONS, FULL AND COMPREHENSIVE ACCESS WILL HAVE TO BE GIVEN. - THE FACT THAT THE OTHER STATE PARTIES HAVE THE SAME RIGHT TO REQUEST A CHALLENGE INSPECTION WILL HAVE A CERTAIN DETERRENCE VALUE. - THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE REQUESTING STATE PARTY CERTIFIES IT HAS EVIDENCE THAT AN OTHER STATE PARTY IS PREPARING THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD EXCLUDE REQUESTS FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS IN CASE OF SUSPECTED MINOR INCIDENTS. - N.B.: MINOR ISSUES SHOULD BE RESOLVED .IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL PROCEDURES FOR CONSULTATION AND FACT FINDING (ART.IX, PARA 1 TO 7). - IN CASE OF APPARENT MISUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY TO REQUEST A CHALLENGE INSPECTION THE CHALLENGED STATE PARTY CAN, AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION, SUBMIT A REQUEST TO THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL TO CONVENE A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE TO DECIDE UPON MEASURES AGAINST THE STATE PARTY THAT REQUESTED THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION. SUCH MEASURES COULD INCLUDE: -- PAYMENT OF THE COSTS OF THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION (BOTH THE COSTS MADE BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT AND THE CHALLENGED STATE PARTY). -- POSSIBLY ALSO A TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF THE RIGHT TO ASK FOR A CHALLENGE INSPECTION; A CHALLENGE INSPECTION IN STEPS -- - WHEN A STATE PARTY FEARS ITS FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS MIGHT BE ENDANGERED BY A GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION BY ANOTHER 50 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET STATE PARTY IT MAY ISSUE A REQUEST FOR A CHALLENGE INSPECTION. - THIS REQUEST SHOULD BE SENT TO THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT. THE REQUEST SHOULD COMPRISE AT LEAST THE FOLLOWING: A) NAME OF THE REQUESTING STATE PARTY; B) NAME OF THE CHALLENGED STATE PARTY; C) A STATEMENT THAT THE REQUESTING PARTY CONSIDERS ITS FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS ARE TO BE IN JEOPARDY; D) THE ARTICLE(S) OF THE CONVENTION THAT IS CONSIDERED TO BE VIOLATED; E) A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE VIOLATION(S) ENCOMPASSING VERY PRECISE DATA OF THE SUSPECTED PLACE AND, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, AN INDICATION OF SUSPECTED TIME OF THE VIOLATION AND QUANTITIES INVOLVED. - N.B.: WITHOUT A VERY PRECISE INDICATION OF THE PLACE OF THE SUSPECTED VIOLATION THE VIOLATION IS UNVERIFIABLE. - THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT INFORMS THE CHALLENGED STATE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND IN ANY CASE WITHIN 24 HOURS, OF THE REQUEST AND ESTABLISHES AN INSPECTION TEAM. - IF THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT CONSIDERS THE INFORMATION GIVEN IN THE REQUEST IS PRIMA FACIE INSUFFICIENT TO MAKE INSPECTION TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE IT IMMEDIATELY ASKS THE REQUESTING STATE PARTY FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. - THE CHALLENGED STATE PARTY WILL HAVE TO ADMIT THE INSPECTION TEAM TO THE SUSPECTED LOCATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IN ANY CASE WITHIN 48 HOURS AND ALLOW THE INSPECTION TEAM TO SECURE THE PLACE. - THE CHALLENGED STATE PARTY MAY, UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, SUGGEST ALTERNATIVE MEASURES TO THE INSPECTION TEAM TO PROVE THAT THE ALLEGATIONS ARE UNFOUNDED. - IN CASE ALTERNATIVE MEASURES THAT ARE SUGGESTED BY THE CHALLENGED STATE PARTY ARE NOT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT BY THE INSPECTION TEAM THE CHALLENGED STATE PARTY MAY SUGGEST OTHER ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. HOWEVER, IF THE CHALLENGED STATE PARTY IS NOT ABLE TO SUGGEST ALTERNATIVE MEASURES THAT DISPROVE THE SUSPICIONS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE CHALLENGE REQUEST WITHIN .. HOURS, FULL AND COMPLETE 51 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET ACCESS WILL HAVE TO BE PROVIDED. - THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAL WILL SEND THE REPORT OF THE INSPECTION TEAM TO THE REQUESTING STATE PARTY, THE CHALLENGED STATE PARTY AND TO THE MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL WITHIN 10 DAYS. - N.B.: THE REPORT OF THE IT WILL COMPRISE EVERYTHING THAT IS RELEVANT FOR ANSWERING THE DOUBTS OF THE REQUESTING STATE PARTY BUT WILL NOT ENCOMPASS ANY CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL THAT THE INSPECTION TEAM DEEMS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED. - THE REQUESTING STATE PARTY MAY, AFTER RECEIVING THE REPORT ASK FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL TO DISCUSS THE REFORT, A) BECAUSE IT CONSIDERS THE INSPECTION TEAM HAS NOT FULFILLED ITS MANDATE (E.G. BECAUSE IT HAS AGREED TO TECHNICAL ALTERNATIVES THAT WERE TECHNICALLY INSUFFICIENT TO DISPROVE THE ALLEGATION). B) BECAUSE THE REPORT GIVES EVIDENCE THAT THE CONVENTION HAS BEEN VIOLATED. - THE CHALLENGED STATE PARTY MAY, AFTER RECEIVING THE REPORT ASK FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL TO DISCUSS THE REPORT, A-) BECAUSE IT CONSIDERS THE INSPECTION TEAM HAS NOT FULFILLED ITS MANDATE (E.G. BECAUSE IT SHOULD HAVE TAKEN ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO PROVE THAT THE ALLEGATIONS WERE BASELESS). B) BECAUSE THE RIGHT TO REQUEST A CHALLENGE INSPECTION WAS IMPROPERLY USED. - THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (AND/OR THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE) WILL HAVE TO DECIDE WHAT ACTION TO TAKE ON THE BASIS OF THE REPORT AND THE REACTIONS TO IT OF THE REQUESTING AND THE CHALLENGED STATE PARTY. - OR THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, DEPENDING ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN EC AND CC. 4. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS -- - DURING THE LAST HALF YEAR SEVERAL CD DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED THAT ARE PARTICULARLY RELEVANT FOR THE CW NEGOTIATIONS. ONE OF THE MOST RELEVANT DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE APPEARED IS, HOWEVER, NOT A CD-DOCUMENT BUT A DOCUMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S/18852). 52 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET - THE REPORT OF THE EXPERTS IS PARTICULARLY RELEVANT IN TWO RESPECTS; -- USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONTINUES AND THE CATEGORY OF VICTIMS IS WIDENING AND NOW ALSO INCLUDES CIVILIANS. THESE FACTS UNDERLINE THE HIGH NECESSITY TO COME TO A GLOBAL AND EFFECTIVE BAN IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. -- THE WAY THE TEAM OF EXPERTS HAS OPERATED CAN TEACH US A LOT ABOUT HOW A CHALLENGE INSPECTION SHOULD BE SET UP. - THE CONCLUSIONS WE MIGHT DRAW ABOUT CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS COULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: A) STARTING FROM THE FACT FINDING MISSION IN 1984 UP TO THE LAST ONE THIS YEAR, A STRICT DECISION OF LABOUR HAS BEEN MAINTAINED BETWEEN FACT FINDING ON THE ONE HAND AND POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING ON THE OTHER. IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER THE PROCESS WENT AS FOLLOWS: - IRAN ASKED THE SG TO VERIFY THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. - THE SG OF THE UN DECIDED TO SEND OUT A TEAM OF EXPERTS. - THE TEAM OF EXPERTS WROTE A REPORT ON THE FACTS THEY FOUND. - THE SG PRESENTED THE REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. - THE SECURITY COUNCIL TOOK ACTION ON THE REPORT. IN OTHER WORDS: ONLY IN THE LAST STAGE, WHEN THE INSPECTION HAD TAKEN PLACE AND THE FACTS HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED A MULTILATERAL DECISION- MAKING BODY PLAYED A ROLE. B) THE TEAM OF EXPERTS WAS NOT ABLE TO VERIFY THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS DIRECTLY BUT HAD TO BASE ITS CONCLUSIONS ON SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE MEASURES SUCH AS EXAMINATION OF PROBABLE VICTIMS OF CW ATTACKS, ANALYSIS OF SOIL SAMPLES AND ANALYSIS OF MUNITION FRAGMENTS OR DUDS. THE DECISION WHETHER THESE ALTERNATIVE MEASURES WERE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE OR DISPROVE THE ALLEGATIONS WAS TAKEN SOLELY BY THE INSPECTION TEAM. NOR THE REQUESTING STATE, NOR ANY MULTILATERAL BODY WAS INVOLVED. END TEXT. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 53 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07140 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): WESTERN GROUP MEETING, JUNE 23, 1987 REFS: (A) GENEVA 4639 (CD-090) (B) GENEVA 6792 (CD-111) (C) STATE 192196 (D) STATE 195105 (E) GENEVA 7023 (CD-116) 1. THIS IS CD-118. (CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- REGULAR WEEKLY MEETING OF WESTERN GROUP REVIEWED STATUS OF ALL AGENDA ITEMS, BUT FOCUSED ON DETERMINING WHAT THE WESTERN GROUP'S NEXT STEP SHOULD BE REGARDING DISCUSSIONOF A MANDATE FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN AD HOC COMMITTEE AND ON WHAT STEPS THE WEST MIGHT TAKE IN THE OUTER SPACE AHC. END SUMMARY. 3. CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- -- DUTCH AMB. VAN SCHAIK (WESTERN CW COORDINATOR) REPORTED THAT CW AHC CHAIRMAN AMB. EKEUS (SWEDEN) IS STILL CONTINUING PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS ON THE ISSUE OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION. -- FRENCH AMB. MOREL (THIS MONTH'S WESTERN GROUP CHAIRMAN) ANNOUNCED THAT FIVE REPRESENTATIVES FROM FRANCE WOULD ATTEND THE MEETING OF CHEMICAL INDUSTRIAL EXPERTS IN GENEVA JULY 6-7. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS D'AMECOURT WILL HEAD THE GROUP. -- IN RESPONSE TO VAN SCHAIK'S CONCERN THAT THE ATTENDANCE OF POLICY MAKING GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIALS WOULD SET THE WRONG TONE FOR A MEETING DESIGNED FOR EXPERTS, MOREL EXPLAINED THAT THIS REPRESENTATION WAS THE MEANS BY WHICH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING TO IMPRESS UPON ITS OWN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY THE NEED TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THAT INDUSTRY OF THE CW NEGOTIATIONS. L. NUCLEAR TEST BAN -- -- JAPANESE AMB. YAMADA (NTB COORDINATOR) PRESENTED DRAFT WESTERN STATEMENT TO BE READ AT CD PRESIDENT'S CONSULTATIONS ON JUNE 24, WHICH CALLED UPON GROUP OF 21 TO RESPOND TO APRIL CD PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR AN NTB MANDATE (REF A). -- FOLLOWING DISCUSSION ON WHETHER TO CHARACTERIZE WESTERN EFFORT AS A MAJOR MOVE BY THE WEST (AUSTRALIA) OR AS AN AFFIRMATION OF 54 00MnOT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 LONG-STANDING POLICY OF FLEXIBILITY ON THE PRECISE WORDING OF AN NTB MANDATE (U.S.), GROUP DECIDED IN FAVOR OF LATTER. -- AUSTRALIAN AMB. BUTLER CHARACTERIZED THE TEXT OF AN NTB MANDATE RECENTLY CIRCULATED BY MEXICAN AMB. GARCIA ROBLES AS DISINGENUOUS IN ITS WORDING AND INTENT, AND OPINED THAT GARCIA ROBLES WOULD PERSIST IN HIS DISINGENUOUS ACTIVITIES AND ULTIMATELY SUCCEED IN PREVENTING THE AD HOC COMMITTEE FROM FORMING THIS YEAR. -- U.S. AMB. FRIEDERSDORF, AS A FOLLOW-ON TO DISCUSSION IN THE WESTERN GROUP ON JUNE 17 (REF B), DREW UPON CLASSIFIED TALKING POINTS (REF C) REGARDING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA, LEAVING THEM WITH OTHER DELS AS A NON-PAPER. 5. CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT -- -- CNAR COORDINATOR EDIS (UK) ASKED THAT SINCE INFORMAL PLENARY DISCUSSIONS WOULD SOON BEGIN, WESTERN REPS SHOULD MEET TO DISCUSS CONTENTS OF PLANNED STATEMENTS AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT WESTERN STATES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD NOT BE ONLY ONES IN THE WESTERN GROUP TO CONTRIBUTE TO DISCUSSION. 6. OUTER SPACE -- -- ITALIAN AMB. PUGLIESE (OS AHC CHAIRMAN) REPORTED THAT G-21 COORDINATOR (EGYPT) HAD ADVISED HIM THAT GROUP WOULD LIKELY CONTINUE PRESSING PROPOSALS FOR EARLY WORK ON THE AHC REPORT AND FOR AHC WORKING GROUPS AS PART OF ITS DEMANDS FOR PROCEDURAL CHANGES IN THE WORK OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON OUTER SPACE. PENDING RESOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES, THE G-21 RESERVED ITS POSITION REGARDING A UK PROPOSAL FOR THE CD SECRETARIAT TO PREPARE A FACTUAL PAPER FOR DELEGATIONS' USE ON THE MANDATE, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, AND ITEMS ON THE AGENDA OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE (COPUOS). AMB. PUGLIESE SAID THE G-21 WERE HOPING FOR A QUID PRO QUO. -- DEL COMMENT: ON JUNE 24, PUGLIESE REPORTED THAT G-21 HAD WITHDRAWN OBJECTION TO INFO PAPER RE COPUOS, WHICH WOULD NOW BE PREPARED BY AHC SECRETARY LEVIN. G-21 HAD ALSO EXPRESSED HOPE 55 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET FOR "MORE FLEXIBLE" WESTERN VIEW OF G-21 PROCEDURAL PROPOSALS. ON JUNE 25, FOLLOWING DEL RECEIPT OF REFTEL D, AMB. FRIEDERSDORF INFORMED PUGLIESE AND OTHER WESTERN DELS THAT U.S. DEL WAS NO LONGER AGREEABLE TO SECRETARIAT PAPER. END COMMENT. -- FRENCH AMB. MOREL (OS COORDINATOR) REPORTED ON WESTERN COORDINATING MEETING HELD JUNE 22. ATTENDEES HAD REAFFIRMED AS COMMON VIEW THAT ACTIVITY IN THE CD OS COMMITTEE SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH NST NEGOTIATIONS. THE MEETING HAD EXPLORED INCONCLUSIVELY VARIOUS PROCEDURAL POSSIBILITIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CURRENT MANDATE DURING THIS SESSION. -- THE KEY, MOREL EMPHASIZED, WAS TO DEVELOP EFFECTIVE TACTICS THAT NONETHELESS AVOIDED THE SLIPPERY SLOPE TO NEGDTIATIONS. MOREL ASSERTED THAT WESTERN GROUP COULD BE MORE ARTICULATE AND SPECIFIC IN DEVELOPING APPROACHES TO WORK ON THE OUTER SPACE LEGAL REGIME THAT WOULD GIVE THE WEST A MORE POSITIVE PERCEPTION IN THE EYES OF THE NNA, AND EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION AND CONCERN THAT THE "NST ARGUMENT" WAS BEING USED TO BLOCK ANY POSITIVE ACTION BY THE WEST. UK REP EDIS ALSO CALLED FOR A MORE DYNAMIC APPROACH, SPECIFICALLY A WILLINGNESS TO ANALYZE COMMENTS ON THE ARMS CONTROL LEGAL REGIME IN FORCE IN SPACE TO IDENTIFY COMMON GROUND. -- COMMENT: IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT ON JUNE 25 (REF E), MOREL MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR THE MESSAGE THAT HIS EXPERTS WILL DELIVER AT THE JUNE 30 OS AHC MEETING -- LESS "ABSTRACTION" AND MORE EMPHASIS ON "PRACTICAL" APPROACHES TO DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY. END COMMENT. 8. PRE-UNGA DISCUSSIONS -- -- VAN SCHAIK REPORTED ON "UNSATISFACTORY" RESULTS OF DUTCH CONSULTATIONS IN NEW YORK DURING MAY WITH YUGOSLAV UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE REP DJOKIC ON A SINGLE CONSENSUS RES AT 42ND GA ON CD REPORT. (COMMENT: IT WAS AGREED THAT DJOKIC'S CONSISTENTLY ANTI-WESTERN ACTIONS AND SPEECHES AT THE UN DO NOT SEEM TO BE IN KEEPING WITH YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT POSITIONS AT THE CD AND ELSEWHERE. END COMMENT). 56 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- GROUP AGREED TO CONSULT FURTHER ABOUT DJOKIC IN GENEVA PRIOR TO UNGA AND DISCUSSED DESIRABILITY OF DRAFTING THE RESOLUTION ON THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (1986 RES 41/86P) IN ORDER TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF WIDESPREAD G-21 DESIRE FOR CONSENSUS RES AND TO CIRCUMVENT THE MISCHIEF THAT DJOKIC HAS PERPETRATED ANNUALLY AT THE UN REGARDING THE RESOLUTION. 9. ON OTHER CD AGENDA ITEMS -- PNW, RW, NSA AND CPD -- DISCUSSION WAS PERFUNCTORY (AND CD ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN ROUTINE). CPD COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES WILL BE REPORTED SEPTEL. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 57 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07183 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS: UK PAPER ON ORGANS AND INSPECTORATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A CW CONVENTION 1. THII IS CD-hg . (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. UK REP FRANCOIS GORDON HAS GIVEN US A DRAFT PAPER OUTLINING MAKEUP, FUNDING AND COST OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES AND INSPECTORATE FOR A CW CONVENTION. FCO MINISTER OF STATE DAVID MELLOR (REPLACED TIMOTHY RENTON) WILL TABLE THE PAPER ON JULY 13. UK HAS REQUESTED U.S. COMMENTS BY JULY 3 IF POSSIBLE. 25X1 3. TEXT OF UK PAPER FOLLOWS: DRAFT CD WORKING PAPER: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: EFFECTING A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN INTRODUCTION 1. THE UNITED KINGDOM PAPER CD589 SET OUT A NUMBER OF DETAILED PROPOSALS ON THE ORGANS AND CONSTITUTION OF AN ORGANIZATION WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPLEMENTING ALL ASPECTS OF THE CONVENTION. THAT PAPER ALSO PROPOSED THAT A PREPARATORY COMMISSION SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IMMEDIATELY THE CONVENTION WAS OPENED FOR SIGNATURE. THE COMMISSION WOULD BE CHARGED WITH MAKING ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS TO ENABLE THE ORGANIZATION TO BE BROUGHT INTO EXISTENCE, AND WOULD BE MAINTAINED UNTIL THE CONVENTION HAD ENTERED INTO FORCE AND THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL HAD MET FOR THE FIRST TIME. 2. SINCE THAT PAPER WAS TABLED, THERE HAS BEEN USEFUL FURTHER ELABORATION OF ARTICLE VIII. IN ADDITION. WORK ON ARTICLES III, IV, V, VI AND IX HAS SUCCEEDED IN DEVELOPING FURTHER CONSENSUS ON THE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS THAT WILL BE NECESSARY IF THE CONVENTION IS TO COMMAND CONFIDENCE. 3. HAVING IN MIND THESE DEVELOPMENTS, THE UK CONSIDERS THAT IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO ENSURE THAT ONCE THE CONVENTION ENTERS INTO FORCE ITS IMPLEMENTATION IS IMMEDIATELY EFFECTIVE. WERE THIS NOT TO BE THE CASE, THERE COULD BE NO CONFIDENCE FROM THE BEGINNING THAT VERIFICATION WOULD TAKE PLACE IN AN APPROPRIATE WAY. IT IS APPARENT, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT A NUMBER OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONVENTION WILL ARISE RAPIDLY; NOTABLY THE REQUIREMENT TO MAKE INITIAL DECLARATIONS COVERING (FOR EXAMPLE) CHEMICAL WEAPONS; CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES; AND FACILITIES / DECLARED FOR THE NON-PRODUCTION VERIFICATION REGIME. 5C SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET THE ORGANIZATION WILL NEED TO BE ABLE TO MONITOR AND VERIFY THESE ACTIVITIES ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. 4. WE BELIEVE THAT A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE ORGANIZATION WILL NEED TO BE IN PLACE AT AN EARLY STAGE IF THIS OBJECTIVE IS TO BE MET. THIS PAPER CONSIDERS THE EXTENT TO WHICH PERMANENT STAFF MAY NEED TO BE RECRUITED AND TRAINED BEFORE THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION AND CONSIDERS HOW LONG THIS PROCESS MIGHT TAKE. IT CONSIDERS SOME OF THE PRACTICAL DETAILS THAT REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF COSTS AND FUNDING; AND MAKES PROPOSALS FOR WHAT ADDITIONAL WORK SHOULD BE DONE NOW WITHIN THE AD HOC COMMITTEE, AND WHAT MAY BE LEFT TO THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION. ENTRY INTO FORCE 5. ARTICLE XV, ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION, HAS YET TO BE AGREED. HOWEVER, WHAT IS AGREED UNDER THIS ARTICLE WILL BE CLEALYRELEVANT TO THE EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION. 6. NUMBER OF STATES PARTY. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF POTENTIALLY RELEVANT PRECEDENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY ENTERED INTO FORCE AT DEPOSIT OF 40 INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION, PLUS THOSE OF THE THREE DEPOSITARIES; WHILST THE BIOLOGICAL WEArONS CONVENTION AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TREATY REQUIRED 22 AND 20 INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION RESPECTIVELY. 7. THE UK PROPOSED IN CD 589 THAT THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION SHOULD ENTER INTO FORCE ON THE THIRTIETH RATIFICATION. HOWEVER IT IS ARGUABLE THAT SUCH A FIGURE MAY BE TOO LOW. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IS NOT ONLY TO PRODUCE A BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS THAT IS BOTH COMPREHENSIVE IN ? SCOPE AND VERIFIABLE IN OPERATION BUT ALSO ONE THAT IS GLOBAL IN EFFECT. IT WILL BE NECESSARY THEREFORE FOR AS MANY STATES AS POSSIBLE TO BECOME PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION. WERE THIS NOT TO BE THE CASE THOSE STATES WHICH WERE PARTIES COULD NOT BE CONFIDENT THAT THEIR OWN RELINQUISHMENT OF THE RIGHT TO POSSESS CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD BE RECIPROCATED BY OTHERS, SOME OF WHOM MIGHT BE CONSIDERED POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES. AGAINST THAT PROSPECT, THEY MIGHT BE INHIBITED FROM RATIFYING THE CONVENTION IN THE FIRST PLACE. 8. THE UK THEREFORE NOW PROPOSES THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR A LARGER NUMBER OF STATES TO HAVE RATIFIED BEFORE THE CONVENTION ENTERS INTO FORCE. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE NPT, WHICH IS IN MANY rr Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 ? SECRET WAYS A MUCH LESS AMBITIOUS AGREEMENT, REQUIRED 43 INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION, WE BELIEVE THAT THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION SHOULD REQUIRED AT LEAST 60 RATIFICATIONS. 9. TIMESCALE. THERE MUST INEVITABLY BE SOME UNCERTAINTY IN DETERMINING HOW LONG IT WILL TAKE AFTER THE CONVENTION HAS BEEN OPENED FOR SIGNATURE BEFORE THE RELEVANT NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS WILL HAVE BEEN DEPOSITED. TAKING THE SAME PRECEDENTS, THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND ENMOD ENTERED INTO FORCE AFTER ABOUT A YEAR AND A HALF; WHILST THE BWC REQUIRED NEARLY THREE YEARS TO ACQUIRE THE RELEVANT RATIFICATIONS. GIVEN THE COMPLEXITY OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, IT WOULD BE PRUDENT NOT TO EXPECT ENTRY INTO FORCE IN THE IMMEDIATE MONTHS AFTER ITS OPENING FOR SIGNATURE. SUBSEQUENT SECTIONS IN THIS PAPER CONSIDER IN MORE DETAIL THE WORK THAT WILL BE NECESSARY TO BRING THE CONVENTION INTO FORCE AS AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 10. THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS IN GOING FROM COMPLETION OF THE CONVENTION TO ENTRY INTO FORCE DIVIDE INTO FIVE GENERAL AREAS: - (A) SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE INSPECTORATE; - (B) PREPARATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS FOR THE NEW ORGANIZATION; - (C) RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF SUFFICIENT INSPECTORS TO UNDERTAKE AT LEAST THE INITIAL INSPECTIONS OF DECLARED FACILITIES; - (D) DEFINITION AND PROCUREMENT OF THE EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO UNDERTAKE INITIAL VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES; AND - (E) COSTS AND FUNDING. SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT 11. THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION WILL HAVE TO RELY HEAVILY UPON ITS PERMANENT STAFF, IN PARTICULAR THE TECHNICAL INSPECTORATE. A CRUCIAL ELEMENT THEREFORE IN MAKING THE CONVENTION EFFECTIVE WILL BE THAT THE PERMANENT STAFF ARE AVAILABLE AND TRAINED IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS FROM THE BEGINNING. IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER STAFFING LEVELS IN MORE DETAIL. 12. A VALUABLE ANALYSIS OF THE LIKELY OVERALL SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF A CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT INSPECTORATE WAS CONTAINED IN THE NETHERLANDS PAPER CD/445. THIS ESTIMATED THAT ABOUT 50 INSPECTORS AND 90 SUPPORT 60 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 , ) Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 STAFF WOULD BE NEEDED PERMANENTLY; WITH AN ADDITIONAL 75 TO 115 INSPECTORS, AND ABOUT 100 SUPPORTING STAFF, NEEDED DURING THE FIRST TEN YEARS. SINCE THEN, THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN AGREEING DETAIL IN THE VARIOUS VERIFICATION REGIMES AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF THAT PAPER APPEAR TO REMAIN BROADLY VALID, AT LEAST AS FAR AS FUNCTIONS ARE CONCERNED. 13. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT MUST ALSO BE NOTED THAT VERY LITTLE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT WILL BE RELEVANT TO THE INSPECTORATE'S SIZE HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT. ONLY ONE DELEGATION HAS REVEALED DETAILS OF ITS STOCKPILES AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES; AND ONLY ELEVEN DELEGATIONS HAVE GIVEN PRELIMINARY DETAILS OF THEIR MANUFACTURE OF CIVIL KEY PRECURSOR CHEMICALS. 14. THE UK BELIEVES IT IS IMPORTANT TO PLACE THE NETHERLANDS ANALYSIS ON A FIRMER FOOTING AND THEREFORE REQUESTS ALL DELEGATIONS TO INFORM THE SECRETARIAT IN AS MUCH DETAIL AS THEY FEEL ABLE OF ACTIVITIES IN THEIR JURISDICTION RELEVANT TO THE OBLIGATIONS THEY WOULD ASSUME UNDER THE CONVENTION. 15. ON ENTRY INTO FORCE, THE INSPECTORATE WILL HAVE THE FOLLOWING MAIN FUNCTIONS: - (A) RECEIVE INITIAL DECLARATIONS FROM 60 OR MORE STATES PARTY, AND PROMULGATE THEM TO THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE. - (B) UNDERTAKE INITIAL INSPECTIONS OF DECLARED FACILITIES (INCLUDING CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILES, CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES, SINGLE PERMITTED FACILITIES; AND CERTAIN DECLARED CIVIL PRODUCTION FACILITIES). - (C) VERIFY INITIAL DECLARATIONS OF STOCKPILES AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE, PLACE THEM UNDER IMMEDIATE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. - (D) PROVIDE, AS APPROPRIATE, ADVICE TO STATES PARTY WISHING TO CONSTRUCT DESTRUCTION FACILITIES. - (E) CONDUCT CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS IN THE EVENT THAT ANY STATE PARTY REQUIRES REASSURANCE ABOUT THE INITIAL DECLARATIONS OF OTHERS. 16. THIS IS A POTENTIALLY SIZEABLE TASK, ESPECIALLY AS IT IS ASSUMED THAT ALL CW POSSESSOR STATES AND THE MANY CHEMICAL PRODUCING STATES ARE AMONG THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO RATIFY THE CONVENTION. TWO FACTORS IN PARTICULAR MAY, HOWEVER, MITIGATE THE NUMBERS OF INSPECTORS NEEDED AT THE VERY OUTSET. - (A) THERE IS UNLIKELY TO BE A REQUIREMENT FOR 61 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET MONITORING STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION UNTIL AT LEAST THE SECOND YEAR AFTER THE CONVENTION HAS COME INTO FORCE AND - (B) THE REQUIREMENT TO MONITOR CIVIL INDUSTRY MAY INCREASE GRADUALLY OVER THE TEN YEAR PERIOD BOTH AS MORE COUNTRIES RATIFY THE CONVENTION, AND HENCE BECOME SUBJECT TO THE NON-PRODUCTION VERIFICATION REGIME; AND AS MORE CHEMICALS ARE ADDED TO THE SCHEDULES TO ARTICLE VI. 17. A PARTICULAR TASK IN THE FIRST YEAR THAT IS NOT LIKELY TO RECUR SUBSEQUENTLY, IS THE NEED TO CARRY OUT INITIAL INSPECTIONS OF STOCKPILES AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES, AND TO PUT IN PLACE APPROPRIATE SEALS AND MONITORING DEVICES. IT MAY ASSIST STAFFING IF THE OTHER MOST MANPOWER INTENSIVE FUNCTION, ROUTINE INSPECTIONS OF THE CIVIL INDUSTRY, WERE TO BE DELAYED UNTIL THE SECOND YEAR OF THE CONVENTION. 18. ANNEX A TRIES TO ASSESS THE STAFF REQUIREMENTS AS THEY MAY VARY OVER TIME AND TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE ABOVE FACTORS. IT IS BASED HEAVILY ON THE ASSUMPTIONS IN CD 445 ABOUT THE POSSIBLE NATURE OF INITIAL DECLARATIONS. AS A MINIMUM, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT WILL NEED TO COMPRISE AT LEAST 30 INSPECTORS AND PERHAPS 60 SUPPORT STAFF TO GET THE CONVENTION OFF TO AN EFFECTIVE START. IT IS EVIDENT THAT BRINGING INTO EXISTENCE AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF THIS SIZE REQUIRES SOME PREPARATION. MUCH OF THE DETAIL MAY BE LEFT TO THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION, BUT THERE WILL NEED TO BE SOME DECISIONS AND ANALYSIS CONDUCTED NOW BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE, IF THE COMMISSION IS ITSELF TO MEET ITS REMIT FULLY. IT WILL ALSO BE NECESSARY TO HAVE AN AGREED STATUTE FOR THE ORGANIZATION AS A WHOLE. HAVE AN AGREED STATUTE FOR THE ORGANIZATION AS A WHOLE. PREPARATION OF HEADQUARTERS 19. ONE OF THE PRIME REQUIREMENTS FOR THE LOCATION OF THE NEW ORGANIZATION WILL BE THAT IT SHOULD BE CONVENIENTLY SITUATED FOR TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS. MEMBERS OF THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT WILL NEED TO BE ABLE TO MOVE RAPIDLY TO A POTENTIALLY WIDE RANGE OF LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE REQUIREMENT FOR RAPID TRANSPORTATION WILL BE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE EFFECTIVE CONDUCT OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION. 20. THE DECISION ON LOCATION WILL BE IMPORTANT: IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO CHANGE THE HEADQUARTERS ONCE ESTABLISHED (ALTHOUGH, THAT SAID, NEITHER A DECISION BY THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION, NOR THE 62 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, COULD BIND THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE). BUT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF STEPS INVOLVED, EACH POTENTIALLY TIME-CONSUMING. - (A) SOLICIT INVITATIONS FROM STATES PARTY FOR THE HEADQUARTERS LOCATION; - (B) AGREE ON THE LOCATION; - (C) NEGOTIATE A HOST NATION AGREEMENT WITH THE HOST COUNTRY TO COVER LOCAL TAXATION ARRANGEMENTS, ETC; - (D) IDENTIFY ACCOMMODATION REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NEW ORGANIZATION, AND THEREAFTER NEGOTIATE AN APPROPRIATE LEASE FOR THE ACCOMMODATION. - (E) ARRANGE APPROPRIATE OFFICE SERVICES AND GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT. 21. MOST, IF NOT ALL, OF THIS ACTIVITY MUST BE LEFT TO THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE ABOVE STEPS, IT WILL BE USEFUL TO HAVE A CLEARER PICTURE OF THE LIKELY SIZE OF PERMANENT STAFF OF THE ORGANIZATION. IT MAY ALSO BE OPEN TO CONSIDERATION WHETHER THE CONVENTION ITSELF MIGHT INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON THE HEADQUARTERS LOCATION. AN AGREED LOCATION BEFORE THE COMMISSION IS SET UP WOULD PROVIDE A FOUNDATION FOR OTHER PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONVENTION; NOTABLY RECRUITMENT OF STAFF. RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF INSPECTORS 22. THE UK HAS ARGUED IN CD589 THAT THE STAFF OF THE SECRETARIAT SHOULD COMPRISE QUALIFIED AND WIDELY EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL WITH THE HIGHEST .STANDARDS OF EFFICIENCY, TECHNICAL COMPETENCE AND INTEGRITY. GIVEN THE LIKELY BACKGROUND OF MANY TECHNICAL PERSONNEL IN THE CIVIL FIELD, AND THE NEED TO DEVELOP THE SPECIALIZED SKILLS DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO MONITORING WEAPONS ASPECTS OF THE CONVENTION IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO DEVISE A TRAINING PROGRAMME TO COVER, INTER ALIA, FAMILIARITY WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS; VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY; THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CHEMICAL AGENTS; AND THE OPERATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF CHEMICAL WEAPON PRODUCTION FACILITIES IN COMPARISON WITH CIVIL CHEMICAL CONCERNS. A TECHNICAL STAFF IN THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION WILL NEED TO DEFINE SUCH A PROGRAMME IN DETAIL. BUT IF THE TRAINING IS TO BE EFFECTIVE IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO HAVE THE COOPERATION OF ONE OR MORE OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS POSSESSOR STATES. 23. BEFORE STAFF CAN BE TRAINED, HOWEVER, TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE (PROBABLY BASED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE.ON EXISTING UN PRACTICE) WILL NEED TO BE DEFINED. SUPPORT STAFF WILL ALSO BE REQUIRED FOR ADMINISTRATION, FINANCE, LEGAL AND OTHER TECHNICAL 63 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET FUNCTIONS. 24. NECESSARILY, THE DETAILED WORK WOULD BE BEST LEFT TO THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION. NONETHELESS WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE COULD CONSIDER NOW, IN GENERAL TERMS, THE TYPE OF TRAINING THAT MIGHT BE REQUIRED FOR THE INSPECTORATE, HOW LONG IT MIGHT TAKE, AND THE LIKELY AVAILABILITY OF SUITABLE CANDIDATES. DEFINITION AND PROCUREMENT OF EQUIPMENT 25. VARIOUS PAPERS AND TECHNICAL WORKSHOPS HAVE INDICATED THE RANGE OF VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY THAT IS ALREADY AVAILABLE AND MIGHT BECOME AVAILABLE. EXPERIENCE GAINED DURING SUCCESSIVE UN MISSIONS WHICH HAVE INVESTIGATED ALLEGATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE HAS GIVEN FURTHER INSIGHT INTO THE EQUIPMENT THAT WILL BE NEEDED BY THE TECHNICAL INSPECTORATE. 26. IT IS CLEAR THAT A SIGNIFICANT PROPORTION OF THIS EQUIPMENT WILL NEED TO BE IN PLACE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CONVENTION. IN PARTICULAR, THERE WILL NEED TO BE SEALS, OR OTHER IDENTIFYING MARKS, FOR A POTENTIALLY LARGE NUMBER OF MUNITIONS WHICH MAY BE IDENTIFIED IN INITIAL DECLARATIONS. REMOTE SENSORS MAY NEED TO BE AVAILABLE; FEW HAVE YET BEEN DEMONSTRATED TO BE APPROPRIATE FOR CW VERIFICATION. 27. INTERNATIONAL PROCUREMENT CAN BE A LENGTHY PROCEDURE IN ITSELF. MOREOVER, SOME OF THIS EQUIPMENT MAY NEED TO BE PRODUCED SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE CONVENTION. IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO DEFINE NOW PRECISELY WHAT IS AVAILABLE AND WHAT EQUIPMENT WILL NEED TO BE ORDERED. EQUIPMENT MUST BE AVAILABLE IN GOOD TIME TO ENSURE THAT INSPECTORS ARE FULLY FAMILIAR WITH IT. 28. VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY IS THEREFORE A POTENTIALLY DIFFICULT AREA. IT WOULD NOT IN OUR VIEW BE APPROPRIATE TO LEAVE EVERYTHING TO THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION. A SMALL SUB-GROUP OF EXPERTS SHOULD BE CONVENED TO DRAW AN ASSESSMENT OF WHAT EQUIPMENT MAY BE AVAILABLE NOW, WHAT IS UNDER DEVELOPMENT, AND WHAT WOULD NEED TO BE DEVELOPED. IT SHOULD IN ADDITION ASSESS THE LIKELY COST AND PROCUREMENT TIMESCALES, IN ORDER TO PLACE THE DETAILED WORK TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION ON A FIRMER FOOTING. COSTS AND FUNDING 29. PREPARATORY COMMISSION. THE PERMANENT STAFF OF THE IAEA PREPARATORY COMMISSION COMPRISED A . TOTAL OF 27 PROFESSIONAL AND SUPPORT GRADES. IT LASTED A YEAR AND COST SOME $624,000 (AT 1957 64 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET PRICES). IMPLEMENTATIONOFTECHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IS LIKELY TO BE MORE COMPLEX AND REQUIRE MORE STAFF. IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO CONSIDER THIS QUESTION FURTHER BUT A PLANNING TOTAL OF SOME 40 STAFF MAY NOT BE INAPPROPRIATE. ASSUMING CURRENT UN SALARY SCALES AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE, SUCH A COMMISSION MIGHT REQUIRE ANNUAL FUNDING OF $1.3 M. IF ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES (ACCOMMODATION, HEATING, LIGHTING, TRAVEL ETC) ARE ADDED THE TOTAL ANNUAL COST COULD WELL RISE TO AROUND $3 M. 30. TO THIS EXPENDITURE MUST BE ADDED, IN THE YEAR BEFORE THE CONVENTION ENTERS INTO FORCE, THE COST OF THE EMBRYONIC TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT, INCLUDING FINANCE FOR NEW EQUIPMENT. FURTHER WORK IS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FIRM FIGURES. 31. THE FINANCE FOR THE IAEA PREPARATORY COMMISSION CAME IN THE FORM OF LOANS FROM THE UN. NO CONTRIBUTIONS FROM GOVERNMENTS WERE REQUIRED. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS FACING THE UN, AND THE POSSIBLE EXTENT OF PRE-FUNDING REQUIRED FOR THE CONVENTION PREPARATORY COMMISSION IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO THIS QUESTION. 32. ORGANIZATION. THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS BUDGET AMOUNTED TO JUST OVER $33 M IN 1986. ON PRESENT ESTIMATES, THE STAFFING LEVELS FOR THE CONVENTION WILL BE SLIGHTLY LOWER (PERHAPS A MAXIMUM OF JUST OVER 400 STAFF, COMPARED WITH AROUND 500 FOR THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS ACTIVITIES); AND WILL FALL AFTER THE TEN YEAR PERIOD FOR STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (TO POSSIBLY AROUND 130). IT IS CLEARLY UNWISE TO EXTRAPOLATE FROM OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (ESPECIALLY THOSE WITH VERY DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS) BUT FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES, IT MAY BE WORTH NOTING THE 1987 BUDGET AND STAFF LEVELS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION ($30M AND 650) AND THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION ($23 M AND 300). IF ANNUAL COSTS FOR THE CONVENTION WERE ASSUMED TO BE OF THE SAME ROUGH ORDER, EXPENDITURE MIGHT RISE TO $25-30 M AT ITS PEAK, FALLING TO PERHAPS $15-2014. FURTHER ELABORATION OF THESE COSTS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON CONTRIBUTIONS FROM STATES PARTY, SHOULD - AS IN THE CASE OF THE IAEA - BE LEFT TO THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION. 33. IT IS APPARENT FROM THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS THAT THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION WILL HAVE TO TAKE ON SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE CONVENTION WILL BE EFFECTIVE FROM 65 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 THE START. SUCH A BURDEN IS NOT UNPRECEDENTED. SIMILAR FUNCTIONS HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT IN THE PAST BY THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS ITSELF, AND THOSE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA. 34. WE PROPOSED IN CD 589 THAT THE CONVENTION PREPARATORY COMMISSION WOULD COME INTO EXISTENCE ON THE FIRST DAY THE CONVENTION WAS OPENED FOR SIGNATURE. IT WOULD BE COMPOSED OF THOSE STATES PARTIES WHICH HAD SIGNED THE CONVENTION, AND WOULD REMAIN IN EXISTENCE UNTIL THE CONVENTION HAD ENTERED INTO FORCE AND, THEREAFTER, UNTIL THE CONSULTIVE COMMITTEE HAD CONVENED AND THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MET FOR THE FIRST TIME. 35. WE HAD ALSO PROPOSED THAT THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION COULD BE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE IAEA PREPARATORY COMMISSION. IT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO MAKE STUDIES, REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS COVERING: - (A) THE FINANCING OF THE ORGANIZATION; - (B) THE PROGRAMMES AND BUDGET FOR THE FIRST YEAR OF THE ORGANIZATION; - (C) TECHNICAL PROBLEMS RELEVANT TO ADVANCE PLANNING; - (D) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT STAFF; AND - (E) THE LOCATION OF THE PERMANENT HEADQUARTERS. 36. IT IS APPARENT, HOWEVER; THAT THE WORKLOAD IS LIKELY TO BE MORE EXTENSIVE THAN THIS LIST IMPLIES. IN PARTICULAR, THE COMMISSION MAY BE REQUIRED TO: - (A) AGREE A LOCATION FOR THE ORGANIZATION HEADQUARTERS, NEGOTIATE APPROPRIATE AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGE ACCOMMODATION AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT; - (B) RECRUIT AND TRAIN A PROPORTION OF THE PERMANENT STAFF IN ADVANCE OF THE CONVENTION; - (C) PRODUCE DETAILED SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF NEW MONITORING EQUIPMENT AND SET THE NECESSARY ACTION IN HAND; AND - (D) ARRANGE ANY NECESSARY LOANS AND PRE-FINANCING FOR THIS ACTIVITY; 37. THESE ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES WILL NEED TO BE CLEARLY SET OUTIN APPROPRIATE AGREEMENT WHICH MIGHT (ON THE IAEA PRECEDENT) BE INCLUDED AS AN ANNEX TO THE CONVENTION. 38. THE AGREEMENT WILL ALSO HAVE TO DEFINE CLEARLY THE ROLE OF AN EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION. IT WILL BE EVIDENT THAT A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY WILL FALL ON THIS INDIVIDUAL TO ENSURE THAT ALL PREPARATIONS ARE MADE IN GOOD TIME. THERE WILL NEED TO BE FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL AUTHORITY 66 RFPRFT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 _ SECRET COMMENSURATE WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY. FURTHER WORK FOR THE AD HOC COMMITTEE 39. IN ORDER NOT TO PROLONG THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE UNITED KINGDOM BELIEVES IT IS IMPORTANT TO PASS AS MANY FUNCTIONS AS POSSIBLE TO BE RESOLVED BY THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION. THAT SAID, IT WOULD BE EQUALLY AS WRONG TO TRY TO PASS TO THE COMMISSION MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE WHICH MUST PROPERLY BE RESOLVED AS PART OF THE MAIN NEGOTIATIONS. A NUMBER OF THESE HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED ABOVE. 40. THE UNITED KINGDOM THEREFORE SUGGESTS THAT THE FOLLOWING AREAS OF WORK SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CD. - (A) FURTHER CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE LIKELY SIZE OF THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT. TO ENABLE THIS TO BE SOUNDLY BASED, DELEGATIONS SHOULD PROVIDE THE AD HOC COMMITTEE WITH AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ON THE ACTIVITIES IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES WHICH WILL FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE CONVENTION. - B) AN ANNEX TO THE CONVENTION, SETTING OUT AN AGREED STATUTE FOR THE ORGANIZATION, WILL NEED TO BE NEGOTIATED. THIS MIGHT INCLUDE OBJECTIVES, FUNCTIONS, BROAD COMPOSITION, AND PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITES. THE UK BELIEVES MUCH OF THIS MATERIAL COULD BE BASED UPON AGREEMENTS ALREADY REACHED WITHIN THE IAEA; - (C) THERE SHOULD BE FURTHER WORK ON TIMESCALE FOR RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL, IN PARTICULAR FOR THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT; - (D) THERE WILL NEED TO BE A BROAD ANALYSIS OF THE EQUIPMENT THAT WILL BE NEEDED FOR VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES. THE UNITED KINGDOM BELIEVES THAT A SMALL SUB GROUP OF EXPERTS SHOULD BE CONVENED TO TRY TO DRAW UP AN ASSESSMENT OF WHAT IS AVAILABLE NOW, WHAT IS UNDER DEVELOPMENT, AND WHAT WOULD NEED TO BE DEVELOPED. IT WOULD IN ADDITION NEED TO ASSESS LIKELY COSTS AND PROCUREMENT TIMESCALES TO ASSIST THE WORK OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION; - (E) IN THE LIGHT OF THIS WORK, THE AD HOC COMMITTEE SHOULD FURTHER CONSIDER THE LIKELY EXPENSES TO BE INCURRED BY THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION, AND MAKE PROPOSALS ON FINANCING; - (F) MORE GENERALLY, IT WILL NEED TO PRODUCE AN AGREED CHARTER FOR THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION. THE UNITED KINGDOM IS PLEASED TO NOTE THAT USEFUL WORK IN THIS AREA HAS ALREADY COMMENCED. CONCLUSION SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 41. THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED ABOVE REPRESENT IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED KINGDOM A PRACTICAL WAY OF ENSURING THAT THE CHEMICAL WEAPON CONVENTION WILL BE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY UPON ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE. IT WILL ONLY BE IF THE ORGANIZATION IS FULLY OPERATIONAL FROM THE BEGINNING THAT ALL STATES PARTY CAN HAVE THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE IN THE CAPACITY OF THE CONVENTION TO SAFEGUARD THEIR SECURITY IN THIS IMPORTANT ARMS CONTROL FIELD. ANNEX CW GANIZATION: SIZE OF INSPECTORATE INTRODUCTION 1. THE NETHERLANDS PAPER CD/445 CONTAINED A ROUGH CALCULATION OF THE SIZE OF A CW INSPECTORATE, BASED ON CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE OBLIGATIONS LIKELY TO ARISE UNDER THE CONVENTION. THIS ANNEX, WHICH IS BASED HEAVILY ON THAT PAPER, ATTEMPTS TO UPDATE SOME OF THIS ANALYSIS IN THE LIGHT OF THE OBLIGATIONS CURRENTLY SET OUT IN CD/cw/wp.167. IT ALSO CONSIDERS HOW THE SIZE OF THE INSPECTORATE, TOGETHER WITH OTHER PERMANENT STAFF, MIGHT VARY THROUGH THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE CONVENTION AND BEYOND. IT ASSUMES, IN PARTICULAR, AS CD/445, THAT EACH INSPECTOR CAN ACHIEVE 40 MAN DAYS/YEAR INSPECTION. INITIAL DECLARATIONS 2. THE PERMANENT STAFF WILL BE REQUIRED TO RECEIVE AND PROCESS INITIAL DECLARATIONS FROM ALL STATES PARTY WITHIN 30 DAYS OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION, AS SET OUT IN ARTICLES III AND VI. WE BELIEVE THAT STAFF LEVELS ESTABLISHED IN GENERAL SUPPORT OF THE TECHNICAL INSPECTORATE (SEE PARA 12 BELOW) WILL BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT WHAT WILL BE LARGELY A CLERICAL TASK. STOCKPILES: INITIAL INSPECTION 3. IT IS LIKELY THAT AFTER INITIAL DECLARATIONS, THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT WILL BE REQUIRED TO CONDUCT AN INITIAL INSPECTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPON STOCKPILES, COMBINED WITH SOME ARRANGEMENTS FOR ON- SITE INSTRUMENTATION TO ENSURE THAT STOCKS ARE NOT REMOVED EXCEPT TO A DESTRUCTION FACILITY. ON THE ASSUMPTION OF 30 STOCKPILES WORLDWIDE, AND FOUR MAN WEEKS INSPECTION/INSTRUMENTATION AT EACH, 15 INSPECTORS WOULD BE NEEDED FOR THIS TASK IN THE FIRST YEAR. THEREAFTER, POSSIBLY 2 INSPECTORS WOULD HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR INITIAL INSPECTION AND SEALING IN RESPECT OF NEW PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION, AND, POSSIBLY, ANY CHEMICAL WEAPONS REPORTED BY PARTIES AFTER INITIAL DECLARATIONS. Gt.. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET STOCKPILES: SYSTEMATIC VERIFICATION 4. MONITORING OF STOCKPILES WILL BE REQUIRED UNTIL DESTRUCTION. A MIXTURE OF ON-SITE INSTRUMENTATION, TAMPER-PROOF SEALS ETC CAN PROBABLY PROVIDE THE MAIN SAFEGUARD; HOWEVER A LIMITED NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS WILL ALSO BE NEEDED UNTIL STOCKS HAVE BEEN REMOVED TO DESTRUCTION SITES. ASSUMING THIS WILL HAVE BEEN COMPLETED BY THE END OF THE SECOND YEAR, AND THAT EACH STOCKPILE WILL UNTIL THEN BE SUBJECT TO FOUR INSPECTIONS A YEAR, SOME 3 INSPECTORS WOULD BE REQUIRED FULL-TIME FOR EACH OF THE FIRST TWO YEARS. STOCKPILES: DESTRUCTION 5. CD/445 SUGGESTED THAT DURING THE FIRST 10 YEARS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE, SIX LARGE AND NINE SMALLER DESTRUCTION PLANTS WILL BE WORKING SIMULTANEOUSLY, AND THAT THIS WOULD GIVE A REQUIREMENT FOR SOME 60 TO 100 INSPECTORS. THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE ANNEX TO ARTICLE IV REQUIRE FURTHER ELABORATION, IN THE LIGHT OF WHICH THE ESTIMATE MAY NEED TO BE REFINED. NOR IS THERE YET CONSENSUS FOR THE ORDER FOR DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS. ALSO RELEVANT WILL BE PRECISE NATIONAL PLANS FOR STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION WHICH ARE NOT YET AVAILABLE. NONETHELESS, IT MAY BE ASSUMED THAT THERE WILL BE SOME PHASING OF NATIONAL DESTRUCTION FACILITIES ENTERING INTO OPERATION. THE NUMBER OF INSPECTORS NEEDED MAY THEREFORE BUILD UP GRADUALLY OVER (SAY) THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF THE CONVENTION. THE LIKELY NEED TO RETAIN DESTRUCTION FACILITIES WILL REQUIRE A LARGE NUMBER OF INSPECTORS UNTIL THE END OF THE FIRST TEN YEARS. PRODUCTION FACILITIES: INITIAL INSPECTIONS 6. AFTER THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF THE CONVENTION, EACH CW PRODUCTION FACILITY WILL HAVE TO BE SUBJECTED TO AN INSPECTION IN ORDER TO VERIFY THAT IT HAS BEEN CLOSED IN A MANNER TO RENDER IT INOPERABLE. VERIFICATION OF NON-OPERATION THEREAFTER CAN TO A LARGE EXTENT BE VERIFIED BY TECHNICAL MEANS. NONETHELESS, THE INITIAL INSPECTION MAY ALSO HAVE TO BE USED TO PUT IN PLACE SUCH TECHNICAL DEVICES. ASSUMING 20 PRODUCTION AND MUNITION FACILITIES, WITH AN AVERAGE OF TWO MAN-WEEKS INSPECTION AND SEALING ACTIVITY AT EACH, SOME 5 INSPECTORS WOULD BE NEEDED IN THE FIRST YEAR. PRODUCTION FACILITIES: NON-OPERATION AND DESTRUCTION 7. VERIFICATION OF NON-OPERATION AND DESTRUCTION OF CW FACILITIES MAY REQUIRE RELATIVELY INFREQUENT VISITS. ASSUMING FOUR VISITS/YEAR, AND 20 FACILITIES, 2 INSPECTORS WOULD NEED TO BE DEDICATED TO THE TASK UNTIL DESTRUCTION IS COMPLETE (YEAR 8). SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET PERMITTED SMALL-SCALE FACILITY 8. CD/445 ASSUMED, ON THH BASIS OF 20 SMALL SCALE FACILITIES WORLDWISE, ABOUT 25 MAN-DAYS INSPECTION PER YEAR. ROUNDING UP, 1 INSPECTOR WOULD NEED TO BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE. CIVIL FACILITIES: INITIAL INSPECTIONS 9. CD/I53 SUGGESTED THAT, WORLDWIDE, ABOUT 50 PLANTS PRODUCED PRECURSORS FOR SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS FOR PERMITTED NON-CW PURPOSES. THE INFORMATION IN THAT PAPER WILL NEED UPDATING TO REFLECT PROGRESS MADE IN ARTICLE VI. HOWEVER, ASSUMING FOUR MAN DAYS INITIAL INSPECTION AT EACH PLANT, WHICH COULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT OF A SEPARATE FACILITY ATTACHMENT AT EACH, AROUND 5 INSPECTORS MIGHT BE NEEDED IN THE FIRST YEAR. THEREAFTER, POSSIBLY A FURTHER 2 INSPECTORS MIGHT NEED TO BE DEDICATED IN ORDER TO CONDUCT INITIAL INSPECTIONS AS NEW PARTIES JOIN THE CONVENTION, OTHER CHEMICAL PLANTS COMMENCE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICALS LISTED IN SCHEDULE 2 TO ANNEX VI, AND NEW CHEMICALS MAY BE ADDED TO THAT SCHEDULE. CIVIL FACILITIES: ROUTINE VERIFICATION 10. FREQUENCY OF INSPECTIONS OF FACILITIES DECLARED UNDER ARTICLE VI HAVE YET TO BE AGREED. HOWEVER, IF EACH SUCH FACILITY IS TO BE VISITED ONCE A YEAR, FOR A WEEK AT A TIME, BY, ON AVERAGE, THREE INSPECTORS, SOME 20 INSPECTORS WOULD BE REQUIRED AT THE OUTSET, RISING TO 40 BY THE END OF TEN YEARS, ASSUMING IN THAT TIME THAT THE NUMBER OF DECLARED PLANTS DOUBLED. IT MAY BE CONVENIENT TO DELAY ROUTINE INSPECTIONS UNTIL AFTER THE FIRST YEAR OF THE CONVENTION. CHALLENGE INSPECTION 11. ALTHOUGH AT LEAST FIVE INSPECTORS WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR EACH CHALLENGE (TO BE CHOSEN FROM A SPECIAL PANEL), IT IS ASSUMED THERE WOULD BE RELATIVELY FEW CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS. 2 INSPECTORS ARE ASSUMED TO BE NEEDED TO COVER FOR OTHER INSPECTORS ABSENCE. SUPPORT STAFF 12. CD/445 SUGGESTED A RATIO OF 1.8 FOR SUPPORT STAFF TO INSPECTORS WORKING FROM HEADQUARTERS; AND 1.0 WITH RESPECT TO RESIDENT INSPECTORS PERMANENTLY PRESENT AT DESTRUCTION FACILITIES. ADDITIONAL STAFF WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE AND SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL. FOR SIMPLICITY, WE HAVE THEREFORE TAKEN A RATIO OF 2.0 TO GIVE AN INDICATION OF TOTAL STAFF NUMBERS. CW ORGANIZATION: SIZE OF INSPECTORATE APPENDIX ON ENTRY YRS YRS YRS YRS YRS YRS YRS YRS YRS YRS 70 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET INTO FORCE 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 1 1. STOCKPILES: INITIAL INSPECTION AND SEALING: 15 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2. STOCKPILES: SYSTEMATIC VERIFICATION: 4 4 - - 3. STOCKPILES: DESTRUCTION: 20 40 . 60 80 100 100 100 100 100 - 4. PRODUCTION FACILITIES INITIAL INSPECTION AND SEALING: 5 5. PRODUCTION FACILITIES: DESTRUCTION: 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 6. PERMITTED SMALLSCALE FACILITY: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7. CIVIL FACILITIES: INITIAL INSPECTION AND AGREEMENT OF FACILITY ATTACHMENT: 5 2 2 2 2 ?2 2 2 2 2 2 8. PERMITTED CIVIL PRODUCTION: ROUTINE VERIFICATION: 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 40 9. CHALLENGE INSPECTION: 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 -2 INSPECTORS 32 53 71 93 115 137 139 141 143 145 45 SUPPORT 64 106 142 186 230 274 278 282 286 290 90 TOTAL PERSONNEL 96 159 213 279 345 411 417 423 429 435 134 END OF TEXT. FLACK END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 71 onnnnm Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07211 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS: JUNE 22-26, 1987 REFS: (A) GENEVA 7142 (CD-102), (B) GENEVA 6995 (CD-112). 1. THIS IS CD-120. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- CLUSTER IV (CW ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES AND FUNCTIONS; FACTFINDING AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION) DISCUSSIONS, LED BY CHAIRMAN WALTER KRUTSZCH, GDR, FOCUSSED ON THE FOLLOWING TOPICS: MODEL AGREEMENT, COMPOSITION AND FUNCTIONS OF EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, RELATIONSHIPS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES TO EACH OTHER AND THEIR LEGAL PERSONALITY. -- U.S. REP MANNIX MET INFORMALLY WITH SOVIET REP SMIDOVICH TO REVIEW PROPOSED WORK FOR REMAINDER OF SUMMER ON CW. MAIN TOPICS ADDRESSED WERE CHALLENGE INSPECTION, ORDER OF DESTRUCTION, CONVERSION OF PRODUCTION FACILITY TO DESTRUCTION FACILITY, AND SUMMER INITIATIVES. -- DUTCH PAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION IS STILL PERKING. (TEXT AND STATUS REPORTED REF A). -- ON JUNE 21 U.S. CD DEL BRIEFED SENATE OBSERVER GROUP ON CD WORK (REPORTED REF B). MOST OF SESSION FOCUSSED ON CW. -- INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITH SWEDISH REP BONNIER INDICATE EKEUS' INTENTION TO CONTINUE CLUSTER I (CHEMICAL WEAPONS) AND CLUSTER IV INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON ORDER OF ELIMINATION, JURISDICTION AND CONTROL, ASSISTANCE, AND MODEL AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY. 3. CLUSTER IV -- -- MOST DELEGATIONS SEEM GENERALLY TO AGREE ON THE NEED FOR SOME FORM OF MODEL AGREEMENT(S) IN CONJUNCTION WITH RELEVANT CONVENTION ARTICLES/ANNEXES. HOWEVER, NO WRITTEN CONCLUSIONS OR TEXT DRAFTING TOOK PLACE. -- DISCUSSION ON THE MAKEUP AND FUNCTIONING OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL FOUND WELL-WORN NON- ALIGNED ARGUMENTS (BACKED BY THE SOVIETS) FOR POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, UK SUPPORT FOR REPRESENTATION BASED ON SIZE OF CHEMICAL 72 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 INDUSTRY, AND U.S. PREFERENCE FOR GEOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION AND PERMANENT SEATS FOR UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS. CONCLUSION: THERE IS NO BASIS TO EXPECT NEAR TERM RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES ON THIS TOPIC. -- DISCUSSION ON RELATIONSHIPS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES AND THEIR LEGAL PERSONALITY RESULTED IN AGREEMENT THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION IS NEEDED, BUT NOT NOW. MANY QUESTIONS WERE RAISED CONCERNING LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE "INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY" REFERRED TO IN THE ROLLING TEXT, AND ITS RELATIONSHIP VIS-A-VIS STATES PARTY; BUT THERE WERE NO SUGGESTIONS OR PROPOSALS. 4. INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITH SOVIET REP -- -- ON JUNE 24 U.S. REP MANNIX MET WITH SOVIET C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 03 GENEVA 07211 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL COUNTERPART SMIDOVICH TO REVIEW CURRENT CW ISSUES. - MANNIX ASKED IF SOVIETS WERE NOW READY TO DISCARD PROVISION ALLOWING FOR CONVERSION OF PRODUCTION FACILITY TO DESTRUCTION FACILITY. (SOVIETS HAD INDICATED IN SPRING THIS WASN'T NECESSARY.) SMIDOVICH REPLIED4THAT MOSCOW NOW REQUIRES TIME FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION ON THIS SUBJECT WHILE CONCURRENTLY LOOKING AT THE WHOLE ISSUE OF DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. -- ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION, SMIDOVICH SAID WE ARE NOT FAR APART ON CONCEPTS, ALTHOUGH TERMINOLOGY DIFFERS, AND THAT CHALLENGE INSPECTION COULD BE SOLVED THIS SUMMER. ON THE SUBJECT OF ACCESS TO BUNKERS, SMIDOVICH SAID HE PERSONALLY DID NOT THINK THAT WOULD BE A PROBLEM. HOWEVER, HE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN KNOWING HOW CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS COULD BE CARRIED OUT TO PROTECT SENSITIVE FACILITIES LIKE COMMAND POSTS. MANNIX NOTED THAT THE U.S. WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE SOME DETAIL FROM THE SOVIETS ON THIS ISSUE. -- ON THE ORDER OF ELIMINATION OF CW, SMIDOVICH SAID HE PERSONALLY AGREED WITH PHASED DESTRUCTION APPROACH BY AGENT WEIGHT, BUT INDICATED SOME CONCERN ABOUT ALLOWING STATES TO DECIDE ON WHICH SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS TO DESTROY FIRST. HE SAID THEY DISLIKE THE FRENCH CONCEPT OF SECURITY 73 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 STOCKPILES. -- WHEN PRESSED ON THE NEED FOR DATA EXCHANGE, SMIDOVICH NOTED THEY HAVE INFORMATION, BUT ARE SKEPTICAL AS TO SERIOUSNESS OF U.S. IN ACTUALLY SIGNING A CONVENTION. WHEN ASKED WHY SOVIETS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE INTERESTED IN VISITING TOOELE, SMIDOVICH NOTED IT WAS A "PROBLEM." HE SAID THEY WOULD SHOW AMB NAZARKIN A BUNKER THEMSELVES, BUT IF THEY COME TO TOOELE, THEY WOULD HAVE TO RECIPROCATE. -- COMMENT: IMPRESSION FROM DISCUSSION WAS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE SOME INITIATIVES AT HAND, BUT ARE BEING CAUTIOUS ABOUT THEIR DISCLOSURE UNTIL THEY HAVE A BETTER SENSE OF HOW THE SUMMER WILL UNFOLD. END COMMENT. 5. DUTCH PAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION -- -- AS REPORTED REF A, DUTCH PAPER IS STILL IN LIMBO. PAPER HAS NOT BEEN SENT BACK TO TTE HAGUE, BUT IS STILL BEING WORKED IN GENEVA. DUTCH REMAIN UNSURE WHAT TO DO WITH IT. -- U.S. DEL HAS CLEARLY INDICATED TO DUTCH THAT PAPER STILL CONTAINS SOME UNHELPFUL IDEAS AND THAT WE DO NOT THINK ANOTHER WESTERN PROPOSAL WOULD BE HELPFUL. 6. UK-SOVIET BILATERAL MEETING -- -- ON JUNE 26, UK4HOSTED BILATERAL MEETING WITH THE SOVIETS. MICHAEL PAKENHAM AND DAVID POWELL CAME FROM LONDON FOR THE MEETING. -- UK REP GRAHA'OOPER PRIVATELY NOTED TO U.S. DEL THAT A JOINT UK-SOVIET EFFORT ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION IS NOT EXPECTED. THE C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 03 GENEVA 07211 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SOVIETS, MOREOVER, ARE VERY UPSET ABOUT THE FRENCH SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL AND PLAN TO CRITICIZE IT IN A PLENARY STATEMENT. COOPER ALSO NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE VERY SECRETIVE AS TO THEIR PLANS FOR THE SUMMER. UK WILL BRIEF THE WESTERN GROUP JULY 1 ON THE MEETING. 7. CONSULTATIONS WITH SWEDES ON INFORMAL WORK -- -- ELISABET BONNIER NOTED PLANS TO CONTINUE WORK FROM CLUSTER I AND IV INFORMALLY BY HAVING SMALL GROUPS MEET ON THE SUBJECTS OF MODEL AGREEMENT, JURISDICTION AND CONTROL, ORDER 7.7 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 -"\ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET OF ELIMINATION AND ASSISTANCE. SPECIFICALLY ON THE SUBJECT OF ASSISTANCE, SHE NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS AND THEIR GROUP ARE NOW SUPPORTING THE PAKISTAN PAPER. SWEDES HOPE TO CONTAIN ITS CONSIDERATION BY WORKING IT IN A SMALL GROUP. 8. CW WESTERN COORDINATING MEETING -- -- JUNE 22 MEETING REVIEWED CLUSTER I WORK TO DATE AND PREVIEWED CLUSTER IV WORK. THERE WAS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR MODEL AGREEMENT(S) OF SOME SORT TO BE NEGOTIATED IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE/ANNEXES. -- PREPARATIONS CONTINUE ON INDUSTRIAL EXPERTS MEETING, WITH A LARGE REPRESENTATION DUE FROM THE WESTERN GROUP. DUTCH COORDINATOR VAN SCHAIK STATED THAT THE NNA ARE EXPECTED TO HAVE 5-6 EXPERTS AND AMB. NAZARKIN HAS ASKED FOR REPRESENTATION FROM THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF CHEMICAL INDUSTRY. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 75 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07223 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY OF JUNE 30, 1987 REF: GENEVA 7129 1. THIS IS CD-121. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- NORWAY (AMB. KRISTVIK) TABLED THREE PAPERS, TWO ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (VERIFICATION RESEARCH AND PROCEDURES) AND ONE ON SEISMOLOGICAL VERIFICATION MEASURES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR BAN. IN HIS FIRST STATEMENT, U.S. AMB. FRIEDERSDORF, LAID OUT U.S. VIEWS ON DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR TESTING IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET DEPFONMIN. PETROVSKY'S 9 JUNE STATEMENT, AND REAFFIRMED U.S. INVITATION TO USSR TO VISIT TOOELE CW DESTRUCTION FACILITY. SOVIET AMB. NAZARKIN RESPONDED TO U.S., ARGUING FOR THE DEFENSIVE NATURE OF WARSAW PACT MILITARY DOCTRINE, AND RESPONDING IN CRITICAL TERMS TO THE INVITATION TO TOOELE. IRANIAN DEPFONMIN LARIJANI DESCRIBED CONTINUING USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS BY IRAQ, INCLUDING ALLEGED USE AGAINST CIVILIAN TARGETS. NORWEGIAN STATEMENT AND PAPERS POUCHED TO ACDA/MA. FULL TEXT OF AMB. FRIEDERSDORF'S STATEMENT TRANSMITTED REFTEL. END SUMMARY. 3. NORWAY -- -- SPEAKING AS AN OBSERVER TO CD, AMB. KRISTVIK, DIRECTOR GENERAL, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS INTRODUCED THREE WORKING PAPERS. THE FIRST TWO (CD/761 AND CD/762) DEAL WITH THE VERIFICATION OF ALLEGED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE FIRST FOCUSSING ON NORWEGIAN RESEARCH RESULTS IN 1986/87 AND THE SECOND ON GENERAL PROCEDURES FOR VERIFICATION. THE THIRD PAPER (CD/763) DEALS WITH SEISMOLOGICAL VERIFICATION MEASURES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN AND DESCRIBES RESEARCH ACTIVITY INVOLVING VERY HIGH FREQUENCIES. 4. U.S.-.- -- AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF REVIEWED U.S. ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES AND, IN RESPONSE TO A 9 JUNE 1987 STATEMENT BY SOVIET DEPFONMIN PETROVSKY, REAFIRMED U.S. POLICY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND ON NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUES. - FRIEDERSDORF EXPLAINED THAT WESTERN STATES RELY ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE FOR SECURITY BECAUSE OF THE CONDITIONS IN THE WORLD TODAY, PARTICULARLY IMBALANCES 7C7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET IN THE CONVENTIONAL, CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR FIELDS. HE CALLED ON THE USSR TO AGREE TO THE GLOBALELIMINATION OF INF SYSTEMS, STRESSING ADVANTAGES FOR VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE. -- WITH REGARD TO NTB, FRIEDERSDORF SAID THE U.S. HAS PROPOSED TO THE USSR A PROCESS WHEREBY THE TWO COUNTRIES COULD INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE REJECTED OUR PROPOSALS. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS AGREED TO A STEP BY STEP PROCESS TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN AS A LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE AND STRESSED THAT THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS IS THE NEGOTIATION OF VERIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS TO THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY AND THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 07223 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL EXPLOSIONS TREATY. - FRIEDERSDORF SAID THE U.S. INVITATION TO SOVIET AMB. NAZARKIN TO VISIT THE U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITY AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS BUNKER INTOOELE, UTAH REMAINS OPEN. 5. USSR -- -- IN A LENGTHY BUT RAMBLING AND ILL-FOCUSED EXTEMPORANEOUS RESPONSE TO FRIEDERSDORF'S STATEMENT, NAZARKIN REPEATED SOVIET CRITICISMS OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY, AND CITED ALLEGED GROWTH OF U.S. NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC AREA (CALLING SPECIFIC ATTENTION TO DEPLOYMENT OF LANCE MISSILES IN SOUTH KOREA) AS REASON FOR MAINTAINING 100 SS-20 SYSTEMS IN ASIATIC USSR. HE REAFFIRMED THE RECENT WARSAW PACT COMMUNIQUE ON MILITARY DOCTRINE. HE ALSO STATED THAT A SOVIET VISIT TO TOOELE WOULD "ONLY" BE A CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE AND NOT USEFUL FOR NEGOTIATIONS. HIS EXPERTS ALREADY KNOW HOW TO DESTROY CW, NAZARKIN SAID, AND A MORE EFFECTIVE CBM WOULD BE FOR THE U.S. TO STOP BINARY PRODUCTION. 6. IRAN -- -- DEPFONMIN LARIJANI REVIEWED INCIDENTS OF ALLEGED CW USE BY IRAQ AGAINST IRANIAN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY TARGETS DURING THE PAST THREE AND ONE HALF YEARS. HE ALSO SAID "SHOULD THIS CONTINUE, THE DAY MAY SOON ARRIVE WHEN CRIMINAL ELEMENTS WILL USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST AIRPORTS AND OTHER FACILITIES" AND STATED THAT ANY SUPPORT OF THE VIOLATOR, KNOWING OF HIS ACTIONS, 77 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONSTITUTES PARTICIPATION IN THE REQUESTED SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ PLETION OF A CW AGREEMENT. 7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. END OF MESSAGE NN 7C CRIME. LARIJANI AND URGED THE COM- PETRONE CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07255 DOE FORDP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): REPORT ON JUNE 26, 1987 UK/SOVIET BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON CW 1. THIS IS CD-122. (CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- UK REP (GORDON) BRIEFED JULY 1 WEEKLY WESTERN GROUP MEETING ON RESULTS OF JUNE 26 UK-SOVIET BILATS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. FOLLOWING MAJOR TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED: CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES; - -- SECURITY BALANCE DURING DESTRUCTION PERIOD/FRENCH PROPOSAL; -- CD/715 (THE UK PROPOSAL) AND OTHER CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUES; -- TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS; -- FILTER ARRANGEMENTS; AND - POST-AUGUST NEGOTIATIONS. THERE WERE NO SURPRISES, BUT UK WAS IMPRESSED WITH SOVIET CANDOR AND INTEREST. END SUMMARY. 3. GORDON CHARACTERIZED SOVIET PERFORMANCE AS RELAXED, SERIOUS, VOID OF POLEMICS, AND FAIRLY CONVINCING OVERALL. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS CORDIAL, WITH DIALOGUE UNHINDERED BY ANY SET AGENDA OR PREDETERMINED CONCLUDING TIME. 4. UK PRESSED FOR BETTER CBMS, BOTH IN CD AND ELSEWHERE, CITING SOVIET ADMISSION OF CW POSSESSION AS AN EXAMPLE. UK ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN MORE DETAILS OR TO BREAK NEW GROUND PRODUCED NO RESULTS. SOVIETS DID ALLOW THEY WERE STILL CONSIDERING RECIPROCAL VISITS TO DESTRUCTION FACILITIES, AND THEY DESCRIBED U.S. BINARY PROGRAM AS A STEP BACKWARDS FROM BUILDING CONFIDENCE. 5. SOVIETS OPINED (CITING A 1986 TASS ESTIMATE) THAT THERE WERE 13-15 STATES IN CW CLUB AND NOTED PROBLEMS ATTENDANT TO SECURING ADHERENCE OF ALL OF THESE TO A CONVENTION. THEY PROPOSED AN EAST-WEST STUDY TO DETERMINE WHICH OF THESE STATES MUST BECOME "PRECONDITIONS" TO A CONVENTION ENTERING INTO FORCE. 6. BALANCE OF SECURITY DURING THE DESTRUCTION PROCESS IS IMPORTANT TO THE SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SOVIETS. THEY ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED FOR A SECURITY STOCKPILE ARRANGEMENT, BUT THEY OBJECT TO IT BEING SO LABELED. THEY REMARKED THAT THEY COULD SEE THOSE STATES POSSESSING THE GREATEST AMOUNTS OF CW DESTROYING PROPORTIONATELY MORE THAN THOSE WITH LESSER AMOUNTS. THE SOVIETS NOTED THAT "DETAILED PROVISIONS" OF A SECURITY STOCKPILE CONCEPT REMAIN TO BE STUDIED. /. GORDON REPORTED ON SOVIET "IMPLACABLE HOSTILITY" TO EXISTENCE OF AN ACTIVE CW PRODUCTION FACILITY FOLLOWING CONVENTION RATIFICATION. FOR THE SOVIETS, THIS IS A "DANGEROUS APPROACH," ONE WHICH WILL COMPLICATE NEGOTIATIONS. 8. THE SOVIETS SOUGHT AND OBTAINED ASSURANCES THAT UK APPROACH TO CHALLENGE INSPECTION IN C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 07255 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL CD/715 WOULD COVER ALL SITES AND FACILITIES (NOT JUST GOVERNMENT-OWNED). THE SOVIETS CONFIRMED THAT CD/715 SHOULD CONTINUE TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, BUT STATED THERE WAS NO NEED AT PRESENT TO COMMENCE DRAFTING TEXT. THE SOVIETS SAID THEY WERE STILL STUDYING WHETHER THE CHALLENGING STATE WOULD BE THE ULTIMATE JUDGE OF NON-COMPLIANCE. (NOTE: WHEN QUESTIONED BY WESTERN GROUP, GORDON STATED THE UK WAS AWAITING A "MEETING OF THE MINDS" AMONG THE WESTERN STATES BEFORE DRAFTING A SPECIFIC CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROVISION. HE NOTED SOVIET AWARENESS OF WESTERN DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS ISSUE, BUT HE OFFERED NO INDICATION OF WHAT MIGHT BE SOVIET INTENTIONS/MOTIVATIONS IN THIS REGARD.) 9. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE SOVIETS; THEY BELIEVE THEY SHOULD BE COVERED BY THE CONVENTION, EVEN IF THEIR ACTIVITIES INVOLVE NON-PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION. THE UK SIDE SAID IT WOULD CONSULT LEGAL ADVISERS. 10. THE SOVIETS SAID THAT ON THE WHOLE THEY WERE NOW INCLINED AGAINST A FILTER AFFECTING INITIATION OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION, BUT THEY RESERVED THEIR so Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CPCRPT POSITION ON ANY "POST-INSPECTION" FILTER, I.E., THE PATH THE INSPECTION REPORT WILL FOLLOW TO ITS POINT OF FINAL ADJUDICATION. AN "AUTOMATIC CHALLENGE" IS ACCEPTABLE, BUT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT CLEAR ON THEIR PREFERENCE FOR HOW THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE INSPECTION IS TO BE RESOLVED. 11. THE MATTER OF WHO COMPENSATES A SITE OR FACILITY SECURED BY AN INSPECTION TEAM FOR LOSS OF REVENUE DURING A POSSIBLE STAND-DOWN (SECURED) PERIOD WAS DISCUSSED. THE UK RESPONDED THAT IN THEIR VIEW IT IS "TOUGH LUCK" FOR THE SITE OR FACILITY WHICH WOULD HAVE TO ABSORB THE LOSS. THIS DID NOT SIT WELL WITH THE SOVIETS. 12. THE SOVIETS "PRESSED HARD" FOR A PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SEP AND DEC 1987, EVEN IF THEY WERE "INFORMAL." THE UK AGREED THAT SOME EFFORTS WERE NEEDED, BUT NOTED NEW YORK COMMITMENTS AS WELL DURING THAT TIME. (NOTE: GORDON STATED? TO WESTERN GROUP THAT THE UK DID NOT WANT TO BE SEEN WALKING AWAY FROM NEGOTIATIONS AT THE SAME TIME THE U.S. BINARY PRODUCTION PROGRAM BEGINS.) UK/SOVIET DIALOGUE WILL CONTINUE WITH A "HIGH LEVEL" MEETING IN MOSCOW IN ABOUT A MONTH. 13. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 25X1 crrpci, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07272 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): WESTERN GROUP MEETING, JULY 1, 1987 1. THIS IS CD-123. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- DEBRIEF OF JUNE 26 CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN UK AND SOVIETS, AND DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR TEST BAN (NTB) MANDATE PROPOSALS HIGHLIGHTED JULY 1 WESTERN GROUP MEETING. CW DEBRIEF BEING REPORTED SEPTEL. END SUMMARY. 3. CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- -- DUTCH AMB VAN SCHAIK (CW COORDINATOR) ATTRIBUTED A SLOWER THEN ANTICIPATED NEGOTIATING PACE IN PART TO THE SOVIETS SLIPPING THEIR GOAL OF A COMPLETED CONVENTION TO 1988. WITHOUT MENTIONING SPECIFICS, VAN SCHAIK DREW ATTENTION TO "MASSIVE DETAILS" WHICH NEEDED TO BE SETTLED, STATING HE HAS ENCOURAGED SWEDISH AMB EKEUS (AHC CHAIRMAN) TO HANDLE THEM IN SMALL GROUPS, "OTHERWISE WE WILL BE AT IT (A CW CONVENTION) FOR ANOTHER 2-3 YEARS." U.S. REP (BARTHELEMY) DISCUSSED NEGATIVE SOVIET REACTION TO TOOELE INVITATION, REPORTING U.S. INTENTION TO PERSIST IN PUTTING THE QUESTION TO THE SOVIETS AND HOPE THAT OTHER WESTERN DELS WILL SEEK TO DO THE SAME. -- DETAIL REPORT OF UK/SOVIET BILATERALS REPORTED SEPTEL; IN BRIEF, SOVIETS, INTER ALIA, PRESSED HARD FOR CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS AT SOME POINT DURING SEPT-DEC PERIOD; HELD UP U.S. CW BINARY MODERNIZA- TION PROGRAM AND FRENCH SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL AS MAJOR COMPLICATIONS TO CONCLUSION OF A CONVENTION; ACCEPTED IDEA OF A SECURITY STOCKPILE ARRANGEMENT, BUT OBJECTED TO ITS BEING LABELED AS SUCH; AND CONFIRMED THAT UK CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROPOSAL (CD/715) SHOULD CONTINUE TO SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, BUT WITHOUT ANY NEED AT PRESENT TO COMMENCE DRAFTING OF TEXT. -- VAN SCHAIK, COMMENTING ON POSSIBLE POST-SUMMER CD CW NEGOTIATIONS, STATED WE NEED TO COMPLETE DETAILED WORK IF AN AGREEMENT IS DESIRED NEXT YEAR. HE LAMENTED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE "GOOD POLICY" IF WE DID NOT CONTINUE SUBSTANTIVE WORK BEYOND AUGUST CD ADJOURNMENT. UK REP (GORDON) OPINED HE DIDN'T WANT TO BE SEEN WALKING AWAY FROM CW NEGOTIATIONS AT A TIME WHEN U.S. BINARY PROGRAM WAS COMING ON LINE. 82 SFPRFT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 4. NUCLEAR TEST BAN -- -- THERE ARE CURRENTLY TWO PAPERS IN PLAY CONCERNING FORMATION OF AN NTB AHC, THOSE OF APRIL CD PRESIDENT AND MEXICAN AMB. GARCIA ROBLES. JAPANESE AMB. YAMADA (NTB COORDINATOR) SUMMARIZED WESTERN GROUP APPROACH TO EACH AS FOLLOWS: (1) CONTINUE TO PRESS NON-ALIGNED (G-21) FOR THEIR REACTION TO FORMER; IF NEGATIVE (UNLIKELY), PROFESS DISAPPOINTMENT AND RUE INABILITY TO FORM AHC; IF POSITIVE (EQUALLY UNLIKELY), C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 07272 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL APPLAUD THEIR RESPONSE AND PROCEED TO ENGAGE IN FURTHER CONSULTATIONS; (2) GARCIA ROBLES' PAPER SIMPLY HAS NO PROSPECT FOR ATTRACTING CONSENSUS AND THUS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN. AUSTRALIA AMB. BUTLER CIRCULATED "NON-ATTRIBUTABLE","NON-NON-PAPER" TO SHOW HOW ELEMENTS OF BOTH COULD BE COMBINED. HIS INTENT WAS TO PROVIDE A "GESTURE" TO GARCIA ROBLES AS WELL AS A RESPONSE TO A "SERIOUS" PRESIDENTIAL EFFORT. -- U.S. REP COUNTERED THAT WESTERN GROUP HAS ALREADY SHOWN SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY BY ACCEPTING APRIL PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL AS BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION; TO NEGOTIATE NOW AMONG OURSELVES ON AN "ILLUSTRATIVE" AUSTRALIAN PAPER IS PREMATURE. U.S. REP NOTED THAT WE DO NOT SEE THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORT BEING SWEPT ASIDE; SWEDEN AND OTHERS WILL NOT ALLOW THIS TO OCCUR. REAFFIRMING U.S. VIEW ON NON-NEGOTIATING MANDATE, U.S. REP CONCLUDED THAT WHAT IS NECESSARY IS ELIMINATION OF THE GARCIA ROBLES PAPER. AT DISCUSSION END, NO STATUS WAS ACCORDED THE BUTLER PAPER WITH OTHER DELS IDENTIFYING WITH U.S. AND YAMADA GAME PLAN. 5. OTHER TOPICS -- -- ITALIAN AMB. PUGLIESE (OS AHC CHAIRMAN) NOTED ONLY FOUR AHC MEETINGS, COVERING THIRD ITEM OF WORK PROGRAM, REMAINED ON THE OUTER SPACE AHC CALENDAR BEFORE FINAL REPORT DRAFTING COMMENCED. HE PREDICTED THAT PROCEDURAL CONTROVERSIES WILL WANE AS AHC TIME EXPIRES, ALTHOUGH HE MAY STILL HOLD SOME PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS, PRINCIPALLY AS A 83 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET HEDGE AGAINST ANY LAST MINUTE HARRANGUES. (COMMENT: ISSUE OF COPUOS PAPER WAS NOT RAISED.) -- CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, RW, NSA AND CPD WERE REPORTED AS PROCEEDING IN ROUTINE AND UNEVENTFUL MANNER. THERE WAS NO COMMENT ON PNW. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 84 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 ,- -- -?/ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07302 DOE FOR DP/ISA: JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): OUTER SPACE SECRETARIAT INFORMATION PAPER ON COPUOUS REFS: (A) GENEVA 6792 (CD-111) (B) STATE 195105 (C) GENEVA 7140 (CD-118) (D) STATE 204911 1. THIS IS CD-124. (CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- AS REPORTED REF C, U.S. CD DELEGATION INFORMED WESTERN GROUP REPS THAT IT WAS NO LONGER AGREEABLE TO UK PROPOSAL FOR CD SECRETARIAT TO PREPARE INFO PAPER ON COPUOS. THIS POSITION HAS NOT PROVEN TO BE POPULAR AMONG WESTERN GROUP, AND MOST HAVE ASKED US TO RECONSIDER. IN VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS U.S. DEL STILL HOPES QUIETLY TO BURY THE PAPERS, WITH HELP OF ITALIAN AHC CHAIRMAN, AND IN THE PROCESS AVOID FURTHER CONFRONTATION WITH OTHER ALLIED DELS. END SUMMARY. 3. UK DEL FIRST BRIEFLY MENTIONED IDEA IN APRIL AHC STATEMENT OF A POSSIBLE OS AHC DECISION'TO HAVE THE COMMITTEE SECRETARY PRE- PARE A BRIEF INFORMATION PAPER ON COPUOS COVERING THAT BODY'S MANDATE AND ACCOMPLISH- MENTS. UKDEL PURSUED IDEA ACTIVELY IN JUNE, NOTING TO WESTERN COLLEAGUES USEFULNESS OF SUCH A PAPER AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO UNHELP- FUL G-21 PROCEDURAL PROPOSALS AND ALSO AS ADDED WAY TO UNDERLINE TO LESS WELL-INFORMED G-21 MEMBERS DISTINCTION BETWEEN MANDATES OF CD AND OF COPUOS. US JOINED OTHER WESTERN DELS IN RAISING NO OBJECTION (REF A). HOWEVER, G-21 DID RAISE INITIAL DOUBTS AND SET FORTH SOME LINKAGE INTIMATIONS WITH SO-CALLED "ROLLING TEXT" CONCEPT, BEFORE INFORMING AHC CHAIRMAN PUGLIESE JUNE 25 THAT A PAPER WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. I. UPON DEL'S RECEIPTOF REF B, AMB. FRIEDERSDORF, IN LIGHT OF TROUBLING DOUBTS RAISED ABOUT UK MOTIVATION IN PROPOSING OS AHC PAPER, INFORMED WESTERN AMSON JUNE 26 THAT USDEL HAD DECIDED AGAINST UK PROPOSAL. FRIEDERSDORF'S REMARKS WERE GREETED WITH DISMAY, WITH FRENCH AMB.MOREL (WESTERN OS COORDINATOR) AND ITALIAN AMB. PUGLIESE (CHAIRMAN, OS AHC) TAKING LEAD IN STATING THAT COPUOS PAPER COULD ONLY BE DELAYED, NOT MADE TO DISAPPEAR. CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED THAT DECISION TO CANCEL OR POSTPONE PAPER WOULD REDOUND TO DETRIMENT OF WESTERN GROUP. ?ALL WESTERN REPS WERE URGED BY MOREL TO CONSULT 85 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET WITH CAPITALS, AND US AMB. IN PARTICULAR WAS URGED TO SEEK RECONSIDERATION OF DECISION. MOST REPS RENEWED APPEALS AT OS COORDINATION MEETING JUNE 29, BUT US DEL MAINTAINED ITS POSITION. 5. UK CHARGE EDIS (SAYING HE WAS ALSO SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF PACKENHAM AT FCO) HAS REPEATEDLY STATED TO U.S. DEL THAT LONDON HAS NEVER WAVERED IN ITS OPPOSITION TO ANY LINKAGE BETWEEN COPUOS AND CD. FRENCH AND ITALIAN DELS HAVE STATED SAME VIEWS. BE THAT AS IT MAY, DEL HOPES TO RESOLVE MATTER BY PERSUADING PUGLIESE QUIETLY TO FILE AWAY INFO PAPER AND, ONLY IF PRESSED, STATING THAT IN THE END NOT ALL DELS WERE AGREEABLE TO ITS CIRCULATION. WE WILL, IN THE PROCESS, SEEK TO C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 07302 DOE FOR DP/ISA: JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL AVOID FURTHER DISPUTE WITH ALLIES, PARTICULARLY UK, FRANCE AND ITALY. FOR THEIR PART, UK DEL PROBABLY WILL NOT WITHDRAW ITS PROPOSAL IN ANY PUBLIC AIRING OF THE ISSUE. IN LATTER EVENT, G-21 COULD POSSIBLY REVIVE EARLIER LINKAGE BETWEEN THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF UK PROPOSAL AND PROCEDURAL DESIRES IN AHC OF THEIR OWN. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT MIGHT INCREASE LIKELIHOOD THAT UK WOULD THEN WITHDRAW. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 8? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07397 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY SESSION OF JULY 2ND REF: GENEVA 7223 (CD-121) 1. THIS IS CD-125 . (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY -- -- NETHERLANDS FOREIGN MINISTER HANS VAN DEN BROEK DELIVERED A STRONG STATEMENT LENDING VALUABLE SUPPORT TO U.S. AND WESTERN POSITIONS ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, NUCLEAR TESTING, CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION, AND VERIFICATION. SOVIET AMB. NAZARKIN QUESTIONED U.S. RESOLVE IN SECURING A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, AND GAVE A DECIDEDLY NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO THE FRENCH CW PROPOSAL. CZECH AMB. VEJVODA RE-STATED WELL-KNOWN EASTERN VIEWS ON OUTERSPACE, AND SUPPORTED TEST-BAN PROPOSAL TABLED BY SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER PETROVSKY ON JUNE 9TH. (TEXT OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION HAS BEEN DATAFAXED AND VAN DEN BROEK STATEMENT POUCHED TO ACDA/MA). END SUMMARY. 3. NETHERLANDS -- -- FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DEN BROEK BEGAN HIS INTERVENTION BY STRESSING THAT ARMS CONTROL IS NOT AN END IN ITSELF, BUT SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE PRESERVATION OF STABILITY AND PEACE. HE NOTED THAT "ARMAMENTS ARE THE RESULTS OF POLITICAL DIFFERENCES, NOT THE OTHER WAY AROUND." HE ALSO ARGUED THE EFFECTIVENESS AND CONTINUING INDISPENSABILITY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE. -- THE REMAINDER OF VAN DEN BROEK'S STATEMENT WAS A TOUR D'HORIZON OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, BROADLY REFLECTING BASIC U.S./WESTERN APPROACHES TO: THE ROLE OF CONFIDENCE AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES; THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION; THE IMPACT OF DEEP CUTS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE FACE OF CURRENT CONVENTIONAL ARMS IMBALANCES; CONVENTIONAL ARMS NEGOTIATIONS; AND OUTER SPACE ISSUES (SOVIET BMD RESEARCH; DEFENSIVE SYTEMS CANNOT BE SEEN IN ISOLATION FROM OFFENSIVE ONES; LOW- ORBIT SATELLITES CAN PLAY A DESTABILIZING, TARGETING ROLE). VAN DEN BROEK ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IF MIGHT NOT BE "TOO LATE TO SEEK SOME WAY" TO PROTECT HIGH-ORBIT SATELLITES, "WHICH 87 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET ARE GENERALLY OF A STABILIZING NATURE." -- ON NUCLLEAR TESTING, HE SAID: "MAYBE IN THE PAST WE EQUALED IN TOO SINGLE A MANNER THE HALTING OF NUCLEAR TESTS WITH ENDING THE SO- CALLED NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. WHAT IN THE SEVENTIES HAS BEEN LABELLED AS A 'SUFFOCATION STRATEGY' DID NOT, IN MY VIEW, DO JUSTICE TO THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN PREVENTING WAR THROUGH DETERRENCE." HE ALSO SUPPORTED THE U.S. STEP-BY-STEP NEGOTIATINGPROGRAM. HOWEVER, HE MAINTINED THAT "STRICT VERIFICATION SEEMS... IN ESSENCE TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE..." -- VAN DEN BROEK CAUTIONED THAT ANY CW . C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 03 GENEVA 07397 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL CONVENTION SHOULD BE FLEXIBILE, AND THAT VERIFICATION WOULD BE THE KEY TO ITS CREDIBILITY. HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT AN EFECTIVE REGIME OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION WAS DIRECTLY LINKED TO AND DEPENDENT ON THE EFFICIENCY OF ROUTINE INSPECTIONS, THAT "NO OBSTACLE WHATEVER" SHOULD BE ABLE TO PREVENT A CHALLENGE INSPECTION FROM TAKING PLACE, AND THAT A REQUESTED.CHALLENGE INSPECTION SHOULD ALWAYS LEAD TO A QUICK ? AND CLEAR ANSWER. -- (COMMENT: TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE VAN DEN BROEK STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE NETHERLANDS WAS ONE OF THE MOST PERSUASIVE AND SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. POSITIONS IN THE CD BY AN ALLY IN RECENT YEARS. IT WAS PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE AS AN ENDORSEMENT OF AMB. FRIEDERSDORF'S JUNE 30TH PLENARY STATEMENT (REFTEL) ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR TESTING. END COMMENT.) 4. USSR -- -- AMB. NAZARKIN ATTEMPTED TO CALL INTO QUESTION U.S. SERIOUSNESS IN SEEKING A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BY REITERATING A LIST OF LONGSTANDING SOVIET "PROBLEMS" ON SUCH ISSUES AS THE CLAIMED DISCREPANCY BETWEEN CD/500 ARTICLES X AND XI AND "TRANSNATIONAL" CORPORATIONS. NAZARKIN AGAIN CRI- TICIZED THE U.S. INVITATION TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS FACILITY IN TOOELE, UTAH. HE OBSERVED THAT THE MAIN TASKS REMAINING FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGREEMENT WERE CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND NON- PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS BY COMMERCIAL INDUSTRY. HE ALSO GAVE A VERY NEGATIVE REACTION TO THE FRENCH 88 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CW PROPOSAL (CD/757), ARGUING THAT IT "CONSTITUTES, IN ESSENCE, ANAPPEAL TO A LEGALIZED BUILD-UP AND PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS." NAZARKIN CONTINUED WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT THE SECURITY OF PARTIES BE ENSURED BY "BLOCKING" STOCKS UNTIL DESTROYED, VIA OSI AND "CONTINUOUS MONITORING WITH INSTRUMENTS". PLACING STOCKS UNDER "INTERNATIONAL ARREST" "WOULD PUT ALL PARTIES IN AN EQUAL POSITION IN TERMS OF THEIR SECURITY", HE SAID. - NAZARKIN LINKED CD/757 TO THE ISSUE OF THE ORDER OF THE DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS, CALLING THE SITUATION "VERY ALARMING" BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT PRIOR GENERAL SUPPORT FOR ARTICLE IV OF THE ROLLING TEXT AND AN ANNEX IS BEING CALLED INTO QUESTION. NAZARKIN SAID ARTICLE IV PROVISIONS WOULD PROVIDE THE SECURITY TO PARTIES THAT CD/757 SEEKS. -- THE SOVIET UNION AGREES THAT THEORETICALLY IT COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED THAT A PARTY MIGHT WITHDRAW OR REFUSE TO CONTINUE THE DESTRUCTION PROCESS, OR THAT THERE MIGHT BE DIFFICULTIES IN ADHERING TO THE DESTRUCTION SCHEDULE, NAZARKIN SAID. BUT THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE WAS ASSISTANCE IN THE LATTER CASE, AND "AN EFFECTIVE MECHANISM WHICH WOULD ENSURE COMPLIANCE" AGAINST SUCH A "FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION" IN THE CASE OF REFUSAL TO CONTINUE DESTRUCTION. NAZARKIN ARGUED THAT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL CONTAINED A PARADOX WITH REGARD TO WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CONVENTION: C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 03 GENEVA 07397 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL IT WOULD "INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCH AN EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE NUMBER OF STATES POSSESSING CHEMICAL WEAPONS WILL, OR CAN, GROW AFTER THE CONVENTION ENTERS INTO FORCE." THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF EVEN ONE PRODUCTION FACILITY WOULD MAKE IT "EASY TO RAPIDLY EXCEED THE LIMITS OF 'SECURITY STOCKS'," AND THIS CAPABILITY WOULD INCREASE THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES OF WITHDRAWAL. - NAZARKIN ARGUED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD PROCEED IN RECOGNITION OF THE ? POSSESSION OF CW BY SOME STATES; THAT CONCLUSION OF THE CONVENTION "SHOULD ELIMINATE" THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN STATES 89 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET POSSESSING AND NOT POSSESSING CW; BUT THAT CD/757 "IS BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT THE STATUS QUO THAT EXISTED BEFORE THE CONVENTION'S ENTERING INTO FORCE CAN BE CHANGED TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THOSE STATES THAT DO NOT POSSESS CHEMICAL WEAPONS OR WOULD LIKE TO INCREASE THEIR STOCKS...." NAZARKIN CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT CD/757 "CONTRADICTS THE ESSENCE AND SPIRIT OF THE CONVENTION BEING ELABORATED AND THE ENTIRE CONSENSUS CONCEPT OF CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT," AND THAT ITS CONCEPT "WOULD SERIOUSLY HAMPER THE CONTROL OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKS" AND REDUCE PROSPECTS FOR WIDE ADHERENCE TO THE CONVENTION. 