ITALY: THE ELECTION AN ITS IMPLICATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000303370001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 8, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
DATY A-~'
DOC NO N f" 67-200('
P F, PD
This paper was prepared by West
European Division, Office of European Analysis, questions
and comments are welcome and may be addressed to
Chief/West European Division I
cnlra Inlc igcnce Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
08 June 1987
Italy: The Election and Its Im lications
Summary
Italian voters will go to the polls a year
early on 14-15 June to determine whether the
five-party coalition that has provided Italy with
unprecedented stability and prosperity will be
reinstated or whether Italy will again experience
revolving-door governments that provide the
Communist Party with new openings. Opinion
surveys and political necessity suggest that the
coalition will eventually be reconstituted, but
only after a period of protracted and bitter
haggling. In the meantime, there is a chance that
a minority center-left or center-right government
dependent on outside Communist support could come
The election itself is not likely to produce
dramatic changes in the balance among Italy's five
governing parties--the Christian Democrats,
Socialists, Social Democrats, Liberals, and
Republicans. The Communists, Italy's second
largest party, are not likely to see their share
of the vote change significantly, although the
party could emerge as Italy's largest if the
Christian Democrats stumble badly--a situation
that would give the Communists new political
momentum even though the Christian Democrats and
Socialists would almost certainly still oppose a
coalition with them. Although a number of
factors make it harder than ever to predict
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
individual party returns, together the five
parties of the enta artito coalition will almost
certainly again win enough seats to form a
majority government.
The major question hanging over the election
is whether they have the will to form another
government together. The last coalition fell, not
over the ostensible dispute over policies, but
over a bitter fight between Christian Democrats
and Socialists for the Prime Ministership. This
struggle was not resolved, and the fierce personal
attacks that have characterized the past few
months will make bridge-building even more
i
d
fficult than usual.
Unless the two sides can patch up their
differences, this election could bring down the
curtain on the era of the enta artito. The
Christian Democrats, far and away the largest
party in the coalition, are determined to recover
the top spot after allowing Socialist Bettino
Craxi to hold it for four years. Personal
ambition and fear that his party will be totally
overshadowed under Christian Democratic leadership
make Craxi equally determined to reassert himself.
Barring a significant realignment of votes,
however, parliamentary arithmetic will ensure that
neither side can form a majority government
without the other--unless they turn to the
Communists. No one at this stage is talking
seriously about bringing the Communists into the
government, but both the Socialists and the
Christian Democrats may entertain the possibility
of a minority government supported from the
outside by the Communists
Whatever the outcome on 14-15 June, we
believe the Christian Democrats and Socialists
will first try to reconstruct the five-party
coalition. Neither wants to give the Communists a
boost, and neither relishes having to depend on
Communist support. Negotiations, however, will be
painful and prolonged, perhaps dragging on through
the summer as Craxi and his Christian Democratic
rivals pick their way through the minefields of
broken promises and personal animosities that
III Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303370001-2
The bitterness engendered by partisan
maneuvering over the past year makes it likely
that a reconstituted five-party coalition would be
less cohesive than its predecessor, but we believe
it would generally continue the policies of the
last four years regardless of who was Prime
Minister. In foreign policy, Rome would continue
to demand for Italy a voice equal to that of the
larger countries in western political and economic
councils and would adhere to the EC and NATO
consensus on key issues such as trade and arms
control. Domestically, the coalition would
further liberalize the economy and cut back on
b
pu
lic spending.
Should the Socialists and Christian Democrats
fail to reach an accord, both will scramble to
build a minority coalition with the smaller
parties. The fate of their efforts will be
decided largely by the Communist Party. A
Socialist-led coalition would probably be more
attractive to the Communists because it would
exclude the Christian Democrats from national
power for the first time since World War II. it
might also benefit the Communists over the longer
term by breaking down the old voting patterns that
have kept them from rising much above the
30-percent ceiling.
A Christian Democratic-Socialist deadlock
that forced one or the other into a minority
coalition with the smaller parties would result in
a less stable, less predictable government. To be
sure, Craxi or another experienced, responsible
politician would probably be at the helm, and this
would guarantee considerable continuity. Because
such a government would require parliamentary
support from the Communists, however, it would be
more timid in supporting Western security policies
and less likely to implement tough domestic
austerity measures. A Christian Democratic-led
minority government might also pursue a more
independent and pro-Arab policy in the Middle
East, which both Christian Democrats and
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303370001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
Background: Bizarre End to the Pentapartito
The election is taking place a year earlier than
required because the five-party coalition failed to
implement the Prime Ministerial "relay pact"--an agreement
reached last summer under which Craxi was supposed to have
handed over his office in March to a Christian Democrat.
