WESTERN EUROPE: ONGOING COUNTERTERRORIST COOPERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 26, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303320001-7
oc N0 fUf /n 8120Q?Z
IR
P $ PD
26 June 1987
WESTERN EUROPE: ONGOING COUNTERTERRORIST COOPERATION
Summary
West European countries made some real strides in
counterterrorist cooperation over the past 12 months. Encouraging
signs have been manifested at all levels--multinational, bilateral,
and national. The European Community (EC) has imposed limited
sanctions against Libya and Syria, agreed to share more information
among its members, and examined ways to coordinate more uniform
extradition policies and border controls. Meanwhile, the Council of
Europe (COE) has provided a means of involving non-EC members in the
battle against terrorism. On a bilateral level, police and
intelligence services have become more willing to share information,
obstacles to extradition have been whittled down, and domestic
legislation has been stiffened.
Despite these encouraging shows of determination in combating
terrorism, West Europeans remain divided among themselves about the
,wisdom of moving too aggressively and following the US lead too
closely. Many politicians argue that to do so is to expose their
DATE 25X1
Issues and Applications Division, Office of European Analysio
This memorandum was prepared byl I the Office of Eurpean
Analysis. Questions and comments are welcome and may be addressed to Chief,
EUR M87-20082
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303320001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303320001-7
countries to terrorist retaliation, to endanger their political and
economic interests in the Third World, and to appear to be fronting
for Washington. Disclosures of deliveries of US arms to Iran and
media stories alleging that Syria--not Libya--was responsible for the
La Belle discotheque bombing in West Berlin last year have
strengthened the voices of those who argue for caution. Moreover,
recent major counterterrorist successes against terrorist groups--in
Spain and France, for example--coupled with a general decrease in
terrorist activity in Europe also have removed some of the urgency
that enabled governments to expand their powers to combat terrorism.
West European governments are generally supportive of a more
sustained and systematic policy of cooperation against terrorism and
are cognizant of the public benefits of a high counterterrorist
profile. The UK in particular has sustained a vigorous antiterrorist
policy against countries such as Libya and Syria, and Italy has
signed antiterrorist accords with a number of countries. In general,
European leaders will press ahead with regional and bilateral
cooperation but will move cautiously in enacting further
antiterrorist legislation that might cause judicial and political
controversy and complicate policy coordination in multilateral
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303320001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7
Multilateral Vehicles for European Counterterrorist Cooperation
The European Community
The Trevi Group of interior and justice ministers is one of the two main
vehicles for promoting cooperation among the members of the EC. The group is
chaired by the country holding the revolving six-month presidency of the EC, an
arrangement which makes for variations in the intensity with which the Group
pursues its tasks. Belgian Justice Minister Gol succeeded this year in setting
up a small permanent administrative office for Trevi, which should help to
counteract the disruption caused by the rotating chairmanship. He also
continued a number of initiatives begun earlier, particularly on strengthening
controls to prevent the movement of terrorists across international borders. A
working group on immigration is exploring methods of curtailing the flow of
asylum seekers, and the Twelve are exchanging information on terrorist suspects
through a secure communications network
The most recent Trevi meeting this April outlined new moves to include
information about thefts of arms and explosives and forged passports in data
exchanges. Participants also agreed to propose making airlines and shipping
companies responsible for people arriving without proper documents. West
Germany and Denmark already have such laws, and the British recently passed
EPC Working Group on Terrorism. A second major vehicle for cooperation
within the EC is a group established by the EC Foreign Ministers in 1986. It
functions as one of the regular working groups in European Political
Cooperation (EPC)--the member states' foreign policy coordination system.
Organizational matters are still being resolved, however, and the working
relationship with the Trevi group has yet to be clarified.