5. CZECHOSLOVAKIA -- -- AMB. VEJVODA MADE A ROUTINE RE-STATEMENT OF BASIC EASTERN POSITIONS ON OUTER SPACE (OS) ISSUES, AND CALLED FOR A NEGOTIATING MANDATE FOR THE OS AHC. VEJVODA ALSO JOINED OTHER EASTERN DELEGATIONS IN SUPPORTING THE EASTERN COMPREHENSIVE TEST-BAN PROPOSAL(CD/756) TABLED BY SOVIET DEPFONMIN PETROVSKY ON JUNE 9TH. 6. THE CONFERENCE HELD THE FIRST OF SEVERAL INFORMAL PLENARY MEETINGS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT (AGENDA ITEM 2). MEETINGS WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY. 7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNW (20 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07505 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS: JUNE 29-JULY 3, 1987 REFS: (A) STATE 200055 (B) GENEVA 7223 (CD-121) (C) GENEVA 7597 (CD-125) 1. THIS IS CD-126. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY -- -- CLUSTER III (NON-PRODUCTION) WORK BEGAN WITH DISCUSSION ON COMMERCIAL SUPERTOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS. JAPAN PUBLICLY MOVED TOWARD U.S. POSITION, BUT NO OTHER NEW MOVEMENTS OCCURRED AND NO DRAFTING OF TEXT TOOK PLACE. -- CLUSTER I (CHEMICAL WEAPONS) INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON ORDER OF ELIMINATION AND OLD,OBSOLETE CHEMICAL WEAPONS RESULTED IN POSSIBLE SOVIET SUPPORT FOR U.S. VIEWS ON FORMER AND A POORLY DRAFTED, MUCH CRITICIZED CHAIRMAN'S DRAFT TEXT ON LATTER. -- INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON JURISDICTION AND CONTROL REVEALED INTEREST IN THE CONCEPT OF REFOCUSSING ATTENTION AWAY FROM SPECIFIC TERMS OF "CONTROL" AND URISDICTION AND CONTROL" AND MORE TOWARD DEFINING/DISCUSSING THE OBLIGATIONS OF A STATE PARTY. -- U.S. DISCUSSIONS WITH FRENCH DEL (PER REF A) REGARDING U.S. UNDERSTANDING OF FRENCH CW SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL BEING REPORTED SEPTEL. -- SOVIET AMB NAZARKIN TOOK U.S. PROPOSAL OF JULY 20 FOR NEXT ROUND OF CW BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AND OUR INTEREST IN FOCUSSING DISCUSSION ON BILATERAL EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION OF DATA (REF A) UNDER CONSIDERATION. -- DUTCH FONMIN HANS VAN DEN BROEK, IN A PLENARY STATEMENT JULY 2 (REPORTED REF C), ENDORSED A STRINGENT CHALLENGE INSPECTION REGIME, STATING THAT NO OBSTACLE WHATEVER SHOULD PREVENT A CHALLENGE INSPECTION FROM TAKING PLACE. -- SOVIET CD AMB NAZARKIN MADE A PLENARY STATEMENT JULY 2 (REPORTED REF C AND DATAFAXED TO ACDA) BEMOANING THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN CW NEGOTIATIONS. 91 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET HE STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE FRENCH CW SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL AND REPEATED OLD SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT CD/500 ARTICLE XI, THE PROBLEM OF "TRANSNATIONAL" CORPORATIONS AND THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF PRODUCTION OF BINARY WEAPONS ON CW NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY. 3. CLUSTER III -- -- FOUR MEETINGS ON THE SUBJECT OF COMMERCIAL SUPERTOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS (CSTLC) CONSIDERED LONGSTANDING ISSUES OF WHETHER TO FOCUS ON LISTS OF CHEMICALS OR FACILITIES, WHAT CRITERIA TO USE TO IDENTIFY SUCH CHEMICALS, AND WHAT TYPE OF REGIME TO APPLY TO CHEMICALS AND/OR FACILITIES. -- THE JAPANESE PUBLICLY INDICATED THEIR CHANGE OF POSITION ON THE SUBJECT, STATING THAT CSTLC WOULD BE A KEY TO FACILITIES OF CONCERN, THAT FOCUS OF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE IN THAT DIRECTION AND NOT ON THE CHEMICALS, AND THAT A POSSIBLE THRESHOLD TO START WITH MIGHT BE ONE TON AS PRESCRIBED FOR THE SINGLE SMALL SCALE FACILITY. -- THE FRG AND TO A LESSER DEGREE BELGIUM CONTINUED TO PUSH THEIR LONGSTANDING POSITION ABOUT LIMITING ANY SUCH CONSIDERATION TO AT MOST ONLY A FEW CHEMICALS. BOTH DELS TOOK CONSIDERABLE HEAT FROM THE SOVIETS ON THEIR POSITIONS. 4. CLUSTER I -- -- CHAIRMAN NIEUWENHUYS (BELGIUM) DRAFTED A TEXT ON OLD, OBSOLETE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE VIEWS EXPRESSED DURING CLUSTER I DISCUSSION. RESULT IS A COMPLICATED PAPER THAT HAS RECEIVED MUCH CRITICISM AND SEEMS TO BE GOING NOWHERE. - U.S, SOVIETS AND SWEDEN MET TWICE TO DISCUSS THE ORDER OF ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE SOVIETS INDICATED THAT THEY MIGHT AGREE TO U.S?SOVIET PARITY AT THE END OF A FIRST PHASE OF CW DESTRUCTION. HOWEVER, WHILE THEY GENERALLY ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF PERCENTAGE REDUCTION OF STOCKS BASED ON AGENT TON WEIGHT, THEY INDICATED THEY STILL NEED TO GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO THE NOTION OF LUMPING ALL SCHEDULE ONE CHEMICALS TOGETHER AND TREATING BULK AND FILLED MUNITIONS THE SAME. THE QUESTION OF A SCHEDULE OF DESTRUCTION OF UNFILLED MUNITIONS REMAINS TO BE RESOLVED. DISCUSSION WILL CONTINUE NEXT WEEK. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 5. JURISDICTION AND CONTROL -- -- INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE U.S, SOVIETS, SWEDEN, INDONESIA, HUNGARY, FRG AND CHINA REVEALED GENERAL DESIRE TO AVOID LOOPHOLES AND ENSURE CLEAR, EQUITABLE OBLIGATIONS ON THE PART OF STATES PARTY. HOWEVER, CHINA STILL HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT OLD STOCKS ON THEIR TERRITORY LEFT "AGAINST THEIR WILL", AND THE SOVIETS REPEATED THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT "TRANSNATIONAL" COMPANIES. -- U.S. EXPRESSED VIEW THAT THE FOCUS SHOULD SHIFT FROM THE TERMS OF "CONTROL" AND "JURISDICTION OR CONTROL" TO DEFINING/DISCUSSING THE OBLIGATIONS OF STATES PARTY AND NOTED THE NEED FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES PARTY. THIS CONCEPT APPEARED TO BE A NOVEL IDEA AND WHILE RECEIVING A GENERALLY POSITIVE NODDING OF HEADS, IT IS CLEAR THAT SOME TIME WILL BE NEEDED TO CONSIDER AND DISCUSS THIS APPROACH. -- THE FRG ADOPTED A RESERVED APPROACH, NOTING UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER RELIANCE COULD BE PLACED ON A COOPERATION BASIS, AND STATING THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE TOPIC WAS NEEDED. 6. U.S- SOVIET BILATERAL DATE AND AGENDA -- -- ON JULY 1, U.S. DEPUTY BARTHELEMY PROPOSED THE DATE OF JULY 20 TO SOVIET AMB NAZARKIN AND EMPHASIZED THE U.S. DESIRE TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON BILATERAL EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION OF DATA. NAZARKIN SAID HE WOULD RESPOND AND SUGGEST AN AGENDA AS WELL. 7. CW WESTERN COORDINATION -- -- AT JUNE 29 MEETING, COORDINATOR AMB. VAN SCHAIK GAVE A GLOOMY ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATE OF CW NEGOTIATIONS, OPINING THAT MOMENTUM SEEMS TO HAVE SLOWED FROM THE SPRING AND THAT THERE IS A GENERAL FEELING OF PESSIMISM. -- U.S. DEL RESPONDED THAT PERHAPS THE UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS OF CONCLUDING A CONVENTION THIS YEAR HAD BEEN MODERATED BY A MORE REALISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE LARGE AMOUNT OF WORK REMAINING TO BE DONE. -- GENERAL CONCERNS ABOUT SWEDISH DESIGNATION OF WORK ON KEY ISSUES TO SELECTED SMALL GROUPS RESULTED IN AMB. EKEUS LEAVING SUCH DISCUSSIONS SOMEWHAT MORE OPEN-ENDED. (COMMENT: IN AN EFFORT TO RESOLVE ISSUES, SWEDES ARE STILL CONTINUING TO ADDRESS ISSUES IN SMALL, SELECTIVE GROUPS, WHICH MAY LEAD TO "PUBLIC" q3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET IRRITATION BY EXCLUDED DELEGATIONS.) 8. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 94 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07503 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): SWEDISH NON-PAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION 1. THIS IS CD-127. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY: CHEMICAL WEAPONS AHC CHAIRMAN HAS GIVEN U.S. REP AND ABOUT TEN OTHER AMBS NON-PAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION. STATED PURPOSE OF NON- PAPER IS TO BE STIMULUS FOR RENEWED SERIES OF PRIVATE AMBASSADORIAL DISCUSSIONS ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION, BUT NOT/NOT TO SERVE AS "AGREED BASIS" FOR THOSE EXCHANGES. TEXT OF NON-PAPER IS TRANSMITTED IN PARA 8 BELOW. END SUMMARY. 3. CD CHEMICAL WEAPONS AHC CHAIRMAN EKEUS ON JULY 9 HANDED USDEPREP (IN ABSENCE OF AMB FRIEDERSDORF) HIS "NON-PAPER FOR CONSULTATIONS: AD HOC ON-SITE INSPECTION." EKEUS EXPLAINED THAT HE IS GIVING THE PAPER TO ABOUT TEN AMBS INDIVIDUALLY. ITS PURPOSE IS ANALOGOUS TO THAT OF PAPER HE CIRCULATED IN THE SPRING, NAMELY, TO STIMULATE PRODUCTIVE DEL HEAD-LEVEL DISCUSSION; HE WILL NOT/NOT ADDRESS IT DIRECTLY IN THE SERIES OF PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH THOSE AMBASSADORS, WHICH WILL RESUME ABOUT JULY 15, MUCH LESS SUGGEST THAT IT SERVE AS "THE AGREED BASIS FOR DISCUSSION." it. IN REVIEWING THE TEXT, EKEUS SAID THAT IT IS MEANT TO REPRESENT SOMETHING OF A BALANCE AMONG THE U.S., SOVIET, UK AND OTHER KNOWN EXISTING POSITIONS. THUS, IT GIVES MORE WEIGHT TO THE UK PROPOSAL (POINT 7) THAN SWEDEN BELIEVES WARRANTED. THEREFORE, THE PAPER IS DEFINITELY NOT/NOT THE CHAIRMAN'S PROPOSED FINAL OUTCOME ON THIS ISSUE. EKEUS ALSO CONCEDED THAT WORST CASE SCENARIOS STILL INVOLVE OPPORTUNITY FOR CHALLENGED STATE EASILY TO OBTAIN PROTRACTED DELAY IN PROVIDING ACCESS, IF INDEED ACCESS IS EVER GRANTED. 5. EKEUS SAID THAT HE VIEWS CONTINUED SMALL, HIGH-LEVEL GROUP DISCUSSION, AS IN SPRING, TO BE ESSENTIAL TO PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE. HE IS CONFIDENT THAT G-21 WILL NOT COMPLAIN, AND HE INTENDS TO MOLLIFY CLUSTER IV CHAIRMAN (KRUTZSCH) AND ANY UNHAPPY WESTERN DELS BY PROVIDING OVERVIEW OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUE AT OPENING OF CLUSTER IV WORK AND ALLOWING FOR BRIEF EXCHANGE ON IT THERE. 95 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 6. EKEUS SAID THAT WHEN RECEIVING THE NON-PAPER, THE INITIAL REACTION OF AMB NAZARKIN HAD BEEN THAT IT WOULD SHIFT THE FOCUS OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION DEBATE WHOLLY TO THE MAKE-UP OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL. 7. EKEUS ENDED BY EXPRESSING "INTEREST" IN ANY U.S. COMMENT OR CRITICISM. APART FROM ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE WASHINGTON MAY WISH TO PROVIDE, DEL WILL SPEAK TO EKEUS PRIVATELY NEXT WEEK AND, DRAWING FROM CURRENT GUIDANCE, CRITICIZE PAPER AS STILL FAR FROM REALISTIC. 8. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF CHAIRMAN EKEUS' NON-PAPER HANDED OVER ON JULY 9. BEGIN TEXT: SWEDEN -- NON-PAPER FOR CONSULTATIONS AD HOC ON-SITE INSPECTION 1. EACH STATE PARTY SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT AT ANY TIME TO REQUEST AN AD HOC ON-SITE INSPECTION ON THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE PARTY IN ORDER TO RESOLVE A SITUATION WHICH GIVES RISE TO DOUBTS ABOUT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION. 2. THE STATE PARTY REQUESTING AN AD HOC ON-SITE INSPECTION AS PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1 SHALL SUBMIT THE REQUEST TO THE HEAD OF THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT. A REQUEST SHALL AS PRECISELY AS POSSIBLE SPECIFY THE LOCATION OR FACILITY TO BE INSPECTED AND THE MATTERS ON WHICH REASSURANCE ARE REQUIRED, INCLUDING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION, ABOUT WHICH DOUBTS OF COMPLIANCE HAVE ARISEN. 3. UPON RECEIPT OF A REQUEST FOR AN AD HOC ON-SITE INSPECTION, THE HEAD OF THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT SHALL IMMEDIATELY A) NOTIFY THE STATE PARTY TO BE INSPECTED ON THE REQUEST; B) INFORM THE MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ABOUT THE REQUEST; C) PREPARE FOR SENDING A TEAM OF INSPECTORS. L. THE TEAM OF INSPECTORS SHALL BE DISPATCHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND ARRIVE IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE SITE TO BE INSPECTED NOT LATER THAN 48 HOURS AFTER THE ORIGINAL REQUEST. THE REQUESTED STATE SHALL ADMIT THE TEAM OF INSPECTORS INTO THE COUNTRY AND ASSIST IT IN 96 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET ITS TRANSPORTS SO THAT THE TEAM CAN ARRIVE AT THE SITE ON TIME. 5. AT THE ARRIVAL THE TEAM OF INSPECTORS SHALL BE PERMITTED TO SECURE THE SITE IN A WAY TO MAKE SURE THAT NO MATERIAL OF RELEVANCE TO THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION IS REMOVED FROM THE SITE. 6. A) THE INSPECTION SHALL START NOT LATER THAN 72 HOURS AFTER THE ORIGINAL REQUEST HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY THE HEAD OF THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT. - B) THE INSPECTORS SHALL FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE INSPECTION HAVE THE ACCESS TO THE SITE WHICH THEY DEEM NECESSARY? FOR THE CONDUCT OF THEIR MISSION. THE INSPECTORS SHALL CONDUCT THE INSPECTION IN THE LEAST INTRUSIVE MANNER POSSIBLE TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR TASK. 7. IN THE EVENT THAT THE REQUESTED STATE DEEM THE INSPECTION TEAM'S ACCESS TO A LOCATION OR FACILITY TO BE CONTRARY TO ITS VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS NOT CONNECTED WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS, IT MAY BEFORE THE START OF INSPECTION PROPOSE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THE DOUBTS OF THE REQUESTING STATE. IF THE REQUESTING STATE DECLARES ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS, THE TEAM OF INSPECTORS SHALL CONDUCT THE INSPECTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THOSE ARRANGEMENTS. OTHERWISE THE INSPECTORS SHALL POSTPONE THE START OF THE INSPECTION AND INVITE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REQUESTING AND THE REQUESTED STATES TO AGREE ON HOW THE INSPECTION SHALL BE CONDUCTED. IF THE REQUESTING AND REQUESTED STATE DO NOT AGREE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE INSPECTION WITHIN 96 HOURS AFTER THE ORIGINAL REQUEST, THE TEAM OF INSPECTORS SHALL INFORM THE HEAD OF THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT. THE HEAD OF THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT SHALL IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL. 8. THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SHALL WITHIN 24 HOURS FROM THE NOTIFICATION OF ITS CHAIRMAN TAKE A DECISION, WHETHER THE INSPECTION SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL REQUEST OR THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE 97 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET MEASURES. IF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE COUNCIL DO NOT INCLUDE THE REQUESTING OR REQUESTED STATE PARTY, THE STATE PARTY NOT REPRESENTED MAY CHOOSE A PERSON TO REPRESENT IT IN THE DELIBERATION AND DECISION OF THE COUNCIL, AS AN AD HOC MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL. THE REQUESTING AND REQUESTED STATES MAY AT ANY TIME BEFORE THE DECISION OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AGREE ON THE CONDUCT OF INSPECTION. IN SUCH AN EVENT THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SHALL TAKE NO DECISION AND THE INSPECTION BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT. THE INSPECTION SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL REQUEST, UNLESS X OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL (A QUALIFIED MAJORITY CORRESPONDING TO 2/3, OR RATHER APPROXIMATELY 60 PERCENT OF THE NUMBER OF THE COUNCIL MEMYERS) DECIDE THAT THE INSPECTION SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. 9. THE HEAD OF THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT SHALL INFORM THE TEAM OF INSPECTORS OF THE DECISION OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL. THE INSPECTION SHALL BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT DELAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECISION BY THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND WITH FULL CONSIDERATION OF PARAGRAPH 6 B) ABOVE. 10. THE TEAM OF INSPECTORS SHALL CONCLUDE THE INSPECTION WITHIN X DAYS AND RETURN TO THE HEADQUARTERS TO PREPARE THEIR REPORT. THE REPORT SHALL BE STRICTLY FACTUAL AND CONTAIN ONLY MATTERS OF DIRECT RELEVANCE. FOR THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION. 11. THE HEAD OF THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT SHALL SUBMIT THE REPORT TO THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND TO THE REQUESTING AND REQUESTED STATES. THE COUNCIL SHALL CONSIDER THE REPORT AND DECIDE WHETHER A VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION HAS TAKEN PLACE OR NOT. IF A STATE PARTY, MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL, IS EITHER A REQUESTING OR A REQUESTED STATE, IT SHALL NOT PARTICIPATE IN CONSIDERATIONS OR DECISIONS BY THE COUNCIL WITH REGARD TO THE REPORT. 12. IF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL DECIDES THAT A VIOLATION HAS OCCURED IT SHALL MAKE A SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE. END TEXT. PETRONE 9C Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 CONFIDENTIALGENEVA 07517 CORRECTED COPY-- PARA 1, CD-128 (VICE CD-28) ORGINALLY PROCESSED AS 5421512 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS, U.S. WORKING PAPERS ON "THRESHOLDS" AND "CAPACITY" REFS: (A) STATE 190593 (B) STATE 202422 (C) STATE 202488 1. THIS IS CD-128 . (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY: PAPER ON CAPACITY (STATE 202488) WAS ACCEPTED BY WESTERN GROUP AND WILL BE PRESENTED TO CD NEXT WEEK. -- PAPER ON THRESHOLDS (STATE 202422) WAS GENERALLY ACCEPTED, BUT DIFFERENCES ON THRESHOLD LEVELS APPEARED IN DISCUSSION WITH WESTERN GROUP. MAJORITY (8 OF 9 MEMBERS) AGREED THAT SCHEDULE 1 UNDECLARED THRESHOLD SHOULD BE INCREASED TO 1000 GRAMS AND ALLOWANCE SHOULD ALSO BE PROVIDED FOR NO CONTROL (REGISTERING/LICENSING) OF SMALLER QUANTITIES. THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT IMPLIED CONTROL OF SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS EVEN DOWN TO MILLIGRAM QUANTITIES. CANADA ASKED FOR INCREASE TO 1000 GRAMS WHICH WAS WHAT THEY NEEDED FOR VARIOUS TESTING DURING A YEAR. NETHERLANDS WAS SATISFIED WITH THE ORIGINAL PRESENTATION. -- ACTION REQUEST - SEE PARAS. 5 AND 6. END SUMMARY. 3. ON SCHEDULE 2, JAPAN AND ITALY WANTED THE LEVELS INCREASED. JAPAN WOULD INCREASE BY A FACTOR OF TEN. ALL OTHERS WERE SATISFIED WITH THRESHOLDS AS PRESENTED. 4. FOR SCHEDULE 3, JAPAN WANTED 10-FOLD INCREASE, WHILE ALL OTHERS WERE SATISFIED WITH THRESHOLDS OR WANTED THEM LOWER. UK WANTED THE UNDECLARED LEVEL REDUCED TO 20-50 TONS/YEAR; THE FRG WANTED SCHEDULE 3 REDUCED BECAUSE OF THEIR CONCERN ABOUT CHLOROPICRIN AS A PRECURSOR FOR PHOSGENE OXIME. IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT CHLOROPICRIN MIGHT BE PUT IN SCHEDULE 2 BASED ON THEIR CONCERN AND NOT CHANGE THE THRESHOLD LEVELS OF SCHEDULE 3. 5. AS A RESULT OF THIS DISCUSSION DEL RECOMMENDS THAT WASHINGTON ONLY CHANG SCHEDULE 1 AND RETAIN SCHEDULE 2 AND 3 AS PRESENTLY FORMULATED. THE RECOMMENDED SCHEDULE WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS.: - UP TO 100 GRAMS/YEAR NO DECLARATION - 100 TO 1000 GRAMS/YEAR NO DECLARATION, STATES 00 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET KEEP REGISTER/CONTROL. - 1KG - 10 KG/YEAR ANNUAL DATE DECLARATION, SUBJECT TO OSI. - 10KG -1000KG/YEAR MAY BE PRODUCED ONLY IN SSSF, UP TO AGGREGATE OF 1 METRIC TON/YEAR, ANNUAL DECLARATION AND CONTINUOUS ON-SITE VERIFICATION. 6. IF WASHINGTON CONCURS WITH THIS CHANGE, DEL WILL PRESENT THIS CHANGE TO THE WESTERN GROUP, WITH INTENTION OF TABLING THE PAPER AT THE CD AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 100 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 "-\ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIALGENEVA 07522 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): FRENCH CHEMICAL WEAPONS SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL REF: STATE 200055 (NOTAL) 1. THIS IS CD-129. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. IN RESPONSE TO U.S. REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF OUR UNDERSTANDING OF (1) THE FRENCH CW SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL (PARA. 3.B., REFTEL) AND (2) THAT THEY HAVE CHANGED THEIR POSITION REGARDING SECRET SECURITY STOCKS (PARA. 3.C, REFTEL), FRENCH DEPUTY CD REP DE LA BAUME STATED HE HAD CONSULTED WITH PARIS IN PROVIDING THE FOLLOWING: -- U.S. UNDERSTANDING OUTLINED IN PARA. 3.3. OF REFTEL IS CORRECT; -- THE FRENCH POSITION REGARDING A SECRET SECURITY STOCKPILE REMAINS UNCHANGED FROM THAT STATED IN THEIR FIRST PROPOSAL, I.E., A "PREFERENCE" FOR A SECRET SECURITY STOCKPILE ARRANGEMENT. 3. ELABORATING FURTHER ON HIS REMARKS, DE LA BAUME SAID THE FRENCH HAVE PROVIDED A "RANGE OF OPTIONS ONLY TO HELP ENGAGE OTHER DELEGATIONS IN DEBATE" ON THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF A SECURITY STOCKPILE. (COMMENT: OFF THE RECORD, DE LA BAUME ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IF RESERVATIONS ARE SO SERIOUS THAT THE WHOLE CONCEPT WOULD BE BLOCKED, THEY COULD ACCEPT, AT SOME LATER STAGE, DECLARED STOCKPILE STORAGE; THEIR IMMEDIATE PREFERENCE, HOWEVER, IS FOR NON-DECLARED STORAGE LOCATION(S). FOR NOW, THE FRENCH WILL CONTINUE TO BRACKET TEXT REFERRING TO DECLARATION OF LOCATION(S) OF CW STOCKPILES. END COMMENT.) L. ACCORDING TO DE LA BAUME, GIVEN THE INITIAL NEGATIVE RESPONSE THEIR PROPOSAL HAS RECEIVED, THE FRENCH DO NOT WANT TO APPEAR UNRECEPTIVE TO ANY SUGGESTIONS, IF ONLY TO KEEP THEIR PROPOSAL ALIVE. FOR THIS REASON, THEY ARE INTENTIONALLY AVOIDING DIRECT LINKAGE TO, OR ENDORSEMENT OF,ANY ONE OPTION. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 101 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07524 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SEC DEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): OUTER SPACE AD HOC COMMITTEE MEETINGS, JUNE 16, 1987 TO JUNE 30, 1987 REFS: (A) GENEVA 6583 (CD-109) (B) GENEVA 4691 (CD-091) 1. THIS IS CD-130. (CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- AHC COMPLETED SECOND ITEM OF ITS 1987 WORK PROGRAM ("EXISTING AGREEMENTS RELEVANT TO THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE") AT JUNE 16, 23 AND 30 SESSIONS. WESTERN GROUP REPSMADE MOST PRESENTATIONS; EASTERN INTER- VENTIONS FOCUSED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON ANTI- SDI THEMES; NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED (G-21) INDIFFERENCE TO SUBJECT WAS REFLECTED IN POOR ATTENDANCE AND PARTICIPATION. COMMITTEE BEGAN CONSIDERATION OF THIRD AND FINAL WORK PROGRAM ITEM ("EXISTING PROPOSALS AND FUTURE INITIATIVES ON THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE") ON JULY 7. (THREE US PRESENTATIONS ON LEGAL REGIME DATAFAXED TO ACDA/MA.) END SUMMARY. JUNE 16 -- -- FIRST OF THREE PAPERS ON US VIEW OF ARMS CONTROL LEGAL REGIME FOR OUTER SPACE SET FORTH SUMMARIES OF PERTINENT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN THIS AREA AND NOTED: CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARTICLES 2 (4) AND 51 OF THE UN CHARTER PLACE VERY STRICT CONTROLS ON THE USE OF FORCE IN OUTER SPACE; AGGRESSIVE THREATS OR USES OF FORCE ARE FLATLY PROHIBITED AND USE OF FORCE IS PERMITTED ONLY IN SELF-DEFENSE. WHEN TAKEN TOGETHER, ACCORDING TO THE US VIEW, THE CITED AGREEMENTS ESTABLISH LEGAL CONTROLS THAT SHOULD ENSURE THAT OUTER SPACE SHALL BE USED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. -- INDIAN REP CLAIMED "ACCEPTED UNIFORM UNDER- STANDINGS" OF SEVERAL AGREEMENTS, AND IDENTIFIED WHAT CONSTITUTED, IN HIS VIEW, "RECENT DIVERGENCES." IN THE COURSE OF HIS ANALYSIS, HE STATED THAT: THE TESTING OF AN X-RAY LASER FOR A BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM (BMD), FOR WHICH POWER WAS PROVIDED BY MEANS OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION, WOULD "CLEARLY VIOLATE" THE LTBT; THE USE OF THE TERM "PEACEFUL PURPOSES" IN THE OUTER SPACE TREATY HAS BEEN TRADITIONALLY UNDERSTOOD TO IMPLY "NON-MILITARY PURPOSES", AND THAT THE MOTIVATIONS FOR THE RECENT AND "QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT" INTERPRETA- TION OF THIS TERM, I.E. THAT IT MEANS "NON- 102 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Relase 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET AGGRESSIVE", PUT FORTH BY ONE COUNTRY (READ U.S.) WERE "OBVIOUS." HE CRITICIZED THE "BROAD" INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY AND RIDICULED "LEARNED DISCOURSES" ABOUT PERMITTED BMD RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, OR TESTING. HE URGED ACCEPTANCE OF LEGAL NORMS THAT WERE COMPATIBLE WITH THE "WILDEST, BROADEST, AND UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTABLE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL PURPOSES IN OUTER SPACE." IN THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME BECAUSE OF AMBIGUITIES IN EXISTING NORMS, UNCLEAR DEFINITIONS, AND "DUAL-PURPOSE" TECHNOLOGIES. HE CRITICIZED AHC FOR ITS CONTINUING FAILURE TO ANALYZE FULLY THESE PROBLEM AREAS BUT CAUTIONED AGAINST THE HASTY ELABORATION OF "AMBIGUOUS" AND "SUPERFICIAL" AGREEMENTS. HE DEFENDED SDI RESEARCH, NOTING THAT IT IS NOT CERTAIN THAT THE POSSIBLE RESULTS WILL BE MORE DANGEROUS OR DESTABLIZING THAN EXISTING CAPABILITIES. HE STATED THAT EFFORTS TO PROVIDE CERTAIN SATELLITES WITH LEGAL IMMUNITY OR TO PROHIBIT ALL IMPLICIT OR DEDICATED ASAT CAPABILI- TIES COULD ENCOUNTER "MANY TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES." HE CONCLUDED BY URGING THE AHC TO DEVELOP QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED BY LEGAL AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS AND SUGGESTED THAT COPUOS, IN AN "INFORMAL SUB-CONTRACT" WITH THE AHC, MIGHT ELABORATE ON THE REGISTRATION CONVENTION OR DEVELOP PROPOSALS FOR ANNEXES OR PROTOCOLS TO CERTAIN EXISTING MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS. (COMMENT: IN SUBSEQUENT WESTERN GROUP CONSULTATIONS, U.S. DEL OBJECTED TO FRG ESPOUSAL OF THE IDEA THAT CD MIGHT SUBCONTRACT ANY WORK TO COPUOS. IN ANY CASE, IT WAS STRESSED, U.S. OPPOSES CHANGES IN THE REGISTRATION CONVENTION.) - AMB. TAYLHARDAT (VENEZUELA) SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. PRESENTATION, BUT STRESSED THERE WERE, NEVERTHELESS, "SEVERE GAPS" IN THE OUTER SPACE LEGAL REGIME. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT WEAPONS DEVELOPED FROM NEW, NON- NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES WERE NOT PROHIBITED FROM DEPLOYMENT IN SPACE, AND CLAIMED THAT THE OUTER SPACE LEGAL REGIME "COLLAPSED" BY FAILING TO PREVENT SUCH EMPLACEMENTS. -- USSR REP STRONGLY CRITICIZED ALLEGED PLANS BY .NATO TO CREATE AN ANTI-TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE FOR WESTERN EUROPE BASED UPON THE TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATED WITH THE US SDI PROGRAM. HE CLAIMED THAT THIS PROPOSED "EURO-SDI" WOULD CONTRADICT THE ABM TREATY, EXACERBATE EAST-WEST TENSIONS IN EUROPE, AND 25X1 102 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 ENDANGER THE COMPLETION OF AN INF AGREEMENT. HE ALSO STATED THAT A EURO-SDI SYSTEM NEED NOT BE INITIATED BECAUSE MEDIUM AND SHORTER RANGE MISSILES ARE TO BE ELIMINATED; THUS, DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD "CAUSE SUSPICIONS" ABOUT THE ACTUAL DEGREE OF INTEREST IN ELIMINATING THESE MISSILES. -- UK REP RENEWED REQUEST TO CD SECRETARIAT TO PREPARE PAPER ON COPUOS THAT WOULD CONTAIN A DES- CRIPTION OF ITS MANDATE, ANALYSIS OF ITS PAST WORK, AND INFORMATION ON ITS CURRENT ACTIVITIES. 4. JUNE 23 -- -- CONTINUED ANALYSIS OF "EXTENSIVE AND STRICT LEGAL CONTROLS" ON WEAPONS ASSOCIATED WITH OUTER SPACE COMPRISED SECOND U.S. PRESENTATION. STATEMENT NOTED THAT LEGAL REGIME CREATED A ZONE WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE; AVERTED DEPLOYMENT BY THE U.S. OR USSR OF ABM SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS IN OUTER SPACE; CONTRIBUTED TO PREVENTING THE USE OF FORCE IN OUTER SPACE; AND PROHIBITED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY BASES, INSTALLATIONS AND FORTIFICATIONS, THE TESTING OF ANY TYPE OF WEAPONS, AND THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY MANEUVERS ON ALL CELESTIAL BODIES. PRESENTATION CITED DEFINITIONS 7 RELATED TO ASAT SYSTEMS, FAILURE OF MANY STATES TO ACCEDE TO EXISTING AGREEMENTS, AND VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE AMONG THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE EXISTING LEGAL REGIME. STATEMENT NOTED THAT COMPLIANCE WITH MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS HAS BEEN GOOD, BUT COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY BY CERTAIN "OTHER PARTIES" HAS BEEN "FAR FROM SATISFACTORY," AND CONCLUDED BY OBSERVING THAT RELEVANT TREATY LAW HAS NOT PREVENTED, NOR COULD IT PREVENT THE BUILD- UP OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS. -- SOVIET REP, IN FOCUSING ON SELECTED ELEMENTS OF LEGAL REGIME, STATED THAT INTERNATIONAL LAW REQUIRED THAT SPACE BE USED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. HE DISAGREED WITH U.S. VIEW THAT PHRASE "PEACEFUL PURPOSES" IN THE OUTER SPACE TREATY COULD BE INTER- PRETED AS "NONAGRESSIVE" RATHER THAN "NONMILITARY," AND EQUATED THIS VIEW TO U.S. EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A "BROAD" INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY. HE CRITICIZED SDI AS ENTAILING DEPLOYMENT OF SO-CALLED "SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS;" CITED AS EXAMPLES OF SHORTCOMINGS IN THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME ITS FAILURE TO PREVENT DEPLOYMENT OF ASAT WEAPONS OR TO PROVIDE FOR IMMUNIZATION OF SATELLITES. HE CONCLUDED BY URGING THE U.S. AND USSR TO REFRAIN FROM WITHDRAWING FROM THE ABM TREATY FOR TEN YEARS WHILE USING THE TIME TO STRENGTHEN THAT , AGREEMENT. 104 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- FRG, FRENCH, AND UK REPS RESPONDED TO SOVIET JUNE 16 EURO-SDI REMARKS. FRG REP DELIVERED CONCISE, FACTUAL EXPOSITION OF NATO CONCERNS OVER GROWING WARSAW PACT CAPABILITIES TO TARGET NATO OBJECTIVES WITH CONVENTIONAL MISSILES RATHER THAN AIRCRAFT; STATED THAT NATO WOULD BE "UNWISE" NOT TO CONSIDER SOME KIND OF DIRECT DEFENSE AGAINST SOVIET MISSILES; AND EMPHASIZED THAT THE BULK OF THE OPTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION ARE INDEPENDENT OF SDI SPINOFFS. FRENCH REP STATED THAT FRANCE HAD NO PLANS TO DEPLOY ANY TYPE OF ABM SYSTEM; THAT THE SOVIET STATEMENT PRESENTED A DISTORTED PICTURE OF WESTERN DEFENSE EFFORTS AND PLANS; AND THAT EVEN WITH THE ELIMI- NATION OF INF SYSTEMS, WESTERN EUROPE WILL STILL FACE FORMIDABLE THREATS FROM THE EAST. UK REP TERMED SOVIET PRESENTATION "EXAGGERATED AND INACCURATE," NOTING THAT THE USSR HAD NOT ABANDONED ITS OWN EXISTING SYSTEMS OR RESEARCH IN THIS AREA. HE CALLED IT "AN EXTRAORDINARY PROPOSITION" THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD SUGGEST THAT THE WEST ABANDON ITS WORK ON THE POSSIBI- LITY OF EXTENDED EUROPEAN AIR DEFENSE. -- VENEZUELAN AMB. TAYLHARDAT URGED AHC TO DEVOTE TIME TO DEVELOPING COMMON DEFINITIONS AND CITED THE NEED FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF TERMS SUCH AS "SPACE WEAPONS" AND "PEACEFUL PURPOSES." HE CALLED ATTENTION TO PERCEIVED INCONSISTENCIES IN THE LEGAL REGIME (QUESTIONING, FOR EXAMPLE, WHETHER THE OUTER SPACE TREATY REALLY ENVISIONS THE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE MOON WHILE ACCEPTING PARTIAL MILITARIZATION ELSEWHEREAND SAID THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED AND BROADENED. 5. JUNE 30 -- -- THIRD AND FINAL U.S. STATEMENT ON LEGAL REGIME NOTED THAT: THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO BAN THE USE OF FORCE IN OUTER SPACE IS REDUNDANT TO AND UNDERCUTS EXISTING AGREEMENTS, SINCE ALL USES OF FORCE EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENSE ARE CURRENTLY PROHIBITED BY LAW PROPOSALS TO IMMUNIZE SATELLITES FROM ATTACK OVERLOOK EXISTING INTER- NATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS THAT PROHIBIT THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST SATELLITES EXCEPT IN CASES OF SELF-DEFENSE; GROUND STATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH SATELLITES ARE SIMILARLY PROTECTED; AND THAT THE CURRENT REGIME PLACES A LARGE VARIETY OF LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON THE NATURE, DEPLOYMENT, AND USES OF ASAT WEAPONS. PRESENTATION ALSO CALLED ATTENTION TO VERIFICATION AND DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED 25X1 ? 1" 3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET WITH NEGOTIATING A COMPREHENSIVE ASAT BAN,AS SOME CALL FOR. STATEMENT CONCLUDED THAT EXISTING REGIME IN OUTER SPACE IS CONSIDERABLY MORE COM- PREHENSIVE AND RESTRICTIVE THAN THE ARMS CONTROL REGIME ON EARTH; THAT THERE IS NO MANIFEST NEED AT PRESENT TO NEGOTIATE NEW ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS OR OTHER LEGAL RESTRAINTS IN THE CD; AND THAT MORE PARTICIPATION IN, BETTER COMPLIANCE WITH, AND FULLER UNDERSTANDING OF THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME IS NEEDED. -- FRENCH AMB. MOREL CALLED ATTENTION IN GENERAL TERMS TO GAPS AND SHORTCOMINGS IN LEGAL REGIME BUT WARNED AGAINST "ARBITRARY" CORRECTIVE ACTION. HE NOTED THAT THE ELABORATION OF DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGIES RELATED TO OUTER SPACE WAS "BARELY AT THE BEGINNING," INTRODUCED FRENCH EXPERT WHO DISTRIBUTED A FRENCH-PRODUCED DICTIONARY OF SPACE TERMS; AND GAVE A DETAILED EXPOSITION OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF DEVELOPING DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS IN THIS AREA. A SECOND FRENCH EXPERT FOCUSED ON THE MANY PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH DEFINING AN ASAT WEAPON, CALLING ATTENTION TO THE MANY WAYS IN WHICH A SATELLITE COULD BE ATTACKED. -- ARGENTINE AMB. CAMPORA, IN THANKING FRANCE FOR THE CONTRIBUTION OF ITS EXPERTS, REMARKED THAT IT REINFORCED VIEW THAT AHC SHOULD HAVE THE HELP OF EXPERTS ON A CONTINUING BASIS. HE ALSO URGED THE AHC TO UNDERTAKE EFFORTS TO ELABORATE SPECIFIC POINTS OF AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS QUESTIONS AND ISSUES, THAT HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED THUS FAR BY THE AHC SO THAT THEY COULD BE LISTED AS PART OF THE COMMITTEE'S FINAL REPORT. HE SUGGESTED THE AHC COULD: IDENTIFY VERIFICATION AS A PRIORITY ISSUE; URGE ACCESSION TO THE OUTER SPACE TREATY BY MORE NATIONS; NOTE THAT THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME PROHIBITS TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SPACE; AND POINT OUT THAT NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE NOT/NOT PROHIBITED FROM SUCH DEPLOYMENT. -- IN RESPONSE TO JUNE 23 STATEMENTS BY FRG, FRANCE, AND UK, SOVIET REP, SUPPORTED BY GDR, DELIVERED ALMOST VERBATUM REPETION OF JUNE 16 DIATRIBE AGAINST SO-CALLED "EURO-SDI". BULGARIAN AND MONGOLIAN REP ALSO REPEATED STANDARD EASTERN THEMES AND CALLED FOR A NEGOTIATING MANDATE FOR THE AHC IN 1988. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 10C Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07581 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP; VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY MEETING OF TUESDAY, JULY 7, 1987 1. THIS IS CD-131. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- , -- SPEAKERS AT JULY 7 CD PLENARY WERE FINLAND, NORWAY, JAPAN, AND POLAND. FINLAND DISCUSSED CW ISSUES, AND INTRODUCED TWO WORKING PAPERS, CD/764 AND CD/765. NORWAY TABLED CD/766, "PROPOSAL FOR AN ANNEX TO ARTICLE IX CONCERNING VERIFICATION OF ALLEGED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS" ON BEHALF OF CANADA AND ITSELF. JAPAN GAVE A HELPFUL TOUR D'HORIZON OF CD OUTER SPACE (OS) ACTIVITIES. POLAND TOUTED THE JARUZELSKI PROPOSAL FOR "NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL DISENGAGEMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE" (CD/754) AND THE EASTERN CTB PROPOSAL (CD/756), AND SUPPORTED THRUST OF SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT OF JULY 2 ON CW. (FINNISH, NORWEGIAN, AND JAPANESE STATEMENTS AND WORKING PAPERS POUCHED TO ACDA/MA). END SUMMARY. 3. FINLAND -- -- FORMIN POLITICAL DIRECTOR MATTI KAHILUOTO STRESSED THAT THE 1.925 GENEVA PROTOCOL "IS BEING VIOLATED," AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE RECENT UN EXPERTS REPORT OF CW USE BY IRAQ. CW USE IN THE GULF WAR WILL "UNDERMINE THE AUTHORITY" OF THE PROTOCOL, AND FINLAND SUPPORTS ONGOING EFFORTS BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TO END THE CONFLICT. - KAHILUOTO REVIEWED THE CD NEGOTIATIONS ON CW, CITING CHALLENGE INSPECTION AS THE MAJOR UNRESOLVED ISSUE AT THIS POINT. "AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS IS CLEARLY A NECESSITY" TO "PROMPTLY AND SATISFACTORILY" ALLAY SUSPICIONS, HE SAID. - KAHILUOTO REVIEWED FINNISH VERIFICATION RESEARCH, INTRODUCED ITS LATEST ANNUAL REPORT ON THIS WORK (CD/764), AND INTRODUCED A RECORD (CD/765) OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEBRUARY WORKSHOP IN HELSINKI ON POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF AUTOMATIC MONITORING SYSTEMS IN VERIFYING A CW CONVENTION. 4. NORWAY -- -- AMB HUSLID TABLED CD/766, A PROPOSED MECHANISM FOR VERIFYING ALLEGED CW USE, ON BEHALF OF NORWAY AND CANADA. CD/766 SEEKS TO ADDRESS ALL PHASES OF VERIFICATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF CW USE, "I.E. FROM (THE) ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INSPECTION TEAM AND THE TEAM'S INVESTIGATION TO (THE) SUBMISSION OF ITS 107 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET REPORT". AN EFFECTIVE CW CONVENTION WILL REQUIRE "IMMEDIATE ON-SITE INSPECTION, WHETHER AT THE INVITATION OF THE STATE PARTY ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE ALLEGED USE OF CW OCCURRED OR AT THE REQUEST OF ANOTHER STATE PARTY"; THEREFORE, CD/766 PROPOSES AN ANNEX TO ARTICLE IX COVERING "CONSULTATIONS, CO-OPERATION AND FACT-FINDING" IN A VERIFICATION REGIME. 5. JAPAN -- -- AMB YAMADA REVIEWED THE STATE OF OS DISCUSSIONS IN THE CD. HE BEGAN BY REMARKING THAT THERE IS "AN ORGANIC INTERRELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN U.S-SOVIET BILATS AND MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, THE BILATS HAVE "A CRITICAL IMPACT" ON THE CD BECAUSE THE U.S. AND USSR PLAY A "PREDOMINANT" ROLE IN SPACE ACTIVITIES. OS IS OPEN TO ALL COUNTRIES, AND AN ARMS RACE THERE WOULD AFFECT THE SECURITY OF ALL. THEREFORE, THE CD SHOULD "EXAMINE FULLY WHAT KIND OF MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS WOULD BE USEFUL," WORKING "TOWARDS EFFECTIVE AND REALIZABLE GOALS," INSTEAD OF PREOCCUPYING ITSELF "WITH POLITICAL DECLARATIONS". -- YAMADA SAID THAT IT WAS NECESSARY "TO KNOW FULLY AND OBJECTIVELY HOW OS IS ACTUALLY BEING USED". EARLY-WARNING SATELLITES HAVE MILITARY FUNCTIONS, BUT ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO PRESERVING STRATEGIC STABILITY. SIMILARLY, METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITES COLLECT DATA FOR NON-MILITARY PURPOSES, BUT ALSO CAN HAVE MILITARY USES. "A SWEEPING, GENERALIZED APPROACH IN THE NAME OF NON-MILITARIZATION OR PREVENTION OF MILITARIZATION OF OS...WOULD NOT ENSURE OUR SECURITY." INSTEAD, VARIOUS FACTORS "NEED TO BE SEEN IN PERSPECTIVE" TO FACILITATE "AN OBJECTIVE JUDGEMENT" AS TO WHAT MULTILATERAL MEASURES MIGHT BE "MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE, EFFECTIVE AND REALIZABLE". -- OBJECTIVE INFORMATION ON MILITARY CAPABILITIES" IS A PREREQUISITE FOR FRUITFUL RESULTS" ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING, AND "THE SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION PROVIDED THUS FAR BY THE SOVIET UNION (ON OS) IS...FAR FROM SUFFICIENT". -- JAPAN SUPPORTS "THE BASIC IDEA" OF EXPANDING OR STRENGTHENING REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE REGISTRATION CONVENTION. HOWEVER, EFFORTS TO EXPAND THE CONVENTION TO OBLIGATE THE REPORTING OF MILITARY INFORMATION WOULD ENCOUNTER RESISTANCE RELATED TO VERIFICATION. -- AS MORE STATES PARTICIPATE IN OS AND THEIR ACTIVITIES BECOME MORE SOPHISTICATED AND DIVERSIFIED," THE NEED TO PROTECT SPACE OBJECTS AND THEIR ACTIVITIES WILL BECOME MORE URGENT". YAMADA 10C SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 SAID JAPAN HAS LAUNCHED 36 SATELLITES FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, AND PLANS TO LAUNCH "ABOUT TEN MORE" BY 1990. A PROPOSAL TO GRANT IMMUNITY TO SATELLITES FROM ATTACK WOULD GUARANTEE NON-INTERFERENCE WITH THOSE WHICH SERVE AS NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, AND "CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER STABILITY " BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD "NOT IN FACT PROTECT SOME ACTIVITIES WHICH MIGHT ENDANGER THE OS ACTIVITIES OF OTHER STATES. "MUCH WILL NEED TO BE DONE TO DETERMINE THE SCOPE OF (SUCH) IMMUNITY," SINCE "A DECLARATORY INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE" IN OS WILL NOT SUFFICE. -- YAMADA THEN TURNED TO SOME LEGAL ISSUES THAT HAVE BEEN RAISED IN THE OS AD HOC COMMITTEE. IT IS NECESSARY TO DEFINE THE TERM, "SPACE WEAPON," IN REVIEWING THE APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO ARMS CONTROL IN OS, BUT AN ABSTRACT DEFINITION WOULD BE "QUITE INADEQUATE". WHAT ARE THE CRITERIA FOR DEFINING SUCH A WEAPON? WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT, THE C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 03 GENEVA 07581 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP; VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL PURPOSE OF USE OR THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION? WHAT ABOUT DUAL-PURPOSE TECHNOLOGIES? IN THE JAPANESE VIEW, THE CD SHOULD STUDY HOW OS IS ACTUALLY USED, IDENTIFY AND CATEGORIZE INSTANCES OF MILITARY USE, AND "CONSIDER SUCH MEASURES AS MAY BE CALLED FOR". -- ON VERIFICATION, YAMADA RECALLED THAT THE OUTER SPACE TREATY, LIKE THE REGISTRATION CONVENTION, MANDATES THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON SPACE ACTIVITIES, AND THAT ARTICLE XII OPENS ALL STATIONS, INSTALLATIONS, EQUIPMENT, AND SPACE VEHICLES ON THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES TO INSPECTION BY STATES ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS. HOWEVER, ARTICLE XII APPLIES ONLY TO CELESTIAL BODIES, SO HE URGED THE CD TO STUDY WHETHER THOSE "LIMITED PROVISIONS" SERVE THE VERIFICATION NEEDS THAT MAY DEVELOP FROM CURRENT EXPANDED SCOPE OF SPACE ACTIVITIES. THE CD SPECIFICALLY SHOULD EXAMINE WHAT TECHNICAL VERIFICATION MEANS COULD BE USED IN A MULTILATERAL VERIFICATION SYSTEM; CONVERSELY, YAMATA SUGGESTED THAT THE CREATION OR IDENTIFICATION OF SUCH A SYSTEM MIGHT FACILITATE THE ELABORATION OF SOME TYPE OF OUTER SPACE CONVENTION. YAMADA CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT JAPAN "IS KEENLY INTERESTED" IN THE FRENCH PROPOSAL TO CREATE AN INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE MONITORING AGENCY, EVEN THOUGH IT POSES "LEGAL, FINANCIAL, AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS". 6 POLAND -- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET ^ AMB TURBANSKI BEGAN BY EXTOLLING THE GOP'S MAY 8 PROPOSAL FOR A PROGRAM OF "NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL DISENGAGEMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE". - TURBANSKI JOINED PREVIOUS EASTERN SPEAKERS IN SUPPORT OF SOVIET CTB PROPOSAL (CD/756). ACCORDING TO TURBANSKI, THE EAST "WILL CONSIDER ANY PROPOSAL" FOR ESTABLISHING AN AD HOC COMMITTEE ON A NUCLEAR-TEST BAN AT THE CD. - TURBANSKI REVIEWED THE CW NEGOTIATIONS, SUPPORTING SOVIET AMB NAZARKIN'S ASSESSMENT AT THE JULY 2 CD PLENARY THAT THEY HAVE ASSUMED "A SLOWER PACE". TO ACHIEVE "DECISIVE PROGRESS," THE CD SHOULD "CONCENTRATE ON THE PRIORITY ISSUES (ARTICLES IV, V, AND VI) NOW," ADDRESSING OTHERS AT AN (UNDEFINED) LATER STAGE. TURBANSKI ALSO CALLED FOR FURTHER WORK ON"REGIONAL SOLUTIONS". HE WENT ON TO CRITICIZE "CERTAIN COUNTRIES" FOR DEVELOPING A "NEW GENERATION OF CW" (I.E., BINARIES), AND CONCLUDED BY ATTACKING FRANCE (BY INFERENCE) FOR ITS PROPOSAL (CD/757) ON THE RETENTION OF CW STOCKS AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF DESTRUCTION OF STOCKPILES UNDER A NEW CW CONVENTION. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 110 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 ./1 -N\ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168k000100140001-0 ( CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07604 DOE FOR DP/ISA; FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL"MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL E.O. 12356: DECL: 07/13/93 BODY TAGS: PARM, UNGA, CA, FR SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CD PLENARY MEETING OF JULY 9, 1987 1. THIS IS CD-132. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- SESSION WAS SHORT WITH STATEMENTS BY CANADIAN AMB. BEESLEY AND FRENCH REP DE LA BAUME, BOTH SPEAKING ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. STATEMENTS POUCHED TO ACDA/MA. END SUMMARY. 3. FRANCE -- -- FRENCH REP DE LA BAUME SPOKE IN RESPONSE TO HEAVY CRITICISM OF THE FRENCH PAPER CD/757 BY SOVIET AMB. NAZARKIN ON JULY 2. DE LA BAUME BEGAN BY STRESSING THAT THE POINT OF THE FRENCH PROPOSAL WAS TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF ALL STATES PARTIES TO A CW CONVENTION AND NOT ONLY OF THE LARGE CW STOCKPILE COUNTRIES. HE NOTED THAT NOTHING GUARANTEES THAT MAJOR CW STATES WILL NOT STOP DESTROYING THEIR STOCKS DURING THE PROPOSED DESTRUCTION PERIOD. SUCH A SITUATION MAY LEAD TO VIOLATIONS OF AND WITHDRAWALS FROM THE CW BAN. THEREFORE, FRANCE PROPOSES THE PRESERVATION OF A SMALL gJT MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT SECURITY STOCKPILE PRACTICALLY UNTIL THE END OF THE 10-YEAR PERIOD (THE PROLONGATION OF WHICH, HE SAID HAS NOT BEEN ABSOLUTELY EXCLUDED) TO AVOID SUCH A SITUATION. -- DE LA BAUME SAID THAT ANOTHER IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE OF THE FRENCH PROPOSAL IS TO ENCOURAGE STATES WITH SMALL CW STOCKPILES OR NO STOCKPILES TO ACCEDE TO THE CONVENTION. -- DE LA BAUME SAID THAT, IN THE FRENCH APPROACH, A STATE CONTINUING TO POSSESS OR WISHING TO POSSESS CW SOLELY FOR THE 10-YEAR PERIOD WOULD BE CONSTRAINED TO DECLARE THEM AND TO SUBMIT ALL ITS TERRITORY 113" Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 PAGE 2 rz- TO INSPECTION, AND "THE SECURITY STOCK, JUST AS THE PRODUCTION FACILITY, WOULD BE THE OBJECT OF A REINFORCED CONTROL." Z. CANADA -- -- BEESLEY LARGELY RESTATED CANADIAN CW POLICY. ONE SIGNIFICANT ITEM WAS THE PARTIAL TEXT OF A LETTER FROM CANADIAN SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS JOE CLARK TO THE UNSYG INTRODUCING A CANADIAN REPORT ENTITLED VERIFICATION: DEVELOPMENT OF A PORTABLE TRICHOTHECENE SENSOR KIT FOR DETECTION OF T-2 MYCOTOXIN IN HUMAN BLOOD SAMPLES. (BEESLEY SAID THE REPORT WILL BE INTRODUCED TO THE CD.) IN THE LETTER CLARK MENTIONS THAT PROBLEMS RELATED TO SPEEDY COLLECTION AND SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS OF SAMPLES ARE "COMPOUNDED IF THE ALLEGATION RELATES TO A 'NOVEL' AGENT, THAT IS A CHEMICAL SUBSTANCE NOT PREVIOUSLY USED FOR OR ASSOCIATED WITH HOSTILE PURPOSES." -- RECOGNIZING THAT A HEAVY WORKLOAD REMAINS IN THE CW NEGOTIATIONS HE WARNED AGAINST UNREALISTIC AND ARTIFICIAL DEADLINES AND SAID "LET US PROCEED EXPIDITIOUSLY, BY ALL MEANS, BUT LET IT BE WITH CARE AND DELIBERATION." PETRONE ADMIN END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 11 E Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07639 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): WESTERN GROUP MEETING, JULY 8 1. THIS IS CD-133. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- MEETING REVIEWED STATUS OF CD AGENDA ITEMS. IN ADDITION, GROUP DISCUSSED POSSIBLE G-21 PROPOSAL THAT THE CD CONCLUDE ITS 1987 SESSION ON AUG 21. END SUMMARY. 3. END OF SESSION -- -- AMB. VON STULPNAGEL (FRG) REPORTED THAT ARGENTINA AND VENEZUELA FAVORED ENDING THE 1987 SESSION ON AUGUST 21 INSTEAD OF AUGUST 28 TO ACCOMMODATE THOSE ATTENDING DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CONVERENCE. FRANCE (DE LA BAUME) RAISED A CAUTION ON THE PROPOSAL, ON TWO GROUNDS: (1) A FURTHER COMPRESSED REPORT WRITING PERIOD WOULD BE DIFFICULT; AND (2) THEY WILL OCCUPY THE CD PRESIDENCY IN AUGUST. THE U.S. SUGGESTED THAT THE WEST SHOULD AWAIT RESPONSE FROM - THE EAST AND G-21 TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF A REDUCED WESTERN COMMITMENT TO THE CD'S WORK. THE GROUP AGREED TO AWAIT FORMAL PRESENTATION OF THE PROPOSAL, THEN NOTE THE REACTION_OF THE OTHER GROUPS BEFORE TAKING A POSITION. 4. CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- -- ALL DELEGATIONS AGREED THAT THE INDUSTRIAL EXPERTS MEETING (SEPTEL) WENT WELL AND THAT THE MOOD, QUALITY OF DISCUSSION AND PARTICIPATION HAD BEEN GOOD. FRENCH AND UK REPS SAID THAT THE JULY 2 INTERVENTION OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN, ACCUSING THE WEST OF DRAGGING ITS FEET IN CW NETOTIATIONS, SHOULD NOT GO UNCHALLENGED. AUSTRALIAN AMB. BUTLER, HOWEVER, AGREED WITH NAZARKIN'S "MARKING TIME" COMMENT. U.S. REP COUNTERED THAT PERCEIVED "PROGRESS" IN SPRING WAS PRODUCT OF SOVIETS FINALLY EMBRACING REASONABLE POSITIONS, AND QUESTIONED WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME A SOVIET CW PROPOSAL WAS TABLED? RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. REP CONCLUDED, FOR ANY "SLOW DOWN" DOES NOT 111 PrS/PT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET ? LIE WITH THE WEST. 5. NUCLEAR TEST BAN -- -- COORDINATOR, YAMADA (JAPAN), REPORTED THAT NTB MANDATE DISCUSSIONS WERE GOING "NOWHERE". U.S. REP OBSERVED THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE A MEXICAN/INDIAN CONSPIRACY TO KEEP ANYTHING FROM HAPPENING. YAMADA ALSO NOTED THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAD REQUESTED WESTERN SUPPORT FOR HIS APRIL INITIATIVE BECAUSE HE COULD NOT OPENLY PRESS FOR DISCUSSION OF IT. THIS WAS THE RESULT OF END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 112 SECRET ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 o Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07738 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS: JULY 6-10, 1987 REFS: (A) GENEVA 7517 (CD-128) (B) GENEVA 7581 (CD-131) (C) GENEVA 7604 (CD-132) (D) GENEVA 7503 (CD-127) (E) GENEVA 7183 (CD-119) 1. THIS IS CD-134 . (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- CHEMICAL INDUSTRY EXPERTS FROM ABOUT 20 CD COUNTRIES MET IN GENEVA JULY 6-7 (REPORTED SEPTEL), FOCUSSING PRIMARILY ON ISSUES RELATED TO DATA REPORTING AND ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. THE MEETING WAS CONSIDERED TO BE GENERALLY SUCCESSFUL IN IDENTIFYING MANY AREAS OF CONSENSUS, WITH EXPECTED SHARED CONCERNS REGARDING COMMERCIAL CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. -- CLUSTER III (NON-PRODUCTION) DISCUSSIONS DID NOT FARE AS WELL. RESULT OF SECOND WEEK'S DISCUSSIONS ON COMMERCIAL SUPERTOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS WAS A HEAVILY BRACKETED WORKING PAPER. -- U.S. WORKING PAPERS ON "THRESHOLDS" AND "PRODUCTION CAPACITY" WERE DISCUSSED IN WESTERN GROUP. ("PRODUCTION CAPACITY" PAPER WILL BE TABLED IN CD DURING WEEK OF JULY 13; "THRESHOLDS" PAPER IS AWAITING MODIFICATION PURSUANT TO ACTION REQUEST, REF A.) -- TRILATERAL (U.S, SOVIETS, SWEDES) DISCUSSIONS ON ORDER OF ELIMINATION OF CW STOCKS CONCLUDED WITH SOVIETS HAVING RETREATED TO THEIR EARLY SPRING POSITION. SWEDES HAVE PROPOSED A COMPARISON FACTOR FOR UNFILLED MUNITIONS AND OTHER DEVICES. OPEN-ENDED CONSULTATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT BEGIN WEEK OF JULY 13. ACTION REQUEST PARA 4. -- IN TRILATERAL DISCUSSION ON GUIDELINES FOR INCLUSION OF CHEMICALS IN SCHEDULE 1, U.S. ATTEMPTS TO BRACKET BINARY-RELATED TEXT RESULTED IN STRONG SOVIET CONDEMNATION OF U.S. FOR ALLEGEDLY "RENEGING" ON A PREVIOUS BILATERALLY AGREED PACKAGE DEAL. MULTILATERAL DISCUSSION OF TEXT HAS BEEN POSTPONED AT SOVIET REQUEST. -- INFORMAL COMMENT BY SOVIET AMB NAZARKIN INDICATED SOVIET INTEREST IN DISCUSSION OF "MANAGED 113 25X1 cwrpw.T. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONDUCT" OF CHALLENGE INSPECTNSAT NEXT BILATERAL ROUND. -- IN PLENARY THIS WEEK, CANADA AND NORWAY TABLED THEIR PROPOSED ANNEX ON VERIFICATION OF USE (REF B). FRENCH DEPUTY DE LA BAUME RESPONDED (REF C) TO SOVIET AMB NAZARKIN'S CRITICISM OF THE FRENCH CW SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL, NOTING THAT, DEPENDING ON SECURITY CONCERNS THAT MAY BE IDENTIFIED, THE RETENTION OF SUCH STOCKS BEYOND THE TEN YEAR PERIOD SET FORTH IN THE PROPOSAL WAS NOT/NOT ABSOLUTELY EXCLUDED. END SUMMARY. -- SWEDEN HAS PROVIDED A DRAFT CHALLENGE INSPECTION PAPER TO A SMALL NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS (REPORTED REF D) AND PLANS TO AGAIN TAKE UP THE SUBJECT IN SMALL HEADS- OF-DELEGATION GROUPS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. 3. CLUSTER III (NON PRODUCTION) -- -- DISCUSSIONS ON A VERIFICATION REGIME FOR COMMERCIAL SUPERTOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS FOUNDERED ON WHETHER THE REGIME SHOULD APPLY TO A LIST OF SELECTED CHEMICALS OR TO THE FACILITIES THAT PRODUCE ANY CHEMICALS OF THAT TOXICITY. -- JAPAN'S MOVE TOWARD THE APPROACH FOCUSSING ON FACILITIES HAS LEFT THE FRG AS THE PRIMARY SUPPORTER OF A SPECIFIC LIST OF CHEMICALS, WITH BELGIUM A LESS STRONG SUPPORTER. -- CHAIRMAN PABLACEDO'S (MEXICO) FRUSTRATION AT THE CONTINUING CIRCULAR DISCUSSIONS LED HIM TO ASK CWAHC CHAIRMAN EKEUS TO CHAIR HIS JULY 10 MEETING. THE EKEUS MEETING RESULTED IN A TEXT SIMILAR TO THE CHAIRMAN'S DRAFT SCHEDULE 4 APPENDED TO WP/167 BUT BRACKETED IN SUCH A WAY- AS TO POSSIBLY APPLY TO CHEMICALS OR FACILITIES. 4. TRILATERAL U.S, SOVIET, SWEDISH DISCUSSIONS -- -- ON ORDER OF ELIMINATION, PREVIOUS SOVIET MOVES TOWARD U.S. POSITION OF A PHASED DESTRUCTION SCHEDULE WITH PARITY AT END OF PHASE ONE, AND COMPARISON OF SCHEDULE 1 CHEMI/CALS BY AGGREGATE WEIGHT WERE EFFECTIVELY WITHDRAWN. AFTER "HAVING DONE FURTHER HOMEWORK ON THE ISSUE," THE SOVIETS STATED THAT THE WHOLE ARRANGEMENT LOOKED TOO MUCH LIKE A SECURITY STOCKPILE. -- THE SOVIETS NOW ARE BACK TO THE NINE ANNUAL DESTRUCTION PERIODS AND, WHILE THEY ACCEPT THE 116 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 CONCEPT OF COMPARISON BY AGENT WEIGHT, THEY WOULD BREAK DOWN SCHEDULE 1 INTO SUB-CATEGORIES OF CHEMICALS (INCLUDING BINARY PRECURSORS), THUS REQUIRING DESTRUCTION OF SPECIFIC CHEMICALS INSTEAD OF ALLOWING THE STATE PARTY THE FLEXIBILITY TO DECIDE WHICH CHEMICALS TO DESTROY FIRST. -- THE SWEDES HAVE PROPOSED A COMPARISON OF UNFILLED MUNITIONS AND OTHER DEVICES AS FOLLOWS: FOR UNFILLED MUNITIONS, COMPARISON COULD BE EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF NUMBER OF ITEMS AND/OR THE AGGREGATE FILL VOLUME; FOR OTHER DEVICES AND EQUIPMENT, COMPARISON COULD BE IN NUMBER OF ITEMS. REQUEST WASHINGTON VIEWS ON THIS PROPOSAL. -- DISCUSSION ON ORDER OF ELIMINATION IS SCHEDULED TO CONTINUE ON JULY 16 IN OPEN-ENDED CONSULTATIONS. -- IN DISCUSSION OF DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR INCLUSION OF CHEMICALS IN SCHEDULE 1, CURRENTLY APPENDED TO- WP/167, U.S. ATTEMPTS TO BRACKET BINARY-RELATED TEXT (ITEM 10) DREW HEAVY CONDEMNATION FROM THE SOVIETS FOR ALLEGEDLY RENEGING ON A PREVIOUS, BILATERALLY AGREED PACKAGE. -- SOVIETS CLAIMED THAT ITEM 10 WAS THE RESULT OF A COMPROMISE. THERE HAD BEEN AN AGREEMENT IN U.S-SOVIET BILATERALS THAT CONNECTED A COMPROMISE ON AVOIDING SPECIFICATION OF "KEY COMPONENTS" WITH AN UNDERSTANDING ON ISSUES OF: HERBICIDES, DEFINITIONS AND INCAPACITANTS. THIS AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REPORTED TO MOSCOW AND HAD BEEN CONSIDERED TO CONSTITUTE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS AND A LARGE SCALE COMPROMISE. -- U.S. DEL POINTED OUT THAT IF THE SOVIETS CHECKED THEIR NOTES FROM THE BILATERALS IN MARCH, THEY WOULD REALIZE THAT WHILE SUCH A "PACKAGE DEAL" HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IT WAS NOT AGREED. -- THE SOVIETS DO NOT WANT ANY BRACKETED TEXT ON THIS NOW AND HAVE PROPOSED THAT THESE GUIDELINES NOT GO INTO MULTILATERAL DISCUSSION AT THIS TIME UNTIL THE SUBJECTS COULD AGAIN BE DISCUSSED BILATERALLY. U.S. DEL SAID WHILE WE WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE GUIDELINES MULTILATERALLY, WE WOULD NOT OBJECT IF SUCH DISCUSSIONS WERE POSTPONED. 5. SOVIET COMMENTS ON "MANAGED CONDUCT" -- -- AT A RECEPTION, SOVIET AMB NAZARKIN EXPRESSED INTEREST IN DISCUSSION ON "MANAGED CONDUCT" OF A CHALLENGE INSPECTION AT THE NEXT BILATERAL ROUND. 115 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED IN THIS CONCEPT. 6. CW WESTERN COORDINATION -- -- AT WESTERN COORDINATION MEETING ON JULY 9, U.S. PAPERS ON "THRESHOLDS" AND "PRODUCTION CAPACITY" WERE DISCUSSED. ALL BUT NETHERLANDS EXPRESSED PROBLEMS WITH THE LOWEST SCHEDULE 1 THRESHOLD IN THE "THRESHOLDS" PAPER AND U.S. DEL HAS SENT RECOMMENDED CHANGE (REF A) BACTO WASHINGTON. PRODUCTION CAPACITY PAPER WAS GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE AND DEL WILL TABLE IT AS A WORKING PAPER WEEK OF JULY 13. -- UK PAPER (REF E) WAS BRIEFLY DISCUSSED. MAJOR REACTION SEEMED TO BE THAT NUMBERS AND COSTS WERE TOO CONSERVATIVE. SEVERAL DELS, ESPECIALLY CANADA, WERE UPSET AT THE VERY SHORT TIME ALLOWED BY THE UK FOR WESTERN COMMENT. UK PAPER WAS TABLED IN CD ON JULY 14. 7. -MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 116 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07759 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY SESSION OF JULY 14, 1987 1. THIS IS CD-135. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- UK MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS DAVID MELLOR ADDRESSED INF, TEST BAN AND CW, AND TABLED A WORKING PAPER ON MAKING THE CW BAN EFFECTIVE. VIETNAMESE DEPFONMIN NGURYEN DI MIEN GAVE TOUR D'HORIZON OF DISARMAMENT ISSUES. FOR THE FIRST TIME MEXICO GAVE A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS. STATEMENT WAS CONSISTENT WITH KNOWN MEXICAN CW POSITION BUT STILL NOTABLE FOR ITS ANTI-U.S. BIAS. (UK AND MEXICAN INTERVENTIONS DATAFAXED TO ACDA/MA.) END SUMMARY. 3. UNITED KINGDOM -- -- MINISTER MELLOR STRESSED THE ROLE THAT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE PLAYS IN PRESERVING PEACE AND SAID THAT, WHILE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE NEEDED, THEY WILL NOT BE -NEEDED AT THEIR CURRENT INFLATED LEVEL. AFTER NOTING THE PROGRESS BEING MADE IN THE INF TALKS MELLOR POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS THE U.S. AND NOT THE SOVIETS THAT PROPOSED THE ZERO-ZERO OPTION, AND URGED THE SOVIETS TO AGREE TO ELIMINATE ALL LRINF AND SRINF MISSILES WITHOUT RESORTING TO FOOT DRAGGING. MELLOR REITERATED BRITISH SUPPORT FOR SDI IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NOV. 1986 THATCHER-REAGAN CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT, AND CALLED UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE U.S. DRAFT TREATY ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS. -- ON NTB, AFTER REGRETTING THE FAILURE OF THE CD TO AGREE TO A MANDATE, MELLOR NOTED THAT THE DRAFT MANDATE INTRODUCED BY CZECH AMB. VEJVODA AS APRIL PRESIDENT WAS ACCEPTABLE (FYI: LAST WEEK UK HAD ASKED USDEL VIEW OF MELLOR'S EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR VEJVODA DRAFT. U.S. DEL HAD URGED THAT UK NOT GO BEYOND WESTERN POSITION THAT VEJVODA TEXT WAS ACCEPTABLE AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION. ACTING UK DEL HEAD EDIS HAS TOLD U.S. THAT TEXT USED IN STATEMENT WAS 117 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET DECIDED IN LONDON.) -- ON CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT MELLOR NOTED THAT "THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND ITS NATO ALLIES ARE NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF MAKING EUROPE SAFE FOR YET ANOTHER CONVENTIONAL WAR" AND THAT NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT MUST BE BALANCED. MELLOR NOTED THE NATO PROPOSAL FOR SEPERATE NEGOTIATIONS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS ON FORCE REDUCTIONS AND CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES UNDER THE CSCE RUBRIC, AND SAID THAT WEST HOPED TO MAKE FORMAL PROPOSALS FOR THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. -- ON CW, MELLOR RESTATED STANDARD UK POSITIONS, SAID HE WAS "HEARTENED BY THE WARM RECEPTION FOR THE BRITISH PAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION", AND INTRODUCED A WORKING PAPER, "MAKING THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN EFFECTIVE," DEALING WITH ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR IMPLEMENTATIONS. -- MELLOR ALSO ANNOUNCED RETIREMENT OF UK CD REP AMB. IAN CROMARTIE. (FYI: UK DEL HAS TOLD U.S. PRIVATELY THAT RETIREMENT IS FOR REASONS OF HEALTH.) 4. VIET NAM -- -- DEPFONMIN MIEN REITERATED EASTERN BLOC NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT POLICY, PRAISED THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL TO ABOLISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY THE END OF THE CENTURY, AND CALLED FOR NTB AS THE HIGHEST ARMS CONTROL PRIORITY. -- TURNING TO THE SOUTEAST ASIAN REGION, MIEN CALLED FOR REGIONAL NON-USE OF FORCE AGREEMENTS, SUPPORTED THE INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE, AND NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-FREE ZONES FOR SOUTEAST ASIA, THE SOUTH PACIFIC AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA. HE ALSO LAUDED THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF A GENERAL SYSTEM OF SECURITY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. -- OF PARTICULAR INTEREST WAS MINISTER MIEN'S EXPRESSED DESIRE TO ACHIEVE A SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF KAMPUCHEA AND OTHER REGIONAL PROBLEMS THROUGH POLITICAL SOLUTIONS ARRIVED AT BY DIALOGUE. HE ALSO NOTED VIET NAM'S DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND (IN A RELATED MATTER) TO GAIN ADMISSION Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 --) Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 TO THE CD. 5. NIGERIA -- -- AMB. TONWE INTRODUCED NIGERIA'S "PROPOSAL FOR THE IMMEDIATE CONCLUSION OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO INSURE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES AGAINST THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS" (CD/768). TONWE SAID OBJECTIVE WAS TO TAKE THE ISSUE OF NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES "OUT OF THE COOLER." --TONWE ALSO ANNOUNCED HIS DEPARTURE FROM GENEVA. 6. MEXICO -- -- AMB. GARCIA ROBLES DELIVERED A TOUR D'HORIZON OF CW ISSUES WHICH WAS IN TONE AND SUBSTANCE CONSISTENT WITH POSITIONS TAKEN BY SOVIET BLOC DELS. THOUGH HIS STATEMENT CONTAINED GENERAL CRITICISMS OF FRENCH AND U.S. POSITIONS NOTHING NEW OR EXTRAORDINARY WAS NOTED. ON THE OTHER HAND IT IS OF SOME SIGNIFICANCE THAT MEXICAN DELEGATION HAS ADDRESSED THE CW NEGOTIATIONS AT ALL, LET ALONE AT SUCH LENGTH. -- ACTION REQUEST: U.S. DEL RECOMMENDS DECL OADR CONSULTATIONS BE PURSUED WITH MEXICO ON REMARKABLY UNBALANCED STATEMENT OF AMB. GARCIA ROBLES, PERHAPS IN THE CONTEXT OF FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO ARMS CONTROL BILATERALS HELD IN MEXICO CITY LAST YEAR. 7. USSR -- -- IN RESPONSE TO THE REFERENCE TO AFGANISTAN IN THE UK INTERVENTION, SOVIET AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN NOTED THE WITHDRAWAL OF SIX (6) SOVIET REGIMENTS ALREADY AND PLANS FOR MORE WITHDRAWLS IN "SHORTER PERIODS," WHICH HE SAID WILL REQUIRE MORE COOPERATION FROM THE UNITED STATES. NAZARKIN ALSO RESPONDED DISJOINTEDLY TO MELLOR'S REMARKS ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AND DETERRENCE. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 119 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07783 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS: INDUSTRIAL EXPERTS MEETING JULY 6-7, 1987 REF: GENEVA 7639 (CD-133) 1. THIS IS CD-136 . (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. SUMMARY -- -- CHEMICAL INDUSTRIAL EXPERTS FROM NEARLY 20 NATIONS PARTICIPATED WITH CD EXPERTS ON TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED CW CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO NON- PRODUCTION OF CHEMICALS PROHIBITED BY THE CONVENTION. THE MEETING WAS CONSIDERED A SUCCESS. MANY PREVIOUSLY UNINVOLVED CHEMICAL COMPANIES ARE NOW FOCUSING ON THE ISSUES, PROVIDING HELPFUL INPUT FOR NEGOTIATORS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN DEVELOPING VERIFICATION PROVISIONS RELATED TO INDUSTRY, AND IDENTIFYING AREAS WHERE FURTHER TECHNICAL WORK IS NEEDED. CONSENSUS APPEARED IN A NUMBER OF AREAS AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 3. -- GENERAL CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE MEETING WAS LONG OVERDUE. THERE HAS BEEN TOO MUCH GUESSWORK WITH A LACK OF BASIC DATA ON FACILITIES AND PRODUCTS. SMALLER COMPANIES NEED TO BECOME INVOLVED, AS WELL AS THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY. THE NECESSARY MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION NEEDS DEVELOPMENT AND FURTHER WORK WITH INDUSTRY IS NEEDED, INCLUDING "MOCK" FACILITY INSPECTIONS. -- EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES: THE SOVIETS AND SEVERAL EASTERN COUNTRIES DID NOT CONCUR THAT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION WAS NOT FEASIBLE TODAY. THE SOVIETS WERE ONLY REPRESENTED BY THEIR PERMANENT CHEMICAL INDUSTRY DELEGATE, DR. KUZMIN, WHO MINIMIZED MOST DIFFICULTIES WHEN THEY WERE SURFACED BY OTHERS. THE OTHER EASTERN DELEGATES SPOKE INFREQUENTLY. -- WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES: MOST WESTERN MEMBERS FELT THAT THE EXPERTS MEETING WAS VERY USEFUL AND SHOULD BE REPEATED. FRG WAS SKEPTICAL AS TO WHETHER THERE COULD BE ASSURANCES THAT INDUSTRIES WERE NOT USED TO PRODUCED CLANDESTINE CW AGENTS. FRG FELT THAT INDUSTRY SHOULD HAVE INPUTTED EARLIER SO THAT NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE BASED ON REALISM. JAPANESE SPOKE POSITIVELY OF THEIR SUPPORT FOR A CW CONVENTION. JAPANESE FELT THAT THIS MEETING OF EXPERTS SHOULD BE REPEATED AND PLAN TO RELATE PROGRESS TO JAPANESE INDUSTRY. EXPERTS GENERALLY SEEMED TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT A CW CONVENTION WOULD IMPACT ON INDUSTRY. U.S. EXPERTS WERE WILL CARPENTER (MONSANTO), KYLE OLSON (CMA), AND LEO ZEFTEL (DUPONT). 120 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 7. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- NONALIGNED: FEW INDUSTRY EXPERTS ATTENDED, ALTHOUGH MEMBERS OF PERMANENT DELEGATIONS WERE OFTEN AT MEETINGS. INDIAN EXPERT WAS MOST SKEPTICAL ABOUT DATA REPORTING FOR SCHEDULE 3, ESPECIALLY IF CUSTOMERS WERE INCLUDED. DR. SANTESSON, SWEDISH EXPERT, OBJECTIVELY CHAIRED THE SESSIONS. END SUMMARY. 3. AREAS OF CONSENSUS -- -- PRODUCTION CAPACITY SHOULD BE BASED ON 24 HOURS PER DAY AND SEVEN DAYS PER WEEK OF OPERATIONS. CAPACITY VERSUS ACTUAL PRODUCTION IS COMPLEX ISSUE AND WILL REQUIRE INSPECTORS TO BE EXPERTS AND KNOW CONSIDERABLE DETAIL ON THE FACILITY OPERATIONS FOR VERIFICATION OF DECLARATIONS. -- AS THE BASIS FOR ESTIMATING INSPECTORATE SIZE, APPROXIMATELY 100 SCHEDULE 2 FACILITIES WERE PROPOSED TO BE USED. THE ESTIMATE DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE PROBLEM OF INCLUDING CUSTOMERS FOR SCHEDULE II PRODUCTS, WHICH COULD BE 5-10 TIMES NUMBER OF PRODUCERS. -- SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS CONSTITUTE A GREATER RISK TO THE CONVENTION THAN SCHEDULE 3 AND PRODUCTION FIGURES FOR SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS SHOULD BE MORE PRECISE. FRG AND JAPAN EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THIS CONCEPT, BUT MOST OTHERS ACCEPTED IT. BASIC DATA IS LACKING ON SCHEDULE 2 PRODUCERS, CONSUMERS AND USES AT THIS TIME. -- SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS, WHICH ARE PRODUCED IN LARGER VOLUMES, ARE OF MORE CONCERN TO INDUSTRY. EXPERTS FELT THAT DECLARATIONS WILL HAVE TO BE IN RANGES RATHER THAN SPECIFIC VALUES. "CAPTIVE USE" CHEMICALS, SUCH AS PHOSGENE, WHICH ARE TEMPORARILY PRODUCED AS PART OF A PROCESS OF MAKING ANOTHER CHEMICAL, POSE REPORTING PROBLEMS. INDUSTRY HAD SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE FEASIBILITY OF REPORTING DATA ON SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS, ESPECIALLY IF DATA ON CUSTOMERS WERE TO BE REQUIRED. NO RELIABLE STATISTICS ON SCHEDULE 3 PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION WERE AVAILABLE. SUPERTOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS (STLC'S) CONCERN INDUSTRY BECAUSE OF TKIR LARGE NUMBER, FEW OF WHICH HAVE APPLICATION FOR PRODUCING CW AGENTS. THIS CATEGORY COULD PARTICULARLY AFFECT THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY WHERE PRODUCTION MAY BE LOW, BUT CAPACITY OF THE MULTIPURPOSE FACILITIES 121 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET WILL APPEAR HIGH. -- CONFIDENTIALITY IS THE MOST IMPORTANT INDUSTRIAL CONCERN IN DATA COLLECTION AND REPORTING. THE COMMERCIAL ASPECTS (CUSTOMER LISTS, PRODUCTION CAPACITY AND FUTURE PRODUCTION PLANS) ARE MORE IMPORTANT TO INDUSTRY THAN TECHNICAL DETAILS, HOWEVER, MAXIMUM EFFORT MUST BE TAKEN TO PROTECT ALL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF INDUSTRY. POSSIBLY USE OF ON-SITE SEALED CONTAINERS MAY BE HELPFUL IN SAFEGUARDING SOME INDUSTRIAL DATA. -- INDUSTRY IS ACCUSTOMED AND ADJUSTED TO DEALING WITH THEIR NATIONAL AUTHORITIES, BUT CONCERNED ABOUT AN INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORATE. EXPERTS POINTED OUT THAT THE CONFIDENTIALITY PROTOCOL OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD) WORKS WELL AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A MODEL FOR THE CW CONVENTION. -- CONCERN WAS REGISTERED ON PREDICTING AND ESTIMATING THE FOLLOWING YEAR'S PRODUCTION PLANS. ALTHOUGH SUCH DATA MAY BE APPROXIMATIONS OR ROUGH ESTIMATES, IT CONSTITUTES CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO INDUSTRY. IN BATCH PLANTS, PARTICULARLY, PRODUCTION PLANS ARE CHANGING FREQUENTLY AND INDUSTRY DOES NOT WANT TO BE REQUIRED TO UP-DATE CHANGES IN PRODUCTION OR CAPACITY MORE THAN ONCE A YEAR. THEY ALSO ARE CONCERNED ABOUT BEING CONSIDERED "IN VIOLATION" IF FORECASTING IS WRONG. -- CERTAIN SPECIALITY CHEMICALS, WHICH COULD INCLUDE STLC'S, ARE OFTEN MADE ONCE EVERY TWO OR THREE YEARS IN MULTIPURPOSE BATCH PLANTS. IN THE INTERIM THE FACILITY WOULD BE USED FOR OTHER PRODUCTION. CAPACITY WOULD STILL BE THERE AND POSSIBLY APPEAR LARGE, BUT PRODUCTION COULD SHOW MARKED CHANGES FROM YEAR TO YEAR. THUS THERE WOULD BE BASIS FOR REPORTING WHY CAPACITY IS NOT BEING UTILIZED AS WELL AS WHEN IT IS BEING EXCEEDED. -- MONITORING SENSORS AND CERTAIN INSTRUMENTS MAY BE APPLICABLE TO MONITORING STOCKPILES, BUT THE TECHNOLOGY IS NOT YET THOUGHT ACCEPTABLE FOR CONTINUOUS ON-SITE PRODUCTION OR NON-PRODUCTION MONITORING. NEED FOR FREQUENT MAINTENANCE AND CALIBRATION AND DOUBTS ABOUT RELIABILITY ARE THE PRIMARY CONCERNS. THE NEED FOR CONSIDERABLE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO ENHANCE TODAY'S TECHNOLOGY IN THIS AREA WAS EMPHASIZED. 122 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 -- EXPERTS FROM FRG, U.S. AND JAPAN MET SEPARATELY AFTER CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE AND HAVE DECIDED TO RECOMMEND THAT A MEETING OF CEFIC (EUROPEAN CHEMICAL ASSOCIATION), CMA (U.S.) AND JAPANESE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION BE HELD IN THE FALL IN EUROPE. THE SCOPE OF THIS MEETING HAS NOT BEEN DEVELOPED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 123 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07823 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): WESTERN GROUP MEETING, JULY 15, 1987 REFS: (A) GENEVA 7639(CD-133) (B) GENEVA 7759 (CD-135) (C) GENEVA 7503 (CD-127) 1. THIS IS CD-137 . (CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- REGULAR WEEKLY MEETING OF WESTERN GROUP FOCUSED ON CLOSING DATE FOR SUMMER SESSION AND CW ISSUES. NTB AND OTHER AGENDA ITEMS WERE ALSO DISCUSSED. END SUMMARY. 3. END OF SESSION -- -- AMB CLERCKX (JULY WESTERN GROUP CHAIRMAN) REPORTED FROM CD PRESIDENT'S CONSULTATIONS THAT SOME MEMBERS OF G-21 HAD PROPOSED TO SHORTEN CD SESSION BY APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK FOR CONVENIENCE OF HEADS OF DELEGATION WISHING TO ATTEND THE DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE IN NEW YORK. EASTERN REP HAD SAID IF REGULAR CD SESSION WERE SHORTENED, DECISION WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE AT SAME TIME ABOUT SCHEDULING OF CW INTERSESSIONAL WORK. -- FRENCH REP REITERATED VIEWS EXPRESSED AT JULY 8 WESTERN GROUP MEETING (REF A), NOTING THAT SINCE THE WEST IS OFTEN CRITICIZED ABOUT ITS APPARENT LACK OF INTEREST IN CD ISSUES, IT WOULD LOOK INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE CD PRESIDENT FOR AUGUST (FRANCE) TO PRESIDE OVER A TRUNCATED SESSION. U.S. AMB FRIEDERSDORF SAID THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT MAKE ITSELF A TARGET FOR CRITICISM BY READILY AGREEING TO A CURTAILED SESSION, AND SUPPORTED FRANCE. NETHERLANDS AMB VAN SCHAIK CAUTIONED THE WEST NOT TO BLOCK A G-21 MOVE TO SHORTEN THE SUMMER SESSION, SINCE THE NEWLY AVAILABLE TIME COULD BE FILLED WITH CW WORK. WESTERN GROUP AGREED TO INFORM CD PRESIDENT THAT ABRIDGMENT HAD NO "PRACTICAL APPEAL," BUT IDEA WOULD NOT BE EXPLICITLY REJECTED. 4. CW - CW COORDINATOR VAN SCHAIK REQUESTED EXPEDITIOUS U.S. BRIEFING ON CW BILATERALS, AND CRITICIZED WESTERN GROUP FOR BLOCKING CW PROGRESS AT A TIME WHEN (HE CLAIMED) THE SOVIETS WERE "LEANING BACKWARDS" TO BE ACCOMMODATING. HE STATED THAT 1 2 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 AMB EKEUS WOULD SOON BEGIN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION ON THE BASIS OF SWEDISH DRAFT PAPER (REF C). VAN SCHAIK STRESSED THAT G-21 FAVORS LARGER ROLE FOR EXECUTIVE COUNCIL IN CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROCESS. -- REGARDING INTERSESSIONAL CW WORK, VAN SCHAIK MADE STRONG PLEA FOR WORK IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 1987, AS WELL AS FOR CONTINUING TRADITION OF WORK IN NOVEMBER-DECEMBER AND JANUARY PERIODS. AMB FRIEDERSDORF EXPRESSED STRONG OPPOSITION TO SEPTEMBER INTERSESSIONALS AND QUESTIONED FEASIBILITY AND UTILITY OF WORK IN OCTOBER PRIOR TO UNGA; HE EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A SCHEDULE SIMILAR TO THAT OF A YEAR AGO WITHOUT COMMITING TO ANY INTERSESSIONALS AT THIS TIME. UK REP STATED THAT WEST SHOULD SHOW COMMITMENT TO "REASONABLE" INTERSESSIONAL WORK, BUT THAT "NON-STOP NEGOTIATIONS" WERE NOT FEASIBLE. -- FRENCH REP STATED THAT HE WILL RENEW MARCH 1987 PROPOSAL FOR "SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL" (CD/747) TO ASSIST IN ADDING CHEMICALS TO SCHEDULES AFTER CONVENTION ENTERS INTO FORCE, AND MAY PRESENT DRAFT LANGUAGE ON THE SUBJECT WHEN CW AHC BEGINS- CONSIDERATION OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS DURING WEEK OF JULY 20. 5. NTB -- -- JAPANESE AMB YAMADA (COORDINATOR) SUMMARIZED STATUS OF MANDATE ISSUE: (1) THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO G-21 DISCUSSION OF PROPOSAL BY APRIL CD PRESIDENT VEJVODA; (2) G-21 HAS LEFT IT TO GARCIA ROBLES TO DECIDE THE MANNER IN WHICH HE WILL INTRODUCE HIS PAPER TO CD -- AS G-21 DRAFT, WITH SELECTED GROUP OF CO-SPONSORS, OR AS MEXICAN PAPER (THE SECOND WAS USED). -- G-21 NTB COORDINATOR (BRAZIL) HAS ACKNOWLEDGED TO YAMADA PRIVATELY THAT GARCIA ROBLES PAPER WAS "WORTHLESS," BUT SAID THAT G-21 COULD DO NOTHING FURTHER ON SUBJECT UNTIL IT WAS TABLED AND DECIDED ON BY CD. YAMADA WAS URGED TO CONTINUE TO PRESS G-21 FOR VIEWS ON VEJVODA PAPER. 6. OUTER SPACE -- -- FRENCH REP (WESTERN COORDINATOR) REPORTED THAT AHC MEETINGS ON "PROPOSALS AND INITIATIVES" HAVE BEEN SHORT AND DESULTORY, WITH G-21 REPS CONTRIBUTING VIRTUALLY NOTHING. ITALIAN AMB PUGLIESI (OS AHC CHAIRMAN) ADDED THAT MEETINGS 125 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET HAVE BECOME TEDIOUS AND THAT SOVIET AMB NAZARKIN, WHO WAS PRESENT AT A RECENT MEETING, EXPRESSED SURPRISE TO HIM ABOUT THE LACK OF ANIMATED DEBATE. 7. CPD - AUSTRALIAN REP (WESTERN CPD COORDINATOR) NOTED THAT AHC CHAIRMAN GARCIA ROBLES PROPOSES TO BEGIN A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE CPD TEXT, TO CONFIRM AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DIFFERENCES, IN EITHER CONTACT GROUPS OR IN THE AHC AND WILL SEEK THE APPROVAL OF THE AHC FOR THIS COURSE OF ACTION. UK REP URGED WESTERN GROUP TO REMEMBER THAT G-21 SEES CPD AS IMPORTANT AND THAT WEST SHOULD WORK TO IMPROVE THE DRAFT WITHOUT "UNNECESSARILY ALARMING OR AROUSING" THEM. 8. NSA -- -- FRG REP (NSA AHC CHAIRMAN) REPORTED ON MEETINGS OF AHC TO DATE INDICATING NO POSSIBILITY OF MOVEMENT IN THIS AREA DURING REMAINDER OF CD SESSION. (COMMENT: AT JULY 14 NSA AHC MEETING, THERE WAS A BRIEF EXCHANGE OF VIEWS PROMPTED BY NEW NIGERIAN NSA PROPOSAL CD/768 (REF B).) 9. RW - FRG REP (WESTERN RW COORDINATOR) REPORTED NO PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY DURING MEETINGS OF RW AHC OR ITS CONTACT GROUPS ON TRACK A (RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS) OR TRACK B (ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR FACILITIES) THUS FAR. 10. PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, INCLUDING ALL RELATED MATTERS (PNW), CESSATION OF THE - NUCLEAR ARMS RACE (CNAR) -- -- UK REP (WESTERN NUCLEAR ISSUES COORDINATOR) REPORTED NO EVIDENCE OF ANY PRESSURE TO UNDERTAKE ACTIVITIES ON PNW. REGARDING CNAR, ACTIVITY OF CONFERENCE IN INFORMAL PLENARIES REMAINED LOW-KEYED AND ROUTINE. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 126 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07900 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY SESSION OF JULY 16, 1987 1. THIS IS CD-138. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT, EXCEPT PARA 5). 2. SUMMARY -- -- THERE WERE TWO SPEAKERS AT 16 JULY PLENARY. SPANISH DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AND DISARMAMENT DIRECTORATE MIRANDA Y ELIO ADDRESSED A WIDE RANGE OF CD-RELATED ISSUES INCLUDING CW AND NPT. MEXICAN AMB. GARCIA ROBLES INTRODUCED CD/772, A DRAFT MANDATE FOR A COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN, FOR MEXICO AND SEVEN OTHER G-21 STATES. (TEXT OF CD/772 IR PARA 5 BELOW) 3. SPAIN -- -- DON CARLOS MIRANDAY ELIO,DIRECTOR GENERAL, DIRECTORATE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AND ISARMAMENT, SAID RECENT ESTABLISHMENT OF HIS DIRECTORATE IN MFA REFLECTS SPANISH INTEREST IN DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS AND INTENTION AND DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORMULA ION OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IN THE CD. -- MIRANDA SAID T AT, SHORT OF WORLDWIDE DISARMAMENT, THE DETERRENCE OF AGGRESSION MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH MINIMAL LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS. THE CONCERN IS THAT AN EAST-WEST EQUILIBRIUM IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND OTHERS DOES NOT GUARANTEE PEACE. THE NEED IS TO ESTABLISH THE LOWEST LEVELS OF FORCE WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF DETERRING ATTACK, AND TO DECREASE CONVEN- TIONAL AS WELL AS NUCLEAR ARSENALS TO THAT MINIMUM LEVEL. DISARMAMENT AND DETERRENCE ALONE WILL NOT ASSURE PEACE, HOWEVER; HUMAN RIGHTS ARE IMPORTANT AND VERIFICATION OF AGREEMENTS IS ESSENTIAL. -- MIRANDA SAID SPAIN RECOGNIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NST NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THAT THE MULTILATERAL CD SHOULD CONTINUE IN ITS DELIBERATIONS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND NOT SIMPLY WAIT FOR THE OUTCOME OF BILATERALS. HE SAID THAT THE CD HAS NEGLECTED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT, AND THAT REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS SHOULD ACCOMPANY REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. -- SPAIN ENDORSES THE GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES AS WELL AS 50 CUTS IN THE STRATEGIC ARSENALS OF HE MAJOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS POWERS AS THE HIGHEST PRIORITY. -- MIRANDA REPORTED ON SPANISH PROCESS OF MAKING THE 127 25X1 cprpcm Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SIGNIFICANT DECISION OF RENOUNCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND DEPOSITING THEIR INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. HE FORECAST THAT THIS WOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF 1987. -- SPAIN APPROVED THE SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM, MIRANDA SAID, REGRETTED ITS TERMINATION, AND WAS HOPEFUL FOR ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS AS A RESULT OF THE U.S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING EXPERTS MEETINGS. MIRANDA ADDED THAT A LINK EXISTS BETWEEN INCREASED CONSTRAINTS ON NUCLEAR TESTING AND DECREASED RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS AN ELEMENT OF DETERRENCE. ? -- ON CW, MIRANDA SAID THAT CHALLENGE INSPECTION IS TRULY A CHALLENGE, AND THAT UK PAPER CD/715 IS A GOOD BASIS FOR AGREEMENT ON A PROCEDURE. IF IT IS NECESSARY TO RETAIN CW STOCKS IN ORDER TO GUARANTEE ADHERENCE, THEN THAT MAY BE NECESSARY. THE SPANISH DELEGATION IS PREPARING A PAPER ON RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF CW AGENTS. SPAIN DOES NOT BELIEVE IT TO BE DESIRABLE TO ENCOURAGE COUNTRIES WHICH CURRENTLY HAVE NO CW TO MANU- FACTURE IT IN ORDER TO NEGOTIATE IT AWAY. SPAIN DOES NOT POSSESS CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND WOULD NOT PERMIT THEM ON ITS TERRITORY. -- ON OUTER SPACE, MIRANDA SAID SPAIN SUPPORTS THE U.S./USSR ABM TREATY IN ITS PRESENT FORM, AND IS PLEASED THAT THE U.S. IS NOT TESTING IN SPACE. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT THERE ARE STABILIZING INFLUENCES OF USING OUTER SPACE FOR MILITARY PURPOSES, SPAIN BELIEVES THAT NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN OUTER SPACE WOULD INEVITABLY INCREASE INSTABILITY. SPAIN BELIEVES THAT ANY DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS IN SPACE SHOULD IN ANY CASE, BE NEGOTIATED BY THE ABMT PARTIES AND TAKE ACCOUNT OF EUROPEAN VIEWS. HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION BLOCKING FURTHER TESTING OF THE U.S. ASAT WEAPON. -- ON RW, MIRANDA RECOMMENDED THAT TRACK B (ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR FACILITIES) BE SEPARATED FROM TRACK A ("TRADI- TIONAL" RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ISSUES) SINCE THE TRACKS SHARE ONLY A COMMON PHYSIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCE, THAT OF THE EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE OF HUMAN BEINGS TO RADIO- ACTIVE MATERIALS. OTHERWISE THERE IS NO SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE ISSUES. -- HE STRESSED THAT SPAIN SEEKS CD MEMBERSHIP. 4. MEXICO -- -- AMB GARCIA ROBLES, FOR INDONESIA, KENYA, MEXICO, PERU, SRI LANKA, SWEDEN, VENEZUELA AND YUGOSLAVIA, TABLED CD/772, DATED 15, 1987, A DRAFT MANDATE FOR AN AHC ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN (TEXT PARA 5 BELOW). 12C SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET MANDATE IS BASED ON UNGA RES, 41/46A, GARCIA ROBLES SAID, WHICH CALLS FOR THE CESSATION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS. HE CONDEMNED NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, AND EXPRESSED UNHAPPINESS THAT PROGRESS ON NTB HAD NOT BEEN MADE IN THE SPRING PART OF THE CD SESSION. IT WAS NOW EVIDENT THAT PROGRESS WOULD NOT BE MADE IN THE SUMMER EITHER, HE SAID. -- GARCIA ROBLES DID NOT SPECIFY IF OR WHEN CD/772 MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO A DECISION, BUT ARGUED THAT THE TEXT SHOULD MEET THE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF ALL DELEGA- TIONS. 5. BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED TEXT CD/772: DRAFT-MANDATE FOR AN AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ITEM 1 OF THE AGENDA OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT DECIDES TO ESTABLISH AN AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ITEM 1 OF ITS AGENDA WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF CARRYING OUT THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY. THE AD HOC COMMITTEE WILL SET UP TWO WORKING GROUPS WHICH WILL DEAL, RESPECTIVELY, WITH THE FOLLOWING INTERRELATED QUESTIONS: (A) WORKING GROUP I - CON ENTS AND SCOPE-OF THE TREATY; (B) WORKING GROUP II - COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION. PURSUANT TO ITS MANDATE, THE AD HOC COMMITTEE WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL EXISTING PROPOSALS AND FUTURE INITIATIVES. IN ADDITION, IT WILL DRAW ON THE KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE THAT HAVE BEEN ACCUMULATED OVER THE YEARS IN THE CONSIDERA- TION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN IN THE SUCCESSIVE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATING BODIES AND THE TRILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. THE AD HOC COMMITTEE WILL ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE WORK OF THE AD HOC GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATIVE MEASURES TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY SEISMIC EVENTS. THE AD HOC COMMITTEE WILL REPORT TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ON THE PROGRESS OF ITS WORK BEFORE THE CONCLUSION OF THE 1987 SESSION. END TEXT. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 12C 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07954 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS: JULY 13-17, 1987 REFS: (A) GENEVA 7759 (CD-135) (B) GENEVA 7503 (CD-127) (C) GENEVA 7738 (CD-134) (D) GENEVA 7517 (CD-128) 1. THIS IS CD-139 . (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- CLUSTER III (NON-PRODUCTION) CONCLUDED WITH A BRACKETED TEXT ON COMMERCIAL SUPERTOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS. U.S. TABLED ITS WORKING PAPER (CD/CW/WP.171) ON PRODUCTION CAPACITY ON JULY 14. -- OPEN-ENDED CONSULTATIONS ON ORDER OF ELIMINATION 'OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS REVEALED GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. PROPOSAL OF AGENT TON WEIGHT AS COMPARISON FACTOR AND WESTERN SUPPORT FOR U.S. APPROACH FOR ELIMINATION OF STOCKPILED SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS. -- OPEN-ENDED CONSULTATIONS ON JURISDICTION AND CONTROL REVEALED UK PROBLEMS WITH INTERPRETATION OF JURISDICTION TO APPLY TO ACTIVITIES OF CITIZENS ABROAD. -- DRAFTING ON TEXT DEALING WITH OLD, OBSOLETE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONTINUED IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. -- CLUSTER IV CONSULTATIONS FOR NEXT TWO WEEKS' WORK REVEALED CHAIRMAN'S INTENTION TO FOCUS ON ISSUES OF AN INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORATE AND MODEL AGREEMENTS. SWEDES ARE STILL CONDUCTING INFORMAL BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON THEIR CHALLENGE INSPECTION DISCUSSION PAPER.END SUMMARY. 3. CLUSTER III -- -- THE THIRD AND FINAL WEEK OF CLUSTER III CONCLUDED WITH BRACKETED TEXT ON A VERIFICATION REGIME FOR COMMERCIAL SUPERTOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS STLC). THE TEXT REFLECTS U.S. VIEW OF FOCUSING ON PRODUCTION CAPACITY AS BEING OF MOST CONCERN, AS WELL AS FRG CONCERN FOR CHEMICAL PRODUCTION QUANTITIES. -- MOST DELS GENERALLY SUPPORTED A COMBINATION THRESHOLD OF BOTH PRODUCTION QUANTITY AND PRODUCTION CAPACITY. SEVERAL DELS (NOTABLY THE UK) HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT OTHER COMMERCIAL CHEMICALS OF LOWER TOXICITY AND A FOOTNOTE WAS INCLUDED TO REQUIRE FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THIS. 130 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- FRG, HOWEVER, HAS SLIGHTLY SHIFTED ITS POSITION TO GIVE MORE WEIGHT TO U.S. POSITION OF FOCUSSING ON CAPACITY AND HAS LESSENED ITS INSISTENCE ON REQUIRING A LIST OF COMMERCIAL STLC SUITABLE FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE. -- ON JULY 14, THE U.S. TABLED ITS WORKING PAPER ON A FORMULA TO DETERMINE PRODUCTION CAPACITY. THE PAPER HAS RECEIVED NO COMMENT OR CRITICISM IN MEETINGS, AND WESTERN GROUP, SOVIETS AND SWEDES HAVE INDICATED GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE PAPER. 4. CLUSTER I (CHEMICAL WEAPONS) ISSUES -- -- IN FIRST OPEN-ENDED CONSULTATIONS HELD JULY 16 ON ORDER OF ELIMINATION, SWEDES CIRCULATED A DISCUSSION PAPER BASED ON PREVIOUS U.S-SOVIET- SWEDISH TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. THE PAPER ADDRESSED SUCH ISSUES AS PHASES OF DESTRUCTION, LEVELLING OUT OF STOCKPILES PRIOR TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION AT TEN YEARS, CATEGORIZATION BY SCHEDULES OF CHEMICALS VERSUS SPECIFIC CHEMICALS, USE OF AGENT TON WEIGHT AS A COMPARISON FACTOR, AND TREATMENT OF BULK AND FILLED MUNITIONS. -- FRENCH REP DE LA BAUME STATED THAT HE VIEWED THE DISCUSSION PAPER AS NOT QUESTIONING THE FRENCH 4 PROPOSAL ON SECURITY STOCKPILES AND THUS HE WOULD NOT BE PREVENTED FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE DISCUSSION. NO FURTHER SPECIFIC REFERENCES WERE MADE BY ANYONE ABOUT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL. -- SOVIETS SPOKE OUT AGAINST PHASED APPROACH AS BEING DISCONTINUOUS AND CREATING SUSPICION. THEY EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR CONTINUOUS DESTRUCTION TO THE TENTH YEAR. WHILE THEY SUPPORTED THE AGENT TON WEIGHT COMPARISON FACTOR, THEY PREFERRED APPLYING IT TO SPECIFIED GROUPS OF CHEMICALS VERSUS SCHEDULES OF CHEMICALS. THEY CONTINUE TO EXPRESS DESIRE FOR TREATING BULK AND FILLED MUNITIONS SEPARATELY IN TERMS OF RISK. - U.S, CANADIAN, UK AND FRENCH REPS ALL ENDORSED PHASED APPROACH, WITH QUANTITATIVE LEVELLING OUT PRIOR TO TENTH YEAR TOTAL ELIMINATION AS BEST WAY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SECURITY CONCERNS. PHASES WERE VIEWED AS A CONFIDENCE BUILDING. APPROACH WHICH WOULD NOT CREATE DISCONTINUITY (DESTRUCTION WOULD CONTINUE YEAR-TO-YEAR UNAFFECTED BY PRESENCE OF STAGES). UK SUPPORTED U.S. POSITION OF CATEGORIZING CHEMICALS BY SCHEDULES 131 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 ? SECRET VERSUS BY SPECIFIC CHEMICALS. U.S. STATED PREFERENCE FOR TREATING BULK AND FILLED MUNITIONS EQUALLY. -- AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING, SWEDISH REP PRIVATELY NOTED TO CANADIAN REP THAT IF THE WEST "KEPT ITS ACT TOGETHER", THE SOVIETS MIGHT CHANGE SOME OF THEIR POSITIONS. -- INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS CONTINUE ON OLD, OBSOLETE CHEMICAL WEAPONS. MOST RECENT DRAFT TEXT IS MUCH SIMPLIFIED AND REFLECTS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH SUCH WEAPONS, BUT JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS PERSIST REGARDING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTUAL DESTRUCTION AND ASSOCIATED COST. 5. JURISDICTION AND CONTROL -- -- IN OPEN-ENDED CONSULTATIONS ON JULY 16, BASED ON CONCERNS RELATED TO NON-STATES PARTY, SOVIET AND EASTERN REPS PROPOSED SPECIFICATION IN THE CONVENTION THAT THE OBLIGATIONS WOULD ALSO APPLY TO "JURIDICAL AND NATURAL" CITIZENS OF STATES PARTY. U.S. RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS NOT NECESSARY; U.S. CITIZENS ABROAD WOULD BE PROHIBITED FROM AIDING A NON-PARTY IN PROHIBITED CW ACTIVITIES SINCE THEY WOULD FALL UNDER U.S. JURISDICTION. -- UK REP MADE SEVERAL STRONG STATEMENTS REFLECTING UK LEGAL CONCEPT OF "JURISDICTION, THAT IS, THAT ANY INTERPRETATION OF "JURISDICTION" TO APPLY TO UK CITIZENS ABROAD WAS UNACCEPTABLE. IF A UK CITIZEN GOES TO A NON-STATE PARTY AND MAKES CW AT THE REQUEST OF THAT COUNTRY, UK LAW WOULD NOT APPLY. 6. CLUSTER IV -- ? -- INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON TOPICS FOR THE NEXT TWO WEEKS OF CLUSTER IV FOCUSSED ON: CANADIAN- NORWEGIAN DRAFT ANNEX ON VERIFICATION OF USE, MODEL AGREEMENTS, FURTHER ELABORATION OF INSPECTORATE TEXT APPENDED TO WP'167 (ROLLING TEXT), AND LEGAL PERSONALITY OF ANRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES OF THE CONVENTION. THE CHAIRMAN (KRUTZCH, GDR) DECIDED TO BEGIN WITH WORK ON THE INSPECTORATE TEXT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RELEVANT UK PAPER TABLED ON JULY 14 (REF A). -- SWEDISH PAPER (REFS B AND CI ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION CONTINUES TO BE DISCUSSED BILATERALLY BETWEEN THE SWEDES AND DELS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION IN THE SPRING. WESTERN REACTION IS GENERALLY 132 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SUPPORTIVE OF GETTING THE ISSUE OUT IN THE OPEN AND BUILDING ON THOSE AREAS OF AGREEMENT IN THE SPRING, BUT VERY NEGATIVE ON THE LARGE ROLE SET FORTH TO THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL. NO MEETINGS ON THIS SUBJECT HAVE BEEN SCHEDULED BY EKEUS YET. 7. CW WESTERN COORDINATION -- -- DUTCH COORDINATOR AMB VAN SCHAIK OUTLINED "WHERE THE MAIN PROBLEMS ARE", DETERMINE WHAT WESTERN OUUPRIORITIES ARE, WHAT CAN BE SOLVED NOW AND WHAT IS TO BE LEFT TO LATER. HE SUGGESTED THAT A REVIEW COULD TAKE PLACE IN MEETINGS PARALLEL TO OTHER ONGOING WORK. -- INITIAL REACTIONS TO THIS IDEA WERE FAVORABLE UNTIL THE U.S., FOLLOWED BY JAPAN AND BELGIUM EXPRESSED CONCERNS AS TO WHAT SUCH OPEN-ENDED MEETINGS MIGHT ACCOMPLISH. THERE WAS APPREHENSION THAT THE FLOOR WOULD BE OPEN FOR ANYTHING TO BE RAISED, PRESSURE WOULD BE PUT ON INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS TO RESOLVE BRACKETED ISSUES THEN AND THERE, AND SUCH MEETINGS WOULD TAKE TIME AWAY FROM WORK ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AT HAND. -- THE SUGGESTION WAS PUT ASIDE, WITH THE INTENTION TO REVIEW. IT LATER AND CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME OVERVIEW OF THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS MID- TO END OF AUGUST. -- DRAFT FRG AND AUSTRALIAN EXPERT PAPERS ON COMMERCIAL STLC INTENDED TO BE TABLED IN CLUSTER III WERE DISCUSSED. THE PAPERS, IN U.S. VIEW, WERE UNHELPFUL IN DEMONSTRATING THE OPPOSITE APPROACHES WESTERN GROUP MEMBERS WERE TAKING ON THIS SUBJECT (I.E., FACILITIES VERSUS CHEMICALS). BY THE END OF THE WEEK THESE PAPERS HAD NOT BEEN TABLED. -- U.S. PAPER ON THRESHOLDS WAS DISCUSSED AGAIN, WITH OTHER WESTERN GROUP MEMBERS CONTINUING TO HAVE PROBLEMS WITH NO BOTTOM-LINE THRESHOLD FIGURE ON PRODUCTION THRESHOLDS. FRG WAS INTERESTED IN HOW MANY MORE FACILITIES THE NEW U.S. CONCEPT OF PRODUCTION CAPACITY WOULD INCLUDE FOR SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS AND HOW SCHEDULE 2 MIGHT NEED TO BE ARRANGED TO SHIFT THE EMPHASIS FROM CHEMICALS TO FACILITIES. U.S. REP NOTED THAT PENDING GUIDANCE FROM WASHINGTON (REF D), WE WOULD NOT BE TABLING THE PAPER FOR AWHILE. 8. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 133 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 07999 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS: VISIT OF NATO UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS WEGENER 1. THIS IS CD-140 (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- AMB. HENNING WEGENER, UNDERSECRETARY GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, NATO, CONSULTED WITH MEMBERS OF USDEL TO CD REGARDING STATUS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS AND DISCUSSED A RANGE OF CW ISSUES. WEGENER WAS PRINCIPALLY INTERESTED IN DETERMINING THE RELATIONSHIP OF CW AND CW NEGOTIATIONS TO NATO'S COMPREHENSIVE ARMS CONTROL CONCEPT STUDY. END SUMMARY. 3. HENNING WEGENER, UNDERSECRETARY GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, NATO, AND FORMERLY FRG AMBASSADOR TO THE CD, AT HIS REQUEST MET JULY 20 WITH AMB. FRIEDERSDORF. U.S. DELOFFS ALSO SAT IN. WEGENER WAS SEEKING INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH, HE SAID, HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN PREPARATION OF NATO'S COMPREHENSIVE ARMS CONTROL CONCEPT STUDY. WEGENER DISCUSSED IN GENERAL TERMS WHETHER, GIVEN THE NATO STUDY UNDERWAY, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO PROVIDE NATO INFORMATION ON THE NEGOTIATIONS, ADDITIONAL TO THAT PROVIDED AT SEMI-ANNUAL DISARMAMENT EXPERTS SESSIONS, ON A REGULAR BASIS, BUT CAME TO NO CONCLUSIONS. WEGENER, WHO HAD ALSO CONSULTED OTHER CD DELEGATIONS, WAS WELL INFORMED ON MOST ASPECTS OF THE CW NEGOTIATIONS. 4. SUBJECT DISCUSSED INCLUDED: -- POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR SOVIET CONCEALMENT OF CW STOCKS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CW CONVENTION. WEGENER BELIEVED SOVIETS WERE MORE LIKELY TO PRODUCE NEW CW RATHER THAN SECRETE EXISTING STOCKS, WHICH WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DISCOVERY. -- SOVIET CW DESTRUCTION CAPABILITIES. WEGENER OPINED THAT THE SOVIETS MUST BE CAPABLE OF DESTROYING THEIR CW STOCKS WITHIN A TEN YEAR PERIOD. U.S. DELOFFS, HOWEVER, EMPHASIZED THAT SOVIETS HAD PROVIDED ABSOLUTELY NO DETAIL ABOUT THEIR CW DESTRUCTION CAPABILITY; FIRM CONCLUSIONS WERE THEREFORE IMPOSSIBLE. -- THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A SECURITY STOCKPILE. 134 OVI,DVM Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-n 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET WEGENER OPINED THAT THIS PROPOSAL, WHICH PERMITTED FRANCE AND U.S. TO CREATE OR MODERNIZE THEIR CW STOCKPILES, UNDERCUT A PRIMARY SOVIET MOTIVATION TO NEGOTIATE A CW BAN -- THAT OF PREVENTING THE COMPLETION OF THE U.S. BINARY PROGRAM. -- NOVEL AGENTS. WEGENER INITIALLY DISCOUNTED THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET WORK IN THIS FIELD, BUT APPEARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SOVIETS WOULD BE ABLE LEGALLY TO CONTINUE AN UNINTERRUPTED RESEARCH PROGRAM IF A CW CONVENTION WERE TO COME INTO EFFECT, WHEREAS U.S. RESEARCH EFFORTS INTO PROTECTIVE MEASURES WOULD LIKELY DIMINISH. -- UK INSPECTION PROPOSAL. WEGENER CONSIDERED ITS VIRTUES TO BE THREEFOLD -- INSPECTIONS WOULD ESTABLISH RIGHT OF INSPECTORS TO OPERATE IN SOVEREIGN NATIONS; LIMIT INSPECTION SITE TO A SPECIFIC LOCALITY AND ARRANGE FOR ITS SECURING; NARROW THE TIME FRAME FOR THE INSPECTION. ITS FLAWS, HE SAID, INCLUDED LEAVING OPEN-ENDED THE POSSIBILITY FOR ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS TO ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AND "ORDAINING" FRIVOLOUS REQUESTS DUE TO THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE CHALLENGING STATE BE SATISFIED. -- RECENT SWEDISH NON-PAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION, CONCERNING ROLE OF EXECUTIVE COUNCIL. WEGENER HAD PROBABLY CONVERSED WITH SWEDISH AMB. EKEUS AS HE WAS WELL INFORMED AND SUPPORTIVE OF SWEDISH PROPOSAL TO IMBUE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL WITH THE POWER TO VOTE ON DISPUTED CHALLENGES. -- WEST EUROPEAN VIEW OF TRADEOFFS OF CW BAN. MANY WEST EUROPEANS IN NATO, WEGENER CONTENDED, BELIEVED THAT A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN THE REMOVAL OF THE SOVIET CW THREAT WITHIN THE TEN YEAR PERIOD AND A SOMEWHAT LESSENED VERIFICATION REGIME WOULD BE A REALISTIC OUTCOME. 5. COMMENT: WEGENER APPEARS TO FAVOR A COMBINATION OF THE UK AND SWEDISH PAPERS ON INSPECTION AS A MEANS OF RESOLVING THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUE. END COMMENT. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 135 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08021 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY SESSION OF JULY 21, 1987 1. THIS IS CD-141. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- STATEMENTS FOCUSSED ON OUTER SPACE AGENDA ITEM WERE DELIVERED BY ARGENTINA, INDIA AND CHINA, WHILE AUSTRALIA REPEATED ITS CALL FOR THE CD TO ESTABLISH A GLOBAL SEISMIC MONITORING NETWORK WHILE WAITING FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB). CANADA DISTRIBUTED TWO DOCUMENTS TO UNDERSCORE ITS CONTRIBUTIONS TO ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION, AND NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA JOINTLY DISTRIBUTED THE TEXT OF THEIR RECENT BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON SEISMIC MONITORING COOPERATION. ON BEHALF OF THE G-21, INDIA TABLED A DRAFT NON-NEGOTIATING MANDATE FOR ESTABLISHING AN AD HOC COMMITTEE ON AGENDA ITEM 3, PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, INCLUDING ALL RELATED MATTERS. (AUSTRALIAN TEXT DATAFAXED TO ACDA/MA, INDIAN, CHINESE, AND ARGENTINE TEXTS POUCHED SEPARATELY.) END SUMMARY. 3. ARGENTINA -- -- IN A STATEMENT DEVOTED TO OUTER SPACE, AMB. CAMPORA REQUESTED THE OS AHC TO INCLUDE IN ITS FINAL REPORT A STATEMENT THAT "NONE OF THE CD'S MEMBERS HAS PERMANENTLY DEPLOYED WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE," AN ACT THAT HE DESCRIBED AS "A SIMPLE ASSERTION", THAT COULD THEN SERVE AS A "POINT OF DEPARTURE" FOR "MORE SPECIFIC MEASURES." WHILE PRAISING SEVERAL FACETS OF THE CURRENT SPACE LEGAL REGIME, HE DECRIED ANY FUTURE ACTIONS THAT MIGHT MIRROR THE LEGAL REGIME IN THE HIGH SEAS; HE CLAIMED THAT THE EQUIVALENT OF THE NAVAL ARMS RACE SHOULD NOT BE DUPLICATED IN SPACE. TO PREVENT THE LAUNCH OF WEAPONS INTO SPACE, HE URGED THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW, DETAILED REPORTING AND REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS FOR SPACE OBJECTS, GOING BEYOND THE 1975 REGISTRA- TION CONVENTION, AS WELL AS ON-SITE INSPECTION OF PAYLOADS AT LAUNCH AREAS. HE CLAIMED THAT VIGOROUS ACTION ON THE SUBJECT REQUIRED ONLY "SIMPLE ACTS OF POLITICAL WILL" BY THE SPACE POWERS. 4. INDIA -- -- ALSO SPEAKING TO OUTER SPACE, AMB TEJA CALLED FOR AN ASAT BAN AND MAINTAINED THAT ITS NEGOTIATION WAS FEASIBLE BECAUSE THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN BMD AND ASAT SYSTEMS ARE MORE SIGNIFICANT, IN TEJA'S VIEW, THAN ARE THE SIMILARITIES OR INHERENT ASAT CAPABILITIES OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD) SYSTEMS. HE URGED ESTABLISHMENT OF A GROUP OF EXPERTS TO STRENGTHEN THE 1975 REGISTRATION 136 onnnom Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONVENTION BY DEVELOPING ADDITIONAL CRITERIA FOR ARTICLE IV TO DESCRIBE A LAUNCHED OBJECT, AND HE CALLED FOR STIFFENING THE ABM TREATY "IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS." HE REPEATED THE INDIAN CLAIM THAT THE TERM "PEACEFUL PURPOSES" IN THE 1967 OUTER SPACE TREATY HAD BEEN TRADITIONALLY UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN "NONMILITARY PURPOSES," CRITICIZED THE "RECENT, NEW INTERPRETATION OF THIS TERM" (I.E. "NON-AGGRESSIVE") PUT FORTH BY "ONE SPACE POWER" (READ U.S.), AND URGED ACCEPTANCE OF THE "WIDEST, BROADEST INTERPRETATION OF 'PEACEFUL PURPOSES'." FINALLY, IN WHAT HAS BECOME A COMMON THEME FOR INDIA, HE REPUDIATED THE LOGIC OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, YET GAVE IT BACK-HANDED (AND PROBABLY UNINTENDED ENDORSEMENT BY CLAIMING THAT AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE WOULD NOT LEAD FROM MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION TO MUTUALLY ASSURED SURVIVAL. -- ON BEHALF OF THE G-21, INDIA TABLED CD/515/REV.3, A DRAFT MANDATE FOR AN AHC TO DEAL WITH PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR. (COMMENT: MANDATE DOES NOT CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBJECT, BUT U.S. DEL'S GUIDANCE PRECLUDES ITS ACCEPTANCE. IF BROUGHT TO DECISION, DELWILL, ITSELF, WITHOLD CONSENSUS IF NECESSARY. HOWEVER, IN PAST YEARS OTHER WESTERN DELS HAVE (RELUCTANTLY) JOINED IN "WESTERN" DENIAL OF CONSENSUS AND WILL PROBABLY DO SO AGAIN.) 5. CHINA -- -- CONTINUING THE FOCUS ON OUTER SPACE, AMB FAN CALLED FOR THE EARLY ELIMINATION AND BANNING OF ASAT WEAPONS, TO BE FOLLOWED BY A PROHIBITION ON EXOTIC ABM SPACE WEAPONS SUCH AS THOSE EMPLOYING DIRECTED ENERGY AND KINETIC PRINCIPLES. HE CRITICIZED THE LACK OF RESULTS FROM THE DEFENSE AND SPACE PART OF THE NST NEGOTIATIONS AND CLAIMED THAT THE TWO SPACE POWERS BORE A SPECIAL RESPON- SIBILITY TO DEVELOP PRACTICAL MEANS TO PREVENT AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE. 6. AUSTRALIA -- -- AMB BUTLER, AVERRING THAT TECHNICAL WORK NECESSARY FOR VERIFICATION OF A CTB IS "ON THE VERGE OF A REAL LEAP FORWARD," ASKED THAT A DECISION TO ESTABLISH A GLOBAL SEISMIC NETWORK (AS DESCRIBED IN CD/717, SUBMITTED BY,AUSTRALIA IN 1986) BE TAKEN BY THE CD BEFORE THE END OF THE 1987 SESSION. SUCH A STEP, HE CLAIMED, WOULD ALLOW THE NECESSARY CTB VERIFICATION STRUCTURE TO BE IN PLACE TO FUNCTION AT SUCH TIME AS THE POLITICAL DECISIONS WERE MADE TO EFFECT A CTB. HE PRAISED THE LEVEL II, OR WAVEFORM, SEISMIC DATA TRANSMISSION EXPERIMENT ? 137 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET BEING PLANNED BY THE CD'S GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC (SEISMIC) EXPERTS, AND NOTED PROUDLY AUSTRALIA'S SELCTION AS ONE OF THE FOUR INTERNATIONAL DATA CENTERS TO THAT EXPERIMENT. NOTING THAT AUSTRALIA HAD RECENTLY DEDICATED A NEW SEISMOLOGICAL CENTER AT ALICE SPRINGS (OPERATED JOINTLY WITH THE U.S.), HE INFORMED THE CD THAT THE CENTER SOON WOULD BEGIN PUBLICATION OF A PERIODIC BULLETIN PROVIDING "ALL DETAILS" OF NUCLEAR TESTS MONITORED BY THAT CENTER -- IN THE SPIRIT OF AUSTRALIAN-SPONSORED UNGA RESOLUTION 41/59N, WHICH CALLED ON ALL STATES TO REPORT CERTAIN DETAILS OF THEIR NUCLEAR TESTS. BUTLER CLAIMED THAT THAT SEISMIC CENTER WAS CAPABLE OF DETECTING AND IDENTIFYING NUCLEAR TESTS "DOWN TO YIELDS OF A FEW KILOTONS" AT THE MAIN TEST SITES OF ALL FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. 7. CANADA -- -- AMB BEESLEY REITERATED CANADA'S EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION BY TABLLNG TWO PAPERS--ONE A COMPENDIUM OF MORE THAN 700 ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION PROPOSALS, AND THE OTHER A SUMMARY OF THE WORKSHOP ON OUTER SPACE HOSTED BY CANADA IN MAY. 8. NEW ZEALAND -- -- JOINTLY WITH AUSTRALIA, REP GRAHAM TABLED THEIR RECENT BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON SEISMIC MONITORING COOPERATION. THAT AGREEMENT CALLS FOR THE BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA, ANALYTICAL METHODS, EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATIONS, ETC. ?PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 13C Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 /' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08052 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): WESTERN GROUP MEETING, JULY 22, 1987 REF(S): (A) GENEVA 7823 (CD-137) (B) GENEVA 7954 (CD-139) (C) GENEVA 7900 (CD-138) (D) GENEVA 8021 (CD-141) 1. THIS IS CD-142. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- REGULAR WEEKLY MEETING OF WESTERN GROUP FOCUSED ON END OF SESSION, CW AND NTB ISSUES. END SUMMARY. 3. END OF SESSION -- -- AMB. CLERCKX (WESTERN GROUP CHAIRMAN) REPORTED "LUKE WARM" INTEREST IN THE CONFERENCE IN A TRUNCATED SESSION (REF A) FROM CD PRESIDENT'S 13 JULY CONSULTATIONS. ABSENCE OF ENTHUSIASM FOR SHORTENING SESSION CONSEQUENTLY PROMPTED JULY CD PRESIDENT KEBEDE (ETHIOPIA) ONLY TO URGE EXPEDITIOUS WORK, LEAVING AUGUST 28 AS THE CONCLUDING PLENARY SESSION. 4. CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- -- INTERSESSIONAL WORK. DUTCH AMB. VAN SCHAIK (CW COORDINATOR) OUTLINED THREE PERIODS OF INTERSESSIONAL WORK PROPOSED BY SWEDISH AMB. EKEUS (AHC CHAIRMAN): EARLY OCTOBER FOR TWO WEEKS; LATE NOVEMBER-EARLY DECEMBER FOR FIVE WEEKS; AND MID-JANUARY FOR THREE WEEKS. VAN SCHAIK STATED THAT EKEUS WOULD LIKE WORK TO BE CONDUCTED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AHC (MORE "PRACTICAL" FOR EKEUS) RATHER THAN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. FRG AMB. VAN STULPNAGEL RAISED MATTER OF FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS, YET TO BE ADDRESSED BY EKEUS OR OTHERS. ALSO UNRESOLVED IS PROPOSED PROGRAM OF WORK (WHICH EKEUS HAS PROMISED WITHIN TWO WEEKS). AMB. FRIEDERSDORF STATED U.S. HAS NOT AGREED TO ANY INTERSESSIONAL WORK, INCLUDING IN JANUARY 1988, PENDING WASHINGTON REVIEW. THE ONLY TIME PERIOD WHICH ALL ACKNOWLEDGED AS UNACCEPTABLE TO FULL GROUP WAS OCTOBER; VAN SCHAIK WILL SO INFORM EKEUS. -- CHALLENGE INSPECTION. ACCORDING TO VAN SCHAIK, EKEUS WILL SUBMIT A DISCUSSION PAPER JULY 24 AS A DEPARTURE POINT FOR MORE OPEN DEBATE ON THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUE. THE PAPER WILL INDICATE (1) WHERE VIEWS CONVERGE, (2) CONVERGING AREAS NEEDING "FURTHER WORK" AND (3) PROBLEMS REMAINING TO BE RESOLVED. WESTERN GROUP DISCUSSION ALSO BRIEFLY FOCUSED ON INDIAN PRESENTATION ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION AT MAY 26-27 OSLO SYMPOSIUM AND ACCOMPANYING CALL, INTER ALIA, FOR AN EARLY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ROLE. VAN SCHAIK SAID CHINA DEFINITELY AND MEXICO PRESUMABLY SUPPORT THE 139 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET INDIAN POSITION. FRENCH AMB. MOREL AND VAN SCHAIK CAUTIONED THAT THE EKEUS PAPER COULD SERVE TO RESURRECT THE (UNHELPFUL) INDIAN PROPOSAL. VON STULPNAGEL CALLED ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE CHALLENGE ISSUE HAS STILL NOT BEEN RESOLVED WITHIN THE WESTERN GROUP. HE NOTED THE TWO "EXTREME POSITIONS" (U.S. AND INDIA) AND THE "MANY SHADES IN BETWEEN." IN THIS CONTEXT, VON STULPNAGEL SAW THE EKEUS PAPER AS A POSSIBLE CATALYST FOR FINALLY ESTABLISHING A CONSENSUS WESTERN POSITION. (COMMENT. EKEUS' INITIAL OBJECTIVE APPEARS TO BE TO INVOLVE DELS HERETOFORE EXCLUDED FROM HIS SMALL GROUP CONSULTATIONS ON THIS KEY ISSUE. IT IS UNCLEAR, HOWEVER, WHAT MAY ENSUE, ALTHOUGH U.S. DEL EXPECTS DISCUSSION TO BE RETURNED TO THE SMALL GROUP FORMAT; THE JULY 31 PAPER WILL,IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, SERVE ONLY AS AN INTERIM SOP TO THOSE EXCLUDED FROM SMALL GROUP DISCUSSIONS.) -- SESSION-ENDING OVERVIEW. VAN SCHAIK PROPOSED TWO POSSIBLE APPROACHES: A WESTERN GROUP SESSION TO REVIEW MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS AND BRACKETED PORTIONS OF TEXT; AND/OR PARTICIPATION IN EKEUS' SUGGESTED AHC UPDATE ON THE STATE OF CW AFFAIRS, CHARACTERIZED AS AN "EDUCATION EXERCISE" AND "NOTHING TO DO WITH NEGOTIATIONS." A 'TOUR DE TABLE' REVEALED STRONG PREFERENCE FOR A WESTERN GROUP SESSION INVOLVING HEADS OF DELEGATIONS AND EXPERTS; DOUBTFULUTILITY, HOWEVER, WAS ASCRIBED TO A BROAD CW AHC EFFORT. AMB. FRIEDERSDORF STATED THAT A WESTERN GROUP REVIEW "MADE SENSE," BUT THAT THE EKEUS PROPOSAL COULD LEAD TO "NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN NEGOTIATIONS." GROUP CONCLUDED THAT MORE INFORMATION WAS NEEDED ON THE EKEUS INITIATIVE BEFORE ANY FIRM POSITION COULD BE TAKEN. (COMMENT. ALTHOUGH VAN SCHAIK PORTRAYED THIS PROPOSAL AS AN "EKEUS" INSPIRATION, IN FACT THE INITIATIVE CAME FROM VAN SCHAIK HIMSELF, BASED ON HIS DESIRE TO CLEAR THE CW "LOG JAM" AND MOVE NEGOTIATIONS ALONG. END COMMENT.) -- JURISDICTION AND CONTROL. VAN SCHAIK, OVER- REACTING TO WHAT HE PERCEIVES AS "MAJOR PROBLEMS," CALLED FOR THE CONVENING OF LEGAL EXPERTS FROM AMONG WESTERN GROUP CAPITALS TO ADDRESS THIS ASPECT OF THE CONVENTION. VAN SCHAIK EVEN WENT SO FAR AS TO PROPOSE NOVEMBER 19-20 AS MEETING DATES (ON THE "EVE OF THE NOVEMBER-DECEMBER AHC SESSION). VAN SCHAIK BELIEVES THAT THE LEGAL EXPERTS CAN PROVIDE NECESSARY CLARIFICATION TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES SPAWNED BY CD DEBATE RECENTLY ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE TREATMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND 140 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET INDIVIDUALS OPERATING ON NON-STATES PARTY TERRITORY (REF B). NO REPS COMMENTED ON VAN SCHAIK'S PROPOSAL. -- FRENCH "SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL" PROPOSAL. MOREL WILL PURSUE HIS PROPOSAL (CD/747) IN CLUSTER IV DISCUSSIONS PRESENTLY UNDERWAY. THE FRENCH, AWARE OF COOL WESTERN RECEPTION ARE INTENT ON SEEKING REACTIONS OF OTHER CD DELS. VAN SCHAIK DESCRIBED ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A BODY AS A "POLITICIZATION ACT," AND SAID HE "LOOKED FORWARD" TO CLUSTER IV DISCUSSIONS. 5. NUCLEAR TEST BAN -- -- JAPANESE AMB. YAMADA (NTB COORDINATOR) REPORTED ON PROPOSED WESTERN GROUP STRATEGY IN RESPONSE TO "MEXICAN" NTB MANDATE TABLED AS CD/772 (REF C). A WESTERN STATEMENT, NOW IN FINAL STAGES OF COORDINATION, WOULD BE USED SHOULD AMB. GARCIA ROBLES (MEXICO) SEEK A DECISION IN PLENARY; IF HE CHOOSES NOT TO PRESS ISSUE, WESTERN GROUP IS STILL INTENT ON GETTING A STATEMENT ON THE RECORD. U.S. REP RESERVED ON SPECIFIC POINT OF ADDRESSAL OF CD/772 IF IT IS NOT PUT TO A VOTE,SAYING WAYS SHOULD BE EXPLOREDTO MAKE POINT WITHOUT GIVING THE MANDATE PROPOSAL "UNDUE IMPORTANCE" AND THE G-21 A PEG ON WHICH TO HANG CRITICISM OF THE WEST. -- AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR BUTLER POINTEDLY ASKED U.S. DELEGATION IF IT HAD ANY NEW, POSITIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON APRIL CD PRESIDENT VEJVODA'S DRAFT MANDATE PROPOSAL. U.S. REP SAID HE HAD NOTHING NEW TO REPORT. AT 21 JULY WESTERN COORDINATING SESSION, U.S. DEL WAS PRESSED BY BUTLER, UK, FRG, BELGIAN, DUTCH AND JAPANESE REPS TO ACCEPTANCE OF VEJVODA DRAFT MANDATE AS IS; U.S. DEL IS APPARENTLY ONLY ONE IN WEST NOT PREPARED TO DO SO. IDEA IS TO PUT PRESSURE ON INDIA AND DEMONSTRATE WESTERN FLEXIBILITY. BUTLER ASKED U.S. DEL TO SEEK WASHINGTON VIEWS ON ACCEPTANCE, HOPEFULLY, HE SAID, ACCOMPANIED BY ITS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WHY THIS WOULD BE USEFUL. BUTLER AND VON STULPNAGEL WANTED TO KNOW THE U.S. DIFFICULTIES WITH VEJVODA TEXT. U.S. REP REPLIED THAT U.S. DEL BELIEVED THAT WEST SHOULD NOT CHANGE ITS STATED POSITION TO WORK FROM VEJVODA TEXT TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS, THAT WASHINGTON WAS OF COURSE KEPT INFORMED OF EVENTS AND VIEWS OF OTHER WESTERN DELS, AND THAT U.S. DEL CONTINUED BELIEVE THAT IF VEJVODA TEXT CAME INTO PLAY, U.S. WOULD BE ABLE TO REACT IN A TIMELY FASHION. U.S. REP ALSO NOTED THAT THE WORD "STRUCTURE" MIGHT POSE SOME DIFFICULTY. OTHER REPS VOICED SOME UNCERTAINTY AS TO EXACTLY HOW -141 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 "PRESSURE" WOULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON INDIA. -- BUTLER, REFERRING TO HIS JULY 21 PLENARY STATEMENT (REF D), SAID HIS CALL FOR "THE IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GLOBAL SEISMIC NETWORK" WAS DONE "ON INSTRUCTIONS" FROM CANBERRA. HE SAID HIS DEL STANDS READY TO HOLD "CONSULTATIONS ON THE BASIS OF LAST YEAR'S PROPOSAL" (CD/717) IN AN ATTEMPT TO GAIN CD ADOPTION BEFORE THE CONFERENCE ADJOURNS. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION ON HIS COMMENTS. -- US REP CIRCULATED NTEM SESSION-ENDING PRESS RELEASE ISSUED JULY 21 BY US MISSION, AND MADE BRIEF ORAL PRESENTATION TO UPDATE WESTERN GROUP ON CONCLUSION OF SESSION. YAMADA QUESTIONED THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREED DATE ON RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS: US REP SAID THE TWO SIDES NEEDED TO WORK OUT THEIR SCHEDULES. VAN SCHAIK FOUND THE COMMUNIQUE CONCLUSIONS "DIS- APPOINTING." NO OTHER DELS COMMENTS. 6. OTHER AGENDA TOPICS -- -- MOREL (OUTER SPACE COORDINATOR), DREW ATTENTION TO ARGENTINE AMB CAMPORA'S JULY 21 PLENARY CALL FOR A STATEMENT IN THE OS AHC FINAL REPORT INDICATING THAT NO CD STATE HAS WEAPONS PERMANENTLY DEPLOYED IN OUTER SPACE (REF D). MOREL INDICATED HE WOULD BE MAKING A CONCLUDING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE WESTERN GROUP AT THE FINAL AHC MEETING ON JULY 28 AND WOULD MAKE "APPROPRIATE REFERENCE" TO CAMPORA'S PROPOSAL AT THAT TIME. -- WITH REGARD TO G-21 RETABLIN AT JULY 21 PLENARY OF THEIR 1986 PNW COMMITTEE MANDATE PROPOSAL, UK REP EDIS (PNW COORDINATOR) OPINED THAT, AS IN 1986, ACTION WAS FOR REPORT WRITING PURPOSES ONLY. -- BUTLER CRITICISM OVER US REP INTERVENTION IN CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE (CNAR) INFORMAL PLENARY WAS REBUFFED BY AMBS FRIEDERSDORF, CLERCKX AND MOREL. SUMMARY OF CNAR ACTIVITY OVER COURSE OF DEBATT TO BE REPORTED SEPTEL. -- NSA, RW, AND CPD REPORTED BY RESPECTIVE COORDINATORS AS PROCEEDING APACE, WITH ONLY CPD DRAWING SLIGHTLY MORE THAN PASSING INTEREST. 7. OTHER BUSINESS -- -- BUTLER REPORTED ON WORK OF THE "GROUP OF SEVEN" AMBASSADORS (CANADIAN AMB BEESLEY IS OTHER WESTERN MEMBER) CONSIDERING WAYS TO IMPROVE CD ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING. HE CIRCULATED AN INFORMAL PAPER CONTAINING SUGGESTIONS SUPPORTED BY ALL SEVEN CONCERNING "SUBSIDIARY BODIES" AND FINAL REPORT WRITING "GUIDELINES." WHILE THE LATTER COULD HAVE A FAVORABLE 142 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 , SECRET IMPACT ON WHAT HAS PERENNIALLY BEEN A CONFRONTATIONAL MATTER FOR SOME AGENDA ITEMS (E.G. NTB), THE FORMER RECOMMENDS ESTABLISHING AN AHC FOR EACH AGENDA ITEM WITH NO REQUIREMENT FOR REESTABLISHMENT AT THE BEGINNING OF EACH ANNUAL CD SESSION; COMMITTEES' WORK WOULD CONTINUE "UNTIL THEIR TASK HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED." EACH AHC WOULD ADOPT ITS OWN PROGRAM OF WORK. UK REP ELICITED ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FROM BUTLER THAT THE TWO SUGGESTION AREAS COULD BE LINKED BY THE G-21. NO FURTHER DISCUSSION ENSUED, BUT BUTLER, LOBBYING HARD FOR REPORT WRITING REFORMS, CLEARLY IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A NEW SUBSIDIARY BODY FORMULA IN ORDER TO WIN THE REPORT WRITING CONCESSIONS. (COMMENT. SUBSIDIARY BODY ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. EVEN THOUGH THE REPORT WRITING GUIDELINES HAVE MERIT, DEL wogu OPPOSE ANY PACKAGE DEAL INVOLVING WHAT WOULD BE PERMANENT AD HOC COMMITTEES FOR EVERY CD AGENDA ITEM. END COMMENT.) PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 1 43. 25X1 NNNN Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIALGENEVA 08046 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): SWEDISH REQUEST FOR VIEWS ON UNGA RESOLUTION ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LAZER WEAPONS 1. THIS IS CD-143 . (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SWEDISH DEPREP MOLANDER PASSED TO US DELOFF A PAPER (POUCHED TO ACDA/MA AND EMBASSY STOCKHOLM) ENTITLED "BATTLEFIELD LASER WEAPONS AND THE QUESTION OF ANTI-PERSONNEL USE OF SUCH WEAPONS." MOLANDER SAID THAT FOR THE 42ND UNGA SWEDEN IS CONSIDERING AMENDING THE RESOLUTION IT CUSTOMARILY INTRODUCES (AT THE MST UNGA THIS WAS RES 41/50, "CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEFINED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS," ADOPTED WITHOUT A VOTE.) THE AMENDMENT WOULD ASK THE UNSYG TO REQUEST THE VIEWS OF MEMBER STATES AS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF BANNING EXPLICITLY DELIBERATE AND SYSTEMATIC ANTI-PERSONNEL USE OF DIRECTED ENERGY TO CAUSE IRREVERSIBLE INJURY TO THE EYE. ONE WAY TO DO THIS, MOLANDER SAID, WOULD BE TO ADD, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1980 INHUMANE WEAPONS CONVENTION THAT IS THE SUBJECT OF RES 41/50, A PROTOCOL BANNING THE USE OF LASERS TO BLIND PERSONNEL. 3. MOLANDER SAID SWEDEN'S PRESENT OBJECTIVE WAS TO INITIATE INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE, NOT TO MAKE AN ACTUAL PROPOSAL FOR A BAN. L. MOLANDER ASKED FOR US REACTION TO THE PAPER AND TO SUGGESTION FOR AN AMENDED UNGA RESOLUTION, AND ASKED THAT COMMENTS BE PASSED IN GENEVA OR STOCKHOLM. HE ADDED THAT SWEDISH CD DEL IS CONSULTING WITH SOVIETS AS WELL. 5. DELOFF UNDERTOOK TO PASS PAPER AND REQUEST TO WASH- INGTON. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 144 S SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08098 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY SESSION OF JULY 23, 1987 REFS: (A) GENEVA 7397(CD-125) (B) GENEVA 7996 1. THIS IS CD144. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER LEO TINDEMANS ADDRESSED INF, CW, NUCLEAR TESTING, OUTER SPACE, AND RW ISSUES. U.S. AND JAPAN COMMENTED ON CW NEGOTIATIONS. HUNGARY SPOKE ON SUBJECTS OF OUTER SPACE AND NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND NEW ZEALAND TOUTED ITS "NUCLEAR FREE ZONE" POLICY. (U.S., JAPANESE AND NEW ZEALAND STATEMENTS DATAFAXED TO ACDA/MA. BELGIAN AND HUNGARIAN STATEMENTS POUCHED TO ACDA/MA. U.S. STATEMENT ALSO CONTAINED REF B.) END SUMMARY. 3. BELGIUM -- -- FONMIN TINDEMANS GAVE A STRONG ENDORSEMENT TO WEST'S NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY AND INF POSTURE. NOTING THAT WESTERN DEFENSE IS BASED ON AN INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES. TINDEMANS CAUTIONED THAT THERE WAS A LIMIT BEYOND WHICH FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES WOULD PROVE THREATENING TO WESTERN SECURITY. THUS, HE ALSO URGED THE ADUCTION OF SOVIET AND U.S. STRATEGIC ARSENALS BY 50 PERCENT, REDUCTIONS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS IN EUROPE, AND THE RAPID COMPLETION OF A CW CONVENTION. -- ON CW, TINDEMANS PRAISED WORK ON VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION OF STOCKPILES AND OF NON-PRODUCTION, STRESSING THAT A CONVENTION IS NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT A "CREDIBLE AND SURE" VERIFICATION SYSTEM REINFORCED BY A CHALLENGE INSPECTION REGIME SUFFICIENT BOTH TO DETER AND DETECT VIOLATIONS. HE ENDORSED EFFORTS TO DISTINGUISH CLEARLY BETWEEN CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES, AND URGED THAT UNDUE RESTRICTIONS NOT BE PLACED ON THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY. TINDEMANS ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF SECURITY CONCERNS DURING THE CW DESTRUCTION PERIOD AND SUGGESTED THEY MIGHT BE MET BY ARRANGING DESTRUCTION SCHEDULES ACCORDING TO QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DIFFERENCES IN STOCKPILES. HE URGED ELABORATION OF 145 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 A SPECIFIC DEFINITION OF A "CHEMICAL WEAPON" FOR INCLUSION IN THE CONVENTION. - TINDEMANS ALSO OFFERED BELGIUM FOR CONSIDERATION AS THE SITE OF THE HEADQUARTERS FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES FOR THE CW CONVENTION. -- ON NUCLEAR TESTING, TINDEMANS SAID A CTB WAS POSSIBLE ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS, AND THE LATTER WAS IMPROBABLE IN THE SHORT OR MEDIUM TERM. HE WELCOMED U.S.-SOVIET TESTING BILATERALS AND STATED THAT ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TTBT AND PNE TREATIES WOULD ALSO BE "A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION." TINDEMANS SUGGESTED THAT THE WORK OF THE CD MIGHT BE DIRECTED TOWARDS FACILITATING THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TEST PROGRAMS (INCLUDING ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF TESTS), AND A LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF TESTS, WITH GRADUAL REDUCTION IN THAT NUMBER. -- ON OUTER SPACE, TINDEMANS URGED THE CD TO EXAMINE THE PROTECTION OF SATELLITES AND TO UNDERTAKE THE ELABORATION OF A RELEVANT LEGAL REGIME AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CODE OF CONDUCT, ALL OF WHICH HE CLAIMED WOULD NOT INVOLVE THE ABM TREATt OR SDI. DISPUTES OVER THE INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THE TWO PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED, HE SAID. - TINDEMANS HOPED THAT A BAN ON RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS COULD BE NEGOTIATED WITHOUT AN "ARTIFICIAL LINK" TO THE NEGOTIATION OF A CONVENTION PROHIBITING ATTACKS AGAINST NUCLEAR FACILITIES. L. UNITED STATES -- -- AMB. FRIEDRSDORF CHARACTERIZED THE WORK OF THE CW AHC THIS SUMMER AS CONSTRUCTIVE, STRESSED THE OBJECTIVE OF A CONVENTION THAT TRULY PROVIDES FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE CW THREAT, AND CAUTIONED THAT IT IS TO BE EXPECTED THAT THE CURRENT CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF MANY DIFFICULT ISSUES WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY SET ASIDE NECESSARILY REQURES TIME AND PATIENCE. -- THE MAJOR PART OF FRIEDERSDORF'S STATEMENT ANSWERED CHARGES AND ASSERTIONS RELATED TO CW CONTAINED IN JULY 2 PLENARY STATEMENT OF SOVIET AMB. NAZARKIN (REF A). FRIEDERSDORF'S RESPONSE 146 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET REBUTTED THE SOVIET CHARGE THAT THE U.S. SEES ? A CW BAN ONLY AS A LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE, URGED THE SOVIETS TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE U.S. INVITATION TO VISIT THE CW DESTRUCTION FACILITY AT TOOELE, UTAH RATHER THAN BEING CRITICAL AND STRESSED THAT THE U.S. APPROACH TO CHALLENGE INSPECTION APPLIED EQUALLY TO ALL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS. -- REGARDING SOVIET CRITICISM OF PLANNED U.S. BINARY PRODUCTION, FRIEDERSDORF STATED THAT THE "LONG OVERDUE" MODERNIZATION OF THE SMALL U.S. STOCKPILE SHOULD NOT BE AN OBSTACLE TO CW NEGOTIATIONS, SINCE MUCH LARGER SOVIET CW PRODUCTION HAD NOT BEEN. -- RESPONDING TO SOVIET QUESTIONS, HE SAID THAT PRODUCTION OF CW BY MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF A NON-PARTY WAS NOT A SPECIAL PROBLEM. IN THE U.S. VIEW, THE REAL PROBLEM IS ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF A NON-PARTY, REGARDLESS OF WHO IS CONDUCTING THEM, AND FRIEDERSDORF CRITICIZED THE SOVIET APPROACH IN THIS AREA AS "NOT AT ALL CLEAR." - FRIEDERSDORF CLOSED BY REPEATING REQUEST THAT COUNTRIES CONFIRM POSSESSION OF CW AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES, AND PROVIDE DETAILS ON THEIR CW CAPABILITIES. HE NOTED THAT U.S. HAD RAISED LATTER POINT WITH THE SOVIET UNION THREE YEARS AGO, BUT THAT NO RESPONSE HAS BEEN RECEIVED. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THIS INFORMATION AND DATA WOULD BE FORTHCOMING IN THE BILATERAL TALKS THAT BEGAN THIS WEEK. 5. JAPAN -- -- IN A GENERALLY POSITIVE TOUR D'HORIZON ON CW ISSUES, AMB. YAMADA EMPHASIZED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS WAS TO BAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS, "NOTHING ELSE," AND CAUTIONED AGAINST ELABORATING MEASURES THAT CREATED IMPEDIMENTS TO THE "LEGITIMATE ACTIVITIES AND DEVELOPMENT" OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY. HE STATED THAT JAPAN DOES NOT POSSESS CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND STRESSED IMPORTANCE FOR JAPAN'S SECURITY OF EXPEDITIOUS DESTRUCTION OF EXISTING CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND RELATED FACILITIES. YAMADA ENDORSED EXAMINATION OF PROPOSALS FOR DESTRUCTION OF LARGER STOCKPILES AT AN ACCELERATED PACE, AND URGED OTHER NATIONS TO FOLLOW THE 1986 EXAMPLE OF THE U.S. AND 147 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET ANNOUNCE POSSESSION OF AND DETAILS ABOUT THEIR STOCKPILES, SO THAT THE VERIFICATION REGIME CAN BE BETTER PLANNED. HE CHARACTERIZED THE LISTS AND CONTROL REGIMES DEVELOPED THUS FAR FOR MONITORING OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AS "GENERALLY REASONABLE," BUT URGED A "REALISTIC PERSPECTIVE" ABOUT THE SUBSTANCES TO BE CONTROLLED AND THE EXTENT OF THEIR REGULATION, SO THAT A "PRACTICAL, RATIONAL AND COST EFFECTIVE" VERIFICATION REGIME COULD BE ESTABLISHED. 6. HUNGARY -- -- AMB. MEISZTER REITERATED STANDARD EASTERN CRITIQUE OF WESTERN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY, CLAIMING THAT THE DOCTRINE SERVES AS A "CODE WORD" FOR CONTINUATION OF THE ARMS RACE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW, DESTABILIZING WEAPONS SYSTEMS. HE URGED COMPLETION OF THE CW CONVENTION AND "A STEP TOWARDS A CTB." -- REGARDING OUTER SPACE, HE CLAIMED TO SEE A "CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS: IN THE AHC ON THE NEED TO GUARANTEE THE IMMUNITY OF SATELLITES, ALTHOUGH HE CONCEDED (SURPRISINGLY) THAT NO CONCRETE PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN ELABORATED. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE AHC FOCUS ON OUTLINING SPECIFIC MEASURES IN THIS AREA AND ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT THE COMMITTEE CONSIDER WHETHER ALL SATELLITES -- BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY -- SHOULD ENJOY THE SAME IMMUNITY; WHETHER ASAT SYSTEMS SHOULD BE BANNED; AND WHETHER THESE PROPOSALS SHOULD BE PUT IN A "LEGALLY BINDING FORM." 7. NEW ZEALAND -- -- NEWLY, ARRIVED AMB. FORTUNE STRONGLY ENDORSED CW AND INF NEGOTIATIONS AND, IN NOTEWORTHY CONTRAST TO EARLIER STATEMENT OF FONMIN TINDEMANS, STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE WESTERN DOCTRINE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. -- FORTUNE SAID THAT "EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE WOULD BE POSSIBLE AT A MUCH LARGER LEVEL OF WEAPONRY THAN EXISTS TODAY, AND, IN THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES, WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT ALL." HE ARGUED THAT AN INF AGREEMENT WOULD BE A "TURNING POINT" IN THIS REGARD. -- FORTUNE TOUTED BOTH THE TREATY OF RARATONGA, AND HIS COUNTRY'S DOMESTIC LEGISLATION THAT PROHIBITS ENTRY OF SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO NEW ZEALAND. WHILE STRESSING THAT HE REPRESENTED A WESTERN COUNTRY, ALBEIT IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, HE ASSERTED 14C Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET "DIFFICULTY" IN ACCEPTING THAT SECURITY IN HIS PART OF THE WORLD WAS "INDIVISIBLE" FROM THAT IN EUROPE OR THAT WESTERN SECURITY MUST INDIVISIBLY RELY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE CLAIMED THAT THERE WERE NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYED IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC AND, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING EUROPEAN SECURITY NEEDS, STATED THAT ALTERNATIVES TO NUCLEAR DETERRENCE EXISTED AND THAT HIS COUNTRY WOULD "PROMULGATE THAT MESSAGE." IN THIS CONTEXT, HE URGED GREATER EMPHASIS ON "REGIONAL, CONVENTIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION." IN THIS CONTEXT, FORTUNE POINTED OUT THAT A REVITALIZED WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION OR A EUROPEAN DEFENSE FORCE WAS "ONE OPTION BEING CANVASSED." PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 149 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 CONFIDENTIALGENEVA 08156 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): UK PAPER ON OUTER SPACE VERIFICATION REFS: (A) STATE 230031 (NOTAL) (B) LONDON 16003 (NOTAL) 1. THIS IS CD-145. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. US CD DELOFFS MADE POINTS AS REQUESTED REFTEL TO ACTING HEAD OF UK CD DELEGATION RICHARD EDIS ON MONDAY, JULY 27. IN RESPONSE, EDIS SAID UK DEL DID NOT/NOT INTEND TO TABLE OUTER SPACE VERIFICATION PAPER AT CD ON JULY 28, AND HAD NEVER INTENDED TO DO SO. HE PRO- FESSED SURPRISE THAT ANYONE FROM US CD DEL COULD HAVE RECEIVED THAT IMPRESSION FROM HIM. HE ALSO SAID THAT UK WOULD NOT/NOT INTRODUCE PAPER DURING REMAINDER OF 1987 CD SESSION. (WE NOTE HOWEVER, REFEL B WHICH REPORTS FCO ASSISTANT UNDER SEC. FALL AS TELLING EMBASSY LONDON THAT WHILE THE UK WILL NOT TABLE THE PAPER UNTIL AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE U.S., IT WOULD STILL LIKE TO TABLE ITS PAPER BEFORE THE END OF THE CD SESSION IN AUGUST.) 3. EDIS SAID UK EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON HAD REPORTED THAT U.S. WOULD BE PROVIDING DETAILED COMMENTS ON UK PAPER IN ANTICIPATION OF ITS POSSIBLE SUBMISSION TO CD IN 1988. EDIS SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THESE WOULD BE CONSIDERED WITHIN BROADER BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS -- AS DISCUSSED BETWEEN ACDA/MA ASSISTANT DIRECTOR HANSEN AND UK EMBOFF RICHARD CLARKE -- WITH A VIEW TO EXAMINING FUTURE WORK OF CD OS AHC. AS ENVISIONED BY EDIS, SUCH A CONSULTATION MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN EARLY OCTOBER IN WASHINGTON. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 150 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SRI:MT 25X1 UNCLAS GENEVA 08186 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): SWEDISH PAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION REF: GENEVA 7503 (CD-127) 1. THIS IS CD-146. (UNCLASSIFIED -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A DISCUSSION PAPER ON ON- SITE INSPECTION ON CHALLENGE CIRCULATED BY CW COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN AMB. EKEUS (SWEDEN) ON 24 JULY 1987. PAPER WAS CIRCULATED TO SSIMULATE FURTHER REVIEW OF THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUE AND WILL BE DISCUSSED AT AN OPEN-ENDED MEETING ON 29 JULY. THE PAPER REFLECTS EKEUS' PERSONAL VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF CONSULTAA IONS HE CONDUCTED LAST APRIL AND IS A REVISED VERSION OF HIS NON-PAPER (REFTEL) CIRCULATED TO SOME AMBASSADORS ON 9 JULY. U.S. DEL INTENDS TO TREAT PAPER AS A PERSONAL ACCOUNT WITH NO FORMAL STATUS. 3. BEGIN TEXT: ON-SITE INSPECTION ON CHALLENGE THE CHAIRMAN OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE HAS CONDUCTED PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS IN ORDER TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF REACHING SOME BASIC UNDERSTANDINGS AS REGARDS PRINCIPLES AND ELEMENTS FOR A SYSTEM OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION. AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE WAS TAKEN THE FOUR POINTS OF CONVERGENCE DETECTED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE FOR 1986 AS A RESULT OF HIS CONSULTATIONS ON ARTICLE IX (CD/734). IN THE CONSULTATIONS A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED WHICH TAKEN TOGETHER COULD INDICATE A POSSIBLE APPROACH FOR INITIATING CHALLENGE INSPECTION. THIS APPROACH IS OUTLINED IN PARR I BELOW. IT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ANY AGREEMENT, BUT INIDICATES THE DIRECTION IN WHICH THE CONSULTATIONS HAVE BEEN GOING. HOWEVER, IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO IDENTIFY A GENERAL DIRECTION IN THE EVENT THE REQUESTED AND REQUESTING STATES DO NOT AGREE AS REGARDS HOW THE INSPECTION SHALL BE CONDUCTED. SEVERAL PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN PRESENTED AND SOME GENERAL IDEAS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED. IN PART II BELOW FOLLOWS A PROBLEM- ORIENTED DESCRIPTION OF POSSIBLE APPROACHES REFLECTING THE DISCUSSIONS. AS REGARDS THE PROCESS AFTER THE ACTUAL INSPECTION HAS BEEN CONCLUDED ONLY LIMITED DISCUSSIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE. THESE ARE REFLECTED IN PART III OF THIS PAPER. I. THE INITIATION OF A CHALLENGE INSPECTION A POSSIBLE APPROACH COULD BE THE FOLLOWING. 1) EACH STATE PARRY SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT AT ANY TIME TO REQUEST A CHALLENGE INSPECTION OF ANY SITE UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF A STATE PARTY, ANYWHERE, IN ORDER TO CLARIFY DOUBTS ABOUT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION. COMMENT: THE QUESTION OF "JURISDICTION OR CONTROL" IS 151 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 ? UNDER CONTINUED DISCUSSION. 2) THE REQUEST SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE HEAD OF THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT. IT SHOULD AS PRECISELY AS POSSIBLE SPECIFY THE SITE TO BE INSPECTED AS THE MATTERS ON WHICH REASSURANCES ARE REQUIRED, AS WELL AS INDICATE THE RELEVANT PROVISION(S) OF THE CONVENTION, ABOUT WHICH UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 05 GENEVA 08186 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL DOUBTS OF COMPLIANCE HAVE ARISEN. COMMENT: THE DESIGNATION OF THE HEAD OF THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT AS THE RECIPIENT OF THE REQUEST INDICATES THAT THERE IS NO POLITICAL "FILTER". AS REGARDS THE CONTENTS OF THE REQUEST THE ABOVE MENTIONED ELEMENTS APPEAR TO BE NECESSARY FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE SITE AND THE PROBLEM. THE POSSIBLE INCLUSION OF FURTHER INFORMATION NEEDS TO BE DISCUSSED. 3) THE HEAD OF THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT SHOULD IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY THE STATE PARTY TO BE INSPECTED, AND INFORM THE MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ABOUT THE REQUEST. COMMENT: THE NEED FOR INFORMING THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL COULD BE DISCUSSED. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS LOGICAL THAT \ THE POLITICALLY RESPONSIBLE EXECUTIVE BODY OF THE CONVENTION IS INFORMED ABOUT A DEVELOPMENT SEEN AS A "RARE EVENT" AND WHICH IMPLIES AN ACTIVATION OF THE SO-CALLED "SAFETY-NET" OF THE CONVENTION. 4) A TEAM OF INSPECTORS SHOULD BE DISPATCHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND ARRIVE IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE SITE TO BE INSPECTED NOT LATER THAN 48 HOURS AFTER THE ORIGINAL REQUEST. COMMENT: THE TIME SPAN OF 48 HOURS FROM THE REQUEST TO THE ARRIVAL APPEARS TO BE REASONABLE CONSIDERING THE NEED FOR SPEED AND NECESSARY TIME FOR THE PREPARATIONS AND TRAVEL OF THE TEAM. THE WORDS "IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF" SHOULD BE INTERPRETED IN THE LIGHT OF 6) BELOW. 5) THE REQUESTED STATE SHOULD BE OBLIGED TO ADMIT THE TEAM OF INSPECTORS INTO THE COUNTRY AND ASSIST IT IN ITS TRANSPORTS SO THAT IT CAN ARRIVE IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE SITE ON TIME. COMMENT: SITUATIONS COULD BE ENVISAGED, I.A. WHEN THE SITE TO BE INSPECTED IS NOT ON THE TERRITORY OF THE REQUESTED STATE PARTY. SUCH CASES COULD HOWEVER BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF QUESTIONS RELATED TO JURISDICTION. 6) THE TEAM OF INSPECTORS SHOULD AT THE ARRIVAL BE PERMITTED TO SECURE THE SITE IN A WAY THEY DEEM NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT NO MATERIAL OF RELEVANCE FOR THE INSPECTION IS REMOVED FROM THE SITE. 152 evroym Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SF(RFT 25X1 COMMENT: THE EARLY SECURING OF THE SITE IS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE CONTINUED PROCESS. 7) THE INSPECTION SHOULD START NOT LATER THAN (12)(24) HOURS AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF THE TEAM OF INSPECTORS. COMMENT: THE BROADER TIME FRAME MAY BE NEEDED IF TIME FOR CONSULTATIONS IS TO BE PROVIDED FOR (SEE UNDER III). 8) THE INSPECTORS SHOULD HAVE THE ACCESS TO THE SITE WHICH THEY DEEM NECESSARY FOR THE CONDUCT OF THEIR MISSION. THEY SHOULD CONDUCT THE INSPECTION IN THE LEAST INTRUSIVE MANNER POSSIBLE TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR TASK. COMMENT: THE ABOVE FORMULATION DOES NOT EXCLUDE COMPREHENSIVE ACCESS BUT OPENS UP POSSIBILITIES FOR A MORE LIMITED CONDUCT OF THE INSPECTION. UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 05 GENEVA 08186 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL II. THE CONDUCT OF A CHALLENGE INSPECTION DURING THE CONSULTATIONS THREE MAIN LINES OF THOUGHT HAVE EMERGED AS REGARDS THE CONDUCT OF THE INSPECTION. 1. INSPECTION CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL REQUEST. IT HAS BEEN POINTED OUT THAT A SYSTEM BUILT UPON THE CARRYING OUT OF THE INSPECTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL REQUEST IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE FOR DETERRING VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, IT OPENS UP FOR POSSIBLE ABUSE OF THE RIGHT TO REQUEST A CHALLENGE INSPECTION. IT APPEARS TO BE A WIDELY HELD VIEW THAT THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL REQUEST UNLESS THE REQUESTED STATE PARTY DEEMS THE INSPECTION TEAM'S ACCESS TO A SITE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL REQUEST TO BE CONTRARY TO ITS VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY LNTERESTS, NOT CONNECTED WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS. FURTHERMORE, IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT OBJECTIONS FROM THE REQUESTED STATE SHOULD IN PRINCIPLE ONLY BE ALLOWED IF IT IS COMBINED WITH A PROPOSAL FOR ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS DESIGNED TO RESOLVE THE DOUBTS OF THE REQUESTING STATE. 2. ALTERNATIVE TO THE ORIGINAL REQUEST THE CONSULTATIONS INDICATE THAT ALTERNATIVE ARRANGE -MENTS ARE CONSIDERED USEFUL FOR THE CHALLENGED STATE TO PROVE ITS COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION BUT ALSO THAT FULL RELIANCE ON SUCH ARRANGEMENTS WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH TO DETER AGAINST VIOLATIONS. DURING THE CONSULTATIONS ATTEMPPS HAVE BEEN MADE TO IDENTIFY MORE PRECISELY WHAT SUCH ALTERNATIVE ARRANGE- MENTS COULD CONSIST OF. THIS PICTURE IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE THAT, IF THE 153 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 REQUESTING STATE ACCEPTS PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE ARRANGE- MENTS THE INSPECTION TEAM SHOULD CARRY OUT ITS TASK. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THOSE ARRANGEMENTS. IF THE REQUESTING STATE DOES NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ARISE. THESE HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVELY BUT INCONCLUSIVELY ADDRESSED DURING THE CONSULTATIONS. - TO WHAT EXTENT COULD THE TIME-FRAME BE PROLONGED IN ORDER TO ALLOW FOR A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE REQUESTING AND REQUESTED STATE? - WHAT, IF ANY, ROLE WOULD THE INSPECTION TEAM PLAY IN SUCH A CONSULTATION PROCESS? - SHOULD THE INSPECTORS BE ACCOMPANIED BY A REPRESEN- TATIVE OF THE REQUESTING STATE IN ORDER TO FACILITATE SPEEDY COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO STATE PARTIES? FURTHERMORE, THE CONVENTION WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEMS THAT WOULD ARISE IF NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REQUESTING AND REQUESTED STATES CAN BE REACHED. IN THIS CONTEXT DIFFERENT APPROACHES HAVE BEEN TAKEN: - ONE APPROACH HAS BEEN THAT THE REQUESTED STATE SHOULD HAVE A STRINGENT OBLIGATION TO SATISFY THE REQUESTING STATE THAT NO VIOLATION HAS TAKEN PLACE AND THAT FAILING TO DO SO WOULD IN ITSELF BE A UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 05 GENEVA 08186 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION. - ANOTHER APPROACH HAS BEEN THAT, IN CASE OF AN UNRESOLVED DISPUTE BETWEEN THE REQUESTING AND REQUESTED STATE, THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SHOULD BE CALLED UPTON TO RESOLVE THE MATTER. THE EXACT ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AT THIS STAGE OF THE PROCESS WOULD NEED TO BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS MUST BE ADDRESSED. -- WHAT ADDITIONAL TIME-FRAME COULD BE ACCEPTABLE? -- IN WHICH FORM WOULD THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL EXPRESS ITSELF ON THE PROBLEM OF THE ORIGINAL REQUEST VERSUS THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS: A DECISION? AN OPINION? A PROPOSAL? A RECOMMENDATION? -- HOW SHOULD THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ARRIVE AT ITS POSITION? FROM THE CONSULTATIONS IT APPEARS THAT CONSENSUS WOULD NOT BE PRACTICAL AND THAT THERE IS A BROAD SUPPORT FOR THE CONCEPT OF QUALIFIED MAJORITY. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT CLEAR ON WHICH SIDE SUCH A MAJORITY SHOULD BE MUSTERED, THAT OF THE ORIGINAL REQUEST OR THAT OF THE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS? -- CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH THE ABOVE IS ALSO THE OUTSTANDING QUESTION OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE ' EXECUTIVE COUNCIL. 154 CCW.DOM Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- FURTHERMORE, IF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL DOES NOT INCLUDE THE REQUESTING OR THE REQEUSTED STATE PARTY, SHOULD IT (THEY) BE GIVEN THE RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED ON THE COUNCIL DURING ITS DELIBERATIONS? 3. ALTERNATIVES WITHIN THE ORIGINAL REQUEST A THIRD. APPROACH WHICH HAS EMERGED IN THE CONSULTATIONS IS TO PROVIDE FOR ALTERNATIVES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ORIGINAL REQUEST. THIS APPROACH INVOLVES AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE REQUESTING AND REQUESTED STATE, TO ELABORATE A WAY TO CONDUCT THE INSPECTION WHICH SATISFIES THE POSSIBLE NEED OF THE REQUESTED STATE TO PROTECT SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES. THIS APPROACH HAS BEEN EXPRESSED AS "MANAGED CONDUCT". AT THIS STAGE OF THE CONSULTATIONS THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS APPROACH ARE NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR. I.A. THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARISES: - WHICH ROLE WOULD THE INSPECTION TEAM PLAY IN ELABORATING THE PRECISE LIMITATIONS OF SUCH A MANAGED CONDUCT OF THE INSPECTION? - WOULD A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REQUESTING STATE NEED TO BE PRESENT AT, OR NEAR, THE SITE? IF SO, WHICH ROLE IS HE TO PLAY? - HOW WOULD A POSSIBLE DISPUTE OVER HOW TO MANAGE THE CONDUCT OF THE INSPECTION BE DEALT WITH? WOULD THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY? THE THREE MAIN LINES OF THOUGHTS OUTLINED ABOVE HAVE EMERGED GRADUALLY AND THERE IS AT THIS POINT IN TIME NOT ALWAYS A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THEM. THEY COULD, HOWEVER, AT LEAST PARTIALLY, BE SEEN AS MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY COMPONENTS OF AN OVERALL UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 GENEVA 08186 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SYSTEM. IN EVALUATING THE DIFFERENT POSSIBLE COMPONENTS OF A SYSTEM FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTION THE FOLLOWING THREE QUESTIONS HAVE SO FAR PROVED GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE AND USEFUL AS A YARDSTICK: - DOES IT DETER AGAINST VIOLATIONS? - DOES IT GIVE REASSURANCE OF COMPLIANCE? - DOES IT BUILD CONFIDENCE? III. THE OUTCOME OF A CHALLENGE INSPECTION THE LAST STAGES IN THE PROCESS OF A CHALLENGE INSPECTION HAS ONLY BEEN ADDRESSED IN THE CONSUL- TATIONS IN A LIMITED FASHION. HOWEVER THERE APPEARS TO BE BROAD CONSENT - THAT A DEADLINE SHOULD BE SET BY WHICH THE INSPECTION TEAM SHOULD CONCLUDE THE INSPECTION AND RETURN TO THE HEADQUARTERS - THAT THE INSPECTORS SHOULD SUBMIT .A REPORT 155 cornym Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET WHICH IS STRICTLY FACTUAL AND ONLY CONTAINS INFORMATION OF DIRECT RELEVANCE TO THE DOUBTS RAISED ABOUT COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION - THAT COPIES OF THE REPORT SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE REQUESTING STATE, THE REQUESTED STATE AND TO THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN RAISED AS REGARDS THE FURTHER PROCESS, INTER ALIA - WHAT WOULD BE THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL IN DETERMINING WHETHER A VIOLATION HAS ACTUALLY TAKEN PLACE? SHOULD IT TAKE A DECISION? EXPRESS AN OPINION? - WHAT WOULD BE THE ROLE OF THE REQUESTING STATE AT THIS STAGE? - WHICH FURTHER ACTIONS COULD BE CONSIDERED SHOULD A VIOLATION BE ESTABLISHED? END TEXT. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED ? NNNN 156 SECRET ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08225 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY SESSION OF JULY 28, 1987 1. THIS IS CD-147. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, DESCRIBING LATEST AND MOST FLAGRANT IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW), WARNED THE CD THAT A CW BAN WILL BE INEFFECTIVE UNLESS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS PREPARED TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE. DEPLORING FEEBLE UN ENFORCEMENT EEFORTS, HE BLAMED THE UNITED STATES FOR IMPEDING UN ACTION ON THE ISSUE AND CONDONING IRAQI CW DEPLOYMENT. GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND BULGARIA ADDRESSED NUCLEAR ISSUES IN PREDICTABLE FASHION. G-21 PNW DRAFT MANDATE FAILED TO ACHIEVE CONSENSUS. IRANIAN TEXT DATAFAXED TO ACDA; ALL TEXTS AND PNW DRAFT POUCHED TO ACDA. END SUMMARY. 3. IRAN -- -- IRANIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS VELAYATI DESCRIBED RECENT IRAQ CHEMICAL WEAPONS ATTACKS ON THE IRANIAN CITY OF SARDASHT AS A QUALITATIVE DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS WARFARE, STATING THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME AN ENTIRE IRANIAN CITY WAS POISONED BY CW. COMPARING SARDASHT WITH HIROSHIMA AND NAGASKI, VELAYATI SOUNDLY CONDEMNED THE INACTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND IN PARTICULAR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, FOR NOT ENFORCING THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL. CRITICIZING THE "TOOTHLESS" UN RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THAT ATTACK, VELAYATI POINTED OUT THAT HISTORY SHOWS THAT SIMILAR RESOLUTIONS MERELY INCITED IRAQ TO COMMIT EVEN MORE FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS. - VELAYATI THEN MADE A POIGNANT ARGUMENT THAT THE WEAK RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO IRAQ'S REPEATED AND OUTRAGEOUS VIOLATIONS OF THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL BODES ILL FOR ANY CW CONVENTION NEGOTIATED IN THE CD. IF DECISIVE ACTION IS NOT TAKEN IN THE FACE OF CLEAR EVIDENCE OF MASS KILLING BY CW USE, VELAYATI QUESTIONED, CAN WE EXPECT ENFORCEMENT OF A PROHIBITION AGAINST LESS DRAMATIC VIOLATIONS SUCH AS PRODUCTION OF CW? HE CONCLUDED THAT THE FAILURE TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE COULD IRREPARABLY WEAKEN SUCH TREATIES AND FORESHADOW BIOLOGICAL (SIC) WARFARE. -- THE FORCE OF VELAYATI'S PRESENTATION WAS MARRED BY AN IRRATIONAL ATTACK UPON THE UNITED STATES, IN WHICH HE ACCUSED THE U.S. OF CONDONING CW DEPLOYMENT IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND PREVENTING THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL FROM DISCUSSING THE ISSUE. (COMMENT: U.S. RESPONDED IN 30 JULY PLENARY.) 157 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 4. GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC -- -- AMBASSADOR ROSE, APPARENTLY SURMISING THAT HIS AUDIENCE PREMATURELY HAD PEAKED OUT ON CONSIDERATION OF SERIOUS OUTER SPACE ISSUES, SHAMELESSLY CATERED TO LESS ALTRUISTIC INSTINCTS IN A PATRONIZING STATEMENT FEATURING PROPOSALS FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND PROLIFERATION 'OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANI- ZATIONS. ROSE ALSO ENDORSED A DOUBLE-ZERO INF AGREEMENT WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S "NEW OFFER AIMED AT GIVING A FRESH IMPETUS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS." HE CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS UP TO THE U.S. TO REMOVE THE REMAINING STUMBLING BLOCKS, INCLUDING PERSHING-IA WARHEADS. -- U.S. AMB FRIEDERSDORF RESPONDED WITH A REMINDER THAT THE DOUBLE-ZERO PROPOSAL WAS NOT GORBACHEV'S, NOR WAS IT NEW, AND THAT THE U.S. COULD NOT BARGAIN AWAY MISSILES BELONGING TO A SOVEREIGN THIRD PARTY. 5. BULGARIA -- -- AMB. TELLALOV BROKE NO NEW GROUND IN HIS DISCUSSION OF NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES, AS HE PRESSED FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES, DECLARATIONS OF NO FIRST USE, AND A TREATY BANNING THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ON OUTER SPACE, TELLALOV DISCOUNTED THE WESTERN ARGUMENT THAT DUAL-CAPABLE WEAPONS SUCH AS ICBM ARE AN IMPEDIMENT TO AN ASAT BAN, REASONING THAT THIS PROBLEM COULD BE SOLVED BY LIMITING THE BAN TO THOSE SYSTEMS THAT HAD BEEN TESTED FOR ASAT USE. REPLYING TO THE WESTERN ARGUMENT THAT ARTICLE 2(4) OF THE UN CHARTER ALREADY PROTECTS SATELLITE AGAINST USE OF FORCE, TELLALOV MADE THE ENTIRELY SPECIOUS REJOINDER THAT THE CHARTER PROVISON IS INAPPOSITE, AS IT PROTECTS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, WHILE SPACE IS THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND AND HENCE BEYOND THE PALE OF THAT PROVISION. 6. PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, INCLUDING ALL RELATED MATTERS (PNW) - CD/515/REV.3, THE PNW DRAFT MANDATE SPONSORED BY THE GROUP OF 21 (POUCHED TO ACDA) FAILED TO GAIN CONSENSUS, AS THE WESTERN GROUP WAS UNITED IN OPPOSITON TO THIS PROPOSAL FOR AN AD HOC COMMITTEE. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 15E Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08226 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS: JULY 20-25, 1987 REFS: (A) GENEVA 8186 (CD-146) (B) GENEVA 8052 (CD-142) (C) GENEVA 7503 (CD-127) (D) GENEVA 7397 (CD-125) (E) STATE 161119 (F) GENEVA 7954 (CD-139) 1. THIS IS CD-148. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- WORK IN CLUSTER IV (CW ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES AND FUNCTIONS, FACTFINDING AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION) FOCUSED ON GUIDELINES FOR AN INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORATE. - CW AHC CHAIRMAN SWEDISH AMB. EKEUS INTRODUCED A DISCUSSION PAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION (REF A) FOR OPEN-ENDED CONSULTATIONS ON JULY 29. -- IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TO PREVIEW WORK POSSIBLE IN CLUSTER I (CHEMICAL WEAPONS) DURING WEEK OF AUGUST 2, SOVIETS PROPOSED FURTHER ELABORATION OF VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. END SUMMARY. 3. CLUSTER IV (CW ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES AND FUNCTIONS) -- DESPITE 10 HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS IN 4 MEETINGS, VERY LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS WAS MADE ON CLUSTER IV ISSUES. THIS WAS DUE TO CLUSTER CHAIRMAN WALTER KRUTZSCH'S (GDR) POOR MANAGEMENT OF DISCUSSION ON THE GUIDELINES FOR AN INSPECTORATE (CURRENTLY APPENDED TO CD/CW/WP.167) AND HIS FAILURE TO REFLECT SUGGESTIONS AND CONCERNS OF SEVERAL DELEGATIONS REGARDING REVISED DRAFTING. - KRUTZSCH ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION TO FOCUS NEXT ON CLARIFING THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES, AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM. ? 4. CLUSTER IV (CHALLENGE INSPECTION) -- -- AT THE JULY 14 CW COMMITTEE MEETING, THE CHAIRMAN, AMB. EKEUS, SWEDEN INTRODUCED A DISCUSSION PAPER (REF A) ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION. THE PAPER REFLECTS EKEUS' PERSONAL VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS HE CONDUCTED LAST APRIL AND IS A REVISED VERSION OF HIS NON-PAPER CIRCULATED TO SOME AMBASSADORS ON 9 JULY (REF C). -- A DRAFT OF THE PAPER HAD BEEN CIRCULATED EARLIER FOR COMMENT TO THOSE DELEGATIONS INVOLVED 15S! SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET IN THE SPRING INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION. WESTERN DELS STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE LARGE ROLE ENVISIONED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL. -- FOLLOWING OPENED-ENDED DISCUSSIONS IN THE COMMITTEE ON 29 JULY, AMB. EKEUS PLANS TO CONDUCT FURTHER INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITH SELECTED HEADS OF DELEGATION AT A TIME YET TO BE DETERMINED. 5. CLUSTER I (CLUSTER WEAPONS) -- CHAIRMAN PHILIPPE NIEWENHUYS' (BELGIUM) HELD AN INFORMAL MEETING ON 21 JULY TO DETERMINE WHAT SUBJECTS TO DISCUSS IN AUGUST. -- U.S. AND SOVIETS EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR DATING DECLARATIONS ON PAST TRANSFERS BACK TO 1 JANUARY 1946. FRENCH SAID THEY WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN TRACKING INFORMATION THAT FAR BACK AND PROPOSED APPROXIMATELY THE DATE WHEN THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION ENTERED INTO FORCE, FOR EXAMPLE, 1 JANUARY 1975. - .SOVIET DELOFF GRANOVSKIY PROPOSED EFFORTS TO ELABORATE -FURTHER THE CURRENT BROADLY-FORMULATED TEXT ON VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. (FYI: SOVIET AMB. NAZARKIN'S JULY 2 SPEECH (REF D) NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION HAD BEEN PROPOSED EARLIER IN THE SUMMER, THE TOPIC HAD NOT YET BEEN WORKED ON. GRANOVSKIY, HOWEVER, INFORMEJ NIEWENHUYS THAT LACK OF MANPOWER WOULD PREVENT SOVIETS FROM PARTICIPATING IN DRAFTING SESSIONS ON THAT SUBJECT. END FYI.) 6. CW WESTERN COORDINATION -- -- TWO MEETINGS WERE HELD THIS WEEK TO ADDRESS IMPORTANT AGENDA ITEMS. SEVERAL ADDITIONAL CW ISSUES (E.G., JURIS- DICTION AND CONTROL, INTERSESSIONALS, END-OF-SESSION REVIEW) WERE RAISED AT THE WESTERN AMBASSADORS MEETING JULY 22 REF B). -- COMMENTS ON A FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL (REF E) TO PROVIDE ADVICE TO THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE FOCUSED ON THE DIFFICULTIES OF ENSURING THE BODY WOULD NOT BE POLITICIZED, ITS RELATIONSHIP TO AN ALREADY-AGREED TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT AND THE NEED TO AVOID DUPLICATION OF EFFORT. ONLY THE UK EXPRESSED UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSAL. -- THE UK HAS DECIDED TO POSTPONE INDEFINITELY TABLING THE PROPOSED APPENDIX TO THEIR DOCUMENT (CD/769) ON COST ESTIMATES FOR AN INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORATE. ALTHOUGH THE APPENDIX WAS INTENDED TO BE PART OF CD/769, THE FIGURES IN THE APPENDIX RECEIVED MUCH WESTERN CRITICISM FOR BEING MUCH TOO LOW. BROAD CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED THAT THE ESTIMATES 160 SECRET ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET WOULD MISLEAD OTHER DELEGATIONS AS TO THE TRUE COST OF THE INSPECTORATE. -- SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE GROUP EXPRESSED CONCERN AT THE DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE TERM "JURISDICTION" BY THE U.S. AND UK (REF F). UK DELOFF GORDON NOTED THAT HE HAD CABLED LONDON FOR INSTRUCTION ON THIS ISSUE BUT DID NOT EXPECT THE ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE WOULD LEAD TO A CHANGE IN THE UK POSITION. OTHER WESTERN DELS NOTED THE NEED TO REVIEW THEIR LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE TERM AND TO SEE WHAT COMMON WESTERN APPROACH MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. - AMB VAN SCHAIK CONTINUED TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF INTERSESSIONALS, NOTING EKEUS' INTEREST IN MEETINGS IN OCTOBER, NOVEMBER, DECEMBER AND JANUARY. MOST WESTERN DELS EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR INTERSESSIONALS IN NOVEMBER AND IN JANUARY; U.S. RESERVATIONS ON THE SUBJECT WERE NOT WELL-RECEIVED. -- U.S. REP CIRCULATED CHEMICAL INDUSTRY THRESHOLD PAPER, REVISED PER INSTRUCTIONS, NOTING OUR DESIRE TO TABLE THE PAPER SOON. - AMB. VAN SCHAIK ALSO CONTINUED TO EXPRESS INTEREST IN AN END-OF-SESSION REVIEW OF THE ROLLING TEXT. MOST DELS FELT THAT WHILE A BROAD REVIEW OF ISSUES THAT STILL NEEDED RESOLUTION WOULD BE HELPFUL, A TEXTUAL BRACKET-BY-BRACKET REVIEW WOULD LEAD TO POLITICAL PRESSURE TO RESOLVE ISSUES ON THE SPOT. 7. ACTION REQUEST CANCELLATION -- DEL WITHDRAWS REQUEST (GENEVA 7738, CD-134; PARA 4) FOR VIEWS ON SWEDISH PROPOSAL CONCERNING COMPARISON FACTOR FOR UNFILLED MUNITIONS AND OTHER CW DEVICES; GUIDANCE IS NO LONGER NEEDED ON THIS POINT. 8. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 161 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIALGENEVA 08266 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): WESTERN PROPOSALS FOR INTERSESSIONAL WORK ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS 1. THIS IS CD-149. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT) 1. OTHER NINE AMBASSADORS (OR ACTING DEL HEAD IN UK CASE) UNANIMOUSLY URGED THAT U.S. CD DELEGATION AGREE TO INTERSESSIONAL WORK ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN GENEVA STARTING NOVEMBER 20, 1987 THROUGH DECEMBER 20, 1987. 2. AMBASSADORS ALSO RECOMMEND SECOND INTERSESSIONAL MEETING START ON JANUARY 10, 1988, AND CONTINUE FOR UNSPECIFIED TIME PRIOR TO OPENING OF 1988 CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT SESSION FIRST WEEK IN FEBRUARY. 3. A TWO-DAY OVERVIEW OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATING STATUS IS RECOMMENDED BY WESTERN AMBASSADORS DURING DECEMBER INTERSESSIONALS. 4. ALL WESTERN AMBASSADORS SPOKE PERSONALLY IN FAVOR OF THIS INTERSESSIONAL PROGRAM AT A "BLACK LABEL" MEETING THIS WEEK. 5. AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF INDICATED NO COMMITMENT TO INTERSESSIONALS WITHOUT WASHINGTON GUIDANCE, AND INDICATED PROPOSED INTERSESSIONALS BY DUTCH AMBASSADOR VAN SCHAIK IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER WERE OUT OF THE QUESTION. 6. AMBASSADOR BUTLER, OF AUSTRALIA, EXPRESSED VIEW . THAT INTERSESSIONAL SHOULD BE HELD WHEN U.S. STARTS BINARY PRODUCTION. 7. AMB. FRIEDERSDORF REQUESTS GUIDANCE ON INTER- SESSIONAL QUESTION, AND RECOMMENDS U.S. AGREE TO INTERSESSIONALS STARTING MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1987, THROUGH WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1987,A TOTAL OF NEARLY THREE WEEKS, AND TUESDAY, JANUARY 12, 1988, THROUGH FRIDAY, JANUARY 27, 1988, A TOTAL OF THREE WEEKS. THIS IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME SCHEDULE AS LAST YEAR. 8. THE DELEGATION IS NOT UNANIMOUS ON THIS MATTER. 9. THE QUESTION OF AGENDA FOR BOTH INTERSESSIONAL SESSIONS REMAINS TO BE DECIDED. 10. AMB. VAN SCHAIK ALSO REQUESTS INVITATION TO WASHINGTON FOR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AT ACDA DURING FALL SESSION AT U.N., OCTOBER 13 THROUGH NOVEMBER 13, 1987. HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE AMB. HANSEN AND OTHERS INFORMALLY ON GENERAL CD DISCUSSION. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NN 162 CPTRPT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08269 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ?(CD): NETHERLANDS VIEWS ON FUTURE CD OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES REF: STATE 29118 (1987 DELEGATION GUIDANCE) 1. THIS IS CD-150. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. ON INSTRUCTIONS, DUTCH DEL DEPUTY VOLKER MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTSTO U.S. DEL ON OUTER SPACE ISSUES; -- THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION WOULD NOT/NOT MAKE A STATEMENT DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE 1987 SESSION OF THE CD'S OUTER SPACE COMMITTEE. ANY FUTURE INTERVENTION WOULD NOT OCCUR BEFORE 1988, AND WOULD BE A RESULT OF BROAD STUDIES THAT ARE CURRENTLY TAKING PLACE IN THE HAGUE. -- THE NETHERLANDS IS PREPARED TO "CONSTRUCTIVELY UPHOLD" THE WESTERN PROFILE IN THE CD ON THE SUBJECT OF OUTER SPACE. VOLKER SAID THAT THE NETHERLANDS INTENDS TO TAKE PART PROMINENTLY IN THESE QUESTIONS. -- VOLKER EXPRESSED A SIMILAR ATTITUDE ABOUT A DUTCH LEADERSHIP ROLE IN SHAPING WESTERN ATTITUDES TOWARDS OUTER SPACE ISSUES AT THE 42ND UNGA IN THE FALL. -- THE NETHERLANDS IS INFORMING BOTH THE U.S. AND ITALY THAT IF THE ITALIANS ARE NOT PREPARED TO BE IN THE FRONT LINE ON OUTER SPACE AT THE 42ND UNGA, THE NETHERLANDS WOULD "NOT OBJECT" TO TAKING SUCH A ROLE. 3. COMMENT: VOLKER HAD APPROACHED U.S. DELOFF ON JULY 17 FOR REACTION TO A PROPOSED STATEMENT IN OS AHC. REMARKS WOULD HAVE STATED THAT IN THE VIEW OF DUTCH DELEGATION "MUTUALLY COHERENT ARMS CONTROL MEASURES IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF SATELLITES ARE WORTH EXPLORING BY THE CD." DRAFT THEN SET FORTH FOLLOWING PROPOSALS: -- A DECLARATION AGAINST INFRINGEMENT ON CERTAIN TYPES OF SATELLITES; -- THE STRENGTHENING OF THE REGISTRATION CONVENTION; -- A LIMITED TEST MORATORIUM ON ASATS AGAINST SATELLITES, AND ESPECIALLY AGAINST HIGH ORBIT SATELLITES (FONMIN VAN DEN BROEK STRESSED DUTCH INTEREST IN THIS POSSIBILITY AS WELL IN JULY 2 CD PLENARY STATEMENT) 163 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- CREATION OF A MULTILATERAL CODE OF CONDUCT, ESPECIALLY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DISTANCE BETWEEN SATELLITES TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT HOSTILE INTENT. -- U.S. DELOFF DREW ON GUIDANCE REFTEL TO RESPOND AND RECOMMENDED AGAINST RAISING PROPOSAL TO SUPPLEMENT THE REGISTRATION CONVENTION IN THE CD. VOLKER SAID HE WOULD REPORT U.S. REMARKS TO THE HAGUE. AS NOTED ABOVE NO STATEMENT WAS MADE. -- LIKE MOST OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CD WESTERN GROUP, DUTCH ARE FRUSTRATED AND RESTIVE OVER LACK OF SO-CALLED "SUBSTANTIVE ACTIVITY" IN THE CD'S OUTER SPACE COMMITTEE. STATEMENT WOULD APPARENTCY5 BEEN OPENING EFFORT ON THEIR PART TO PRESS FOR MORE ACTIVIST STANCE IN OS AHC IN 1988. JULY 28 DUTCH RESPONSE REINFORCES THIS VIEW AND HINTS AT WISH TO BE WESTERN OS COORDINATOR DURING 1988 CD SESSION. AS THIS SITUATION DEVELOPS, U.S. DEL NOTES THAT ITALIANS HAVE BEEN GENERALLY HELPFUL AND SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. POSITIONS AS WESTERN OS COORDINATOR IN 1985 AND 1986, AND AS OS AHC CHAIRMAN IN 1987. FRENCH POSTURE AS WESTERN OS COORDINATOR IN 1987 HAS BEEN EQUALLY CONSIDERATE NOWITHSTANDING LONG-STANDING DIFFERENCES WITH U.S. ON SPACE ISSUES. DEL DOUBTS THAT DUTCH AMB. VAN SCHAIK WOULD BE AS ACCOMMODATING TO U.S. VIEWS ON OUTER SPACE ISSUES AS ITALIANS OR FRENCH HAVE BEEN. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 164 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in.Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08409 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): HIGHLIGHTS OF WEEK OF 27-31 JULY; WESTERN GROUP MEETING 29 JULY 1. THIS IS CD-151. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW -- -- AS THE CD ENDED THE SECOND MONTH OF THE SUMMER PART OF ITS 1987 SESSION, HIGHLIGHTS OF LAST WEEK OF JULY INCLUDED 28 JULY PLENARY STATEMENT BY IRANIAN FONMIN ON USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN GULF WAR, INCLUDING ATTACK ON U.S. APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE. AMB FRIEDERSDORF RESPONDED AT 30 JULY PLENARY AND REBUTTED CHARGES. SOVIET AMB NAZARKIN WAS ABSENT, RECALLED TO MOSCOW FOR CONSULTATIONS. LATE ON 31 JULY U.S. DEL LEARNED THAT SOVIET FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE IS INSCRIBED TO ADDRESS THE CD ON 6 AUG. -- IN CW, COMMITTEE ADDRESSED CHAIRMAN'S PAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION. -- MEXICAN AMB GARCIA ROBLES' CPD COMMITTEE MAY BE APPROACHING END GAME, AND AS PACE PICKS UP, EASTERN GROUP HAS GONE PUBLIC IN PLENARY TO CRITICIZE U.S. DEL FOR BRACKETING PORTIONS OF CPD TEXT IN COMMITTEE. OTHER COMMITTEES ARE WINDING UP SUBSTANTIVE WORK, WHILE CD IS BEGINNING TO CONSIDER PROCEDURAL REFORM SUGGESTIONS. -- WESTERN GROUP MEETINGS FOCUSED ON CW INTERSESSIONAL QUESTION AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL, AND ON PROCEDURAL REFORM AT REGULAR WEEKLY MEETING. END SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW. 3. 28 JULY IRANIAN STATEMENT AND 30 JULY U.S. - RESPONSE -- -- FONMIN VELAYATI DESCRIBED LATEST AND MOST FLAGRANT IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) AT SARDASHT, WARNED THE CD THAT A CW BAN WILL BE INEFFECTIVE UNLESS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS PREPARED TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE, DEPLORED FEEBLE UN ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS, AND BLAMED THE UNITED STATES FOR IMPEDING UN ACTION ON THE ISSUE AND FOR CONDONING IRAQI CW EMPLOYMENT. - AMB FRIEDERSDORF REBUTTED VELAYATI RECALLING U.S. CONDEMNATION OF ILLEGAL ANYWHERE, ANYTIME, IN PARTICULAR IRAQI STRESSED U.S. EFFORTS AIMED AT HALTING WAR. 4. AMB NAZARKIN'S ABSENCE -- 'S CHARGES, CW USE USE, AND THE GULF 165 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- SOVIET REP WAS REPORTED BY MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION TO HAVE BEEN RECALLED TO MOSCOW FOR CONSULTATIONS. NAZARKIN CANCELLED A PARIS VISIT SCHEDULED FOR 28 JULY. -- AFTER PRESS REPORTS THAT FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE WOULD VISIT GENEVA AND ADDRESS THE CD, U.S. DEL LEARNED FROM CD SECRETARIAT LATE ON 31 JULY THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD JUST BEEN INSCRIBED TO SPEAK AT REGULAR PLENARY MEETING ON 6 AUGUST. 5. CW-- -- COMMITTEE DISCUSSED CHAIRMAN EKEUS' STATUS REPORT ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUE. DISCUSSION REFLECTED UNIFIED WESTERN PUSH FOR STRINGENT INSPECTION PROVISION. 6. COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT (CPD) - AMB GARCIA ROBLES HAS PUT HIS COMMITTEE INTO HIGHER GEAR, HOLDING ALMOST DAILY CONSULTATIONS, IN AN EFFORT TO PRODUCE AN ACCEPTABLE DOCUMENT PRIOR TO END OF AUGUST. U.S. DEL HAS BEEN AT FOREFRONT OF EFFORTS TO REVISE SECTIONS LONG LEFT UNEXAMINED. NUMEROUS BRACKETED PORTIONS REMAIN. IT IS UNCLEAR WHAT SHAPE THE FINAL PRODUCT WILL TAKE, AND EVEN WHETHER THERE WILL BE A TEXT IN GOOD ENOUGH SHAPE TO FORWARD TO THE 42ND UNGA. -- AT 30 JULY PLENARY, CZECH AMB VEJVODA, SPEAKING FOR EASTERN GROUP, CRITICIZED U.S. ACTIONS IN COMMITTEE ON BRACKETING TEXT AS BACK-SLIDING, AND CALLED FOR OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL TO BE ADDED TO LIST OF PRIORITY ITEMS. 7. OUTER SPACE -- -- DUTCH REP TOLD US OF NETHERLANDS INTEREST IN TAKING A MORE ACTIVE STANCE AT FUTURE CD AND UNGA SESSIONS. DUTCH MAY RAISE SUBJECT DURING PROPOSED WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS IN THE FALL. 8. WESTERN GROUP AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL MEETING -- -- DEL HEADS CONSIDERED SCHEDULING OF INTERSESSIONAL WORK ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. DETAILED REPORT AND AMB FRIEDERSDORF'S RECOMMENDATION SEPTEL. WESTERN REPS ALSO SEEK A GENERAL REVIEW WITHIN WESTERN GROUP OF STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS DURING NOVEMBER-DECEMBER SESSION. 9. 28 JULY REGULAR WESTERN GROUP -- A. EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THE CD -- -- AMBS BEESLEY (CANADA) AND BUTLER (AUSTRALIA), THE TWO WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN EFFORTS OF SEVEN CD AMBASSADORS TO PROPOSE PROCEDURAL CHANGES IN CD, LED 166 cprpcT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET DISCUSSION OF THE PAPER AGREED TO BY THE SEVEN. BUTLER RECALLED THAT GENESIS OF EFFORT WAS WESTERN GROUP'S OBJECTION DURING 1986 TO THE CONTENTIOUS MANNER IN WHICH REPORT-WRITING EXERCISES HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED. BUTLER PROPOSED THAT WESTERN GROUP ACCEPT GROUP OF SEVEN'S SUGGESTIONS DEALING WITH REPORT-WRITING REFORMS, BUT DEFER STATING THAT THE OTHER SUGGESTIONS -- TO REFORM THE MANNER IN WHICH SUBSIDIARY BODIES ARE ESTABLISHED AND FUNCTION -- ARE UNACCEPTABLE. -- BEESLEY, NOTING THAT PAPER HAD NOT BEEN CIRCULATED PREVIOUSLY TO G-21, EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT ACCEPTANCE BY G-21, WHILE BELGIUM AND OTHERS POSTULATED THAT G-21 WOULD LINK ACCEPTANCE OF REPORT-WRITING REFORMS TO ACCEPTANCE BY WEST OF REFORM IN ESTABLISHING SUBSIDIARY BODIES. NO DISAGREEMENT WAS EXPRESSED WITH VIEW THAT WEST WOULD NOT ACCEPT LINKAGE. - AMB FRIEDERSDORF NOTED THAT, QUESTIONS OF PROCEDURES FOR SUBSIDIARY BODIES AND OF POSSIBLE LINKAGE BETWEEN IT AND REPORT-WRITING ASIDE, THERE WERE SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SUGGESTIONS FOR REPORT- WRITING REFORM. HE OBJECTED STRONGLY TO PROPOSED "REFORM" CALLING FOR THE NAMING OF DELEGATIONS WHO ARTICULATE VIEWS IN FORMAL AND INFORMAL PLENARY SESSIONS AS AN INVITATION TO NAME-CALLING, AND POINTED OUT THAT THE SUGGESTED "GUIDELINE" CALLING FOR "PRECISE DESCRIPTION" OF THE CD'S WORK COULD LEAD OTHERS TO INTERPRET THAT AS A CALL FOR VOLUMINOUS REPORTS. QUESTION OF SUMMARIES OF INFORMAL PLENARY PROCEDURES WAS ALSO RAISED. B. NUCLEAR TEST BAN -- -- WESTERN COORDINATOR YAMADA SAID THERE WERE NO NEW DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE "MEXICAN" DRAFT MANDATE (CD/772), BUT A DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED WESTERN STATEMENT ON NTB HAD BEEN CIRCULATED WITHIN GROUP. NO ONE RAISED ANY OBJECTIONS. C. OUTER SPACE -- -- AMB MOREL REPORTED THAT ARGENTINE AMB CAMPORA CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR DECLARATION IN OS AHC FINAL REPORT THAT CD STATES HAD NOT PERMANENTLY DEPLOYED WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE, BUT CAMPORA APPEARED TO REALIZE, FROM INITIAL WESTERN RESPONSE, THAT PROPOSAL WILL FACE DIFFICULTY DURING REPORT-WRITING PROCESS. 10. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 167 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08410 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): OUTER SPACE AD HOC COMMITTEE MEETINGS, JULY 7 - JULY 28, 1987 REFS: (A) 86 GENEVA 6102 (CD-130) (B) GENEVA 7524 1. THIS IS CD152. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY -- -- AHC CONSIDERED FINAL ITEM OF ITS 1987 WORK PROGRAM ("EXISTING PROPOSALS AND FUTURE INITIATIVES ON PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE") AT JULY 7, 14, 21, AND 28 SESSIONS. FIRST THREE MEETINGS WERE SHORT AND POORLY ATTENDED; EASTERN REPS REPEATED STANDARD PROPOSALS TO BAN ASAT SYSTEMS, GUARANTEE IMMUNITY OF SATELLITES, AND ESTABLISH INTERNATIONAL SPACE VERIFICATION INSPECTORATE; NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED (G-21) SHOWED APPARENT INDIFFERENCE TO SUBJECT; AND WESTERN REPS RARELY SPOKE. END SUMMARY. 