Although Craxi resigned in March, he immediately began to
impose new conditions that effectively stymied attempts to
install a Christian Democratic Prime Minister. The
Socialists subsequently insisted on holding referendums on
nuclear energy and judicial reform, knowing that the
Christian Democrats were adamantly opposed.
President Cossiga's efforts to resolve the
impasse--including his unprecedented decision to ask a
Communist, Nilde Iotti, to act as a mediator among the
parties--proved ineffectual in the face of growing acrimony
between the Socialists and the Christian Democrats. The
crisis came to a bizarre end when the Christian Democrats
combined with the Communists to bring down a government
headed by a senior Christian Democratic figure, Amintore
Fanfani, while the Socialists, hoping to pin the blame for
an early election squarely on the Christian Democrats, voted
to support the government. Cossiga subsequently appointed
Fanfani to form a caretaker government of technocrats and
Christian Democrats to preside over a new election.
The failure of the relay agreement put an end to a
coalition which most observers agree proved more effective
than most of its predecessors despite frequent internal
bickering. Its most notable accomplishment was to bring
down Italy's chronically high rate of inflation to a
relatively modest 6 percent, chiefly by reducing cost of
living adjustments in the face of Communist and trade union
resistance. Under Craxi's decisive leadership, the
coalition also made progress in tackling the country's
widespread economic inefficiencies, including curbing tax
evasion, and selling off parts of the bloated public sector.
These and other measures such as the liberalization of
capital and financial markets increased business confidence
and investment and enabled Italy to achieve a current growth
rate of about 3 percent, one of the fastest in Western
Europe.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
The coalition also scored an important success in
combatting domestic terrorism: last year there were only
about 30 incidents compared with an average of over 1,000 a
year in the late 1970s. In the foreign affairs area, the
coalition enhanced Italy's prestige within the Alliance by
allowing INF deployments in Sicily and expanded Italian
involvement in the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean region
by contributing to peacekeeping forces in Lebanon and the
Sinai. The coalition's one outstanding failure was its
inability to reduce the public sector deficit, which at over
12 percent of GDP is the highest among the major economic
powers and threatens the country's continued prosperity.
The acrimonious breakup of the coalition does not, in
our judgment, necessarily imply the collapse of that
governing formula. The Socialists, Christian Democrats, and
three smaller parties remain sufficiently close on most
domestic and foreign policy issues--even on civilian nuclear
energy and judicial reform, the ostensible causes of the
coalition's collapse--to permit compromise if they are so
inclined. The main stumbling block will again be control of
the Prime Ministership. The Christian Democrats are anxious
to recover the office after allowing Craxi to hold it for
four years, while Craxi fears both he and his party will be
totally overshadowed if the Christian Democrats were to
control the top spot.
An Issueless Campaign
The continuing broad substantive agreement among the
members of the former coalition--as well as the decline of
ideological differences in Italian politics--is illustrated
by the absence of any real debate on issues in the current
campaign. Both the Socialists and Christian Democrats have
taken the low road so far, concentrating on accusing each
other of intending to form a post-election alliance with the
Communists.
The only issue on which they have put forward detailed
proposals has been electoral law reform. The Socialists
have called for popular election of the President of the
Republic while the Christian Democrats have proposed that
coalitions must be formed prior to an election. These
proposals have kindled little enthusiasm among the
electorate, however, perhaps, because they are so blatantly
partisan: the Socialists are clearly trying to facilitate
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
Craxi's eventual elevation to the Presidency while the
Christian Democrats are seeking to prevent the Socialists
from trying to play them off against the Communists after
the election. Even the Communists are confining themselves
to the blandest of generalities, probably because they are
trying to support recent efforts to portray themselves as a
mod
t
era
e, mainstream party.