EC Foreign Ministers. State-sponsored terrorism has come under increasing
scrutiny in the EC. Minor sanctions were agreed by the EC Foreign Ministers
against Libya in April and against Syria in November 1986 (see Annex A). Most
members, however, remain hesitant about applying strong measures--economic
sanctions or breaking diplomatic relations, for example--because of their
political and economic stakes in these countries. Even though EC sanctions
theoretically remain in place, relations with Syria appear to be warming, and
Belgium and West Germany have returned their ambassadors to Damascus. Syrian
claims of a shutdown of Abu Nidal activites in Syria is likely to give some
additional impetus toward improving relations with EC countries. Only the
British have remained adamant in their opposition to any relaxation of EC
sanctions
A noteworthy development has been the willingness of EC members
occasionally to forgo consensus. The Foreign Ministers condemned Syria last
November and the Trevi group agreed on a terrorist threat assessment for
Western Europe in December even though Greece refused to sign the formal
documents in either case. Greece, citing its aversion to "naming names" on
terrorism, probably will continue to set itself apart on this issue.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7
EC Judicial Cooperation Working Group. This EC group has made some
progress in efforts to simplify extradition proceedings, which in most cases
are lengthy and complicated. A proposed new procedure would involve a simple
telefax request sent by one Ministry of Justice to another. Since the proposal
is being submitted to each country's judicial specialists to consider questions
of sovereignty, however, agreement probably will be delayed for several months.
Cooperation with the US and Other Non-Members
While the United States has no formal relationship with EC groups, it does
receive briefings on proceedings. Attorney General=Meese has met three times
with the Trevi troika--the past, current, and next chairman--most recently in
Brussels in April 1987. Austria and Canada are consulting also with the
troika, and Switzerland has indicated it wishes to do so. The thoroughness of
briefings has varied according to the disposition of the presiding country. In
our judgment the Danes, who chair the group next, may not be as forthcoming as
the Belgians and British have been. The US will be allowed to participate in
technical conferences such as those held by airport security chiefs and special
intervention units and may be asked to share information with Trevi specialists
preparing threat assessments.
The EPC working group also has a formal mechanism for contacts with third
countries, but consultations require prior approval by the Political Committee.
Working-level exchanges with countries such as the United States are frowned
upon by some members--particularly France--which views cooperation with the US
as less important than intra-European cooperation. The United States is often
able to obtain informal readouts of meetings, but more extensive official
contacts are unlikely.
Council of Europe
The 21-member Council of Europe* also has stepped up its counterterrorist
activities. The COE's resolutions are non-binding, but they have served to
exert moral pressure on European capitals to coordinate their actions against
terrorism. A COE ministerial conference on terrorism last November, for
example, coincided with EC debates on Syrian involvement in terrorism and
produced a declaration condemning terrorism and a resolution on abuse of
diplomatic privileges. Participants agreed to tighten the implementation of
the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, which limit the
size of diplomatic missions and stress that the premises of a mission not be
used in a manner incompatible with its functions. Although no countries were-
*In addition to the twelve EC members--Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and West Germany--the Council of Europe includes Austria, Cyprus,
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7
cited specifically,' members agreed they would endeavor to adopt anoint
position with regard to states that encourage acts of terrorism.
The COE also has made progress in bringing all its members under the 1977
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, also known as the
Strasbourg Convention. This convention states that specific violent crimes
such as hijacking, hostage taking, and attacks on internationally protected
persons are to be considered extraditable crimes. Many countries have until
now refused to extradite offenders who have claimed that their acts were
"political offenses." The last holdouts--Malta, France, Greece, and
Ireland--have now signed the convention and indicated their intention to ratify
it. Irish ratification may be delayed pending discussion with the British on
the controversial no-jury tribunals in Northern Ireland. France has said it
will ratify with reservations protecting the right of asylum, as have about
half the signatories, thus limiting the positive effects of their adherence.
Justice ministry officials who formed a new COE committee on terrorism met
for the first time in January--and again in March--but made little headway.
The committee is charged with developing proposals for closer counterterrorist
cooperation among member states, devising ways to impede the movement of
terrorists, cooperating with the EC, and informing non-members about ongoing
efforts. At the March meeting the group concentrated on using existing
committees--such as a public international law committee and one on the
movement of persons--to further its work. Full reports are expected at a June
committee meeting that will review national legislation on terrorism. The
Council of Ministers has yet to resolve the question of cooperation with
Non-EC members clearly want an increased role for the Council. Most EC
states, however, are reluctant to expand the COE's antiterrorism role and
prefer the Trevi group as the primary vehicle for counterterrorist cooperation.