3. JULY 7 MEETING -- -- GDR PRESENTED WORKING PAPER ENTITLED "PROPOSAL FOR A STRUCTURED DISCUSSION OF ITEM 3 OF THE PROGRAM OF WORK: EXISTING PROPOSALS AND FUTURE INITIATIVES ON THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE" (CD/OS/WP.18). PAPER CITES INCOMPLETENESS OF EXISTING LEGAL REGIME AND SEEKS REMEDIES FOR THIS PROBLEM BY REITERATING LONG-HELD EASTERN PROPOSALS ON: THE ENUMERATION OF AGREEMENTS PREVENTING THE DEPLOYMENT OF ARMS IN SPACE; DEVELOPMENT OF AMENDMENTS AND PROTOCOLS TO THE OUTER SPACE TREATY; MORATORIA ON DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, AND DEPLOYMENT OF ASATS AND "SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS;" AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND VERIFICATION ORGANIZATIONS. -- ROMANIA NOTED DEFICIENCIES IN THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME, URGED NEGOTIATIONS, AND ENDORSED A "ROLLING TEXT" APPROACH TO REPORT DRAFTING. - ARGENTINAN REP (GARCIA MORITAN) REITERATED 1986 REQUEST (REF A) FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION TO FACILITATE ACCESS BY THIRD WORLD NATIONS TO SPACE RESOURCES, TO GUARANTEE THE PEACEFUL USE OF SPACE, AND TO PREVENT THE CURRENT SPACE POWERS FROM EXERCISING EXCLUSIVE CONTROL IN THIS AREA. ALSO REPEATED WAS STANDING ARGENTINE UNHAPPINESS WITH U.S. POSTURE DURING 1982 FALKLAND'S WAR IN TERMS 'OF CLAIM THAT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM MILITARY SATELLITES WAS USED FOR MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST NONALIGNED STATES. THE CD WAS URGED TO ADOPT MEASURES TO PRECLUDE FUTURE OCCURRENCE. 161' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- USSR REVIEWED IN DETAIL PREVIOUS OUTER SPACE NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS, ARGUING THAT SUFFICIENT MATERIAL NOW EXISTED TO DELINEATE ISSUES WHERE NEGOTIATIONS WERE POSSIBLE. SOVIET REP (ZHARKOV) ALSO NOTED PROPOSALS FOR VERIFYING SPACE ARMS CONTROL MEASURES AND REITERATED USSR COMMITMENT TO "ADEQUATE VERIFICATION FULLY IN KEEPING WITH THE SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF MEASURES ADOPTED." HE CONCLUDED BY REMINDING THE AHC OF THE "VAST GAPS" IN THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME AND BY ATTACKING SDI. 4. JULY 14 MEETING -- -- SOVIET REP (ZHARKOV) CHARGED "A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES" IN THE CD WITH BLOCKING THE BEGINNING OF MULTILATERAL OUTER SPACE NEGOTIATIONS, AND AGAIN REVIEWED THE FULL SPECTRUM OF SOVIET PROPOSALS. REP THEN CITED SEVERAL EXAMPLES OF PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF SPACE SCIENCE UNDERTAKEN BY USSR, REITERATED SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A WORLD SPACE ORGANIZATION TO COORDINATE AND MANAGE SUCH EFFORTS ON A GLOBAL SCALE, AND EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO LAUNCH SPACECRAFT OF OTHER COUNTRIES WITH SOVIET ROCKETS. -- BULGARIAN REP REPEATED STANDARD EASTERN ARGUMENTS ON OS ISSUES. IN ENDORSING PROPOSALS TO GUARANTEE IMMUNITY OF SATELLITES, HE DISMISSED CONCERNS OF THOSE RELUCTANT TO AFFORD SUCH PROTECTION TO "DUAL-CAPABLE" SYSTEMS, STATING THAT TO BE MILITARILY RELIABLE, A SYSTEM WITH MILITARY CAPABILITIES MUST BE TESTED IN A MILITARY MODE. HE DENIED THAT ARTICLE 2 OF THE UN CHARTER WAS APPLICABLE TO THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT, AND URGED THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SPECIFIC NEW PROPOSAL THAT GUARDS AGAINST THE THREAT OF USE OF FORCE IN SPACE. -- ARGENTINE AMB. CAMPORA CALLED ATTENTION TO JUNE 30 FRENCH PRESENTATION ON ASAT SYSTEMS (REF B), NOTING THAT FRENCH EXPERT HAD OUTLINED BROAD SPECTRUM OF WAYS BY WHICH A SATELLITE COULD BE ATTACKED.AND THAT PRESENTATION HAD "CREATED DOUBTS" FOR HIM ABOUT THE PRECISE TYPE OF AGREEMENT TO BAN ASATS. SINCE A SATELLITE CAN BE COMPROMISED OR DESTROYED IN MANY WAYS, CAMPORA SAID, THE AHC MUST DEVELOP A "VERY CLEAR CONCEPT" OF WHAT IT WANTS TO BAN. HE ASKED, ON THE BASIS OF FRENCH 16Ss Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 EXPERT PRESENTATION ON DEFINITION AND TERMINOLOGY (REF B), WHETHER FRENCH DEL BELIEVED AN ASAT AGREEMENT WAS FEASIBLE, OR TECHNICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. FRENCH REP RESPONDED THAT JUNE 30 PRESENTATION WAS INTENDED ONLY TO STRESS THE COMPLEX CHARACTER OF THE THREAT, NOT TO ENGAGE IN POLITICIZATION OF THE ISSUE. 5. JULY 21 MEETING -- -- GDR .ENDORSED SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION INSPECTORATE, CLAIMING THAT INSPECTIONS OF PAYLOADS PRIOR TO LAUNCH WOULD REVEAL THEIR MISSION AND THUS GUARANTEE THE NONDEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS IN SPACE. HE ALSO URGED ADOPTION OF SO-CALLED "RULES OF THE ROAD" FOR SATELLITES AND, IN VIEW OF THE "IMMINENT" DEPLOYMENT OF SDI, CALLED FOR IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATION OF A TREATY PROHIBITING THE EMPLACEMENT OF WEAPONS IN SPACE. -- ARGENTINE AMB. CAMPORA SUBMITTED DRAFT OF PROPOSED CONSENSUS STATEMENT FOR INCLUSION IN AHC FINAL REPORT THAT "NO STATE WHICH IS A MEMBER OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT HAS STATIONED WEAPONS ON A PERMANENT BASIS IN OUTER SPACE." CAMPORA SAID THAT HIS PROPOSAL WOULD NOT PREJUDICE DISCUSSION OF OTHER SUBJECTS, SUCH AS THE DEFINITION OF A SPACE WEAPON, AND WOULD PREVENT COMMENCEMENT OF ANY DEPLOYMENTS OF THIS TYPE. HE CLAIMED THAT A STATE WOULD "CAST SUSPICION ON ITSELF, ITS MOTIVATIONS, AND ITS ACTIVITIES" IF IT OBJECTED TO HIS STATEMENT. -- CHINA CRITICIZED THE U.S. AND THE USSR FOR FAILING TO PRODUCE CONCRETE RESULTS FROM THEIR CURRENT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND URGED BOTH POWERS TO TAKE THE LEAD IN DEVELOPING "PRACTICAL MEASURES TO PROHIBIT COMPLETELY AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE." IN THIS CONTEXT HE REITERATED PRC SUPPORT FOR A PROHIBITION OF ASAT SYSTEMS AND CALLED FOR RESTRICTIONS ON MORE EXOTIC ASAT WEAPON TECHNOLOGIES. -- U.S. REP MADE BRIEF STATEMENT NOTING THAT THERE WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL TECHNICAL, POLITICAL, AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH AN INTER- NATIONAL VERIFICATION INSPECTORATE. -- COMMENT: AFTER ADJOURNMENT OF MEETING, SOVIET REP ZHARKOV TOLD U.S. REP THAT USSR NST DELEGATION APPEARED TO BE DEVELOPING AN EVEN "MORE AMENABLE ATTITUDE" TOWARDS MULTILATERAL CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN, NOT FURTHER DEFINED, OUTER SPACE ISSUES IN THE FUTURE. HE URGED U.S. TO GIVE SOME THOUGHT TO FUTURE DIRECTION OF AHC WORK. REP RESPONDED THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO CONSIDER 1988 WORK PROGRAM FOR 170 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET AHC. END COMMENT. 6. JULY 28 MEETING -- -- HUNGARY CALLED FOR A GUARANTEE OF FULL IMMUNITY FOR ALL EXISTING SATELLITES, ARGUING THAT SINCE NONE CONTAINS ANY ARMAMENTS AT THIS POINT, THERE IS NO NEED TO DIS- TINGUISH BETWEEN THEM. THE STATEMENT URGED NEGOTIATION OF A MULTILATERAL TREATY ON THIS SUBJECT, CLAIMING THAT THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME WAS "INADEQUATE" IN THIS AREA, AND THAT "RELIABLE VERIFICATION" COULD BE CARRIED OUT USING AN INTERNATIONAL SPACE VERIFICATION INSPECTORATE, CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS, AND INSPECTION DEVICES. -- UK REP SEVERELY CRITICIZED SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR AN ASAT BAN, SATELLITE IMMUNITY, AND COMPREHENSIVE OUTER SPACE TREATIES, STATING THAT THEY MAY SERVE THE SOVIET BILATERAL NEGOTIATING POSITION, BUT HAVE "LITTLE PRACTICAL VALUE" FOR THE AHC. HE REJECTED PROPOSALS FOR THE CD TO CONSIDER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTER- NATIONAL SPACE ORGANIZATION, NOTING THAT IT WOULD FALL WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF COPUOS. IN SETTING FORTH IDEAS FOR FURTHER STUDY BY. THE CD "AT AN APPROPRIATE POINT," BEDFORD CALLED ATTENTION TO THE POSSIBLE MULTILATER- ALIZING OF EXISTING BILATERAL AGREEMENTS, A MONITORING ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL SATELLITES, CONSTRAINTS ON SOME ELEMENTS OF ANTI-SATELLITE ACTIVITY, AND A RULES OF THE ROAD AGREEMENT FOR SPACE. HE URGED WIDER ADHERENCE TO AND BETTER COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING AGREEMENTS, AND SUGGESTED DEVELOPMENT BY THE CD OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. IN THIS CONTEXT, BEDFORD SAID THAT THE ABM TREATY'S WITHDRAWAL PERIOD MIGHT BE EXTENDED. HE CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT "IMPORTANT PRELIMINARY WORK" COULD BE UNDERTAKEN ON VERIFICATION, AND THAT UNTIL THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE EXTENT OF THE EXISTING LEGAL REGIME, THE CURRENT "AVALANCHE" OF PROPOSALS WILL REMAIN "INDIGESTIBLE." -- VENEZUELAN AMB. TAYLHARDAT URGED THAT ARTICLE IV OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY BE AMENDED BY ADDING THE PHRASE "OR ANY TYPE OF SPACE WEAPON" TO THE FIRST PARAGRAPH AFTER THE PHRASE "OR ANY OTHER KINDS OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION." HE CLAIMED SUCH AN AMENDMENT WOULD BE "SIMPLE", RESULTING IN A.STRONGER TREATY THAT WOULD BAN ALL WEAPONS FROM SPACE. TAYLHARDAT ALSO CALLED FOR WORK ON A COMPREHENSIVE TREATY PROHIBITING ANY ARMED ACTIVITY IN SPACE. -- WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE ROLE OF THE NST NEGOTIATIONS, AUSTRALIAN REP LETTS SAID THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THROUGH MULTILATERAL DISARMEMENT MACHINERY, HAD A LEGITIMATE ROLE TO PLAY IN THE PREVENTION OF 171 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE. THE EXISTING LEGAL REGIME WAS NOT A "FOOLPROOF GUARANTEE" TO PREVENT AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE. AS EXAMPLES OF THIS, LETTS SAID, THAT REGIME OFFERED "VERY LITTLE" IN THE WAY OF "SPECIFIC PROTECTION" FOR SATELLITES AND THAT NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT COULD DESTROY SATELLITES WERE NOT PROHIBITED. SHE URGED THAT AHC DRAFT A LIST OF QUESTIONS ON THESE TOPICS AND PRESENT THEM TO LEGAL AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS FOR ADVICE AS PART OF AN EFFORT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN PERMISSIBLE AND NON-PERMISSIBLE USES OF SPACE. LETTS PRAISED CANADIAN PAXSAT EFFORT, STATING THAT IT SHOWED THAT COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE TWO MAJOR SPACE POWERS COULD BE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE VERIFICATION PROCESS, AND URGED CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE MONITORING AGENCY AS A "POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION" TO VERIFICATION, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND TRANSPARENCY. -- ALGERIA GAVE ROUTINE PRESENTATION THAT PRAISED OUTER SPACE SECTIONS OF 1986 HARARE DECLARATION, EXPRESSED ALARM OVER APPEARANCE OF NEW SPACE WEAPONS, AND URGED IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS. -- SOVIET REP ZHARKOV SAID THAT THE AHC HAS EXHAUSTED THE BULK OF ITS CURRENT MANDATE AND WORK PROGRAM AND URGED THAT THE FUTURE WORK OF THE AHC FOCUS ON DIS- CUSSION OF EXISTING PROPOSALS, FUTURE INITIATIVES, AND "SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS" AIMED AT ELABORATING AGREEMENTS. HE CHARGED THE U.S. "ALONE" WITH TRYING TO CONVINCE THE AHC THAT THE EXISTING LEGAL REGIME, BASED ON ARTICLE 2 (4) OF THE UN CHARTER, IS SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE. HE CLAIMED THAT THIS POSTURE WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE NST AND CW TALKS, WHERE THE UN CHARTER ALSO APPLIES. ZHARKOV ALSO CRITICIZED U.S. POSTURE ON SATELLITE IMMUNITY, CLAIMING THAT IF U.S. COULD ACCEPT "GENERAL PROVISIONS" IN THE UN CHARTER AND THE OUTER SPACE TREATY COVERING THE IMMUNITY OF SATELLITES, IT SHOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THE NEGOTIATION OF A MORE SPECIFIC AGREEMENT THAT STRENGTHENS THOSE TREATIES WITH "CLEAR-CUT LEGAL OBLIGATIONS AND VERIFICATION PROVISIONS." HE ASKED FOR AN EXPLANATION OF HOW THE US F-15 ASAT SYSTEM WOULD FIT INTO AN ASAT REGIME AND CONCLUDED BY REENDORSING THE USSR PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL SPACE VERIFICATION INSPECTORATE. ? -- MONGOLIAN AMB. BAYART REITERATED STANDARD EASTERN OUTER SPACE THEMES IN CONCLUDING STATEMENT FOR EASTERN GROUP, INCLUDING SUGGESTION FOR MORE INTENSE DISCUSSION OF PROPOSALS AND INITIATIVES IN 1988, AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF "CONSENSUS POINTS OF DEPARTURE" FOR NEGOTIATIONS. HE URGED THAT EFFORTS IN 1988 FOCUS ON A BAN ON ASAT SYSTEMS, IMMUNITY FOR SATELLITES, 17'2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 cFrRFT 25X1 AND A CODE OF CONDUCT. -- FRENCH AMB. MOREL, IN CONCLUDING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE WESTERN GROUP, SAID THAT CD WORK ON OUTER SPACE HAD NOT YET REACHED A LEVEL OF COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT WOULD PERMIT A MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO THE ISSUE, AND THAT PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE COMMITTEE ARE ONLY "ONE PART" OF THE "NECESSARY EXPLORATORY WORK." WORK HAD NOT YET REACHED A STAGE REQUIRING A GROUP OF EXPERTS, MOREL SAID. HE CRITICIZED ARGENTINE AMB. CAMPORA'S JULY 21 PROPOSAL TO AHC FOR A DECLARATION BY CD STATES OF NON-DEPLOYMENT OF SPACE WEAPONS; AND CONCLUDED BY EMPHASIZING THE "VASTNESS OF THE TASK AHEAD" FOR THE COMMITTEE. -- NO G-21 SUMMARY STATEMENT WAS MADE. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 17:: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08443 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY SESSION OF JULY 30, 1987 REFS: (A) GENEVA 8225 (CD-147) (B) GENEVA 8052 (CD-142) 1. THIS IS CD-153. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- U.S., YUGOSLAVIA, AUSTRALIA, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA SPOKE. AMB. FRIEDERSDORF RESPONDED TO INACCURATE AND CRITICAL REMARKS ON U.S. CW POSITIONS MADE AT THE JULY 28 PLENARY BY IRANIAN FONMIN VELAYATI. YUGOSLAVIA COMMENTED BROADLY ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ISSUES AND, MORE SPECIFICALLY, ON MANDATES FOR CD SUBSIDIARY BODIES. AUSTRALIA, IN A LENGTHY STATEMENT, ADDRESSED NTB, NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, OUTER SPACE, CW, CPD AND THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THE CD (THE LATTER IN CONNECTION WITH EXAMINIATION OF GROUP OF SEVEN PAPER, wP.286). CZECHOSLOVAKIA SPOKE ON CPD ISSUES, CRITICIZING U.S. ACTIONS AND POSITIONS IN CPD COMMITTEE. OUTGOING JULY CD PRESIDENT, ETHIOPIAN AMB. TEREFEE, MADE BRIEF REMARKS ABOUT NEED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON AN NTB MANDATE. (U.S. STATEMENT, wP.286 DATAFAXED; AUSTRALIAN, YUGOSLAVIAN AND CZECH STATEMENTS POUCHED TO ACDA/MA.) END SUMMARY. CONFIDENTIAL 3. U.S.A. -- -- AMB. FRIEDERSDORF REPLIED BRIEFLY TO JULY 28 PLENARY STATEMENT OF IRANIAN FONMIN VELAYATI IN WHICH THE LATTER HAD CRITICIZED THE U.S. FOR "CONDONING DEPLOYMENT OF CW IN THE WAR AND JUSTIFYING ITS CONTROL ONLY IN PEACETIME." FRIEDERSDORF REMINDED THE CD OF U.S. CONDEMNATION OF ALL USES OF CW AND OUTLINED RECENT U.S. EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A HALT TO THE GULF WAR. HE ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO STRESS THAT CW CONVENTION MUST TRULY BE VERIFIABLE SO AS TO AVOID ACHIEVING MERELY A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY WHEN IT IS BROUGHT INTO FORCE. 4. YUGOSLAVIA -- -- AMB. KOSIN SAID THE CD HAD FALLEN SHORT OF ITS OBJECTIVE IN TERMS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT DESPITE A GENERALLY IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE FOR NEGOTIATIONS. HE CLAIMED, AS WELL, TO PERCEIVE A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ON VERIFICATION AS POLITICALLY IMPORTANT TO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHILE ADMITTING THAT THE CD CANNOT CHANGE THE BASIC STRATEGIES, PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES ? 174 SFPRPT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET INVOLVED, HE URGED THE CD TO HELP CLARIFY DISARMAMENT ISSUES. -- FORESHADOWING CD EXAMINATION OF GROUP OF SEVEN PAPER, WP.286, SUGGESTING PROCEDURAL CHANGES, ON THE ISSUE OF MANDATES, KOSIN SAID THE GOOD INTENTIONS OF THE CD ARE BEING THWARTED BY "PROCEDURAL" MANUEVERINGS. MANDATES FOR SUBSIDIARY BODIES SHOULD BE BASED ON THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE ITSELF, THUS PERMITTING PROGRESS ON SUBSTANCE THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROGRAMS OF WORK RATHER THAN MANDATES. 5. AUSTRALIA -- -- AMB. BUTLER SAID THAT, SINCE THE WORK OF THE CD WOULD SOON BE JUDGED BY SSOD III, HE FELT IT NECESSARY TO ADDRESS A NUMBER OF AGENDA ITEMS. THE RECENT ELECTIONS IN AUSTRALIA ALSO PROMPTED HIM TO UNDERTAKE SUCH A LENGTHY AND BROAD REVIEW TO MAKE CLEAR AUSTRALIA'S VIEWS. -- BUTLER ATTACHED "HIGHEST PRIORITY" TO A CTB, RECALLING THAT THE AUSTRALIAN RESOLUTION (41/47) IN THE UNGA LAST YEAR HAD ACHIEVED REMARKABLE SUPPORT AND ASKING WHY THIS SUPPORT HAD NOT BEEN TRANSLATED INTO TANGIBLE WORK DURING THE CURRENT CD SESSION. HE SAID THAT THE CD SHOULD NOT INDULGE IN ANY MORE DISPUTES ABOUT "MANDATE LANGUAGE OR IN OTHER FORMS OF SHADOWPLAY." BUTLER COMPLAINED THAT, THANKS TO THE WORK OF THE "SMALLEST HANDFUL OF DELEGATIONS" (READ INDIA, MEXICO), THE CD HAS BEEN PREVENTED FROM WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION TO THE MANDATE QUESTION AND THAT THE RULE OF CONSENSUS SHOULD NOT EVOLVE INTO A RULE OF VETO. -- ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, BUTLER SUPPORTED RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARSENALS. HE CALLED THE SOVIETS DISAVOWAL, BOTH OF THE DOCTRINE OF DETERRENCE AND THAT THEIR MILITARY FORCES CONSTITUTE A DETERRENT, "INTELLECTUALLY UNRESPECTABLE". DETERRENCE WAS A "FLAWED" DOCTRINE, BUTLER SAID, BUT IT IS PRACTICED BY ALL NUCLEAR STATES AND BY SOME NON-NUCLEAR STATES AS WELL. THE ONLY SOLUTION WAS TO NEGOTIATE BRACKETED AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS. (COMMENT: ON THE WHOLE, BUTLER'S REMARKS CONTRAST FAIRLY FAVORABLY WITH NEW ZEALAND 23 JULY STATEMENT CRITICAL OF WESTERN APPROACH TO DETERRENCE. THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION OF "DIVISIBLE" 25X1 175 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS.) -- REGARDING OUTER SPACE, BUTLER SAID THERE WAS A NEED TO MONITOR THE MILITARY USES OF OUTER SPACE, UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION, AND CLAIMED THAT THE PRESENT LEGAL REGIME WAS INSUFFICIENT. BUTLER ADDED THAT VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH ANY NEW REGIME WOULD BE OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE AND SAID THE CD COULD MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION IN THIS AREA. HE ENDORSED AN INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR VERIFICATION BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MUCH WORK REMAINED TO BE DONE ON THE ISSUES OF TECHNOLOGICAL FEASIBILITY AND COST EFFECTIVENESS. -- ON CW, BUTLER REJECTED THE NOTION THAT THERE WAS NO PROGRESS BEING MADE, NOTING THAT THE REMAINING ISSUES WERE PARTICULARLY COMPLEX ONES. THE AREAS IN WHICH MOST PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE, HE SAID, WERE CHALLENGE INSPECTION, COMMERCIAL SUPERTOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS AND DISCUSSION OF THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL. BUTLER SUPPORTED THE CALL FOR ALL CD DELEGATIONS TO DECLARE WHETHER OR NOT THEY POSSESSED CW. -- CALLING FOR A CPD TO BE FINISHED THIS YEAR, BUTLER SAID IT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO THE UNGA AT LEAST SUBSTANTIALLY FREE OF BRACKETS. IN A PROBABLE REFERENCE TO U.S. DEL ACTION IN THE CPD COMMITTEE, HE URGED THAT RESOLVED ISSUES SHOULD NOT BE RE-OPENED. -- BUTLER CONCLUDED WITH A DISCUSSION OF WP.286. HE URGED ACCEPTANCE OF GROUP'S SUGGESTIONS ON IMPROVING PREPARATION OF THE CD'S ANNUAL REPORT. ON THE QUESTION OF ESTABLISHEMENT OF SUBSIDIARY BODIES, BUTLER SAID AUSTRALIAN DEL CONSIDERED REPORT PROVED A "SENSIBLE SOLUTION TO MANDATE CONTROVERSIES, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED COMPLEXITY OF ISSUES AND POSSIBLE NEED OF FURTHER STUDY. IN LIGHT OF CD'S GENERIC MANDATE PURSUANT TO PARA 120 OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT, BUTLER SAID HE SOUGHT TO END CD'S ARGUMENTS ON SPECIFIC MANDATES. INSTEAD, THE CD SHOULD WORK OUT PROGRAMS OF WORK FOR EACH SUBSIDIARY BODY, WHERE SUBSTANCE, NOT FORM, WOULD BE AT ISSUE. (COMMENT: AS NOTED REF B, U.S. DEL CONSIDERS GROUP OF SEVEN'S SUGGESTION THAT SUBSIDIARY BODIES BE ESTABLISHED FOR gLL AGENDA ITEMS TO BE UNACCEPTABLE.) 176 crrocT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SFCRFT 25X1 6. CZECHOSLOVAKIA -- -- SPEAKING FOR EASTERN GROUP, AMB. VEJVODA ADDRESSED CPD. A CPD WITHOUT A NUCLEAR TEST BAN, EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR OR SPECIFIC MEASURES OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED COMPREHENSIVE, HE SAID. VEJVODA BEMOANED THE BRACKETING OF CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE CPD TEXT AND URGED THOSE COUNTRIES WHO INSISTED ON BRACKETS TO RECONSIDER. VEJVODA SINGLED OUT THE U.S. DELEGATION FOR CRITICISM, ACCUSING THE U.S. OF HAVING LAUNCHED A RECENT EFFORT TO BRACKET ALREADY AGREED TEXT. VEJVODA ARGUED FOR THE NEED TO INCLUDE A PROVISION ON THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE IN THE CPD'S MAIN CHAPTER ON DISARMAMENT MEASURES. 7. AT SUBSEQUENT INFORMAL PLENARY SESSION, WP.286 WAS INTRODUCED, BUTNO ONE WANTED TO TACKLE THE TOUGH ISSUES, AND DISCUSSION WAS POSTPONED UNTIL LATER. ?PETRONE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN ' 177 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE GENEVA 08466 CORRECTEDCOPYCD NUMBER CHANGED ORIGINALLY PROCESSED UNDER CDS 5709464 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): SOVIET BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC) DATA EXCHANGE DECISION REF: GENEVA 4403 (CD-083) 1. THIS IS CD-154. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. AT BILATERAL CW MEETING ON TUESDAY, AUGUST 4, 1987, SOVIET REP BATSANOV INFORMED U.S. DEL THAT THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAD TAKEN ACTION TO IMPLEMENT THE DATA EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AGREED IN APRIL 1987 BY THE PARTIES TO THE 1972 BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN . WEAPONS CONVENTION (REFTEL). HE PROVIDED U.S. REPS WITH TASS PRESS RELEASE. (TEXT PARA 4 BELOW). 3. U.S. REP MIKULAK WELCOMED SOVIET ACTION, NOTED THAT U.S. PREPARATIONS FOR THE DATA EXCHANGE WERE ALSO UNDERWAY, AND STRESSED THAT IT WAS THE QUALITY OF THE DATA PROVIDED THAT SHOULD BE THE BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE VALUE OF THE AGREED MEASURES. 4. TEXT OF TASS PRESS RELEASE FOLLOWS. BEGIN TEXT: MOSCOW AUGUST 3 TASS - THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS CONSIDERED AND APPROVED THE MEASURES EFFECTED BY MINISTRIES AND DEPARTMENTS UPON THE RESULTS OF THE SECOND CONFERENCE TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION, HELD IN GENEVA IN SEPTEMBER 1986, AND A MEETING OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS HELD IN KEEPING WITH THAT CONFERENCE'S RECOMMENDATION IN MARCH-APRIL 1987. THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS NOTED THAT AT THOSE CONFERENCES IMPORTANT ARRANGEMENTS WERE REACHED ON CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CONVENTION AND STEP UP INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF THE PEACEFUL USES OF THE BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE. THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS COMMITTED COMPETENT MINISTRIES AND DEPARTMENTS TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO REALIZE UNRESERVEDLY AND EFFICIENTLY THE AFORE- MENTIONED ARRANGEMENTS AS REGARDS THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND DATA ON THE ACTIVITY OF RESEARCH CENTRES AND LABORATORIES WHICH HAVE A HIGH LEVEL BIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, ON THE OUTBREAKS OF EPIDEMICS WHICH DEVIATE FROM THE NORM, AND ALSO TO ENCOURAGE THE PUBLICATION OF THE RESULTS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 17E ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 /' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 AND BROADEN CONTACTS AMONG SCIENTISTS IN THE FIELD OF BILOGY. END TEXT. 5. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 179 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 ?Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08467 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): HIGHLIGHTS OF SOVIET FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE'S 6 AUG PLENARY STATEMENT 1. THIS IS CD-154 . (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENITRE TEXT). 2. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF SOVIET FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE'S STATEMENT TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT AT ITS AUGUST 6 PLENARY SESSION (FULL TEXT DATAFAXED TO ACDA/MA): INF-- -- MAIN OBSTACLE TO AGREEMENT IS PERSHING IA. -- IF WARHEADS BELONG TO THE U.S., THEN THEY MUST BE INCLUDED IN DOUBLE ZERO AGREEMENT. ?IF THEY ARE THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS, WHY DOES FRG POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN VIOLATION OF THE NPT? -- "SOVIET PEOPLE WILL NEVER ACQUIESCE IN WEST GERMANY BECOMING A NUCLEAR POWER." -- CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT COULD VOICE OPINION ON WHETHER JOINT OWNERSHIP OF NUCLEAR ARMS BY A NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR STATE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT. -- VERIFICATION SHOULD INCLUDE CONTINUOUS MONITORING OF MISSILE DESTRUCTION, AS WELL AS VERIFICATION OF ELIMINATION OF THE RELEVANT PRODUCTION BASE AND INFRASTRUCTURE. THERE SHOULD BE MANDATORY ACCESS TO SOVIET AND U.S. MILITARY FACILITIES IN THIRD COUNTRIES WHERE MISSILES COULD BE STATIONED. VERIFICATION PHILOSOPHY -- -- SOVIET UNION ENVISIONS "FOOL-PROOF, INDISPUTABLE, RELIABLE AND THE MOST STRICT AND RIGOROUS METHODS PROVIDING 100 PERCENT CONFIDENCE THAT WEAPONS ARE INDEED BEING ELIMINATED, THAT OBLIGATIONS RELATING TO THE REMAINING WEAPONS ARE BEING COMPLIED WITH AND THAT THE BANS ARE NOT BEING CIRCUMVENTED.-11 NUCLEAR TESTING -- -- BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO BAN NUCLEAR TESTS SHOULD PROCEED CONCURRENTLY. -- CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT SHOULD ESTABLISH SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS GROUP TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON VERIFICATION OF A BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING. -- AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF GLOBAL RADIATION MONITORING, INVOLVING SPACE COMMUNICATION LINKS, SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED. SPACE -- -- ALL SPACE LAUNCHES SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO ON-SITE INSPECTION TO GUARANTEE THAT WEAPONS ARE NOT PLACED IN SPACE. NOTE THIS SHOULD BD CD-155, NOT CD-154 -- IN THE EVENT OF A TOTAL BAN ON SPACE-STRIKE 120 cornem Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET ARMS, INSPECTIONS COULD ALSO COVER STORAGE FACILITIES, INDUSTRIAL PLANTS, LABORATORIES, TESTING CENTERS, ETC. CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- -- BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAS ALMOST BEEN ATTAINED. ONLY (U.S.) BINARY PROGRAM COULD BLOCK IT. -- SOVIET DELEGATIO "WILL PROCEED FROM THE NEED TO MAKE LEGALLY BINDING THE PRINCIPLE OF MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS WITHOUT RIGHT OF REFUSAL." --"SOVIET SIDE INVITES THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS TO THE SOVIET MILITARY FACILITY AT SHIKHANY TO SEE STANDARD ITEMS OF OUR CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND TO OBSERVE THE TECHNOLOGY OF DESTROYING CHEMICAL WEAPONS AT A MOBILE FACILITY. LATER WE WILL INVITE EXPERTS TO THE SPECIALIZED PLANT FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS NOW BEING BUILT IN THE VICINITY OF CHAPAYEVSK." CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT -- -- CONFERENCE SHOULD MEET YEAR-ROUND WITH TWO OR THREE RECESSES. -- AN ADDITIONAL SESSION SHOULD BE HELD THIS YEAR TO COMPLETE MOST OF THE DRAFTING ON A CW BAN. -- CONFERENCE SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THE STATUS OF U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS. TNE ISSUE WILL BE RAISED WITH THE U.S. -- NON-NUCLEAR STATES SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN SOLVING PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. SOVIET UNION WILL ACT TO ENHANCE THE PRESTIGE OF THE CONFERENCE AS THE "PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT FORUM." 3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 25X1 181 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08498 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY SESSION OF AUGUST 4, 1987. REF GENEVA 8021 (CD-141) 1. THIS IS CD-156 . (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY-- -- GDR AND MONGOLIA TABLED BASIC PROVISIONS FOR DRAFT TREATY OUTLAWING ASATS, CD/777, WHILE ROMANIA SPOKE ROUTINELY ON CPD AND NTB, AND TOUTED BALKAN AND OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES. U.S. AMB FRIEDERSDORF REBUTTED MONGOLIA'S REITERATION OF EAST'S CLAIM THAT RECENT SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF DOUBLE ZERO APPROACH IN INF WAS A SOVIET INITIATIVE BY REMINDING CD THAT US HAD FIRST ADVANCED THAT PROPOSAL IN 1981. (CD/777 DATAFAXED, MONGOLIAN STATEMENT POUCHED TO ACDA/MA). END SUMMARY. 3. MONGOLIA-- - AMB BAYART PRAISED RECENT SOVIET ENDORSEMENT OF DOUBLE ZERO INF APPROACH AS A "NEW, EXTREMELY CONSTRUC- TIVE PROPOSAL", AND CALLED ON THE US TO DEMONSTRATE THE "SAME RESPONSIBLE APPROACH" BY REACHING AN AGREEMENT. SPEAKING AS IF MONGOLIA WERE REPRESENTING A BROAD SPECTRUM OF ASIAN STATES, BAYART ADDED THAT REDUCING NUCLEAR- CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND NAVAL FLEETS IN THE PACIFIC WOULD STRENGTHEN SECURITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AS WELL AS A WIDER CONCEPTION OF ASIAN SECURITY. -- AS EASTERN GROUP COORDINATOR ON OUTER SPACE, BAYART SUMMED UP THE AHC'S WORK THIS YEAR AS NOT HAVING MADE ANY TANGIBLE PROGRESS AND AS HAVING LARGELY REPEATED LAST YEAR'S DISCUSSIONS. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE AHC HAS "PRACTICALLY COMPLETED" ITS WORK ON IDENTIFYING THE SCOPE OF THE EXISTING LEGAL REGIME, AND HAS OUTLINED THE AREAS THAT REQUIRE THE ELABORATION OF NEW AGREEMENTS. BAYART ADDED SUPPORT OF THE EASTERN GROUP TO ARGENTINE AMB CAMPORA'S CALL (REFTEL) FOR STATES TO DECLARE WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAVE PERMANENTLY STATIONED WEAPONS IN SPACE, CRITICIZED JAPAN FOR ITS RECENT DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN SDI RESEARCH, AND URGED THE AHC IN 1988 TO FOCUS ITS ATTENTION ON PROPOSALS AND INITIATIVES FOR PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE. -- TOGETHER WITH GDR, MONGOLIA TABLED CD/777, "MAIN PROVISIONS OF A TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF ANTI- SATELLITE WEAPONS AND ON WAYS TO ENSURE THE IMMUNITY OF SPACE OBJECTS". -- ON CW, BAYART ENDORSED A UNIFORM OR LINEAR RATE OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION, AND SAID MASS SHOULD BE THE BASIS FOR MEASURING THAT RATE. NOT SUPRISINGLY, HE ALSO CALLED ON THE CONVENTION TO PUT AN IMMEDIATE HALT TO THE DEVEL- OPMENT OR PRODUCTION OF ANY TYPE OF CW. 182 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 L. ROMANIA -- -- AMB DOLGU DELIVERED A GENERALLY NON-SUBSTANTIVE STATEMENT THAT TOUCHED ON NTB, CPD, OS, AND PNW, STATING THAT CPD SHOULD BE FOCUSSED ON REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ON REDUCING MILITARY BUDGETS (THE THEME OF THE TRADITIONAL ROMANIAN UNGA RESOLUTION). REGARDING OUTER SPACE, HE NOTED THAT THE EXISTING LEGAL REGIME WAS DEFICIENT AND URGED THE OS AHC TO DEVELOP A LIST OF PROPOSALS THAT COULD SERVE AS THE BASIS OF A SO-CALLED "ROLLING TEXT." 5. GDR -- -INTRODUCING WITH MONGOLIA, CD/777, AMB ROSE ALSO LAUDED THE SOVIET DRAFT TREATY ON SPACE ISSUES TABLED IN THE BILATERAL NST NEGOTIATIONS. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 183 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08595 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY MEETING OF AUGUST 6, 1987 REF: GENEVA 8467 (CD-155) 1. THIS IS CD- 157 (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE ADDRESSED CD PLENARY (HIGHLIGHTS REPORTED SEPTEL: TEXT DATAFAXED TO WASHINGTON). FRG RESPONDED TO SOVIET QUESTION ON WHETHER FRG HAD NUCLEAR WEAPONS. U.S. REP ALSO RESPONDED ON PERSHING MISSLE ISSUE, AND CITED SEVERAL EXAMPLES OF WORK REMAINING BEFORE A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION COULD BE COMPLETED. ARGENTINA'S SPEECH ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS EMPHASIZED THAT A CW CONVENTION SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH PEACEFUL USES OF CHEMICALS. PERU RAISED POINTS ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN, CHEMICAL WEAPONS, OUTER SPACE AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. IN INFORMAL MEETING, CD FAILED TO AGREE TO ANY PROCEDURAL REFORMS SUGGESTED BY GROUP OF SEVEN. END SUMMARY. 3. FRG-- -- AMB VON STULPNAGEL, REPLYING TO SHEVARDNADZE'S QUESTION ON WHETHER THE FRG POSSESSED NUCLEAR WEAPONS, STATED THAT THE FRG HAD NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IS IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE NPT. VON STULPNAGEL SUPPORTED THE U.S. POSITION ON EXCLUDING THE PERSHING I-A MISSLES FROM THE BILATERAL US/USSR NEGOTIATIONS, AND STATED THAT ALL NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON THOSE MISSLES BELONGED TO THE UNITED STATES. 4. U.S. -- -- AMB FRIEDERSDORF WELCOMED THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE SHEVARDNADZE SPEECH THAT MIGHT BRING POSITIONS CLOSER TOGETHER, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN US AND SOVIET POSITIONS WAS ONLY ONE STEP; ALL CD MEMBER STATES HAD TO BE SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE CW NEGOTIATIONS. HE THEN CITED SOME OF THE SIGNIFICANT ISSUES REMAINING TO BE RESOLVED BEFORE A CW CONVENTION COULD BE COMPLETED -- MONITORING NONPRODUCTION IN THE CIVIL CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, THE ORGANIZATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE CONVENTION, CHALLENGE INSPECTION, SECURITY DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE TREATY'S EFFECTIVE DATE AND THE CONCLUSION OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION, THE TREATMENT OF PLANTS THAT HAVE NEVER PRODUCED CHEMICAL WEAPONS BUT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO DO SO, AND THE PROBLEM POSED BY CHEMICAL WEAPONS STATES THAT MIGHT REFUSE TO JOIN THE CONVENTION. - FRIEDERSDORF RESPONDED TO SHEVARDNADZE'S DISCUSSION OF PERSHING MISSILES IN THE FRG BY REITERATING THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT NEGOTIATE'ON THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS OR ON EXISTING PROGRAMS OF COOPERATION WITH OUR ALLIES IN THE 184 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. HE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE FRG PERSHING I-A FORCE MAKES AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO NATO SECURITY AND THAT ANY FUTURE PLANS FOR THOSE FORCES WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE FRG IN COORDINATION WITH ITS NATO ALLIES. 5. ARGENTINA AMB CAMPORA STRESSED THAT A FUTURE CHEMICAL CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS CONVENTION SHOULD NOT UNDULY INTERFERE WITH THE PEACEFUL USES OF CHEMICALS, PARTICULARLY IN RESPECT TO THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. HE ADDED THAT VERIFICATION PROVISIONS MIGHT APPLY TO SUCH TRANSFERS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE MOST DANGEROUS CHEMICAL WEAPONS SHOULD BE DESTROYED FIRST. 6. PERU -- -- COUNSELOR FELIX C. CALDERON CALLED FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN, NOTING THAT TESTING STATES ENCOURAGE HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND DREW ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR TO THE FRENCH TESTING SITE IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, WHICH, HE SAID, A DELEGATION OF THE PERMANENT COMMISSION OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC (PERU, COLUMBIA, ECUADOR, CHILE) WAS SEEKING TO INSPECT IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER TESTING CAUSED ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. HE VAGUELY REFERRED TO A NEED FOR A NEW BODY OPEN TO ALL NATIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF NEGOTIATING A CW BAN. CALDERON CITED EXAMPLES OF THE NEED TO EXPAND THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME GOVERNING OUTER SPACE, PARTICULARLY THE MULTILATERALIZING OF THE ABM TREATY AND THE NEGOTIATION OF AN ASAT BAN. HE IMPLICITLY CRITICISED THE SDI PROGRAM. 7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NN 25X1 185 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08620 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS: JULY 27-31, 1987 REFS: (A) GENEVA 8186 (CD-146) (B) STATE 190593 (C) GENEVA 8266 (CD-149) 1. THIS IS CD-158. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY .- -- IN CLUSTER IV (ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION) DELS FINISHED GUIDELINES FOR AN INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORATE AND DISCUSSED FUNCTIONS AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES OF THE CONVENTION. -- AT OPEN-ENDED CONSULTATIONS ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION WESTERN GROUP WAS UNIFIED IN PRESSING FOR STRINGENT CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROVISION. WESTERN REPS CRITICIZED CHAIRMAN'S PAPER (REF A) AS UNBALANCED AND REJECTED NON-ALIGNED PROPOSALS FOR EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REVIEW OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION REQUESTS. U.S. REPS REITERATED U.S. PROPOSAL FOR MANDATORY, SHORT-NOTICE INSPECTION OF ANY RELEVANT FACILITY. -- IN CLUSTER I (CHEMICAL WEAPONS) CHAIRMAN'S DRAFT TEXT ON "OLD MUNITIONS" WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED BY THE DELS OF CHINA, U.S.S.R. AND INDONESIA BECAUSE IT WOULD MAKE THE STATE PARTY THAT FINDS CW RESPONSIBLE FOR DELCARATION AND DESTRUCTION, RATHER THAT THE STATE THAT HAD ABANDONED THEM. -- WESTERN CW COORDINATING GROUP FOCUSED ON SCHEDULING OF .INTERSESSIONALS, CW COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN'S PAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND DRAFT U.S. PAPER ON "THRESHOLDS." GROUP UNANIMOUSLY AGREED THAT CHALLENGE INSPECTION PAPER WAS UNBALANCED AND SHOULD NOT BECOME A FORMAL DOCUMENT. AS A RESULT OF NUMEROUS CRITICAL REMARKS BY WESTERN GROUP REPS ON THRESHOLDS PAPER, U.S. DECIDED TO CONSULT FURTHER AND POSTPONE TABLING THE PAPER IN THE CD. -- TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS (U.S., U.S.S.R., SWEDEN) ON THE SCHEDULE FOR CW STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION FOCUSED ON CATEGORIZATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS/AGENTS AND TIME PHASING OF DESTRUCTION. U.S. DEL PRESENTED APPROACH CONTAINED IN GUIDANCE (REF B).SOVIET DEL EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR A "CLEARLY-SPECIFIED, MECHANICAL" APPROACH TO ISSUE OF WHAT HAS TO BE DESTROYED EACH YEAR AND EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT MORE FLEXIBLE U.S. APPROACH WOULD MEAN THAT MOST MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT STOCKS WOULD NOT BE TOUCHED UNTIL THE END OF THE DESTRUCTION PERIOD. SOVIETS ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT U.S. SUPPORT FOR "LEVELING-OUT" OF STOCKS OF DIFFERENT STATES AT SOME POINT IN THE TEN YEAR DESTRUCTION PERIOD RESEMBLED THE FRENCH SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL. END SUMMARY. 186 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 3. CLUSTER IV (CW ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION) -- -- WORK ON DRAFT "GUIDELINES" ON THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORATE WAS COMPLETED. THE CHAIRMAN (KRUTZSCH, GDR) STATED THE PAPER WOULD BE THE BASIS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND ELABORATION. HE ALSO DISTRIBUTED . A DRAFT PAPER CONTAINING PROPOSED TEXT FOR CASES OF NON-ROUTINE VERIFICATION BASED ON NORWEGIAN/CANADIAN PROPOSED ANNEX ON GENERAL PROCEDURES FOR VERIFICATION OF ALLEGED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CD/766). CHAIRMAN PROPOSED IT BE USED AS A STARTING POINT FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WHEN THERE IS MORE COMPLETE RESOLUTION OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUES. -- IN ADDITION, KRUTZSCH DISTRIBUTED A WELL WRITTEN NEW DRAFT TEXT FOR ARTICLE VIII WHICH ADDRESSES IN A SERIOUS MANNER THE ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES OF THE CONVENTION. THE PAPER PROPOSES ESTABLISHMENT OF AN "INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS" AND CHANGING THE NAME OF THE "CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE" TO THE "GENERAL CONFERENCE." IN ENSUING DISCUSSIONS ISSUES RAISED INCLUDED: (1) THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH THE ORGANS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION WILL OPERATE, (2) THE NAMES, FUNCTIONS AND INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE PRINCIPAL, EXECUTIVE AND TECHNICAL ORGANS, (3) MOST APPROPRIATE MECHANISM FOR PERIODIC REVIEWS OF THE OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION, AND (4) MECHANISMS FOR MAKING AMENDMENTS TO ANNEXES. -- ON 30 JULY, THE CHAIRMAN DISTRIBUTED EXPERTS' PAPER (UK, SWEDEN, AND GDR) ON "MODEL AGREEMENT" FOR FACILITIES PRODUCING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS. GENERAL VIEW WAS THAT PAPER CAN SERVE AS A GUIDELINE. UK EXPERT CAUTIONED IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE APPLICABLE TO A STORAGE FACILITY. -- AT THE FINAL CLUSTER MEETING, GROUP APPROVED CHAIRMAN'S REPORT ON CLUSTER IV WORK FOR THE SUMMER SESSION. CONSENSUS WAS THAT, WHILE FEW ISSUES HAD BEEN RESOLVED, THERE WAS A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUES. THE REPORT, WITH ITS ATTACHMENTS, WILL BE THE BASIS FOR FUTURE WORK. 4. CLUSTER IV (CHALLENGE INSPECTION) -- -- WESTERN GROUP PRESENTED A STRONG AND UNITED FRONT AT THE 29 JULY OPEN-ENDED CONSULTATIONS CHAIRED BY CW COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN (EKEUS, SWEDEN) AND BASED ON HIS DRAFT PAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION (REF A). U.S., FRANCE, FRG, NETHERLANDS AMBASSADORS, ACTING HEAD OF UK DELEGATION, JAPANESE DEOFF ALL DEFENDED ASPECTS OF THE WESTERN GROUP POSITION IN FAVOR OF SHORT- 187 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET NOTICE, MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS. WESTERN CW COORDINATOR (AMB VAN SCHAIK, NETHERLANDS) PRESENTED THE WESTERN GROUP POSITION THAT THE PAPER REPRESENTS ONLY THE PERSONAL VIEWS OF THE CHAIRMAN (EKEUS) AND, WHILE USEFUL AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION, HAS SERIOUS FLAWS. WESTERN REPS MADE POINT THAT OBLIGATION THIS VIEW, AND ALLOWED THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL TO DELAA GROUP DOES NOT FEEL THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ACCEDE TO A CHALLENGE INSPECTION REQUEST IS THE CENTRAL ISSUE. CHAIRMAN'S PAPER DID NOT FAIRLY REPRESENT THIS VIEW, AND ALLOWED THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL TO DELAY OR PREVENT INSPECTIONS. WHILE THE WESTERN GROUP AGREED THAT BASIC QUESTIONS PRESENTED IN THE PAPER (DOES IT DETER VIOLATIONS? DOES IT ASSURE COMPLIANCE? DOES IT BUILD CONFIDENCE?) ARE GOOD CRITERIA, THE GROUP NOTED THAT THE PAPER DOES NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ARGUMENT FOR CARRYING OUT INSPECTION ACCORDING TO THE ORIGINAL REQUEST. -- DESPITE GENERAL WESTERN GROUP AGREEMENT, DIFFERENCES BETWEEN U.S. AND UK APPROACHES TO CHALLENGE INSPECTION WERE OBVIOUS. THE UK REPEATEDLY REFERRED TO THEIR CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROPOSAL (CD/715), WHILE THE U.S. ADHERED TO ITS POSITION (CD/500). U.S.S.R. AND GDR VOICED SUPPORT FOR CD/715. - DELS OF INDIA, YUGOSLAVIA AND CHINA STRONGLY SUPPORTED A DECISION-MAKING ROLE FOR THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AS A MEANS OF AVOIDING ABUSE AND PROVIDING MAXIMUM DETERRENT VALUE. -- CHAIRMAN EKEUS ENDED THE MEETING BY SAYING THAT THE SESSION HAD GENERATED MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS, AND THAT HE WOULD SCHEDULE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS. 5. CLUSTER I (CHEMICAL WEAPONS) -- -- CLUSTER CHAIRMAN (NIEUWENHUYS, BELGIUM HELD INFORMAL DISCUSSION ON HIS DRAFT TEXT DEALING WITH DISCOVERED OLD AND OBSOLETE CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. THE PROPOSED TEXT PRESCRIBED PROCEDURES FOR DECLARING WHAT WAS FOUND AND SPECIFIED THAT, WHILE THE DISCOVERING STATE MUST ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECLARATION AND DESTRUCTION, IT MAY REQUEST ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. THE PROPOSED TEXT WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED BY DELS OF THE USSR, CHINA AND INDONESIA. (NEITHER CHINA NOR INDONESIA WANT ANY FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR OLD AND OBSOLETE MUNITIONS FOUND ON THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES). DELS FROM JAPAN AND NETHERLANDS DID NOT PARTICIPATE. THE CHAIRMAN ALSO DISTRIBUTED ANNEX MATERIAL ON VERIFICATION OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION. 188 0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 6. CW WESTERN COORDINATION -- -- THE GROUP DISCUSSED WESTERN GROUP REVIEW OF CW NEGOTIATIONS, INTERSESSIONALS AND THE CW COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN'S DRAFT PAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION. GROUP COORDINATOR VAN SCHAIK CONTINUED TO PRESS HIS IDEA OF A REVIEW. (NOTE: MOST WESTERN DELS SUPPORT VAN SCHAIK'S PROPOSAL IF THE REVIEW IS LIMITED TO DISCUSSION OF KEY ISSUES). ON INTERSESSIONALS, VAN SCHAIK PROPOSED MEETING FOR SECOND HALF OF OCTOBER, NOVEMBER, AND DECEMBER AS WELL AS JANUARY. HE PRESSED THE U.S. DEL FOR A POSITION BY 5 AUGUST "TO AVOID THE WESTERN CW GROUP BEING SEEN AS DELAYING NEGOTIATIONS." U.S. DEL HAS REQUESTED GUIDANCE (REF C). -- VAN SCHAIK ALSO PROPOSED A LEGAL EXPERTS MEETING 19-20 NOVEMBER, TO DISCUSS JURISDICTION AND CONTROL ISSUE. -- FRENCH REP (DE LA BAUME) PRESSED FOR EARLY DISCUSSION OF THE FRENCH PAPER PROPOSING A SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL. PRELIMINARY CONSENSUS IS THAT SUCH A BODY REPRESENTS IMPLICATION OF FUNCTIONS OF THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT, IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO POLITICIZED ACTION AND COULD BECOME A POTENTIAL POLITICAL FILTER. -- AT U.S. REQUEST, THE REVISED U.S. PAPER ON PRO- DUCTION THRESHOLDS WAS DISCUSSED JULY 22. THE PRO- POSED THRESHOLD LEVELS FOR SCHEDULE 2 AND 3 CHEMICALS AND THE CONCEPT OF LINKING PRODUCTIONS THRESHOLD TO FACILITY CAPACITY DECLARATIONS AND SUBSEQUENT SCHEDULING OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS WERE MAJOR ISSUES. DELEGATIONS FROM UK, JAPAN, NETHERLANDS AND AUSTRALIA WANTED LOWER THRESHOLDS FOR SCHEDULE 2 AND 3 CHEMICALS, PARTICULARLY HYDROGEN CYANIDE AND TRIMETHYL PHOSPHITE, THEY SUGGESTED THRESHOLDS RANGING FROM 10-30 TONS. AUSTRALIAN DEL PROPOSED A FOUR-TIERED THRESHOLD REGIME. THE FRG DEL OBJECTED TIEING PRODUCTION THRESHOLDS TO CAPACITY, AND SUGGESTED PRODUCTION NOT BE RELATED TO CAPACITY. JAPANESE REP SUPPORTED FRG AND ARGUED THAT LINKAGE OF PRODUCTION THRESHOLD TO CAPACITY WAS AN ENTIRELY NEW CONCEPT AND REQUESTED FURTHER CONSIDERATION. PREDOMINANT VIEW WAS THAT WHILE CAPACITY IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN DETERMINING INSPECTION REGIMES, IT SHOULD NOT BE LINKED TO THRESHOLDS AS DONE IN THE U.S. PAPER. U.S. DEL AGREED TO DELAY TABLING THE PAPER PENDING FURTHER CONSULTATIONS. 7. ORDER OF CW DESTRUCTION -- -- TWO TRILATERAL (U.S., U.S.S.R., SWEDEN) MEETINGS FOCUSED ON DIFFERENT VIEWS OF CATEGORIZATION FOR DES- TRUCTION AND PROPOSED ORDER OF DESTRUCTION. (U.S. PROPOSED 3 CATEGORIES BASED ON SCHEDULE 1-3: SOVIETS 189 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 CPMPT 25X1 PROPOSED 7 CATEGORIES. THEY SUBDIVIDE THE SUPER TOXIC LETHAL CATEGORY). THE SOVIET DEL CONCEDED THAT PARALLEL AND EQUAL DESTRUCTION IN ALL CATEGORIES WAS NOT TECHNICALLY OR ECONOMICALLY EFFICIENT. THEY STATED THAT THE FLEXIBILITY OF CHOICE OF AGENTS IN THE ORDER OF DESTRUCTION PROPOSED BY THE U.S. WOULD CREATE A POTENTIAL SECURITY IMBALANCE AND IS SIMILAR TO THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A SECURITY STOCKPILE. SOVIET DEL PREFERS A "CLEARLY-SPECIFIED, MECHANICAL" APPROACH TO WHAT CAN BE DESTROYED EACH YEAR IN ORDER TO MAKE VIOLATIONS MORE DIFFICULT, INSPECTIONS EASIER AND CONTROL STOCKPILE PROPORTIONS TO ASSURE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ALL PARTIES. SOVIET DEL AGREED THAT DES- TRUCTION BY WEIGHT WAS THE SIMPLEST AND MOST EFFECTIVE APPROACH AND THAT WEIGHT COMPARISON WOULD BE MADE WITHIN EACH CATEGORY, RATHER THAN BETWEEN CATEGORIES. SWEDISH DEL PRESENTED VARIATIONS ON THE U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS WHICH FACILITATED DISCUSSION, BUT DID NOT NARROW THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS. 8. MOSCOW MINIMIZED CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 190 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 _ CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08621 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): HIGHLIGHTS OF WEEK 0F3-7 AUGUST; WESTERN GROUP MEETING 5 AUGUST REF: GENEVA 8467 (CD-155) 1. THIS IS CD-159. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW -- -- VISIT OF SOVIET FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE WAS HIGHLIGHT OF THE WEEK. WHILE THE BULK OF HIS STATEMENT IN 6 AUGUST PLENARY WAS DEVOTED TO INF AND THE FRG PERSHING 1-A'S, SHEVARDNADZE OFFERED NEW PROPOSALS ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND VISITS TO SOVIET CW FACILITIES, AND ON NUCLEAR TESTING; AND REFINED EARLIER PROPOSALS ON OUTER SPACE. -- WIND-UP OF SUBSTANTIVE WORK IN COMMITTEES IS CONTINUING, SAVE FOR CPD, WHICH IS INTO THE SECOND READING OF THE DRAFT DOCUMENT, AND THE CONFERENCE IS BEGINNING TO PREPARE ITS REPORT TO THE UNGA, STILL LARGELY AT THE COMMITTEE LEVEL. AT THE PLENARY LEVEL, A WESTERN EFFORT TO REFORM THE REPORT- PREPARATION PROCESS FAILED. CD'S SEISMIC EXPERTS GROUP CONCLUDED ITS TWO-WEEK SESSION (REPORT SEPTEL). -- IN CW, WORK ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION CONTINUED TO BE MOST PROMINENT IN THE CD, WHILE THE U.S. AND USSR CONCLUDED ROUND VI OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH MIXED RESULTS. - AMB. FRIEDERSDORF TOLD WESTERN GROUP THAT U.S. DEL HOPES TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON CW INTERSESSIONAL MEETINGS SOON. -- WESTERN GROUP MEETING PRODUCED SOME SMOKE BUT NO FIRE IN FOCUS ON HIROSHIMA DAY AND CW. END SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW. 3. SHEVARDNADZE AUG 6 PLENARY STATEMENT -- -- REFTEL HIGHLIGHTED MAIN POINTS IN SHEVARDNADZE'S STATEMENT,LARGELY ON INF AND THE FRG'S PERSHING 1-A'S. ON NUCLEAR TESTING, SHEVARDNADZE REPEATED STANDARD SOVIET POSITIONS, BUT INTRODUCED A NEW ELEMENT BY CALLING FOR AN EXPERTS GROUP TO CONSIDER ALL ASPECTS OF VERIFYING A COMPREHENSIVE BAN AND TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CD ON THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF A VERIFICATION SYSTEM FOR A WEAPONS TEST BAN. HE ALSO CALLED FOR ESTABLISHING A GLOBAL RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM TO ASSIST IN BOTH CTB VERIFICATION, AND, AT THE SAME TIME, IN ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING. ON OUTER SPACE, SHEVARDNADZE OFFERED SOME EMBELLISHMENTS ON PROPOSALS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION AT LAUNCH SITES OR ELSEWHERE--FIRST MADE IN THE CD IN FEBRUARY BY 191 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SOVIET FIRST DEPFONMIN VORONTSOV. -- OF MOST IMPORTANCE WAS THE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE "PRINCIPLE OF MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION WITHOUT RIGHT OF REFUSAL" FOR A CW CONVENTION. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. REPS, SOVIET DELOFFS HAVE SAID THIS MEANS ACCESS ANYWHERE, WITHOUT REGARD TO FORM OF OWNERSHIP, AND WITH ANY STATE HAVING THE RIGHT TO REQUEST AN INSPECTION. -- ALSO IMPORTANT WAS SHEVARDNADZE'S INVITATIONS TO VISIT SOVIET CW PROVING GROUND AND CW DESTRUCTION FACILITIY AND OFFER TO SHOW STANDARD SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS. SOVIETS HAVE TOLD U.S. DEL THEY NOW ACCEPT THE U.S. INVITATION TO VISIT TOOELE IN OCTOBER. ^ SHEVARDNADZE ALSO PROPOSED ACCELERATING THE PACE OF THE CW NEGOTIATIONS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH A REVISED MEETING SCHEDULE FOR THE CD ITSELF, DESIGNED TO INTENSIFY ITS WORK. 4. CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- -- IN ADDITION TO THE SHEVARDNADZE PROPOSALS, ROUND VI OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS CONCLUDED ON 7 AUGUST. IN THE CD, MAIN ITEM WAS CONTINUATION OF COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN EKEUS' PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION AT DEL HEAD LEVEL. 5. WESTERN GROUP MEETING 5 AUGUST -- -- GROUP AGREED TO SUPPORT GROUP OF SEVEN'S (CHINA, AUSTRALIA, CANADA, INDIA, MEXICO, HUNGARY, USSR) SUGGESTION FOR PROCEDURAL REFORM OF REPORT-WRITING THAT WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN A SIMPLIFIED TREATMENT OF AGENDA ITEMS FOR WHICH SUBSIDIARY BODIES HAVE NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. (HOWEVER, WHEN CD SUBSEQUENTLY TOOK THIS UP IN INFORMAL PLENARY ON AUG 6, THE EAST BLOCKED AGREEMENT BY LINKING THIS MATTER TO CHANGES IN RULES FOR ESTABLISHING SUBSIDIARY BODIES THAT ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST. THE G-21 REMAINED SILENT.) -- A LENGTHY AND EMBARRASING EXCHANGE TOOK PLACE ON WHETHER THE WEST SHOULD SPEAK ON HIROSHIMA DAY, AUG 6, WITH DUTCH AMB. VAN SCHAIK INSISTING, AND JAPANESE AMB. YAMADA FIRMLY REFUSING TO SPEAK FOR WEST. AUSTRALIA AND CANADA SUPPORTED DUTCH. UK AND U.S. DECLINED TO VOLUNTEER. (COMMENT: VAN SCHAIK'S PERSISTENCE, TYPICAL OF HIS APPROACH AS CW WESTERN COORDINATOR, WAS BASED ON THE ANTICIPATION THAT SHEVARDNADZE WOULD USE HIROSHIMA AS A THEME. HOWEVER, HE NEVER MENTIONED HIROSHIMA.) -- ON CW, AMB. FRIEDERSDORF RESPONDED TO QUERIES ON 192 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET U.S. VIEWS ON INTERSESSIONAL SCHEDULE BY SAYING HE HOPED TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS SOON. -- ON OUTER SPACE, COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, ITALIAN AMB. PUGLIESI, TOLD U.S. DELOFF THAT WHILE SECRETARIAT DRAFT OF COMMITTEE REPORT SEEMS BALANCED, HE ANTICIPATED VIGOROUS EFFORT BY G-21 TO DIRECT REPORT'S CONCLUSIONS TOWARD RECOMMENDATION OF ENHANCED MANDATE FOR ADDITIONAL SUBSTANTIVE WORK IN 1988. (AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN DELOFFS HAVE SEPARATELY INDICATED AN INTEREST IN EARLY PLANNING FOR "CONSTRUCTIVE AND POSITIVE" WORK IN 1988.) 6. GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC (SEISMIC) EXPERTS -- -- CONSIDERABLE WRANGLING OVER NAMING AND TITLING OF EXPERTS TO LEAD VARIOUS ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH EFFORT TO DESIGN A MODERN DATA EXCHANGE SYSTEM, AND WITH SERIES OF EXPERIMENTS WITH LEVEL II (FULL WAVEFORM) DATA, WAS RESOLVED. SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO AGREE TO STATE EXPLICITLY THAT ALL PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD BE ABLE FREELY TO COMMUNICATE WITH ALL INTERNATIONAL DATA CENTERS MAY PRESAGE AN EFFORT TO USE MOSCOW INTERNATIONAL DATA CENTER TO FILTER DATA FROM OTHER STATES' SEISMIC STATIONS IN THE REGION. MARSH END dF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 193 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08648 TAGS. PARM, UNGA, CDG SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION OF THE GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS (GSE) REF: GENEVA 3190 (CD-054) 1. THIS IS CD-160. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- THE AD HOC GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY SEISMIC EVENTS (GSE) MET IN ITS TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION JULY 27 THROUGH AUGUST 7. REPRESENTATIVES FROM 25 COUNTRIES ATTENDED THIS SESSION. DURING THE SESSION, THE GSE WORKED ON THE DESIGN OF A NEW MODERN SYSTEM OF SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE. THE GROUP NAMED CONVENORS TO FIVE STUDY GROUPS AND APPOINTED A PRINCIPAL COORDINATOR FOR THE EXPERIMENT. THE GROUP ADOPTED A PROGRESS REPORT TO THE CD AND RECOMMENDED THAT ITS NEXT SESSION BE HELD MARCH 7 THROUGH MARCH 18, 1988. END SUMMARY. 3. THIS WAS THE SIXTEENTH SESSION OF THE GSE UNDER ITS THIRD MANDATE ADOPTED IN 1979 BY THE THEN COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CD/46). NOTEWORTHY WAS THE ATTENDANCE OF TECHNICAL REPS FROM INDIA AND ARGENTINA (MEMBERS OF THE FIVE-CONTINENT INITIATIVE, BUT NOT FREQUENTLY REPRESENTED IN THE GSE). Z. U.S. PARTICIPANTS TABLED FOUR PAPERS: GSE/US/47, AN INVITATION TO A WORKSHOP ON INTERNATIONAL DATACENTERS; GSE/US/48, PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS FOR DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS AT INTERNATIONAL DATACENTERS; GSE/US/49, RECOMMENDATION FOR INCLUDING AZIMUTH AS A REPORTABLE PARAMETER; AND GSE/US/50, PRELIMINARY TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON THE WORKSHOP ON INTERNATIONAL DATA- CENTERS. U.S. AND AUSTRALIA TABLED GSE/AUS,USA/2, THE ALICE SPRINGS SEISMIC ARRAY PROCESSOR, A JOINT INVESTIGATION. THIS PAPER DESCRIBES A PROJECT OF THE AIR FORCE TECHNICAL APPLICATIONS CENTER AND THE DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY ON THE U.S. SIDE, AND THE BUREAU OF MINERAL RESOURCES, GEOLOGY AND GEOPHYSICS ON THE AUSTRALIAN SIDE. WORKING JOINTLY WITH JAPAN, THE U.S. PREPARED TWO OTHER REPORTS WHICH WERE SUBMITTED: ONE AS CONFERENCE ROOM PAPER 167, A SOURCEBOOK FOR WAVEFORM DATA EXCHANGE; AND GSE/COOPERATIVE/1, SUMMARY OF INFORMAL WAVEFORM DATA EXCHANGE EXPERIMENTS. 5. FOLLOWING THE U.S. CONCEPTS PAPER (GSE/US/44) 194 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET TABLED LAST MARCH (REFTEL), SWEDEN AND THE USSR TABLED PAPERS DESCRIBING THEIR CONCEPTS OF THE NEW MODERN SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE SYSTEM. THE THREE PAPERS FORMED THE BASIS FOR MOST OF THE DISCUSSION ON THE NEW SYSTEM DESIGN. THERE WERE HINTS IN THE SOVIET PAPER AND IN THEIR INTERVENTIONS THAT THEY MAY BE BACKING AWAY FROM A POSITION OF FREE-AND-EASY ACCESS TO ALL DATA, AS STATED BY THE GSE IN ITS LAST PROGRESS REPORT TO THE CD (CD/745, 16 MARCH 1987). (COMMENT: BASICALLY, THE U.S. FAVORS COMPLETE, OPEN ACCESS AND THE SOVIETS FAVOR "REGIONAL" ACCESS THROUGH ONE IDC, WHICH COULD ALLOW AN IDC TO BLOCK TAGS. FARM, UNGA, CDG REPORTING OF DATA FROM ITS REGION. THE SOVIET APPROACH WAS REFLECTED DURING DRAFTING OF THE GROUP'S PROGRESS REPORT TO THE CD (CD/778). IN ORDER TO REACH CONSENSUS, THE GROUP ADOPTED A "SOME BELIEVE-OTHERS BELIEVE" FORMULATION ON THE ISSUE OF THE AVAILABILITY OF DATA BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL DATA CENTERS (IDC'S) AND NATIONAL DATA CENTERS (NDC'S). THE REASONS FOR THE SOVIET APPROACH ARE NOT KNOWN, BUT MAY INVOLVE THEIR POLITICAL AGENDA (E.G. THE TIMING OF THE PROPOSED LARGE-SCALE EXPERIMENT) AND/OR THEIR APPROACH TO POTENTIAL COSTS (E.G. MANPOWER, HARDWARE, ETC.). U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE CONTINUED TO RESIST THE SOVIET APPROACH. END COMMENT.) 6. FOR PURPOSES OF ITS FUTURE WORK, THE GSE APPOINTED TWO CONVENORS FOR EACH OF FIVE STUDY GROUPS EXCEPT FOR THE IDC STUDY GROUP, WHICH WILL HAVE FOUR CONVENORS. THE U.S. IS ONE OF THE CONVENORS FOR IDC'S. IN ADDITION, A "PRINCIPAL COORDINATOR" (BASHAM, CANADA) WAS NAMED TO PLAN THE LARGE-SCALE EXPERIMENT. IT WAS AGREED TO DESIGNATE FOUR "ASSISTANT COORDINATORS" AT THE FOUR PLANNED IDC'S ANDAN OPEN-ENDED LIST OF "COORDINATORS" AT IDC'S, TO HELP THE PRINCIPAL COORDINATOR. 7. A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION/GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEM (WMO/GTS) ATTENDED ONE SESSION AND BRIEFED THE GSE ON THE CAPABILITY OF THE WMO/GTS TO SUPPORT EXPERIMENTS IN WAVEFORM DATA EXCHANGE. THE WMO REP STATED THAT WMO HAS PLANS TO UPGRADE SOME, BUT NOT ALL, PORTIONS OF THE NETWORK, MAKING THEM USABLE TO TRANSFER WAVEFORM DATA. THIS MEANS THAT THE WMO/GTS WILL PROBABLY NOT BE AN 195 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET EFFECTIVE METHOD FOR WAVEFORM DATA EXCHANGE. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO INSIST OTHERWISE AND EXPERIMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE PERFORMED TO SUBSTANTIATE THE REAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE WMO/GTS FOR EXCHANGING LARGE VOLUMES OF WAVEFORM DATA. 8. THE U.S. HOSTED A TECHNICAL MEETING FOR GSE PARTICIPANTS AT WHICH COMMUNICATIONS EXPERTS FROM COMSAT DISCUSSED GLOBAL SATELLITE COMMUNI- CATIONS. THE MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE GSE. 9. DURING THIS SESSION THE JAPANESE GSE PARTICIPANTS HOSTED TWO INFORMAL MEETINGS TO DISCUSS RESULTS OF INFORMAL WAVEFORM EXCHANGE EXPERIMENTS. JAPANESE CD DEL, AS WESTERN NTB COORDINATOR, ALSO HOSTED AN ENLARGED WESTERN MEETING TO DISCUSS GSE'S PLANNED WORK. NO CONFLICT OF VIEW EMERGED RE GSE WORK AND PLANNING. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 196 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 SECRET GENEVA 08647 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): BRIEFING FOR WESTERN GROUP AMBASSADORS ON ROUND VI OF U.S.-SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS 1. THIS IS CD- 161. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. AT AUGUST 12 WESTERN GROUP MEETING, AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF BRIEFED AMBASSADORS ON ROUND VI OF THE US-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS ON A COMPREHENSIVE CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN. FOLLOWING.ARE TALKING POINTS ON WHICH AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF BASED THE BRIEFING. BEGIN TEXT: -- THE SIXTH ROUND OF INTENSIFIED U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS BASED ON THE NOVEMBER 1985 SUMMIT AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV BEGAN JULY 20 AND ENDED FRIDAY, AUGUST 7. -- THE SIDES HELD EIGHT MEETINGS OVER THIS THREE-WEEK PERIOD, TWO OF THEM AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL AND THE ? OTHERS AT EXPERTS ,LEVEL. -- THE RESULTS OF THE ROUND WILL BE ASSESSED IN WASHINGTON, AND MY OBSERVATIONS TODAY REPRESENT THE DELEGATION'S PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT. -- OVERALL, WE HAVE MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT THE ROUND. LET ME EXPLAIN WHY. -- WE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED THAT DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN -- BILATERALLY AND MULTILATERALLY-- FOR MORE THAN A DECADE, THE SOVIET UNION HAS REVEALED VIRTUALLY NO INFORMATION ABOUT THE VERY WEAPONS IN ITS POSSESSION ABOUT WHICH WE ARE NEGOTIATING. -- IN THIS CONNECTION, WHEN THE SOVIETS FINALLY ADMITTED EARLIER THIS YEAR THAT THEY DO IN FACT HAVE CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WE WELCOMED THIS MOVE AS A STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF OPENNESSABOUT THEIR CW CAPABILITY. -- AT THE SAME TIME, WE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT MUCH MORE OPENNESS ON THEIR PART WAS REQUIRED: (1) WE TOLD THEM THAT SUFFICIENT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS THAT THEY MUST RESPOND SERIDUSLY TO OUR 1984 PROPOSALS FOR EARLY BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE. (2) WE SAID THAT THEY COULD NO LONGER ARGUE THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE. (3) WE INDICATED THAT THIS ISSUE WOULD BE AT THE TOP OF OUR AGENDA FOR ROUND VI, AND THAT IN OUR VIEW, IT SHOULD BE THE FOCUS OF THE DISCUSSIONS. -- WE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION OF THAT DATA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE U.S. 1984 PROPOSAL, WAS ESSENTIAL BEFORE A CW CONVENTION COULD BE SIGNED. 197 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- YET, THE SOVIETS CAME BACK BEFORE THE START OF THE ROUND WITH AN AGENDA WHICH PLACED THIS SSSUE AT THE END OF A SIX-ITEM AGENDA. -- IN OUR FIRST MEETING, IT BECAME PART OF THE SEVENTH ITEM OF A REVISED SOVIET AGENDA. -- THE SOVIET SIDE AGREED TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE. HOWEVER, THEY DID NOT DO SO UNTIL THE LATTER PART OF THE SECOND WEEK OF THE ROUND -- DESPITE OUR URGING THAT THEY DO SO EARLIER TO FACILITATE AS THOROUGH AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AS POSSIBLE. -- WE ARE CAREFULLY ASSESSING WHAT THE SOVIETS FINALLY PUT FORWARD ON THIS ISSUE. -- PART OF WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND SEEMS TO BE RELATED TO SHEVARDNADZE'S INVITATION TO CD DELEGATIONS TO VISIT SHIKHANYTHIS FALL. -- THE REST OF THE PROPOSAL HAS SOME POSITIVE ELEMENTS. HOWEVER, IT ALSO IS SERIOUSLY FLAWED IN SOME VERY IMPOR- TANT RESPECTS. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE ARE NO PROVISIONS FOR VERIFICATION OF THE DATA -- A KEY ELEMENT OF ANY MEANINGFUL EXCHANGE OF DATA. -- THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS ALSO SERIOUSLY INADEQUATE WITH RESPECT TO THE TIMING OF THE EXCHANGE. UNDER OUR PROPOSAL, THE DATA WOULD BE EXCHANGED IN TWO STAGES, BOTH BEFORE SIGNING OF THE CONVENTION. IN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, ONLY THE MOST GENERAL PART OF THE EXCHANGE WOULD OCCUR BEFORE SIGNATURE. THE EXCHANGE OF DETAILED INFORMATION WOULD OCCUR AFTER SIGNATURE. -- STILL, WE NOW HAVE A SOVIET RESPONSE TO OUR 1984 PROPOSALS, AND WE FINALLY CAN BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE. WE EXPECT THAT DATA EXCHANGE WILL BE A MAJOR TOPIC OF DISCUSSION AT THE NEXT ROUND. -- WE ARE NOT SURE WHEN THE NEXT ROUND WILL BE. THE SOVIETS HAVE INFORMALLY SUGGESTED DECEMBER, AND WE HAVE REFERRED THE SUGGESTION TO WASHINGTON. -- BECAUSE THE SOVIETS WERE MARKING TIME FOR SO MUCH OF THE ROUND -- THEIR EXCUSE WAS THE SHEVARDNADZE AUGUST 6 STATEMENT -- THE ONLY OTHER ISSUE WE HAD TIME TO ADDRESS IN DETAIL WAS CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES. WE ARE NOW QUITE CLOSE ON THIS ISSUE, AND WE MAY BE ABLE TO COME UP WITH A COMMON POSITION AT THE NEXT ROUND. -- THE SIDES ALSO TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON A FEW OTHER ISSUES: (1) THE ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY U.S. AND SOVIET OBSERVERS WOULD BE PRESENT DURING INSPECTION ON EACH OTHERS TERRITORY WAS ONE. THE SIDES HAD REFERRED A PROPOSAL ON THIS ISSUE TO CAPITALS AT THE END OF ROUND V, AND THE SIDES FORMALLY INDICATED IN THE JUST-CONCLUDED ROUND THAT THE 198 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET PROPOSAL HAD BEEN APPROVED IN CAPITALS. (2) ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION, WE REQUESTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CLARIFY ITS POSITION IN LIGHT OF SHEVARDNADZE'S REMARKS ON THE ISSUE IN HIS AUGUST 6 STATEMENT. THEIR RESPONSE WAS ALONG THE LINES OF NAZARKIN'S'AUGUST 11 PLENARY STATEMENT. -- WE WERE TOLD THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS FOR MANDATORY SHORT-NOTICE CHALLENGE INSPECTION OF ANY LOCATION UNDER THE JURISDICTION OR CONTROL OF A PARTY. UNDER THEIR PROPOSAL, ANY PARTY COULD MAKE A CHALLENGE REQUEST. THEY ARGUED THAT SENSITIVE NON-CW INFORMATION COULD BE PROTECTED BY APPROPRIATELY DESIGNED INSPECTION PROCEDURES AND ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. THEY ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IMPROPER REQUESTS COULD BE DISCOURAGED BY A SYSTEM WHICH WOULD ALLOW VICTIMS OF SUCH REQUESTS TO CLAIM COMPENSATION -- APPARENTLY FROM THE CHALLENGER -- FOR LOSS OF PROPRIETARY INFORMATION OR DOWN-TIME AT ENTERPRISES. -- TO SUM UP, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF POSITIVE ELEMENTS TO THE ROUND, AND WE DO NOT UNDER-ESTIMATE THEM. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ROUND COULD HAVE BEEN MORE PRODUCTIVE. THAT IT WAS NOT IS DUE TO SOVIET TACTICS. -- WE HAVE AGREED TO MEET INFORMALLY IN THE COMING WEEKS TO DISCUSS MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION ISSUES. HOWEVER, THIS WILL NOT MAKE UP FOR THE VALUABLE TIME WHICH WAS LOST IN THE ROUND WHICH ENDED LAST WEEK. END TEXT. 3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE SECRET 25X1 NNNN Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08681 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS, VISIT TO U.S. FACILITY, ACTION REQUEST REF: GENEVA 8545 (CW BILAT-039) 1. THIS IS CD-162 . (CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT) 2. *BACKGROUND -- A. AT FINAL PLENARY MEETING (REPORTED REFTEL) OF ROUND VI OF BILATERAL CW DISCUSSIONS, HELD FRIDAY, AUGUST 7, SOVIET DEL FORMALLY ACCEPTED EARLIER U.S. INVITATION? TO VISIT U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITY AT TOOELE, UTAH, DURING WEEK OF OCTOBER 19. U.S. DEL ACCEPTED SOVIET INVITATION TO CD DELS TO VISIT SOVIET CW PROVING GROUND AT SHIKHANY IN OCTOBER. B. IN RECIPROCITY FOR VISIT TO SHIKHANY, SOVIETS ASKED FOR VISIT TO A "COMPARABLEU.S. FACILITY, SUCH AS DUGWAY PROVING GROUND OR FORT DETRICK." SINCE THEY PLAN TO SHOW STANDARD SOVIET CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AT SHIKHANY, THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE STANDARD U.S. CHEMICAL MUNITIONS, "INCLUDING BINARIES." C. U.S. DEL HEAD (AMB. FRIEDERSDORF) NOTED THAT SINCE SOVIET RESPONSE ON PROPOSED DATE FOR TOOELE VISIT HAD TAKEN SEVERAL MONTHS, HE WANTED TO 'CHECK WITH WASHINGTON TO ENSURE THAT DATE WAS STILL APPROPRIATE. HE SAID HE WOULD ALSO REFER DUGWAY/DETRICK ISSUE TO WASHINGTON AS WELL. D. DEL HAS ATTEMPTED TO CLARIFY RATIONALE FOR SOVIET REQUEST TO VISIT FORT DETRICK, SINCE THIS FACILITY HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH BIOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES RATHER THAN CHEMICAL ACTIVITIES. SOVIET DEL WAS UNABLE TO EXPLAIN AND IS SEEKING GUIDANCE. 3. DEL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: A. SOVIETS CLEARLY (AND LOGICALLY) CONSIDER TOOELE VISIT TO CORRESPOND TO VISIT TO THEIR DESTRUCTION FACILITY AT CHAPAYEVSK. SINCE CONSTRUCTION IS ONLY BEGINNING AT CHAPAYEVSK, IT MAY BE SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE A VISIT TAKES PLACE; INVITATION HAS ALREADY BEEN EXTENDED, HOWEVER. B. WASHINGTON MAY WISH TO CONSIDER MODIFYING PLANS FOR SOVIET VISIT IN OCTOBER TO DEEMPHASIZE TOOELE. DEL'S UNDERSTANDING IS THAT TOOELE FACILITY IS CURRENTLY SHUT DOWN AND THAT IT IS UNCERTAIN WHEN OPERATIONS WILL RESUME. C. DEL RECOMMENDS THAT WASHINGTON CONSIDER SOVIET VISIT TO BOTH TOOELE AND DUGWAY DURING WEEK OF OCTOBER 19. WE COULD SCALE BACK TOOELE VISIT TO A BRIEFING AND WALK-THROUGH EXPLAINING IN VERY 200 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 , SECRET GENERAL TERMS THAT FACILITY IS NOT OPERATING, AND EXTEND AN INVITATION TO RETURN TO SEE FACILITY IN OPERATION AROUND THE TIME OF THE U.S. VISIT TO CHAPAYEVSK. D. DEL ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT WASHINGTON TAKE IVTO ACCOUNT ADVANTAGES OF KEEPING TO ORIGINAL DATE. 4. ACTION REQUEST -- A. DEL REQUESTS GUIDANCE ON FOLLOWING: -- WHETHER SOVIET VISIT WILL BE TO TOOELE, DUGWAY OR BOTH -- ACCEPTABLE DATES -- SOVIETS HAVE REQUESTED TO SE STANDARD U.S. CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. THEY HAVE STATED THAT THEY WILL DISPLAY STANDARD SOVIET CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. AT SHIKHANY. WILL U.S. BE ABLE TO DISPLAY ITS MUNITIONS (INCLUDING 155 MM BINARY ROUND, BUT NOT/NOT BIGEYE BOMB, WHICH IS A DEVELOPMENTAL ITEM. )AT TOOELE OR AT DUGWAY? -- SOVIETS ALSO STATED THEY WILL DEMONSTRATE OR SHOW MOBILE DESTRUCTION FACILITY AT SHIKHANY, WILL U.S. DRILL-AND-TRANSFER SYSTEM (DATS) BE AVAILABLE FOR DISPLAY? IF SO, AT WHICH LOCATION? B. DEL REQUESTS GUIDANCE IF POSSIBLE BY OPENING OF BUSINESS, GENEVA TIME, TUESDAY, AUGUST 18. 5. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 201 NNNN 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08761 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): WESTERN GROUP COORDINATION MEETING ON PREPARATIONS FOR 42ND UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE SESSION 1. THIS IS CD-163. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. UNDER LEAD OF U.S. REP (EDIS), WESTERN COORDINATING GROUP ON FIRST COMMITTEE MET 3 AUGUST TO BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR 42ND UNGA. FOLLOWING PARAS SUMMARIZE SALIENT POINTS. 3. OVERALL APPROACH -- -- THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT WHILE IT WOULD BE WELCOME IF THE NUMBER OF RESOLUTIONS WERE TO DECREASE, THIS SHOULD NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF IMPORTANT WESTERN INITIATIVES. -- WHILE NOE REVCONS ARE AT ISSUE, OUTCOMES OF SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MID-SEPTEMBER MEETING, DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE, AND THE 1987 CD SESSION WILL INFLUENCE PACE AND MOOD OF FIRST COMMITTEE SESSION. -- THIRD SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD-III) COULD AFFECT COMMITTEE'S WORK, WITH REGARD TO (A) POSSIBILITY THAT SOME MIGHT SEEK TO REOPEN THE 1988 DATE OF SSOD: (B) IMPACT OF CD'S WORK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMEN AND (C) FORESHADOWING EFFECT ON DEVELOPMENT OF RESOLUTIONS. 4. GROUP BRIEFLY REVIEWED STANDARD SET OF ISSUES LIKELY TO BE ADDRESSED. OF NOTE WERE -- -- AUSTRALIAN REPORT THAT 1987 IS NEW ZEALAND'S YEAR TO MANAGE THEIR TRADITIONAL JOINT TEST BAN RESOLUTION. - EDIS' REMARKS THAT PRESUMABLY THE WEST WOULD AGAIN PUT FORWARD ITS OWN DRAFT OUTER SPACE RESOLUTION; FRG REP GERMANN'S RESPONSE THAT THIS YEAR THE DRAFT WOULD NEED TO BE DIFFERENT, GIVEN CONVICTION OF MANY THAT CD'S OS COMMITTEE HAD EXHAUSTED ITS MANDATE; AND EDIS' REJOINDER THAT THE DRAFT WOULD OF COURSE NEED TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. . -- DISCUSSION OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS/CBM'S, WITH EDIS COUNSELING CAUTION IN LIGHT OF 1986 DIFFICULTIES WITH NNA, AND GERMANN SAYING FRG WOULD AT LEAST LIKE TO TRY A WESTERN RESOLUTION COMBINING THESE ISSUES. -- ON SSOD-III, FRENCH AND FRG REPS REPORTED NO INTEREST ON THEIR PART IN PRESSING FOR 1988, AND U.S. REP COUNTERED THAT WASHINGTON BELIEVED STRONGLY THAT THE SESSION SHOULD BE HELD AS AGREED. -- ON THE CD, THE DUTCH REPORTED THAT ARGENTINE AMB CAMPORA WOULD TRY HIS HAND AT DRAFTING A CONSENSUS RESOLUTION. YUGOSLAV REACTION TO DUTCH APPROACH IN BELGRADE HAD NOT BEEN VERY POSITIVE TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA'S TAKING THE INITIATIVE ON SUCH A CONSENSUS TEXT. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 5. INITIATIVES -- -- UK IS CONSIDERING SPONSORING RESOLUTIONS ON THE BILATERAL ARMS TALKS, ON OBJECTIVE INFORMATION ON MILITARY MATTERS, AND ON UN STUDIES. -- FRG HAS THREE POSSIBILITIES: IT IS WORKING WITH CAMEROON ON ROLE OF THE UN IN DISARMAMENT: IT SEEKS TO COUNTER YUGOSLAV RES ON RESULTS OF SSOD-1: AND IT PROPOSES TO PURSUE A RES ON CONVENTIONAL STABILITY. -- CANADA IS WORKING ON VERIFICATION AND THE USUAL CONSENSUS RES ON CW. -- FRANCE HOPES FOR A PURELY PROCEDURAL RES ON THE DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE, TO BE PROPOSED BY THE NNA. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL /81NNN 203 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08776 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY SESSION OF 11 AUGUST 1987 REF: GENEVA 8545 (CD-039) 1. THIS IS CD-164. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- USSR STATEMENT ON CW WAS BASICALLY A PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF PROPOSALS (FIRST MADE TO U.S. DEL PRIVATELY) AS A FOLLOW-UP TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE'S 6 AUGUST CD PLENARY ADDRESS. JAPAN, SPEAKING FOR THE WESTERN GROUP, SUPPORTED CZECH DRAFT MANDATE PROPOSAL ON NTB AS BASIS FOR DEVELOPING A CONSENSUS. MEXICO, GDR AND AUSTRALIA EXCHANGED COMMENTS ON NTB MANDATE PROPOSALS. (SOVIET AND JAPANESE TEXTS DATAFAXED TO ACDA/MA.) END SUMMARY. 3. USSR -- -- ?AMB. NAZARKIN REITERATED TO THE CD MANY OF THE POINTS MADE IN BILATERAL CW MEETING ON 7 AUGUST . (REFTEL). HE CALLED CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUES THE "KEY" TO REACHING AN AGREEMENT AND SUMMARIZED USSR VIEW THAT CHALLENGE INSPECTION SHOULD BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS: - 1. MANDATORY WITHOUT RIGHT OF REFUSAL; - 2. 48 HOUR TIME LIMIT BETWEEN REQUEST AND ARRIVAL OF INSPECTION TEAM AT THE SITE; - 3. EQUAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS FOR ALL STATES PARTIES AS REGARDS SUBMISSION AND ACCOMMODATION OF REQUESTS; - 4. REQUEST SHOULD CONTAIN ALL NECESSARY DATA (E.G. WHICH PROVISION OF CONVENTION VIOLATED, WHERE VIOLATION SUSPECTED OF OCCURING AND WHEN); - 5. MEASURES TO PREVENT USE OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION AS MEANS TO ACQUIRE SENSITIVE INFORMATION NOT INVOLVED IN CW (IN DISCUSSING THESE MEASURES, NAZARKIN ENDORSED DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. PROPOSALS ON "MANAGED CONDUCT" AND CALLED FOR USE OF INSTRUMENTS CAPABLE ONLY OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION SO AS TO AVOID COMPROMISE OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION); - 6. REQUESTED STATE MAY SUGGEST ALTERNATIVE MEASURES AND REQUESTOR STATE SHALL MAKE A DETERMINATION ON ADEQUACY OF THESE MEASURES (SOVIETS ENDORSED UK POSITION CONTAINED IN CD/715, SAYING THESE PROPOSALS COULD WELL SERVE AS "CENTRAL IDEA" BEHIND ALTERNATIVE MEASURES PORTION OF FUTURE CONVENTION); - 7. DECISION ON ALTERNATIVE MEASURES TO BE USED 204 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SRT MUST BE MADE WITHIN THE 48-HOUR DEADLINE ALREADY ESTABLISHED. - NAZARKIN EXTENDED GENERAL INVITATION TO ALL CD DELEGATIONS TO SEND TWO REPRESENTATIVES TO SHIKHANY TO VIEW STANDARD SOVIET CW MUNITIONS AND TO OBSERVE A MOBILE DESTRUCTION FACILITY AT WORK. DATES GIVEN WERE 7-8 OCTOBER 1987 (NOT 8-9 OCTOBER AS INDICATED DURING BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS). HE ALSO INDICATED EXPERTS WOULD BE INVITED TO CHAPAYEVSK WHEN THAT FACILITY IS COMPLETED AND INFORMED CD THAT HE HAD ACCEPTED U.S. INVITATION TO TOOELE. VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL -- SOVIET STATEMENT BRIEFLY MENTIONED DESIRABILITY OF INCLUDING A PROVISION ON STATES' RESPONSIBILITY TO COMPENSATE REQUESTED STATE FOR FINANCIAL LOSSES INVOLVED IN A CHALLENGE INSPECTION IN WHICH NO VIOLATIONS WERE CONFIRMED. NAZARKIN ALSO REITERATED THAT ALL FACILITIES OR LOCATIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF A STATE PARTY, ITS JURISDICTION ELSEWHERE OR POSSESSED BY A NATURAL OR LEGAL PERSON OF A STATE PARTY ANYWHERE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTION. - NAZARKIN REJECTED U.S. CONCEPT OF A FACT FINDING PANEL AS "UNDEMOCRATIC" AND ASKED U.S. TO RECONSIDER ITS POSITION ON THIS MATTER. IN LIGHT OF U.S. CALL FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTION AT ALL RELEVANT LOCATIONS, NAZARKIN ALSO ASKED FOR JUSTIFICATION OF U.S. POSITION ON ARTICLE XI VIS-A-VIS RIGHT OF REFUSAL. -- IN CONCLUDING REMARKS, NAZARKIN ADDRESSED PROCEDURAL MATTERS, CALLING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PREPARATORY COMMISSION AFTER THE SIGNING OF A CONVENTION AND SUPPORTING SHEVARDNADZE'S SUGGESTION THAT AN ADDITIONAL SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE BE CONVENED IN 1987 (MID-NOVEMBER TO LATE DECEMTER) TO WORK ONLY TOWARD COMPLETION OF A DRAFT CW CONVENTION. 4. JAPAN -- -- AMB. YAMADA DELIVERED WESTERN GROUP STATEMENT SUPPORTING CZECH AMB. VEJVODA'S APRIL DRAFT MANDATE PROPOSAL ON NTB AS A BASIS FOR DEVELOPING A CONSENSUS, AND REJECTING THE "MEXICAN" DRAFT MANDATE PROPOSAL CD/772 AS AN OLD APPROACH WHICH HAD FAILED TO ENGENDER MUCH SUPPORT. 5. RESPONDING TO YAMADA'S REMARKS, MEXICAN AMB. GARCIA ROBLES REITERATED VALIDITY OF CD/772. AMB. 25X1 205 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET ROSE (GDR) SPOKE VERY BRIEFLY IN SUPPORT OF CD/772 AND AMB. BUTLER (AUSTRALIA) ENDED SESSION BY REAFFIRMING THAT, BUT FOR A HANDFUL OF DELEGATIONS (READ INDIA, MEXICO), A CONSENSUS ON AN NTB MANDATE WOULD ALREADY HAVE BEEN REACHED. 6. MOSCOW MINIMIZED CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 206 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 ' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 _ SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08849 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): HIGHLIGHTS OF WEEK OF 10-14 AUGUST; WESTERN GROUP MEETING 12 AUGUST REFS: (A) GENEVA 8759 (CW BILAT-043) (NOTAL) (B) GENEVA 8647 (CD-161) 1. THIS IS CD-165. --- (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW -- -- MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEEK WAS U.S DEL'S MEETING WITH SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIALS FROM MOSCOW, WHO DESCRIBED IN MORE DETAIL NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS RELATED TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS (REF A). IN PLENARY, SOVIET AMB. NAZARKIN SPOKE ON BOTH 11 AND 13 AUGUST, AMPLIFYING FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE'S 6 AUGUST STATEMENT ON CW, NUCLEAR TEST BAN AND OUTER SPACE. MEXICAN AMB. GARCIA ROBLES AND AUSTRALIAN AMB. BUTLER POLITELY DUELLED IN 13 AUG. PLENARYOVER ESTABLISHMENT OF AN NTB COMMITTEE. -- COMMITTEE ACTION IS ALMOST COMPLETELY FOCUSED ON COMPLETING REPORTS TO THE CONFERENCE, WITH OUTER SPACE BEING THE MOST CONTENTIOUS SO FAR. -- WESTERN GROUP AGAIN DISCUSSED SCHEDULING OF INTERSESSIONAL WORK ON CW AND MADE ITS USUAL TOUR D'HORIZON. END SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW. 3. MEETING WITH SENIOR SOVIET CW POLICY-LEVEL OFFICIALS -- -- U.S. REPS MET WITH VISITING STATE COUNSELOR TO SOVIET COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, S.A. ARZHAKOV, AND COLONEL-GENERAL A. KUNTSEVICH ON 13 AUGUST. SOVIET SIDE MADE CLEAR THEIR VIEW THAT IF U.S. HAS MADE A POLITICAL DECISION TO CONCLUDE A CW BAN SOON, ALL OTHER ISSUES CAN BE SOLVED. U.S. SIDE WAS REQUESTED TO IDENTIFY KEY ISSUES BLOCKING SPEEDY CONCLUSION OF A CW CONVENTION, WHICH ARZHAKOV CHARACTERIZED AS BEING IN THE HOME STRETCH. U.S. DEL WAS BRIEFED ON PLANS FOR VISIT TO SOVIET CW TEST SITE AT SHIKHANY. FOLLOW-ON MEETING IS SCHEDULED FOR AUG. 18. 4. NAZARKIN PLENARY STATEMENTS -- -- AT 11 AUGUST PLENARY, SOVIET AMB. NAZARKIN LAID OUT IN DETAIL FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE'S PROPOSALS ON CW, IN PARTICULAR CHALLENGE INSPECTION WITHOUT RIGHT OF REFUSAL (BASICALLY U.S. PROPOSAL AS IN CD/500: ART. X MINUS FACT-FINDING PANEL INITIATION MECHANISM, AND MINUS CD/500 ART. XI -- I.E., ANY STATE PARTY CAN REQUEST A MANDATORY SHORT-NOTICE CHALLENGE INSPECTION ANYWHERE IN ANOTHER STATE 207 CCI4DOT 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 PARTY). NAZARKIN ALSO URGED CD CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES AND "MANAGED CONDUCT" OF ANY INSPECTION, TO PROTECT SENSITIVE INFORMATION. -- AT 13 AUGUST PLENARY, NAZARKIN FOCUSED FIRST ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN, CRITICIZING U.S. STATEMENTS FROM 1982 ONWARDS THAT A COMPREHENSIVE BAN WAS ONLY A LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE, AND THAT NUCLEAR TESTING WAS NECESSARY FOR DETERRENCE. NAZARKIN ALSO DISCUSSED SHEVARDNADZE'S PROPOSAL FOR A NEW SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS GROUP TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS FOR ANY COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST BAN. NAZARKIN REVIEWED EASTERN AND SOVIET OUTER SPACE PROPOSALS, AND SOVIET IDEAS FOR ON-SITE VERIFICATION OF ALL SPACE LAUNCHES TO VERIFY ABSENCE OF WEAPONS. 5. WESTERN GROUP MEETING 19 AUGUST -- -- ON CW, DUTCH COORDINATOR VAN SCHAIK PRESSED GROUP TO DEVELOP COORDINATED POSITION ON QUESTION OF INTER- SESSIONAL WORK, AND REPORTED ON STATUS OF 1988 CHAIRMAN- SHIP QUESTION -- TO RETURN SWEDISH AMB EKEUS, OR INSIST ON MAINTAINING ROTATION PRINCIPLE. IN RESPONSE TO U.S. DEBRIEF ON US-SOVIET CW BILATERALS (REF B), FRENCH AMB MOREL DECRIED LACK OF SOLID DATA ON CW CAPABILITIES THAT MAY BE AVAILABLE TO PARTIES AT TIME OF SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION, AND LINKED THIS TO THE FRENCH POSITION ON SECURITY STOCKPILES. -- ON OUTER SPACE, COORDINATOR MOREL REPORTED "ACTIVE CONFRONTATION" BETWEEN EAST AND WEST DURING AHC REPORT- WRITING EFFORT, WITH A "POLITICAL OFFENSIVE" BY THE EASTERN BLOC DESIGNED TO "EMBARRASS THE WEST." MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 208 SFCRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08848 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY SESSION OF AUGUST 13, 1987 REFS: (A) GENVA 8467 (CD-155); (B) GENEVA 8776 (CD-164) 1. THIS IS CD-166 . (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- AMB NAZARKIN, AMPLIFYING SOVIET FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE'S 6 AUGUST PLENARY STATEMENT (REF A), ADDRESSED NUCLEAR TEST BAN (NTB) AND PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE (OS). HE ADDED A QUESTION REGARDING U.S. CHANGE OF NTB POSITION FROM 1980. SWEDEN TRIED AGAIN TO WIN SUPPORT FROM A DISSENT?NG AND SOMEWHAT APATHETIC AUDIENCE FOR THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL TO BAN ATTACKS AGAINST NUCLEAR FACILITIES. THE GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS (GSE) INTRODUCED THE REPORT OF THEIR LAST MEETING. (USSR TEXT DATAFAXED: SWEDISH TEXT AND GSE REPORT POUCHED TO ACDA/MA.) -- AT SESSION'S END MEXICO, WITH AN ASSIST FROM VENEZUELA, AND AUSTRALIA DEBATED PARLIMENTARY FINE POINTS OF STATUS OF CD/772 ("MEXICAN" DRAFT) AND APRIL CD PRESIDENT VEJVODA'S (CZECHOSLOVAKIA) DRAFT MANDATES FOR AN NTB COMMITTEE. END SUMMARY. 3. USSR -- -- SOVIET AMB NAZARKIN CONTRASTED THE US AND USSR ? POSITIONS ON NTB. HE NOTED THAT IN 1980 THE US CONSIDERED AN NTB TO BE A PRIORITY MATTER, WHEREAS IT WAS NOW A LONG?