The Parties Weigh Their Chances
Italian voting patterns have traditionally been among
the most stable in the Western world, and we believe it
unlikely that any of the major political groupings will
experience large swings in this election, given the absence
of sharp divisions among the parties and general public
disinterest in a contest that is widely perceived to be the
result of maneuvering for narrow partisan advantage. Prior
to the breakdown of the five-party coalition, a variety of
electoral indicators--including party performance in local
government elections, opinion polls, and the overall
performance of the parties--suggested that both the
Christian Democrats and the Socialists could score modest
gains over their 1983 results in this election, while the
smaller parties and the Communists appeared likely to suffer
losses. Christian Democratic and Socialist optimism about
their electoral prospects was a key factor prompting Craxi
and Christian Democratic leader De Mita to harden their line
and force an early election.
o The Christian Democrats, who won just under 33
percent of the vote in 1983, appeared to have
reversed their decline in the 1985 local and
regional elections where they rose to 35 percent.
The party has also generally done well in
pre-election public opinion polls, scoring often in
the 35-to 36-percent range. Party leaders were also
buoyed by public approval of the five-party
coalition and may have been optimistic that De
Mita's reformist leadership, which has included the
appointment to prominent national posts of younger
leaders untainted by charges of corruption, has
improved the party's crumbling image.
o Although the Socialists won only 11.4 percent of the
vote in 1983, they are now scoring regularly in the
14-to-16 percent range in opinion polls. Craxi has
been the party's key asset: according to some
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
opinion surveys, as many as three out of five
Italians approve of Craxi's performance, and he has
been consistently rated the most effective Italian
politician. The Socialists' ability to translate
Craxi's popularity into substantive gains in this
election has always been in some doubt, however,
because the party has failed to make significant
progress in local elections held since 1983 and is
beset by a range of organizational problems that
could diminish its ability to get out the votes.
o The three smaller coalition parties have been
generally down in the polls and have failed in local
elections to match their combined 1983 showing of
12.1 percent. Some of the disenchanted Catholic
voters they won over from the Christian Democrats in
1983 appear to be returning to their traditional
party. The Social Democrats, moreover, may be
losing some traditional anti-Communist supporters
because their recently chosen leader, Franco
Nicolazzi, is trying to expand the party's base of
support by moving it to the left--for instance by
raising the possiblity of joining a coalition with
the Communists.
o The Communists, whose support dropped from their
all-time high of 34 percent in 1976 to just under 30
percent in 1983, suffered a double setback in 1985
when they fell back a further 2 percent in local and
regional elections and lost a referendum they had
sponsored. In pre-election polls, the party has
done no better than hold even at 30 percent, and in
some it has fallen back again to about 27 percent.
Perhaps the most glaring problem for the Communists
has been the decline in morale and the sense of
drift that has prevailed since the death of party
leader Enrico Berlinguer in 1984 and his replacement
by the rather gray party bureaucrat, Alessandro
Natta. The party has probably also been hurt by
settled economic conditions which discourage the
economic protest voting that often boosted the party
in the past.
Possible Confounding Factors
Party calculations about their prospects in the
election have been thrown into some question by several
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
recent developments. The most important has been the
acrimonious and premature breakup of the five party
coalition. Italian conventional political wisdom holds that
the party responsible for forcing an early election pays a
penalty at the polls. That penalty could be especially
severe this year due to the popularity of the coalition--
one poll has indicated that 65 percent of Italians believe
that the current election is unnecessary. Although the
Christian Democrats played the most prominent role in
forcing the election, recent polls suggest that the public
has seen through Craxi's backstage maneuvering and blames
both parties in equal measure for the breakup of the
.. F__ I
coal ; 4;
o
If both the Christian Democrats and the Socialists pay
an electoral penalty, the smaller parties which tap into the
same broad pool of centrist voters could benefit. The
Communists too, could gain from the current perception that
the pentapartito might not be able to regroup following the
election. For the first time since the late 1970s, there is
a possibility that the Communists could participate in
governance, and this prospect has improved the sagging
morale of party workers.
Communist Party fortunes may also have been given a
boost in recent months by Italian voters' increasingly
benign view of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's domestic
reforms and arms control initiatives have lent luster to a
more moderate image that could help the Communists retain
higher-income voters who have supported the party as a
potential instrument for socioeconomic reform rather than
for ideological or class reasons. It could also harm the
Christian Democrats who have traditionally been best able to
rally their supporters when they could portray themselves as
a bulwark
i
aga
nst a fear-inspiring Communist party.