They consider the COE too large and unwieldy a forum for effective operational
cooperation and are particularly hesitant to include in their deliberations
countries such as Malta and Cyprus, which have close ties to some radical Arab
One previously neglected area in which the Council may have some impact is
media coverage of terrorism. After a contentious debate at its January
session, the COE's Council of Ministers agreed that the Secretary General
should contact European media organizations with an eye toward agreement on
guidelines for journalists covering terrorist events.
Economic Summit
Terrorism has been increasingly discussed since the late 1970s in the
annual Economic Summit held by Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany. Past Summits issued the 1978
Bonn Declaration on aircraft hijacking, the 1980 Venice Declaration on the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303320001-7
protection of diplomats, and last year's Tokyo statement on terrorism. (See
Annex B) 25X1
This year's Venice Summit expanded the Bonn Declaration to cover all forms
of terrorism against civil aviation and to include future aviation conventions.
(See Annex C). Agreement by the Summit Seven experts' group was finally
reached in March after the French reversed a prior decision not to participate.
Stiffening the Bonn Declaration, which commits the Seven to suspend air traffic
with any country that fails to extradite or prosecute suspected hijackers,
fulfilled a commitment made at the Tokyo Summit.
Such declarations are not legally binding, however. The only action ever
taken by Economic Summit members under the Bonn Declaration--a ainst Arians
Afghan airlines--had little appreciable impact.
Bilateral Cooperation
In our judgment, one of the most significant developments in bilateral
cooperation over the past year has been a trend toward facilitating
extradition. Of all the West European countries, France perhaps has been most
reluctant to compromise its historic traditions as an asylum for political
dissidents of all stripes. These attitudes have now begun to change,
indicating the growth of a European consensus in favor of strong action against
French willingness to expel Spanish militants belonging to ETA, the Basque
terrorist group, is a notable instance of improved bilateral cooperation. The
new Chirac government has used an administrative procedure to return over 60
Basques to Spain over the past year, marking a reversal of previous government
insistence on treating these individuals as "political" dissidents. France had
previously extradited three Basques to Spain in 1984 as a gesture of support
for Spanish democracy, but this had remained an isolated gesture. The French
also have continued to expel ETA members to countries other than Spain,
including the first person with formal status as a political refugee ever to be
expelled from France.
The French have also begun to arrest and expel some known Italian
terrorists, thus smoothing somewhat the troubled bilateral relations in that
area. They may also extradite or expel several Red Brigades suspects captured
recently. Rome had become increasingly critical of the French failure to act
on more than 100 extradition requests. Paris also agreed to extradite Odfried
Hepp--after he served a sentence for carrying a false passport--from France to
West Germany. It is significant that one of the charges for which Hepp was
extradited was membership in a terrorist society; previously France interpreted
the 1951 extradition treaty in a restrictive fashion with regard to terrorist
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303320001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303320001-7
Growing bilateral cooperation between ministers responsible for internal
security is another positive development. Italian Interior Minister Scalfaro
has actively pursued accords with the US, France, Austria, Greece, Turkey,
Egypt, Spain, and Morocco in an attempt to dispel Italy's reputation for
"softness" toward terrorists. These accords cover international terrorism,
organized crime, and drug trafficking. In addition, the interior ministers of
France and West Germany concluded an antiterrorist agreement in April 1987 that
provides for the display of "wanted" posters in both countries and the possible
exchange of liaison officers. Bonn and Paris also pledged to discuss
"cross-border surveillance." In addition to signing a counterterrorist
agreement, France and Spain recently initiated a joint commission to prepare
border control agreements. We expect conern over the influx of asylum seekers
and the mobility of terrorists to lead to new bilateral arrangements regulating
borders, even though one EC goal is free movement for citizens of the twelve
member countries.