-TERM GOAL TO BE VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF A TIME WHEN WE NO LONGER RELY UPON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE FOR SECURITY. BUT THE US ALSO RELIED ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN 1980, MUSED NAZARKIN, SO WHY THE RETRACTION FROM 1980 POLICY ON NTB? (US AMB FRIEDERSDORF REPLIED THAT IN 1980 RONALD REAGAN CAMPAIGNED ON A PLATFORM FAVORING STRONGER NATIONAL DEFENSE TO CONFRONT A GROWING SOVIET THREAT; THAT HE WAS ELECTED BY AN OVERWHELMING MARGIN; THAT THIS POLICY WAS CONFIRMED IN AN EVEN GREATER LANDSLIDE IN 1984; AND THAT, IN THIS INSTANCE, THE UNITED STATES FOUND IT NECESSARY TO PLACE SECURITY AHEAD OF DISARMAMENT.) - NAZARK? REVIEWED VARIOUS SOVIET AND EASTERN GROUP NTB INITIATIVES, INCLUDING THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH ANOTHER GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS TO WORK OUT A VERIFICATION SYSTEM FOR AN NTB. HE PROPOSED THAT THE CD DECIDE, THIS SESSION, TO FORM SUCH A GROUP AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1988 SESSION. ( US DEL INTENDS TO OPPOSE ANY SUCH ACTION.) NAZARKIN ALSO SUPPORTED CD/772, THE "MEXICAN" DRAFT MANDATE. - NAZARKIN ALSO TOUTED A NUMBER OF SOVIET OS PROPOSALS, 209 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET INCLUDING A SUGGESTION, FIRST MADE IN FEBRUARY TO PLACE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAMS PERMANENTLY AT ALL SPACE LAUNCH SITES TO INSPECT ALL OBJECTS LAUNCHED INTO SPACE. NAZARKIN WAS QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT ICBM SITES WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED. It. SWEDEN -- -- AMB EKEUS DELIVERED A LUCID, WELL-ORGANIZED SCHOLARLY BRIEF OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS. HIS REASONED APPROACH COULD NOT CONCEAL THE FRUSTRATION HE HAS EXPERIENCED IN FAILING TO ATTRACT MORE COMMITMENT TO THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL FOR A BAN ON ATTACKS AGAINST NUCLEAR FACILITIES. -- REGARDING OS, EKEUS STATED THAT THE CENTERPIECE OF AD HOC COMMITTEE WORK SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE THE EXAMINATION OF PROPOSALS AND INITIATIVES AIMED AT PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE. HE SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED MEASURES BANNING ASATS. ACKNOWLEDGING THE CD'S LACK OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE ON SPACE TECHNOLOGY, EKEUS PROPOSED AN AD HOC MEETING OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS, PREFERABLY AT THE OUTSET OF THE 1988 CD SESSION, TO ADDRESS, AMONG OTHER ISSUES, DEFINITIONS AND VERIFICATION TECHNIQUES RELATED TO ASATS. 5. GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS REPORT -- -- DR. OLA DAHLMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE AD HOC GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATIVE MEASURES TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY SIESMIC EVENTS, INTRODUCED THE GROUP'S REPORT OF ITS JULY 27-AUGUST 7 MEETING (CD/778). 6. MEXICAN/AUSTRALIAN DEBATE -- -- PROMPTED BY AMB BUTLER'S 11 AUGUST PLENARY STATEMENT THAT ONLY A "HANDFUL" OF DELS WAS BLOCKING ESTABLISHMENT OF AN NTB COMMITTEE (REF B), AMB GARCIA ROBLES SPARKED A LENGTHY EXCHANGE ON THE STATUS AND VIABILITY OF VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR A MANDATE FOR SUCH A COMMITTEE, COUCHED LARGELY IN TERMS OF PROCEDURAL FINE POINTS. VENEZUELAN AMB TAYLHARDAT INTERVENED ONCE TO SUPPORT MEXICO, AND AT THE SAME TIME WELCOME NAZARKIN'S STATEMENT. NET RESULT WAS TO LEAVE THE SITUATION UNCHANGED, BUT TO NO DOUBT COMPLICATE THE SOON-TO-BE-COMMENCED REPORT-WRITING EXERCISE ON NTB. 7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 210 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08949 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE'MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS: AUGUST 3-7, 1987 REFS: (A) GENEVA 8467 (CD-155) (B) STATE 16119 (C) PARIS 27724 1. THIS IS CD-167. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- - SOVIET FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE'S AUGUST 6 ANNOUNCEMENT IN THE CD (REF A) THAT THE SOVIET UNION NOW SUPPORTS MANDATORY SHORT NOTICE CHALLENGE INSPECTION RESULTED IN MEASURABLY INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE U.S./WESTERN GROUP POSITION ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION. -- SOCIALIST GROUP AND SOME WESTERN AMBASSADORS FLOATED IDEA OF EXTENDING SWEDISH CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE CW AD HOC COMMITTEE TO COVER THE 1988 CD SESSION. U.S. AND MOST WESTERN GROUP REPS FIRMLY AGREED THAT SUCH A MOVE, SHOULD IT EVENTUATE, MUST NOT PREJUDICE WESTERN GROUP'S RIGHT TO THE CHAIRMANSHIP IN 1989 ON THE BASIS OF THE ROTATION PRINCIPLE. -- CONTENTIOUS DEBATE OVER FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DESTRUCTION OF OLD ABANDONED CW MUNITIONS ENLIVENED CLUSTER I DISCUSSIONS. FRG VIGOROUSLY ARGUED THAT PROBLEM SHOULD BE HANDLED THROUGH BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS OUTSIDE THE CONVENTION, WHILE CHINA AND INDONESIA (WITH SOVIET SUPPORT) ARGUED THAT THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE HANDLED WITHIN THE CONVENTION. JAPAN, WHICH SUPPORTS THE FRG, STAYED OUT OF THE FRAY. -- CHAIRMEN OF CLUSTERS I AND IV SUBMITTED DRAFT REPORTS ON ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. END SUMMARY. 3.--CLUSTER IV (ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION) -- CLUSTER CHAIRMAN KRUTZCH (GDR) SUBMITTED HIS REPORT (CD/CW/WP.175) ON WORK ACCOMPLISHED ON GUIDELINES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORATE, MODEL AGREEMENTS AND ARTICLE VIII OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION. THE PAPERS IN THE REPORT WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION AND ELABORATION. HE IS CONTINUING SMALL GROUP INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON MODEL AGREEMENTS. CW COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN (EKEUS, SWEDEN) CONTINUED HIS SELECTED AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL CONSULTATIONS ON HIS DRAFT PAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS. STRONGER SUPPORT FOR U.S. POSITION FOR SHORT NOTICE MANDATORY INSPECTIONS WITH MINIMUM OR TOTALLY UNIMPEDED ACCESS 211 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET INCREASED WITH SOVIET FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE'S 6 AUGUST PLENARY STATEMENT. KEY G-21 REPS, SUCH AS CHINA, PAKISTAN, INDIA AND YUGOSLAVIA ARE MAKING CLEAR THEIR INTEREST IN A ROLE FOR THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL IN CHALLENGE INSPECTION DECISIONMAKING, AND INTEREST IN MANAGED ACCESS/ALTERNATIVE MEASURES BEINGA MORE PROMINENT FEATURE OF THE DISCUSSIONS. 4, CLUSTER I (CHEMICAL WEAPONS) -- U.S. DEL PARTICIPATED IN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH USSR, BELGIUM AND FRANCE ON CLUSTER CHAIRMAN NIEUWENHUY'S (BELGIUM) DRAFT ANNEX V OR ARTICLE IV ON VERIFICATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE DOCUMENT WAS RESTRUCTURED ALONG THE LINES OF ANNEX V OF ARTICLE V IN CURRENT ROLLING TEXT (cDicwiwp.167) AND AGREED LANGUAGE THERE AND IN SECTIONS II, IV AND V OF THE ANNEX TO ARTICLE IV APPLICABLE TO VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION WAS USED. THIS RESULTED IN A SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED PAPER FOR THE 7 AUGUST DRAFT REPORT. -- INFORMAL CHAIRMAN'S CONSULTATIONS FAILED TO RESOLVE EXTREMELY STRONG DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INDONESIA AND CHINA ON THE ONE SIDE AND FRG AND JAPAN ON THE OTHER ON THE ISSUE OF OLD DISCOVERED MUNITIONS. THE FRG AND JAPAN, IN A LOWER KEY, REJECTED THE CHAIRMAN'S PAPER IN THE DRAFT REPORT. THEY HELD TO THE POSITION THAT FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF ABANDONED WEAPONS IS A BILATERAL ISSUE AND INAPPROPRIATE FOR CONSIDERATION IN A MULTILATERAL CONVENTION. CHINA, WITH SUPPORT FROM THE USSR AND INDONESIA, IS EQUALLY STRONG IN ITS POSITION THAT RESPONSIBILITY MUST BE FIXED BY THE CONVENTION. SHORT TERM PROSPECTS FOR AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE ARE DIM. 5. CW COMMITTEE -- -- CHAIRMAN EKEUS (SWEDEN) PRESENTED AN AMBITIOUS PROPOSED WORK PLAN FOR AUGUST. IT INCLUDED CONTINUED FORMAL AND INFORMAL WORK ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION, VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION, AND OLD MUNITIONS, ORDER OF DESTRUCTION, MODEL AGREEMENTS AND JURISDICTION AND CONTROL. -- JAPAN TABLED A PAPER ON VERIFICATION OF NON- PRODUCTION (CD/CW/WP.174,) WHICH PROPOSED A CONCEPT OF VERIFICATION OF NON-CHEMICAL-WEAPONS PRODUCTION BY FOCUSING ON CHEMICALS UNDER SCHEDULES 1-3. THE CONCEPT WOULD MINIMIZE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR VERIFICATION INSPECTIONS OF CIVILIAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY FACILITIES. -- NORWAY INTRODUCED A RESEARCH REPORT TITLED ?"DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURES FOR VERIFICATION OF ALLEGED USE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS. PART IV". THE RESEARCH WAS THE BASIS FOR THE CANADA AND NORWAY PAPER ON VERIFICATION OF ALLEGED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CD/766). 212 coroym Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- CHAIRMAN EKEUS' PERSONAL PROPOSAL FOR INTERSESSIONAL AGENDA ITEMS INCLUDES: DEFINITIONS, NON-PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ORDER OF DESTRUCTION, ON-SITE CHALLENGE INSPECTION, GUIDELINES ON THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORATE AND JURISDICTION AND CONTROL. ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS INCLUDE VERIFICATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUC- TION AND ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES. THERE HAS BEEN NO DECISIONON AN INTERSESSIONAL AGENDA. THE AGENDA WILL BE DEVELOPED THROUGH CONSULTATIONS BY THE CHAIRMAN DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. 6. WESTERN CW COORDINATING GROUP -- -- GROUP COORDINATOR VAN SCHAIK, (NETHERLANDS) ANNOUNCED THAT DELEGATIONS HAVE GIVEN UP ON POSSIBLE INTERSESSIONALS IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER. HOWEVER, THERE IS WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE OF SESSIONS IN NOVEMBER, DECEMBER AND JANUARY, AND HE PRESSED THE U.S. DEL ON URGENCY OF KNOWING SOONEST THE U.S. POSITION AS U.S. DEL IS HOLDING UP A DECISION. U.S. REP INDICATED THAT DEL HAS REQUESTED GUIDANCE. -- VAN SCHAIK STATED THE WESTERN GROUP SUPPORTS HIS IDEA OF A WESTERN GROUP OVERVIEW OF THE CW NEGOTIATIONS FOR 2-3 DAYS IN DECEMBER OR JANUARY. -- THE SOCIALIST GROUP AND SOME WESTERN GROUP AMBASSADORS ARE FLOATING THE IDEA OF HAVING THE CURRENT CHAIRMAN (EKEUS, SWEDEN) CONTINUE IN 1988. WESTERN GROUP CONSENSUS IS THAT IF THE SOCIALIST GROUP DECIDES TO GIVE UP ITS TURN TO CHAIR THE COMMITTEE, THE WESTERN GROUP'S RIGHT TO CHAIRMANSHIP IN 1989 MUSTNOT BE AFFECTED. NO DECISION IS LIKELY UNTIL DECEMBER/JANUARY. -- IN WESTERN GROUP DISCUSSION ON THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL TO ADVISE THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CW CONVENTION (REF B AND C), DUTCH AND AUSTRALIAN REPS QUESTIONED THE NEED FOR SUCH A COUNCIL OUTSIDE ONE OF THE ALREADY AGREED UPON GOVERNING BODIES. -- VAN SCHAIK'S PROPOSAL FOR A LEGAL EXPERTS MEETING WAS SUPPORTED BY DELS OF JAPAN, FRG, CANADA AND ITALY. U.S. AND AUSTRALIAN REPS EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM AND STATED THAT THE GROUP SHOULD FIRST DECIDE WHAT WOULD BE EXPECTED FROM THE MEETING AND WHAT SPECIFIC QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED. 7. MOSCOW MINIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN. 213 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08950 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): VISITS TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) FACILITIES; ACTION REQUEST REF: STATE 255245 1. THIS IS CD-168. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SOVIET VISIT TO TOOELE, UTAH -- -- ON THURSDAY, AUGUST 20, SOVIET CD DEL HEAD (AMB. NAZARKIN) INFORMALLY ASKED U.S. DEL HEAD (AMB. FRIEDERSDORF) IF SOVIET VISIT TO U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITY AT TOOELE ARMY DEPORT COULD BE SCHEDULED SLIGHTLY EARLIER THAN NOVEMBER 23-24 DATE USG HAD PROPOSED. NAZARKIN SAID THAT, BETWEEN END OF UN DISARMAMENT DEBATE IN MID- NOVEMBER AND HIS PLANNED RETURN TO GENEVA FOR INTERSESSIONAL CW NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA IN EARLY DECEMBER HE HAD TO CARRY OUT BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AND VISIT MOSCOW. (CW MEETINGS ARE NOW SCHEDULED TO BEGIN IN GENEVA ON NOVEMBER 30, AS U.S. PROPOSED.) IT WOULD THUS BE VERY DIFFICULT TO VISIT TOOELE ON DATES U.S. PROPOSED. - NAZARKIN REQUESTED THAT VISIT BE SCHEDULED DURING WEEK OF NOVEMBER 16-20 ON WHATEVER DAYS WERE CONVENIENT FOR USG. END OF THE WEEK WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. 3. CD VISIT TO SHIKHANY PROVING GROUND -- -- AMB. NAZARKIN ALSO TOLD AMB. FRIEDERSDORF THAT SOVIETS HAD NOW SETTLED ON OCT. 12-14 AS FIRM DATES FOR SHIKHANY WORKSHOP. PARTICIPANTS WOULD ARRIVE IN MOSCOW ON OCT. 12 AT OWN EXPENSE. VISIT TO SHIKHANY WOULD TAKE PLACE ON OCT. 13. PARTICIPANTS WOULD LEAVE MOSCOW ON OCT. 14. INVITATIONS WILL BE SENT TO CD DELS DURING WEEK OF AUG. 24. 4. ACTION REQUEST -- -- DEL REQUESTS AUTHORITY TO WORK OUT WITH SOVIET DEL SPECIFIC TWO-DAY PERIOD DURING WEEK OF NOVEMBER 16-20 FOR SOVIET VISIT TO TOOELE. DEL WOULD, UNLESS INSTRUCTED THAT OTHER DAYS ARE PREFERRED, INITIALLY INVITE SOVIETS FOR THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19 AND FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 20. -- SINCE DELS LEAVE GENEVA ABOUT AUG. 28, DEL REQUESTS RESPONSE, IF POSSIBLE, NOT LATER THAN OPENING OF BUSINESS, GENEVA TIME, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 26. 5. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN. 214 eyrovm Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08965 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): FRANCO-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATION ISSUES 1. THIS IS CD-169. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TgXT). 2. SUMMARY -- - ACCORDING TO FRENCH CD AMBASSADOR, AUGUST 17 FRANCO-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON CW CONVENTION ISSUES FOCUSSED ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND FRENCH SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL. THE FRENCH EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SIDES ALSO TOUCHED ON THE NTH COUNTRY PROBLEM. END SUMMARY. 3. AT AUGUST 17 MEETING OF WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES, FRENCH AMBASSADOR MOREL PROVIDED A READOUT OF AUGUST 17 FRANCO-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS ON CW CONVENTION ISSUES. 4. DATA EXCHANGE -- -- MOREL INDICATED THAT FRENCH HAD EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF MULTILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE. SOVIET AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN REPLIED THAT USSR APPRECIATED THAT WAS A PROBLEM AREA. HOWEVER, THERE WERE SOME "PRACTICAL" DIFFICULTIES." THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO AGREE TO SOME NON-BINDING CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION, FOR EXAMPLE, DECLARATIONS OF POSSESSION OR NON-POSSESSION OF CW. ON THE OTHER HAND, DATA EXCHANGE AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION WOULD BE LEGALLY BINDING. 5. NTH COUNTRY PROBLEM -- -- ON THE MATTER OF THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF STATE PARTIES WHICH WOULD HAVE TO SIGN THE CONVENTION BEFORE IT CAME INTO FORCE, NAZARKIN SAID THAT IN ESSENCE ONCE THE MEMBERS OF THE NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES HAD BECOME PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO DRAW OTHER COUNTRIES INTO IT. 6. FRENCH SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL -- -- NAZARKIN MADE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS TOTALLY OPPOSED TO ANY CW PRODUCTION ONCE THE CONVENTION ENTERS INTO FORCE. NAZARKIN SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERS THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE SIZE OF STOCKS POSSESSED BY INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION THE STOCKS WOULD BE "BLOCKED" AND WOULD THEREBY LOSE THEIR MILITARY VALUE. THE FRENCH REPLIED THAT THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT UNDECLARED STOCKS. NAZARKIN SEEMED TO SUGGEST A WILLINGNESS TO RECONSIDER THE SOVIET POSITION ON A STRICTLY LINEAR DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS. HE SUGGESTED 215 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET POSSIBILITY THAT THE SIZE OF ALL STOCKS COULD BECOME EQUAL IN THE NINTH YEAR OF THE TEN-YEAR DESTRUCTION PERIOD. 7. CHALLENGE INSPECTION -- -- CHALLENGE INSPECTION WAS DISCUSSED AT LENGTH. NAZARKIN SAID THAT THE RECENTLY ANNOUNCED SOVIET POSITION IN FAVOR OF A MANDATORY QHALLENGE INSPECTION WITH NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL HAD "FORMALIZED" THE CONCEPT IN THE UK CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROPOSAL (CD/715). NAZARKIN MAINTAINED THAT THE USSR HAD ADOPTED CD/715 AND CONFIRMED IT IN A MORE STRINGENT WAY. -- THE SOVIET UNION HAS SAI6 THEY ENVISAGE THREE POSSIBLE CHALLENGE INSPECTION SCENARIOS: (1) CASES INVOLVING CW USE, (2) CASES INVOLVING HIDDEN STOCKPILES, AND (3) CASES INVOLVING HIDDEN PRODUCTION. -- THE DISCUSSION TOUCHED ON THE NEED TO DEVELOP STANDARDIZED INSTRUMENTS FOR USE BY INSPECTORS, AND NAZARKIN INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT INSPECTORS WOULD BRING "HIDDEN" INSTRUMENTS WITH THEM FOR PURPOSES OF ESPIONAGE. -- ON THE MATTER OF INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED BY THE CHALLENGING STATE REGARDING THE BASIS FOR THE CHALLENGE, NAZARKIN SAID THAT WHAT WAS REQUIRED WAS THE ESSENTIAL DETAILS NECESSARY TO FACILITATE THE CONDUCT OF THE INSPECTION AND PROTECT AGAINST IMPROPER REQUESTS. TNE FRENCH SIDE HAD INDICATED THAT THE REQUEST SHOULD BE IN THE NATURE OF A MANDATE FOR A SEARCH RATHER THAN A DETAILED INDICTMENT. -- ON THE POSSIBLE USE OF "FILTERS" IN CHALLENGE INSPECTION REQUESTS, NAZARKIN NOTED THAT THE G-21 AND CHINESE INSISTENCE ON A ROLE FOR THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SHOULD BE ALLEVIATED BY THE ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT TO ACCEPT AN INSPECTION. THE SOVIET UNION FELT THAT THE CONCERNS OF THE G-21 AND CHINA HAS BEEN BASED PRIMARILY ON THE US FACT-FINDING PROPOSAL. (FRENCH RESPONDED SKEPTICALLY.) NAZARKIN SAID THAT IN THE SOVIET VIEW THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL WOULD BE TO REVIEW THE RESULTS OF AN INSPECTION. -- REGARDING THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS IN CASE OF A VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION, NAZARKIN SAID THAT INCENTIVES FOR COUNTRIES TO REMAIN WITHIN THE CONVENTION SHOULD BE MAXIMIZED. THUS, ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO COUNTRIES WITH EMERGING CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES, AS SUGGESTED BY THE RECENT PAKISTANI PROPOSAL (CD/752). THEN, THE THREAT OF WITHDRAWAL OF THESE BENEFITS COULD BE USED AS LEVERAGE IN INSTANCES OF POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS. THE EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON ENSURING THAT COUNTRIES REMAIN WITHIN THE CONVENTION RATHER THEN ON EXPELLING 216 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET THEM FOR VIOLATIONS. 8. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 217 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 08966 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS: AUGUST 10-14, 1987 REFS: (A) GENEVA 8776 (CD-164) (B) GENEVA 8467 (CD-155) (C) GENEVA 8759 (BILAT-43) (D) GENEVA 8647 (CD-161) 1. THIS IS CD-170. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY-- - SOVIET CW NEGOTIATIONS OFFENSIVE WAS GIVEN A BOOST BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN'S 11 AUGUST PLENARY ADDRESS. HE PROVIDED DETAILS ON THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE CONDUCT OF MANDATORY, NO- RIGHT-OF-REFUSAL CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS, SAID THE VISIT TO SHIKHANY FOR CD DEL REPS WOULD OCCUR 7-8 OCTOBER, ANNOUNCED SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE U.S. INVITATION TO VISIT THE DESTRUCTION FACILITY IN TOOELE, UTAH IN OCTOBER, PRESENTED SOVIET VIEWS ON THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION, SUGGESTED THE CONFERENCE RECONVENE FROM MID-NOVEMBER TO THE END OF DECEMBER 1987. -- AS A RESULT OF THE NEW SOVIET POSITION, THERE WAS FURTHER MOVEMENT TOWARD THE U.S. AND UK POSITIONS ON CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS. -- AT AUGUST 13 U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL MEETING WITH VISITING SOVIET OFFICIALS, THE SIDES DISCUSSED ISSUES AFFECTING THE CW CONVENTION NEGOTIATIONS, THE UPCOMING VISITS OF CD CW REPRESENTATIVES TO SHIKHANY ON 7-8 OCTOBER AND SOVIET REPS TO TOOELE. -- IN BRIEFING THE WESTERN GROUP ON RESULTS OF ROUND VI OF U.S.-SOVIET CW DISCUSSIONS, AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF AND U.S. DELOFF MIKULAK STRESSED U.S. PROPOSAL ON BILATERAL EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION OF DATA BEFORE THE CONVENTION IS SIGNED. FRENCH AMBASSADOR MOREL EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR U.S. POSITION. -- WESTERN GROUP CONSENSUS WAS THAT IF THE SOCIALIST GROUP CONCEDES ITS TURNTO A CW COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN FOR 1988 TO CURRENT CHAIRMAN (EKEUS/SWEDEN), THE WEST'S RIGHT TO THE CHAIRMANSHIP IN 1989 MUST NOT BE PREJUDICED. - PRESURE FROM OTHER WESTERN DELS CONTINUED FOR U.S. TO TAKE A POSITION ON SCHEDULING INTERSESSIONALS. -- CLUSTER IV CHAIRMAN (ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES 218 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION) SUBMITTED THE RESULTS OF THE WORKING PARTY ON MODEL AGREEMENTS FOR INCLUSION IN THE FINAL REPORT. -- CLUSTER I (CHEMICAL WEAPONS) ISSUE OF OLD DISCOVERED MUNITIONS REMAINED UNRESOLVED AND WILL BE ADDRESSED DURING INTERSESSIONALS OR IN THE 1988 CD. -- THE DRAFT FINAL REPORT OF THE CW COMMITTEE WAS DISTRUBUTED FOR REVIEW AND COMMENT ON 14 AUGUST. END SUMMARY. 3. USSR CD PLENARY ADDRESS -- -- THE USSR HAS LAUNCHED AN APPARENT OFFENSIVE FOR RAPID CONCLUSION OF THE CW CONVENTION. -- IN HIS 11 AUGUST CD PLENARY ADDRESS (DATAFAXEDTO ACDA, SUMMARIZED IN REF A) SOVIET AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN PROVIDED DETAILS OF THE SOVIET POSITION ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION. HE SAID ALL STATE PARTIES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS TO REQUEST MANDATORY, NO-RIGHT-OF-REFUSAL INSPECTIONS, DENOUNCED THE U.S. FACT FINDING PANEL PROPOSAL AS DISCRIMINATORY, SAID INSPECTORS MUST ARRIVE ON SITE WITHIN 48 HOURS AS THE MAXIMUM TIME, SUGGESTED WAYS THAT ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OR "MANAGED ACCESS" CAN BE FACILITATED WHILE ASSURING NATIONAL SECURITY IS NOT COMPROMISED AND POSSIBLE ABUSE OF INSPECTION RIGHTS IS MINIMIZED. HE ANNOUNCED 7-8 OCTOBER AS DATES FOR THE VISIT OF CD TO SHIKHANY AND SOVIETACCEPTANCE OF THE U.S. INVITATION FOR A SOVIET DELEGATION TO VISIT THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITY IN TOOELE, UTAH. HE ALSO ELABORATED ON THE SOVIET VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION IN DEVELOPING THE PROCEDURES AND ORGANS NECESSARY TO BRING THE CONVENTION INTO FORCE. - NAZARKIN THEN REITERATED FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE'S POSITION ON INTENSIFYING NEGOTIATIONS (REF B) AND SUGGESTED THAT AN ADDITIONAL FORMAL SESSION OF THE CD BE SCHEDULED FROM MID-NOVEMBER THROUGH THE END OF DECEMBER WITH THE CW CONVENTION AS THE SINGLE ITEM ON THE AGENDA. 4. MEETING WITH SENIOR SOVIET CW POLICY LEVEL OFFICIALS -- AT THE AUGUST 13 U.S.-SOVIET MEETING (REF C) SOVIET COUNCIL OF MINISTERS COUNSELOR ARZHAKOV ASKED IF U.S. ? HAD MADE A POLITICAL DECISION TO CONCLUDE A CW CONVENTION SOON. IF SO, THEN ALL OTHER ISSUES CAN BE SOLVED. HE ALSO REQUESTED U.S. VIEWS ON WHICH 25X1 219 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET ISSUES ARE BLOCKING RAPID CONCLUSION OF THE CONVENTION. ADDITIONALLY, HE ASKED QUESTIONS CONCERNING U.S. POSITION ON COOPERATION AND SHARING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION AND TREATY VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY, CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS, VERIFICATION OF NON-DEVELOPMENT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, "OLD STOCKS" AND WILLINGNESS OF U.S. TO INVITE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES TO A FACILITY COMPARABLE TO THEIR SHIKHANY PROVING GROUND. -- IN DESCRIBING THE VISIT OF CD CW DELEGATIONS TO SHIKHANY, COLONEL-GENERAL KUNTSEVICH STATED THAT ALL TYPES OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS IN THE SOVIET INVENTORY WILL BE DISPLAYED AND INFORMATION ON SIZE, FILL WEIGHT, AGENT TYPE AND TACTICAL DESIGNATION WILL BE PROVIDED. VISITING DELEGATION EXPERTS WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE THE-MUNITIONS AND HAVE THEIR QUESTIONS ANSWERED. -- U.S. AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF WELCOMED THE SOVIET INITIATIVES AND AFFIRMED U.S. COMMITMENTTO CONCLUDING A CW CONVENTION. HE DELIVERED A COPY OF QUESTIONS IN WHICH THE U.S. DELEGATION REQUESTED MORE DETAIL AND CLARIFICATION ON THE SHIKHANY VISIT AND THE SOVIET REQUEST TO VISIT FORT DETRICK OR DUGWAY PROVING GROUND. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE U.S. WOULD STUDY THE QUESTIONS POSED BY COUNSELOR ARZHAKOV AND PROVIDE ANSWERS AT THE FOLLOW-UP MEETING SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 18. 5. WESTERN GROUP BRIEFING ON U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS -- -- IN BRIEFING THE WESTERN GROUP ON ROUND VI(REF D), AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF AND U.S. REP MIKULAK EMPHASIZED THE U.S. INSISTENCE ON EARLY BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION OF DATA PRIOR TO U.S. SIGNATURE OF THE CW CONVENTION. THE INCREASED WESTERN GROUP ACCEPTANCE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF DATA EXCHANGE AND ITS VERIFICATION AS A CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE AFFECTING THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WAS REFLECTED IN FRENCH AMBASSADOR MOREL'S STRONG ENDORSEMENT OF THE U.S. POSITION. MOREL EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT INSUFFICIENT DATA ON CW CAPABILITIES MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO PARTIES AT THE TIME OF SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION AND URGED WESTERN GROUP MEMBERS TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS. 6. WESTERN CW COORDINATION -- -- CHAIRMAN VAN SCHAIK (NETHERLANDS) EMPHASIZED THAT LACK OF U.S. POSITION INXINTERSESSIONALWAS HOLDING-UP DECISIONS ON SCHEDULING INTERSESSIONALS. U.S. REP REPLIED THAT U.S. DEL WAS STILL ? WAITING FOR GUIDANCE. -- VAN SCHAIK REPORTED THAT THE SOCIALIST GROUP HAD 220 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET ASKED THAT A DECISION ON THE 1988 CW COMMITTEE CHAIR- MANSHIP BE DELAYED UNTIL JANUARY OR FEBRUARY 1988. SOCIALISTS HAVE HINTED THEY WANT THE CURRENT CHAIRMAN (EKEUS, SWEDEN) TO CONTINUE, AND SAY THEY WANT TO REVIEW THE RESULTS OF INTERSESSIONAL WORK BEFORE MAKING A DECISION. WESTERN GROUP CONSENSUS WAS THAT IF THE SOCIALIST GROUP GIVES UP ITS TURN TO SELECT A CHAIRMAN OR IF THEY CHOOSE TO SELECT EKEUS AS THEIR CHOICE, THE WESTERN GROUP'S RIGHT TO THE CHAIRMANSHIP IN 1989 MUST NOT BE PREJUDICED. FRG AMB VAN STULPNAGEL ARGUED THAT POSSIBLE SOCIALIST SELECTION OF EKEUS WOULD CREATE PRESSURE FOR EKEUS TO COMPROMISE WITH SOCIALIST POSITIONS. -- THERE WAS CONSENSUS THAT THE CW COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN'S (EKEUS) CONSULTATIONS HAD BEEN USEFUL AND ARE AN APPROPRIATE FORUM TO DISCUSS ALTERNATIVES AND REACH AN EVENTUAL CONSENSUS. THERE HAD BEEN POSITIVE MOVEMENT TOWARD THE WESTERN POSITION ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND AN EAST-WEST VERSUS NNA CONFRONTATION HAD BEEN AVOIDED. -- IN DISCUSSING THE CONTENT OF THE FINAL REPORT, FRG AMBASSADOR VON STULPNAGEL EMOTIONALLY CRITICIZED THE PAPER ON OLD DISCOVERED MUNITIONS THAT WAS INCLUDED IN CLUSTER I CHAIRMAN'S (NIEWENHUYS, BELGIUM) REPORT. VON STULPNAGEL ARGUED THAT FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF ABANDONED STOCKS IS A BILATERAL ISSUE AND INAPPROPRIATE FOR INCLUSION IN A MULTILATERAL CONVENTION. HE WAS QUIETLY SUPPORTED BY JAPAN. GROUP CONSENSUS WAS THAT THE CONVENTION MUST ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF OLD DIS- COVERED MUNITIONS IN A GENERAL WAY TO ASSURE DECLARATION AND VERIFICATION. HOWEVER, FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES SHOULD BE SETTLED BILATERALLY OUTSIDE THE CONVENTION. THE CONTESTED PAPER WILL NOT BE IN THE FINAL REPORT. -- WESTERN GROUP EXPERTS DISCUSSED HOW THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL COULD BE ESTABLISHED AND FUNCTION WITHIN CURRENTLY AGREED ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF THE CONVENTION. THE GROUP RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR SUCH A BODY, BUT THERE WAS NO CONSENSUS AS TO ITS RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER ORGANS OF THE CONVENTION. BELGIAN REP EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT BIGGER COUNTRIES WOULD MONOPOLIZE LEADERSHIP IN SUCH A BODY AT THE EXPENSE OF SMALL COUNTRIES SUCH AS BELGIUM WHICH HAVE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES DISPROPORTIONATE TO THEIR SIZE. 7. BUREAU MEETING -- -- INTERSESSIONAL SCHEDULE AND 1988 CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE CW AD HOC COMMITTEE WERE AGENDA ITEMS. INTER- SESSIONAL SCHEDULE IS DEPENDENT UPON U.S. POSITION 221 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET WHICH WAS NOT THEN AVAILABLE. SOCIALIST GROUP WILL NOT SELECT A CHAIRMAN FOR 1988 UNTIL JANUARY. WESTERN GROUP PRESENTED WESTERN POSITION ON RESERVING ITS RIGHT TO CHAIRMANSHIP IN 1989. 8. CW COMMITTEE -- -- THE DRAFT FINAL REPORT WAS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND COMMENT BY 17 AUGUST AND COMPLETION ON 19 AUGUST. -- CANADA DISTRIBUTED A PAPER ON IDENTIFICATION OF CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES (CD/CW/WP.178). PAPER PROVIDES CHEMICAL ABSTRACTS SERVICE REGISTRY NUMBERS FOR CHEMICALS ON THE CURRENTLY PROPOSED SCHEDULES 1 AND 2. -- CLUSTER I (CHEMICAL WEAPONS) COORDINATOR NIEUWENHUYS (BELGIUM) WAS UNABLE TO RESOLVE STRONG DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FRG AND CHINA ON HIS PAPER ON OLD DISCOVERED STOCKS. THE PAPER WILL NOT BE IN THE FINAL REPORT OF THE CW COMMITTEE. -- CLUSTER IV (ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES) CONTINUED SMALL GROUP WORK ON THE OUTLINE MODEL AGREEMENT FOR FACILITIES PRODUCING OR CONSUMING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS. 9. INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITH FRENCH REP -- -- U.S. DEL REQUESTED MEETING WITH FRENCH REP DE LA BAUME TO REVIEW U.S. CONCERNS PRIOR TO FRENCH-SOVIET BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS DURING WEEK OF 17 AUGUST. ACCORDING TO FRENCH REP, SUBJECTS FOR THE DISCUSSIONS WILL BE CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR SECURITY STOCKPILES. FRENCH REP STATED THAT FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS PUSHING AT HIGH LEVELS FOR U.S. RESPONSE TO THEIR SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL. HE INDICATED THAT SENIOR FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL HAD RAISED ISSUE WITH U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR CARLUCCI. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE DELIBERATELY EXTREME FRENCH POSITION IN THE PROPOSAL WAS INTENDED TO ELICIT RESPONSE OF THE CD MEMBERS. HE OBSERVED THAT IF THE U.S.-SOVIET STOCKPILES WERE TO BE REDUCED TO EQUAL LEVELS DURING DESTRUCTION PROCES, THE NEED FOR SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL WOULD BE LESSENED. FRANCE STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE U.S. POSITION ON EARLY BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. -- SWEDISH DELOFF (BONNIER; PROTECT) HAS TOLD U.S. DELOFF THAT SWEDES HAD ALSO NOTICED FRENCH INACTIVITY ON SECURITY STOCKPILE ISSUE. CONFIDENTIAL INQUIRIES IN PARIS HAD LED SWEDES TO CONCLUSION THAT FRENCH NOW EXPECTED TO BE ABLE TO PRODUCE SUFFICIENT CW FOR THEIR SECURITY STOCKPILE BEFORE CONVENTION ENTERED INTO FORCE. SWEDES BELIEVE FRENCH AS A RESULT ARE NO LONGER PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT HAVING OPTION TO PRODUCE DURING INITIAL TEN-YEAR PERIOD. RATHER THEIR INTEREST HAS SHIFTED TO HAVING MOTHBALLED PRODUCTION PLANT IN GOOD ENOUGH CONDITION DURING THIS PERIOD THAT IT CAN BE REACTIVATED IN TWO MONTHS. ? 222 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 10. MOSCOW MINIMZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN ? 223 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 09039 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY SESSION OF AUGUST 18, 1987 1. THIS IS CD171. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- INDIAN AMB. TEJA AND GDR AMB. ROSE MADE TOURS D'HORIZON OF CD'S 1987 WORK. HUNGARIAN AMB. MEISZTER, AS CHAIRMAN OF RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS COMMITTEE, INTRODUCED COMMITTEE'S 1987 REPORT. U.S. AMB. DRIEDERSDORF RESPONDED TO ROSE AND ALSO CRITICIZED VENTING FROM SOVIET AUG. 2 EXPLOSION. SOVET REP RESPONDED THAT VENTING HAD NOT RESULTED IN ANY FALLOUT. END SUMMARY. 3. INDIA -- -- AMB. TEJA NOTED THAT THE 1987 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CD WOULD BE ITS LAST BEFORE THE THIRD SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT (SSOD-III) AND EXPRESSED DISAPPOINT- MENT THAT THE CD HAD, ONCE AGAIN, FAILED TO MEET THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S DEADLINE FOR THE FORMULATION OF A DRAFT COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM ON DISARMAMENT. TEJA ALSO NOTED CONCERN FOR THE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF BRACKETS AND THE QUESTIONING OF ELEMENTS OF THE SSOD-I FINAL DOCUMENT. HE LAMENTED THE FAILURE TO AGREE UPON MANDATES FOR COMMITTEES ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN, CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, AND PREVEN- TION OF NUCLEAR WAR, AND THE INABILITY TO NEGOTIATE IN THE OUTER SPACE AHC. -- ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW), TEJA ADVOCATED ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS TO ENSURE THAT THE CONVENTION WOULD NOT HINDER THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, AND CALLED FOR A REEXAMINATION OF THE CW AHC MANDATE TO PERMIT ACTUAL DRAFTING. SPEAKING AS A MEMBER OF THE GROUP OF SEVEN "WISE MEN" SET UP TO CONSIDER CD PROCEDURAL ISSUES, HE OBSERVED THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS REPRESENTED "ONE SINGLE DOCUMENT," AND THAT "ANY ATTEMPT TO PRESENT IT AS TWO PAPERS IN THE BELIEF THAT REPORT WRITING SHOULD RECEIVE PRIORITY OVER OTHER ISUSUES WILL NOT ACHIEVE THE DESIRED OBJECTIVE." 4. AUSTRALIA -- -- IN RESPONSE TO TEJA, AMB. BUTLER, ALSO A MEMBER OF THE GROUP OF SEVEN, DISAGREED THAT RECOMMENDATIONS 224 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 z / Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET IN GROUP'S REPORT ON SUBSIDIARY BODIES AND ON REPORT WRITING WERE LINKED, CLAIMING 1986 AGREEMENT IN CD TO MAKE CHANGES IN REPORTING PROCEDURES. 5. GDR-- -- DURING AN OTHERWISE ROUTINE TOUR D'HORIZON OF THE CD, AMB. ROSE SINGLED OUT THE U.S. FOR STANDARD EASTERN CRITICISM ON BINARY CW WEAPONS, INF AND NTB. 6. U.S. -- -- AMB. FRIEDERSDORF RESPONDED BRIEFLY TO ROSE, AND USED THE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST VENTING OF AUGUST 2 IN VIOLATION OF LTBT. 7. USSR -- -- REP ZHARKOV RESPONDED TO FRIEDERSDORF, READING OUT TASS STATEMENT CLAIMING THAT, WHILE SOVIET TEST VENTED, NO FALLOUT WAS PRODUCED. 8. HUNGARY -- -- RW AD HOC COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, AMB. MEISZTER, TABLED THE COMMITTEE'S REPORT WITHOUT FANFARE. FORMAL CONSIDERATION IS SCHEDULED FOR AUG. 25. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 225 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 09066 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): HIGHLIGHTS OF WEEK OF 17-21 AUGUST; WESTERN GROUP MEETING 19 AUGUST 1. THIS IS CD-172. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW -- -- AS CONFERENCE MOVED INTO HIGHER GEAR FOR WRAPPING UP ITS WORK IN FORMAL SESSION FOR 1987, MOST IMPORTANT EVENTS WERE SECOND U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL MEETING ON CW, AND EFFORTS IN CW COMMITTEE TO AGREE ON PROCEDURES FOR INTERSESSIONAL WORK. -- U.S. AMB FRIEDERSDORF MADE FINAL PLENARY STATEMENT SURVEYING YEAR'S RESULTS. SEVERAL OTHER DELS ALSO GAVE TOURS D'HORIZON. - CW COMMITTEE REPORT WAS DELAYED OVER DISAGREEMENT ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTERSESSIONAL WORK; RW COMMITTEE REPORT WAS INTRODUCED; OUTER SPACE, CPD AND NSA COMMITTEES ESSENTIALLY COMPLETED WORK ON THEIR REPORTS; CONFERENCE BEGAN WORK ON BALANCE OF ITS REPORT ON NTB, NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND PNW SECTIONS. -- FINAL PLENARY SESSION IS SCHEDULED FOR 5 PM 28 AUGUST. -- WESTERN GROUP DISCUSSED CW INTERSESSIONAL ISSUES; HEARD FROM FRENCH ON THEIR CW BILATS WITH SOVIETS; AND DISCUSSED LAST-MINUTE MANEUVERING ON NTB MANDATE, SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR NEW NTB SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS GROUP, AND REPORT-WRITING ISSUES. END SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW. 3. SECOND MEETING WITH SENIOR SOVIET CW POLICY-LEVEL - OFFICIALS -- -- ON AUGUST 18 U.S. REPS MET AGAIN WITH VISITING STATE COUNSELOR TO SOVIET COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, S. A. ARZHAKOV, AND COLONEL-GENERAL A. KUNTSEVICH TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF CW CONVENTION ISSUES, SOVIET INITIATIVES, BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE, AND VISITS TO TOOELE, UTAH, AND TO SOVIET FACILITY AT SHIKHANY. SOVIET SIDE QUERIED WHETHER U.S. COMMITMENT TO CW NEGOTIATIONS WAS SERIOUS, AND WERE FIRMLY ASSURED OF U.S. COMMITMENT. ON DATA EXCHANGES SOVIETS EXPRESSED CONCERN LEST, IF AN EXCHANGE TOOK PLACE PRIOR TO SIGNATURE, U.S. MIGHT ACQUIRE DATA AND THEN DECIDE NOT TO SIGN. U.S. SIDE STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF EARLY, VERIFIED EXCHANGE TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND TO FACILITATE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS (DETAILS SEPTEL). 4. WESTERN GROUP MEETING 19 AUGUST -- -- ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AMB FRIEDERSDORF MADE CLEAR 226. SWIRRT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET THAT U.S.-PROPOSED DATES FOR INTERSESSIONAL WORK WERE FIRM. ON CW COMMITTEE CHAIRMANSHIP ISSUE, THE WEST AGREED TO HOLD FIRM ON PRINCIPLE OF ROTATION. COORDINATOR VAN SCHAIK (NETHERLANDS) REPORTED ON NEW DATES FOR SHIKHANY VISIT (12-14 OCTOBER). AMB MOREL REPORTED ON BILATERALS WITH SOVIETS IN PARIS (SEPTEL). VAN SCHAIK SECURED WESTERN AGREEMENT TO UNDERTAKE A TWO-STAGE OVERVIEW (EXPERTS AND AMBASSADORS) DURING INTERSESSIONALS. -- ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN, COORDINATOR YAMADA (JAPAN) REPORTED WESTERN AGREEMENT NOT TO ACCEPT SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A NEW VERIFICATION EXPERTS GROUP. BELGIAN REP SAID THAT BRUSSELS THOUGHT SOVIET IDEA MIGHT HAVE SOME MERIT, BUT WENT ALONG. DUTCH ALSO WANTED NOT TO BE TOO NEGATIVE. -- ON THE MANDATE ISSUE, YAMADA REPORTED THAT APRIL PRESIDENT VEJVODA (CZECHOSLOVAKIA) WAS NOT READY TO MAKE HIS PROPOSAL FORMAL. GROUP ALSO CONSIDERED REPORT ON NTB ITEM, AND, AFTER SORTING OUT CONFUSION SOWN BY FRG AMB VON STULPNAGEL OVER WHETHER ANY WESTERN DEL (READ U.S.) NOW HAD A MORE POSITIVE VIEW OF THE VEJVODA PROPOSAL THAN BEFORE, AGREED TO TAKE A LOW KEY APPROACH TO HANDLING THE PROPOSAL IN THE REPORT. -- ON OUTER SPACE, DISMAY WAS EXPRESSED OVER PERSISTENT EFFORTS OF INDIANS, VENEZUELANS AND PRC TO INSERT CLEARLY NONCONSENSUS JUDGMENTS INTO CONSENSUS CONCLUSIONS OF OS. FRG ASKED MOREL, AS CD PRESIDENT, TO INTERCEDE AT WEEKLY CONSULTATIONS TO CLARIFY MEANING OF CONSENSUS, AS WELL AS TO ESTABLISH DEADLINES FOR ALL AHC WORK ON REPORTS TO AVOID FOOT- DRAGGING. MOREL REFUSED TO DO THE FORMER (I.E., INTERFERE IN A COMMITTEE) BUT AGREED TO DO THE LATTER. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 09107 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP, DARPA VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY SESSION.OF AUGUST 21, 1987 1. THIS IS CD-173. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- IN LENGTHY PLENARY SESSION HIGHLIGHTED BY PRESENCE OF SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER, MOST SPEAKERS DELIVERED END-OF-ROUND ASSESSMENTS OF 1987 SESSION. CD TOOK NOTE OF REPORT OF GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS ON SEISMOLOGY. (U.S., SWEDISH, BRAZILIAN, POLISH, EGYPTIAN, AND PAKISTANI STATEMENTS FAXED; SRI LANKAN AND JAPANESE STATEMENTS POUCHED TO ACDA/MA.) END SUMMARY. 3. SWEDEN -- -- FONMIN STEN ANDERSURGED GREATER ATTENTIVENESS BY CD TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ISSUES, CALLED FOR AN END TO "ATOMIC DIPLOMACY," AND CAUTIONED THAT ELIMINATION OF SOME WEAPONS SHOULD NOT TRANSFER THE ARMS RACE TO OTHER AREAS. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE REITERATED SWEDISH CONCERNS ABOUT THE GROWTH OF NAVAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND INCREASED DEPLOY- MENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT SEA, AND RECOMMENDED DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. THE CD COULD NEGOTIATE A MULTILATERAL TREATY ON THE PREVENTION OF INCIDENTS AT SEA, HE SAID. . ON NTB, HE URGED WORK IN THE CD ON VERIFICATION, SCOPE, AND CONTENTS OF AN AGREEMENT. US-SOVIET BILATERALTESTING TALKS ARE WELCOME; NEW TESTING RESTRAINTS MUST BE STEPS TOWARD A GLOBAL CTB NEGOTIATED IN THE CD. ANDERSSDNWELCOMED ALLIANCE- TO-ALLIANCE EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS, AND SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE 35 CSCE STATES BE ADEQUATELY INFORMED ON THEIR DEVELOPMENT, AND"PARTICIPATE IN A CONTINUOUS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS" ON THEIR SUBSTANCE. HE SUPPORTED REGIONAL CBM'S INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR FREE CORRIDOR IN THE BORDER AREA BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. 4. U.S. -- -- IN AN END-OF-ROUND TOUR D'HORIZON, AMB. FRIEDERSDORF NOTED "RENEWED ACTIVITY" ON BOTH NSA AND RW, NOTING THAT DIFFERENCES OF VIEW ABOUT PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES MAY ACTUALLY BE GREATER NOW THAN EARLIER. FRIEDERSDORF REITERATED DOUBTS WHETHER THE OS AHC MANDATE HAD BEEN EXHAUSTED, AND RAISED A QUESTION ON UTILITY OF CONTINUED 221. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET INFORMAL PLENARIES ON NUCLEAR ISSUES IN 1988. 00 NUCLEAR TEST BAN, HE STRONGLY ENDORSED THE WORK OF THE GSE, CALLING ATTENTION TO INCREASED PARTICI- PATION IN ITS WORK, AND NOTED THAT THE CD DID NOT ESTABLISH AN NTB AHC. FRIEDERSDORF STRESSED THE TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE U.S. OVER THE YEARS TO DEVELOP AND SUSTAIN VERIFICATION CAPABILITIESS AND, IN GENTLE PUT-DOWN OF SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A NEW EXPERTS GROUP AND, REITERATED THAT AN AHC WAS THE APPROPRIATE WAY TO CONSIDER VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES. FRIEDERSDORF ALSO CALLED FQR THE SOVIET UNION TO PUBLISH CURRENTLY CLASSIFIED SEISMIC DATA ON THEIR PAST NUCLEAR TESTS. HE TERMED CURRENT EFFORTS ON CPD TO BE "HELPFUL" BECAUSE DISAGREEMENTS ARE CLEARLY SPELLED OUT AND THE COMMITTEE HAS FOCUSED ON THEM. -- REGARDING CW, FRIEDERSDORF EMPHASIZED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOT STAGNATING, THAT DELEGATIONS WERE SEEKING SOLUTIONS TO REAL PROBLEMS, AND THAT "AN IMPRESSIVE AMOUNT OF ESSENTIAL WORK" WAS ACCOMPLISHED. HE WELCOMED SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND THE INVITATION BY THE USSR TO VISIT THE CW FACILITY AT SHIKHANY. HE SUMMARIZED THE MAJOR REMAINING TASKS RELATED TO A CW BAN AS: DEVELOP EFFECTIVE PROVISIONS FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTION, FOR MONITORING THE CIVIL CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, AND FOR ENSURING THE SECURITY OF ALL STATES DURING THE PERIOD FOR DESTRUCTION OF CW; ENCOURAGE ALL STATES POSSESSING CW TO BECOME PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION; ENSURE THAT PROVISIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED; PREVENT EROSION OF EXISTING CONSTRAINTS ON CW WHILE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE; AND INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AMONG THE NEGOTIATING STATES THROUGH GREATER OPENNESS ABOUT CW CAPABILITIES. 5. BRAZIL -- -- IN BRIEF INAUGURAL STATEMENT AMB. AZAMBUJA PRAISED U.S. AND USSR NEGOTIATING EFFORTS IN THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARENA, BUT MAINTAINED THAT OTHER NATIONS SHOULD ALSO PARTICIPATE "ACTIVELY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY." HE PRAISED THE "RELENTLESS EFFORTS" OF THE G-21 TO ACHIEVE AN NTB AHC AND CRITICIZED THE RELUCTANCE OF OTHERS TO ENDORSE , A "MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATING MANDATE." WHILE ENDORSING THE WORK TO DATE ON THE CW CONVENTION, HE URGED SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY, THROUGH AMENDMENT OF THE PREAMBLE AND ARTICLE XI, TO PERMIT "UNFETTERED DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES." 229 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 6. POLAND -- -- IN HIS FINAL STATEMENT BEFORE DEPARTING THE CD, AMB. TURBANSKI FOCUSED ON OUTER SPACE ISSUES, EXPRESSING DISSATISFACTION. HE CLAIMED A "GENERAL CONVERGENCE OF OPINIONS" ABOUT PRESERVING AND STRENGTHENING THE LEGAL REGIME, AND THAT THE CD HAD A LEGITIMATE RIGHT BOTH TO BAN THE USE OF FORCE IN SPACE AND TO LIMIT THE POSSESSION OF RELATED "INSTRUMENTS OF FORCE." TURBANSKI CRITICIZED EFFORTS TO EMPHASIZE "THE ADEQUACY OF THE PRESENT LEGAL ORDER" BY STATES "WHICH ARE PLANNING TO INTRODUCE WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE" OR WHICH ARE PROVIDING POLITICAL, SCIENTIFIC OR ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO SUCH EFFORTS. HE CALLED ATTENTION TO INCREASING RISK OF COLLISION IN SPACE DUE TO ACCUMULATION OF DEBRIS. HE PRAISED THE CANADIAN PAXSAT PRESENTATION AND OTHER "PROGRESS" ACHIEVED DURING 1987 ON VERIFICA- TION, AND URGED A "REORIENTATION OF EFFORTS" FOR FUTURE CD WORK IN THIS AREA. - TURBANSKI VIGOROUSLY PRAISED THE WORK OF THE CW AHC AND ENDORSED THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION. HE WAS CRITICAL OF WORK ON NUCLEAR ITEMS (CNAR, PNW, NTB) AND JUDGED OVERALL THAT THE CD'S 1987 WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY. 7. EGYPT -- -- IN HIS FAREWELL STATEMENT, AMB. ALFARARGI CLAIMED THAT THE CONFERENCE WAS "TOTTERING," WITHOUT ANY "REAL PROGRESS," AND WITH "A CLEAR RECESSION" IN SOME AREAS. ON NTB, ALFARARGI SAID EVERYONE WAS THE LOSER WHEN NO WORK TOOK PLACE: "VERTICAL NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ESCALATES, THE PROBABILITIES OF HORIZONTAL NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION INCREASE." - ALFARARGI REJECTED THE ARGUMENT THAT NUCLEAR DETERRENCEHAD ENSUREDPEACE IN EUROPE FOR FORTY YEARS, CLAIMING THAT THIS ENCOURAGED NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION "ON GROUNDS THAT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE CAN ALSO ENSURE PEACE AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL IN OTHER PARTS" OF THE WORLD, AND THAT THE ARGUMENT WAS INHERENTLY DISCRIMINATORY AGAINST NNWS. -- ON CW, IN A CONFUSED DISCUSSION OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION (PERHAPS BAD TRANSLATION IN THE ENGLISH- LANGUAGE COPY OF HIS TEXT) ALFARARGI CLAIMED THAT STATES INTENT ON POSSESSING CW WOULD NOT ADHERE TO THE CONVENTION TO REMAIN FREE OF LEGAL RESPONSIBILIT IF NOT MORALPRESSURE. THUS WORK ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION SHOULD NOT IGNORE 2.0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 "-N, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 POSSIBILITY OF ABUSES AND "ITS THREAT TO STATE NATIONAL SECURITY AND JEOPARDIZING THE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (SIC) FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES" BY OVER-EMPHASIZING ITS ROLE IN VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE. - ALFARARGI ALSO CALLEDFOR CBMS, INCLUDING ABSTAINING FROM PRODUCING "NEW GENERATIONS" OF CW PRODUCTION EVEN AFTER ADHERENCE (READ FRANCE). -- ON OUTER SPACE, ALFARARGI EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT AHC WORK WAS STILL IN AN "EXPLORATORY" PHASE AFTER THREE YEARS, AND URGED FUTURE WORK ON DETAILED STUDY OF THE EXISTING PROPOSALS AND FUTURE INITIATIVES TO PREVENT AN ARMS RACE IN THAT AREA. TO ENSURE THIS, THE AHC CHAIRMAN SHOULD BE GIVEN "GREATER POWERS." -- REGARDING THE USE OF "CONSENSUS" IN THE RULES OF PROCEDURE, ALFARARGI ARGUED THAT IT SHOULD SERVE AS "AN EXPRESSION OF THE GENERAL TREND IN WHICH THE WHOLE MEMBERSHIP OF STATES PARTICIPATE IN FORMULATING" AND THAT IT WAS "DIFFICULT" TO ACCEPT THE RIGHT OF ONE STATE TO IMPEDE THE WORK OF THE CD, ESPECIALLY IN PROCEDURAL MATTERS. 8. SRI LANKA -- -- IN A REVIEW OF THE BROAD SPECTRUM OF CD ISSUES, NEWLY ARRIVED AMB. RODRIGO CRITICIZED "STAGNATION" ON THE NTB ISSUE, ENDORSED PROTECTION OF SATELLITES, SUPPORTED ON-SITE INSPECTION OF SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES, ENDORESED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS TO "CLARIFY AND UPDATE ISSUES," AND CRITICIZED THE "FESTOONING" OF CPD WITH BRACKETS. -- ON CW, RODRIGO NOTED THAT IN VERIFICATION A BALANCE"BETWEEN THE DEMANDS OF A STRICT, BINDING VERIFICATION REGIME" AND "THE CONCERNS OF STATES TO PROTECT VITAL INSTALLATIONS FROM UNWARRANTED PRYING" WAS NEEDED. 9. AUSTRALIA -- -- AMB. BUTLER ENDORSED THE WORK OF THE GSE AND REAFFIRMED THE AUSTRALIAN PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A GLOBAL SEISMIC MONITORING NETWORK. 10. JAPAN -- -- AMB. YAMADA PRAISED THE WORK OF THE GSE ON SEISMIC WAVEFORM DATA EXCHANGE, ENDORSED GSE EFFORTS TO PROVIDE "FREE AND EASY ACCESS" TO DATA AND ANALYSIS RESULTS, CRITICIZED THOSE 231 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET COUNTRIES THAT APPEARED "HESITANT OR RELUCTANT" TO ADOPT THIS PRINCIPLE, AND SAID IT MAY BE TIME FOR CD TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO GSE'S WORK. (COMMENT: JAPANESE TOLD US THEY HAVE SOME CONCERN OVER COST OF PLANNED EXPERIMENTS.) ON NTB, YAMADA NOTED THAT NO MANDATE PRESENTED THUS FAR HAS CONSENSUS SUPPORT AT PRESENT, AND URGED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TO FACILITATE A SOLUTION. 11. PAKISTAN -- -- AMB. AHMAD TERMED THE 1987 CD'S RESULTS "EXTREMELY MODEST, IF NOT NEGLIGIBLE," ESPECIALLY IN THE NUCLEAR-RELATED AGENDA ITEMS. HE CRITICIZED THE "RIGIDITY" PRESENT ON THE NTB ISSUE AND URGED A FRESH LOOK IN 1988 SO THE CD CAN BEGIN "SUBSTANTIVE WORK" ON A CTB. AHMAD SAID HE WOULD ACCEPT "INTERMEDIATE HINTS" IN THIS AREA ONLY IF UNDERTAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF A SHORT AND PREDETERMINED TIME LIMIT FOR COMPLETING A COMPREHENSIVE BAN, AND SAID THAT AN NTB SHOULD NOT/NOT BE LIKED TO A REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. -- ON OUTER SPACE, AHMAD DISMISSED THE AHC'S WORK AS UNSATISFACTORY, WITH WORK ON GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE LEGAL REGIME TERMED "LARGELY REPETITIOUS AND POLEMICAL." HE URGED AN IMPROVED AHC MANDATE IN 1988 TO PERMIT MORE FOCUSED DISCUSSION AND ELABORATION OF CONCRETE MEASURES. - AHMAD PRAISED THE "SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS" ON A CW CONVENTION, URGED THAT THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL RESOLVE DISPUTES OVER HOW CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED, ASKED FOR FURTHER ATTENTIVENESS TO ASSISTANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ISSUES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ARTICLE XI, AND REITERATED HIS PROPOSAL FOR COLLECTIVE ASSISTANCE AGAINST A CHEMICAL WEAPONS THREAT. - AHMAD SUGGESTED POSTPONING FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE CPD TO A MORE PROPITIOUS TIME. 12. GDR -- -- AMB. ROSE ENDORSED THE WORK OF THE GSE AND URGED ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A NEW, SPECIAL GSE TO RECOMMED MEASURES TO VERIFY A CTB. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 232 . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 09132 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR ODS/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT; CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY SESSION 25 AUGUST 1987 1. THIS IS CD-174. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT) 1. SUMMARY -- -- IN A FAREWELL ADDRESS TO THE CD, AMB BEESLEY (CANADA) REVIEWED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CD DURING HIS TENURE. AMB HACENE (ALGERIA) GAVE A BRIEF YEAR-END REVIEW OF CD WORK. THE CONFERENCE ADOPTED THE RW AHC REPORT. END SUMMARY. *2. FRG ON NSA -- -- FRG DELOFF INTRODUCED THE REPORT OF THE NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES (NSA) AHC, CD/784. HE ACKNOWLEDGED SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES AND NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, AND RECOMMENDED CONTINUED SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS IN 1988. 3. CANADA -- -- IN A LENGTHY STATEMENT, DEPARTING CANADIAN AMBASSADOR BEESLEY REVIEWED THE WORK OF THE CD SINCE HIS ARRIVAL IN 1983. IN HIS VIEW, THERE HAVE BEEN CONCEPTUAL CHANGES IN THINKING WHICH AUGUR WELL FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; HE CITED THE INF TALKS AS A SIGNIFICANT EXAMPLE. IN THE CD, HE NOTED THAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN SLOW ON THE MAIN ISSUES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CW. HE REAFFIRMED THAT THE CANADIAN PRIORITY IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS IS VERIFICATION. -- HE THEN REVIEWED EACH AGENDA ITEM, CITING CANADIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. ON CW, HE NOTED RECENT SOVIET STATEMENTS ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THERE ARE MANY DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT. HE CALLED ON ALL STATES TO FOLLOW CANADA'S LEAD TO DECLARE THEMSELVES FREE OF CW. -- BEESLEY NOTED THAT NTB WAS THE FUNDAMENTAL NUCLEAR ISSUE IN THE CD, ONE TO WHICH EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION IS CENTRAL. HE APPLAUDED THE WORK OF THE GSE, POINTED TO CANADIAN EFFORTS TOWARD VERIFICATION WORK, AND ? CALLED FOR FORMATION OF AN AD HOC COMMITTEE. -- HE NOTED SLOW MOVEMENT IN THE CD OUTER SPACE ARENA, BUT CITED CANADIAN CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE PAXSAT PROGRAM. IN BRIEF REMARKS ON RW AND CPD, HE STATED THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE PROGRESS IN THE FORMER, AND THAT WHILE NOTABLE IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE DRAFT TEXT OF THE LATTER, IN SOME WAYS THERE IS NOW A NARROWER CONSENSUS THAN AT UNSSOD-I. 25X1 233 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- LOOKING AHEAD TO UNSSOD-III, BEESLEY NOTED THERE HAS BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON ANY ISSUE DURING THE PAST FOUR YEARS IN THE CD; THAT THE CD WILL COME UNDER SCRUTINY; BUT THAT THE SPECIAL SESSION WILL REAFFIRM THE CRITICAL ROLE OF THE CD. -- HE SUPPORTED PROPOSALS OF THE "GROUP OF SEVEN" AMBASSADORS (OF WHICH HE WAS A MEMBER) FOR THE MORE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THE CD. 4. ALGERIA -- -- ALGERIAN AMB HACENE COVERED THE WATERFRONT OF CD ISSUES, REGRETTING LACK OF PROGRESS IN NTB, CNAR, AND PNW; BUT GAVE CREDIT TO THE NNA FOR THEIR FLEXIBILITY ON THESE ISSUES. HE APPLAUDED PROGRESS ON CW, BUT CAUTIONED THAT ANY CONVENTION SHOULD NOT HAMPER CIVILIAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES, PARTICULARLY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. HE REGRETTED THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AHC ON OUTER SPACE HAD NOT LED TO SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS, AND THAT THE CPD NEGOTIATIONS HAD TAKEN A STEP BACKWORD AS EVIDENCED BY THE PLETHORA OF BRACKETS IN THE CPD TEXT. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 234 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 09167 DOE FOR DP/I5A; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): MEETING WITH SWEDISH FONMIN ANDERSSON 1. THIS IS CD-175. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. U.S. AMB. FRIEDERSDORF MET WITH SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER STEN ANDERSSON AFTER ANDERSSON'S APPEARANCE AT CD PLENARY EARLIER IN THE DAY (SEPTEL). AT INTERVENING LUNCHEON, SOVIET AMB. NAZARKIN WAS ALSO PRESENT, ALONG WITH SEVERAL OTHER SWEDISH GUESTS. AFTER LUNCH, ANDERSSON, AMB. MAJ BRITT THEORIN AND CARL MAGNUS HYLTTENIUS FROM FOREIGN MINISTRY MET FOR ABOUT THIRTY MINUTES WITH FRIEDERSDORF, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A NOTETAKER. 3. ANDERSSON WAS OPEN AND FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION, RECALLING WITH OBVIOUS PLEASURE EARLIER TIMES HE HAD SPENT IN THE U.S., AS LONG AGO AS 1954. ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, HE EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN AMB. FRIEDERSDORF'S VIEWS ON A POSITIVE OUTCOME OF THE CD'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS, ON WHETHER AN INF AGREEMENT WOULD LEAD TO A SUMMIT MEETING THIS YEAR, AND ON WHAT STEPS MIGHT FOLLOW A SUMMIT. 4. FRIEDERSDORF, PRAISING SWEDISH AMB. EKEUS FOR HIS LEADERSHIP ON THE CW NEGOTIATIONS, SUMMARIZED RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, NOTING POSITIVE IMPACT OF SOVIET MOVEMENT TOWARD THE U.S. POSITION IN ITS DRAFT CONVENTION IN CD/500, AND SAID HE THOUGHT THERE WAS REASON FOR OPTIMISM THAT A CONVENTION WAS NOT OUT OF REACH. 5. ON INF, FRIEDERSDORF SAID HE HAD NO OFFICIAL INFORMATION, BUT FROM WHAT HE UNDERSTOOD, THERE WAS SOME FEELING THAT AN AGREEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT, DESPITE THE PROBLEM WITH THE FRG PERSHING 1-A'S, AND THAT IF THIS OCCURRED BY SEPTEMBER, A SUMMIT CONCEIVABLY COULD STILL TAKE PLACE THIS YEAR. AFTER THAT, AGREEMENTS IN START AND IN CW COULD OCCUPY CENTER STAGE. 6. ANDERSSON RAISED THE QUESTION OF DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING OUTER SPACE, AND EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT A COMPETITION IN WEAPONS THERE MIGHT LEAD TO AN END TO THE U.S.-SOVIET NST TALKS. ANDERSSON SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SAY HOW SERIOUS THE U.S. WAS TO CREATE A WEAPONS SYSTEM THERE. WAS IT ON ITS OWN MERIT, OR WAS IT A QUESTION OF TACTICS? HIS GUESS, HE SAID, WAS THAT THE SDI PROGRAM WAS TACTICAL, 235 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT THERE IS A REAL NEED FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. 7. FRIEDERSDORF RESPONDED THAT, WHILE HE WAS NOT AN EXPERT, AND DID NOT KNOW WHAT WAS IN THE PRESIDENT'S MIND, HE BELIEVED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS CONVINCED THAT THE RESEARCH WAS WORTH THE EFFORT TO SEE IF NON- THREATENING DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, IF PERFECTED, COULD OFFER PROTECTION FROM NUCLEAR ATTACK, AND THAT THIS WOULD BE MUCH BETTER THAN AN OPEN-ENDED COMPETITION IN HUGE ICBM'S. THE SOVIET UNION HAS, OF COURSE, BEEN ENGAGED IN A SIMILAR RESEARCH EFFORT FOR MANY YEARS, FRIEDERSDORF POINTED OUT. EVEN WITHOUT THE SOVIET EFFORT, THE PRESIDENT WOULD PURSUE HIS OWN PROGRAM BECAUSE IT WAS A MATTER OF ESTABLISHING IF A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM WAS FEASIBLE. THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES SUCH A GOAL IS WORTH THE TRY, DESPITE THE COST AND PUBLIC CONTROVERSY. 8. ANDERSSON REJOINED THAT THERE WAS A RISK THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD ENGAGE IN A COMBINED OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS COMPETITION. FRIEDERSDORF SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WAS A WORST CASE SCENARIO. UNDER A MORE OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO, BOTH SIDES WOULD REALIZE THAT IT WAS TIME TO START BUILDING DOWN INSTEAD OF UP. 9. THE CONVERSATION TURNED TO A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, WITH ANDERSSON COMMENTING THAT SWEDEN HAS VERY FEW EXPERTS TO EVALUATE THE REALITIES OF THE NEW OPENNESS, BUT THAT HE WAS RATHER HOPEFUL. THE EVOLUTION WOULD BE HARD TO STOP IF PEOPLE LEARNED TO THINK FOR THEMSELVES. QUESTIONS FROM BELOW WOULD CHALLENGE THE PARTY AND MILITARY BUREAUCRACIES. BUT IF GORBACHEV WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL, THERE WOULD BE A STRONG NEGATIVE REACTION. PEOPLE IN THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES THEREFORE HAD AN IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITY TO SUPPORT THE CHANGES. 10. FRIEDERSDORF, AGAIN CAUTIONING THAT HE WAS NOT AN EXPERT, SAID HE BELIEVED SOMETHING WAS IN FACT GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION. HE CITED THE CASE OF THE SOVIET GENERAL THEN VISITING GENEVA ON CW MATTERS WHO NOT LONG AGO HAD CLAIMED AT A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THE USSR HAD NO CHEMICAL WEAPONS. NOW THE SAME GENERAL WAS INVOLVED IN INVITING CD DELEGATIONS TO VISIT A SOVIET CW FACILITY. THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN UNTHINKABLE FIVE YEARS AGO. IF GORBACHEV TAKES STEPS TO BE ACCOMMODATING, WHILE KEEPING OUR GUARD UP, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO RESPOND, FRIEDERSDORF COMMENTED. 11. ANDERSSON THANKED FRIEDERSDORF, SAYING HE 2:36 com,vm Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET WAS MORE OPTIMISTIC AS A RESULT OF THEIR CONVERSATION. MARSH END OF MESSAGE .237 CONFIDENTIAL NNNN ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SECRET GENEVA 69187 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): BRIEFING BY SOVIET NST NEGOTIATOR TO WESTERN AND NEUTRAL/NONALIGNED CD REPRESENTATIVES 1. THIS IS CD-76. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- ON AUGUST 26, 1987, DEPUTY SOVIET NST NEGOTIATOR OBUKHOV BRIEFED WESTERN AND NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED (G-21) CD AMBASSADORS ON THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE ON THE NST TALKS. THE GENERAL CONTENT OF THE BRIEFING, AS DESCRIBED BY FRENCH ATTENDEE (PROTECT) TO U.S. DELOFF, ISREPORTED HERE. SOVIET PRESENTATION WAS ASSESSED BY ATTENDEE AS RELATIVELY SHORT COMPARED TO PREVIOUS YEARS, AND CRITICAL OF U.S. RESPONSES TO SOVIET INITIATIVES IN ALL THREE AREAS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY. 3. GENERAL ISSUES -- -- OBUKHOV NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN ALL THREE SUBGROUPS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN INF, THEY HAD ADOPTED THE GLOBAL DOUBLE ZERO OPTION. IN DEFENSE AND SPACE, THEY HAD PROPOSED A TEN-YEAR NONWITHDRAWAL PERIOD, RESTRICTIONS ON PERMITTED RESEARCH, AND STRICT VEROICATION PROVISIONS FOR THE SPACE ARENA. REGARDING START, HE STATED THAT THE SOVIET DRAFT TREATY WAS CONSISTENT WITH PROPOSALS FOR 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS, BUT THAT PROGRESS IN THAT AREA DEPENDED UPON RESTRAINT IN OUTER SPACE. -- IN CRITICIZING U.S. RESPONSES IN ALL THREE AREAS, HE CLAIMED THAT IN INF THE "PERSHING 1 PROBLEM" REMAINED TO BE RESOLVED. REGARDING DEFENSE AND SPACE, HE STATED THAT THE U.S. WAS ACTING IN AN "OBSTRUCTIVE" MANNER, WANTED ONLY A SEVEN-YEAR NONWITHDRAWAL PERIOD FROM THE ABM TREATY, SOUGHT MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY TO CONDUCT ALL RESEARCH POSSIBLE, AND WANTED THE ABILITY TO UNDERTAKE DEPLOYMENTS AFTER THE SEVEN YEAR WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. , IN STRATEGIC ARMS, HE SAID THAT THE U.S. POSITION ON OUTER SPACE WAS BLOCKING PROGRESS. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT OTHER U.S. PROPOSALS WOULD "UNDERMINE THE STRUCTURE OF SOVIET FORCES." HE CALLED ATTENTION TO PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE SIDES ON NEGOTIATING ON ALCMS, CLAIMED THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT PROPOSING ANY LIMITS ON SLCMS, AND TERMED U.S. EFFORTS TO INCLUDE THE BACKFIRE BOMBER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AS "RIDICULOUS." 238 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 4. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS -- -- IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, OBUKHOV MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS: -- THE AIM OF BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE TO ELIMINATE ALL OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL MISSILES; -- THE U.S. "BROAD INTERPRETATION" OF THE ABM TREATY IS ACTUALLY CONTRARY TO THE INTENT OF THAT TREATY. U.S. PROGRAMS ARE LEADING TO AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE AND THIS IS WHY SDI HAS BEEN SO SEVERELY CRITICIZED; THE SOVIETS HAVE NO PROGRAM EQUIVALENT TO SDI; -- THE SOVIETS HAVE PRESENTED A LIST TO THE U.S. OF SPACE DEVICES THAT WOULD BE PROHIBITED FROM BEING LAUNCHED; -- THE USSR WILL CAREFULLY STUDY THE U.S. PROPOSALS ON INF VERIFICATION PRESENTED ON AUGUST 25. 5. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH DEL HAD RECEIVED, AND IGNORED, INVITATION TO SIMILAR SOVIET BRIEFING IN MARCH 1987, NO INVITATION WAS ADVANCED BY USSR THIS TIME. 6. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 239 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SECRET GENEVA 09169 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN;-SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): NST AMBASSADOR'S 1. THIS IS CD-177. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- DEPUTY HEAD OF STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS (START) SUBGROUP OF NST DEL (AMB. HAMMER), DEPUTY HEAD OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES SUBGROUP OF NST DEL (AMB. WOODWORTH) AND DEPUTY HEAD OF D&S SUBGROUP (AMB. COOPER) BRIEFED WESTERN AND G-21 (NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED) /CHINESE CD REPRESENTATIVES AT SEPARATE MEETINGS ON AUGUST 24 AND AUGUST 25 RESPECTIVELY ON THE STATUS OF THE NST NEGOTIATIONS. REPRESENTATIVES FROM SEVERAL OBSERVER STATES ALSO ATTENDED. AUDIENCE WAS ATTENTIVE AND QUESTION-ANSWER PERIOD WAS INFORMATIVE AND ENLIGHTENING. END SUMMARY. 3. NST START AMBASSADOR READ HAMMER, INF AMBASSADOR JOHN WOODWORTH, AND D&S AMBASSADOR HANK COOPER MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM WESTERN ALLIED CD DELEGATIONS ON AUGUST 24 AND CHINESE AND MOST NNA (G-21) REPRESENTA- TIVES ON AUGUST 25 TO BRIEF ON STATUS OF THE NST NEGOTIA- TIONS. (FOR ATTENDEES, SEE CABLE ADDRESSEES.) REPRE- SENTATIVES FROM CD OBSERVER STATES WERE ALSO INVITED. REGARDING START, HAMMER EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S. TABLED A DRAFT TREATY ON MAY 8, THAT THE SOVIETS TABLED ONE ON JULY 31, AND THAT AN AGREEMENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE BY THE END OF THE YEAR. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT CON- SIDERABLE DIFFERENCES EXISTED BETWEEN THE TWO DOCUMENTS, ESPECIALLY ON THE SUBJECTS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE SUB- LIMITS, THE TREATMENT OF MOBILE MISSILES, THE HANDLING OF SLCMS, AND SOVIET EFFORTS TO LINK START SYSTEM REDUCTIONS TO SDI. -- ON D&S, COOPER SAID THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN SLOW, BUT SOME HAS CLEARLY BEEN APPARENT. HE STATED THAT THE SIDES HAD ARRIVED AT A FORMULA FOR NONWITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY FOR A PERIOD OF YEARS, BUT THAT MAJOR CONCEPTUAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES EXIST ON THE SUBJECTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THEIR PRINCIPLE OBJECTIVE IS TO CRIPPLE SDI. -- REGARDING INF, WOODWORTH SAID THAT THE PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENT HAD BEEN SOVIET RECENT AGREEMENT TO THE "GLOBAL DOUBLE ZERO" FORMULA, AND THAT THE SIDES HAD BEEN OCCUPIED WITH REVISING THEIR DRAFT INF TREATIES TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS DEVELOPMENT. HE NOTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS COULD BE 240 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET ALTERED AND SIMPLIFIED. HE ALSO VIGOROUSLY AND FIRMLY REITERATED THE U.S. POSITION ON THE FRG'S PERSHING MISSILES, STATING THAT THE SUBJECT WAS "IRRELEVANT" TO THE FRAMEWORK OF A US-USSR INF AGREEMENT, THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT/NOT SACRIFICE ITS ALLIANCE WITH THE FRG FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT, AND WOULD NOT/NOT PERMIT THESE MISSILES TO BECOME A CONDITION OF AGREEMENT. QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIODS -- -- (NOTE: MANY OF THE QUERIES PRESENTED DURING BOTH QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIODS COVERED THE SAME ISSUES AND SOME WERE DUPLICATIVE. THEY HAVE BEEN GROUPED BY SUBJECT AND SUMMARIZED.) -- INF: JAPAN (AMB YAMADA), NETHERLANDS (AMB VAN SCHAIK) AND AUSTRALIA (LETTS) ASKED FOR THE U.S. VIEW OF THE TIMETABLE. WOODWORTH AND COOPER RESPONDED THAT THEY HOPED THAT THE SEPTEMBER .US-USSR FONMIN MEETING WOULD NOT/NOT BE PRESENTED WITH UNRESOLVED INF ISSUES FOR DECISION AT THAT LEVEL.THEY ALSO NOTED THAT A SIGNED INF TREATY MUST BE SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS BY FEBRUARY/ MARCH 1988 IN ORDER TO BE RATIFIED DURING THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION, AND EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT/NOT SUBMIT A TREATY THAT WAS NOT VERIFIABLE. WHEN ASKED BY JAPAN (YAMADA) AND NORWAY (LUNDBO) FOR EXPLANATION OF SOVIET REQUEST FOR MANDATORY ACCESS TO MILITARY FACILITIES IN THIRD COUNTRIES, WOODWORTH RESPONDED THAT HE PRESUMED THEY WERE REFERRING TO U.S./ USSR FACILITIES IN RELEVANT INF BASING COUNTRIES, BUT THAT SOVIETS HAD NOT YET PROVIDED CLARIFICATION. INDIA (AMB TEJA) AND INDONESIA PRESSED ON FRG PERSHING MISSILES AND WOODWORTH REITERATED THAT THEY WERE IRRELEVANT TO A U.S./USSR AGREEMENT. -- CRUISE MISSILES: IN RESPONSE TO QUERY BY FINLAND ON SCOPE OF USSR'S PROPOSED LIMITS ON SLCMS, HAMMER RESPONDED THAT THEY WERE DESIGNED TO UNDERCUT THE U.S. SLCM PROGRAM WHILE SAFEGUARDING THAT OF THE SOVIETS. REGARDING THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS ALCMS, HE NOTED THAT MAJOR DIFFERENCES EXIST OVER PROPOSED COUNTING RULES FOR THESE SYSTEMS. -- DEFENSE AND SPACE ISSUES: AUSTRALIA (LETTS) ASKED IF CURRENT ABM COMPLIANCE PROBLEMS WERE CONSIDERED A "MATERIAL BREACH" OF THE ABM TREATY. COOPER RESPONDED THAT A "MATERIAL BREACH" WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF A CENTRAL PROVISION OF THE TREATY. WHEN ASKED FOR HIS REACTION TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A PERMANENT PRESENCE OF INSPECTORS AT SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES, COOPER REMARKED THAT THE ISSUE HAS NOT YET BEEN SPECIFICALLY RAISED, ALTHOUGH SOME INDIVIDUAL FACETS 25X1 0111 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET OF THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF INSPECTION OF LAUNCH PLATFORMS HAS BEEN MENTIONED BY THE SOVIETS. 5. COMMENT: BRIEFINGS WERE WELL-ATTENDED AND SUBSEQUENT REMARKS TO U.S. CD DEL CONFIRMED APPRECIATION BY ATTENDEES OF U.S. EFFORTS TO KEEP CD DELEGATIONS INFORMED OF STATUS OF NST ON A CONTINUING BASIS. DEL AGAIN UNDERLINES POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THESE BRIEFINGS AND REMAINS DEEPLY APPRECIATIVE OF NST AMBASSADORS FOR THEIR CONTINUING COOPERATION IN THIS ENDEAVOR. END COMMENT. MARSH END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 212 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 ( SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 09206 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS: AUGUST 17-21, 1987 REFS: (A) GENEVA 9040 (BILAT-45 (B) GENEVA 8759 (BILAT-43) ^ (C) STATE 255245 (D) GENEVA 8950 (CD-168) (E) STATE 253609 (F) GENEVA 8965 (CD-169) 1. THIS IS CD-178. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- - THE SOVIETS ARE CONTINUING THEIR CW NEGOTIATIONS OFFENSIVE THROUGH PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS WITH DELEGATIONS FROM MAJOR WESTERN NATIONS, G-21 AND CHINA, IN WHICH TWO VISITING HIGH LEVEL SOVIET OFFICIALS DISCUSS WHAT EACH DELEGATION SEES AS THE MAJOR ISSUES REQUIRING RESOLUTION FOR COMPLETION OF THE CW CONVENTION. -- HEAD OF SOVIET DELEGATION (AMB NAZARKIN) CONFIRMED DATES OF OCTOBER 12-14 .FOR VISIT OF CD CW DELS TO SHIKHANY AND REQUESTED U.S. CONSIDER WEEK OF NOVEMBER 16 FOR SOVIET VISIT TO TOOELE. -- DURING 18 AUGUST INFORMAL BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, SOVIETS HELD FIRM TO THEIR POSITION ON TIMING AND PHASING OF DATA EXCHANGE, GAVE ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON SHIKHANY ITINERARY DROPPED REQUEST FOR VISIT TO FORT DETRICK AND STATED THAT U.S. HAD NOT PRODUCED CHEMICAL WEAPONS FOR 17 YEARS BECAUSE WE HAVE SUFFICIENT STOCKPILES TO MEET MILITARY NEEDS WHILE PERFECTING BINARY TECHNOLOGY. -- FRENCH AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT CHALLENGE INSPECTION, FRENCH SECURITY STOCKPILEPROPOSAL, NTH COUNTRY PROBLEM AND MULTILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE WERE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED AT AUGUST 17 FRENCH - SOVIET BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON CW CONVENTION ISSUES. -- U.S. AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF ANNOUNCED TO THE WESTERN GROUP U.S. PROPOSED DATES FOR INTERSESSIONAL WORK. -- IN HIS AUGUST 20 PLENARY ADDRESS, U.S. AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF CHARACTERIZED THE SUMMER SESSION OF THE CW COMMITTEE AS ONE THAT SUCCESSFULLY DELVED INTO DETAILS OF CRITICAL ISSUES, EVOLVED NEW THINKING, RESULTED IN GREATER CONSENSUS ON SOME CRITICAL ISSUES AND PRODUCED NEW INSIGHT INTO THE DETAILS OF MANY COMPLEX ISSUES THAT REMAIN TO BE SOLVED BEFORE AN EFFECTIVE VERIFIABLE CW CONVENTION CAN BE COMPLETED. -- SOUTH KOREAN PERMANENT MISSION FIRST SECRETARY WAS BRIEFED ON STATUS OF CW NEGOTIATIONS. -- REPRESENTATIVE OF MEXICAN DEL STATED DURING INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS THAT PRIMARY INTEREST OF G-21 NATIONS IN A CW CONVENTION IS TECHNICAL 25X1 242 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET ASSISTANCE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FOR DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES. -- A REVISED CLUSTER I PAPER ON VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION WAS ACCEPTED FOR INCLUSION IN APPENDIX II OF THE FINAL REPORT. -- APPROVAL OF THE CW COMMITTEE DRAFT REPORT WAS DELAYED BY UNRESOLVED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION ON PROPOSED DATES AND FORMAT FOR INTERSESSIONALS. END SUMMARY. 3. WESTERN CW COORDINATION -- -- SOVIETS HAVE LAUNCHED A MAJOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CAMPAIGN. WESTERN GROUP DELEGATIONS Of U.S., UK, FRANCE, AUSTRALIA, FRG AND JAPAN, MAJOR G-21 COUNTRIES (PAKISTAN, INDIA AND SWEDEN) AND CHINA ARE HAVING PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS WITH VISITING SOVIET OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS WHAT EACH DELEGATION VIEWS AS MAJOR ISSUES TO COMPLETION OF A CW CONVENTION. THESE CONSULTATIONS ARE VIEWED BY WESTERN DELEGATIONS AS FACT-FINDING SESSIONS THROUGH WHICH THE SOVIET OFFICIALS ARE OBTAINING INFORMATION FOR THE BASIS OF FURTHER SOVIET INITIATIVES TO BE ANNOUNCED AT APPROPRIATE TIMES TO MAXIMIZE PUBLIC PORTRAYAL OF THE SOVIET UNION AS THE MAIN FORCE DRIVING THE CW NEGOTIATIONS TO COMPLETION. THE SEPTEMBER U.S.-SOVIET MINISTERIAL MAY WELL BE THE FIRST OCCASION FOR THE SOVIETS TO PROPOSE NEW INITIATIVES TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES. -- AT THE REQUEST OF CANADA,SOVIETS ARE SEEKING NEW DATES FOR CD VISIT TO SHIKHANY TO AVOID CONFLICT WITH NGO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON IMPLEMENTING A GLOBAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION SCHEDULED FOR 7-9 OCTOBER IN OTTAWA. -- MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT THE SHIKHANY VISIT WERE EXPRESSED BY SOME DELEGATIONS. AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR BUTLER EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ACTUAL TIME AT SHIKHANY (ESTIMATED 3-4 HOURS) WILL NOT BE ADEQUATE FOR EXPERT TECHNICAL REVIEW AND THAT SOVIETS MAY BE SETTING UP TO SHOW AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE WHILE GAINING MAXIMUM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY BENEFIT. BELGIUM DEL CONCURRED AND STATED THAT MILITARY EXPERTS SHOULD BE MEMBERS OF VISITING DELEGATIONS TO MAXIMIZE GAIN OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION IN TIME AVAILABLE. UK REP OPINED THAT THE INVITATION TO SHIKHANY REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT OPENING BY THE SOVIET UNION AND MUST BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. -- COORDINATOR VAN SCHAIK (NETHERLANDS) REITERATED HIS PLANS FOR AN EXPERTS AND HEADS OF DELEGATION OVERVIEW DURING INTERSESSIONALS. I. SECOND MEETING WITH SENIOR SOVIET CW POLICY-LEVEL OFFICIALS -- 244 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 ,J Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 -- AT THE SECOND MEETING (REF A) WITH VISITING STATES COUNSELOR TO THE SOVIET COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, S.A. ARZHAKOVAND COLONEL-GENERAL A. KUNTSEVICH, U.S. AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF RESPONDED TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE FIRST MEETING (REF B) AND EXTENDED AN OFFICIAL INVITATION FOR THE SOVIET VISIT TO TOOELE, UTAH ON THE ALTERNATIVE DATES OF 23-24 NOVEMBER 1987 AS INSTRUCTED IN REF C. -- SOVIETS ACCEPTED INVITATION TO TOOELE IN PRINCIPLE BUT HAD CONFLICT WITH PROPOSED DATES. THEY LATER REQUESTED U.S. CONSIDER WEEK OF 16-20 NOVEMBER WITH SPECIFIC PREFERENCE FOR 19-20 NOVEMBER 1987. REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE SUBMITTED IN REF D. -- SOVIETS HELD FIRM TO THEIR POSITION THAT TIMING, PHASING, AND VERIFICATION OF DATA EXCHANGE COINCIDE WITH COMPLETION OF THE CW CONVENTION, AND DENOUNCED THE U.S. POSITION AS INAPPROPRIATE AND POLITICAL IN NATURE IN THAT IT REQUIRED EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION OF CONFIDENTIAL DATA BEFORE A POLITICAL DECISION AND - COMMITMENT TO THE CONVENTION IS MADE. -- SOVIETS REJECTED THE U.S. POSITION THAT 17 YEARS OF SOVIET CW PRODUCTION AND U.S. NON-PRODUCTION HAS CREATED STOCKPILE IMBALANCES. IN THEIR VIEW, THE U.S. STOPPED PRODUCTION OF CW IN 1969 ONLY AFTER IT HAD SUFFICIENT STOCKPILES TO MEET ALL MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WHILE PERFECTING BINARY TECHNOLOGY. -- SOVIETS ANNOUNCED NEW DATES OF 12-14 OCTOBER FOR CD VISIT TO SHIKHANY. CD DELEGATIONS WOULD ARRIVE IN MOSCOW ON 12 OCTOBER, FLY TO SHIKHANY (1000 KM) ON 13 OCTOBER, RETURN TO MOSCOW THAT EVENING AND DEPART MOSCOW ON 14 OCTOBER. (COMMENT: EXACT DATES FOR VISIT REMAIN UNDECIDED.) -- SOVIET SIDE DELETED REQUEST FOR VISIT TO FORT DETRICK, MD WHEN TOLD BY U.S. REP THAT FORT DETRICK IS A MILITARY MEDICAL RESEARCH FACILITY AND DOES NO WORK RELATED TO CW. 5. WESTERN GROUP MEETING -- -- U.S. AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF ANNOUNCED THAT U.S. PROPOSED DATES FOR INTERSESSIONALS OF 30 NOV - 16 DEC 1987 AND 12-29 JAN 1988 ARE FIRM (REF E). -- THE GROUP WAS UNANIMOUS THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF ROTATION MUST BE MAINTAINED IN SELECTION OF A CW COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN FOR 1988. THAT PRINCIPLE WILL ASSURE WESTERN GROUP CHAIRMANSHIP IN 1989. -- IN REPORTING ON FRANCO-SOVIET BILATERAL CW DISCUSSIONS HELD IN PARIS ON AUGUST 17, FRENCH AMBASSADOR MOREL STATED THAT DATA EXCHANGE, NTH COUNTRY PROBLEM, FRENCH SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION WERE DISCUSSED (REF F). 245 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- THE GROUP AGREED TO WESTERN CW COORDINATOR VAN SCHAIK'S PROPOSAL FOR SEPARATE EXPERT AND AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL OVERVIEWS DURING INTERSESSIONALS. EXACT DATES ARE TO BE PROPOSED WHEN INTERSESSIONAL SCHEDULE IS FINALIZED. 6. U.S. CD PLENARY ADDRESS -- ? -- IN HIS. AUGUST 20 ADDRESS (DATAFAXED TO ACDA) U.S. AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF PRAISED THE SUMMER WORK OF THE CW COMMITTEE, PARTICULARLY FOR ITS DETAILED WORK ON CRITICAL ISSUES THAT WILL BE THE BASIS FOR FURTHER WORK. HE WELCOMED THE NEW SOVIET INITIATIVES, ENUMERATED AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF REMAINING CRITICALISSUESAND AFFIRMED U.S. COMMITMENT TO SOLVE THESE ISSUES AND COMPLETE AN EFFECTIVE, VERIFIABLE CW CONVENTION. 7. CONSULTATION WITH ROK OFFICIAL -- -- ON AUGUST 20, DELOFF BRIEFED SOUTH KOREAN PERMANENT MISSION FIRST SECRETARY EUN-S00 KIM ON THE STATUS OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS. KIM, WHO IS A LIAISON OFFICER TO THE OLYMPIC ORGANIZINGCOMMITTEE, SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO GET A SENSE OF WHERE THE NEGOTIATIONS STAND IN LIGHT OF (1) SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE'S AUGUST 6 STATEMENT TO THE CD (IN WHICH HE ANNOUNCED SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION WITHOUT RIGHT OF REFUSAL) AND (2) THE DPRK'S RECENT PROPOSAL FOR TRIPARTITE DISARMAMENT TALKS. WHEN DELOFF ASKED KIM WHETHER THE ROK HAS TAKEN A POSITION ON THE CW CONVENTION, HE REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT THINK SO. HE SAID BOTH THE MFA AND THE MOD HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE ISSUE. 8. PRIVATE CONSULTATION WITH CLUSTER CHAIRMEN -- -- DURING INFORMAL LUNCHEON WITH CHAIRMEN OF CLUSTER I (NIEUWENHUYS, BELGIUM), CLUSTER III (MACEDO, MEXICO) AND CLUSTER IV (KRUTZSCH, GDR), U.S. REP ASKED WHAT THEY SAW AS MOST SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO COMPLETING A CW CONVENTION. THEIR COLLECTIVE RESPONSES INCLUDE COST OF ADMINISTRATION, COOPERATIVE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, CHALLENGE INSPECTION OF CIVILIAN INDUSTRY, NON-PARTY CW POSSESSOR STATES, ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL ORGANIZATION AND ORDER-OF-DESTRUCTION. - MECEDO SAID THAT G-21 (INCLUDING MEXICO) INTEREST IN A CW CONVENTION IS THE POTENTIAL FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR CIVIL CHEMICAL INDUSTRY. COMMITMENT TO SIGNING A COMPLETED CONVENTION WILL BE BASED ON A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS. A SIMILAR VIEW 24C Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET WAS EXPRESSED BY THE AMBASSADOR OF BRAZIL, MARCOS CASTRIOTO DE AZAMBUJA, IN A CD PLENARY ADDRESS ON AUGUST 20 IN WHICH HE SAID THAT, "A CHEMICAL CONVENTION SHOULD NECESSARILY INCLUDE PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE UNFETTERED DEVELOPMENT OF CHEMICAL INDUSTRY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, WITH DUE ATTENTION TO THE NEEDS OF DEVELOPING AREAS OF THE WORLD." THIS POSITION IS ALSO STATED IN THE BRAZILIAN PAPER "CONVENTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ASPECTS RELATED TO ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT" (CD/CW/WP.176). WORDS, NEARLY IDENTICAL TO THOSE OF THE BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR, WERE USED BY THE AMBASSADOR OF INDIA, J.S. TEJA, IN AN AUGUST 18 PLENARY ADDRESS. PERU AND ARGENTINA STRESSED SIMILAR POSITIONS IN AUG. 6PLENARY STATEMENTS, AND THE SOVIET UNION PROMISES TO ADD FUEL TO THE FIRE BY OPINING THAT TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CAN SERVE AS THE "CARROT" THAT WILL ENCOURAGE STATES TO COMPLY WITH THE CW BAN. PAKISTAN, IN PLENARY SPEECHES AND IN CD/752, HAS EMPHASIZED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FOR CW DEFENSIVE PURPOSES. 9. CW COMMITTEE -- -- DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION ON DATES AND FORMAT FOR INTERSESSIONALS DELAYED APPROVAL OF THE DRAFT FINAL REPORT. THE SOVIETS HELD FIRM TO THEIR POSITION OF CONVENING A FORMAL SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE FROM 23 NOVEMBER--18 DECEMBER 1987 AND 4-30 JANUARY 1988. THE U.S. HELD TO GUDANCE OF 30 NOVEMBER-16 DECEMBER 1987 AND 12-29 JANUARY 1988 WITH A FORMAL SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ONLY DURING JANUARY. THE CHAIRMAN'S ATTEMPTTO RESOLVE THE IMPASSE WITH A COMPROMISE TEXT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. AN ADDITIONAL MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE WAS SCHEDULED FOR 25 AUGUST. -- A REVISED COPY OF THE CLUSTER I DOCUMENT ON PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FOR THE VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS DISTRIBUTED. THE REVISIONS WERE THE RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS BY THE CHAIRMAN (NIEUWENHUYS, BELGIUM) WITH U.S. AND SOVIET REPRESENATIVES. THE DOCUMENT WILL BE INCLUDED ? IN APPENDIX II OF THE FINAL REPORT. -- JAPAN DISTRIBUTED A PAPER (CD/CW/WP.180) COMMENTING ON GUIDELINES FOR SCHEDULE (1) WHICH EMPHASIZES POTENTIAL USE OF THE CHEMICALS AS CRITERIA FOR SELECTION FOR LISTING INSTEAD OF TOXICITY. 10. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL ? 25X1 NNNN 247 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 09205 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS: AUGUST 24-28, 1987 REF: STATE 255245 1. THIS IS CD-179. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- AFTER SEVERAL HOURS OF CONSULTATIONS AND NUMEROUS REVISIONS OF TEXT ON THE SCHEDULE AND FORMAT FOR INTERSESSIONALS, A TEXT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION WAS AGREED AND A FINAL DRAFT REPORT OF THE CW AD HOC COMMITTEE WAS ADOPTED ON 26 AUGUST 1987. -- VISITING SOVIET HIGH LEVEL CW OFFICIALS CONTINUED PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS WITH KEY WESTERN AND NONALIGNED DELEGATIONS TO ASSESS THE STATUS OF CW NEGOTIATIONS. -- BASED ON WHAT HE SEES AS UNCHANGING SOVIET OPPOSITION TO EARLY MULTILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE, FRENCH AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT SOVIETS EXPECT "BLIND" SIGNATURE OF CW POSSESSOR STATES. -- WESTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED SPECIFIC TOPICS FOR PRESENTATION AT A TWO-LEVEL WESTERN GROUP OVERVIEW OF THE CONVENTION SCHEDULED FOR THE AFTERNOONS OF 4 AND 11 DECEMBER AND 12 DECEMBER IF NECESSARY (EXPERTS) AND 17 DECEMBER (HEADS OF DELEGATIONS). -- WESTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN ASKED FOR INPUT ON SPECIFIC AGENDA SUBJECTS FOR A LEGAL EXPERTS' REVIEW OF JURISDICTION AND CONTROL TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR DEC. 10-11 IN GENEVA. -- SOVIETS ARE CONSIDERING CHANGING DATES OF CD VISIT TO SHIKHANY TO OCTOBER 4-6. END SUMMARY. 