A final confounding factor may be the appearance for
the first time of a "green" list on the ballot. The greens,
who are well-organized locally, won over 2 percent in local
elections held in 1985, and may have particular appeal for
younger leftist voters increasingly interested in
environmental questions. If the greens and the new leftist
Radical Party are able to go beyond the 2 percent gained by
the old radicals in 1983, they could cut significantly into
the vote that might otherwise go to the Socialists and
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303370001-2
Alternative Electoral Outcome Implications
Electoral prognostication is even more difficult for
Italy than for other West European countries because opinion
polls cannot accurately gauge the 1-to 3- point swing that
can mean the difference between "victory" and "defeat" for
each party in the Italian political context. Moreover,
Italian opinion polls are notoriously inaccurate; on 1 June,
Italy's premier polling agency, Doxa, announced that it
would not perform any surveys for the election because
respondents are so unwilling to indicate true preferences
that the results are inherently unreliable.
For what they are worth, the results of recent opinion
polls show (all plus or minus 2 to 3 percent):
o The Christian Democrats falling as low as 27 percent
or rising to about 36 percent.
o The Socialists rising to anywhere from about 13 to
15 percent.
o The combined vote of the three smaller coalition
parties falling to as little as 9 percent.
o The Communists either holding at 30 percent or
falling as low as 27 percent.
An informal survey taken by the Italian Interior
Ministry just before the dissolution of Parliament showed
local prefects predicting that the Christian Democrats and
the Communists will both fall about a point from 1983 levels
while the Socialists will gain about two points. Although
based solely on subjective judgments, this "poll" has
historically proven as accurate as any other.
Our own best "guesstimate" is that Craxi's popularity
and the effectiveness of his government will translate into
at least modest gains for the Socialists despite the party's
image and organizational problems. The Christian Democrats
may also record a slight increase in support as a portion of
those who defected in 1983 come back to the fold now that
the party appears somewhat less corrupt and divided, but
there is a chance they will falter if a disproportionate
number of voters punish them for the coalition's demise.
The smaller parties, which are beset by organizational and
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303370001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
25X1
identity problems, are likely to lose support. The
Communists, pressed by the Socialists in the south and by
the greens throughout the country, could drop below 30
percent, although they could conceivably still end up as the
largest party in the unlikely even the Christian Democrats
stumble badly. .
Restablishing the Five-Party Coalition
Whatever the electoral outcome, both the Socialists and
the Christian Democrats will most likely try to reconstruct
the five-party coalition, despite the acrimonious breakdown
of its predecessor and the harsh rhetoric over the past few
months. They are driven in that direction because nearly
all the alternatives to this formula require some form of
Communist involvement in governance.*
Although Craxi has publicly refused to rule out working
with the Communists after the election and the Christian
Democrats have been suspiciously careful about treading on
Communist sensitivities, both parties will avoid dealing
with the Communists except as a last resort. Craxi realizes
that ending the Communists' prolonged isolation from power
would give them a political boost that would ultimately harm
Socialist chances for gaining increased support on the left.
Christian Democratic leaders are aware that any attempt to
revive the mid-1970s "historic compromise" formula of
Christian Democratic-Communist cooperation would provoke
strong opposition from the more conservative elements in the
party.
It is theoretically possible that the Christian
Democrats, if they were to gain two to three percentage
points in this election, could form a government with the
smaller coalition parties and perhaps some minor regional
parties that could survive in Parliament by gaining the
outside support of the neo-fascist MSI. The Christian
Democrats governed very briefly and unsuccessfully with MSI
support in the late 1950s, but it is very questionable
whether they and especially the smaller parties would now be
willing to work even informally with the MSI because of its
reputed links to rightwing terrorism and its residual
fascist legacy.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
The reconstruction of the five-party coalition will not
be easily accomplished, however, because the Socialists and
the Christian Democrats are likely to clash once again over
coalition leadership. Barring an unexpected collapse in
their electoral support, the Christian Democrats will almost
certainly insist on reclaiming the Prime Ministership, with
De Mita, one of his allies, or possibly Andreotti as their
candidate. Craxi, an inveterate political risk-taker, will
probably reject this demand initially, if only to see
whether his obstinance will force the Christian Democrats to
cave in. The process of coalition formation could thus drag
on throughout the summer and involve several false starts.