Bilateral negotiations for new extradition treaties were begun or concluded
between a number of countries over the past year. Many older treaties are so
dated that modern crimes, such as terrorism and drug trafficking, are not
listed as extraditable offenses. These newer treaties generally broaden the
conditions under which offenders can be extradited and narrow the "political
offense exception" by removing political motives for certain violent crimes
such as murder and hijacking as grounds for denying extradition.
In Britain, Parliament is enacting a bill to overhaul the UK law on
extradition. The principal change contained in the bill is the abolition of
the requirement that a foreign government must prove a prima facie case against
the defendant in British courts before extradition can be approved. Passage of
this law will make it easier to implement recent extradition treaties. The UK
ratified a new extradition treaty with Spain and signed one with Italy in March
1986. No bilateral agreement with Spain to regulate extradition had existed
since Spain denounced a 1978 agreement, and the treaty between Italy and the
United Kingdom replaced one dating from 1873. In the past the UK had often
denied Italian extradition requests because the evidence was not judged
convincing or was not an offense under British law.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303320001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7
Cooperation with the United States
American initiatives have been instrumental in bolstering the willingness
of West Europeans to cooperate with the US on extradition matters. The US
Senate ratified a supplementary extradition treaty with the United Kingdom in
July 1986 aimed primarily at facilitating the extradition of members of the
outlawed Provisional Irish Republican Army accused of terrorist acts. The
treaty sharply circumscribes the ability of American courts to deny extradition
by upholding a defendant's claim that his crime is politically motivated. At
the same time, it does permit a court to block an extradition if it believes
the accused would not receive a fair trial because of "race, religion,
nationality or political opinions."
Other US initiatives to modernize treaties have resulted in the signing in
April 1987 of a new treaty with Belgium, which replaces one dating from 1901,
and a supplementary extradition treaty with Spain. The treaty with Spain
includes a comprehensive limitation of the political crimes defense and
obligates both signatories to prosecute domestically in cases where extradition
is denied. There also are ongoing talks between the United States and Austria,
Switzerland, France, and Luxembourg.
US-French negotiations have been prolonged and, to date, unproductive.
There has been some evolution in French jurisprudence and policy toward a more
restrictive interpretation of the political motivation arguments when used in
defense of terrorists; still the French believe there is a need to consider
such circumstances as "historical grievances" or the morality of returning
suspects to a repressive regime. Earlier this year the US modified its
proposal in an effort to move forward on the treaty negotiations, but the
French have not yet responded.
The US request to extradite Mohammed Ali Hammadi from West Germany for
complicity in the TWA 847 hijacking has been a particularly sensitive
extradition case. Initially Bonn appeared ready to agree, but the kidnaping of
two West Germans in Beirut last January made the Kohl government reluctant to
meet US requests. Bonn announced its refusal to extradite on 24 June; instead
Hammadi will be tried in West Germany on charges of murder and air piracy.
Concern for their hostages also makes it unlikely that Bonn will issue an
international arrest warrant for the Syrian intelligence officer implicated in
last year's bombing of the German-Arab Friendship Society in West Berlin. Bonn
clearly would like to avoid alienating Damascus while pressing for assistance
in freeing the hostages.
Cooperation with the Soviet Union
The Soviet Union has taken some tentative steps toward negotiating
extradition treaties with several Western governments that would provide for
the return of terrorist suspects. Discussions with the French, Italians,
Canadians, British, and West Germans are unlikely to result in any formal
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7
accords because of the Soviet concept of "automatic" extradition. The
Europeans worry that political dissidents might be termed terrorists and would
have to be turned over to the Soviets without even a hearing.
Domestic Legislation.
Upsurges in violence also impelled some West European governments to enact
tougher domestic legislation last year. West Germany
In December
the Bundestag approved legal measures which classified sabotage on railway
lines, and plants and firms in the energy supply sector, as punishable
.terrorist offenses. The legislation also gave federal and state police
authorities direct access to the central traffic information system to speed up
the search for escape vehicles and expanded the competencies of the federal
prosecutor to make him responsible for foreign terrorist groups. A
controversial provision that would have provided immunity for suspected
terrorists whose testimony assists in the conviction of other terrorists was
dropped, but a state's witness provision remains a serious consideration.