3. WESTERN GROUP -- - CONSENSUS WAS ACHIEVED ON PROPOSED TEXT FOR PARAGRAPH 13C OF THE CW COMMITTEE DRAFT REPORT CONCERNING THE SCHEDULING AND FORMAT OF INTER- SESSIONALS. U.S. PROPOSED DATES AND FORMAT WERE ACCEPTED. SOVIET INSISTENCE THAT THE TEXT INCLUDE A STATEMENT THAT IN PREPARATION FOR THE INTERSESSIONAL WORK THE CW COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN CONDUCT PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS DURING THE PERIOD OF NOVEMBER 23-27 IN GENEVA WITH ANY DELEGATIONS PRESENT WAS ACCOMMODATED. -- SOVIET STATE COUNSELOR TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, S. A. ARZHAKOV, AND COLONEL-GENERAL A. KUNTSEVICH ARE CONTINUING THEIR PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS WITH KEY WESTERN AND NONALIGNED DELEGATIONS TO OBTAIN EACH 243 OCV,t10,1, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 ' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 DELEGATION'S VIEW OF THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CW CONVENTION. -- IN DISCUSSION OF THESE SOVIET CONSULTATIONS, FRENCH AMBASSADOR MOREL SAID THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ON THE OFFENSIVE: THERE ARE STRIKING NEW ELEMENTS IN THEIR MOVE, BUT THEY HAVE NOT CHANGED THEIR VIEW OF THE CONVENTION, WHICH THEY SEE AS A MEANS TO GET BLIND SIGNATURES OF CW POSSESSOR STATES. THIS IS EVIDENCED BY THEIR UNCHANGING POSITION ON LIMITING MULTILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE. THEY ARE WILLING TO GIVE YES-NO ANSWERS, BUT NO DATA ON THE DIMENSIONS OF THEIR CAPABILITIES. MOREL SAID THE WESTERN GROUP MUST TAKE THE OFFENSIVE AND BE MORE ACTIVE IN RAISING AND PURSUING SIGNIFICANT CONCEPTS. - AMB VON STULPNAGEL REPORTED THAT IN FRG-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS, IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTION CONCERNING THE PRESENCE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS OUTSIDE SOVIET TERRITORY, THE SOVIETS REFERRED TO THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT THEY HAD NO CHEMICAL WEAPONS OUTSIDE THE SOVIET UNION AND CONFIRMED THAT POSITION. VON STULPNAGEL OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIET STATEMENT IS EITHER NOT VALID, OR THE SOVIETS HAVE MOVED WORLD WAR II CHEMICAL WEAPON STOCKS FROM POLAND, THE GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN THE LAST SEVEN TO NINE MONTHS. -- AUSTRALIAN REP REPORTED THAT IN THEIR VISIT WITH THE SOVIET VISITORS, THE SOVIETS REMAINED INFLEXIBLE IN FACE OF AUSTRALIAN PRESSURE FOR GREATER OPENNESS TO INCLUDE DATA ON THE SOVIET COMMERCIAL CAPABILITIES. -- JAPAN AMBASSADOR YAMADA STATED THAT SOVIETS EMPHASIZED LACK OF WESTERN (PARTICULARLY U.S.) COMMITMENT TO THE CW NEGOTIATIONS, FEAR OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPAN AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES THAT COULD RESULT IN PRODUCTION OF NEW, MORE TOXIC MATERIALS AND THEIR POSITION THAT DATA EXCHANGE OUTSIDE THE CONVENTION WOULD BE DESTABALIZING BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF COMMITMENT OF SOME WESTERN (U.S.) NATIONS TO THE CONVENTION. -- WESTERN CW COORDINATOR VAN SCHAIK (NETHERLANDS) ANNOUNCED THE AFTERNOONS OF DEC 4 AND 11, AND DEC 12 IF NECESSARY, AS THE DATES FOR WESTERN GROUP EXPERTS LEVEL OVERVIEW MEETING AND DEC 17 FOR HEADS OF DELEGATION. THE NETHERLANDS WILL PREPARE AN ANNOTATED AGENDA AND OVERVIEW OUTLINE. EACH DELEGATION WILL BE ASSIGNED SPECIFIC SUBJECTS FOR PRESENTATION. U.S. DEL HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO ADDRESS ARTICLE VI. (FYI - VAN SCHAIK 249 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 DESIRES TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER DURING HIS WASHINGTON VISIT OF 23-24 OCTOBER.) -- VAN SCHAIK, WITH STRONG SUPPORT FROM THE FRG, HAS TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED A MEETING OF LEGAL EXPERTS FOR DEC 10-11 IN GENEVA TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT OF JURIS- DICTION AND CONTROL. VAN SCHAIK REQUESTED SUGGESTIONS FOR SPECIFIC AGENDA ITEMS. FRG IS TO PREPARE AN AGENDA OUTLINE, BUT NO DATE WAS GIVEN AS TO WHEN IT WILL BE AVAILABLE. U.S. DEL SUGGESTED THE PROPOSED MEETING MAY BE PREMATURE BECAUSE SPECIFIC ISSUES HAVE NOT YET BEEN SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED AND ELABORATED AND SAID THAT U.S. POSITION ON THE MEETING WILL BE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON AND RESPONSE FORWARDED TO VAN SCHAIK OR DISCUSSED WITH HIM DURING HIS OCTOBER 23-24 VISIT TO WASHINGTON. U.S. REP ALSO SUGGESTED THAT SPECIFIC QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DELEGATIONS FOR DISCUSSION BE PROVIDED TO CAPITALS FOR REVIEW BY LEGAL EXPERTS TO ASSIST IN A DECISION ON PARTICIPATION AND PREPARATION. -- AUG. CD PRESIDENT, FRENCH AMB. MOREL, DISCUSSED POSSIBLE SOVIET EFFORTS TO SCHEDULE A FULL SESSION OF THE CD TO ADDRESS CW. CONSENSUS WAS THAT THE SOVIETS CAN REGISTER THEIR POSITION IN THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE BECAUSE THE POSITION WAS PRESENTED BY FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE IN HIS AUGUST 6 PLENARY ADDRESS, BUT CONSULTATION AND CONSENSUS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO CONVENE A SPECIAL SESSION. WHEN ISSUE AROSE IN DRAFTING CD'S REPORT THE UPSHOT WAS A REFERENCE TO THE PROPOSAL FOR A SPECIAL SESSION, AND TO THE FACT THAT "CONSULTATIONS ON THE PROPOSAL WERE HELD BUT NO ACTION WAS TAKEN." 4. TOOELE VISIT BY SOVIET DELEGATION AND CD VISIT TO SHIKHANY -- -- SOVIET DELEGATION WAS INFORMED OF U.S. APPROVAL OF NOVEMBER 19-20 FOR SOVIET VISIT TO TOOELE, UTAH (REF A). -- SOVIETS ARE PROPOSING CHANGING THE DATES FOR THE CD VISIT TO SHIKHANY TO OCT 4-6. THEY ARE WAITING INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW BEFORE FINALIZING DATES AND ISSUING INVITATIONS. 5. CW COMMITTEE -- -- THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WAS ADOPTED ON 26 AUGUST 1987 WITH PARAGRAPH 13C ON INTERSESSIONALS REFLECTING A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS. -- CHAIRMAN EKEUS (SWEDEN) PRESENTED THE APPROVED REPORT TO THE CONFERENCE AT AUGUST 27 PLENARY (STATEMENT DATAFAXED TO ACDA) WHERE HE SUMMARIZED THE PROGRESS MADE ON THE CONVENTION DURING THE 1987 SESSIONS. THE REPORT WAS ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE AT ITS FINAL PLENARY ON AUGUST 28, 1987. 250 00r.DOT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 , SECRET -- A WORKING PAPER ON A GLOBAL NETWORK OF AIR MONITORING STATIONS FOR THE VERIFICATION OF CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT WAS DISTRIBUTED BY FINLAND (CD/CW/WP.181) 6. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 251 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 09208 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): PLENARY SESSIONS 27 AND 28 AUGUST 1987 1. THIS IS CD-180. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY -- -- AT 27 AUGUST PLENARY, BULGARIA, SPEAKING FOR EAST, REVIEWED 1987 SESSION. IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMEN, ITALIAN (OUTER SPACE), SWEDISH (CW) AND MEXICAN (CPD) AMBASSADORS INTRODUCED COMMITTEE REPORTS. POLAND SUPPORTED SPECIAL SESSION OF CD ON CW. AUSTRALIA PRESENTED WESTERN VIEWS ON CPD, WHICH CONTRASTED SHARPLY WITH CRITICAL REMARKS MADE BY MEXICAN AMBASSADOR. (SWEDISH STATEMENT DATAFAXED TO ACDA/MA.) -- AT CONCLUDING PLENARY ON 28 AUGUST, SPEAKING FOR THE WEST, FRG REP GAVE MODERATELY UPBEAT ASSESSMENT OF 1988 CD SESSION, CITING PROGRESS IN CW NEGOTIATIONS. ALGERIA, FOR G-21, AND CHINA FOLLOWED SUIT. FRANCE COMPLAINED ABOUT CW COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN EKEUS' TREATMENT OF ITS POSITION ON SECURING STOCKS IN HIS INTRODUCTION OF COMMITTEE REPORT. FRENCH PRESIDENT MOREL WAS ALSO POSITIVE IN HIS ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS POR A GROWING "NETWORK" OF ARMS NEGOTIATIONS. CD FORMALLY ADOPTED ITS REPORT AND ADJOURNED. -- SOVIET DEL PROVIDED INFO ON SHIKHANY VISIT (TEXT BELOW, AND DATAFAXED TO ACDA/MA). END SUMMARY. 3. BULGARIA -- -- DEPREP BOZHILOV COVERED ALL ITEMS ON THE CD AGENDA AND WAS PREDICTABLY CRITICAL OF THE U.S. SPECIFICALLY, BOZHILOV SAID THAT: 1) THE INTEREST OF THE U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES IN BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS HAD KEPT THE CD ON THE "SIDELINES" 2) THE U.S. HAD PUT UP "ARTIFICIAL BARRIERS" RELATING TO NTB; 3) THE "FOREST" OF BRACKETS IN THE CPD TEXT HAD SPRUNG FROM U.S. "ROOTS." BOZHILOV ALSO SUPPORTED SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A SPECIAL CD SESSION ON CW, AND BACKED THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF YEAR-ROUND WORK, SAYING THE CD SHOULD BECOME A "PERMANENT AND UNIVERSAL" BODY. 4. ITALY -- -- AMB. PUGLIESE PRESENTED THE REPORT OF THE OUTER SPACE COMMITTEE, NOTING BRIEFLY THAT THE DIFFICULTIES IN DEALING WITH THIS ISSUE AT THE CD WERE DUE LARGELY TO THE IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AND EVER- ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY. 5. SWEDEN -- 252 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET - AMB. EKEUS PRESENTED THE CW REPORT AND ANALYZED, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, THE STATUS OF THE DELIBERATIONS. HE NOTED THAT CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE AND THAT, AS A RESULT, THERE WAS A "REAL POSSIBILITY" THAT A CONVENTION WOULD COME INTO BEING IN THE NEAR FUTURE. 6. MEXICO -- -- IN PRESENTING THE CPD REPORT, AMB. GARCIA ROBLES USED THE OCCASION TO REPROVE "SOME MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE" FOR THEIR ROLE IN FURTHER BRACKETING PORTIONS OF THE 1986 CPD DOCUMENT. WHILE HE NEVER MENTIONED THE U.S. BY NAME, THE TWO EXAMPLES OF SUCH BRACKETING WHICH GARCIA ROBLES CHOSE TO CITE CONTAINED THINLY VEILED REFERENCES TO THE U.S. AS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE. GARCIA ROBLES CLAIMED THAT THIS LINE OF "CONDUCT" MUST BE CHANGED IN ORDER FOR THERE TO BE FUTURE PROGRESS ON CPD. 7. POLAND -- -- IN HIS SWAN SONG AT THE CD, DEPARTING AMB. TURBANSKI MADE BRIEF REMARKS IN SUPPORT OF THE CONCEPT OF A CD SPECIAL SESSION ON CW. 8. AUSTRALIA -- -- AS WESTERN CPD COORDINATOR, AUSTRALIAN DELOFF LETTS SPOKE. THE BRACKETING OF THE CPD TEXT WAS DESCRIBED AS A VALID EXERCISE IN "ADJUSTING" IT TO PRESENT DAY REALITY. LETTS ADDED THAT THE SSOD-I FINAL DOCUMENT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ABOVE AMENDMENT AND THAT THE BRACKETING PROCESS WOULD ULTIMATELY RESULT IN AN IMPROVED TEXT WHICH WOULD ENJOY WIDER ACCEPTANCE WHEN THE TIME CAME TO FINALIZE IT. SHE ENDED POSITIVELY, NOTING THAT PROGRESS HAD ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED IN SEVERAL AREAS OF THE CPD. 9. AT 28 AUGUST PLENARY, FRENCH REP DE LA BAUME COMPLAINED THAT EKEUS, IN INTRODUCING CW COMMITTEE REPORT, HAD UNFORTUNATELY SINGLED OUT FRENCH POSITION ON SECURITY STOCKS FOR CRITICISM. DE LA BAUME SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT, STATING THAT FRENCH VIEWS IN CD/757 WERE AN ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF 30 DAY NOTIFICATION OF STOCKS, EVEN IF PROCEDURE OF SEALED ENVELOPES WERE ADOPTED, BECAUSE THE INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY WOULD POSSESS THE INFORMATION. HE STRESSED THAT QUESTION WAS CLOSELY RELATED TO ORDER OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION. 10. AS CD WRAPPED UP ITS FORMAL 1987 SESSION, SOVIET DELEGATION FINALLY PROVIDED INFORMATION ON THEIR INVITATION TO VISIT CW FACILITY AT SHIKHANY. DATES ARE NOW SET FOR 3-4 OCTOBER. TEXT OF PAPER CIRCULATED TO ALL DELS FOLLOWS IN PARA. 11 253 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET ' 11. BEGIN TEXT SOVIET PAPER: -- INFORMAL COMMUNICATION - THE USSR DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO NOTIFY IN A PRELIMINARY WAY DELEGATIONS OF STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT AS WELL AS DELEGATIONS OF OBSERVERS IN THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THE SECRETARIAT THAT THE VISIT TO THE SOVIET MILITARY FACILITY AT SHIKHANY IS.PLANNED FOR 3-4 OCTOBER. - UP TO THREE REPRESENTATIVES (WITHOUT SPOUSES) WILL BE INVITED FROM EVERY STATE PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS (INCLUDING OBSERVERS). THE SOVIET SIDE WILL PROVIDE FREE ACCOMMODATION FOR REPRESENTATIVES IN MOSCOW AND IN THE SHIKHANY AREA (ACCOMMODATION AT SHIKHANY IS PLANNED ON BOARD OF A PASSENGER LINER). TRAVEL TO AND FROM MOSCOW BACK HOME WILL BE AT THE EXPENSE OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE VISIT. - OFFICIAL INVITATIONS WILL BE FORWARDED IN THE NEAR FUTURE BY THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE USSR IN GENEVA. END TEXT. 12. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 254 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 - \ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 09207 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIEW MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): WESTERN COORDINATION MEETINGS ON PREPARATIONS FOR 42ND UNGA SPECIAL SESSION REFS: (A) GENEVA 8761 (CD-163) (B) GENEVA 8046 (CD-143) (C) STATE 267921 (NOTAL) 1. THIS IS CD-181. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. UK REP (EDIS) CHAIRED FOLLOW-UP WESTERN MEETINGS 19 AND 28 AUG TO CONTINUE ADVANCE CONSULTATIONS ON PREPARATIONS FOR 42ND UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE BEGUN AT 3 AUG MEETING (REF A). 3. AT 19 AUG MEETING EDIS PASSED OUT A FORM FOR KEEPING TRACK OF THE MULTIPLICITY OF ISSUES CONSIDERED IN FIRST COMMITTEE (DATAFAXED TO ACDA/MA). 4. GROUP EXCHANGED ADDITIONAL INFO ON INTELLIGENCE AND PLANS. DUTCH SUPPORTED FRG IN SEEKING TO COUNTER YUGOSLAVS ON SSOD-I FOLLOW-ON RES, AND ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS/STABILITY INITIATIVE. THEY WERE CONTINUING TO CONSULT WITH ARGENTINA ON A CONSENSUS CD RES. JAPANESE SUGGESTED WORKING FOR A CONSENSUS RES ON US-SOVIET BILATERALS, AND THOUGHT UK APPROACH WAS ONE-SIDED. FRG REPORTED THAT CAMEROON WOULD TAKE THE LEAD ON ROUND. U.S. SAID THAT, WHILE THINKING WAS STILL PRELIMINARY, WASHINGTON WAS PLANNING TO REINTRODUCE RESES ON CW USE AND COMPLIANCE, WITH POSSIBLY SOME MODIFICATIONS (WORKING OUT TECHNICAL PROCEDURES FOR CW USE INVESTIGATION, AND REPORTING ON COMPLIANCE ACTIONS). ALSO, CONSIDERATION WAS BEING GIVEN TO A NEW RES ON FREE EXCHANGE ON VIEWS OF DISARMAMENT. U.S. CAUTIONED THAT STABILITY/CSBM RESES NEEDED CAREFUL HANDLING, AND FRG DEL FULLY AGREED. 5. FRG AND DUTCH REPORTED SWEDISH APPROACHES ON LASER WEAPONS (REF. B). (DUTCH HAVE ALREADY TOLD SWEDES THAT THEY DON'T LIKE THE IDEA OF MODIFYING THE TRADITIONAL RES ON INHUMANE WEAPONS BECAUSE, AS DUTCH TOLD US PRIVATELY, IT RISKS CONSENSUS.) -- COMMENT: PURSUANT TO REF. C, ON MARGINS OF 28 AUG PLENARY, U.S. DELOFF COMMUNICATED TO AMB EKEUS NEGATIVE U.S. RESPONSE TO SWEDISH APPROACH, LEAVING NON-PAPER WITH POINTS IN MESSAGE. LEAVING NON--APER WITH POINTS IN MESSAGE. 6. THE FOLLOWING MATTERS WERE DISCUSSED AT 27 AUGUST MEETING -- -- UK REP EDIS, RELYING UPON NOTES FROM 41ST UNGA, STATED THAT U.S. HAD PROFESSED INTEREST IN DRAFTING A WESTERN RESOLUTION ON NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. 25X1 255 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET EXPRESSING AMAZEMENT, U.S. DEL QUESTIONED ACCURACY OF NOTES, BUT STATED THAT THE MATTER WOULD BE REFERRED TO WASHINGTON TO SEE IF ANY SUCH INCLINATION PERSISTED. -- IT WAS AGREED GENERALLY THAT WESTERN STATES SHOULD LEAK THE FACT THAT ANOTHER BOTA (UNIDIR) RESOLUTION WILL BE TABLED THIS YEAR, WHETHER OR NOT WEST LATER SPONSORS SUCH A RESOULTION. -- FRENCH DEL STATED THEY HAD NO INDICATION THAT PARIS WAS CONSIDERING TABLING A CW RESOLUTION THIS YEAR. -- NO DELEGATION STATED AN INTENTION TO SPONSOR A WESTERN PNW RESOLUTION THIS YEAR. -- MOST WESTERN GROUP DELS ANTICIPATE THAT NNA WILL NOT SETTLE FOR OUTER SPACE RESOLUTION SIMILAR TO LOTH AND 41ST UNGA RESOLUTIONS, BUT WILL INSIST UPON SOMETHING BARTON GROUP MEMBERS CANNOT SUPPORT (AND U.S. WILL BE FORCED TO VOTE AGAINST). MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 256 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET C ONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 09209 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP, DARPA DARPVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF SECOND PART OF 1987 SESSION REF: GENEVA 4914 (CD-100) 1. THIS IS CD- 182 (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- FOR THE TWELFTH CONSECUTIVE YEAR, THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (PREVIOUSLY THE CCD) COMPLETED NO ARMS CONTROL OR DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT. THE SECOND PART OF THE 1987 SESSION, JUNE 9 - AUGUST 28, CONTINUED THE HARD WORK ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS ISSUES BEGUN DURING THE FIRST PART OF THE SESSION, FEBRUARY-APRIL. (REF. A PROVIDES AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST PART OF THE SESSION.) -- EARLY IN THE SUMMER, THE FRENCH IDEAS ON CW SECURITY STOCKS WERE PROMINENT, BUT FRENCH DID NOT PRESS THEM. LATER, SOVIET FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE'S 6 AUGUST PLENARY STATEMENT AND FOLLOW-UP SOVIET PRESEN- TATIONS PROMPTED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN THE CW COMMITTEE. THROUGHOUT THE SUMMER, CW COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN EKEUS LED DELEGATIONS IN DETAILED CONSIDERATION OF NUMEROUS-ISSUES ON THE COMMITTEE'S AGENDA. -- AS IN THE SPRING, THE OTHER WORK OF THE CONFERENCE WAS CARRIED ON IN A RELATIVELY LOW- KEY FASHION, WITH PERHAPS THE ONLY PRODUCTIVE DEVELOPMENTS TAKING PLACE IN THE TECHNICAL WORK OF THE GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS ON SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE. THE OUTER SPACE COMMITTEE ATTRACTED THE LION'S SHARE OF THE POLITICAL WRANGLING THIS SUMMER, WITH NUCLEAR ISSUES BEING FAIRLY BENIGNLY TREATED COMPARED WITH PAST YEARS. ACTION IN THE COMMITTEE DEALING WITH THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT WAS ALSO HEATED AT TIMES, WITH U.S. BEARING THE BRUNT OF MUCH OF THE CRITICISM. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN NST, IN THE VIENNA CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND CSCE FOLLOW-ON EFFORTS AND IN THE NUCLEAR TESTING EXPERTS MEETINGS ALSO UNDOUBTEDLY WIDENED THE FOCUS OF DELEGATIONS HERE BEYOND SPECIFIC CD AGENDA ITEMS. -- THE COMMITTEE ON THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT CAME TO LIFE FOR A FEW WEEKS, DURING WHICH THE U.S., WITH INCREASING SUPPORT FROM ITS ALLIES, INTRODUCED MANY AMENDMENTS, USUALLY IN 25X1 257 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET THE FORM OF BRACKETS AROUND EXISTING TEXT, THAT RESULTED IN A DRAFT MORE AMENABLE TO WORKING OUT, EVENTUALLY, A FINAL PROGRAM. -- AT THE PLENARY LEVEL, THE CONFERENCE CONTINUED TO ATTRACT A HIGH LEVEL OF VISIBILITY, FIRST SEEN IN THE SPRING, WITH THE APPEARANCE OF ARGENTINE PRESIDENT ALFONSIN, AND SOVIET, DUTCH, BELGIAN, IRANIAN AND SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTERS. - CW INTERSESSIONAL WORK IS SLATED FOR 30 NOVEMBER - 16 DECEMBER AND 12 - 29 JANUARY. THIS PROMISES TO SET THE STAGE FOR AN ACTIVE 1988 CD SESSION ON THE CW NEGOTIATIONS, IF NOT ON OTHER ISSUES. ON THE LATTER, UNLESS POSITIONS OF DELEGATIONS WERE TO CHANGE MARKEDLY, WHAT CAN BE EXPECTED IS MORE MUDDLING THROUGH. -- ONE EXTERNAL DRIVING FACTOR WILL BE THE APPROACHING THIRD SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNGA DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT. DELEGATIONS ARE ALREADY POINTING TO THE NEED FOR THE CD TO SUBMIT A SPECIAL REPORT TO SSOD-III, AND LAMENTING THAT THE CONCRETERESULTS TO BE DISPLAYED THEREIN ARE MEAGER. TO DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION, THE U.S. DEL WILL NEED A CAREFULLY PREPARED STRATEGY TO HIGHLIGHT THE REALITIES OF MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT EFFORTS, STRESSING THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE ON CW AND GSE IN THE CD; IN CDE; AND HOPEFULLY IN NST-- AND THE FACT THAT, WHEN DEALING WITH SECURITY MATTERS, TIME LIMITS FOR ACHIEVING AGREEMENT ARE ALMOST NEVER PREDICTABLE AND OFTEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. -- THE BALANCE OF THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES AN OVERVIEW AND ASSESSENT OF THE WORK OF THE CD DURING THE SECOND (SUMMER) PART OF ITS 1987 SESSION. END SUMMARY. 3. GENERAL CLIMATE, GROUP POSTURES AND PERFORMANCE -- OVERALL, THE CD CONTINUED ITS RELATIVELY UN- POLEMICAL PERFORMANCE (COMPARED WITH SEVERAL YEARS AGO), WITH PRODUCTIVE WORK PRIMARILY IN THE CW NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER INTEREST SPARKED BY EARLY PLENARY INTERVENTIONS BY SOVIET VICE FONMIN PETROVSKY, FRENCH ON CW SECURITY STOCKS, AND ARGENTINE PRESIDENT ALFONSIN, THINGS WERE QUIET UNTIL THE APPEARANCE OF SOVIET FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE AUG 6. PLENARY ACTIVITY THEREAFTER SAW A NUMBER OF IMPROMPTU EXCHANGES ON SUCH MATTERS AS THE INF NEGOTIATIONS, A MANDATE FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN COMMITTEE, AND IMPROVING CD PROCEDURES, BUT NOTHING OF GREAT MOMENT, AND NOTHING COUCHED IN THE POLEMICAL TERMS MORE FAMILIAR HERE A FEW YEARS 258 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 AGO. THERE IS A CLEAR SENSE OF HOPE AND EXPECTANCY THAT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THE INF NEGOTIATIONS COULD LEND ADDED IMPETUS TO WORK IN THE CD, ESPECIALLY ON CW. IN THE LATTER AREA, THE CONTINUED MARCH OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TOWARD POSITIONS PROPOSED BY THE U.S. IN CD/500 ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO A SENSE THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE APPROACHING A NEW LEVEL AT WHICH THE RESOLUTION OF REMAINING ISSUES IS NOT ONLY POSSIBLE, BUT SHOULD, IN THE VIEW OF MANY DELEGATIONS, BE CONCLUDED QUICKLY. A. SOVIETS/EAST -- SOVIET DELEGATION CONTINUED A PATTERN OF TACITURN BEHAVIOR ON THE PART OF AMB. NAZARKIN, BUT IT WAS COUPLED WITH THE HIGH LEVEL APPEARANCES OF VICE FONMIN PETROVSKY AND FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE. THE LATTER, IN PARTICULAR, ATTRACTED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION. REST OF EAST WAS RELATIVELY MILD IN APPROACH TO ISSUES. OF SOME INTEREST WAS THE FACT THAT CZECH AMB. VEJVODA, WHO AS APRIL CD PRESIDENT OFFERED A PROPOSAL FOR A MANDATE FOR AN AD HOC COMMITTEE UNDER. THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN AGENDA ITEM THAT MET WITH WESTERN ACCEPTANCE AS A BASIS FOR CONSULTATIONS, WAS LEFT HIGH AND DRY BY HIS GROUP, WHICH ENDORSED PROPOSALS OF G-21 DELEGATIONS KNOWN TO BE UNACCEPTABLE TO WEST. B. NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED (G-21) -- AT THE CONFERENCE LEVEL, ASIDE FROM THE ALFONSIN PLENARY STATEMENT AND THOSE BY SWEDISH AND IRANIAN FONMINS, THERE WAS RELATIVELY LITTLE G-21 ACTIVITY THIS SUMMER. AS USUAL, SWEDEN STOOD OUT AS A SERIOUS CONTRIBUTOR TO THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE. ARGENTINE, VENEZUELAN AND INDIAN DELS WERE ACTIVE IN OUTER SPACE COMMITTEE; PAKISTAN IN RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS COMMITTEE; NIGERIA AND PAKISTAN IN NSA COMMITTEE; AND INDIA MOVED BEHIND THE SCENES ON THE NTB ISSUE, FOLLOWING ITS OUT-FRONT STANCE DURING THE SPRING. CHANGE OF AMBASSADORS IN BRAZILIAN, EGYPTIAN, NIGERIAN AND SRI LANKAN DELS, AND IMMINENT DEPARTURE OF ARGENTINE DEPUTY GARCIA MORITAN, UNDOUBTEDLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE QUIETUDE. MEXICAN AMB. GARCIA ROBLES, EVER THE SKILLED PARLIAMENTARIAN, WITH THE ACTIVE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INDIAN DEL, TIED UP THE NTB MANDATE ISSUE. HE WAS OTHERWISE PREOCCUPIED WITH HIS CPD COMMITTEE, WHICH DID NOT COMPLETE ITS WORK. C. WESTERN GROUP -- -- AUSTRALIAN AMB. BUTLER WAS LESS ACTIVE THIS 259 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SUMMER COMPARED WITH THE SPRING, ALTHOUGH HE REMAINS THE MOST ARTICULATE CHAMPION OF VIEWS -- EITHER COORDINATED WESTERN OR NATIONAL -- OF WESTERN REPS. FOR UNEXPLAINED REASONS, HOWEVER, HE (AS WELL AS CANADIAN AMB. BEESLEY)APPEARTO HAVE BEEN DRAWN IN MORE DEEPLY THAN HE EXPECTED IN THE GROUP OF SEVEN'S WORK ON PROCEDURAL REFORM, TO THE EXTENT OF BEING FORCED TO DISAGREE PUBLICLY WITH AT LEAST ONE OTHER G-7 MEMBER OVER THE GROUP'S REPORT. AMB. VON STULPNAGEL DID A REASONABLE JOB OF CHAIRING THE NSA COMMITTEE, AND MODERATED HIS AGRESSIVE PURSUIT OF RW TRACK B. JAPANESE DELEGATION EMERGED AS VERY EFFECTIVE IN ITS ROLES AS WESTERN NTB COODINATOR AND RW COMMITTEE'S GROUP A CHAIRMAN. AMB. YAMADA IS THOUGHTFUL AND CAREFUL. HIS DEPUTY, NUMATA, IS BRIGHT, ENERGETIC, AND SKILLED IN BEHIND-THE-SCENES NEGOTIATING. THEY BOTH PROVED TO BE VALUABLE ADDITIONS TO THE WESTERN GROUP IN THEIR FIRST YEAR HERE. FRENCH AMB. MOREL TURNED IN AN IMPRESSIVE PERFORMANCE AS CD PRESIDENT, EXERCISING FIRM CONTROL DURING THE DIFFICULT REPORT-WRITING MONTH OF AUGUST. FRENCH WERE ALSO HELPFUL AS WESTERN OUTER SPACE COORDINATOR. NEWLY ARRIVED ITALIAN AMB. PUGLIESE DID A REASONABLE JOB OF CHAIRING THE OFTEN POLEMICAL AND CONTENTIOUS OUTER SPACE COMMITTEE. DUTCH AMB. VAN SCHAIK WAS INEFFECTIVE AS WESTERN CW COORDINATOR, CONCENTRATING MORE ON PROCEDURE THAN ON SUBSTANCE. AT TIMES, VAN SCHAIK PRESSED U.S. DEL TO AGREE TO EXPAND THE CW COMMITTEE'S SCHEDULE,BEYOND U.S. DEL'S GUIDANCE, WITH AN UNWARRANTED DEGREE OF TENACITY. THIS SUGGESTS A DIFFICULT TIME IF VAN SCHAIK PURSUES, AND ATTAINS, THE ROLE OF WESTERN OUTER SPACE COORDINATOR IN 1988. -- BELGIAN AMB. CLERCKX AND HIS DELEGATION WERE OUR STAUNCHEST SUPPORTERS, SIDING WITH THE U.S. WITH GREATEST FREQUENCY AND, EVEN MORE CRITICALLY, PROVIDING REAL SUPPORT WHEN IT WAS MOST NEEDED. DEPUTY NIEUWENHUYS COMMENDABLY SERVED U.S. INTERESTS IN HIS ROLE AS CW ITEM COORDINATOR. AN OFFICIAL EXPRESSION OF U.S. APPRECIATION IN THESE REGARDS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. D. CHINA -- -- CHINESE DELEGATION QUIETLY CONTINUED ITS PARTICIPATION, ESPECIALLY LN CW AND OUTER SPACE COMMITTEES. THERE WERE NO MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS, ALTHOUGH AMB. FAN ACCEPTED THE ROLE OF CHAIRMAN OF THE GROUP OF SEVEN, WORKING ON PROCEDURAL 2G0 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 REFORM. NOTHING HAS BEEN LEARNED ABOUT HIS EFFECTIVENESS THERE. 4. CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- -- DURING THE SUMMER, DETAILED WORK TOOK PLACE IN THE CW COMMITTEE ON CRITICAL ISSUES FOR WHICH AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE HAD BEEN OBTAINED IN THE SPRING. NEW CONCEPTS AND IDEAS WERE EXPLORED, DISCUSSED AND ELABORATED IN DOCUMENTS THAT PROVIDE A SOLID BASIS FOR CONTINUED WORK DURING INTERSESSIONALS AND IN 1988. SIGNIFICANT WORK TOOK PLACE ON: VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION, ORDER OF DESTRUCTION, ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES, NON-PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, OLD DISCOVERED MUNITIONS AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION. DETAILS ARE DISCUSSED SEPTEL. -- LEVEL OF EXPECTATION FOR RAPID COMPLETION OF A CW CONVENTION WAS AGAIN RAISED BY SOVIET CONCESSIONS ON MANDATORY, NO-RIGHT-OF-REFUSAL CHALLENGE INSPECTION, PROPOSALS FOR INTENSIFIED NEGOTIATIONS AND AN INVITATION TO CD CW DELEGATIONS TO VISIT SOVIET CW FACILITY AT SHIKHANY, FIRST INTRODUCED BY FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE IN HIS 6 AUG. PLENARY STATEMENT, AND FOLLOWED BY MORE DETAILED ELABORATION IN AMB NAZARKIN'S 11 AUG. STATEMENT. THESE STATEMENTS WERE FOLLOWED IN TURN BY PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS BY TWO VISITING SOVIET HIGH LEVEL CW POLICY OFFICIALS WITH KEY WESTERN, G-21 AND CHINESE DELEGATIONS, WITH THE STATED .SOVIET OBJECTIVE OF ASSESSING THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS. -- THE SESSION ENDED IN A MOOD OF HEIGHTENED SENSITIVITY. THE DETAILED WORK RESULTED IN A NUMBER OF ISSUES FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION AND ELABORATION. THE SOVIET INITIATIVES HAVE MOVED THE ENTIRE NEGOTIATION CLOSER TO THE ORIGINAL U.S. PROPOSAL IN CD/500. ALL CD MEMBERS MUST NOW MORE SERIOUSLY EVALUATE THEIR POSITIONS, ASSESS THEIR LEVEL OF COMMITMENT AND CHART THEIR COURSE FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. 5. OUTER SPACE (OS) AHC MET NINE TIMES WHEN CD RESUMED IN JUNE TO HEAR BRIEFING ON CANADIAN PAXSAT PROJECT AND TO DEVOTE FOUR SESSIONS TO EACH OF TWO REMAINING ITEMS OF WORK PROGRAM: LEGAL REGIME; AND EXISTING PROPOSALS AND FUTURE INITIATIVES. MANY OF THESE MEETINGS WERE POORLY ATTENOED AND COMMITTEE DID NOT MAKE FULL USE OF ITS ALLOCATED TIME. DISCUSSIONS WERE DESULTORY AND POLEMICAL, WITH BOTH EASTERN GROUP AND SEVERAL G-21 DELEGATIONS APPARENTLY SEEKING 2E1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET TO MAKE TENURE OF WESTERN AHC CHAIRMAN (AMB PUGLIESE, ITALY) AS UNCOMFORTABLE AS POSSIBLE. -- U.S. DEL DEVOTED ITS PRESENTATIONS TO CONTINUATION OF ANALYSIS OF EXISTING OUTER SPACE LEGAL REGIME, NOTING THAT IT WAS EQUITABLE, BALANCED, AND EXTENSIVE, AND PLACED STRICT LEGAL CONTROLS ON VIRTUALLY ANY POSSIBLE TYPE OF WEAPON IN THAT ARENA. -- SOVIET BLOC REITERATED PROPOSALS FOR ASAT BAN, SAFEGUARDING SATELLITE IMMUNITY, AND COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENTS PROHIBITING THE USE OF FORCE IN OR FROM SPACE. EASTERN GROUP ALSO VIGOROUSLY TOUTED USSR PROPOSAL FOR INTERNATIONAL SPACE VERIFICATION DIRECTORATE AND PRESSED FOR MORE "FORWARD LOOKING" AND "FOCUSED" APPROACH TO AHC WORK IN 1988. -- ALTHOUGH IDEAS AND PROPOSALS ADVANCED AT AHC HAVE NOT BEEN SHARPLY. FOCUSED OR WELL THOUGHT OUT, IT IS CLEAR THAT G-21, WITH STRONG SUPPORT OF SOVIET BLOC, WILL SEEK TO DIRECT WORK OF COMMITTEE TO CONSIDERATION OF A SMALL NUMBER OF SPECIFIC PROPOSITIONS IN 1988, AND WILL PROBABLY SEEK MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY FROM NEW, NONNEGOTIATING MANDATE, AND CONCOMITANT WORK PROGRAM, FOR 1988. IT WILL BE G-21 TURN TO HOLD CHAIRMANSHIP, AND LIKELY CANDIDATE IS VENEZUELAN AMB. TAYLHARDAT. -- G-21 EXPRESSED INCREASED DISSATISFACTION WITH WORK OF AHC AS SUMMER PROGRESSED. AT VARIOUS TIMES, INCLUDING REPORT-WRITING PERIOD, INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS SOUGHT: ADDITIONAL, SMALL INFORMAL MEETINGS TO DISCUSS SELECTED TOPICS AT GREATER DEPTH: CREATION OF SO-CALLED "ROLLING TEXT" FOR A FINAL REPORT: AND INTENSIVE FOCUS ON SELECTED INDIVIDUAL PROPOSALS IN ORDER TO MOVE AHC INTO WHAT WAS TERMED A "PRE-NEGOTIATING POSTURE." -- CANADIAN AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS DELIVERED MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE PRESENTATIONS AT AHC, AND UK WAS ALSO HELPFUL (ALTHOUGH RESIDUE OF UNHAPPINESS OVER TREATMENT OF COPUOUS AND VERIFICATION PAPERS WAS APPARENT.) OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPATION WAS LIMITED, AND ALL WESTERN GROUP MEMBERS HAVE EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION AND RESTIVENESS OVER LACK OF SO-CALLED "SUBSTANTIVE ACTIVITY" IN AHC. 6. NUCLEAR TEST BAN (NTB)/GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS -- -- FOR THE FOURTH YEAR IN A ROW, THE CONFERENCE WAS UNABLE TO AGREE ON A MANDATE FOR ESTABLISHING AN AD HOC COMMITTEE. ' INDIA, REPORTEDLY UPON EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS FROM DELHI, AND WITH BEHIND-THE-SCENES SUPPORT FROM ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL, UNABASHEDLY INSISTED THAT A NEGOTIATING MANDATE WAS NECESSARY IF THERE WAS ,117,1 Declassified - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SFrRFT 25X1 .TO BE A COMMITTEE IN 1987. MEXICO, CONSISTENT-WITH THE MODERATION IN ITS POSITIONS BETWEEN LAST YEAR'S CD AND UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE, DID NOT STRIDENTLY INSIST ON A NEGOTIATING MANDATE. INSTEAD, WHILE MAINTAINING MEXICO'S OWN STRONG PREFERENCE FOR IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS ON A CTB, AMB GARCIA ROBLES TOUTED A MANDATE, CD/772, INTRODUCED BY IT AND SEVEN OTHERS FROM THE G-21. HE ASCRIBED VIRTUE TO THE TEXT "WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF CARRYING OUT THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY" AND CLAIMED THAT THE SAME TEXT SHOULD SATISFY THOSE STATES DESIRING AN IMMEDIATE CTB (E.G., MEXICO) AND THOSE FOR WHICH A CTB IS A LONG-TERM GOAL (I.E., US). EMPHASIZING THAT IT WAS THE ONLY MANDATE FORMALLY TABLED DURING 1987, GARCIA ROBLES REFUSED TO BE DRAWN. INTO A DISCUSSION USING THE TEXT CIRCULATED INFORMALLY BY CZECH AMB VEJVODA DURING HIS APRIL CD PRESIDENCY. APPARENTLY GROWING INCREASINGLY TIRED OF GARCIA ROBLES' ANTICS, THE WESTERN GROUP (LESS FRANCE, OF COURSE) MAINTAINED UNIFIED STANCE THAT VEJVODA TEXT CONTINUED TO SERVE AS BASIS FOR REACHING CONSENSUS ON A MANDATE, AND THAT INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WERE THE MOST APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO TAKE. EASTERN GROUP EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR CD/772, BUT CONTINUED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT EITHER A NEGOTIATING OR NON-NEGOTIATING MANDATE. --ALTHOUGH US NUCLEAR TESTING POLICY REMAINS UNACCEPTABLE TO G-21 AND EAST, THEIR CRITICISMS HAVE BECOME SOMEWHAT LESS POLEMICAL. AT THE SAME TIME, AND AS THE CURRENT SOVIET TEST PROGRAM EXCEEDS THE NUMBER OF US TESTS, THE PRAISE HEAPED ON THE SOVIET MORATORIUM IS DRYING UP. -- BILATERAL NUCLEAR TESTING EXPERTS MEETINGS (NTEM) CONTINUE TO CAPTURE THE INTEREST OF DELEGATIONS, BUT DO NOT DIMINISH THE CALLS OF THE G-21 EITHER FOR MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS OR FOR US AND USSR TO ACKNOW- LEDGE THEIR "RESPONSIBILITY TO REPORT" TO THE CD ON THE PROGRESS OF BILATERAL TALKS. -- IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION, ESPECIALLY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF NUCLEAR TEST LIMITATIONS, IS SELDOM QUESTIONED, ALTHOUGH MANY STATES (ESPECIALLY G-21) CONTINUE TO CLAIM THAT CURRENT VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES ARE SUFFICIENT. NEW SOVIET THEME OF PROPOSING, AT LEAST fN BROAD, GENERAL TERMS, STRINGENT AND WIDE-RANGING VERIFICATION MEASURES IS FALLING ON RECEPTIVE EARS THAT WANT TO BELIEVE THAT BOTH THE POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL DIMENSIONS OF VERIFICATION HAVE BEEN SOLVED. -- SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A NEW GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS 2G3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET TO RECOMMEND "THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF A SYSTEM OF VERIFICATION" FOR A NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST BAN, NOT SURPRISINGLY ENDORSED BY EAST, MET WITH SKEPTICISM FROM G-21 AND CHINA, AND WAS ALMOST UNIFORMLY OPPOSED BY WEST. WESTERN GROUP FEARED THAT A NEW GSE MIGHT JEOPARDIZE THE PROGRESS OR MANDATE FOR THE CURRENT SEISMIC EXPERTS GROUP. - GSE CONTINUES TO CONSIDER TECHNICAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO A NEW DESIGN FOR AN INTERNATIONAL NETWORK TO EXCHANGE WAVEFORM SEISMIC DATA, AND THE DESIGN AND CONDUCT OF A SERIES OF EXPERIMENTS TO EXCHANGE SUCH DATA. THE PRINCIPAL COORDINATOR FOR THE EXPERIMENTS, BASHAM (CANADA), WAS AGREED UPON. ALTHOUGH BY NO MEANS CERTAIN, THERE IS SOME UNDERLYING CONCERN AMONG WESTERN DELS THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF A LARGE-SCALE DATA EXCHANGE STRESSING THE FREE AND OPEN ACCESS TO ALL DATA BY ALL PARTICIPANTS. -- AUSTRALIA CONTINUES TO TOUT ITS PROPOSAL THAT THE CD DECLARE THAT A GLOBAL SEISMIC NETWORK NOW EXISTS, DESPITE LACT OF SUPPORT FOR PROPOSAL FROM US AND OTHER WESTERN STATES. UNDETERRED, AMB BUTLER PROMOTED IDEA THAT THE NETWORK COULD BE EFFECTED "SIMPLY BY NOT UNPLUGGING" THE NETWORK TO BE USED FOR THE GSE EXPERIMENT NOW BEING PLANNED. - NTB REPORT, UNLIKE THE CASE DURING 1986, WAS ADOPTED WITHOUT CONTENTION. 7. CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT (CNAR) -- -- BICKERING OVER NEED FOR "STRUCTURED" DISCUSSION DELAYED FIRST INFORMAL PLENARY UNTIL JUNE 30. PRESIDENT OF CD READ A "PERSONAL" LIST OF TOPICS TO IMPART A MODICUM OF SUCH STRUCTURE, BUT FEW PAID ANY ATTENTION TO IT. THE SIX INFORMAL PLENARIES WERE TACKED ON TO THE END OF REGULAR PLENARY SESSIONS, WHICH MERCIFULLY LIMITED THE AVAILABLE TIME. DISCUSSION, AS LAST YEAR, WAS DESULTORY, MEDIOCRE, AND RAMBLING. -- SOVIETS USED CLOSE TO HALF OF TIME TO TOUT VARIOUS DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS, ATTACK WESTERN CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, AND INDULGE IN ONE POLEMICAL OUTBURST AGAINST U.S. THEIR ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN WHY THEIR OWN DEFENSE SYSTEM WAS PEACEFUL IN ITS NATURE WHEREAS THE WEST'S WAS WARLIKE PRODUCED AN OUTPOURING OF FOG. THEIR PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE WAS TO USE THE FORUM TO ATTACK THE PRESENCE OF U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE. SOVIET ALLIES RARELY SPOKE. -- G-21 MEMBERS REMAINED LARGELY ON SIDE-LINES. MANY ATTEND PRIMARILY TO BE ENTERTAINED BY SOVIET-U.S. EXCHANGES. INDIA GAVE A PREDICTABLE SPEECH AGAINST 264 crromp Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. CHINA DID NOT ADDRESS FORUM. NEW ZEALAND ASKED UNHELPFUL QUESTIONS ON U.S. NUCLEAR TESTING POLICIES. -- WESTERN GROUP: ONLY U.S., UK AND FRANCE GAVE STATEMENTS -- DEFENDING CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND SETTING OUT WELL-KNOWN POSITIONS ON DISARMAMENT. SANCTIMONIOUS REMARKS OF AUSTRALIAN AMB. BUTLER DECRIED POLEMICS BUT OFFERED NO CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR ROLE OF CD IN CNAR. WESTERN PARTICIPATION IN CNAR IS AN EXERCISE IN DAMAGE LIMITATION. THE NUISANCE VALUE OF THE MEETINGS IS NOT TOO HIGH. DEBATES POINT TO HOPELESS- NESS OF A ROLE FOR CD ON THIS ISSUE. 8. PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, INCLUDING ALL RELATED MATTERS (PNW) -- -- THIS AGENDA ITEM ATTRACTED ALMOST NO ATTENTION DURING 1987. VARIOUS PRESIDENTS QUERIED GROUP COORDINATORS AS TO THE APPROPRIATE VEHICLE FOR ADDRESSING THIS TOPIC, BUT EXCEPT FOR CONSULTATIONS BY FEBRUARY PRESIDENT FAN (CHINA), THESE WERE PRO FORMA AND GENERATED LITTLE INTEREST. IN FAN'S CONSULTATIONS, WEST URGED INFORMAL PLENARY SESSIONS, WHICH THE G-21 WOULD NOT ACCEPT. THE G-21 SUPPORTED ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMITTEE, TABLING THE SAME TIRED, UNACCEPTABLE MANDATE (CD/515/REV.3) THEY SUPPORTED IN 1985 AND 1986. WHEN IT WAS PUT TO A DECISION IN JULY, THE U.S. WAS ABLE EASILY TO GARNER WESTERN CONSENSUS IN OPPOSITION. THIS CONTRASTED WITH PREVIOUS YEARS, WHEN THE U.S. DELEGATION HAD A DIFFICULT TIME MUSTERING SUPPORT. -- VERY FEW PLENARY STATEMENTS WERE MADE ON PNW THIS YEAR, AND NO SUBSTANTIVE WORKING PAPERS WERE INTRODUCED. THE REPORT-WRITING EXERCISE ON THIS AGENDA ITEM, WHICH CAME ON THE HEELS OF A SERIES OF MARATHON AND ACRIMONIOUS REPORT-WRITING SESSIONS IN THE OUTER SPACE COMMITTEE, WAS RELATIVELY SUBDUED. 9. NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES (NSA) -- -- PAKISTAN AND NIGERIAN PERSISTENCE, WHICH WAS REWARDED BY FORMATION OF AD HOC COMMITTEE EARLY IN FEBRUARY, ALSO LED TO COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING JULY - AUGUST, UNDER RELUCTANT CHAIRMANSHIP OF FRG. -- BULGARIA (EASTERN ITEM COORDINATOR) RAN SHOW ON BEHALF OF UNINTERESTED SOVIET REP. PRINCIPAL EASTERN THEME WAS VIRTUE OF SOVIET DECLARATION ON NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT EAST ALSO WAVED RED FLAG ON POSSIBLE ROLE OF NSA RESPECTING VESSELS CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. -- ONLY PAKISTAN AND NIGERIA OF THE G-21 WERE ACTIVE. PAKISTAN CONFINED ITSELF TO GENERAL REMARKS ABOUT INADEQUACY OF UNILATERAL DECLARATION ON NSA VERSUS AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DOCUMENT. 265 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- NIGERIA CONTRIBUTED ONLY NEW PROPOSAL TO AHC, WHICH ADVOCATED A COMPLEX, FOUR-TIER APPROACH TO CATEGORIZING STATES ACCORDING TO THEIR ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP TO THE FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE, ETC. THE PROPOSAL WAS NOT DISCUSSED IN DETAIL, EXCEPT BY BULGARIAN REP, WHO ATTEMPTED TO TURN IT AGAINST THE WESTERN NUCLEAR POWERS, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF WHICH IGNORED HIM. -- FROM THE WESTERN GROUP, U.S. GAVE BRIEF RESTATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY, AND FRANCE AND UK DELIVERED LONGER STATEMENTS ON THEIR ASSURANCES. NETHERLANDS RESURRECTED FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS. WHEN BULGARIA CRITIQUED IT IN A LONG, NEARLY OPAQUE STATEMENT, NETHERLANDS REP REPLIED THAT HE WOULD COMMENT ON THE REMARKS SOMETIME NEXT YEAR. HALLMARK OF WESTERN PARTICIPATION WAS POLITE INDIFFERENCE. 10. COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT -- A. THE CONFERENCE APPROVED THE REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE (AHC) ON THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISAR- MAMENT (CPD) (CD/732/ADD.1) AT ITS 28 AUGUST PLENARY SESSION AND TRANSMITTED IT TO THE 41 UNGA AS REQUESTED IN UNGA DECISION 41/421. THE PLENARY ALSO ADOPTED THE AHC'S RECOMMENDATION TO CONTINUE WORK ON THE PROGRAM IN THE 1988 SESSION AND SUBMIT IT TO SSOD-III. B. IN 1987, THE CPD AHC WAS, ONCE AGAIN, UNABLE TO REACH CONSENSUS ON A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM. IN ORDER TO BRING THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT CPD IN LINE WITH U.S. POLICY GUIDANCE, THE U.S. DELEGATION, ACTING ALONE, IN CONCERT WITH INDIVIDUAL WESTERN DELEGATIONS, OR AS A MEMBER OF THE WESTERN GROUP, PROPOSED MANY CHANGES. THE RESULT OF THESE ACTIONS AND SUBSEQUENT RESPONSES BY EASTERN AND G-21 DELEGATIONS WAS A TEXT CONTAINING FAR MORE BRACKETS THAN PREVIOUSLY, BUT MORE CLEARLY DELINEATING THE SPECIFIC ISSUES OF DISAGREEMENT REQUIRING RESOLUTION. SINCE THE CURRENT TEXT MORE CLEARLY REFLECTS U.S.- FAVORED POLICY ALTERNATIVES, IT CAN ALSO STAND ALONE, spouLD IT BE SUBMITTED "AS IS" TO SSOD-III. THE U.S. DELEGATION AT THE NEXT CD (OR ANY OTHER FORUM) CAN USE THE NEW DRAFT TO ARGUE EFFECTIVELY THE U.S. POSITION WITHOUT HAVING TO RESORT TO FURTHER BRACKETING. THE CURRENT DRAFT, FURTHER, DOES NOT REFLECT THE U.S, "BOTTOM LINE" AND SHOULD PERMIT ROOM FOR FUTURE NEGOTI- ATING. C. THE SSOD-I FINAL DOCUMENT (FD) AND THE CPD -- -- AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1987 SESSION, THE SSOD-I FINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED THE STATUS OF BEING DE FACTO "HOLY WRIT" OF MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT. IN KEEPING WITH THIS VIEW, THE CPD HAD DEGENERATED INTO A VIRTUAL REPLAY OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT, IN WHICH ANY ATTEMPT TO CHANGE FD TEXT, OR SUBMIT FRESH ALTERNATIVES, WAS 26E Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET VIEWED AS HERESY BY THE G-21, THE EASTERN BLOC AND MANY WESTERN DELEGATIONS. THE INITIAL BRACKETING OF FINAL DOCUMENT TEXT IN THE CPD, THEREFORE, BROUGHT SIGNIFICANT RESISTANCE INSIDE AS WELL AS OUTSIDE THE WESTERN GROUP. BY THE END OF THE SESSION, HOWEVER, INDIVIDUAL WESTERN DELEGATIONS, AND THE WESTERN GROUP AS A WHOLE JOINED THE U.S. IN BRACKETING SEVERAL PARAGRAPHS ORIGINATING IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT. SIGNIFICANTLY, THE WESTERN GROUP'S 27 AUG. PLENARY STATE- MENT ON CPD NOTED THAT WHILE THE FD REMAINED A "BENCH- MARK" FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT EFFORTS THE PRACTICE OF USING FINAL DOCUMENT LANGUAGE SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE ACCORDED AN UNASSAILABLE STATUS. THE STATEMENT FURTHER OBSERVED THAT, "DEFENDING THE LANGUAGE OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT MERELY BECAUSE IT COMES FROM THAT SOURCE AND TO THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER SOLUTIONS SEEMS TO US TO DIMINISH THE CHANCES OF ARRIVING AT A DOCUMENT OF WHICH WE CAN BE PROUD BOTH FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF QUALITY AND SUBSTANCE." -- THIS CHANGE IN MINDSET BY THE WEST SHOULD GO FAR TOWARDS UNSHACKLING FUTURE CD CPD SESSIONS AND, MORE ( IMPORTANTLY, THE SSOD-III, FROM THE WEIGHT OF HAVING TO CONFORM TO AN IRREFUTABLE HOLY WRIT. INDEED, MANY EASTERN AND G-21 DELEGATIONS SHOW SIGNS OF ADJUSTING AND NO LONGER INSIST UPON THE INCLUSION OF TEXT MERELY BECAUSE IT IS FROM THE FINAL DOCUMENT. 11. RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (RW)/NEW TYPES AND SYSTEMS OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (MDW) RW AD HOC COMMITTEE CONDUCTED ITS WORK VIA TWO "CONTACT GROUPS" THAT MET IN PARALLEL DURING THE SUMMER SESSION, GROUP A DEALING WITH "TRADITIONAL" RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ISSUED AND GROUP B ADDRESSING THE PREVENTION OF ATTACKS AGAINST NUCLEAR FACILITIES. GROUP A ATTEMPTED TO ELABORATE POSSIBLE ELEMENTS FOR A TREATY OUTLAWING RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, DRAWING LARGELY ON TEXT ORIGINALLY AGREED TO BYTHE U.S. AND USSR IN PARALLEL DRAFTS SUBMITTED IN 1979 (CD/31 AND CD/32) AND ON TEXT OF U.S.- LED EFFORT IN 1983, CD/414. THE PROLIFERATION OF FOOTNOTES AND ALTERNATIVE TEXTUAL FORMULATIONS THAT EMERGED SUGGESTS THAT VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT ARE NOT CONVERGING. ISSUE OF VERIFICATION WAS NEVER DISCUSSED. U.S. DEL TOOK LOW-KEY APPROACH. THE DISCUSSIONS IN GROUP B SHOWED THAT STATES' POSITIONS ON THE ISSUE OF PREVENTING ATTACK ON NUCLEAR FACILITIES ARE DIVERGING, AS INDICATED BY A REPORT THAT IS FESTOONED WITH A DIZZYING NUMBER OF FOOTNOTES, ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS, GROUPINGS OF ALTERNATIVES, ETC. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS 267 ? ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET COMMENTED IN PLENARY THAT THE STATEMENTS WERE, AT BEST, REHASHINGS OF DISCUSSIONS OF PRIOR YEARS. -- WIDESPREAD FRUSTRATION AT ABSENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN RW MAY LEAD TO INCREASED INTEREST IN IDEA ADVANCED BY DUTCH DELOFF THAT THE CD DOES NOT SEEM ABLE TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE OF BANNING ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO REFER THE ISSUE TO ANOTHER FORUM. THE U.S. DELEGATION REAFFIRMED ITS VIEW THAT THERE IS NOT NOW ANOTHER FORUM BETTER SUITED TO THE TASK OF CONSIDERING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT ADDITIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION IS REQUIRED, WHILE MAKING CLEAR THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT SEEN A NEED FOR SUCH PROTECTION. DESPITE A WELL-REASONED PLENARY STATEMENT REITERATING ITS LOGIC FOR BANNING SUCH ATTACKS, EVEN SWEDEN SEEMS TO BE LOSING SOME OF ITS ZEAL FOR THIS TOPIC, AND AT LEAST ONE OTHER DEL SUGGESTED THAT THE CD CONSIDER DEFERRING RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF RW AHC BECAUSE OF THE DIM PROSPECTS OF NEGOTIATING AN AGREEMENT IN EITHER AREA. -- THE QUESTION OF NEW TYPES/SYSTEMS OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (AN OLD BREZHNEV IDEA) DID NOT ARISE. 25X1 7 12. PROCEDURAL ISSUES -- -- THE GROUP OF SEVEN (A.K.A. "WISE MEN") PRODUCED AN UNWISE REPORT. WITH WESTERN AMBS BUTLER (AUSTRALIA) AND BEESLEY (CANADA) APPARENTLY ASLEEP AT THE SWITCH, INDIAN AMB TEJA AND OTHERS IN THE GROUP (FAN, CHINA; NAZARKIN, USSR; MEISZTER, HUNGARY; GARCIA ROBLES, MEXICO) PRODUCED A SINGLE DOCUMENT CONTAINING WHOLLY UNACCEPTABLE "SUGGESTIONS" ON ESTABLISHMENT OF SUBSIDIARY BODIES, TOGETHER WITH SOME MODERATELY USEFUL SUGGESTIONS ON REPORT- WRITING. AFTER UNCOMFORTABLE EXCHANGES IN WESTERN GROUP, IN WHICH BUTLER INSISTED THAT THERE WAS NO LINKAGE BETWEEN THE TWO SETS OF SUGGESTIONS, IT BECAME CLEAR IN THE CD THAT LINKAGE WAS INDEED BEING MADE BY THE EAST (AND SOME IN G-21), AND THE EXERCISE WAS SET ASIDE UNTIL NEXT YEAR. -- THE EFFORT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN A COMPLETE FAILURE, HOWEVER, IF IT IS THE CAUSATIVE FACTOR BEHIND A RELATIVELY QUIET AND UNPOLEMICAL PROCESS OF REPORT- WRITING ON THE USUALLY CONTROVERSIAL NUCLEAR TEST BAN AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ISSUES. (THE OUTER SPACE COMMITTEE REPORT WAS ANOTHER, MORE DIFFICULT, MATTER.) -- ON AUGUST 6, SOVIET FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE SUGGESTED THAT THE CD INTENSIFY ITS WORK SCHEDULE, BY CHANGING 260 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET ITS CURRENT PROCEDURES TO MEET ON A YEAR-ROUND SCHEDULE WITH TWO OR THREE RECESSES. (AT PRESENT, THE CONFERENCE HAS A SINGLE SESSION OF (NORMALLY) TWO THREE-MONTH PERIODS, FEBRUARY-APRIL AND JUNE- AUGUST). U.S. REACTION HAS BEEN NEGATIVE, AS IT HAS TO THE FALL-BACK SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A SPECIAL CD SESSION WITH ONLY CW ON ITS AGENDA. HOWEVER, THE QUESTIONS OF WHEN THE CD SHOULD MEET, AND HOW IT SHOULD CONDUCT BUSINESS, ARE MATTERS THAT WILL PROBABLY ATTRACT INCREASING INTEREST AS SSOD-III APPROACHES. 13. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 269 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 09210 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; UNVIE MISSION; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS, SUMMER WRAPUP 1. THIS IS CD-183 (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW -- -- ON AUGUST 26 CW NEGOTIATIONS RECESSED UNTIL LATE NOVEMBER. SUMMER ROUND RAN APPROXIMATELY TEN WEEKS. -- MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN SUMMER DISCUSSIONS WERE FRENCH PROPOSAL TO ALLOW RETENTION OF "SECURITY STOCKPILES," FIRST MEETING OF EXPERTS FROM THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, AND SOVIET MOVES ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND MILITARY FACILITY VISIT. -- FRENCH PROPOSAL EARLY IN THE SUMMER AND MANAGEMENT WEAKNESSES IN CW COMMITTEE EXACERBATED NATURAL LET-DOWN FROM UNSUSTAINABLE OPTIMISM OF SPRING PART OF THE SESSION. MOOD FOR MOST OF SUMMER WAS COOL AND OVERCAST. SOVIET MOVES TOWARD END OF SESSION, ANNOUNCED IN DRAMATIC FASHION DURING VISIT OF SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE, HAVE REKINDLED MORE POSITIVE OUTLOOK. -- SOVIET NEGOTIATING AND PUBLICITY EFFORTS, WHICH HAD BEEN IDLING SINCE LATE SPRING, HAVE RECENTLY BEGUN TO INTENSIFY AGAIN. SOVIETS ARE NOW CONSULTING AGGRESSIVELY, MAKING GRAND GESTURES, AND PRESSING FOR COMPLETION OF NEGOTIATIONS. -- SUMMER'S WORK HAS NOT PRODUCED MANY NEW PROVISIONS FOR DRAFT CONVENTION TEXT. CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF PREPARATORY SPADE WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED, HOWEVER, WHICH WILL LEAD TO ADDITIONS TO DRAFT TEXT IN 1988. -- ON MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, DEL IS IN A SOUND TACTICAL POSITION. DRAFT CONVENTION IS BASED LARGELY ON 1984 U.S. PROPOSAL (CD/500). PRESSURE IS INSTEAD FOCUSSED ON NON-ALIGNED (ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION), ON FRG AND JAPAN (ON CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MONITORING), AND ON SOVIETS (ON OPENNESS ABOUT CW CAPABILITIES). -- DEL REQUESTS CLEARER GUIDANCE ON U.S. OBJECTIVES AND CONSIDERABLE ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE ON SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS. -- DEL RECOMMENDS THAT GREATER ATTENTION BE PAID TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EXPLOITATION OF MANY STRONG POINTS OF U.S. POSTURE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. -- DEL RECOMMENDATIONS AND REQUESTS CONTAINED PARA 10. END SUMMARY. 270 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 3. POLITICAL CONTEXT -- A. SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES -- -- FROM EARLY JUNE UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF AUGUST, THE SOVIETS WERE MARKING TIME. THEY WERE NOT OBSTRUCTIONIST BUT WERE CONTENT TO FOLLOW THE CLUSTER COORDINATORS THROUGH THE SWAMP OF DETAILED ANNEX MATERIAL. THE GOAL OF COMPLETING THE CONVENTION IN 1987 WAS GIVEN LIP SERVICE, BUT WAS NOT PRESSED. SOVIETS WERE SEVERELY CRITICAL OF THE NEWLY-TABLED FRENCH PROPOSAL ON SECURITY STOCKPILES, BUT WERE OTHERWISE MODERATE IN THEIR RHETORIC. -- SOVIET DEPORTMENT SHIFTED WITH THE AUGUST 6 PLENARY STATEMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE IN WHICH HE ANNOUNCED SUPPORT FOR MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND INVITED CD DELS TO VISIT A SOVIET CW FACILITY. SHEVARDNADZE STATEMENT WAS FOLLOWED UP BY DETAILED ELABORATION FROM SOVIET DEL AND ARRIVAL OF TWO SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM MOSCOW TO CONDUCT CONSULTATIONS WITH NUMEROUS CD DELS. SOVIETS ARE ALSO STRESSING NEED TO HOLD ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATING SESSIONS AND TO BREAK WITH OTHER PAST PROCEDURES IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN 1988. -- SO FAR, SOVIET PUSH HAS NOT BEEN REFLECTED IN DAY-TO-DAY NEGOTIATING WORK. -- ONE SOVIET OBJECTIVE FOR THIS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OFFENSIVE MUST SURELY BE TO MINIMIZE THE IMPACT OF U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS MODERNIZATION BY COMPLETING THE CONVENTION EARLY IN THE BINARY PRODUCTION PROGRAM. ANOTHER MUST BE TO HAVE THE U.S. TAKE THE BLAME IF A CONVENTION IS NOT RAPIDLY ACHIEVED. SOVIETS ACT RESIGNED TO FACT, HOWEVER, THAT THEIR MOVES HAVE COME TOO LATE TO STOP BINARY PRODUCTION FROM BEGINNING. - SOVIETALLIES HAVE BEEN GENERALLY INACTIVE. GDR REP DEL HEAD KRUTZSCH, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN INDUSTRIOUS (ALTHOUGH OCCASIONALLY MISGUIDED) IN HIS POSITION AS CLUSTER COORDINATOR. B. WESTERN GROUP -- -- ON THE KEY ISSUES OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND DATA EXCHANGE, ALLIES WERE ACTIVE AND UNIFIED. IN OTHER AREAS, WESTERN DELS HAVE LARGELY BEEN PURSUING THEIR OWN AGENDAS. AS USUAL, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE EXPLICITLY-COORDINATED ACTION. MORE WORKING PAPERS THAN USUAL WERE WITHHELD BECAUSE OF ALLIED OBJECTIONS. AMON& ALLIED DELS, FRG DEL IS INCREASINGLY SEEN AS OBSTRUCTIONIST BECAUSE OF ITS APPROACH TO CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND "OLD STOCKS" ISSUES. DUTCH REP, WHO 273. Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for. Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 ? SECRET WAS WESTERN COORDINATOR FOR CW, WAS INEFFECTIVE. HE CONCENTRATED MORE ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES THAN ON COORDINATING WESTERN VIEWS AND TACTICS ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. -- FRENCH UPSET MANY DELEGATIONS BY INTRODUCING THEIR PROPOSAL ON RETENTION OF (UNDECLARED) SECURITY STOCKPILES AND A LIMITED (DECLARED) PRODUCTION CAPABILITY. THEY HAVE NOT PURSUED IT. THEY HAVE BEEN MORE ACTIVE ON THEIR RELATIVELY MINOR PROPOSAL FOR A SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COUNCIL AS PART OF THE CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION MACHINERY. THERE ARE SEVERAL SIGNS IN FACT THAT FRENCH NEGOTIATING POSTURE HAS CHANGED RECENTLY. AMONG THESE ARE THE FAILURE TO PUSH THE SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL, STRONG SUPPORT FOR STRINGENT CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROVISION, AND STRONG SUPPORT FOR U.S. APPROACH ON DATA EXCHANGE. C. NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED (G-21) AND CHINA -- -- EXCEPT FOR SWEDEN, THESE DELS PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY ONLY ON ISSUES THAT DIRECTLY AFFECT THEM, SUCH AS CHALLENGE INSPECTION, TECHNOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE, AND "OLD STOCKS". MOST ACTIVE DELS HAVE BEEN SWEDEN, INDIA, PAKISTAN, INDONESIA, CHINA, AND YUGOSLAVIA. -- SWEDISH REP (AMB EKEUS) HAS DONE A GOOD JOB OF CHAIRING THE CW COMMITTEE. HE HAS CONSULTED CLOSELY WITH U.S. DEL AND GENERALLY ACCOMMODATED OUR VIEWS. IN FACT, HE HAS BEEN EASIER TO GET ALONG WITH THAN PAST WESTERN CHAIRMEN. 4. CLUSTER I (CHEMICAL WEAPONS) -- -- WORK IN CLUSTER I, WHICH IS COORDINATED BY PHILIPPE NIEUWENHUYS/BELGIUM, FOCUSSED ON PROVISION FOR "OLD STOCKS" DISCOVERED AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE AND ON VERIFICATION OF CW STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION. ("OLD STOCKS" PROVISION IS INTENDED TO COVER DUD MUNITIONS FOUND ON WWI BATTLEFIELDS OR STOCKS ABANDONED DURING WW II.) THERE WAS MUCH DISCUSSION, BUT LITTLE OF A CONCRETE NATURE WAS ACCOMPLISHED. -- "OLD STOCKS" ISSUE TURNED OUT TO BE HIGHLY CONTENTIOUS. CHINA, INDONESIA AND THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH HAVE ALL DISCOVERED FOREIGN (I.E., JAPANESE OR GERMAN) STOCKS ON THEIR TERRITORIES, PRESSED FOR STATE THAT ABANDONED STOCKS TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DESTROYING THEM. FRG AND JAPAN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ABANDONING STATE HAD RESPONSIBILITIES, BUT INSISTED THAT THE ISSUES BE SETTLED BILATERALLY, RATHER 272 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 - 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET THAN THROUGH A CONVENTION PROVISION: -- DEBATE RESULTED IN INCORPORATION OF A MAXIMALIST TEXT AND A MINIMALIST TEXT IN COORDINATOR'S REPORT. FRG BLOCKED INCLUSION OF ANY MATERIAL ON ISSUE IN FINAL REPORT OF CW COMMITTEE. HOWEVER, U.S. DEL SUCCEEDED IN GETTING A REFERENCE TO COORDINATOR'S REPORT INTO THE MAIN REPORT TO HELP ASSUAGE WOUNDED PRIDE OF BELGIAN COORDINATOR. (BELGIAN DEL HAS BEEN MUCH MORE POLITICALLY HELPFUL TO THE U.S. AT THE CD THAN HAS THE FRG DEL.) -- DEL'S VIEW IS THAT MINIMAL PROVISION (AS IN CD/500) ON DECLARATION AND VERIFICATION OF OLD STOCKS WILL EVENTUALLY BE ADOPTED AND THAT COSTS ISSUE WILL BE SETTLED BILATERALLY. SOVIETS ARE MOSTLY HAVING FUN BAITING THE FRG; THE FRG IS FALLING FOR THIS AND BARKING LOUDLY. CHINESE, WHO HAVE BEEN VERY VOCAL, ARE CALMING DOWN AS THEY REALIZE THAT THEY ARE ACCIDENTALLY PROVOKING THE FRG. JAPANESE ARE TALKING DIRECTLY WITH CHINESE AND HAVE MADE CLEAR TO U.S. DEL THAT THEIR INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO SOLVE THE ISSUE. PRIVATELY, ITALY HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ETHIOPIA WILL BECOME ACTIVE ON THIS ISSUE. -- DRAFT ANNEX PROVISION ON VERIFICATION OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION WAS ELABORATED BY ADAPTING MATERIAL FROM THE SPRING SESSION ON VERIFICATION OF ELIMINATION OF CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES. CHAIRMAN'S TEXT IS STILL AT AN EARLY STAGE. APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH CD/500. -- IN ADDITION TO WORK BY NIEUWENHUYS, CW COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN EKEUS HELD PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS WITH U.S. AND USSR ON ISSUE OF SCHEDULE FOR STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION ("ORDER OF DESTRUCTION"), AS WELL AS OPEN-ENDED CONSULTATIONS. RESULTING SKETCHY OUTLINE IS INCLUDED IN FINAL REPORT. DISCUSSIONS MARKED BEGINNING OF SERIOUS EFFORT TO DEAL WITH SUBJECT. ONLY NEW POINT AGREED WAS THAT AGENTS SHOULD BE COMPARED ON WEIGHT BASIS RATHER THAN THROUGH SOME MORE COMPLEX FORMULA BASED ON TECHNICAL PARAMETERS. SOVIETS SEEM TO BE CAUTIOUSLY CONSIDERING U.S. APPROACH, WHICH WOULD LEAD TO U.S.-SOVIET PARITY BEFORE FINAL DESTRUC- TION PHASE, BUT ARE WARY OF ITS RESEMBLANCE TO FRENCH APPROACH. 5. CLUSTER II (CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES) -- -- THIS TOPIC, WHICH IS ALSO COORDINATED BY NIEUWENHUYS/BELGIUM, WAS DEFERRED PENDING BILATERAL RESOLUTION OF U.S.-SOVIET DIFFERENCES. VEHICLE FOR RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES IS THE JOINT U.S.-SOVIET 27Z CPCRPT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET PAPER BEING WORKED IN THE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. THIS PAPER IS NEARLY COMPLETE. 6. CLUSTER III (CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MONITORING) -- -- DISCUSSIONS IN THIS CLUSTER, WHICH IS COORDINATED BY PABLO MACEDO/MEXICO, FOCUSSED ON HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL PROVISION FOR MONITORING OF COMMERCIAL FACILITIES THAT PRODUCE SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS FOR LEGITIMATE PURPOSES. FINAL REPORT CONTAINS A DRAFT ANNEX TEXT THAT IS FULL OF BRACKETS AND FOOT- NOTES. HOWEVER, IN CONTRAST TO SPRING SESSION, ALL DELS (NOTABLY FRG, BELGIUM AND JAPAN) SEEM WILLING TO ACCEPT SOME KIND OF ANNEX PROVISION ON COMMERCIAL SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICAL PRODUCTION. -- ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED INCLUDE: WHETHER FOCUS SHOULD BE ON A FEW LISTED CHEMICALS OR ON PRODUCTION FACILITIES; THRESHOLDS AND CRITERIA FOR DECLARATION; AND NATURE OF MONITORING REGIME. U.S. DEL, AS INSTRUCTED, HAS ALSO KEPT OPEN THE QUESTION OF "CAPABILITY" - I.E., HOW TO DEAL WITH PLANTS THAT HAVE NOT PRODUCED CW-RELATED CHEMICALS, BUT COULD. -- SOVIETS CONTINUE TO SHOW HIGH INTEREST IN COMPLETING GUIDELINES FOR SCHEDULE 1. REMAINING ISSUE IS WHETHER TO INCLUDE GUIDELINE REFERRING TO PRODUCTION OF AGENT IN "MUNITIONS AND DEVICES." POINT CLEARLY REFERS TO BINARY CW, ALTHOUGH SOVIETS HAVE DROPPED TERM "BINARY." DEL IS WITHHOLDING AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT AS LEVERAGE FOR GREATER SOVIET OPENNESS ABOUT THE AGENTS THEY POSSESS. -- CHEMICAL INDUSTRY EXPERTS FROM ABOUT 20 CD COUNTRIES MET IN GENEVA IN EARLY JULY. MEETING WAS FIRST OF ITS KIND AND FOCUSSED PRIMARILY ON ISSUES RELATED TO DATA REPORTING AND ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. -- AFTER WESTERN CONSULTATIONS, DEL TABLED INTERAGENCY-CLEARED WORKING PAPER ON CALCULATION OF PRODUCTION CAPACITY. HOWEVER, DRAFT WORKING PAPER ON THRESHOLDS FOR DECLARATION AND MONITORING WAS NOT PRESENTED IN THE CD, PENDING EFFORTS TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES IN THE WESTERN ? GROUP. PRINCIPAL OBJECTION HAS BEEN THAT PAPER USES CAPACITY RATHER THAN ACTUAL PRODUCTION AS TRIGGER FOR DECLARATION. 7. CLUSTER IV (ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES; CHALLENGE INSPECTION) -- -- DISCUSSIONS IN CLUSTER IV, WHICH IS COORDINATED BY WALTER KRUTZSCH/GDR, DEALT PRIMARILY WITH GENERAL ANNEX 274 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET PROVISIONS ON INSPECTION MODALITIES AND WITH INTERRE- LATIONSHIPS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES. A GROUP OF THREE EXPERTS ALSO PREPARED FOR LATER DISCUSSION A DRAFT MODEL AGREEMENT FOR INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS AT A KEY PRECURSOR PRODUCTION FACILITY. -- INSPECTION MODALITIES PAPER ("GUIDELINES ON THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORATE") CONTAINS PROVISIONS ON DESIGNATION OF INSPECTORS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF INSPECTORS, AND GENERAL RULES GOVERNING INSPECTIONS AND THE CONDUCT OF INSPECTORS. PAPER WAS EXTENSIVELY - DISCUSSED AND APPEARS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH U.S. VIEWS. HOWEVER, DESPITE PRESSURE FROM KRUTZSCH AND A NUMBER OF OTHER DELS, U.S. DEL INSISTED THAT PAPER RETAIN STATUS OF CHAIRMAN'S PAPER RATHER THAN GO INTO THE DRAFT CONVENTION TEXT -- IN ORDER TO ALLOW FOR WASHINGTON REVIEW. - KRUTZSCH ALSO PREPARED PERSONAL REDRAFT OF ARTICLE VIII (CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE) TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON NEED TO CLARIFY FUNCTIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES OF THE CONVENTION AND ON THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THESE BODIES. CONSENSUS WAS THAT PAPER IDENTIFIED IMPORTANT QUESTIONS AND THAT APPROACH SUGGESTED SEEMED REASONABLE, BUT THAT MATTERS HAD TO BE STUDIED IN CAPITALS BEFORE ARTICLE COULD BE REDRAFTED. -- WELL-WRITTEN UK PAPER (CD/769; 10 JULY 1987) ON ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE VERIFICATION SYSTEM IS READY TO OPERATE WHEN CONVENTION COMES INTO FORCE HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED YET, THOUGH IT SEEMS LIKELY TO BE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION LATER. SOVIETS HAVE REACTED POSITIVELY AND SOUGHT U.S. VIEWS. -- MUCH TO FRUSTRATION OF CLUSTER COORDINATOR, HE WAS NO. ALLOWED TO TAKE UP CHALLENGE ISSUE. 8. CHALLENGE INSPECTION -- -- POLITICALLY SENSITIVE ISSUE OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION, WHICH FALLS WITHIN AMBIT OF CLUSTER IV, WAS SNATCHED AWAY BY CW COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN EKEUS. SEVERAL PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH HEADS OF KEY DELS, PLUS TWO OPEN-ENDED MEETINGS, SHOW GRADUAL SHIFT OF POSITIONS TOWARD U.S. APPROACH. SHIFT WAS MARKEDLY ACCELERATED BY ANNOUNCE- MENT (AS PREDICTED BY U.S. DEL LAST SPRING) THAT SOVIET UNION WOULD SUPPORT BROAD PROVISION FOR MANDATORY, SHORT-NOTICE INSPECTION. - EKEUS SKILFULLY SHEPHERDED CHALLENGE DISCUSSIONS WITH SERIES OF CHAIRMAN'S DISCUSSION PAPERS. CURRENT VERSION, WHICH IS ACCURATE REFLECTION OF STATUS OF ' DISCUSSIONS IN MOST RESPECTS, IS CONTAINED IN APPENDIX TO FINAL REPORT. (PAPER, HOWEVER, DOES NOT REFLECT U.S. PROPOSAL FOR FACT-FINDING PANEL.) 275 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- WHILE GENERAL APPROACHES OF WESTERN AND EASTERN GROUPS NOW SEEM QUITE CLOSE, KEY NON-ALIGNED DELS (INDIA, PAKISTAN, YUGOSLAVIA) AND CHINA CONTINUE TO WANT MULTILATERAL INVOLVEMENT IN CHALLENGE PROCESS TO HELP PREVENT ABUSE. THIS, HOWEVER, SEEMS TO BE MORE AN INITIAL REACTION, RATHER THAN A WELL-THOUGHT-OUT POSITION. THESE COUNTRIES AND OTHERS PROBABLY DEFERRED SERIOUS STUDY OF THE CHALLENGE ISSUE WHILE U.S.-SOVIET DIFFERENCES WERE SO SHARP, BUT ARE NOW SUDDENLY CON- FRONTED WITH THE ISSUE AS A RESULT OF SOVIET SHIFTS IN POSITION. THE SWEDES PROFESS TO BE CONFIDENT THAT THEY CAN BRING THEIR GROUP AROUND. 25X1 -- AMONG OTHER WESTERN DELS, DUTCH HAVE BEEN MOST SUPPORTIVE OF MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION. UK AND FRG CONTINUE TO STRESS APPROACH "CONTAINED IN CD/715," BUT THEIR INTERPRETATION OF CD/715 IS SHIFTING TOWARD THE U.S. POSITION. FRENCH HAVE BEEN MORE SUPPORTIVE OF STRINGENT CHALLENGE PROVISION THAN PREVIOUSLY. -- SOVIETS HAVE NOW STAKED OUT A MAXIMALIST POSITION. A MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION CAN BE REQUESTED BY ANY STATE PARTY (U.S. - ONLY THE FIVE MEMBERS OF THE FACT-FINDING PANEL) AND APPLIES TO ALL LOCATIONS AND FACILITIES (U.S. - DISAGREEMENT WITHIN USG). 7 -- OF THE THREE MAJOR ASPECTS OF A CHALLENGE PROVISION (INITIATION, CONDUCT, FOLLOW-UP), THE "FOLLOW-UP" ASPECT IS LEAST-DEVELOPED. PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY VAGUE AND DISCUSSION MINIMAL. -- NOW THAT VIEWS ON THE GENERAL APPROACH TO CHALLENGE SEEM TO BE CONVERGING, INTEREST IS RISING IN MORE DETAILED ASPECTS, PARTICULARLY INSPECTION PROCEDURES AND OTHER MEANS FOR PREVENTING ABUSE. SOVIETS HAVE RAISED A NUMBER OF ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION. 9. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES -- -- SCOPE OF UBIQUITOUS PHRASE "JURISDICTION OR CONTROL" WAS DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH, BUT INCREASED CONFUSION WAS MAIN RESULT. SOVIETS ARE SEEKING TO HAVE PRO- HIBITIONS APPLY TO ALL "JURIDICAL AND NATURAL" PERSONS OF A STATE PARTY WHEREVER THEY MAY BE LOCATED. DIFFERING VIEWS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF LAW ARE APPARENT IN WESTERN GROUP. WHILE SOME SEEK TO TURN ISSUE OVER TO LEGAL EXPERTS, U.S. DEL BELIEVES THE BASIC ISSUE IS ONE OF POLICY, RATHER THAN LEGAL INTERPRETATION, I.E., WHAT IS IT WE WANT TO DO? -- THINKING ON ENTRY INTO FORCE REQUIREMENTS HAS BEGUN IN RESPONSE TO CONCERNS U.S. DEL HAS ARTICULATED IN PLENARY STATEMENTS. UK HAS PROPOSED RAISING THRESHHOLD TO 60 RATIFICATIONS. SOVIETS HAVE SAID PRIVATELI THAT INITIAL PARTIES SHOULD INCLUDE ALL NATO AND WARSAW 276 ? SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET PACT MEMBERS, THE "CHEMICALLY-DEVELOPED" STATES, THOSE STATES THAT HAVE CW, AND KEY NNA, "SUCH AS INDIA." ^ NNA DELS ARE INCREASINGLY RESTIVE ABOUT SUBJECT OF TECHNOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE. WORKING PAPERS HAVE BEEN TABLED BY PERU, PAKISTAN AND BRAZIL. HOWEVER, SWEDISH CHAIRMAN HAS MANAGED TO DODGE SUBJECT FOR THE TIME BEING. 10. PLANS AND PROSPECTS -- A. POLITICAL CONTEXT -- -- WHILE ALL RECOGNIZE THAT THE CONVENTION WILL NOT BE COMPLETED IN 1987, HOPE IS GROWING THAT 1988 WILL BE THE YEAR. DEL EXPECTS AGGRESSIVE CAMPAIGN BY SOVIETS TO PORTRAY CONVENTION AS CLOSE TO COMPLETION. SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE MAY WELL PUSH THIS IDEA AT MID-SEPTEMBER MEETING WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ. -- ONE EARLY SIGN HERE IS SOCIALIST GROUP HINTS ABOUT HAVING CURRENT SWEDISH CHAIRMAN CONTINUE NEXT YEAR RATHER THAN BEING REPLACED BY A SOCIALIST GROUP REP ACCORDING TO THE NORMAL ROTATION PATTERN. SOCIALIST GROUP DELOFFS ARE ALSO FLOATING IDEA OF CHANGING CW COMMITTEE MANDATE FOR 1988 TO ALLOW "FINAL DRAFTING" OF THE CONVENTION. -- SOVIETS HINTS THAT IN ORDER TO FINISH THE CONVENTION THEY ARE WILLING TO WORK YEAR ROUND AND ACCEPT VIRTUALLY ANYTHING THE U.S. WANTS, WILL CREATE PRESSURE ON THE U.S. TO PUT THE SOVIETS TO THE TEST. -- INCREASING CONVERGENCE OF U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS WILL SMOKE OUT OTHER DELS WHO HAVE BEEN HIDING BEHIND U.S.-SOVIET DIFFERENCES. THIS IS ALREADY APPARENT ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION. IN ADDITION, AS DELS PERCEIVE THAT CONVENTION IS COMING CLOSER, THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO RAISE VARIOUS PET CONCERNS. "TEMPEST IN A TEAPOT" OVER "OLD STOCKS" ISSUE AND INCREASING G-21 INTEREST IN A TECHNOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE PROVISION ARE HARBINGERS OF ISSUES TO COME. -- IN LATE 1987 AND 1988, IT IS PARTICULARLY THE FRG AND FRANCE THAT WILL BE PUT TO THE TEST. THE FRG WILL BE VIRTUALLY ISOLATED (EXCEPT FOR JAPAN) IN ITS RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT STRICT MONITORING OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY. THE SOVIETS WILL, OF COURSE, MAKE SURE EVERYONE KNOWS THIS. FRANCE WILL BE PUT ON THE SPOT BOTH BY GREATER SOVIET OPENNESS ABOUT THEIR CW CAPABILITIES AND BY PROGRESS TOWARD A CONVENTION ABOUT WHICH FRANCE SEEMS AMBIVALENT. -- FRG IN THE END CANNOT AFFORD TO APPEAR AS AN OBSTACLE TO A CW BAN. THEY WILL GO ALONG, EVEN IF VERY RELUCTANTLY, WITH WHATEVER OTHERS CAN ACCEPT. -- HOW FRANCE WILL REACT TO 1987 DEVELOPMENTS IS 25X1 277 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET UNCLEAR. GREATER SOVIET OPENNESS WILL INCREASINGLY PUT THE FRENCH ON THE SPOT TO INDICATE WHETHER FRANCE HAS CW AND TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON FRENCH CAPABILITIES. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY FRENCH WILL INSIST ON ALL ASPECTS OF SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL. FRENCH DEL HAS NOT SEEMED PARTICULARLY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT PROPOSAL AND DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO PUSH IT. CORE CONCERN SEEMS TO BE THAT STOCKS REMAIN ABOVE MINIMUM DETERRENT LEVEL UNTIL NEAR THE END OF THE DESTRUCTION PERIOD. IF THE FRENCH GET THIS, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THEY WILL WASH THEIR HANDS OF A CW BAN. B. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES -- -- THERE IS BROAD ACCEPTANCE OF MAIN CD/500 VERIFICATION PROVISIONS EXCEPT FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTION. DEL BELIEVES THAT GENERAL SUPPORT FOR MANDATORY, SHORT-NOTICE CHALLENGE PROVISION IS LIKELY EARLY IN 1988, WITH PERHAPS A FEW HOLD- OUTS. -- NUMEROUS TECHNICAL VERIFICATION-RELATED ISSUES REMAIN, HOWEVER. MOST PROMINENT ARE PROVISIONS PER- TAINING TO CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MONITORING (E.G., CONTENT OF LISTS; INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS; APPROACH TO COMMERCIAL SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS) AND TO ARRANGEMENTS FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTION (E.G., INITIATION; INSPECTION PROCEDURES; FOLLOW-UP; EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY). THESE ISSUES WILL GET INCREASING ATTENTION. -- OTHER ISSUES THAT ARE BECOMING MORE PROMINENT ARE: DATA EXCHANGE; STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES; TECHNOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE; ENTRY-INTO-FORCE REQUIREMENTS. -- UNEXPECTEDLY, DATA EXCHANGE HAS BECOME A "SAFE" TOPIC AND IS THEREFORE GROWING RAPIDLY IN IMPORTANCE. IN PLENARY STATEMENTS, SEVERAL WESTERN DELS HAVE PICKED UP U.S. THEME OF GREATER OPENNESS ABOUT CW CAPABILITIES. EVEN FRENCH REP AND DEPUTY REP ARE STRESSING THEME IN WESTERN DISCUSSIONS. SOVIETS THEMSELVES ARE ADVERTISING THEIR "NEW THINKING" BY INVITING CD DELS TO VISIT THEIR CW PROVING GROUND TO LEARN ABOUT SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IN DOING SO, OF COURSE, THEY ARE PRODUCING RISING EXPECTATIONS. PROSPECTS ARE THAT "OPENNESS" WILL BE A PROMINENT TOPIC NEXT YEAR. C. PROCEDURAL MATTERS -- -- CW COMMITTEE AGREED TO HOLD CONSULTATIONS DURING PERIOD 30 NOVEMBER - 16 DECEMBER AND TO MEET DURING PERIOD 12-29 JANUARY. THESE PERIODS ARE ROUGHLY THE SAME AS LAST YEAR. U.S. WAS LONE HOLD-OUT AGAINST AN ADDITIONAL WEEK IN NOVEMBER AND UPGRADING DECEMBER 278 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET DISCUSSIONS FROM "INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS" TO MEETINGS OF THE COMMITTEE ITSELF. -- IN A COMPROMISE WITH THE SOVIETS, U.S. AGREED TO ACCEPT LANGUAGE IN PARAGRAPH 13C OF THE FINAL REPORT THAT STATES THAT THE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN WILL CONDUCT PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS IN GENEVA DURING THE PERIOD OF NOVEMBER 23-27 WITH DELEGATIONS PRESENT. CHAIRMAN HAS THE RIGHT TO HOLD PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS WHEN HE PLEASES, SO THE TEXT STATES THE OBVIOUS. MOREOVER, ALL COMMITTEE MEMBERS ARE FULLY AWARE THAT U.S. DEL WILL NOT BE PRESENT DURING THIS PERIOD. COMMITTEE DID NOT SET AN AGENDA FOR THE INTERSESSIONAL WORK, BUT LEFT IT TO CHAIRMAN TO WORK OUT IN CONSULTATIONS. -- IN A BREAK WITH RECENT PRACTICE, THE CW COMMITTEE DEFERRED UNTIL JANUARY NAMING A CHAIRMAN FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR 1988. FRG AND NETHERLANDS REPS PRESSED TO KEEP OPTION OPEN FOR CURRENT SWEDISH CHAIRMAN TO CONTINUE IN 1988. (ACCORDING TO ROTATION PRINCIPLE, NEXT CHAIRMAN WOULD COME FROM EASTERN GROUP.) - CW COMMITTEE ALSO BROKE WITH RECENT PRACTICE BY NOT MAKING A RECOMMENDATION ABOUT ITS 1988 MANDATE. NOT-SO-SECRET AGENDA OF SOCIALIST GROUP IS TO CHANGE MANDATE TO ALLOW "FINAL DRAFTING" OF THE CONVENTION. ONLY A MINOR TEXTUAL CHANGE WOULD BE REQUIRED. THIS ISSUE WILL COME TO A HEAD IN JANUARY. - IN EARLY 1988, WESTERN GROUP WILL HAVE TO SELECT A CW COORDINATOR FOR THE GROUP AND A REPRESENTATIVE TO FILL ONE OF THE THREE CLUSTER COORDINATOR SLOTS. FRG DEL HEAD (AMB. VON STULPNAGEL) IS CLEARLY EAGER TO BE WESTERN GROUP COORDINATOR, BUT NO CANDIDATE FOR THE MORE DEMANDING CLUSTER COORDINATOR SLOT IS YET APPARENT. THESE CHOICES WILL ALSO NEED TO BE SETTLED IN JANUARY. 11. RECOMMENDATIONS AND REQUESTS -- A. DEL REQUESTS CLEARER GUIDANCE ABOUT U.S. OBJECTIVES. WE NEED TO KNOW IF THE U.S. WISHES TO COMPLETE THE CONVENTION AND WHAT SPECIFIC PROVISIONS THE CONVENTION MUST CONTAIN TO BE ACCEPTABLE. WE MUST BE ABLE TO EXPLAIN CLEARLY THESE U.S. REQUIREMENTS TO OTHERS. B. DEL STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT USG GIVE GREATER ATTENTION TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ASPECTS OF CW NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF SOVIET OFFEN- SIVE WHICH IS GETTING UNDER WAY. WE NEED TO PROMOTE BETTER UNDERSTANDING IN CONGRESS AND AMONG ALLIES ABOUT THE VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES OF A CW BAN, SOVIET CW ACTIVITIES, AND SECURITY RISKS FROM NON-PARTIES. WE ALSO NEED TO PERSUADE PEOPLE THAT OUR HEARTS ARE IN THE RIGHT PLACE. WITH RESPECT TO THE CD ITSELF, DEL 279 25X1 CFCRPT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET RECOMMENDS THAT WASHINGTON CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING: WAYS TO GET PUBLIC DIPLOMACY MILEAGE OUT OF THINGS WE ARE ALREADY DOING (MASSIVE CW DESTRUCTION PROGRAM AND PLANNED REMOVAL OF STOCKS FROM THE FRG), STATEMENT AT THE CD BY VERY.SENIOR OFFICIAL; VERIFICATION-RELATED DEMONSTRATION, POSSIBLY IN GENEVA. C. DEL ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT USG REVIEW SOVIET AND CHINESE PUBLIC ASSERTIONS ABOUT THEIR CW CAPABILITIES. SOVIETS HAVE OFFICIALLY STATED THAT THEY HAVE NO STOCKS OUTSIDE THEIR BORDERS; CHINESE HAVE SAID OFFICIALLY THAT CHINA IS NOT A CHEMICAL WEAPONS STATE. BOTH STATEMENTS SEEM TO BE AT ODDS WITH VIEWS WITHIN USG. IF USG CONCLUDES THAT THESE STATEMENTS ARE INCORRECT, CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CHALLENGING THEM. PROCESS OF DATA EXCHANGE WILL NOT BE WORTH ANYTHING IF QUESTIONABLE STATEMENTS GO UNCHALLENGED. D. DEL HAS RUN OUT OF GUIDANCE IN A NUMBER OF AREAS, PARTICULARLY THOSE INVOLVING DETAILED ANNEX PROVISIONS. WHILE DEL HAS MANAGED TO SLOW DOWN WORK IN THESE AREAS, THIS WORK WILL CONTINUE WITH OR WITHOUT US. IN ORDER TO STEER DISCUSSIONS AND DRAFTING EFFORTS, DEL NEEDS CONSIDERABLE ADDITIONAL MATERIAL. RECOGNIZING THAT INTERAGENCY WORK LOAD IS ALREADY HEAVY ONLY HIGH- PRIORITY ITEMS ARE LISTED BELOW. DEL REQUESTS GUIDANCE ON FOLLOWING: CHALLENGE INSPECTION -- A. NEED TO RETAIN FACT-FINDING PANEL. - B. NEED TO RETAIN ARTICLE XI. - C. APPROACH TO INSPECTION FOLLOW-UP. - D. APPROACH TO INSPECTION PROCEDURES. - E. EXTRATERRITORIALITY. CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MONITORING -- A. WHETHER SCOPE OF COVERAGE IS ADEQUATE. B. PROCEDURES FOR PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS. - C. REVISION OF DRAFT WORKING PAPER ON THRESHOLDS. D. REVIEW OF GUIDELINES FOR SCHEDULE 1. - E. REVIEW OF DRAFT MODEL AGREEMENT FOR SCHEDULE 2 FACILITIES. CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKS AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES -- A. DETAILED APPROACH TO STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION SCHEDULE. ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES -- A. REVIEW OF CHAIRMAN'S "GUIDANCE FOR THE INTER- NATIONAL INSPECTORATE." B. REVIEW OF CHAIRMAN'S PROPOSED REVISION OF ARTICLE VIII. C. REVIEW OF UK WORKING PAPER CD/769. .2C0 SECRET. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET ' 25X1 -- LEGAL ISSUES -- - A. U.S. LEGAL AUTHORITY OVER U.S. CITIZENS CON- CERNING ACTIONS OUTSIDE U.S. TERRITORY. - B. SAME FOR BUSINESS FIRMS INCORPORATED IN THE U.S. BUT OPERATING OUTSIDE U.S. TERRITORY. 12. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 2C1 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 _ CONFIDENTIALGENEVA 09220 DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CALL ON NEW ZEALAND PERMREP FORTUNE REF: STATE: 259408 1. THIS IS CD-184. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. PURSUANT TO REQUEST PARA 5 REFTEL, AMB. FRIEDERSDORF CALLED ON NEW ZEALAND AMB. FORTUNE 31 AUGUST, AND TOOK UP SUBSTANCE OF 23 JULY CD STATEMENT, DRAWING ON POINTS PARA 8 REFTEL. 3. FORTUNE INDICATED THE ENTIRE SPEECH WAS WRITTEN IN WELLINGTON WITHOUT INPUT FROM NEW ZEALAND MISSION IN GENEVA. 4. THE SPEECH WAS NOT INTENDED TO PRESENT ANY NEW MATERIAL, BUT AS A RESTATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE NEW ZEALAND LABOUR GOVERNMENT. 5. FORTUNE SAID THE NEW ZEALAND ELECTION HAS SOME IMPACT ON THE CONTENT, AS DID THE TIMING IN THE CD SESSION, AS WELL AS UNSPECIFIED U.S. REFERENCE TO NEW ZEALAND IN THE CD. AMB. FRIEDERSDORF SAID HE HAD MADE NO REFERENCE TO NEW ZEALAND DURING CD SESSION AND ASKED FOR PARTICULARS. 6. AMB. FORTUNE, WHO ASSUMED AN AGREEABLE DEFENSIVE POSTURE ON THE WHOLE MATTER, SAID NEW ZEALAND WANTS NEITHER TO BE CLASSIFIED AS NEUTRAL OR ISOLATIONIST, BUT AN ALLY OF THE U.S. 7. NEW ZEALAND DOESN'T WANT TO UNDERMINE WESTERN OR U.S. SECURITY, FORTUNE COMMENTED AND THE ONLY POINT OF DIFFERENCE WITH THE U.S. IS ON THE MATTER OF NUCLEAR-ARMED SHIPS ENTERING NEW ZEALAND PORTS. "WE DON'T WANT THE U.S. TO THINK OF NEW ZEALAND AS AN UNRELIABLE RENEGADE," FORTUNE ADDED. 8. "WE HAVE NO FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE WITH U.S. SECURITY POLICY OR THE NEED FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE FOR THE TIME BEING. DETERRENCE IS NOT DISAGREEABLE TO US, BUT WE WANT TO EXPLORE WAYS TO ROLL BACK AWAY FROM IT," FORTUNE STATED. 9. "OUR POSITION IS A TOUGH LINE TO WALK, AND U.S. BELIEVES WE ARE TEETERING TOO FAR TO THE LEFT," HE ADDED. 10. "NEW ZEALAND HAS NO INTENTION TO EXPORT ITS POLICY; WE REALIZE OUR GEOGRAPHICAL UNIQUENESS. WE DO NOT TRY TO INFLUENCE AUSTRALIA OR ANY OF OUR NEIGHBORS." 11. "WE FEEL WE ARE TOTALLY PART OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, AND IF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WAS SLIGHTLY MORE TOLERANT, SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT REGARDING OUR PROBLEMS," FORTUNE COMMENTED. 12. "WE HAVE MINIMAL CONTACT WITH THE SOVIETS, AND NO INFLUENCE WHATSOEVER. OUR ONLY INFLUENCE ON THE ISSUES OF DISARMAMENT ARE WITH THE U.S.," THE AMB. OBSERVED. 2C2 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 13. AMB FORTUNE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NEW ZEALAND IS CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET EXTENSION OF NAVAL POWER IN THE PACIFIC AND IS UNDERTAKING EXPENSIVE ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES IN THIS REGARD. 14. FORTUNE WAS QUITE CONCILIATORY: EXPRESSED A STRONG DESIRE TO ESTABLISH RAPPORT WITH U.S.C.D. DELEGATION IN GENEVA, AND OPINED HIS DELEGATION SHOULD BE TREATED AS AN ALLY BY U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN DELEGATION. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SECRET STATE 200055 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NEGOTIATIONS: GUIDANCE ON NEXT ROUND OF US-USSR BILATERALS AND FURTHER GUIDANCE FOR 1987 SUMMER SESSION REFS: A) STATE 178236; B) STATE 190593 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. US-USSR CW BILATERALS: A. US CD DEL SHOULD PROPOSE TO SOVIET CD DEL THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF BILATERAL CW DISCUSSIONS BE CONDUCTED IN GENEVA FOR A PERIOD OF THREE WEEKS BEGINNING ON 20 JULY 1987. IN SO DOING, AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF SHOULD INFORM SOVIET AMBASSADOR THAT THE US DELEGATION WILL FOCUS ON THE BILATERAL EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION OF DATA, WHICH THE US REGARDS AS ESSENTIAL BEFORE SIGNATURE OF A CONVENTION WILL BE POSSIBLE. EMBASSY MOSCOW MAY INFORM APPROPRIATE MFA OFFICIALS THAT US CD DEL WILL MAKE ABOVE POINTS TO SOVIET CD DEL. DEPARTMENT WILL CONVEY THESE POINTS TO SOVIET EMBASSY WASHINGTON AS WELL. B. FOR CD DELEGATION: DURING US-SOVIET BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS PROPOSED FOR JULY 20, USDEL IS INSTRUCTED TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON THE BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF DATA AND VERIFICATION OF THAT DATA. USDEL IS ALSO AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT LIMITED DISCUSSIONS ON ARTICLE X AND THE ELIMINATION OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES. IF OTHER ISSUES ARE RAISED BY SOVIETS, DEL MAY RESPOND BRIEFLY WITHIN CURRENT GUIDANCE, BUT SHOULD NOT ALLOW FOCUS TO BE DIVERTED FROM KEY ISSUES NOTED ABOVE. FURTHER DETAILED GUIDANCE WILL BE PROVIDED LATER. 3. FURTHER GUIDANCE FOR 1987 SUMMER SESSION: FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTS GUIDANCE PROVIDED REF B: A. IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS, DELEGATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE, EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE GLOBAL BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IN SO DOING, DELEGATION SHOULD NOT SINGLE OUT FOR DIRECT CRITICISM THE LATEST FRENCH PROPOSAL (CD/757) TABLED ON JUNE 16, WHICH CALLS FOR A CW SECURITY STOCKPILE. B. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT ONE OPTION IN THE FRENCH PAPER PROVIDES FOR THE DECLARATION OF SECURITY STOCKPILE LOCATION AND THAT IT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION, WITH ITS FINAL ELEMENTS BEING DESTROYED BETWEEN THE NINTH AND TENTH YEARS AFTER THE CONVENTION COMES INTO FORCE, PROVIDED THAT APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN FULFILLED (E.G., NO DIFFICULTIES WITH THE INSPECTION MECHANISM, NO BREAKOUT FROM THE CONVENTION, NO FAILURE OF CW POSSESSOR STATES TO ACCEDE TO THE CONVENTION). WE FURTHER UNDERSTAND THE FRENCH PROPOSAL ALLOWS CONTINUED PRODUCTION FOR STOCKPILE MAINTENANCE, SUBJECT TO INTERNATIONAL MONITORING, FROM THE TIME OF CONVENTION ENTRY INTO FORCE UNTIL THE END OF THE EIGHTH YEAR. FRENCH CONCERNS FOR A SECURE, STABLE ENVIRONMENT DURING THE FRAGILE TEN-YEAR DESTRUCTION 2E14. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 PERIOD ARE SHARED BY THE USG. HOWEVER, THE USG HAS NOT FULLY DEVELOPED OR AGREED ON THE ACTIONS BEST SUITED TO ENSURE THAT STABILITY. US DEL MAY INFORM THE FRENCH, AND OTHERS AS APPROPRIATE, THAT THE IDEAS CONTAINED IN THE FRENCH PAPER REMAIN UNDER STUDY IN WASHINGTON. C. WITHOUT IMPLYING USG ACCEPTANCE OR AGREEMENT, DELEGATION SHOULD SEEK CONFIRMATION THAT WASHINGTON'S UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE FRENCH PROPOSAL (AS NOTED IN PARA 3B ABOVE) ARE ACCURATE--ESPECIALLY THAT THEY HAVE CHANGED THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION REGARDING A SECRET SECURITY STOCKPILE. IF QUERIED AS TO WHEN THE USG WILL HAVE A POSITION, DEL SHOULD SAY THAT WE BELIEVE THAT MANY DIFFICULT ISSUES (E.G., NON-PRODUCTION, INCLUDING MONITORING OF CHEMICAL INDUSTRY; ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE/INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORATE; BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF DATA) REMAIN FAR FROM RESOLUTION. WE THEREFORE DO NOT REPEAT NOT BELIEVE A FINAL USG POSITION ON CD/757 NEEDS TO BE TAKEN SOON. D. WASHINGTON ANTICIPATES THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION WILL ATTEMPT TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT A CW CONVENTION IS IMMINENT BY MAKING WELL-PUBLICIZED MOVES TOWARD ACCEPTING SOME VARIANT OF THE UK APPROACH TO CHALLENGE INSPECTION. USDEL SHOULD ACTIVELY COUNTER ANY IMPRESSION THAT A CW CONVENTION COULD BE REACHED IN THE NEAR FUTURE THROUGH A COMPROMISE ON THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUE. WASHINGTON SUGGESTS THIS MAY BE DONE BY FOCUSSING THE CD'S ATTENTION ON THE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES YET TO BE RESOLVED IN THE NEGOCIATIONS, AS WELL AS BY REITERATING SOUND ARGUMENTS WHICH REAFFIRM THE IMPORTANCE OF THE APPROACH TO CHALLENGE INSPECTION DEFINED IN ARTICLE X OF CD/500, I.E., NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL. 4. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 2S5 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 SECRETGENEVA 07475 ACDA FOR MA; DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, DATE OF NEXT ROUND AND AGENDA 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-025. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SOVIET CD DELOFF (BATSANOV) PASSED WORD TO USDEL (BARTHELEMY) THAT U.S.-SUGGESTED DATE FOR BEGINNING OF NEXT ROUND OF BILATERALS, 20 JULY (SEPTEL), WAS ACCEPTABLE. SOVDELOFF ALSO HANDED OVER AMB NAZARKIN'S SUGGESTION FOR AN AGENDA CONTAINING 6 ITEMS (TEXT IN PARAGRAPH 6 BELOW). 3. BARTHELEMY NOTED THAT THE PROPOSAL DID NOT CONTAIN "BILATERAL EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION OF DATA," WHICH HE HAD INFORMED AMB NAZARKIN WILL BE THE ESSENTIAL FOCUS OF USDEL ATTENTION IN THE ROUND. SOVIET DELOFF RESPONDED THAT ITEM 6 ON THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, WAS INTENDED TO COVER THIS MATTER. 4. SOVIET DELOFF REQUESTED THAT USDEL PROVIDE A SUGGESTED AGENDA OF ITS OWN AND AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE SO AS TO 4'FACILITATE AGREEMENT" AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ROUND. 5. ACTION REQUESTED: DEL WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE ON SPECIFIC AGENDA TEXT, IF ANY, TO BE PROPOSED TO SOVIET DEL PRIOR TO JULY 20. 6. BEGIN TEXT OF SOVIET PAPER -- -- SUGGESTED AGENDA FOR THE 6TH ROUND OF BILATERAL DISCUSSION ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS: (1.) REVIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE 5TH ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS (CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES, RECIPROCAL PARTICIPATION IN ON-SITE INSPECTIONS). (2.) CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS. (3.) WAYS AND MEANS TO COVER BINARY WEAPONS IN THE CONVENTION (REVIEW OF THE ROLLING TEXT AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS). (4.) TRANS/MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF JURISDICTION AND CONTROL AND NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES. (5.) UNDIMINISHED SECURITY THROUGHOUT THE DESTRUCTION PERIOD. (6.) CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. 2C6 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SFCRFT 25X1 7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 207 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 I;RE rn;ss;?,_s. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 rc_c, (7N Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SECRET STATE 221597 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) DISCUSSIONS, ROUND VI GUIDANCE REFS: A) STATE 200055 (GUIDANCE ON SCHEDULE AND AGENDA) B) GENEVA 2732 (CW BILAT-21: ROUND V WRAP UP) C) GENEVA 2588 (CW BILAT-14: JOINT PAPER ON BILATERAL INSPECTION OBSERVERS) 1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR U.S. DEL TO ROUND VI OF THE BILATERAL U.S.-USSR DISCUSSIONS ON A CW BAN TO BE HELD IN GENEVA BEGINNING JULY 20. 3. AGENDA -- -- AS INDICATED REF A, DEL SHOULD FOCUS DISCUSSION ON THE BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF DATA AND VERIFICATION OF THAT DATA. DEL IS ALSO AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT LIMITED DISCUSSIONS ON ARTICLE X AND THE ELIMINATION OF PRO- DUCTION FACILITIES. IF OTHER ISSUES ARE RAISED BY THE SOVIETS, DEL MAY RESPOND BRIEFLY WITHIN CURRENT GUIDANCE, BUT SHOULD NOT ALLOW ATTENTION TO BE DIVERTED FROM U.S. OBJECTIVE OF ADDRESSING KEY ISSUES AS NOTED ABOVE, WITH PRIMARY FOCUS ON EXCHANGE OF DATA. 4. DATA EXCHANGE -- -- ORIGINAL GUIDANCE ON DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE (84 STATE 192781) REMAINS BASIS FOR U.S. POSITION. -- DEL SHOULD NOT ALLOW FOCUS TO BE SHIFTED AWAY FROM _ THIS ISSUE. -- DEL SHOULD CONTINUE TO STRESS TO SOVIETS THAT USG REGARDS BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF DATA AND VERIFICATION OF THE DATA, AS PROPOSED IN AUGUST 1984, AS ESSENTIAL BEFORE SIGNATURE OF A CONVENTION WILL BE POSSIBLE. -- DEL SHOULD REMIND THE SOVIETS THAT THEY HAVE HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY THE PROPOSAL AND THAT WASH- INGTON EXPECTS A DETAILED RESPONSE ON THIS ISSUE. THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A RESPONSE CAN ONLY PROLONG THE NEGOT- IATIONS ON A CW BAN. -- RECENT RESEARCH SUGGESTS THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE X CHALLENGE INSPECTION PRIOR TO TREATY SIGNATURE, I.E., WITHOUT THE LEGAL BASIS PROVIDED BY THE TREATY, COULD PRESENT LEGAL DIFFICULTIES. THIS ISSUE IS BEING STUDIED BY THE INTERAGENCY CW WORKING GROUP. THERE- FORE, PENDING FURTHER GUIDANCE, DEL SHOULD AVOID GETTING INTO DETAILED DISCUSSION OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION ASPECT OF U.S. DATA EXCHANGE PROPOSAL. 5. CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES -- A. WASHINGTON AGENCIES HAVE REVIEWED JOINT INFORMAL PAPER ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND FIND IT ACCEPT- ABLE SUBJECT TO THE COMMENTS SUBPARA. (B) AND (C) BELOW. B. BRACKETED POINTS: -- PAGE 5, THIRD TICK. DEL MAY AGREE THAT BUILDINGS ARE TO BE REUSED ONLY FOR NON-MILITARY PEACEFUL PER- 25X1 2C9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET MITTED PURPOSES. -- PAGE 7, FIRST TICK UNDER "RELATED MEASURES". DEL SHOULD MAINTAIN POSITION THAT A FACILITY THAT PRODUCED A KEY PRECURSOR FOR BOTH CIVIL AND MILITARY PURPOSES SHOULD BE MONITORED UNDER ARTICLE VI AND THAT EXCEPT FOR SUCH FACILITIES NO SPECIFIC PROVISION IS NEEDED ON "EXCESS CAPACITY". -- PAGE 8. DEL SHOULD MAINTAIN POSITION THAT FACILITIES FOR PRODUCING CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AND SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS EMPLOY- MENT SHOULD BE DECLARED AND ELIMINATED, AS SPECIFIED IN BRACKETED TEXT. C. DEL SHOULD SEEK FOLLOWING CHANGES IN MARCH 5 TEXT: -- PAGE 1: DEFINITION SECTION SHOULD HAVE A NOTE TO EXPLAIN THAT THE EFFECT OF THE DEFINITION IS TO TREAT EACH PROCESS UNIT IN THE REACTION SEQUENCE AS A SEPARATE PRODUCTION FACILITY. -- PAGE 2, LAST LINE: ADD "HEAT TRANSFER". -- PAGE 3 LINE 9: ADD "CORROSION-RESISTANT" BETWEEN "SPECIAL" AND "MATERIAL". -- PAGE 5, LAST LINE: CORRECT TYPO SO THAT LINE READS "VESSELS OR ANY LOW-PRESSURE CONTAINMENT AREAS". -- PAGE 6, SECOND TICK, PART (A): ADD A REFERENCE TO USE OF INSTRUMENTS TO PARALLEL APPROACH IN PART (B). -- PAGE 6, SECOND TICK: DEL SHOULD MAKE CLEAR IN NEGOTIATING RECORD THAT USG BELIEVES THAT A MINIMUM FREQUENCY OF INSPECTION SHOULD BE AGREED BEFORE THE TREATY IS COMPLETED. -- PAGE 7, UNDER 3(A), SECOND TICK: PREVAILING INDUSTRY STANDARDS SHOULD BE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, NOT STANDARDS OF AN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY. -- PAGE 8, UNDER (B), SECOND TICK, LAST LINE: ADD "DURING DESTRUCTION AT THE DESTRUCTION SITE". D. DEL MAY EXPLORE HOW MATERIAL CONTAINED IN JOINT PAPER COULD BE INSERTED INTO THE CD NEGOTIATIONS. WE WOULD PREFER THAT AGREED APPROACH BE INTRODUCED RELATIVELY SOON TO HELP KEEP CD DISCUSSIONS FROM CENTERING ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUE. E. IF SOVIETS ACCEPT U.S. POINTS SUBPARA. B AND C ABOVE, AND OTHER SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES ARE NOT MADE, FURTHER WASHINGTON REVIEW OF TEXT IS NOT REQUIRED. HOWEVER, IF SOME POINTS ARE NOT ACCEPTED, OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES ARE MADE, THESE POINTS WILL NEED TO BE REVIEWED IN WASHINGTON. F. DEL SHOULD DETERMINE FOR ITSELF BEST TACTICS FOR WHEN.AND HOW TO ANNOUNCE IN THE CD THAT THE U.S. HAS MODIFIED ITS POSITION ON THE PRODUCTION FACILITIES ISSUE AND HOW TO INTRODUCE MATERIAL FROM THE JOINT PAPER INTO CD NEGOTIATIONS. IN SO DOING, DEL SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT RECENT NSC DIRECTIVE, NEED TO KEEP CD -290 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET DISCUSSIONS FROM CENTERING ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUE, AND WHAT TIMING WILL MAXIMIZE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY BENEFITS. 6. BILATERAL INSPECTION REPRESENTATIVES -- A. WASHINGTON AGENCIES HAVE REVIEWED JOINT INFORMAL PAPER (REF C) ON BILATERAL INSPECTION OBSERVERS AND FIND IT ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT MODIFICATION. B. SOVIETS SUGGESTED IN ROUND V THAT THE U.S. AND USSR HAVE A "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT" UNDER WHICH A SOVIET NATIONAL WOULD HEAD THE SECTION OF THE IN- SPECTORATE RESPONSIBLE FOR INSPECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND VICE VERSA. IF SOVIETS RAISE SUBJECT, U.S. REPS SHOULD INDICATE THAT THE PROPOSAL IS STILL BEING STUDIED. 7. NON-INTERFERENCE/NON-CONCEALMENT -- -- GUIDANCE FOR ROUND IV (86 STATE 333967) IN- DICATED THAT: (A) ON NON-INTERFERENCE, DEL SHOULD BE GUIDED BY LANGUAGE OF THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT (SALT I), AND (B) FURTHER GUIDANCE WOULD BE PROVIDED ON LANGUAGE FOR NON-CONCEALMENT PROVISION. -- THE U.S. DRAFT INF TREATY CONTAINS LANGUAGE ON BOTH TOPICS. FOR NON-INTERFERENCE PROVISION, DEL MAY DRAW ON ARTICLE X, PARA. 1. ("NEITHER PARTY SHALL INTERFERE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION CARRIED OUT IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH GENERALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, OR WITH THE INSPECTION SYSTEM PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE IX.") FOR NON-CONCEALMENT PROVISION, DEL MAY DRAW ON ARTICLE X, PARA. 2, FIRST SENTENCE. ("NEITHER PARTY SHALL USE CONCEALMENT MEASURES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS TREATY BY EITHER NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 1 OF THIS ARTICLE OR BY THE INSPECTION SYSTEM PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE IX.") 8. NEXT ROUND -- -- DEL MAY AGREE TO HOLD SEVENTH ROUND OF BILATERALS LATER IN THE YEAR. SINCE SCHEDULING MAY BE AFFECTED BY TIMING OF HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS AND BECAUSE DIFFERING VIEWS EXIST IN WASHINGTON ON DATES, DEL SHOULD AVOID PREJUDICING DATE QUESTION. ANY SOVIET PROPOSAL SHOULD BE REFERRED TO WASHINGTON. 9. INFORMING OTHERS -- -- DEL MAY ISSUE CUSTOMARY PRESS STATEMENT AT END OF ROUND. -- DEL SHOULD INFORM THE CD WESTERN GROUP, THE CW COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN AND KEY NNA WHEN THE ROUND BEGINS. AT THE END OF THE ROUND, DEL SHOULD BRIEF THE WESTERN GROUP ON THE GENERAL AREAS OF DISCUSISON AND GENERAL DISAGREEMENT. DEL MAY ALSO INFORM THE CW COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN AND KEY NNA DELS IN GENERAL ON THE TALKS, INCLUDING THE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED. -- AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE ROUND, WASHINGTON 291 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET PLANS TO BRIEF THE FRENCH, FRG AND UK IN DETAIL. 10. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 292 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SECRET GENEVA 07998 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) DISCUSSIONS, ROUND VI: EXPERTS MEETING, JULY 20, 1987 REFS: (A) STATE 221597 (B) GENEVA 7475 (CW BILAT-025) 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-026. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- FIRST BILATERAL MEETING OF ROUND VI WAS AT EXPERTS LEVEL. DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON AGENDA AND SCHEDULE. U.S. DEL INSISTED ON BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION OF THAT DATA AS THE PRIORITY AGENDA ITEM, WHILE SOVIET DEL PROPOSED DISCUSSION OF SELECTED MULTILATERAL ISSUES. NO AGREEMENT ON AGENDA WAS REACHED DESPITE A LENGTHY AND LIVELY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON SCHEDULING OF MEETINGS. END SUMMARY. 3. AT FIRST MEETING OF ROUND VI OF U.S.-SOVIET CW BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON 20 JULY 1987, EXPERTS DISCUSSED AGENDA AND SCHEDULE. AS INSTRUCTED REF A, U.S. DEL PRESSED FOR BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION OF THAT DATA AS FOCUS OF ROUND VI DISCUSSIONS. THE U.S. DEL REMINDED THE SOVIETS THAT THE U.S. HAD PUT FORWARD A KEY PROPOSAL FOR DATA EXCHANGE IN AUGUST 1984 AND THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE FAILED TO RESPOND SERIOUSLY TO IT. DEL STRESSED THAT USG REGARDS BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF DATA AND ITS VERIFICATION AS ESSENTIAL BEFORE SIGNATURE OF A CONVENTION WILL BE POSSIBLE. DEL FURTHER EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF UTILIZING LIMITED TIME FOR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONSTO ADDRESS KEY ISSUES THAT CANNOT BE DEALT WITH IN THE MULTILATERAL FORUM AND THAT FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE DATA EXCHANGE/ VERIFICATION ISSUE AS A SIGNIFICANT CONFIDENCE- BUILDING MEASURE WILL ONLY PROLONG THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. 4. SOVIET DEL AGAIN ARGUED FOR AN AGENDA WHICH MADE NO MENTION OF DATA EXCHANGE (REF B). THE SOVIETS WOULD FOCUS ON ISSUES CURRENTLY UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION IN THE CD. THEY ARGUED THAT THE BILATERALS MUST DIRECTLY SUPPORT THE MULTI- LATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AND HASTEN THEIR SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION. OF THE SIX ITEMS ON THEIR AGENDA, SOVIET DEL SINGLED OUT THREE: (1) HOW THE CW CONVENTION WILL COVER BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS, I.E., GUIDELINES FOR SCHEDULE 1 OF THE CONVENTION; (2) COVERAGE OF ACTIVITIES OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS; AND (3) THE FRENCH PROPOSAL ON SECURITY STOCKPILES AND ALLOWED PRODUCTION 293 crrprT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET (CD 757). IN THE SOVIET VIEW, THE FRENCH PAPER IS A "NEW SERIOUS OBSTACLE" BECAUSE IT REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM THE APPROACH AGREED BY THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION OVER YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS. 5. U.S. DEL REGISTERED STRONG DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT INCLUDED DATA EXCHANGE IN THEIR PROPOSED AGENDA DESPITE THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF U.S. CONCERNS AND POINTEDLY AND REPEATEDLY ASKED SOVIET SIDE IF IT WAS READY TO RESPOND IN DETAIL TO THE LONG-STANDING U.S. PROPOSAL ON BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION. IN RESPONSE, SOVIET DEL DIRECTED CONVERSATION TO ITS OWN AGENDA PROPOSAL AND CAREFULLY AVOIDED ANY REFERENCE TO DATA EXCHANGE. AS A RESULT THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ON THE AGENDA. 6. ON SCHEDULE, IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD THREE MEETINGS EACH WEEK WITH PLENARIES ONLY AT THE BEGINNING AND END. ADDITIONAL MEETINGS COULD BE SCHEDULED AS NECESSARY. THE REMAINING TWO MEETINGS FOR THE FIRST WEEK WERE SCHEDULED FOR 21 JULY (PLENARY) AND 23 JULY (EXPERTS). 7. COMMENT -- -- MOST EXPERIENCED SOVIET CW NEGOTIATORS (SMIDOVICH AND BERDENNIKOV) ARE IN MOSCOW. SOVIET EXPERT TEAM IS HEADED BY SERGEI B. BATSANOV (MFA) WHO IS NOW NAZARKIN'S DEPUTY FOR CW. HE WAS INVOLVED IN CW BILATERALS IN LATE 1970'S AND THEN FOLLOWED CW ISSUES IN MOSCOW. HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE MFA'S DIVISION OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY WHICH HANDLES CW. OTHER MEMBERS OF SOVIET EXPERTS TEAM ARE: V.M. GANZHA - ADVISOR, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, USSR A.E. GRANOVSKIY - ADVISOR, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, USSR O.V. KUZMIN - ADVISOR, MINISTRY OF CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, USSR A.P. KUTEPOV - ADVISOR, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, USSR S.V. NEMCHINOV - EXPERT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, USSR E.V. BYKOV - INTERPRETER, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, USSR. -- UNDERSTAFFED SOVIET DEL IS CLEARLY STRAINING TO COVER CD NEGOTIATIONS AND BILATERALS AT THE SAME TIME. SOVIETS DID NOT SEND ANYONE FROM MOSCOW TO PARTICIPATE IN ROUND VI. THEY INDICATED THAT THEY WILL OFFER A SUGGESTION LATER ON HOW TO 294 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRFT ARRANGE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AFTER THE SUMMER CD SESSION SO AS TO AVOID THE PROBLEM OF OVERLAP. 8. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 25X1 ?AS narinccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SECRET GENEVA 08135 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, JULY 21, 1987 AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF'S STATEMENT 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-027. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE PREPARED STATEMENT DELIVERED BY U.S. CD REPRESENTATIVE MAX FRIEDERSDORF AT THE FIRST PLENARY MEETING OF THE SIXTH ROUND OF U.S.-SOVIET INTENSIFIED CW BAN DISCUSSIONS. BEGIN TEXT. MR. AMBASSADOR, -- TODAY'S SESSION IS THE FIRST PLENARY MEETING OF ROUND VI OF THE INTENSIFIED BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN. THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO THE AGREEMENT REACHED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AT THE NOVEMBER 1985 SUMMIT MEETING. -- REVIEW IN WASHINGTON OF THE RESULTS OF ROUND V CONFIRMED THE JUDGMENT OF THE DELEGATION THAT THE ROUND WAS THE MOST PRODUCTIVE TO DATE. DURING ROUND V AN INFORMAL JOINT PAPER ON INSPECTION OBSERVERS WAS PREPARED, AN INFORMAL JOINT PAPER ON PRODUCTION FACILITIES WAS BROUGHT CLOSE TO COMPLETION, AND USEFUL DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD ON NON-PRODUCTION, CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND DATA EXCHANGE. I CAN INFORM YOU THAT THE PAPER ON INSPECTION OBSERVERS HAS BEEN FOUND ACCEOPTABLE WITHOUT FURTHER MODIFICATION. THE PRODUCTION FACILITIES PAPER WAS FOUND GENERALLY SATISFACTORY, BUT THERE ARE A FEW POINTS WHICH NEED TO BE DISCUSSED BY EXPERTS. -- THE U.S. DELEGATION HOPES THAT ROUND VI WILL BE EVEN MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN ROUND V AND THUS CONTINUE THE TREND OF INCREASINGLY CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS. WE WILL JUDGE THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THIS ROUND PRIMARILY IN TERMS OF THE PROGRESS THAT IS ACHIEVED ON THE DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE. IN THE VIEW OF THE UNIIED STATES, THE ISSUE OF DATA EXCHANGE AND CONFIRMATION OF THE DATA PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION SHOULD BE THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF THIS ROUND. -- THERE ARE OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES -- SUCH AS CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND ELIMINATION OF CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES -- THAT NEED TO BE RESOLVED. BUT WE WILL NOT ALLOW THESE ISSUES, OR OTHERS THAT MAY BE RAISED BY THE SOVIET SIDE, TO SHIFT THE PRIMARY FOCUS FROM DATA EXCHANGE. -- IN 1984 THE UNITED STATES INITIATED THE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS TO PROVIDE A FORUM FOR DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS. WE LATER AGREED TO THE SOVIET REQUEST TO DISCUSS KEY MULTILATERAL ISSUES AS WELL. IT SEEMS TO MY DELEGATION THAT THE DISCUSSIONS Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET OF BILATERAL AND MUTILATERAL ISSUES HAVE GOTTEN OUT OF BALANCE. WHILE BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED, THE FOCUS HAS BEEN ON MULTILATERAL PROBLEMS SUCH AS NON-PRODUCTION, CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION. IN OUR VIEW THERE IS SOME CATCHING UP TO DO ON THE BILATERAL ISSUES. THE U.S. HAS BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT YET TUT FORWARD A DETAILED RESPONSE TO THE U.S. DATA EXCHANGE PROPOSALS MADE THREE YEARS AGO, IN AUGUST 1984. THERE HAS BEEN AMPLE TIME FOR STUDY AND FOR SEEKING ANY CLARIFICATION THOUGHT NECESSARY. IT IS TIME NOW FOR THE SOVIET SIDE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THIS ISSUE. FAILURE TO DO SO CAN ONLY PROLONG THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. MR. AMBASSADOR, -- I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS SATISFACTORY BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF DATA, AND VERIFICATION OF THAT DATA, TO BE ESSENTIAL BEFORE A CW CONVENTION CAN BE SIGNED. BEFORE WE WILL BE WILLING TO ENTER A CW CONVENTION, WE MUST HAVE INCREASED CONFIDENCE, BASED ON GREATER OPENNESS ABOUT EXISTING CW CAPABILITIES. THE PROPOSED DATA EXCHANGE WAS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE U.S AND THE USSR. -- AS YOU WILL RECALL, WE PROPOSED THAT THE EXCHANGE BE CARRIED OUT IN TWO PHASES. IN THE FIRST PHASE, GENERAL DATA ON STOCKPILES AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES WOULD BE EXCHANGED. THE TWO SIDES WOULD DETERMINE THROUGH THEIR OWN MEANS WHETHER TO MOVE ON TO PHASE II. IN THE SECOND PHASE, DETAILED DATA WOULD BE EXCHANGED. A LIMITED NUMBER OF ROUTINE INSPECTIONS, IN ADDITION TO CHALLENGE INSPECTION, WOULD SERVE TO VERIFY THE DATA AND TO TEST THE INSPECTION PROCEDURES. THE FULL DETAILS OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL ARE, OF COURSE, FOUND IN THE MATERIALS WE PROVIDED THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN AUGUST 1984. -- WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE USSR HAS MOVED RECENTLY TOWARD SOMEWHAT GREATER OPENNESS ABOUT ITS CW CAPABILITIES. THIS IS A MODEST BUT USEFUL BEGINNING. BUT BY ITSELF, THIS DOES NOT REPRESENT A DETAILED RESPONSE TO THE LONG-STANDING U.S. PROPOSALS ON DATA EXCHANGE NOR A SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION FOR BILATERAL CONFIDENCE. -- WE ARE ALSO AWAITING A SOVIET RESPONSE REGARDING ANOTHER MEASURE FOR BUILDING MUTUAL ASSURANCE. I AM REFERRING TO RECIPROCAL VISITS TO U.S. AND SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITIES. WE HAVE INVITED SOVIET EXPERTS TO VISIT OUR FACILITY AT TOOELE, UTAH. SINCE AN EXCHANGE OF SUCH VISITS WAS AGREED AT THE MINISTERAL LEVEL, WE ARE PUZZLED ABOUT THE 297 ? SFMRT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET NEGATIVE COMMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE ABOUT OUR INVITATION. WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING A POSITIVE OFFICIAL RESPONSE SOON, PERHAPS DURING THIS ROUND, AS WELL AS AN INVITATION TO VISIT THE SOVIET CW DESTRUCTION FACILITY. SUCH VISITS WOULD HELP AT LEAST IN A SMALL WAY TO BUILD GREATER MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. MR. AMBASSADOR, -- MY STATEMENT TODAY HAS PERHAPS BEEN SOMEWHAT BRIEFER THAN IS CUSTOMERY FOR AN OPENING STATEMENT. AT THIS STAGE THE DETAILED POINTS ARE BEST TAKEN UP IN EXPERT LEVEL DISCUSSIONS. MY PURPOSE WAS TO STRESS THAT THE DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE SHOULD DE THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF THIS ROUND. IT IS A KEY ISSUE THAT HAS HARDLY BEEN DISCUSSED. WE URGE THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO PRESENT A DETAILED RESPONSE TO OUR LONG-STANDING PROPOSALS DURING THIS ROUND SO THAT WORK CAN MOVE AHEAD. END TEXT. 3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN ? SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SECRET GENEVA 08031 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, JULY 21, 1987, AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN'S STATEMENT. 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-028. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF USSR CW DELEGATION HEAD YOURI K. NAZARKIN'S CW PLENARY SPEECH AS DELIVERED. BEGIN TEXT: MR. AMBASSADOR IT GIVES US PLEASURE TO WELCOME YOU AS THE HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION AND ALL YOUR COLLEAGUES AT THE SIXTH ROUND OF THE USSR-U.S. CONSULTATIONS WHICH ARE BEING CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESOLUTION MADE RIGHT HERE IN GENEVA AT THE 1985 SUMMIT MEETING. AT THE VERY OUTSET I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY HOPE THAT THIS FORTHCOMING ROUND WILL BE CONDUCIV TO EXPEDITING THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONVENTION ON A COMPLETE, EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIABLE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IT WAS NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT WE TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE U.S. SIDE YESTERDAY AT THE USSR-U.S. EXPERTS' MEETING TO THE EFFECT THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION HOPES FOR .INCREASING SERIOUSNESS AND PRODUCTIVITY OF THIS ROUND AS COMPARED TO THE PRECEDING ONES. THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD WELCOME SUCH RESULTS OF THE CURRENT ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS WHICH COULD BE ASSESSED IN A SIMILAR MANNER. IT WAS WITH THE SAME GREAT SATISFACTION THAT WE ACKNOWLEDGED YOUR APPROACH. THE SOVIET DELEGATION SHARES WITH YOU THIS HOPE OF HANDLING EVERY ITEM ON THE AGENDA WITH UTMOST SERIOUSNESS. SINCE PROBLEMS CLOSELY RELATED TO ISSUES SUBJECT TO MULTILATERAL CONSIDERATION ARE BEING DISCUSSED AT THE BILATERAL LEVEL, I WOULD LIKE TO DWELL ON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS OF THE TALKS ON CW BAN WHICH ARE TAKING PLACE AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT. AS WE REPEATEDLY STATED WE ARE PREPARED TO CONCLUDE THE CONVENTION ON A CW BAN EVEN THIS YEAR AND WE ARE PROCEEDING FROM THIS ASSUMPTION. I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE HERE THAT THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE TALKS HAVE BEEN WITNESSING, UNTIL RECENTLY, INCLUDING ALSO THIS PAST SPRING, NOTICEABLE PROGRESS REACHED AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT. TODAY, HOWEVER, I REGRET TO BE FORCED TO STATE THAT THIS FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS DID NOT GROW INTO A STABLE TREND. ACCORDING TO OUR ASSESSMENT, ALMOST NO FORWARD MOVEMENT CAN BE OBSERVED IN THE MULTILATERAL TALKS AT THIS TIME. AS FAR AS A NUMBER OF CERTAIN PROBLEMS IS CONCERNED, THERE ARE ATTEMPTS TO REPUDIATE THE UNDERSTANDINGS THAT BEGAN TO TAKE SHAPE AND BECAME POSSIBLE AS A RESULT OF COMPLICATED COMPROMISES REACHED BY A NUMBER OF THE PARTICIPANTS. I WILL NOT PRODUCE A SENSATION IF I SAY THAT THE SITUATION 29 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET AT THE MULTILATERAL TALKS DEPENDS TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE ON THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN OUR TWO SIDES. AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF OUR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WHICH ARE BEING CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SUMMIT MEETING IN GENEVA, BOTH SIDES REACHED THE UNDERSTANDING THAT, IN A BROAD SENSE, THE TOPICS FOR CONSIDERATION WILL INVOLVE TWO CATEGORIES OF ISSUES. 1) ISSUES DISCUSSED AT MULTILATERAL TALKS, PRIMARILY THOSE WHICH COULD BE HELPED BY A SPECIAL INPUT ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES: 2) ISSUES STRICTLY RELATING TO THE BILATERAL AREA. THIS CONCEPT WHICH WAS THE BASIS OF THE PRECEDING ROUNDS OF CONSULTATIONS YIELDED USEFUL RESULTS THEN AND, WE HOPE, WILL BE JUSTIFYING ITSELF IN THE FUTURE AS WELL. WE HOPE, WILL BE JUSTIFYING ITSELF IN THE FUTURE AS WELL. IT IS ON THE BASIS OF THIS THAT WE APPROACH THE TASKS OF THE CURRENT ROUND OF BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AND PROPOSE TO DISCUSS THE FOLLOWING ISSUES AT THIS ROUND. THE SOVIET SIDE IS CONVINCED THAT A CONVENTION BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS MUST EFFECTIVELY PROHIBIT NOT ONLY CHEMICAL WEAPONS ALREADY IN THE STATES' ARSENALS, BUT ALSO RELIABLY BAR ALL THE WAYS TO THE APPEARANCE OF NEW, MORE CONTEMPORARY VARIETIES OF THIS TYPE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. WE PROPOSE IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THE MATTER OF BINARY WEAPONS COVERAGE BY THE CONVENTION BE DISCUSSED IN THE COURSE OF THE CONSULTATIONS. STRIVING TO ACHIEVE AN UNDERSTANDING THE SOVIET SIDE MET THE U.S. SIDE HALF WAY ON A NUMBER OF POINTS DURING THE COURSE OF THE TALKS. AS A RESULT, ACCORDING TO OUR UNDERSTANDING, WE DEVELOPED THE IMPRESSION THAT A COMPROMISE WAS REACHED WITH RESPECT TO THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR THE REVIEW OF THE SCHEDULE OF CATEGORY I. AT THE CURRENT SESSION, HOWEVER, THE AMERICAN SIDE POSED THE QUESTION CONCERNING A REVISION OF THIS COMPLEX COMPROMISE WHICH FACT NATURALLY CAUSED A CERTAIN DOUBT IN OUR MIDST CONCERNING THE U.S. SIDE'S READINESS TO INCLUDE BINARY WEAPONS IN THE CONVENTION. MOREOVER, THIS MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US THAT BECAME OBVIOUS HALTED THE MULTILATERAL TALKS IN THIS RESPECT ALSO. THIS IS WHY WE CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO CLARIFY THIS ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND GIVE A GREEN LIGHT TO THE MULTILATERAL TALKS. OF COURSE, BILATERAL TALKS PROVIDE THE MOST CONVENIENT FORM FOR THESE CONSULTATIONS. IT IS NOT A SECRET THAT THE SEARCH FOR ADEQUATE FORMULATIONS PERTAINING TO JURISDICTION AND CONTROL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONVENTION PRESUPPOSES A LIST OF PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THE ORGANIZATIONS WHICH CARRY OUT ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORIES OF TWO OR MORE STATES AS WELL AS ORGANIZATIONS OWNED BY CITIZENS OF MORE THAN ONE STATE. AS THE SOVIET SIDE SEES IT, THIS IS WHAT PRODUCES THE NEED TO STUDY POINTS RELATED TO 300 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 THE ACTIVITIES OF INTERNATIONAL CORPORATIONS. WE ALSO PROPOSE TO CONTINUE TALKS ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF JURISDICTION AND CONTROL, THE RESOLUTION OF WHICH WILL DETERMINE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FUTURE CONVENTIONS. THIS PROBLEM IS IN THE MOST DIRECT WAY RELATED TO ONE OF THE KEY ASPECTS OF THE CONVENTION, NAMELY, TO CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO REMIND YOU THAT, IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THE GENERAL POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WE POSED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS TO THE AMERICAN SIDE, AND, IN PARTICULAR, ON CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS, AT THE PLENARY MEETING ON JULY 2. FOR THE TIME BEING WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED REPLIES TO THESE QUESTIONS. I SHALL BRIEFLY RECALL THEIR SUBSTANCE. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, US VIEWS AT THE PRESENT TIME ON CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS ASSUME THAT A REQUEST WITHOUT THE RIGHT TO FOREGO IT MUST RELATE TO ALL THE LOCATIONS AND FACILITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE STATE PARTY WITHOUT REGARD TO DIFFERENCES IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE FORM OF OWNERSHIP NOR THE DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER THEM ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT. THIS IS THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN BY THE U.S. DELEGATION OF ARTICLE X OF ITS DRAFT CONVENTION CD/500 IN WHICH THE U.S. SIDE PROPOSES SPECIAL INSPECTION. ALSO ARTICLE XI TALKS ABOUT AD HOC INSPECTIONS. WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND ITS STATUS. AS BEFORE, THE U.S. SIDE INSISTS ON MAINTAINING THIS ARTICLE. IN THIS CASE, IT IS NOT CLEAR IN WHAT SITUATIONS THE U.S. INTENDS TO USE THIS ARTICLE. THE REPLY TO THIS QUESTION WILL, TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE, DETERMINE THE RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS. THERE IS ANOTHER PROBLEM - THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTIVITIES OF A SUBSIDIARY COMPANY REGISTERED IN ONE OF THE STATES PARTY TO THE FUTURE CONVENTION. IN THIS CASE TWO SITUATIONS ARE POSSIBLE: 1) WHEN THE SUBSIDIARY COMPANY IS ACTIVE ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER STATE PARTY AND 2) WHEN IT CARRIES ON ACTIVITY IN A COUNTRY NOT PARTY TO THE CONVENTION. SUCH TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AT TIMES ARE ACTIVE ON TERRITORIES OF OTHER STATES AS IF THEY WERE STATES WITHIN A STATE AND DO NOT PERMIT ANY MONITORING OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR SUBSIDIARIES. THEREFORE THE QUESTION OF WHICH STATE SHOULD BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONVENTION BY THESE CORPORATIONS SHOULD BE A PRACTICAL ONE. AS LONG AS WE DID NOT RECEIVE ANY CLARIFICATIONS FROM THE U.S. SIDE ON THESE ISSUES AT THE PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE CONFERENCE, WE WOULD LIKE TO POSE THESE QUESTIONS AGAIN IN THE COURSE OF THIS ROUND OF BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT TOPICS OF DISCUSSION AT THE 301 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET PRESENT CONSULTATIONS IS, AS WE SEE IT, THE ISSUE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF THE STATES PARTY TO THE FUTURE AGREEMENT. OUR APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE IS DETERMINED BY THE FACT THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE PERIOD OF DESTROYING CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILES THE STATES KEEP CERTAIN STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WHICH REMAIN STILL RATHER SUBSTANTIAL IN THE FIRST YEARS FOLLOWING THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION. THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION MUST BE BASED ON THE FACT THAT KEEPING A CERTAIN PART OF THE STOCKPILE OUTSIDE OF INTERNATIONAL MONITORING WOULD ALSO BE UNACCEPTABLE, JUST AS THE POSSIBLITY FOR ANY OF THE STATES TO VIOLATE THE BALANCE RESULTING FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE LEAST COMBAT-READY AND EFFECTIVE FORMS OF SUCH WEAPONS AND MAINTAINING ITS MOST DANGEROUS FORMS FOR A CONSIDERABLE PART OF THE DESTRUCTION PERIOD. IT APPEARS THAT IN ANALYZING THIS PROBLEM WE SHOULD DETERMINE OUR ATTITUDE TO THE BASIC CHANGES IN THE SITUATION AT THE MULTILATERAL TALKS, WHICH COULD HAVE A POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THEIR COURSE. IN THIS CONNECTION WE WOULD LIKE TO TURN TO DOCUMENT CD/757 INTRODUCED BY FRANCE. AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE, ON JULY 2, WE GAVE IT OUR DETAILED ASSESSMENT. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THE TABLING OF THIS DOCUMENT GENERATES CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES AT THE TALKS. WE ARE POSING THIS QUESTION AT THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AT THIS TIME AS LONG AS THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY STOCKS AND EVERYTHING THAT IS RELATED TO IT VIOLATES THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION OF THE FUTURE CONVENTION WHICH IS BEING JOINTLY DEVELOPED BY OUR DELEGATIONS AND, SHOULD IT BE ACCEPTED, IT WOULD RADICALLY CHANGE THE ENTIRE CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENT. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A DISCUSSION OF THE BRITISH DOCUMENT IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS; A PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE FRENCH DOCUMENT COULD FOLLOW. THIS IS WHY IT IS NATURAL THAT WE NEED TO KNOW THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW ON THIS MATTER. IT WOULD BE RATHER USEFUL TO DISCUSS ALSO THE LAST DOCUMENT OF GREAT BRITIAN WHICH LEADS TO A PRACTICAL PREPARATION FOR THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION. IT IS CLEAR THAT OUR GENERALLY POSITIVE EVALUATION OF THE MAIN DIRECTION OF THIS DOCUMENT DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE AGREE WITH ALL ITS PROVISIONS. IN ANY CASE WE WELCOME AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THIS DOCUMENT. THESE AND OTHER QUESTIONS WERE PROPOSED BY US IN THE DRAFT AGENDA WHICH WE HANDED THE AMERICAN SIDE TWO WEEKS AGO. IT REFLECTS OUR POINT OF VIEW ON THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS FOR PROGRESS AT THE TALKS. I WILL NOT HIDE IT THAT WE WERE DISAPPOINTED YESTERDAY WHEN THE AMERICAN EXPERTS PRACTICALLY REJECTED OUR PROPOSALS 302 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET ON THE AGENDA. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DWELL ON A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE WHICH, AS WE SEE IT, IS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE FOR FUTURE PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT FOR A SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THESE TALKS AND SUBSEQUENT EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THE CONVENTION ON PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONFIDENCE IS EXTREMELY NECESSARY. AND WE FEEL THAT THE MAIN THING THAT IS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE PARTICIPANTS OF THESE TALKS IS TO FOREGO BOTH CURRENT PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND PLANS TO PRODUCE THEM. ' AS FOR THE U.S. SIDE'S PROPOSAL TO STUDY THE QUESTION OF BILATERAL CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGE OF DATA IN THE COURSE OF THIS ROUND, WE ARE PREPARED FOR IT AND INTEND TO DISCUSS IT NOT FOR THE SAKE OF EXPOUNDING ONE'S POSITIONBU RATHER FOR THE PURPOSE OF REACHING AN UNDERSTANDING. IF THE AMERICAN SIDE PURSUES THE SAME GOALS -- REACHING AN UNDERSTANDING -- IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE USEFUL TO AGREE ON THE LEGAL FORM IN WHICH THE UNDERSTANDING ABOVE COULD BE EXPRESSED. AS WE SEE IT,A POSSIBLE VERSION COULD BE, LET US SAY, A MEMORANDUM OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. WE FEEL IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO DISCUSS ALSO THIS ASPECT IN THE COURSE OF THE CURRENT ROUND. MR. AMBASSADOR, IN YOUR STATEMENT YOU RETURNED TO THE VISIT TO TOOELE. YOU COMMENTED ON MY REMARKS MADE AT THE PLENARY MEETING ON JULY 2. WITHOUT PREJUDGING AND GETTING AHEAD OF MYSELF I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT IT WAS NOT A TOTALLY PRECISE INTERPRETATION; WE CAN RETURN TO A MORE PRECISE INTERPRETATION OF IT IN THE COURSE OF THIS ROUND. I ONLY WISHED TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE ISSUES RAISED ON JULY 2. OUR IDEA WAS TO SHOW OUR DOUBTS THAT ONE SHOULD NOT EXAGGERATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SUCH VISITS. I PRESUME, MR. AMBASSADOR, YOU WILL NOT DENY THAT SUCH A QUESTION IS NOT THE KEY ISSUE. THIS IS WHAT I WISH TO CONVEY TO YOU, BUT WE CAN RETURN TO THIS MATTER IN THE COURSE OF OUR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. PROCEEDING FROM THE ABOVE AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE EXPERTS YESTERDAY WE PROPOSE THAT THE DELEGATIONS CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AT THE CURRENT ROUND: 1. COVERAGE OF BINARY WEAPONS BY THE CONVENTION (REVIEW OF THE ROLLING TEXT AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS). 2. MATTERS OF JURISDICTION AND CONTROL, NATIONAL MEASURES ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND PRESENCE OF MILITARY BASES ON FOREIGN TERRITORIES. 303 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 3. UNDIMINISHED SECURITY DURING THE COURSE OF THE PERIOD OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION. WHAT IS IMPLIED HERE IS AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE FRENCH DOCUMENT. 4. CREATION OF A MECHANISM FOR THE CARRYING OUT OF THE CONVENTION (A PREPARATORY COMMISSION, A CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, AN EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, A TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT). IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THIS ITEM WE COULD EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE BRITISH DOCUMENT. 5. REVIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS OF ROUND V (CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES, MUTUAL PARTICIPATION OF OBSERVERS IN THE INSPECTIONS). 6. CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS,. WE HAVE NATURALLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHAT YOU STATED TODAY AS WELL AS YOUR VIEWS ON THESE TWO DOCUMENTS, AND OUR SIDE INTENDS TO DO THE SAME. 7. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES: -- NON-PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRIOR TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONVENTION; -- BILATERAL CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGE OF DATA AND A POSSIBLE WORKING OUT OF THE MEMORANDUM OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THIS ACCOUNT. LASTLY I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT THE POSITION OF THIS ITEM IN THE ENTIRE ORDER DOES NOT REFLECT THE PRIORITY WE ASCRIBE TO THIS ITEM; E.G., AMONG THE ISSUES OF THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WE CONSIDER ITEM 6. ON CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS TO BE THE KEY ITEM, BUT WE PLACED IT AFTER BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. THE ORDER OF ITEMS REFLECTS OUR PROPOSAL AS TO THE TIMING OF WHEN THESE ITEMS WILL BE DISCUSSED. ACCORDING TO OUR VIEW,WE SHOULD FIRST DISCUSS EVERYTHING PRECEDING ITEM 6.IN THE PART ON JURISDICTION AND CONTROL AND SHOULD THEN TURN TO CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS. THE BILATERAL ISSUES SHOULD BE PLACED IN THE SEPARATE ITEM, ITEM 7. IT WOULD BE USEFUL AT THIS TIME TO AGREE ON AN AGENDA TO DETERMINE THE ORDER, AND TO AGREE ON THE FORM OF WORK, THAT IS, WHICH MEETINGS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ON AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL AND WHICH ONES ON THE LEVEL OF EXPERTS, AS WELL AS THE SCHEDULE. END TEXT. 3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 304 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 SECRET GENEVA 08032 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, ROUND VI: PLENARY MEETING, JULY 21, 1987 REFS: (A) GENEVA 2620 (CW BILAT-017) (B) GENEVA 2622 (CW BILAT-016) 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-029. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. SUMMARY -- -- FIRST PLENARY MEETING OF ROUND VI WAS MARKED BY SHARP DIFFERENCES OVER THE AGENDA. AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF POINTED TO IMBALANCE BETWEEN PROGRESS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES AND BILATERAL ISSUES AND REITERATED U.S. POSITION THAT ROUND VI SHOULD FOCUS PRIMARILY ON BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE ISSUES. AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN COMPLAINED THAT CD TALKS WERE STALLEDAND THAT THERE WAS BACKWARD MOVEMENT IN SOME AREAS. HE STRESSED NEED TO DISCUSS COVERAGE OF BINARIES UNDER THE CONVENTION, AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION. HE SAID SOVIET SIDE WAS PREPARED FOR BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE WITH AIM OF REACHING AGREEMENT. THIS COULD BE CODIFIED IN AN MOU. NAZARKIN ALSO PROPOSED AS A CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE U.S. RENUNCIATION OF BINARY PRODUCTION. THE SIDES AGREED TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AN AGENDA AT JULY 23 EXPERTS MEETING. END SUMMARY. 3. U.S. STATEMENT -- -- IN A PREPARED STATEMENT (SEPTEL) AT FIRST PLENARY OF ROUND VI (HELD TUESDAY, JULY 21), AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF COMMENTED ON PRODUCTIVE NATURE OF ROUND V AND INFORMED SOVIETS THAT WASHINGTON HAD APPROVED JOINT PAPER ON BILATERAL INSPECTION OBSERVATIONS (REF A) AND WAS GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH PRODUCTION FACILITIES PAPER (REF B), ALTHOUGH SOME POINTS REMAINED FOR EXPERTS TO DISCUSS. HE SAID RECENT SOVIET MOVES TOWARD SOMEWHAT GREATER OPENNESS ON ITS CW CAPABILITIES WERE A MODEST BUT USEFUL BEGINNING AND PRESSED SOVIET SIDE TO RESPOND IN DETAIL TO U.S. 1984 DATA EXCHANGE PROPOSALS. HE ALSO NOTED IMBALANCE BETWEEN PROGRESS ON MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES AND EMPHASIZED .THAT U.S. CONSIDERS SATISFACTORY BILATERALDATA EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION OF THE DATAESSENTIAL BEFORE A CW CONVENTION CAN BE SIGNED. THE DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE SHOULD BE THE MAIN FOCUS OF ROUND VI. THE U.S. WOULD JUDGE THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE ROUND PRIMARILY IN TERMS OF THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED ON THIS ISSUE. AMB 305 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET FRIEDERSDORF ALSO SAID U.S. SIDE WAS PUZZLED BY NEGATIVE SOVIET COMMENTS REGARDING U.S. PROPOSAL FOR VISIT BY SOVIET EXPERTS TO THE CW DESTRUCTION FACILITY AT TOOELE. HE SAID THE U.S. LOOKS FORWARD TO A POSITIVE RESPONSE SOON AS WELL AS AN INVITATION TO VISIT THE SOVIET CW DESTRUCTION FACILITY. 4. SOVIET STATEMENT -- -- IN HIS STATEMENT (WHICH HE MODIFIED AT THE TABLE IN LIGHT OF U.S. STATEMENT), AMB NAZARKIN SAID SOVIET SIDE HOPES ROUND VI WILL ACCELERATE CONCLUSION OF A CW CONVENTION. SOVIET SIDE HAD STATED REPEATEDLY THAT A CONVENTION WAS POSSIBLE THIS YEAR. THE SOVIET SIDE IS READY FOR THAT. HOWEVER, IN RECENT MONTHS THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS HAVE STALLED AND THERE HAS EVEN BEEN SOME BACKSLIDING IN CERTAIN AREAS -- FOR EXAMPLE, ON GUIDELINES FOR CATEGORY I CHEMICALS, WHERE, HE SAID, THE U.S. SEEMS TO BE ABANDONING AN EARLIER COMPROMISE. THIS ISSUE MUST BE SETTLED BILATERALLY ASAP SO THE MULTILATERAL TALKS CAN PROGRESS. OTHER MULTI- LATERAL ISSUES WHICH MUST BE ADDRESSED ARE JURISDICTION AND CONTROL; COVERAGE OF MULTI- NATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES; THE PURPOSE OF ARTICLE XI (AD HOC INSPECTIONS) IN THE U.S. DRAFT TREATY IN LIGHT OF THE U.S. INTERPRETATION OF ITS CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROPOSAL (ARTICLE X); AND THE ISSUE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF STATES DURING THE TEN-YEAR CW DESTRUCTION PERIOD. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SIDES MUST DISCUSS THE FRENCH SECURITY STOCKPILE PROPOSAL (CD/757), WHICH,SHOULD IT BE ACCEPTED, WOULD THREATEN THE JOINTLY ELABORATED CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CW CONVENTION. THE FRENCH PROPOSAL, HE SAID, WOULD RADICALLY CHANGE THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT. THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO WISHES TO DISCUSS THE UK PAPER (CD/769) ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION; THE USSR REGARDS THIS PAPER IN A GENRERALLY POSITIVE LIGHT. THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO IS READY FOR A BUSINESS- LIKE DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE WITH A VIEW TO REACHING AGREEMENT. THE SIDES SHOULD ALSO ADDRESS THE LEGAL FORM OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT. A BILATERAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING IS ONE POSSIBILITY. FINALLY, SOVIET SIDE IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE INVITATION TO TOOELE. THE SOVIET SIDE IS NOT TOTALLY NEGATIVE ON THIS BUT DOES NOT CONSIDER IT A KEY ISSUE AND WANTED TO EXPRESS ITS DOUBTS. AMB NAZARKIN THEN REVIEWED THE PROPOSED 306 cwrneT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 gFrlIFT 25X1 SOVIET AGENDA, STARIING WITH THE BINARY COVERAGE ISSUE AND CONCLUDING WITH CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND THE CBMS ON DATA EXCHANGE AND NON-PRODUCTION PRIOR TO THE CONVENTION, AND NOTING THAT THE FACT THAT CBMS WERE THE LAST ITEM DID NOT REFLECT THE PRIORITY THE SOVIET SIDE ATTACHES TO THEM -- FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIET SIDE CONSIDERS CHALLENGE INSPECTION A KEY ITEM BUT HAD PLACED IT BELOW THE REVIEW OF ROUND V -- I.E., BELOW FIVE OTHER ITEMS. RATHER, THE ORDER OF ITEMS REFLECTS THE CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE IN WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE CONSIDERS THE ISSUS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED. 5. DISCUSSION -- -- AMB FRIEDERSDORF STATED THAT THE U.S. ALSO WANTS A CW CONVENTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, THE U.S. IS PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS OF THE SUBSTANCE AND NOT ACCORDING TO THE CALENDAR. IT IS SETTING NO ARTIFICIAL DEADLINES. FURTHER- MORE, CW IS A MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION, AND MANY COUNTRIES HAVE A STAKE IN THE ISSUES. MOST OF THE ITEMS IDENTIFIED BY AMNAZARKIN SHOULD PROPERLY BE DISCUSSED IN THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF THE FRENCH SECURITY STOCKPILE PAPER, WHICH IS CURRENTLY UNDER INTENSIVE REVIEW IN WASHINGTON. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED BILATERALLY. PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE WOULD DO MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE TO ADVANCE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CD. - AMB FRIEDERSDORF SAID HE WOULD RESPOND TO THE SOVIET SIDE'S QUESTIONS ON ISSUES SUCH AS COVERAGE OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION IN A CD PLENARY STATEMENT ON JULY 23. REGARDING SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT US RENOUNCE PRODUCTION OF BINARIES, THAT IS BEYOND OUR CONTROL AT CD. PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS MADE CONSCIOUS DECISION THAT US SECURITY INTERESTS REQUIRE REDRESSING OF CW IMBALANCE. -- HE SAID THE U.S. SIDE WELCOMED THE SOVIET ASSERTION THAT IT IS PREPARED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON DATA EXCHANGE. HOWEVER, TO FOCUS ON THE LEGAL FORM OF THE AGREEMENT BEFORE DISCUSSING MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE FACETS WOULD BE TO "PUT THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE." THE U.S. SIDE WAS ALSO PLEASED TO HEAR THAT THE SOVIET SIDE IS NOT. AS NEGATIVE TOWARDS THE TOOELE VISIT AS WE HAD THOUGHT AND WOULD BE GLAD TO DISCUSS THE VISIT FURTHER. REGARDING SOVIET CONCERNS THAT CONVENTION BAN BINARIES, OUR DRAFT TREATY COVERS ALL CW, INCLUDING BINARIES. ON SCHEDULE I CHEMICALS, THE U.S. POSITION 307 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET HAS NOT CHANGED, AND THE U.S. SIDE IS PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE IN THE MULTILATERAL FORUM. AMB FRIEDERSDORF SAID THE U.S. SIDE IS READY TO RESPOND TO ALL SOVIET QUESTIONS. HOWEVER, HE EMPHASIZED, INTHS ROUND, BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE HOLDS MORE PROMISE FOR PROGRESS THAN ANY OTHER ISSUE. THE U.S. SIDE IS NOT INFLEXIBLE ON THE ORDER OF DISCUSSION OF ISSUES BUT WILL INSIST THAT DATA EXCHANGE BE HIGH ON THE AGENDA. - AMB NAZARKIN REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE APPRECIATES THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTACHED TO BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE AND IS PREPARED FOR A BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSION. HOWEVER, THE U.S. SIDE SHOULD ALSO UNDERSTAND THE SOVIET INTEREST IN ADDRESSING SOME MULTILATERAL ISSUES. BOTH MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED. THE SOVIET SIDE DISCUSSES BOTH IN ITS BILATERALS WITH OTHER CD DELEGATIONS, AND IT WOULD BE ODD FOR IT NOT TO DO SO WITH THE U.S. THE EXPERTS SHOULD TRY TO AGREE ON AN AGENDA WHICH WOULD INCLUDE BOTH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL TOPICS. ^ AMB FRIEDERSDORF SAID MULTILATERAL TOPICS COULD BE DISCUSSED BUT REMINDED AMB NAZARKIN THAT DATA EXCHANGE CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED BILATERALLY AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE THE FOCUS OF THE ROUND. PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE WOULD FACILITATE PROGRESS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES. HE SAID THE SIDES SEEM TO BE MOVING CLOSER ON THE AGENDA AND THE EXPERTS SHOULD DISCUSS IT FURTHER. - AMB NAZARKIN THEN ADDED THAT THE SOVIET EXPERTS WOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO REFLECT THE BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE IN THE AGENDA. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 30C SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SECRET GENEVA 08185 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, ROUND VI: EXPERTS MEETING, JULY 23, 1987 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-030 (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY -- -- AT JULY 23 EXPERTS MEETING DISCUSSION AGAIN FOCUSED ON AGENDA ISSUE. SOVIET DEL REQUESTED A PLENARY MEETING FOR THURSDAY, 30 JULY, TO PUT FORTH IDEAS ON BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE. U.S. DEL AGREED BUT RESISTED SOVIET PRESSURE TO HAVE EXPERTS METTING ON TUESDAY, JULY 28 TO DISCUSS HOW BINARY CHEMICAL MUNITIONS ARE COVERED IN THE DRAFT CONVENTION. END SUMMARY. 3. AT THE THIRD MEETING OF ROUND VI OF THE U.S.-SOVIET CW BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON 23 JULY 1987, EXPERTS DISCUSSED AGENDA IN GUISE OF SCHEDULE FOR THE SECOND WEEK OF NEGOTIATIONS. 4. THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSED HOLDING AN EXPERTS MEETING TUESDAY, 28 JULY TO DISCUSS THE COVERAGE OF BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE CONVENTION AND A THURSDAY, 30 JULY PLENARY MEETING AT WHICH AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN WOULD DELIVER A STATEMENT DEALING WITH A NUMBER OF CW ISSUES AND, IN PARTICULAR, BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE; THEY ALSO PROPOSED A THIRD MEETING ON FRIDAY JULY 31. THE SOVIET SIDE ACKNOWLEDGED U.S. REASSURANCES THAT CD/500 COVERED BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS, BUT ASSERTED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD PROGRESSED BEYOND THAT DOCUMENT, AND THEY SAID THEY NOW WISHED TO DETERMINE HOW THEY WERE COVERED IN THE CD'S ROLLING TEXT. THEY ALSO WISHED TO HEAR U.S. VIEWS ON THE JOINT INFORMAL PAPER ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES (FYI: "COVERAGE OF BINARIES" ISSUE APPEARS TO REVOLVE AROUND SCOPE OF ONE OF THE LISTS OF CHEMICALS -- SCHEDULE 1 -- AND THE LONG-STANDING SOVIET DESIRE TO SEE THE TERM "MUNITIONS AND DEVICES" IN THE GUIDELINES FOR REVISION OF THIS LIST. END FYI). THE FRIDAY MEETING, IF AGREED, COULD INVOLVE A PRESENTATION BY THE AMERICAN SIDE OF ANY FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS ON DATA EXCHANGE AND AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION ON VARIOUS QUESTIONS AND PLANS FOR THE NEXT WEEK. 5. U.S. SIDE NOTED AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN'S JULY 21 STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE IS READY TO DEAL WITH THE BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE IN A BUSINESS-LIKE WAY. U.S. SIDE EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT, HOWEVER, IN THE APPARENT LOW PRIORITY THAT DATA EXCHANGE 30r2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SEEMED TO HAVE IN THAT IT HADNOW MOVED FROM BEING PART OF ONE OF SIX ISSUES ON THE AGENDA THE SOVIETS PROPOSED IN EARLY JULY TO BEING PART OF ONE OF SEVEN. U.S. SIDE INSISTED THAT THE DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE BE GIVEN PRIORITY AND PRESSED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO GET THE DATA EXCHANGE PLENARY SCHEDULED EARLIER IN THE WEEK. (FYI: SOVIET EXPERT TEAM HEAD (BATSANOV) LATER TOLD U.S. EXPERT TEAM HEAD (MIKULAK) DURING A BREAK THAT THE REASON THE SOVIETS COULD NOT SCHEDULE A PLENARY WORE THURSDAY WAS THAT HE AND AMB. NAZARKIN HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO CONSULT WITH THE FRENCH IN PARIS ON TUESDAY, JULY 28 ON THE SECURITY STOCKPILE ISSUE. ON JULY 27, SOVIET CD DEPUTY DEL HEAD ZHARKOV REVEALED TO U.S. DELOFF LEVINE THAT THE PARIS MEETING HAD BEEN CANCELLED. AMB. NAZARKIN HAD BEEN CALLED BACK TO MOSCOW OVER THE WEEKEND. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIET SIDE INFORMED U.S. DEL THAT THEIR AMBASSADOR WOULD NOT RETURN TO GENEVA UNTIL SATURDAY 1 AUGUST. 30 JULY PLENARY WILL STILL TAKE PLACE, WITH BATSONOV IN CHAIR FOR SOVIET SIDE. END FYI.) 6. AFTER REALIZING THAT U.S. SIDE WOULD NOT ADDRESS OTHER SUBJECTS BEFORE DATA EXCHANGE WAS DISCUSSED, SOVIET SIDE DROPPED ITS PROPOSAL FOR A TUESDAY 28 JULY EXPERTS MEETING ON BINARIES ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT SOVIET CONCERNS WOULD BE DISCUSSED LATER IN ROUND. THE NET RESULT WAS THAT AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ONLY ON THE THURSDAY PLENARY. ANY DECISION TO HOLD SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS WAS DEFERRED UNTIL AFTER THE DATA EXCHANGE MEETING. 7. COMMENT -- -- SOVIETS ARE CLEARLY MARKING TIME. THEIR TWO MOST EXPERIENCED AND CAPABLE CW NEGOTIATORS (SMIDOVICH, BERDENNIKOV) ARE ABSENT, THEY HAVE REFUSED TO ADDRESS THE PRINCIPAL U.S. CONCERN UNTIL LATE IN THE SECOND WEEK OF THE ROUND, AND THE HEAD OF THEIR DELEGATION HAS BEEN RECALLED TO MOSCOW FOR A WEEK TO ENGAGE IN OTHER APPARENTLY MORE IMPORTANT WORK. -- NET RESULT OF FIRST HALF OF THE ROUND (I.E, JULY 20-29) IS THAT U.S. SIDE HAS SUCCEEDED IN MAKING DATA EXCHANGE THE PRINCIPAL SUBJECT OF THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE EXCHANGE, WHICH IS SCHEDULED FOR JULY 30. SOVIET DILATORY TACTICS HAVE RESULTED IN HALF THE AVAILABLE TIME HAVING BEEN CONSUMED 'in U - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SFCRFT 25X1 WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE OF GREATEST CONCERN TO US, MUCH LESS ANY PROGRESS IN RESOLVING IT. END COMMENT. 8. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 311 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SECRET GENEVA 08265 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, ROUND VI: SOVIET DRAFT M.O.U. ON DATA EXCHANGE 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-031. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. FOLLOWING IS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE WHICH THE SOVIET DELEGATION PRESENTED TO THE U.S. DELEGATION AT THE CW BILATERAL PLENARY MEETING ON JULY 30, 1987. 3. BEGIN TEXT: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES REGARDING THE BILATERAL CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGE OF DATA ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES (BASIC PROVISIONS) - 1. THE TWO SIDES HAVE AGREED TO CARRY OUT A BILATERAL CONFIDENTIAL DATA EXCHANGE AS REGARDS THEIR CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKS AND CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES. THE AIM OF SUCH AN EXCHANGE CONSISTS IN FACILITATING AN EARLY SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION AND ITS ENTERING INTO FORCE FOR THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES. - 2. THE TWO SIDES WILL CARRY OUT SUCH AN EXCHANGE IN TWO STAGES. IN SO DOING THEY PROCEDE FROM THE UNDER- STANDING THAT SUCH AN EXCHANGE WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE SCOPE PROVIDED FOR IN DECLARATIONS AGREED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL BE MADE NO LONGER THAN 30 DAYS AFTER THE CONVENTION .ENTERS INTO FORCE. - AT THE FIRST STAGE THE SIDES WILL EXCHANGE THE FOLLOWING DATA: - THE VOLUME OF THE EXISTING CW STOCKS, THE PROPORTION OF EVERY TYPE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS IN MUNITIONS OR IN BULK; - THE NUMBER OF CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND CW STORAGE FACILITIES AND THEIR LOCATION; - LOCATION OF CW DESTRUCTION FACILITIES. - AT THE SECOND STAGE THE SIDES WILL EXCHANGE THE FOLLOWING DATA: - CHEMICAL NAMES OF ALL CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS IN THE POSSESSION OF THE ARMED FORCES; - DETAILED COMPOSITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AT EVERY STORAGE FACILITY; - PRODUCTION CAPACITIES ON EVERY TYPE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS; - CHARACTERISTICS OF CW DESTRUCTION FACILITIES; - LABORATORIES, PROVING GROUNDS AND OTHER FACILITIES WHICH HAVE SPECIALIZED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. ? 312 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 - 3. THE TWO SIDES AGREE THAT THE FIRST STAGE OF DATA EXCHANGE WILL BE IMPLEMENTED AFTER THE CONVENTION IS OPEN FOR SIGNATURE AND BOTH SIDES' OFFICIAL AGREEMENT TO SIGN THE CONVENTION, I.E., AFTER THE SIDES IMPLEMENT THE PROVISION OF PARA. 4 BELOW; THE SECOND STAGE WILL BE IMPLEMENTED AFTER THE TWO SIDES SIGN THE CONVENTION AND SUBMIT IT TO THE LEGISLATIVE BODIES OF THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES FOR RATIFICATION. - 4. AFTER THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE CONVENTION IS APPROVED BY THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT THE TWO SIDES SHALL ASSURE EACH OTHER OF THEIR INTENT TO SIGN IT AND TO PROMOTE THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONVENTION BY ALL STATES POSSESSING ADVANCED CHEMICAL POTENTIALS. (THE FORM OF SUCH AN ASSURANCE IS TO BE AGREED UPON). - 5. THE PRESENT MEMORANDUM IS CONFIDENTIAL. - 6. THE MEMORANDUM WILL ENTER INTO FORCE WHEN IT IS SIGNED BY THE AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES. 4. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 313 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SECRETGENEVA 08285 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, ROUND VI, ACTION REQUEST REFS: (A) GENEVA 2622 (B) 86 STATE 343781 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-032. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. IN ADDITION TO DEALING WITH FACILITIES FOR PRODUCING TOXIC CHEMICALS AND KEY PRECURSORS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PURPOSES, JOINT INFORMAL POINT PAPER (REF A) ON ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES ALSO DEALS WITH FACILITIES FOR PRODUCING NON-CHEMICAL PARTS FOR CHEMICAL MUNITIONS OR SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT. FACILITIES USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR EITHER PURPOSE WOULD BE DECLARED AND ELIMINATED. LANGUAGE FOR SECTION WAS PROPOSED BY U.S. DEL PER INSTRUCTIONS (REF B). 3. SOVIET DEL ACCEPTED THIS PROVISION IN JULY 30 PLENARY STATEMENT AND INFORMED THE U.S. SIDE THAT "THE USSR DOES NOT HAVE FACILITIES WHICH ARE USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE PRODUCTION OF NON- CHEMICAL PARTS OF CHEMICAL AMMUNITION." SOVIETS ASKED "WHAT THE SITUATION IS WITH RESPECT TO THIS MATTER IN THE UNITED STATES." 4. ACTION REQUEST -- -- DEL WOULD LIKE TO RESPOND TO SOVIET QUESTION BUT DOES NOT HAVE NECESSARY BACKGROUND INFORMATION. -- DEL REQUESTS INFORMATION ON WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS IN THE U.S. ANY GOVERNMENT OR COMMERCIAL FACILITY WHICH IS USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE PRODUCTION OF NON-CHEMICAL PARTS OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS OR SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT. DEL ALSO REQUESTS AUTHORIZATION TO MAKE CORRESPONDING GENERAL RESPONSE TO SOVIET QUESTION. -- DEL REQUESTS RESPONSE, IF POSSIBLE, BY OPENING OF BUSINESS (GENEVA TIME), WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 5. -- DEL INTERPRETS TERMS "FACILITY" AND "EXCLUSIVELY" TO EXCLUDE INDIVIDUAL MACHINES, WHATEVER THEIR FUNCTION, OR BUILDINGS USED FOR BOTH PRODUCTION OF NON-CHEMICAL PARTS OF PAST OR CURRENT CHEMICAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND FOR OTHER ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS PRODUCTION OF METAL PARTS OF SMOKE OR RIOT CONTROL AGENT (RCA) MUNITIONS. 5. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE SECRET UNNN 314 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SECRET GENEVA 08352 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, ROUND VI: PLENARY MEETING, JULY 30, 1987 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-033. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY -- -- IN A PREPARED STATEMENT (SEPTEL) DELIVERED AT JULY 30 PLENARY MEETING, USSR REP (BATSANOV) OUTLINED SOVIET VIEWS ON EARLY BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE. HE ALSO PROVIDED 'U.S. SIDE A DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON DATA EXCHANGE (SEPTEL) SETTING FORTH THE BASIS ON WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE THE EXCHANGE PROCEED. -- U.S. REP (MIKULAK) ACKNOWLEDGED SOVIET RESPONSE TO U.S. AUGUST 1984 PROPOSALS AND ASKED ABOUT ABSENCE OF PROVISIONS FOR CONFIRMATION OF DATA BY ROUTINE AND CHALLENGE ON-SITE INSPECTION. HE ALSO INDICATED U.S. SIDE WOULD SEEK FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS DURING WEEK OF AUGUST 3. - DELS AGREED TO RECONVENE AT EXPERTS LEVEL AUGUST 3 TO ADDRESS PRODUCTION FACILITIES PAPER. END SUMMARY. 3. FOURTH MEETING OF ROUND VI WAS HELD JULY 30 AT PLENARY LEVEL AT REQUEST OF SOVIET SIDE WHICH HAD INDICATED IT WOULD PRESENT PREPARED STATEMENT OUTLINING SOVIET VIEWS ON DATA EXCHANGE. IN ABSENCE OF AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN, IN MOSCOW ON CONSULTATIONS, ACTING HEAD OF SOVIET DELEGATION (BATSANOV) PRESENTED THE STATEMENT. U.S. SIDE WAS HEADED BY EXPERTS TEAM LEADER MIKULAK. 4. SOVIET STATEMENT -- -- BATSANOV BEGAN BY RECALLING THAT DURING THE 1976-80 U.S.-SOVIET TALKS ON A CW CONVENTION, THE U.S. HAD PROPOSED BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE AFTER BOTH STATES HAD SIGNED THE CONVENTION. THE SIDES HAD AGREED ON "EVERYTHING," EXCEPT WHETHER IRRITANTS WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE EXCHANGE OF DATA. -- HE REITERATED CONCERN THAT THE U.S. SIDE CHANGED ITS POSITION TO REQUIRE DATA EXCHANGE PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION, "TOTALLY UNRELATED TO ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE." HOWEVER, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD DECIDED TO DISCUSS THE U.S. PROPOSALS AND ENVISIONED AN EXCHANGE 315 ? 25X1 ovnnnm Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 IN TWO STAGES. -- IN THE FIRST STAGE, THE SIDES WOULD EXCHANGE DATAON THE VOLUME OF CW STOCKS, THE PERCENTAGE OF ALL CW AGENTS WEAPONIZED AND IN BULK, THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF CW PRODUCTION AND STORAGE FACILITIES, AND THE CW DESTRUCTION FACILITIES. THIS EXCHANGE WOULD OCCUR AFTER THE CONVENTION IS ACCEPTED BY THE CD, OPENED FOR SIGNATURE, AND THE SIDES AGREE TO SIGN IT AND TO ENCOURAGE ALL STATES WITH CW POTENTIAL TO RATIFY IT. . -- IN THE ^ SECOND STAGE, THE EXCHANGE WOULD INCLUDE MORE DETAILED DATA, GENERALLY AS SPECIFIED IN THE CW CONVENTION, INCLUDING THE CHEMICAL NAMES OF THE CW AGENTS POSSESSED BY EACH SIDE, THE COMPOSITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AT EACH STORAGE SITE, THE CAPACITY AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DESTRUCTION FACILITIES, AND CHARACTERISTICS OF TEST SITES AND OTHER SPECIALIZED CW DEVELOPMENT FACILITIES. THIS STAGE WOULD OCCUR AFTER THE SIDES SIGN THE CONVENTION AND SUBMIT IT TO THEIR RESPECTIVE LEGISLATIVE BODIES FOR RATIFICATION. -- THE USSR PROCEEDS FROM THE FACT THAT DATA EXCHANGE MUST NOT BE ANAIM IN ITSELF, BUT A MEANS TO PROMOTE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE SIGNATURE AND ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE USSR AND THE U.S. THUS, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD PREPARED FOR U.S. CONSIDERATION A DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) ON THIS ISSUE (SEPTEL). IN ADDITION, THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES EXCHANGING CERTAIN DATA, "ALREADY THIS YEAR," PRIOR TO SIGNING OF THE MOU. THIS WOULD INCLUDE DATA ON THE TYPES OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS POSSESSED BY THE SIDES, ON THE PRESENCE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND CW FACILITIES IN FOREIGN TERRITORIES, AND ON PAST TRANSFERS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION AND CW PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT TO OTHER STATES. -- REGARDING THE JOINT CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES PAPER SUBMITTED TO CAPITALS AD REFERENDUM AT THE END OF ROUND V, BATSANOV SAID THAT ELIMINATION MEASURES SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO FACILITIES WITH AN ANNUAL PRODUCTION CAPACITY OF ONE TON OR LESS. HOWEVER, SUCH FACILITIES SHOULD BE DECLARED. HE ADDED THAT ALL EQUIPMENT AT CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES SHOULD BE DESTROYED. REGARDING PRODUCTION ON NONCHEMICAL PARTS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS MUNITIONS AND OF SPECIALIZED CW EQUIPMENT, USSR DOES NOT HAVE FACILITIES USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THIS PURPOSE 316 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 AND SOVIET SIDE WANTS TO KNOW WHA THE SITUATION IS IN THE U.S. IN THE SOVIET VIEW, SHOULD SUCH FACILITIES BE REQUIRED FOR BINARIES, THEY SHOULD BE ELIMINATE IN THE SAME WAY AS PRODUCTION FACILITIES. BATSANOV ALSO STATED THAT EQUIPMENT USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR PRODUCTION OF NON-CHEMICAL PARTS OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AT OTHER MUNITIONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES SHOULD BE TRANSPORTED TO A SPECIAL LOCATION, AND DESTROYED UNDER INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION. SECRET -- THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO ACCEPTS JOINT PAPER ON PARTICIPATION OF U.S. AND SOVIET OBSERVERS IN INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS OF EACH OTHERS' TERRITORY IN ITS PRESENT FORM. -- THE SOVIET SIDE HOPES U.S. SIDE WILL DISCUSS ISSUES OF INTEREST TO THE SOVIET SIDE. IN HIS JULY 23 CD PLENARY STATEMENT, AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF HAD ADDRESSED QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE SOVIET SIDE AT THE JULY 21 BILATERAL PLENARY MEETING. HOWEVER, SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES NOT ALL QUESTIONS HAD BEEN ANSWERED TO ITS SATISFACTION. THE USSR WANTS TO KNOW WHETHER ARTICLE XI OF CD/500 IS TO BE REMOVED. THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO WONDERS WHETHER THE U.S. TAKES RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTIVITIES ON U.S. TERRITORY OF COMPANIES OF OTHER STATES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIET SIDE SHARES THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON THE NEED FOR AS MANY STATES AS POSSIBLE TO JOIN THE CONVENTION, AND ALSO APPRECIATES THE AMBASSADOR'S REAFFIRMATION OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE GOAL OF THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CONCLUSION OF AN EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIABLE CW BAN 5. DISCUSSION -- -- U.S. REP REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET STATEMENT ADDRESSING THE DATA EXCHANGE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE U.S. IN 1984 HAD OPENED THE WAY FOR A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE. FOLLOWING A BRIEF RECESS TO PERMIT U.S. DEL TO STUDY THE SOVIET DRAFT MOU AND DISCUSS TACTICS, U.S. REP INDICATED THAT THE U.S. SIDE WILL SUBMIT A LIST OF DETAILED QUESTIONS ON THE SOVIET PROPOSALS BEFORE THE END OF THE CURRENT ROUND. U.S. REP ALSO POINTED OUT THAT, WHEREAS THE U.S. DATA EXCHANGE PROPOSAL CONTAINS A PROVISION FOR CONFIRMATION OF PHASEII DATA BY ROUTINE AND CHALLENGE OSI AS WELL AS NTM, SUCH A PROVISION IS MISSING FROM THE SOVIET DRAFT MOU. BATSANOV REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD CONCLUDED THAT CONFIRMATION BY OSI AS PROPOSED 317 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET BY THE U.S. WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE, AND U.S. REP SAID THAT THE U.S. SIDE CONSIDERED SUCH A PROVISION IMPORTANT AND FOUND SOVIET RESPONSE DISAPPOINTING. -- THE SIDES AGREED TO MEET AUGUST 3 TO DISCUSS THE JOINT CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES PAPER AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ISSUE. THE U.S. SIDE WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS CHALLENGE INSPECTION. FOR ITS PART, AT THIS MEETING, THE U.S. SIDE WOULD LIKE ANSWERS TO ITS REQUEST FOR SOVIET SUGGESTIONS FOR HANDLING THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ISSUE. LATER IN THE ROUND, U.S. SIDE WILL BE READY TO DISCUSS OTHER ISSUES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE SOVIET SIDE. 6. COMMENT -- -- SCOPE OF SOVIET DATA EXCHANGE PROPOSALS APPEARS AT FIRST GLANCE TO BE VERY SIMILAR TO SCOPE OF U.S. 1984 PROPOSALS. WE PLAN TO PROBE THOROUGHLY TO SEE IF IMPORTANT HIDDEN DIFFERENCES EXIST. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS SERIOUSLY INADEQUATE ON TIMING AND HAS NO PROVISIONS FOR CONFIRMATION OF DATA. -- FURTHER COMMENTS/ANALYSIS WILL BE PROVIDED IN WRAP-UP CABLE AT END OF ROUND. 7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 318 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SECRET GENEVA 08386 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, ROUND VI: ENGLISH VERSION OF USSR STATEMENT OF JULY 30, 1987 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-034. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. FOLLOWING IS THE ENGLISH VERSION OF THE USSR STATEMENT AT THE PLENARY MEETING ON JULY 30 READ BY S. B. BATSANOV. BEGIN TEXT -- MR. AMBASSADOR, AT TODAY'S MEETING, WHICH WAS SET UP AT THE SOVIET SIDE'S REQUEST, WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS VIEWS WHICH, AS WE SEE IT, WOULD BE HELPFUL IN EXPEDITING BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS OF THE TWO STATES. BEFORE DOING SO, HOWEVER, LET ME THANK YOU, MR. AMBASSADOR, AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FOR YOUR HOSPITALITY AND YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE TIME LIMITATIONS WITHIN WHICH THE SOVIET DELEGATION FOUND ITSELF. MR. AMBASSADOR, AT THE PRECEDING PLENARY MEETING, AMBASSADOR Y. K. NAZARKIN NOTED THE SOVIET DELEGATION'S PREPAREDNESS TO DISCUSS, IN A BUSINESS-LIKE SPIRIT, THE ISSUE OF BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE BEFORE THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION. TAKING STEPS IN THE DIRECTION OF THE WISHES EXPRESSED PREVIOUSLY BY THE U.S. DELEGATION, TODAY WE INTEND TO EXPOUND OUR VIEWS ?IN DETAIL ON THIS PROBLEM, COMPLEX AND DELICATE IN MANY WAYS. IT REALLY HAS A LONG HISTORY. THE U.S. SIDE RAISED THIS PROBLEM IN THE BILATERAL TALKS CONDUCTED DURING 1976 - 1980. AT THAT TIME, WE ACCEPTED THE U.S. PROPOSAL PRACTICALLY IN ITS ENTIRETY, AND, AS A RESULT, AN UNDERSTANDING WAS RECORDED WITH RESPECT TO THE DATES OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND THE VOLUME OF DATA PRESENTED. THE SIDES WERE SUPPOSED TO EXCHANGE THESE DATA 15 DAYS AFTER THE DEADLINE, AGREED UPON VIA DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, FOR PRESENTING THE CONVENTION FOR RATIFICATION BY LEGISLATIVE BODIES OF THE USSR AND THE U.S. THE ONLY QUESTION WHICH WE DID NOT MANAGE TO AGREE ON AT THAT TIME WAS WHETHER IRRITANTS SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE INFORMATION PRESENTED. WE WERE FOR INCLUDING STOCKS OF THIS CATEGORY; THE U.S. WAS AGAINST IT. HOWEVER, BY MUTUAL RECOGNITION, THIS ISSUE WENT BEYOND THE FRAMEWORK OF BILATERAL EXCHANGE PROPER AND WAS TO BE RESOLVED DEPENDING ON AN UNDERSTANDING ON IRRITANTS AS A WHOLE. THIS IS WHY WE WERE NATURALLY PUZZLED AND CONCERNED WHEN THE U.S. SIDE REVISED ITS AGREEMENT WITH THE UNDERSTANDING I MENTIONED. IN PARTICULAR, THIS CONCERNS THE FACT; THAT THE U.S. SIDE SPOKE OUT FOR INFORMATION EXCHANGE ALREADY PRIOR TO THE 25X1 319 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SIGNING OF THE CONVENTION AND TOTALLY UNRELATED TO ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE. WE EXPRESSED THIS CONCERN OF OURS TO THE U.S. SIDE SEVERAL TIMES. AT THIS TIME, I ONLY WISH TO SAY THAT THIS CONCERN REMAINS. NEVERTHELESS, AFTER A CAREFUL STUDY OF THIS QUESTION, WE CONSIDERED IT POSSIBLE TO MEET THE U.S. SIDE HALF WAY IN THIS MATTER, AS WELL AS TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF EXCHANGING DATA INCLUDING PRIOR TO SIGNING OF THE CONVENTION. WE VISUALIZE SUCH AN EXCHANGE IN TWO STAGES. AT THE FIRST STAGE, THE SIDES WOULD EXCHANGE DATA ON THE VOLUME OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS' STOCKPILES, THE PERCENTAGE OF EACH TYPE OF WARFARE AGENTS IN MUNITIONS OR IN BULK, ON THE NUMBER OF CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND STOCKPILE DEPOTS WITH AN INDICATION OF THEIR LOCATIONS AND, FINALLY, ON THE LOCATION OF CW DESTRUCTION FACILITIES. AT THE SECOND STAGE, DATA EXCHANGE WOULD INCLUDE THE CHEMICAL NAMES OF ALL CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS IN POSSESSION OF THE ARMED FORCES, A SIMILAR COMPOSITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AT EACH DEPOT, PRODUCTION CAPACITY FOR EACH TYPE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, CHARACTERISTICS OF CW DESTRUCTION FACILITIES, AS WELL AS LABORATORIES, TESTING GROUNDS AND OTHER ESTABLISHMENTS SPECIALIZING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. AS A WHOLE, SUCH A DATA EXCHANGE WOULD BE CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE VOLUME PROVIDED FOR BY DECLARATIONS AGREED UPON AT THE NEGOTIATIONS AND MADE BY STATES PARTY TO THE CONVENTION NOT LATER THAN 30 DAYS AFTER ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE. WE PROPOSE TO CARRY OUT THE FIRST STAGE OF DATA EXCHANGE AFTER THE CONVENTION IS OPEN FOR SIGNATURE AND FOLLOWING OFFICIAL AGREEMENT OF THE SIDES TO SIGN THE CONVENTION. WE VISUALIZE IT IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER. AFTER APPROVAL OF THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE CONVENTION AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, THE USSR AND THE U.S. WOULD ASSURE EACH OTHER OF THEIR INTENTIONS TO SIGN THIS CONVENTION AS WELL AS PROMOTE THE SIGNING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONVENTION BY ALL STATES POSSESSING A DEVELOPED CHEMICAL POTENTIAL. THE FORM OF SUCH AN ASSURANCE COULD BE AGREED UPON. IN ANY CASE, ALL THIS SHOULD TAKE PLACE PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF THE CONVENTION. THE SECOND STAGE OF DATA EXCHANGE WOULD BE CARRIED OUT AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE CONVENTION BY THE SIDES AND AFTER ITS PRESENTATION FOR RATIFICATION TO THE LEGISLATIVE BODIES OF THE USSR AND THE U.S. AS YOU SEE, IN THIS MANNER WE PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT DATA EXCHANGE MUST NOT BE AN AIM IN ITSELF, BUT RATHER ITS FUNCTION MUST BE TO PROMOTE THE SOONEST POSSIBLE SIGNING OF THE CONVENTION AND ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR THE USSR AND THE U.S. WE ASCRIBE GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS CONSIDERATION. .320 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET IN ORDER TO BASE WORK ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN UNDER- STANDING ON DATA EXCHANGE ON A PRACTICAL FOUNDATION WE PROPOSE TO AGREE ON THE TEXT OF A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH RESPECT TO SUCH AN EXCHANGE. THE SOVIET SIDE PREPARED A DRAFT OF THE BASIC PROVISIONS OF SUCH A MEMORANDUM WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO HAND OVER TO THE AMERICAN DELEGATION AT THIS TIME. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE WISHES OF OUR AMERICAN COLLEAGUES WE PREPARED AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THIS TEXT INTO ENGLISH IN ORDER TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE U.S. SIDE TO STUDY OUR PROPOSALS. THE SOVIET DELEGATION EXPECTS TO HEAR THE U.S. SIDE'S VIEWS ON THE DRAFT TEXT OF THE BASIC PROVISIONS OF THE MEMORANDUM HANDED OVER TO IT, SO THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO START WORKING ON AN AGREEMENT CONCERNING THIS DOCUMENT. IN ADDITION TO THAT, WE PROPOSE EXCHANGING CERTAIN INFORMATION ALREADY THIS YEAR, PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF THE MEMORANDUM. THIS INFORMATION WOULD INCLUDE DATA ON THE TYPES OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND MUNITIONSPOSSESSED BY THE USSR AND THE U.S., ON THE PRESENCE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND CW FACILITIES IN FOREIGN TERRITORIES, ON PAST TRANSFERS OF CHEMICAL I WEAPONS TO OTHER STATES, ON TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION AND CW PRODUCTION. THOSE ARE OUR PROPOSALS ON THE ISSUE OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE. MR. AMBASSADOR, AS WE UNDERSTOOD IT, THE U.S. DELEGATION INTENDS TO CONTINUE THE STUDY OF THE BILATERAL DOCUMEN ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES AT THIS ROUND. WE, TOO, HAVE OUR CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THIS DOCUMENT WHICH, AS WE SEE IT, COULD BE FINALIZED EVEN IN THE COURSE OF THIS ROUND. IN ORDER TO DEVELOP THE UNDERSTANDINGS ACHIEVED AT THE PRECEDING ROUND WE WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE THAT CW FACILITY LIQUIDATION MEASURES NOT ENCOMPASS FACILITIES WHICH, STARTING ON JANUARY 1, 1946 AND UP TO ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION, YIELDED NOT MORE THAN ONE TON PER YEAR OF SYNTHESIZED CATEGORY I CHEMICALS AND OTHER APPROPRIATE CHEMICALS. SUCH FACILITIES (LABORATORIES, SCIENTIFIC AND RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENTS, AND OTHERS) SHOULD STOP ANY ACTIVITY PROHIBITED BY THE CONVENTION IMMEDIATELY UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION AND SHOULD BE DECLARED NOT LATER THAN 30 DAYS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION. HAVING SCRUTINIZED THE ISSUE ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION OF THE EQUIPMENT AT THE FACILITIES, WE CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE TO DESTROY THE ENTIRE EQUIPMENT AT CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES (CHEMICALS AND PRODUCTION LINES). 321 25X1 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 FINALLY, IN THE DOCUMENT ON FACILITIES, THE ISSUE ON THE PRODUCTION OF NON-CHEMICAL PARTS FOR CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AS WELL AS SPECIAL EQUIPMENT FOR THE APPLICATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS REMAINED UNRESOLVED. NATURALLY, DURING THE BREAK IN MOSCOW, THIS QUESTION WAS ALSO STUDIED. THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS GIVEN THE AUTHORITY TO INFORM THE U.S. SIDE OF THE FACT THAT THE USSR DOES NOT HAVE FACILITIES WHICH ARE USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE PRODUCTION OF NON-CHEMICAL PARTS OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT THE SITUATION IS WITH RESPECT TO THIS MATTER IN THE UNITED STATES. IN ANY CASE, WE THINK THAT, IF BINARY WEAPONS' PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY POSSESSES SUCH SPECIFICITY, WHICH REQUIRES MANDATORY CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT SPECIALLY DESIGNED FOR THE PRODUCTION OF NON-CHEMICAL HARDWARE AND COMPONENT PARTS OF BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS, IT IS NATURAL THAT SUCH FACILITIES SHOULD BE LIQUIDATED. WITH REFERENCE TO THE ABOVE, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO PROPOSE TO INCLUDE INTO THE CONVENTION A PROVISION THAT FOR FACILITIESWHICH ARE USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE PRODUCTION OF NON-CHEMICAL PARTS OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ONE WOULD USE LIQUIDATION MEASURES WHICH ARE INTENDED FOR CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DESTRUCTION. AS FAR AS OTHER MUNITION PRODUCTION FACILITIES ARE CONCERNED, THEIR ENTIRE EQUIPMENT INTENDED FOR THE PRODUCTION OF NON-CHEMICAL PARTS OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS SHOULD BE TRANSPORTED TO SPECIAL LOCATIONS AND DESTROYED UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. IN SAYING THIS WE UNDERSTAND SPECIALLY DESIGNATED EQUIPMENT TO BE THE KIND OF EQUIPMENT WHICH WAS USED AND IS USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE ERODUCTION OF NON-CHEMICAL PARTS OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. WE PROPOSE TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES IN DETAIL ON THE LEVEL OF EXPERTS. IN ORDER TO FINISH OUTLINING THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS, CONDUCTED IN MOSCOW, OF THE PRECEDING ROUND OF BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ALL I HAVE LEFT TO DO IS TO INFORM YOU THAT THE SOVIET SIDE AGREES WITH THE DOCUMENT DEVELOPED AT THIS ROUND ON MUTUAL PARTICIPATION OF USSR AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES IN INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS ON THE TERRITORIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. MR. AMBASSADOR, WE WOULD LIKE TO HOPE THAT THE CONSIDERATIONS PRESENTED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION TODAY WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO ACTIVATE THIS ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE AMERICAN SIDE IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS NOT ONLY THE QUESTION OF BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE, TO 322 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 . - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 \ WHICH IT ASCRIBES SUCH A GREAT IMPORTANCE, BUT ALSO THE PROBLEMS OF INTEREST TO THE SOVIET SIDE. YOU ARE AWARE OF THESE PROBLEMS. WE EXPECTED THAT, AS YOU HAD STATED AT THE PRECEDING PLENARY MEETING OF BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS, YOUR PRESENTATION AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ON JULY 23 WOULD CONTAIN REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONS POSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION. WE NOTE THAT IN YOUR STATEMENT OF JULY 23 YOU DID TOUCH UPON THE APPROPRIATE TOPICS. I CANNOT SAY, HOWEVER, THAT THE CLARIFICATIONS WE HEARD INTRODUCED ADDITIONAL CLARITY INTO THE U.S. POSITION. THIS PERTAINS IN PARTICULAR TO CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS. IN YOUR STATEMENT OF JULY 23 YOU WERE OBVIOUSLY SPEAKING ABOUT ARTICLE X OF THE DOCUMENT CD/500, ABOUT THE INTERPRETATION WHICH IS GIVEN TO IT BY THE U.S. SIDE AT THIS TIME. WE TAKE THIS CLARIFICATION INTO CONSIDERATION. HOWEVER, OUR QUESTION PERTAINED TO ARTICLE XI OF THE U.S. DRAFT, AND THE SUBSTANCE OF IT BOILED DOWN TO THE QUESTION: IS THIS ARTICLE TO BE REMOVED OR NOT? ACCORDING TO ARTICLE XI OF THE U.S. DRAFT OF THE CONVENTION, AS FAR AS WE COULD TRACE IT, NO CORRECTIONS WERE INTRODUCED. THEREFORE THE SOVIET DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT, FOR THE TIME BEING, NO REPLY TO ITS QUESTION WAS RECEIVED, AND IT COULD HARDLY BE ASSUMED THAT IT WAS A MATTER OF WHETHER ANOTHER EDITION WAS OR WAS NOT PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE. IN YOUR STATEMENT, MR. AMBASSADOR, WE HEARD A REPLY TO THE QUESTION OF MULTI-NATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BUT, I REGRET TO SAY, IT WAS ONLY A PARTIAL REPLY. IT PERTAINED TO CORPORATIONS FORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. LAW. BUT, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES PROPER THERE ARE COMPANIES OF OTHER STATES, AND, FOR THE TIME BEING, IT IS NOT CLEAR TO US WHETHER THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE FIRMS OR DOES NOT SHARE SUCH AN APPROACH. AS FOR YOUR STATEMENT, MR. AMBASSADOR, THAT A MAXIMALLY LARGE NUMBER OF STATES SHOULD JOIN THE CONVENTION, AND THAT THIS WOULD PROMOTE RESOLVING THESE PROBLEMS, WE, OF COURSE, CONSIDER IT A POINT OF VIEW WITH WHICH WE AGREE. IN CONCLUSION I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THAT IN YOUR PRESENTATION OF JULY 23 YOU CONFIRMED THE ADHERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE PURPOSE OF DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIABLE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION, MR. AMBASSADOR. END OF TEXT. 3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE SECRET 323 25X1 corn:top Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SECRETGENEVA 08555 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, ROUND VI: EXPERTS MEETING, AUG 3, 1987 REF: STATE 221597 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-035. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. AT THE FIFTH MEETING OF ROUND VI HELD ON AUGUST 3, CW EXPERTS UNSUCCESSFULLY ATTEMPTED TO RESOLVE REMAINING DIFFERENCES IN THE JOINT CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES PAPER DRAFTED IN EARLIER BILAT ROUNDS (REFTEL). US DEL PRO- POSED CHANGES AS INSTRUCTED REF B, PARA 5. SOVIETS METHODICALLY ASKED FOR EXPLANATIONS FOR ALL BUT PURELY EDITORIAL CHANGES. THE MEETING WAS CUT SHORT AFTER THE SIDES WORKED THEIR WAY THROUGH THREE-FOURTHS OF THE PAPER IN ORDER THAT EXPERT TEAM LEADERS COULD ATTEND CD CW CONSULTATIONS ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION. 3. HIGHLIGHTS OF THIS EXERCISE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING (REFERENCES ARE TO GUIDANCE IN REFTEL AND TO MARCH 5 DRAFT OF CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES PAPER): . A. MINIMUM FREQUENCY OF INSPECTION AT CONVERTED FACILI- TIES (GUIDANCE PARA 5C, SIXTH TIC; TEXT PAGE 6, SECOND TIC) -- U.S. PROPOSED THAT A SPECIFIC NUMBER BE AGREED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. -- SOVIETS DID NOT ACCEPT U.S. POSITION AND COUNTER- PROPOSED THAT ONLY THE PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING THE MINIMUM FREQUENCY BE AGREED. B. USE OF INSTRUMENTS TO MONITOR FACILITIES CONVERTED TO A USE NOT INVOLVING CHEMICAL PRODUCTION OR PROCESSING (GUIDANCE PARA 5C, FIFTH TIC; TEXT PAGE 6, SUBTIC A). -- U.S. PROPOSED THAT USE OF INSTRUMENTS BE EXPLORED. -- SOVIETS WERE UNCONVINCED THAT USE OF INSTRUMENTS IS NECESSARY BUT AGREED IT COULD BE EXPLORED. C. ELIMINATION OF EXCESS CAPACITY AT KEY PRECURSOR PRODUCTION FACILITIES (GUIDANCE, PARA 5B, SECOND TIC; TEXT PAGE 7, FIRST TIC). -- U.S. POSITION IS THAT A FACILITY THAT PRODUCED A KEY PRECURSOR FOR BOTH CIVIL AND MILITARY PURPOSES SHOULD BE MONITORED UNDER ARTICLE VI AND THAT, EXCEPT FOR SUCH FACILITIES, NO SPECIFIC PROVISION IS NEEDED ON "EXCESS CAPACITY". -- SOVIETS DID NOT ACCEPT U.S. POSITION AND COUNTER- PROPOSED A FOOTNOTE TO EFFECT THAT ALL KEY PRECURSOR FACILITIES SHOULD BE TREATED EQUALLY. b. SOVIETS ALSO REPEATED WELL-KNOWN POSITION THAT "OTHER SUPERTOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS," WHICH U.S. BELIEVES SHOULD BE LISTED IN SCHEDULE OF THE ROLLING TEXT, BE REFERRED TO AS "SCHEDULE 4." US DEL DEMURRED, AND ISSUE WAS LEFT FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION. 3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH 324 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 ? SECRET SECRET GENEVA 08554 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, ROUND VI: EXPERTS MEETING, AUGUST 4, 1987 REF: GENEVA 8265 (CW BILAT-031) 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-036. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY -- -- BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE WAS ONLY SUBJECT DISCUSSED AT AUGUST 4 EXPERTS MEETING. U.S. SIDE PRESENTED QUESTIONS TO CLARIFY ELEMENTS OF SOVIET DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND STRESSED "SERIOUS INADEQUACY" OF SOVIET APPROACH TO TIMING OF EXCHANGE AND THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF PROVISIONS FOR THE CONFIRMATION OF DATA. SOVIET DEL IN TURN EMPHASIZED LINKAGE BETWEEN BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE AND BILATERAL COMMITMENT TO SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF CONVENTION. NEXT EXPERTS MEETING WAS SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 6, WITH FINAL PLENARY OF ROUND ON AUGUST 7. END SUMMARY. 3. AT THE SIXTH MEETING OF ROUND VI, HELD AUGUST 4, 1987, EXPERTS DISCUSSED SOVIET-PROPOSED MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) ON DATA EXCHANGE (REFTEL) PRESENTED TO THE U.S. DELEGATION AT THE CW BILATERAL PLENARY MEETING ON JULY 30, 1987. U.S. REP STATED THAT U.S. DEL HAD QUESTIONS TO PRESENT RELATED TO THE SCOPE OF THE PROPOSED EXCHANGE, THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS, AND THE TIMING OF THE EXCHANGE. AFTER RECEIVING ASSURANCE THAT THEY WOULD RECEIVE ALL QUESTIONS IN WRITTEN FORM (TEXT SEPTEL), SOVIET REP AGREED TO DISCUSS QUESTIONS INFORMALLY AND INDIVIDUALLY. 4. REGARDING THE SCOPE OF EXCHANGE, U.S. REP NOTED SOVIET MOU LISTED DATA TO BE EXCHANGED IN LANGUAGE THAT WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE FORMULATIONS USED IN THE DECLARATION PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION (CD/CW/WP.167). HE ASKED IF SOVIET MOU TEXT WOULD EVENTUALLY DUPLICATE FORMULATIONS CONTAINED IN CONVENTION. SOVIETS RESPONDED THAT MOU WAS NOT IN FINAL FORM. SOVIET REP THEN ASKED FOR U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE LINK BETWEEN THE MOU AND THE DECLARATION PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION. U.S. REP ANSWERED THAT U.S. POSTURE WAS ALREADY REFLECTED IN ITS 1984 PROPOSAL, WHICH ESTABLISHED A DIRECT CONNECTION BETWEEN THE SECOND PHASE OF THE EARLY BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE AND THE DECLARATIONS TO TAKE PLACE UNDER THE CONVENTION. THE TWO SIDES COULD MAKE USE OF THE "CAREFULLY NEGOTIATED" CONVENTION FORMULATIONS FOR THE BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF DETAILED DATA TO ENSURE THAT THE SAME DATA IS 325 crrprp Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET INVOLVED IN BOTH CASES. 5. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THE SCOPE OF AN EXCHANGE, THE SOVIETS RESPONDED TO A U.S. REQUEST TO OUTLINE WHAT THE SOVIETS SEE AS THE MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN THE SIDES' APPROACHES TO A PHASE ONE EXCHANGE BY NOTING U.S. PROPOSAL WAS LINKED TO U.S. DRAFT CONVENTION. THE SOVIET REP NOTED THAT THEIR MOU SET FORTH SPECIFIC PARAMETERS FOR DECLARATION, AND THAT ULTIMATELY THE SIDES WOULD HAVE TO BE GOVERNED BY THE RULES OF THE' CONVENTION. THE SOVIET REP SAID THAT THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES ARE NOT FAR APART ON THE SCOPE OF THE PHASE ONE DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE, AND ALSO CALLED ATTENTION TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A DATA EXCHANGE IN 1987 OUTSIDE OF THE SCOPE OF THE MOU. U.S. REP DESCRIBED THE LATTER PROPOSAL AS CONSTRUCTIVE AND SAID THAT U.S. SIDE WOULD RETURN TO THE ISSUE OF AN ADDITIONAL DATA EXCHANGE LATER. 6. U.S. REP THEN ASKED WHETHER SOVIET MOU PROVIDED IN FIRST PHASE FOR AN EXCHANGE ON THE TYPES OF CHEMICAL AGENTS POSSESSED BY EACH SIDE, WHICH U.S. HAD PROPOSED. SOVIET REP PROMISED TO PROVIDE ANSWER. U.S. REP ALSO ASKED WHETHER SOVIETS PLANNED TO PROVIDE DISTINCT TOTALS FOR NUMBER OF CW'PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND FOR NUMBER OF STORAGE FACILITIES. SOVIET REP RESPONDED THAT TWO FIGURES WOULD INDEED BE PROVIDED. 7. REGARDING THE CONFIRMATION OF DATA, U.S. REP STATED THAT MOU SAID NOTHING ABOUT MEANS BY WHICH DATA EXCHANGE WOULD BE VERIFIED, THAT SOVIETS AT JULY 30 PLENARY HAD TERMED SUCH CONFIRMATION "INAPPROPRIATE," AND THAT U.S. SIDE WAS NOW SEEKING FURTHER EXPLANATION. IN RESPONSE, SOVIET REP SAID THAT AN EARLY DATA EXCHANGE WAS ACCEPTED BY THE USSR AS A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE BUT NOT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONVENTION. THE DECLARATIONS WOULD BE VOLUNTARY BUT ASSOCIATED WITH "CERTAIN OFFICIAL UNDERSTANDINGS." VERIFICATION OF THIS DATA, HOWEVER, COULD ONLY BE CONDUCTED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONVENTION AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER IT ENTERS INTO FORCE. WHEN U.S. REP STATED THAT ONLY CERTAIN VERIFICATION ELEMENTS OF THE CONVENTION WOULD BE APPLIED DURING THIS CONFIRMATORY PROCESS, SOVIET REP RESPONDED THAT AN EXCHANGE OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONVENTION DOES NOT EQUATE TO FULFILLING THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY STATE PARTIES. 8. SOVIETS THEN ASKED WHICH U.S. CONCERNS WOULD BE REMOVED WITH A VERIFICATION PROCEDURE. U.S. REP RESPONDED THAT SIDES WILL BE EXCHANGING VERY 326 RFPRRT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET DETAILED INFORMATION; THERE MAY BE DIFFERENCES IN THESE DATA; AND THESE DIFFERENCES WILL HAVE TO WORKED OUT. HE NOTED THAT THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR CONFIRMATION WOULD HELP RELIEVE THESE PROBLEMS AND THEN ASKED SOVIETS HOW THE "INEVITABLE DIFFERENCES" IN DATA WOULD BE RESOLVED. IN RESPONSE, SOVIET REP ANSWERED THAT USSR HAD "ADOPTED" U.S. VIEW THAT THE PROCESS OF EXCHANGING DATA ITSELF YIELDED GREATER OPENNESS AND ENHANCED CONFIDENCE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE USSR ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THE LINK BETWEEN THIS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE AND ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION, STATED THAT ALL SUCH DATA WOULD BE CONFIRMED AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE, AND STRESSED IMPROBABILITY THAT A SIDE WOULD CONTEMPLATE EXCHANGING FALSE DATA KNOWING THAT "THE TRUTH" WOULD EVENTUALLY BE DETERMINED. 9. U.S. REP THEN STATED THAT CURRENT LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION, THAT SOVIET APPROACH (PROVIDING FOR DATA EXCHANGE AND NO CONFIRMATION WHEN ENTRY INTO FORCE WAS CLOSE) WAS NOT SATISFACTORY TO MEET POLITICAL AND SECURITY ' CONSIDERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH A DECISION TO ADOPT THE CW CONVENTION, AND THAT SOLUTION LAY IN U.S. PROPOSAL FOR DATA EXCHANGE BEFORE SIGNATURE. -- SOVIET REP RESPONDED THAT IN SOVIET VIEW STATES MADE DECISION TO RENOUNCE CHEMICAL DETERRENCE AT TIME OF UNDERTAKING NEGOTIATIONS ON CW CONVENTION, NOT AT SOME FUTURE TIME OF SIGNATURE OR RATIFICATION. HE ACCUSED U.S. OF ATTEMPTING TO USE THE PROCEDURE OF DATA EXCHANGE AND CONFIRMATION AS AN END IN ITSELF. THIS CONFIRMED, ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET REP, THE CORRECT- NESS OF INSISTING THAT ANY DATA EXCHANGE SHOULD BE CLOSELY LINKED. TO SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION. 10. REBUTTING SOVIET REMARKS THAT RENOUNCING BINARY PRODUCTION WOULD BUILD CONFIDENCE, U.S. REP REMINDED SOVIETS THAT CONTINUED SOVIET PRODUCTION OF CW OVER THE LAST 18 YEARS HAS SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED U.S. CONFIDENCE, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN SILENT ABOUT WHAT HAS BEEN HAPPENING IN SOVIET ARSENALS AND STOCKPILES DURING THAT TIME. THEN, MOVING TO ISSUE OF TIMING OF EXCHANGE, HE ASKED SOVIETS FOR RATIONALE FOR PROPOSING TIMES FOR PHASE I AND PHASE II EXCHANGES THAT ARE LATER THAN THOSE PROPOSED BY U.S. SOVIET REP RESPONDED BY REITERATING THAT DATA EXCHANGE WAS, IN USSR VIEW, LINKED CLOSELY TO SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, AND 25X1 327 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION, AND BY QUESTIONING WHETHER U.S. WOULD SIGN THE CONVENTION IF THE DATA EXCHANGE WAS SUCCESSFUL. U.S. REP RESPONDED THAT WHILE THERE COULD BE NO ABSOLUTE GUARANTEES, SOVIETS SHOULD REALIZE THAT CONFIDENCE IS BUILT BY STEPS, AND THAT EACH SUCCESSFUL STEP MAKES IT EASI,ER TO PROCEED TO THE NEXT. 11. DATA EXCHANGE DISCUSSION MEETING CONCLUDED WITH U.S. REP STATING THAT APPROACHES OF SIDES ON SCOPE WERE SIMILAR, IF NOT EXACTLY THE SAME BUT THAT SOVIET POSITIONS ON CONFIRMATION AND TIMING WERE "SERIOUSLY INADEQUATE." SOVIET REP REPEATED THAT STATES WOULD EXCHANGE CORRECT DATA BECAUSE INCORRECT DATA WOULD BE DISCOVERED AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE, AND REITERATED THAT AIM OF ENTIRE PROCESS OF DATA EXCHANGE SHOULD BE TO ENSURE THAT CONVENTION ENTERS INTO FORCE AND THAT SEPARATIONOF DATA EXCHANGE AND ENTRY INTO FORCE IS "UNSATISFACTORY" TO THE SOVIETS. 12. OR FOLLOWING DAY, U.S. DEL ACCEPTED SOVIET PROPOSAL TO HOLD NEXT EXPERTS MEETING ON AUGUST 6 AND PLENARY ON AUGUST 7. DEL, HOWEVER, TURNED DOWN SOVIET DEL HEAD'S PROPOSAL THAT ROUND BE EXTENDED FOR A WEEK TO MAKE UP FOR TIME LOST WHEN HE WAS CALLED BACK TO MOSCOW. DEL NOTED THAT ITS INSTRUCTIONS ENVISIONED ONLY A THREE-WEEK ROUND, BUT INDICATED THAT U.S. CD DEL MEMBERS WOULD BE PREPARED TO MEET INFORMALLY WITH SOVIET COUNTERPARTS TO PERMIT SOVIETS TO ELABORATE ON "SIGNIFICANT" NEW PROPOSALS WHICH SOVIET DEL OFF INDICATED FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE WOULD PRESENT TO CD ON AUGUST 6. DEL ALSO DECLINED TO SET DATE FOR NEXT ROUND AND ADVISED SOVIETS TO INCORPORATE ANY SUGGESTIONS IN THEIR FINAL PLENARY STATEMENT. 13. TEXT OF AUGUST 3 TASS PRESS RELEASE ON SOVIET ACTION TO IMPLEMENT THE DATA EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AGREED UP AT THE APRIL 1987 EXPERTS MEETING OF PARTIES TO THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC) OF WHICH SOVIET REP PROVIDED TO U.S. DEL AT BEGINNING OF THE MEETING, TRANSMITTED BY SEPTEL. 14. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 328 CMCRWT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 _SECRET___ SECRETGENEVA 08543 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, ROUND VI: U.S. QUESTIONS ON THE SOVIET MOU ON DATA EXCHANGE 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-037. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF QUESTIONS U.S. DEL FURNISHED SOVIET DEL AT CW BILAT MEETING ON AUGUST 4, 1987. BEGIN TEXT: U.S. DELEGATON QUESTIONS FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE SOVIET POSITION ON BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE 1. THE AUGUST 14, 1984 U.S. PROPOSAL PROVIDES FOR BOTH ROUTINE AND NON-ROUTINE INSPECTIONS TO HELP CONFIRM THE DATA EXCHANGED IN PHASE II. WE CONSIDER THIS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE. THE SOVIET RESPONSE CONTAINS NO PROVISIONS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION. IN RESPONSE TO A U.S. QUESTION, THE SOVIET SIDE SAID THAT SUCH A PROVISION WAS CONSIDERED "INAPPROPRIATE". A. WHY DOES THE SOVIET SIDE CONSIDER ON-SITE INSPECTION "INAPPROPRIATE?" B. HOW DOES THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVE THAT THE INEVITABLE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ACCURACY AND COMPLETENESS OF THE DATA COULD BE RESOLVED? 2. THE AUGUST 14, 1984 U.S. PROPOSAL PROVIDES FOR BOTH PHASES TO BE COMPLETED BEFORE SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS ESSENTIAL TO BUILD THE CONFIDENCE NECESSARY TO SIGN THE CONVENTION. THE SOVIET RESPONSE SPECIFIES THAT PHASE I IS TO BE CARRIED OUT AFTER THE TWO SIDES HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO SIGN THE CONVENTION AND PHASE II ONLY AFTER THEY HAVE SIGNED. A. WHAT IS THE SOVIET RATIONALE FOR PLACING PHASE I AFTER THE CONVENTION IS COMPLETED, RATHER THAN WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY, AS THE U.S. PROPOSAL ENVISIONS? B. WHAT IS THE SOVIET RATIONALE FOR PLACING PHASE II AFTER THE CONVENTION HAS BEEN SIGNED, RATHER THAN PRIOR TO SIGNATURE, AS THE U.S. PROPOSAL ENVISIONS? 3. OUR UNDERSTANDING OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE SOVIET DRAFT MEMORANDUM IS THAT THE SOVIET SIDE ENVISIONS PHASED BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF ALL THE INFORMATION SPECIFIED IN THE FOLLOWING PARTS OF CD/CW/WP.167: ARTICLE III AND THE ANNEX TO ARTICLE III; ARTICLE IV, PARAGRAPH 2, AND THE ANNEX TO ARTICLE IV, SECTION I AND SECTION IV.A; ARTICLE V, PARAGRAPH 4, AND THE ANNEX TO ARTICLE V, SECTION I AND SECTION IV.A. IS THIS UNDERSTANDING CORRECT? IF NOT, PLEASE SPECIFY WHICH INFORMATION WOULD NOT BE EXCHANGED. WHICH INFORMATION, IF ANY, WOULD BE PROVIDED IN A DIFFERENTFORM THAN SPECIFIED 329 25X1 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET IN CD/CW/WP.167? 4. THE SOVIET DRAFT MEMORANDUM STATES THAT "THE PRESENT MEMORANDUM IS CONFIDENTIAL." THE MEANING OF THIS PROVISION IS UNCLEAR TO US. IS THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSING THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THE MEMORANDUM BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL? ONLY THE TEXT? ONLY THE INFORMATION EXCHANGED? END TEXT. 3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH ? END OF MESSAGE SECRET NN 330 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 ? ? SECRET SECRET GENEVA 08544 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, ROUND VI: AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF'S STATEMENT AUG. 7, 1987 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-038. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF U.S. AMB. FRIEDERSDORF'S STATEMENT AS DELIVERED AT FINAL BILATERAL PLENARY SESSION AUG 7. BEGIN TEXT: MR. AMBASSADOR, -- ROUND VI OF THE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IS COMING TO A CLOSE. I WISH THAT I COULD SAY THAT IT WAS EVEN MORE PRODUCTIVE'THAN ROUND V. UNFORTUNATELY THAT WOULD NOT BE ACCURATE. -- THE U.S. DELEGATION VIEWS THE OUTCOME OF ROUND VI WITH MIXED FEELINGS. -- ON THE ONE HAND, THERE HAVE BEEN POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. FOR THE FIRST TIME THE TWO SIDES ENGAGED IN A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE PRO- POSALS FOR BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE MADE BY THE UNITED STATES IN AUGUST 1984. THIS DISCUSSION SHOWED THAT BOTH SIDES ENVISION A TWO-PHASE PROCESS IN WHICH GENERAL DATA r IS EXCHANGED FIRST AND THEN MORE DETAILED DATA IS PROVIDED. ALSO, IT APPEARS THAT THE TWO SIDES HAVE SIMILAR VIEWS ON THE SCOPE OF THE DATA TO BE EXCHANGED IN EACH PHASE. FURTHERMORE, THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS PROPOSED TMAT A PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF DATA TAKE PLACE ALREADY THIS YEAR. -- WE ALSO CONSIDER IN A POSITIVE LIGHT TWO OTHER DEVELOPMENTS -- THE CONFIRMATION BY BOTH SIDES THAT THE PAPER ON INSPECTION OBSERVERS, DEVELOPED JOINTLY IN ROUND V, IS ACCEPTABLE IN ITS PRESENT FORM, AND THE TREND THAT WE HAVE OBSERVED TOWARD A SIMPLER APPROACH TO ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES. -- ON THE OTHER HAND, ROUND VI UNFORTUNATELY HAS BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTING IN SOME MAJOR RESPECTS. IN THE U.S. VIEW THE SOVIET APPROACH TO BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE IS SERIOUSLY FLAWED IN TWO CRITICAL AREAS -- I REFER TO TIMING, AND PROCEDURES FOR CONFIRMATION. AS A RESULT, THE SOVIET APPROACH WOULD NOT BE ENTIRELY EFFECTIVE IN BUILDING THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE IN THE DATA. -- THE U.S. DELEGATION IS ALSO VERY DISAPPOINTED THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS NOT PREPARED TO PRESENT ITS VIEWS ON DATA EXCHANGE AND THE ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ROUND. HALF THE ROUND PASSED BEFORE THE SOVIET DELEGATION MADE ITS VIEWS KNOWN. THIS DELAY AFFECTS NOT ONLY THE PROCESS OF REACHING AGREEMENT BILATERALLY, BUT ALSO THE PROCESS OF MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. 331 25X1 crrprm Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET -- FOR THE SECOND TIME SINCE THESE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BEGAN -- FIRST IN APRIL 1986 AND NOW IN THE PRESENT ROUND, VALUABLE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PRODUCTIVE WORK HAVE BEEN LOST AS WE WAITED FOR SOVIET LEADERS TO MAKE STATE- MENTS THAT COULD AFFECT THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS. OUR TWO DELEGATIONS, OF COURSE, CANNOT CONTROL THE TIMING OF FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES, BUT IMPORTANT STATEMENTS ARE NOT ARRANGED ON THE SPUR OF THE MOMENT, AND IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PLAN THE TIMING OF CW DISCUSSIONS IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY WILL NOT BE IMPEDED BY SUCH EVENTS. I AM QUITE CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT THIS ROUND OF TALKS MIGHT HAVE BEEN MORE PRODUCTIVE IF IT HAD BEGUN AFTER MR. SHEVARDNADZE MADE HIS STATEMENT. MR. AMBASSADOR, -- THE ISSUE OF DATA EXCHANGE AND CONFIRMATION OF THE DATA PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION WILL CONTINUE TO BE A KEY ISSUE IN FUTURE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. IT IS A SUBJECT TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE AND THE U.S. DELEGATION WILL THEREFORE CONTINUE TO DIRECT ATTENTION TO IT. -- FAILURE TO WORK OUT AN EFFECTIVE SOLUTION -- ONE WHICH TRULY BUILDS CONFIDENCE -- CAN ONLY PROLONG THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. AS I NOTED AT THE OPENING PLENARY OF THIS ROUND ON JULY 21, BEFORE THE UNITED STATES WILL BE WILLING TO ENTER A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, WE MUST HAVE INCREASED CONFIDENCE, BASED ON GREATER OPENNESS ABOUT EXISTING CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITIES. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN THAT THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS SATISFACTORY BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF DATA, AND VERIFICATION OF THAT DATA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR 1984 PROPOSAL, TO BE ESSENTIAL BEFORE A CW CONVENTION CAN BE SIGNED. -- LACK OF INFORMATION ALSO HAS BEGUN TO IMPEDE NEGOTIATIONS ON CERTAIN IMPORTANT PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION. HOW CAN ONE HAVE MUCH CONFIDENCE, FOR EXAMPLE, IN SCHEDULE 1 OR SCHEDULE 2 OF THE CONVENTION WHEN THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT EVEN INDICATED WHAT CHEMICALS ARE IN ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE? ARE THESE TWO LISTS COMPREHENSIVE, OR ARE THEY SERIOUSLY DEFICIENT? WITHOUT MORE INFORMATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION THERE IS NO WAY FOR US OR OTHERS TO KNOW. -- OTHER AREAS OF THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ALSO SUFFER BECAUSE OF LACK OF SOVIET OPENNESS. HOW CAN DELEGATIONS DECIDE ON THE MOST APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO THE ORDER OF DESTRUCTION OF STOCKPILES IF ONLY THE UNITED STATES IS WILLING TO SAY WHAT TYPES OF AGENTS AND MUNITIONS IT HAS? THE SAME HOLDS TRUE FOR THE ORDER OF DESTRUCTION FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES. SEVERAL ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES COULD BE CITED TO ILLUSTRATE HOW SOVIET SECRECY COMPLICATES AND SLOWS THE MULTILATERAL 332 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 NEGOTIATIONS. -- SINCE EARLY EXCHANGE OF DATA WOULD PROMOTE CONFIDENCE AND FACILITATE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, THE U.S. DELE- GATION NOTED WITH INTEREST THE JULY 30 SOVIET PROPOSAL TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ALREADY THIS YEAR. THE U.S. DELEGATION CONSIDERS THIS A CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL AND IN PRINCIPLE CAN AGREE TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION BEFORE THE END OF 1987. HOWEVER, THE U.S. DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN DURING THE NEXT ROUND TO A MORE EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE THAN THAT PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE. -- A FINAL WORD ABOUT BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE. I HAVE DWELT ON THIS SUBJECT AT SOME LENGTH IN MY STATEMENT TODAY BECAUSE OF ITS IMPORTANCE AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS. MY AIM HAS NOT BEEN TO ASSIGN BLAME FOR THE LACK OF CONFIDENCE THAT EXISTS, BUT RATHER TO PERSUADE YOU THAT SOVIET LACK OF OPENNESS IS WORKING AGAINST SOVIET INTERESTS. THIS SECRECY IS A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE THAT GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV HAS EMPHASIZED AGAIN AND AGAIN -- THE COMPLETE AND EFFECTIVE ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. I SINCERELY URGE THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO CONSIDER THIS ISSUE FURTHER IN PREPARATION FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. MR. AMBASSADOR, -- I WOULD LIKE TO TURN NOW TO THE SUBJECT OF ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES. THIS TOPIC HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT ONE FOR THE LAST SEVERAL ROUNDS OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. -- THE EXPECTATION OF THE U.S. DELEGATION WAS THAT THE JOINT PAPER ON ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRO- DUCTION FACILITIES WOULD BE COMPLETED DURING THIS ROUND. WHILE DIFFERENCES HAVE BEEN REDUCED, SEVERAL SUBSTANTIVE POINTS REMAIN TO BE SOLVED, IN ADDITION TO A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC FORMULATIONS. THE SOVIET SIDE, HOWEVER, HAS MADE CLEAR THAT WITH RESPECT TO EQUIPMENT IT NOW FAVORS AN APPROACH CLOSER TO THE ORIGINAL U.S. PROPOSAL. THIS IS A CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT. WHILE THE UNITED STATES HAS ATTEMPTED TO ACCOMMODATE SOVIET INTEREST IN REUSE OF EQUIPMENT, WE TOO WOULD PREFER A SIMPLER SOLUTION. THE U.S. DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO JOIN THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN DEVELOPING A COMMON APPROACH ALONG THOSE LINES. -- BEFORE LEAVING THE ISSUE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRO- DUCTION FACILITIES, I WOULD LIKE TO RESPOND TO A QUESTION RAISED IN THE SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT OF JULY 30. THE SOVIET DELEGATION INFORMED THE U.S. SIDE THAT THE USSR DOES NOT HAVE FACILITIES THAT ARE USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE PRODUCTION OF NON-CHEMICAL PARTS OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. THE SOVIET SIDE THEN INQUIRED WHAT THE 333 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 SITUATION IS WITH RESPECT TO THIS MATTER IN THE UNITED STATES. THE U.S. DELEGATION HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO INFORM THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT HAVE FACILITIES THAT ARE USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE PRODUCTION OF NON-CHEMICAL PARTS OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. -- ON JULY 30, THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO ASKED FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF TWO OTHER ASPECTS OF THE U.S. POSITION. THE FIRST QUESTION WAS WHETHER ARTICLE XI OF CD/500 CONTINUED TO BE PART OF THE U.S. POSITION. THE ANSWER IS SELF-EVIDENT. ARTICLE XI REMAINS PART OF THE U.S POSITION. THE SECOND QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTIVITIES ON U.S. TERRITORY OF COMPANIES OF OTHER STATES. THE ANSWER IS ALREADY CLEAR IN ARTICLE XII OF CD/500. THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE ANY MEASURES NECESSARY IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS CONSTITUTIONALPROCESSES TO IMPLEMENT THIS CONVENTION AND, IN PARTICULAR, PROHIBIT AND PREVENT ANY ACTIVITY THAT A PARTY IS PROHIBITED FROM CONDUCTING BY THE CONVENTION ANYWHERE UNDER ITS JURISDICTION OR CONTROL. TO PUT IT ANOTHER WAY, ALL ACTIVITIES ON U.S. TERRITORY, REGARDLESS OF WHO IS CONDUCTING THEM, WOULD HAVE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION. MR. AMBASSADOR, -- ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION CONSIDERS THE RESULTS OF THIS ROUND WITH MIXED FEELINGS, WE HAVE NOTED IMPORTANT POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT. THE DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE SOVIET UNION, MR. SHEVARDNADZE, PRESENTED AN IMPOR- TANT STATEMENT OF. SOVIET VIEWS ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS YESTERDAY. THE STATEMENT CONTAINS A NUMBER OF CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS. THE U.S. DELEGATION WELCOMES THEM AND HOPES THAT THEY WILL HELP TO MOVE THE NEGOTI- ATIONS FORWARD. -- TO ASSIST US IN THE STUDY AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION, WE WOULD LIKE TO ASK FOR CLARIFICATION OF MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE'S STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION "WILL PROCEED FROM THE NEED TO MAKE LEGALLY BINDING THE PRINCIPLE OF MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS WITHOUT RIGHT OF REFUSAL." WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF THIS PRINCIPLE WOULD APPLY TO ANY LOCATION OR FACILITY THAT IN THE FUTURE MIGHT BE SUSPECTED OF BEING USED FOR ACTIVITIES IN VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION. IF NOT, TO WHAT LOCATIONS OR FACILITIES WOULD IT APPLY? ALTHOUGH CHALLENGE INSPECTION IS ONLY ONE OF THE KEY ISSUES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, A CORRECT UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET POSITION IN THIS AREA IS IMPORTANT TO U.S. DECISIONS ABOUT HOW BEST TO PROCEED. -- REDUCING THE GAP BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS IS 334 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 IMPORTANT. BUT THERE ARE ALSO MANY OTHER COUNTRIES WHOSE VIEWS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THERE IS STILL MUCH WORK AHEAD OF US BOTH IN THESE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AND IN THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CD. A NUMBER OF COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT PROBLEMS REMAIN. THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO WORK HARD WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION, AND WITH ALL OTHER CD DELEGATIONS, TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. END TEXT. 3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF? MESSAGE SECRET NN 335 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SECRET GENEVA 08545 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, ROUND VI: PLENARY MEETING, AUGUST 7, 1987 1. THIS IS CW BILAT- . (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY -- -- IN A PREPARED STATEMENT (SEPTEL) DELIVERED AT AUGUST. 7. PLENARY MEETING, US AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF SUMMARIZED THE OUTCOME OF THE SIXTH ROUND AS MIXED. WHILE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE 1987 US PROPOSAL ON BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE BEFORE THE CONVENTION ENTERED INTO FORCE WAS WELCOME, AND WAS NEAR THE US POSITION ON SCOPE, THE RESPONSE ON TIMING AND CONFIRMATION WAS DISAPPOINTING. HE ALSO EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT IN THE TIME WASTED DURING THIS ROUND BEFORE FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE'S AUGUST 6 CD STATEMENT. US REP EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF DATA EXCHANGE TO BOTH CONFIDENCE BUILDING AND THE SOLUTION OF CW CONVENTION ISSUES. - AMB FRIEDERSDORF TOOK NOTE OF PROGRESS ON JOINT PAPER ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES, AND RESPONDED TO A NUMBER OF EARLIER SOVIET REQUESTS FOR CLARIFICATION. HE ALSO REQUESTED A CLARIFI- CATION OF MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE'S 6 AUGUST CD PLENARY REMARKS ONTHE MANDATORY NATURE OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION WITHOUT RIGHT OF REFUSAL. -- USSR AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN ALSO EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE RESULTS OF THE ROUND. HE SAID THAT THE ROUND ENDED ON AN "UNFINISHED NOTE" ON BOTH bATA EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES. HE SAID LACK OF PROGRESS WAS DUE TO US PRE-CONDITION AT THE START OF THE ROUND AND RE- JECTED THE US VIEW THAT SOVIET LACK OF OPENNESS AND TIMING WAS RESPONSIBLE. ON THE NEW SOVIET POSITION ON THE MANDATORY NATURE OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL, ANY STATE PARTY COULD MAKE A CHALLENGE OF ANY LOCATION WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION BASED ON THE FORM OF PROPERTYOR THE LOCATION OF A CHALLENGE. FURTHERMORE, AN INSPECTION TEAM MUST BE ADMITTED WITHIN 48 HOURS OF THE CHALLENGE. THE SOVIET SIDE REMAINS INTERESTED IN ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. THEY WANT TO DISCUSS PROCEDURES FOR AVOIDING LOSS OF SENSI- TIVE INFORMATION, INSTRUMENTS, AND THE ISSUE OF COMPENS- ATION FOR LOSSES IN THE EVENT OF AN UNFOUNDED CHALLENGE. AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT VERI- FICATION ON MILITARY BASES ON THE SOIL OF NON-PARTY STATES. -- THE AMBASSADOR MENTIONED TENTATIVE DATES OF 8-9 OCTOBER FOR VISIT TO SOVIET CW FACILITY AT SHIKHANY AND THE US SIDE ACCEPTED. THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED THE LONG- STANDING US INVITATION TO VISIT THE CW DESTRUCTION 336 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 ",\ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET FACILITY AT TOOELE, UTAH ANDREQUESTED AN INVITATION TO A US FACILITY SUCH AS FORT DETRICK OR THE DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS. END SUMMARY. 3. EIGHTH AND FINAL MEETING OF ROUND VI WAS HELD AUGUST 7 AT PLENARY LEVEL, HEADED ON THE SOVIET SIDE BY AMBASS- ADOR NAZARKIN AND THE US SIDE BY AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF. 4. U.S. STATEMENT -- -- IN A PREPARED STATEMENT (SEPTEL), AMB FRIEDERSDORF ASSESSED RESULTS OF THIS BILAT ROUND AS MIXED. -- AS POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS, HE NOTED THAT THE DELS HAD THEIR FIRST DETAILED DISCUSSION OF US 1984 PROPOSALS FOR BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE AND ITS VERIFICATION, THAT BOTH SIDES CONTEMPLATE A TWO-STAGE PROCESS, AND THAT BOTH HAVE SIMILAR VIEWS ON SCOPE OF DATA TO BE EXCHANGED. ALSO, SOVIET SIDE HAD PROPOSED A PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF DATA IN 1987. OTHER FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS WERE THE ACCEPTANCE BY BOTH SIDES OF THE JOINT PAPER ON INSPECTION OBSERVERS, AND THE CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ON ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES. -- HOWEVER, THE US SIDE WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE SOVIET DATA EXCHANGE PROPOSAL WAS SERIOUSLY FLAWED IN THE CRITI- CAL AREAS OF TIMING AND VERIFICATION. THE US ALSO RE- GRETTED THAT FOR THE SECOND TIME (THE FIRST BEING ROUND II IN APRIL 1986) MUCH TIME WAS WASTED MARKING TIME WAITING FOR SPEECH BY SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIAL. -- RETURNING TO THE DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE, AMB FRIEDERS- DORF CRITICIZED SOVIET SECRECY AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO NEGOTI- ATIONS AND TO CONFIDENCE BUILDING, AND STRESSED THAT BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION OF THAT DATA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE US 1984 PROPOSAL IS ESSENTIAL BEFORE A CW CONVENTION CAN BE SIGNED BY THE US. -- ADDRESSING SOVIET QUESTIONS POSED EARLIER IN THE ROUND, AMB FRIEDERSDORF SAID THAT ARTICLE XI OF CD/500 REMAINS A PART OF THE US POSITION, AND THAT THE US HAS NO FACILITIES USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE PRODUCTION OF NONCHEMICAL PARTS OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. IN CONCLUSION, HE ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE NEW SOVIET APPROACH TO CHALLENGE INSPECTION ANNOUNCED BY FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE IN HIS CD PLENARY STATEMENT OF 6 AUGUST (SEPTEL). 5. SOVIET STATEMENT -- -- AMB NAZARKIN SAID THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO HAD MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT THE ROUND. -- IMPORTANT WORK WAS BEGUN ON BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION. THE APPROACHES OF THE SIDES WITH RESPECT TO PHASES AND SCOPE SEEM CLOSE. ON TIMING AND VERIFICATION OF THE DATA EXCHANGE, THE POSITIONS DIFFER. THE SOVIET SIDE WANTS U.S. TO MAKE SUGGESTIONS FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. THE SIDES ALSO MADE PROGRESS 7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET ON THE JOINT CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES PAPER. -- HOWEVER, THE SOVIET SIDE IS DISSATISFIED AND DISAPPOINTED WITH CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE ROUND. MORE SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS COULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED HAD THE ROUND BEEN EXTENDED BEYOND AUGUST 7 AS SOVIETS PROPOSED. THE SIDES WERE UNABLE TO SERIOUSLY ADDRESS A WHOLE SERIES OF IMPORTANT ISSUES DUE PRIMARILY TO THE FACT THAT THE U.S. SIDE ESTABLISHED A PRECONDITION -- I.E., DISCUSSION OF DATA EXCHANGE -- FOR STARTING WORK IN ROUND VI AND HAD STUCK TO THIS PRECONDITION EVEN AFTER IT WAS OFFICIALLY ASSURED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE. ALSO, THE SOVIET SIDE CATEGORICALLY REJECTS THE U.S. SUGGESTIONS THAT THESE CONSULTATIONS BE HELD SO THEY DO NOT COINCIDE WITH OTHER EVENTS. INSTEAD OF APPRECIATING THE SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON DATES, THE U.S. SIDE REPROACHED THE SOVIET SIDE. HOPEFULLY, THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS OF THE ROUND CAN BE FURTHER DEVELOPED IN INFORMAL CONTACTS DURING THE CD SESSION. AMB NAZARKIN THEN ELABORATED ON THE CW PROPOSALS IN FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE'S AUGUST 6 CD PLENARY STATEMENT. ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION, HE REITERATED THE SOVIET SIDE'S WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF THE UK PROPOSAL (CD/715). HOWEVER, AS THE U.S. HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE UK PROPOSAL, THE SOVIET SIDE NOW PROPOSED MANDATORY ON-SITE CHALLENGE INSPECTION OF ANY FACILITY OR LOCATION UNDER THE JURISDICTION OR CONTROL OF A STATE PARTY AS WELL AS OF ITS NATIONALS AND ITS CORPORATIONS IN ANY LOCATION WHATSOEVER. ANY STATE PARTY COULD MAKE A REQUEST WITHOUT ANY DISTINCTIONS BASED ON THE FORM OF OWNERSHIP OF THE SITE OR LOCATION. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIET UNION WAS CONCERNED ABOUT LOSS OF SENSITIVE NON-CW INFORMATION AND BELIEVED APPROPRIATE INSPECTION PROCEDURES SHOULD BE ELABORATED. INSPECTORS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO BEGIN THE INSPECTION WITHIN 48 HOURS OF INSPECTION REQUEST. THE SOVIET UNION IS ALSO OPEN TO DEVELOPMENT OF SOLUTIONS WHICH PREVENT ABUSE OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION. THE CHALLENGING STATE SHOULD INDICATE THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION IT CONSIDERS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED, WHEN AND WHERE THE VIOLATION TOOK PLACE, AND THE NATURE OF THE VIOLATION. THE QUESTION OF INSTRUMENTS TO ASSIST IN "MANAGED" INSPECTIONS ALSO NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES, WHICH WILL NOT DELAY THE INSPECTION AND WHICH WOULD BE AGREED WITHIN 48 HOURS, SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED. THE CHALLENGING STATE WOULD DECIDE WHETHER THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE IS ACCEPTABLE. THE SOVIET UNION ALSO 338 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET PROPOSES CONSIDERATION OF A SYSTEM WHEREBY THE VICTIM OF AN IMPROPER CHALLENGE REQUEST COULD CLAIM COMPENSATION FOR DOWN-TIME AT A FACTORY FOR FOR LOSS OF PROPRIETARY INFORMATION. THE USSR ALSO WISHES TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF VERIFICATION AT MILITARY FACILITIES OF STATES PARTIES OUTSIDE THEIR TERRITORY, INCLUDING ON THE TERRITORY OF NON-STATES PARTIES. -- THE SOVIET SIDE HOPES THE U.S. WILL ACCEPT THE INVITATION TO VISIT THE SOVIET CW SITE AT SHIKHANY. TENATIVE DATES ARE OCTOBER 8-9. AS RECIPROCATION, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD LIKE TO BE INVITED TO A SIMILAR U.S. FACILITY, SUCH AS FORT DETRICK OR THE DUGWAY PROVING GROUND. THE SOVIET SIDE ACCEPTS THE U.S. INVITATION TO VISIT TOOELE IN OCTOBER. DETAILS COULD BE DISCUSSED BEFORE THE CD ADJOURNS AT THE END OF AUGUST. 6. DISCUSSION -- -- AMB FRIEDERSDORF REBUTTED AMB NAZARKIN'S CRITICISM OF HIS REMARKS ON SOVIET SECRECY BY EMPHASIZING THAT US SIDE'S REMARKS ON THE NEED FOR OPENNESS REFERRED SPECIFI- CALLY TO THE CW NEGOTIATIONS. ON DATA EXCHANGE THERE ARE STILL VERY SIGNIFICANT AREAS OF DIFFERENCES. HOWEVER, WE WILL LISTEN TO THE SOVIET'S POINT OF VIEW AND WE ARE SURE THEY WILL LISTEN TO OURS. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF ISSUING ULTIMATUMS. - AMB FRIEDERSDORF EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR SOVIET CLARIFICATION OF SOVIET POSITION ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION. HE SAID US IS COOL TO THE "ALTERNATIVE MEASURES" ASPECT OF THE UK CHALLENGE INSPECTION APPROACH. IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THIS APPROACH WOULD NOT DELAY AN INSPECTION, BUT WE WOULD NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES BEING AGREED BETWEEN THE TWO STATES INVOLVED WITHIN 24 HOURS OF A CHALLENGE. - AMB FRIEDERSDORF ACCEPTED THE SOVIET INVITATION TO SHIKHANY ON BEHALF OF THE US. SOVIET REQUEST FOR RECIPRO- CAL VISITS TO FORT DETRICK OR DUGWAY PROVING GROUND WOULD BE REFERRED TO WASHINGTON. HE EXPRESSED PLEASURE THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ACCEPTED US INVITATION TO VISIT TOOELE, UTAH AND SAID THAT WE WOULD RECHECK THE VISIT DATES IN VIEW OF THE TIME THAT HAS ELAPSED SINCE THE INVITATION WAS EXTENDED. HE ALSO SAID THE US WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO EVENTUAL VISIT TO SOVIET CW DESTRUCTION FACILITY BEING BUILT AT CHAPAYEVSK. - AMB NAZARKIN SAID DEL HEADS COULD LATER DISCUSS AGENDA AND TIMING FOR THE NEXT ROUND. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD PREPARE A SEPARATE PRESS STATEMENT FOR RELEASE ON MONDAY. 7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH 339 eprnop Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET 25X1 SECRET GENEVA 08572 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, ROUND VI: EXPERTS MEETING, 6 AUG. 1987 REFS: (A) GENEVA 8467 (CD-155) (B) GENEVA 2622 (CW BILAT-16) (C) STATE 221597 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-040 (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY -- -- FINAL EXPERTS MEETING OF ROUND ON 6 AUGUST 1987 FOLLOWED A CD PLENARY STATEMENT BY SOVIET FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE. SOVIET SIDE STATED THAT IT WAS READY TO ENGAGE IN DETAILED MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH ANY CD DEL ON THE INITIATIVES IN THE STATEMENT. -- IN DISCUSSION ON DATA EXCHANGE, U.S. DEL STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF EARLY EXCHANGE AND CONFIRMATION AS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE NECESSARY TO FACILITATE DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION OF NUMEROUS COMPLEX ISSUES BEING NEGOTIATED IN THE MULTILATERAL BODY. SOVIET DEL FIRMLY ADHERED TO ITS POSITION THAT EXCHANGE AND CONFIRMATION OF DETAILED DATA REFLECTING FULL MILITARY CAPABILITIES SHOULD OCCUR AFTER SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION. -- SIDES COMPLETED ONCE-THROUGH REVIEW OF JOINT POINT PAPER ON CHEMICAL PRODUCTION FACILITIES. REMAINING SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES ARE SMALL. END SUMMARY. 3. THE SEVENTH AND LAST EXPERTS MEETING OF ROUND, HELD AUGUST 6, FOLLOWED A CD PLENARY STATEMENT BY SOVIET FONMIN SHEVARDNADZE (REF A). SOVIET DEL EMPHASIZED THAT IT IS READY TO ENGAGE BOTH MULTILATERALLY AND BILATERALLY IN DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH INTERESTED DELEGATIONS ON THE INITIATIVES ANNOUNCED BY SHEVARDNADZE. SOVIET DEL FURTHER STATED THAT IT IS TENTATIVELY CONSIDERING THAT THE VISIT OF CD REPS TO THE SHIKHANY CW SITE ANNOUNCED BY SHEVARDNADZE WOULD OCCUR IN EARLY OCTOBER BEFORE THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE UNGA CONVENES ITS FALL 1987 SESSION. 4. BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE -- -- U.S. REP REITERATED IMPORTANCE U.S. PLACES ON EARLY EXCHANGE AND CONFIRMATION FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE BILATERALLY AND FACILITATING MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CW CONVENTION. ON LATTER POINT, HE EXPLAINED THAT COMPLETION OF LISTS OF CHEMICALS COVERED BY THE CONVENTION AND DETERMINING AN 340 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 z SECRET EQUITABLE ORDER OF DESTRUCTION THAT ASSURES UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES WOULD BE HELPED BY DETAILED DATA THIS YEAR ON TYPES OF CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS. HE FURTHER SAID THAT ACCURATE COST ESTIMATES FOR VERIFICATION SYSTEM AND COST WOULD BE FACILITATED BY EARLY DETAILED DATA ON THE NUMBER OF PRODUCTION, STORAGE, INDUSTRIAL AND DESTRUCTION SITES THAT WILL BE COVERED BY THE CONVENTION. U.S. REP EMPHASIZED THAT MORE DETAIL WAS REQUIRED THAN COULD BE OBTAINED BY SIMPLE "YES OR NO" ANSWERS ABOUT BROAD CATEGORIES OF AGENT AND MUNITION TYPES AND ABOUT THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF FACILITIES. QUANTITATIVE DATA MUST BE AVAILABLE FOR BOTH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. -- SOVIET REP FIRMLY STUCK BY POSITION THAT EXCHANGE AND CONFIRMATION OF DETAILED DATA DISPLAYING FULL MILITARY CAPABILITY WILL ONLY OCCUR AFTER THE CONVENTION ENTERS INTO FORCE. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT VISIT OF CD REPS TO SHIKHANY CW FACILITY WOULD INCLUDE "REALISTIC SHOWING" OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. ALSO, SOVIET SIDE HAD NO RIGID IDEAS ON LEVEL OF DETAIL TO BE PROVIDED IN DATA TO BE EXCHANGED IN 1987 ON "TYPES" OF CHEMICAL AGENTS. THIS WAS TO BE NEGOTIATED. -- FOLLOWING FURTHER DISCUSSION ON U.S. AND SOVIET POSITION ON DATA EXCHANGE, SOVIET DEL SUMMARIZED BY SAYING THAT U.S. LINKS DATA EXCHANGE TO CONFIDENCE- BUILDING MEASURES IN A MUCH BROADER SENSE THAN THE SOVIET UNION. 5. JOINT POINT PAPER ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION - FACILITIES (REF B) -- -- THIS TOPIC WAS SOVIET CHOICE FOR MEETING AGENDA. A ONCE-THROUGH REVIEW WAS COMPLETED PER GUIDANCE (REF C) LEAVINGPRIMARILY TWO REMAINING SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES: (A) WHETHER ALL EQUIPMENT MUST BE DESTROYED (SOVIETS - YES; U.S. UNDECIDED) AND (B) WHETHER ALL KEY PRECURSOR PRODUCTION FACILITIES MUST BE TREATED EQUALLY WITH RESPECT TO ELIMINATION OF EXCESS CAPACITY (SOVIET - YES; U.S. - STRICTER RULES FOR FACILITIES THAT HAVE BEEN USED FOR CW PRODUCTION). THE SIDES AGREED THAT FURTHER INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS MAY BE HELD TO PREPARE THE PAPER FOR POTENTIAL FORMAL AGREEMENT IN NEXT ROUND. 6. SOVIET SIDE REQUESTED THAT INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS CONTINUE PAST AUGUST 7 END OF THE ROUND. U.S. SIDE STATED THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE BUT DISCUSSIONS WOULD HAVE TO HAVE DIFFERENT CHARACTER THAN THOSE DURING 341 CCODCM ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET FORMAL BILATERAL ROUND. 7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 342 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SECRET GENEVA 08617 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSION, ROUND VI: WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-041 . (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT) NOTE: GENEVA #008545 CW BILAT SENT NIACT IMMEDIATE IS CW-039. 2. SUMMARY/OVERALL ASSESSMENT -- -- SIXTH BILATERAL ROUND, HELD IN GENEVA DURING THREE- WEEK PERIOD ENDING AUGUST 7, FOCUSED ON THREE YEAR-OLD U.S. PROPOSAL FOR BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE BEFORE SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION. SOVIETS FINALLY PROVIDED DETAILED RESPONSE. VIEWS OF TWO SIDES APPEAR CLOSE ON SCOPE OF EXCHANGE, BUT SOVIET APPROACH IS SERIOUSLY INADEQUATE ON TIMING AND IGNORES ISSUE OF CONFIRMATION OF DATA. -- SIDES AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO EXCHANGE SOME DATA (TO BE AGREED LATER) BEFORE END OF 1987. -- SOVIETS MARKED TIME UNTIL MIDDLE OF THE ROUND AND DID NOT RESUME BUSINESS-LIKE PACE OF PREVIOUS ROUNDS UNTIL NEXT-TO-LAST MEETING, WHICH OCCURRED JUST AFTER AUGUST 6 STATEMENT OF SOVIET FOREIGN ` MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT. - DELS ALSO DISCUSSED JOINT PAPER ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES THAT WAS ALMOST COMPLETED IN PREVIOUS ROUND, BUT DID NOT MANAGE TO FINISH IT. END SUMMARY. 3. DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES -- A. U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS MET EIGHT TIMES IN GENEVA BETWEEN 20 JULY AND 7 AUGUST FOR SIXTH ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS PURSUANT TO THE 1985 SUMMIT AGREEMENT TO INTENSIFY BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. (THIS REPRESENTS TWO FEWER MEETINGS THAN ROUND V AND FIVE FEWER THAN ROUND IV.) FIRST AND LAST MEETINGS WERE AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL, THE OTHERS AT EXPERTS LEVEL. B. PRINCIPAL TOPIC WAS BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE. THE TWO SIDES ALSO DISCUSSED ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES. 4. SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS -- A. IN CONTRAST TO BUSINESS-LIKE APPROACH IN ROUNDS IV AND V, SOVIETS MARKED TIME FOR MUCH OF ROUND VI. SOVIET POSITION ON DATA EXCHANGE WAS NOT PRESENTED UNTIL THE ROUND WAS HALF OVER AND THEY SHOWED NO URGENCY ABOUT FINISHING THE JOINT 343 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET PAPER ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) PRODUCTION FACILITIES THAT WAS ALMOST COMPLETED IN THE PREVIOUS ROUND. HEAD OF SOVIET DEL HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO GO TO PARIS FOR CONSULTATIONS DURING SECOND WEEK, BUT THEN WAS RECALLED TO MOSCOW INSTEAD FOR ENTIRE WEEK. ONLY AT FINAL EXPERTS MEETING ON AUGUST 6, AFTER SHEVARDNADZE SPEECH IN THE CD DID SOVIETS GET BACK TO BUSINESS-LIKE PACE OF PREVIOUS ROUND. B. AT BEGINNING OF ROUND, SOVIETS PRESSED FOR DISCUSSION OF "COVERAGE OF BINARIES" IN THE CONVENTION. (ISSUE APPARENTLY REVOLVES AROUND GUIDELINES FOR ADDING CHEMICALS TO ONE OF THE LISTS IN THE CONVENTION.) HOWEVER, ISSUE FADED AWAY WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT DISCUSSION. 5. ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES -- A. BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE -- -- AS INSTRUCTED, U.S. DEL PRESSED HARD AND SUCCEEDED IN MAKING BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF ROUND. SOVIETS RELUCTANTLY AGREED AND DATA EXCHANGE WAS DOMINANT THEME OF SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS. -- SOVIETS FINALLY RESPONDED TO AUGUST 1984 UNITED STATES PROPOSAL. THEY PRESENTED A DRAFT BILATERAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING FOR A TWO- STAGE EXCHANGE. FIRST STAGE WOULD INVOLVE RELATIVELY GENERAL DATA AND SECOND STAGE MORE DETAILED INFORMATION. FIRST STAGE WOULD TAKE PLACE AFTER CONVENTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED BUT BEFORE IT IS SIGNED BY THE U.S. AND THE USSR. THE SECOND STAGE WOULD OCCUR AFTER SIGNATURE. THERE ARE NO PROVISIONS FOR CONFIRMATION OF THE DATA. U.S. DEL EMPHASIZED NEED FOR EARLY DATA EXCHANGE TO BUILD CONFIDENCE NECESSARY FOR SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION AND TO FACILITATE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. SOVIETS, ON THE OTHER HAND, STRESSED THAT PURPOSE OF DATA EXCHANGE WAS TO PROMOTE PROMPT ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION, AND WAS EXPLICITLY LINKED TO COMMITMENTS TO SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION. -- TWO SIDES APPEAR TO HAVE SIMILAR VIEW OF PHASING AND SCOPE OF EXCHANGE, BUT MUCH DIFFERENT VIEWS ON TIMING AND VERIFICATION. SOVIET PROPOSAL IS SERIOUSLY INADEQUATE IN THESE LATER TWO AREAS. -- SOVIETS ALSO PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION DURING 1987, BUT SCOPE IS SO LIMITED THAT "EXCHANGE" WOULD ADD LITTLE TO PREVIOUS PUBLIC DECLARATIONS. 34/1. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SFCRRT 25X1 U.S. DEL AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO AN EXCHANGE BUT MADE CLEAR SCOPE WOULD HAVE TO BE MUCH BROADER IF EXCHANGE WAS TO BE USEFUL. (SOVIETS MAY INTEND THAT "EXCHANGE OF DATA" WOULD BE IN FORM OF VISITS TO SHIKHANY AND TOOELE.) B. CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES -- -- DRAFT JOINT PAPER FROM ROUND V WAS BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. U.S. DEL PRESENTED CHANGES AS INSTRUCTED. IN MID-ROUND PLENARY STATEMENT SOVIETS ANNOUNCED THAT THEY NO LONGER WISHED TO RELEASREUSE ANY EQUIPMENT FROM CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND WOULD ACCEPT BRACKETED TEXT DEALING WITH FACILITIES PRODUCING NON-CHEMICAL PARTS OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. -- BECAUSE OF FOCUS ON DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE, PRODUCTION FACILITIES PAPER WAS DISCUSSED FOR A TOTAL OF ONLY THREE HOURS. SOVIETS SHOWED NO URGENCY ABOUT TAKING UP SUBJECT OR IN MAKING CHANGES IN PAPER TO REFLECT NEW POSITION OUTLINED IN THEIR JULY 30 PLENALRY STATEMENT. HOWEVER, BY END OF ROUND, SIDES HAD GONE THROUGH THE PAPER ONCE, LEAVING A NUMBER OF UNRESOLVED POINTS IN THEIR WAKE. MOST OF THESE APPEAR TO BE.QUESTIONS OF FORMULATION RATHER THAN SUBSTANCE. -- PRINCIPAL REMAINING SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ARE (A) WHETHER ALL EQUIPMENT MUST BE DESTROYED (SOVIETS- YES; U.S.-UNCLEAR), AND (B) WHETHER ALL KEY PRECURSOR PRODUCTION FACILITIES MUST BE TREATED EQUALLY WITH RESPECT TO ELIMINATION OF EXCESS CAPACITY (SOVIETS-YES; U.S.-STRICTER RULES FOR FACILITIES THAT HAVE BEEN USED FOR CW PRODUCTION.) -- SOVIETS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN COMPLETING PAPER IN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS AFTER END OF ROUND AND ASKED FOR U.S. VIEWS ON HOW AGREED APPROACH COULD BE INTRODUCED IN CD DISCUSSIONS. U.S. DEL SAID DISCUSSIONS COULD CONTINUE INFORMALLY BUT PAPER COULD ONLY BE FINALIZED AT NEXT FORMAL ROUND AND ONLY BE INTRODUCED INTO THE CD AFTER THAT. C. BILATERAL OBSERVER ARRANGEMENT -- -- BOTH SIDES FORMALLY INDICATED THAT JOINT PAPER DRAFTED DURING ROUND V WAS ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT MODIFICATION. -- SOVIETS DID NOT RAISE THEIR EARLIER SUGGESTION FOR A "GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT" WHEREBY INSPECTORATE SECTION FOR THE USSR WOULD BE HEADED BY AN AMERICAN AND THE AMERICAN SECTION BY A SOVIET. 345" Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET D. CHALLENGE INSPECTION -- -- ALTHOUGH AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS SUBJECT, DEL DID NOT RAISE IT FOR TACTICAL REASONS, EXCEPT TO ASK IN FINAL PLENARY STATEMENT FOR CLARIFICATION OF NEW SOVIET POSITION ANNOUNCED PREVIOUS DAY BY SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER. SOVIET RESPONSE WAS THAT CHALLENGE INSPECTION SHOULD BE MANDATORY WITH NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL. ALL STATES SHOULD HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS TO REQUEST SUCH INSPECTIONS. PROVISION SHOULD COVER ANY LOCATION OR FACILITY. CONCRETE INSPECTION PROCEDURES SHOULD BE ELABORATED TO PROTECT SENSITIVE INFORMATION. -- SOVIETS ALSO SAID THEY REMAINED INTERESTED IN THE UK CONCEPT OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES, BUT THAT IF THE TWO STATES INVOLVED COULD NOT REACH AGREEMENT WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS, THEN THE INSPECTION MUST TAKE PLACE. -- NEW SOVIET POSITION APPEARS VERY CLOSE TO U.S. PROPOSAL IN CD/500, EXCEPT THAT SOVIETS HAVE DROPPED U.S. IDEA OF FACT-FINDING PANEL AND ARTICLE XI. 7. EXCHANGE OF VISITS -- -- U.S. ACCEPTED SOVIET INVITATION FOR CD DELS TO VISIT SHIKHANY CHEMICAL PROVING GROUND IN EARLY FALL TO SEE SOVIET CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AND MOBILE DESTRUCTION UNIT. ? -- SOVIETS ACCEPTED U.S. INVITATION TO VISIT CW DESTRUCTION FACILITY AT TOOELE,UTAH. IN RECIPROCITY FOR VISIT TO SHIKHANY CHEMICAL FACILITY, THEY ASKED ALSO TO VISIT A FACILITY "SUCH AS" DUGWAY PROVING GROUND IN UTAH OR FORT DETRICK,MARYLAND,AND TO SEE U.S. CHEMICAL MUNITIONS, INCLUDING BINARIES. (COMMENT: RATIONALE FOR SOVIET REQUEST TO VISIT FORT DETRICK,WHICH HAS NO CW-RELATED ACTIVITIES, IS UNCLEAR. END COMMENT.) 6. NEXT ROUND -- -- AS AUTHORIZED, DEL ACCEPTED SOVIET PROPOSAL TO HOLD ANOTHER ROUND THIS FALL. DATE IS TO BE SETTLED LATER. SOVIETS DID NOT MAKE FORMAL PROPOSAL BUT ARE TALKING IN TERMS OF DECEMBER IN GENEVA DURING CD INTERSESSIONAL WORK ON CW BAN. 7. RECOMMENDATIONS/REQUESTS -- A. DEL REQUESTS FURTHER GUIDANCE ON FOLLOWING ASPECTS OF BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE: --- WHETHER OR NOT CURRENT U.S. APPROACH TO CONFIRMATION OF DATA EXCHANGE THROUGH ARTICLE X CHALLENGE INSPECTION IS ACCEPTABLE TO U.S. AND, 346 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET IF NOT,GUIDANCE ON REVISED APPROACH. (ROUND VI GUIDANCE INSTRUCTS DEL TO AVOID DETAILED DISCUSSION. DEL WILL NOT/NOT BE ABLE TO FINESSE THIS POINT IN NEXT ROUND.) --- WHAT DATA SHOULD BE EXCHANGED BEFORE THE END OF 1987. DEL IS SENDING SEPTEL POSSIBLE APPROACH FOR WASHINGTON. --- EXACTLY WHEN PHASEI AND PHASE II DATA WOULD BE EXCHANGED IN PERIOD BEFORE SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION CONSIDERATION. --- WHETHER U.S. IS PREPARED TO OFFER FORMAL ASSURANCES THAT IT WILL SIGN THE CONVENTION IF BOTH PHASES OF THE DATA EXCHANGE ARE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED. B. DEL REQUESTS GUIDANCE ON FORM IN WHICH VARIOUS BILATERAL MEASURES WILL BE FORMALLY RECORDED (FOR EXAMPLE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING). C. DEL REQUESTS GUIDANCE ON FOLLOWING ASPECTS OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION: --- INSPECTION PROCEDURES --- SOVIET PROPOSAL ON CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES --- APPLICABILITY TO U.S. MILITARY BASES ON TERRITORY OF NON-STATES PARTIES --- NEED TO RETAIN FACT-FINDING PANEL CONCEPT --- NEED TO RETAIN ARTICLE XI. 8. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 347 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET SECRET GENEVA 08762 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, ROUND VI: DRAFT RESPONSE TO SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR 1987 DATA EXCHANGE REF: GENEVA 8386 (CW BILAT-034) 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-042 (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SOVIET JULY 30 PROPOSAL FOR BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE (REFTEL) INCLUDES A PROPOSAL FOR DATA TO BE EXCHANGED IN 1987. THE SOVIETS PROPOSED THAT THIS EXCHANGE "INCLUDE" DATA ON TYPES OF CW AGENTS AND MUNITIONS POSSESSED BY THE USSR AND THE U.S., ON THE PRESENCE OF CW AND CW FACILITIES IN FOREIGN TERRITORIES, AND ON PAST TRANSFERS TO OTHER STATES OF CW, TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION AND CW PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES. U.S. DEL HAS DRAFTED A MORE DETAILED COUNTERPROPOSAL FOR DATA EXCHANGE IN 1987. THIS DRAFT WAS NOT REPEAT NOT PRESENTED TO SOVIET SIDE. U.S. DEL'S DRAFT IS PROVIDED IN PARA 3 BELOW AS A CONTRIBUTION TO INTER- AGENCY CONSIDERATION OF U.S. RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. 3. BEGIN TEXT OF U.S. DEL DRAFT: UNITED STATES PROPOSAL FOR DATA TO BE EXCHANGED THIS YEAR THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION SHALL EXCHANGE, ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY, RELEVANT INFORMATION PRIOR TO THE END OF 1987, AS SPECIFIED BELOW: 1) THE TYPES OF CHEMICALS EACH POSSESSES FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PURPOSES. A "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER SHALL BE GIVEN FOR EACH NUMBERED ITEM IN SCHEDULES (1), (2), AND (3) OF CD/CW/WP.167. 2) THE TYPES OF MUNITIONS EACH POSSESSES FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PURPOSES. A "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER SHALL BE GIVEN FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES: ARTILLERY MORTAR MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHER BOMB SPRAY TANK GUIDED MISSILE OTHER ROCKETS AND MISSILES OTHER (SPECIFY TYPE) 3) WHETHER OR NOT EACH POSSESSES FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PURPOSES ANY CHEMICAL THAT IS NOT LISTED IN SCHEDULE (1), (2), OR (3) OF CD/CW/WP.167 AND, IF SO, THE CHEMICAL NAME(S) OF THE CHEMICAL(S). 4) THE PROPORTION THAT EACH SCHEDULE REPRESENTS OF THE TOTAL QUANTITY. (FOR EXAMPLE, SCHEDULE (1): 60 PER CENT, SCHEDULE (2): 10 PERCENT, SCHEDULE (3): 30 PERCENT. 5) THE AGGREGATE QUANTITY OF CHEMICALS EACH POSSESSES 34C Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PURPOSES, INDICATED ACCORDING TO THE FOLLOWING RANGES: LESS THAN 1,000 TONS 1,001 TO 10,000 TONS 10,001 TO 50,000 TONS 50,001 TO 100,000 TONS 100,001 TO 150,000 TONS 150,001 TONS OR GREATER 6) THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF LOCATIONS WHERE CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE STORED, INDICATED ACCORDING TO THE FOLLOWING RANGES: 1-9; 10-19; 20-29; 30-39; 40-49; 50 AND ABOVE. 7) THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF EXISTING CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES, ACCORDING TO THE DEFINITION JOINTLY ELABORATED. 8) THE EXPECTED TOTAL NUMBER OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITIES. 9) WHETHER OR NOT CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE STORED OUTSIDE ITS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES. 10) WHETHER OR NOT IT HAS CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES OUTSIDE ITS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES. 11) WHETHER OR NOT IT HAS TRANSFERRED CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN QUANTITIES GREATER THAN ONE TON TO ANOTHER STATE SINCE JANUARY 1, 1946. END OF TEXT. 4. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 349 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET GENEVA 08804 EXDIS ACDA FOR MA; DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP VIENNA FO??USDEL CSCE; USDEL MBFR; CONVENTIONAL MANDATE DEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR BODY TAGS: FARM, UNGA, CDG, UR, US SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSION, ROUND VI: AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN'S STATEMENT, AUGUST 7, 1987 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-044. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S STATEMENT DELIVERED AT FINAL BILATERAL PLENARY SESSION AUGUST 7. AFTER NAZARKIN READ HIS STATEMENT, HE INDICATED THAT HE WISHED TO CORRECT IT TO REFLECT MATERIAL HE HAD ADDED AT THE TABLE IN LIGHT OF AMBASSADOR FRIEDERSDORF'S STATEMENT. SOVIET DELEGATION PROVIDED THE CORRECTED RUSSIAN TEXT TO U.S. DEL AT COB AUGUST 11. 3. BEGIN TEXT: MR. AMBASSADOR, -- BEFORE PROCEEDING TO AN ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THIS ROUND I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER SOME COMMENTS OF A GENERAL NATURE IN CONNECTION WITH THE STATEMENT YOU JUST DELIVERED. YOU TALKED A GREAT DEAL ABOUT THE INSUFFICIENT OPENNESS OF SOVIET SOCIETY, RETURNING TO THAT SUBJECT THROUGHOUT A CONSIDERABLE PART OF YOUR SPEECH. THE NATURE OF A PARTICULAR SOCIETY IS NOT AN AGENDA ITEM. WE HAVE OUR OWN VIEW OF YOUR SOCIETY, BUT WE DO NOT INTEND TO DISCUSS IT AT THE CONSULTATIONS ON BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. ONE ITEM ON THE AGENDA IS REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF A CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGE OF DATA. THAT ISSUE IS QUITE SPECIFIC; LET US WORK TOWARD REACHING AGREEMENT ON IT. SAYING THAT SOMETHING IS NOT OPEN ENOUGH OR IS SEMI-CLOSED WILL NOT CONTRIBUTE TO BUSINESSLIKE NEGOTIATIONS. YOU TAKE THE UNILATERAL MEASURES YOU CONSIDER NECESSARY, AND WE TAKE THOSE WE CONSIDER NECESSARY; THIS IS NOT A SUBJECT FOR MUTUAL RECRIMINATIONS BUT IS UP TO EACH SIDE TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF. IT IS A DIFFERENT MATTER WHEN THE QUESTION OF EXCHANGING DATA IS UNDER DISCUSSION. WE PROPOSE THAT WE FOCUS ON THIS SUBJECT. TO THIS END, WE HAVE PROPOSED A DRAFT OF THE BASIC PROVISIONS OF A MEMORANDUM ON A BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE. IT IS QUITE LIKELY AND VERY NATURAL THAT YOU WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO AGREE IMMEDIATELY 350 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 PAGE 2 TO ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT. THAT'S FINE, FOR WE DO NOT PLAN TO IMPOSE OUR VIEWS AND IDEAS ON YOU. LET US SEEK AGREEMENT IN THAT AREA. IT IS PRECISELY IN ACHIEVING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION THAT WE SEE THE PURPOSE OF OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH YOU. NOW PERMIT ME TO SET FORTH OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS OF THIS ROUND. -- ON THE ONE HAND, AT THIS ROUND WE HAVE BEGUN THE IMPORTANT WORK OF CONSIDERING IN DEPTH BILATERAL MEASURES FOR A DATA EXCHANGE BEFORE THE CONVENTION ENTERS INTO FORCE. FOR THIS PURPOSE ON JULY 30 WE PRESENTED TO THE U.S. DELEGATION A DOCUMENT ON THE BASIC PROVISIONS FOR AN APPROPRIATE MEMORANDUM, AND A PROPOSAL THAT AS EARLY AS 1987 CERTAIN INFORMATION BE EXCHANGED ABOUT TYPES OF POISONOUS SUBSTANCES AND MUNITIONS THAT THE USSR AND THE U.S. HAVE IN THEIR ARSENALS, AS WELL AS ABOUT A NUMBER OF OTHER ITEMS. AS WE UNDERSTAN? IT, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEGUN A SERIOUS ANALYSIS OF OUR PROPOSALS. THIS IS THE CONTEXT IN WHICH WE ARE CONSIDERING THE QUESTIONS WHICH WERE HANDED TO US BY THE U.S. DELEGATION. WE HAVE PROVIDED PRELIMINARY REPLIES TO THEM IN THE COURSE OF MEETINGS AT THE EXPERTS' LEVEL; AS SOON AS WE ARE READY TO DO SO WE WILL PROVIDE ( ADDITIONAL RESPONSES AND CLARIFICATIONS ON THE U.S. SIDE'S QUESTIONS. -- IN GIVING A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION WHICH HAS EMERGED WITH RESPECT TO A CONFIDENTIAL DATA EXCHANGE, I WOULD NOTE THAT ON SUCH ASPECTS AS PHASING AND THE OVERALL SCOPE OF DATA TO BE PROVIDED, THE DELEGATIONS' APPROACHES ARE RATHER CLOSE. ON OTHER ASPECTS, NAMELY, THE TIME FRAME FOR THESE PHASES AND THE QUESTION OF VERIFYING DATA, OUR POSITIONS DIFFER. IT IS CLEAR THAT WE MUST FOCUS OUR FURTHER EFFORTS ON THE AREAS WHERE OUR APPROACH IS DIFFERENT. WE ARE PREPARED TO LISTEN TO YOUR COUNTERPROPOSALS AND IDEAS. WE EXPECT THAT THESE PROPOSALS WILL NOT REPEAT IN THE FORM OF AN ULTIMATUM WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN STATED BY THE U.S. SIDE. WE HAVE PRESENTED NEW PROPOSALS, SUBSTANTIATED THEM, AND WOULD HOPE TO CONTINUE A DETAILED CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE AIMED AT ACHIEVING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. THE U.S. DELEGATION'S PROPOSALS IN THEIR PRESENT FORM ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET SIDE, AND WE HAVE ALREADY STATED THAT. OUR DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO SEEK A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS -- THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT MAKES UP THE PROCESS OF SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS AIMED AT ACHIEVING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDINGS. -- IN THE COURSE OF THIS ROUND THERE WAS ALSO AN INTERESTING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES. IN THIS AREA, TOO, THE SOVIET DELEGATION PRESENTED NEW IDEAS AIMED AT 1F1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 PAGE 3 ACCELERATING THE NEGOTIATIONS AND ENHBNCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CONVENTION BEING NEGOTIATED. FURTHER PROGRESS WAS MADE IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE RELEVANT DOCUMENT; SOME USEFUL CLARIFICATIONS APPEARED IN ITS TEXT, AND BRACKETS WERE REMOVED FROM A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT PROVISIONS. I THINK THAT EVERYTHING I HAVE JUST MENTIONED COULD BE CLASSIFIED AS POSITIVE. -- BUT AS YOU HAVE CORRECTLY NOTED, MR? AMBASSADOR, A NUMBER OF ASPECTS ARE DISAPPOINTING. BOTH WITH RESPECT TO THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND WITH RESPECT TO THE DOCUMENT ON FACILITIES, THIS ROUND IS BREAKING UP ON AN UNFINISHED NOTE, AS IT WERE. I THINK THAT IF WE HAD CONTINUED THE WORK WE CO?LD HAVE ACHIEVED MORE SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS AS EARLY AS THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. -- MOREOVER, AT THIS ROUND OUR DELEGATIONS DID NOT SUCCEED IN DISCUSSING IN ANY DEPTH AT ALL A WHOLE SERIES OF IMPORTANT ISSUES OF FUNDAMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR ACCELERATING THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON CONCLUDING A CONVENTION. WE NOTE WITH REGRET THAT SUCH A SITUATION CAME ABOUT PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE U.S. SET A PRECONDITION FOR BEGINNING BUSINESSLIKE WORK AT THIS ROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE SOVIET SIDE PRESENT SUBSTANTIVE CONSIDERATIONS ON A BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE; THE U.S. ALSO CONTINUED TO INSIST ON THIS CONDITION EVEN AFTER IT RECEIVED OFFICIAL ASSURANCES AT THE FIRST PLENARY MEETING THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS WORK ON REACHING AGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE AS WELL. WE HAVE KEPT OUR PROMISE, OF COURSE, BUT UNFORTUNATELY TIME WAS LOST AND INSTEAD OF CONCENTRATING ON THE PROBLEM OF DATA EXCHANGE DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THIS ROUND, THE DELEGATIONS WERE FORCED TO MAKE UP FOR LOST TIME IN ALL AREAS. -- I AM ABSOLUTELY UNABLE TO ACCEPT THE SUGGESTION TO PLAN OUR CONSULTATIONS IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY NOT COINCIDE WITH OTHER ACTIVITIES. I CANNOT DO THIS BECAUSE THE USSR DELEGATION PROPOSED -- AND QUITE INSISTENTLY -- THAT THE SIXTH ROUND BE HELD IN JUNE. THE U.S. SIDE INFORMED US THAT IT WAS NOT PREPARED TO DO SO AND PROPOSED TO BEGIN THIS ROUND LATER -- IN JULY. WE ACCOMMODATED YOUR WISHES. INSTEAD OF ACKNOWLEDGING OUR FLEXIBILITY AND READINESS TO COOPERATE, YOU ARE ACCUSING US OF HAVING PLANNED THIS ROUND BADLY. I AM ABSOLUTELY UNABLE TO ACCEPT THIS; MOREOVER, THE SOVIET DELEGATION PROPOSED TO EXTEND THIS ROUND BY ONE WEEK, BUT YOU WERE NOT PREPARED FOR THAT EITHER. -- SUCH ARE THE REASONS WHY WE CANNOT GIVE AN UNEQUIVOCALLY POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS OF THIS ROUND. HOWEVER, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE POSITIVE THINGS WHICH NEVERTHELESS OCCURRED AT THIS ROUND COULD BE FURTHER DEVELOPED IN THE COURSE OF 352 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 ( SUBSEQUENT INFORMAL CONTACTS BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT. -- THERE ARE QUITE A FEW SUBJECTS FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSION. THE SOVIET DELEGATION LISTED THEM AT THE FIRST PLENARY MEETING, AND I WILL NOT REPEAT THEM. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT WITH RESPECT TO A NUMBER OF THESE ISSUES A NEW SITUATION HAS NOW ARISEN, WHICH MAKES IT NECESSARY TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE AND AT THE SAME TIME OPENS UP NEW PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS. -- THERE IS NO NEED FOR ME TO REMIND YOU THAT IN HIS SPEECH AT THE AUGUST 6 PLENARY MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, E.A. SHEVARDNADZE, ME?BER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU AND USSR MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, PRESENTED IMPORTANT PROPOSALS ON A WHOLE SERIES OF DISARMAMENT ISSUES, AMONG THEM A BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IT IS QUITE NATURAL THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION HAD QUESTIONS AND NEEDED CLARIFICATION OF THE PROPOSALS HE PRESENTED. I INTEND TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE CLARIFICATIONS NOW. -- FIRST, REGARDING ON-SITE CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS. IT IS APPARENT THAT EVERYONE RECOGNIZES THAT THIS IS ONE OF THE KEY ISSUES AT THE NEGOTI?TIONS, POSSIBLY EVEN THE KEY ISSUE. IN SPITE OF THE VERY VIGOROUS EFFORTS MADE AT THE NEGOTIATIONS, THERE IS STILL NO AGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE. IT WOULD SEEM, AND WE HAVE ALREADY SAID THIS, THAT GREAT BRITAIN'S DOCUMENT CD/715 COULD PROVIDE A GOOD BASIS FOR RESOLVING IT. UNFORTUNATELY, THE U.S. SIDE STILL HAS A CERTAIN RESERVATION IN THIS REGARD. -- HAVING CONSIDERED THE SITUATION WHICH HAS EMERGED AND IN AN EFFORT TO CONTRIBUTE TO EARLY AGREEMENT, AND AT THE SAME TIME PROCEEDING FROM THE NEED TO ENSURE THE MOST STRINGENT VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, THE SOVIET UNION CAME OUT IN FAVOR OF MAKING ON-SITE CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS MANDATORY AND NOT ALLOWING STATES THE RIGHT TO REFUSE THEM. -- WE BELIEVE THAT A REQUEST TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS OF THIS KIND MAY BE MADE BY ANY STATE-PARTY TO THE CONVENTION, WITHOUT EXCEPTION. EVERYONE MUST HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS. SIMILARLY, THERE MU?T BE NO DISCRIMINATION BASED ON THE FORM OF OWNERSHIP OF THE LOCATIONS AND FACILITIES WHICH NEED TO BE INSPECTED. A REQUEST TO CONDUCT AN INSPECTION, WE BELIEVE, MAY BE MADE WITH RESPECT TO ANY FACILITY AND ANY LOCATION ON THE TERRITORY OF A STATE-PARTY OR UNDER ITS JURISDICTION OR CONTROL, AS WELL AS WITH RESPECT TO ANY FACILITY AND LOCATION, NO MATTER WHERE IT IS, BELONGING TO ANY INDIVIDUAL OR LEGAL E?TITY OF A STATE-PARTY. IN OUR VI?W, THIS UNIVERSALITY IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO MAKE PAGE LI 353 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 PAGE 5 CHALLENGE INSPECTION TRULY EFFECTIVE AND A UNIVERSAL INSTRUMENT OF "POLITICO-LEGAL DETERRENCE." -- I HOPE THAT I HAVE GIVEN A COMPLETE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION. YOU ASKED, MR. AMBASSADOR. -- OF COURSE, THE APPREHENSIONS WHICH WE EXPRESSED EARLIER ABOUT OPENING UP SENSITIVE LOCATIONS AND INFORMATION STILL REMAIN. HOWEVER, EMPHASIZING PRINCIPLES OF UNIVERSALITY, WE ENVISAGE THAT IN THIS RESPECT, TOO, STATES PARTY TO THE CONVENTION WILL BE IN AN EQUAL POSITION. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE, OF COURSE, TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE USEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS ADVANCED BY VARIOUS DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING YOURS, IN ORDER TO REDUCE TO A MINIMUM THE DANGER I HAVE SPOKEN ABOUT. -- WE ADVOCATE CONDUCTING CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS USING PROCEDURES THAT WOULD MAKE SURE THAT A STATE VIOLATING THE CONVENTION CANNOT CONCEAL THE FACT AND THE CONSEQUENCES THEREOF. FOR THIS PURPOSE, IT IS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE THAT AN INSPECTION TEAM ARRIVE AT THE INSPECTION SITE NO LATER THAN 48 HOURS AFTER THE REQUEST IS MADE. IT APPEAFS TO THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THIS TIME-FRAME REPRESENTS THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION FROM THE STANDPOINT OF BEGINNING THE INSPECTION AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE AND SATISFYING THE TECHNICAL REALITIES INVOLVED IN TRANSPORTING INSPECTORS FROM THEIR HEADQUARTERS TO THE MOST DISTANT LOCATIONS ON OUR PLANET. -- AT THE SAME TIME, AS I HAVE ALREADY SAID, WE DO NOT NOW REJECT THE POSSIBILITY OF SEEKING THE KIND OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS THAT WOULD PREVENT ABUSING A REQUEST AND USING INSPECTIONS FOR PURPOSES INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONVENTION, AND ALSO FOR UNCOVERING SECRETS UNRELATED TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE USSR PROPOSES THAT THIS BE DONE BY DEVELOPING SPECIFIC, RELEVANT PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS, BUT THAT IT BE DONE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PRINCIPLE OF MANDATORY AND EFFECTIVE INSPECTIONS, NOT CONTRARY TO THIS PRINCIPLE. -- WHAT MIGHT THIS INVOLVE? -- FIRST, PRESUMABLY IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE REQUEST ITSELF CONTAIN AT LEAST A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF NECESSARY DATA ABOUT WHAT PROVISION OF THE CONVENTION HAS BEEN VIOLATED, WHERE AND WHEN THE SUSPECTED VIOLATION TOOK PLACE OR IS TAKING PLACE, AS WELL AS DATA ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SUSPECTED VIOLATION. THE REQUIREMENT FOR SUCH DATA WOULD SEEM QUITE NATURAL AND WITHOUT THEM INSPECTION WOULD BE TECHNICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. -- IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPING POSSIBLE MEASURES THAT 354 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 PAGE 6 WOULD EFFECTIVELY RULE OUT USING CHALLENGE INSPECTION TO OBTAIN DATA UNRELATED TO CW, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD BE HARMFUL TO THE INTERESTS OF THE CHALLENGED STATE, IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO PROVIDE THAT METHODS AND INSTRUMENTS TO BE USED BY INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORS BE IN STRICT CONFORMITY WITH THEIR FUNCTIONS AND THAT THE CHALLENGED STATE HAVE ACCESS TO ALL SUCH INSTRUMENTS IN ORDER TO INSPECT THEM. PRESUMABLY, SUCH INSTRUMENTS MUST MEET CERTAIN STANDARDS. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THIS IS WHAT THE UNITED STATES HAS IN MIND WHEN SPEAKING OF "SUPERVISED ACCESS" OF INSPECTORS IN CARRYING OUT THE INSPECTION. -- THE SOVIET UNION ALSO REMAINS INTERESTED IN WHAT THE BRITISH PROPOSED SOME TIME AGO, NAMELY, ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS A PROMISING AREA FOR CONSIDERATION. INDEED, IF THE STATES CAN PROPOSE SOME KIND OF MEASURES WHICH WOULD CONVINCE THE SUSPECTING STATE THAT THE CONVENTION HAS NOT BEEN VIOLATED, THIS SHOULD BE DONE. WHY CONDUCT AN INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION WITH COMPLETE ACCESS TO ENTERPRISES, IF CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION CAN BE ENSURED THROUGH ALTERNATIVE MEASURES WITHOUT CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS? AT THE SAME TIME, WE PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT PROPOSING ALTERNATIVE MEASURES AND CONSULTING ABOUT THEIR CONTENT MUST NOT BE USED TO DELAY THE BEGINNING OF INSPECTIONS. IN ANY EVENT, THE USSR IS CONVINCED THAT PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING AN INSPECTIONS MUST BE AGREED UPON WITHIN 48 HOURS. THIS IS THE MAXIMUM PERIOD OF TIME. WE BELIEVE THAT A DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT THE ALTERNATIVE MEASURES ARE SATISFACTORY MUST BE MADE NOT BY THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OR ANY OTHER BODY PROVIDED FOR BY THE CONVENTION, BUT BY THE STATE WHICH HAS SUSPICIONS CONCERNING NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION BY ANOTHER STATE, IN OTHER WORDS, BY THE STATE WHICH ISSUED THE CHALLENGE. THE SOVIET UNION BELIEVES THAT SUCH A PROVISION WOULD PROMOTE GREATER EFFICIENCY IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE MEASURES PROPOSED AND IN CONDUCTING A CHALLENGE INSPECTION. -- PRESUMABLY WE COULD ALSO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF USING AND DEVELOPING ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION BY REMOTE CONTROL. -- WE HAVE ANOTHER IDEA ON HOW TO CURB ABUSE OF THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE. WE WOULD PROPOSE TO THE U.S. DELEGATION THAT WE HOLD AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING IN THE CONVENTION A PROVISION REGARDING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF A STATE, INCLUDING LIABILITY, FOR ABUSING THAT RIGHT AND FOR THE POSSIBLE DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY THE RECEIVING STATE AS A RESULT OF SUCH AN UNJUSTIFIED INSPECTION. IN OTHER WORDS, EACH STATE-PARTY WHICH MIGHT BE THE SUBJECT OR, IF YOU WILL, 355 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 PAGE 7 THE VICTIM OF AN UNJUSTIFIED INSPECTION COULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEEK COMPENSATION FOR THE ACTUAL DAMAGE IT SUSTAINED BECAUSE A PARTICULAR FACILITY CEASED OPERATION OR BECAUSE COMMERCIAL AND OTHER SECRETS WERE REVEALED AS A RESULT OF A CHALLENGE INSPECTION. NATURALLY, THE QUESTION OF SUCH COMPENSATION WILL ARISE ONLY IF THE INSPECTION FAILS TO CONFIRM NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION; HOWEVER, IF THE VIOLATION IS ESTABLISHED, THEN THE VIOLATING STATE WILL BEAR ALL RESPONSIBILITY -- POLITICAL, LEGAL, MATERIAL AND MORAL. -- THERE IS YET ANOTHER POINT THAT OUR DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO RAISE AT THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. IT CONCERNS NOT ONLY CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS BUT VERIFICATION IN GENERAL. WE WOULD LIKE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF MONITORING MILITARY BASES AND OTHER MILITARY FACILITIES OF STATES PARTY TO THE CONVENTION, WHICH ARE LOCATED ON THE TERRITORY OF OTHER STATES, INCLUDING STATES NOT PARTY TO THE CONVENTION. WE HAVE ALREADY RAISED THIS QUESTION AND, AS I RECALL, THE U.S. SIDE HAS EXPLAINED ITS VIEWS ON THIS SCORE?. AT THIS ROUND WE WILL NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO RESOLVE THIS MATTER BUT IN THE FUTURE OUR DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO CLARIFY SOME ASPECTS OF IT. -- MR. AMBASSADOR, I WILL NOW TURN TO THE PROPOSAL MENTIONED IN THE STATEMENT OF USSR FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE, REGARDING AN INVITATION FOR THE U.S. AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO VISIT THE SOVIET MILITARY FACILITY IN SHIKHANY? TO BEGIN WITH, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE U.S. WILL ACCEPT THIS INVITATION. IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS WE INTEND TO CLARIFY THE TECHNICAL DETAILS INVOLVED IN SUCH A VISIT, BUT AT THIS TIME I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE USE OF OUR MEETING TO LEARN THE U.S. SIDE'S VIEWS ON THESE TECHNICAL DETAILS. -- CONSIDERING THE SCHEDULE OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE MOST ACCEPTABLE DATES WOULD BE OCTOBER 8 AND 9, 1987, AND THE SOVIET DELEGATION INTENDS TO PROPOSE THIS OFFICIALLY. FOR THE TIME BEING THIS IS AN UNOFFICIAL INVITATION FOR THESE DATES AND WE WOULD LIKE TO LEARN YOUR VIEWS ON THIS. WE ARE CONSULTING WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS ON THI? MATTER AND SUBSEQUENTLY WE INTEND TO ISSUE AN OFFICIAL INVITATION. -- AT THE SAME TIME, IN THE CONTEXT OF BUILDING CONFIDENCE WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE U.S. SIDE WILL RECIPROCATE; THIS WOULD INCLUDE A POSSIBLE VISIT TO A SIMILAR U.S. FACILITY (DUGWAY OR FT. DIETRICH) AND FAMILIARIZATION WITH STANDARD MODELS IN THE U.S. CHEMICAL ARSENAL, INCLUDING BINARY MUNITIONS, AND THE TECHNOLOGY OF DESTROYING SUCH MUNITIONS. 356 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 -- WE ARE TAKING YET ANOTHER STEP TO BUILD CONFIDENCE. THE SOVIET DELEGATION IS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO STATE OFFICIALLY THAT IT ACCEPTS THE U.S. SIDE'S INVITATION TO VISIT THE FACILITY IN TOOELE IN OCTOBER OF THIS YEAR. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS IN THIS CONNECTION COULD BE DISCUSSED BY THE DELEGATIONS IN AUGUST, BEFORE THE END OF THIS SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE. OF COURSE, WE RECALL THE U.S. SIDE'S DESIRE FOR A POSSIBLE VISIT TO A CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCtION FACILITY IN OUR COUNTRY. IN THIS CONNECTION, LET ME CLARIFY THE FOLLOWING. DURING THE VISIT TO THE FACILITY IN SHIKHANY THERE WILL BE A DEMONSTRATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY USING A MOBILE FACILITY. SECONDLY, WE ARE PREPARED TO INVITE A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO VISIT THE SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITY WHICH IS UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN KUYBYSHEV OBLAST' NEAR THE CITY OF CHAPAYEVSK, AFTER ITS CONSTRUCTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED. -- THIS CONCLUDES MY PRESENTATION. END TEXT. MARSH ADMIN END OF MESSAGE SECRET _ PAGE 8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 SECRET CONFIDENTIALGENEVA 09133 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, ROUND VI TELEGRAM LIST. 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-046. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT) FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF REPORTING TELEGRAMS ON THE U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CW DISCUSSIONS HELD IN GENEVA DURING THREE-WEEK PERIOD ENDING AUGUST 7, 1987, PLUS REPORTING CABLES FOR TWO POST-ROUND MEETINGS.. CW BILAT GENEVA DATE TIME ABBREVIATED NUMBER NUMBER GROUP SUBJECT/TOPIC 025 07475 0916132JUL87 DATES/AGENDA 026 07998 231630ZJUL87 20/7 EXPERTS MTG/ AGENDA 027 08135 281551ZJUL87 21/7 PLENARY/ FRIEDERSDORF STATEMENT 028 08031 241402ZJUL87 21/7 PLENARY/ - . NAZARKIN STATEMENT 029 08032 242406ZJUL87 21-7 PLENARY REPORT 030 08185 291550ZJUL87 23-7 EXPERTS/AGENDA 031 08265 322520ZJUL87 30-7 USSR DRAFT MOU ON BILAT DATA EXCHANGE 032 08285 311612ZJUL87 ACTION REQUEST/CW PROD. FAC.. 033 08352 041150ZAUG87 30-7 PLENARY REPORT 034 08386 041605ZAUG87 30-7 PLENARY USSR STATEMENT ON DATA EXCHANGE 035 08555 101250ZAUG87 3-8 EXPERTS/CWPF 036 08554 101248ZAUG87 4-8 EXPERTS/DATA EXCHANGE 037 08543 101225ZAUG87 4-8 EXPERTS/U.S. QUESTIONS 038 08544 10122.7ZAUG87 7-8 PLENARY/ FRIEDERSDORF STATEMENT 039 08545 101229ZAUG87 7-8 PLENARY REPORT 040 08572 101609ZAUG87 6-8 EXPERTS/DATA/CWPF 041 08617 111637ZAUG87 WRAPUP 042 08762 141411ZAUG87 U.S. DATA DRAFT 043 08759 141404ZAUG87 13-8 POST-ROUND MTG. 044 08804 171531ZAUG87 7-8 PLENARY/NAZARKIN STATEMENT 045 09040 251013ZAUG87 18-8 POST-PLENARY MTG. 3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARSH END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 35t7 WM:MT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0 Secret Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100140001-0

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SOVIET BLOC, NEUTRAL/NONALIGNED AND NATO COUNTRY STATEMENTS AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD) 9 JUNE - 28 AUGUST 1987 VOLUME I