The ultimate outcome of the Socialist-Christian
Democratic struggle will be heavily influenced by how they
and the other major parties fare in the election. If the
Socialists were to do unexpectedly well--gain at least three
percentage points--while the Christian Democrats only held
their own, then Craxi would be in a strong position to
recapture the Prime Ministership. Under these
circumstances, De Mita's claim to take over the top spot
would be weakened by harsh internal party criticism from
traditional factional leaders who never liked De Mita and
his party reform program in the first place. More broadly,
the party leadership would be concerned that this outcome
might permit a strengthened Craxi to form an alliance with
the smaller parties and the Communists, excluding the
Christian Democrats from national power and its attendant
patronage for the first time since World War II. Even so,
Craxi would have a hard time prevailing over Christian
Democratic enmity toward him to retake the top spot. He
might, however, gain Christian Democratic support for a
compromise candidate from one of the smaller parties, such
as Republican Party leader Spadolini, thereby at least
preventing the Christian Democrats from dominating the
If the Christian Democrats score a significant gain
while the Socialists falter, a triumphant De Mita would
probably have little trouble in brushing aside Socialist or
even internal Christian Democratic opposition and seizing
the Prime Ministership--or handing the job to a loyalist
such as Treasury Minister Goria or former parliamentary
leader Martinazzoli. Even the monumentally self-assured
Craxi would probably recognize that he had little claim to
the leadership under such circumstances. If he chose to
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303370001-2
fight, the decline in small party strength that would almost
certainly accompany a Christian Democratic advance would
probably sap the morale of the leadership, dashing any
effort by Craxi to form a front with them against the
If the Socialists and the Christian Democrats both gain
support, the outcome of their battle over the Prime
Ministership would become much less predictable. Both would
be likely to believe that their relative claims to the post
had been strengthened. Craxi might be somewhat more likely
to cave in eventually; he cannot afford to alienate the
Christian Democrats entirely because he will need some
Parliamentary support from them to achieve his ultimate
ambition of becoming President. More likely, the two
parties would compromise on a candidate from the smaller
parties. There is, however, a fair chance that a deadlock
would ensue, leading to the collapse of efforts to
reconstruct the five-party coalition.
A complete breakdown in negotiations between Socialists
and Christian Democrats would send both parties scrambling
to try to form a government on their own. Neither is
likely, at least initially, to seek a formal coalition with
the Communists in view of the political risks involved.
Instead, each will aim for a minority coalition with the
smaller parties--including, in the Socialists' case, the
radicals and greens. Their success would depend less on the
preferences of the smaller parties than on the attitude of
the Communist Party, whose support or acquiesence in
Parliament would be essential to the government's survival.
Whichever minority government emerges is likely to have an
extremely precarious existence because the Communists would
probably be unwilling to provide firm pledges of external
support even in exchange for concessions on
policy--especially if the party were to eclipse the
Christian Democrats and secure a plurality of the votes.
The party's earlier involvement in such an arrangement--the
historic compromise with the Christian Democrats in the late
1970s--led to internal discord and a loss of voter support.
A Socialist-Dominated Minority Coalition with Outside
PCI Support
The Communists would probably see clear advantages in
providing external support in Parliament for a Socialist-led
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303370001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303370001-2
coalition. They could portray this arrangement to their
supporters as a step toward the creation of a "democratic
alternative" coalition of all leftist forces, which is their
current declared political objective. More important, they
would probably view the unprecedented exclusion of the
Christian Democrats from national power as an historic
reshuffling of the Italian political deck that could create
new opportunities for them, especially among left-leaning
Christian Democratic voters. Finally, they would probably
hope to be able to exercise a strong influence over the
policy of the coalition, which would at best dispose of
about 30 percent of the votes in Parliament.
A Christian Democratic-Dominated Minority Coalition with
Outside PCI Support
The main advantage for the Communists of supporting a
Christian Democratic-led coalition would be that they would
avoid boosting Craxi, who makes no secret of his desire to
weaken and marginalize them. The Christian Democrats might
also be able to counter the apparent advantages of a
Socialist-led coalition by offering the Communists a deal on
reforming the electoral system that would work to the
advantage of both parties. The issue of electoral reform is
likely to become unavoidable following the next election
because the iconoclastic Radical Party will almost certainly
succeed in forcing a referendum in the next two years aimed
at abolishing the current proportional voting system.
Although the Communists have thus far responded cooly to
Christian Democratic proposals for modifying the electoral
system, both parties have a commom interest in working
toward a formula that would reward larger parties.
Policies and Implications
A reconstructed five-party coalition would generally
continue the foreign and domestic policies its predecessor
pursued, but it would probably be less cohesive and
effective in view of the worsened relations among its
On foreign policy, the coalition would support
continued Italian participation in SDI and would publicly
favor a zero-zero approach to INF reduction while adhering
to whatever consensus developed in NATO on this issue. The
coalition would press for an enhanced role for Italy in
Western political and economic councils--more intensely,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303370001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303370001-2
though, if the strong-willed Craxi rather than a Christian
Democrat or Republican leader Spadolini emerged as Prime
Minister. It would continue efforts to build bridges with
the more moderate forces in the Middle East and would tone
down earlier Italian courting of Libya and the PLO because
Craxi, who once favored these efforts, appears now to be
moving closer to Spadolini's skeptical view of these forces.
In the domestic area the coalition would probably
concentrate on reining in public spending. It would also
proceed with efforts to liberalize capital and financial
markets and sell off parts of the state industrial sector,
in the hope of stimulating investment in hi-tech industry,
an Italian weak spot. It would probably try to compromise
on the contentious nuclear energy question by imposing a
construction moratorium pending a safety review.
A Socialist-Led minority coalition with outside
Communist support would probably pursue foreign and domestic
policies similar to those of the five-party coalition,
albeit with some subtle but important differences. The key
figures in such a government would be Craxi and Spadolini,
and both would ensure that Italy remained a faithful US ally
and NATO partner. Moreover, the Communists would be anxious
to enhance their credentials as a responsible party and
demonstrate the genuineness of their move to a more
pro-Western stance. But the Communist party remains
neutralist and pacifist at heart and would therefore try to
prevent the government from allowing participation in SDI
research, permitting use of Italian military bases in
out-of-area operations, or accepting SRINF missiles if
pressed to do this by NATO. Domestically, the coalition
might have trouble even trying to rein in public spending,
because the Communists--perhaps supported by an emboldened
Socialist left-wing--would probably be reluctant to limit
wage increases or approve new restrictions on social
programs for lower income groups.
A Christian Democratic-led minority coalition would
also broadly continue five-party coalition policies and face
the same types of problems arising from dependence on
Communist support. Such a government might actually be less
likely to face down the Communists on issues such as SDI and
public spending than a Socialist-led government because its
potential leaders lack Craxi's strong will. It might also
try to pursue a more activist and independent policy in the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303370001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2 -
Arab-Israeli conflict. The Christian Democrat's chief
foreign policy expert, Andreotti, favors such a policy, and
he is likely to enjoy the enthusiastic support of the
Communists, who share his broadly pro-Arab views.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303370001-2
Italy: 1983 Election
Indicates member of government
Seats in Chamber of Deputies
Total seats 630
Other parties
50
Christian
Democrats
225
Communists
172
Socialists
73
Social
Movement
(Neo-Fascists)
42
Republicans
29
Liberals
2.9
Other parties
6.9
Christian
Democrats
32.9
Communists
29.9
Socialists
11.4
Social
Movement
(Neo Fascists)
6.8
Republicans
5.1
Social
Democrats
4.1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303370001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2
SUBJECT: Italy: The Election
Distribution:
1 - Nelson Ledsky, NSC
1 - Peter Sommer, NSC
1 - Richard Hecklinger, State
1 - Eric Melby, State
1 - William Bodde, State
1 - Diana Smith, State
1 - Michael Klosson, State
1 - Martin Van Heuven, State
1 - Anthony Kochanek, State
1 - Anna Borg, State
1 - Marcie Ries, State
1 - Barry Lowenkron, State
1 - Henry Myers, State
1 - Robert German, State
1 - Vivienne Ascher, State
1 - Robert Fauver, Treasury
1 - Wynfred Joshua, Defense
1 - George Bader, Defense
1 - Mark Shwartz, Defense
1 - Byron Jackson, Commerce
1 - DCI-DDCI Executive Staff
1 - NIC/AG
/5 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - MPS/PES
1 - D/EURA
1 - DD/EURA
1 - C/EURA/WE
1 - DC/EURA/WE
2 - EURA Production Staff
1 - EURA/WE Production File
and Its Implications
1 - EURA/WE/IIM Production File
EURA/WE/IIMJ
(08 June 1987)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303370001-2