Total amnesty would not be granted for murder, however.
France has experienced violence from both internal groups and foreign
extremists operating on French soil. A national security council to deal with
terrorism composed of concerned ministers--Foreign Affairs, Justice, Interior,
Public Security, and Defense--was set up in April 1986 and met frequently
during the wave of bombings in September. Paris' response to the bombings
.included mandatory visa checks for foreigners--except for EC nationals and the
Swiss, random identity and security checks in public places, and deployment of
troops along French borders to combat illegal immigration. According to the
Public Security minister, after procedures for expelling illegal foreign
residents were simplified, more than 1700 foreigners were thrown out of France
in a six-week period during September and October 1986.
New laws passed last September extended the period of preventive detention
from two to four days and gave the French government the right to dissolve
foreign associations "gravely disturbing the peace." The government will also
be able to reduce prison sentences of convicted terrorists willing to inform on
their accomplices, while cash rewards have been offered to those who inform
police about suspicious persons. To avoid the thorny problem of giving a legal
definition to "terrorism," the law states that certain offenses will be
prosecuted as terrorism when they are "linked with an individual or collective
enterprise for the purpose of undermining public order through intimidation or
terror". Those accused of such offenses are referred to a court made up of
seven professional magistrates, until now used only for espionage cases. This
type of court sentenced LARF leader Georges Abdallah and, more recently, Direct
Action member Regis Schleicher to life imprisonment.
In contrast to the toughening of legislation in France and West Germany,
Belgium is encountering delays in passing a package of judicial reforms that
include legalized wiretapping, more stringent gun controls, and freer use of
75X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7
arms by police. Italy and Spain--where the terrorist threat has appeared to be
ebbing--are moderating some of their strong antiterrorist laws. Madrid intends
to lower the number of days a suspect can be kept in preventive detention, and
Rome just approved a new law aimed at reducing the sentences of repentant
terrorists who have renounced their former ideology. On balance, however, both
Rome and Madrid will continue to pursue relatively tough policies.
Outlook. Continued disclosures of links among terrorist groups, the
desire to convince their publics of their determination to take effective
action, and the hostage situation in Lebanon will continue to focus attention
on terrorism in Western Europe this year and are likely to force West European
governments to press ahead in counterterrorist efforts.
Thus, practical cooperation in such areas as the theft and forgery of
passports, more effective arrangements for extradition, and a more unified
approach to the problems of illegal immigration and abuse of the right of
asylum can be expected to continue. The EC, for example, plans to simplify
frontier procedures within the Community but will attempt to strengthen
controls at external frontiers. Many EC countries are already enforcing
stricter travel controls, but are unlikely to go along with France's
requirement for entry visas for citizens of non-EC nations.
EC members have been less hesitant than in the past in publicly condemning
nations sponsoring terrorism but see economic sanctions as being both
ineffective and largely unenforceable. They are even more opposed to military
retaliation; most do not agree with US claims that the attack against Libya
last year was legally justifiable as "self-defense" under the UN Charter.
Barring new revelations of state involvement in terrorism or the prospect of
unilateral action by the US or another power, they probably will avoid taking
any additional steps.
Governments probably will move slowly in introducing further antiterrorist
legislation for fear of negative political consequences. Civil libertarians
are voicing concern that, in combating terrorists, governments are shifting too
much power to the state and the police. Even though West Germany became the
first European country to introduce an identity card that can be read by
computers, its introduction was delayed for four years because of strong
opposition by civil liberties groups. The French have expressed similar
reservations about a planned computerized identity card and the new non-jury
courts.
The increased willingness of police forces and intelligence services to
share information marks a departure from traditional attitudes and has
contributed to a number of recent arrests of terrorist suspects in Italy,
Spain, and France. Long-standing problems of competition, rivalry, overlapping
responsibilities, and confusion remain, however. For example, France and Italy
still lack a central counterterrorist coordinator with authority over the
various services and components that deal with terrorism. Many states also
lack the financial and personnel resources to implement far-reaching
counterterrorist policies.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303320001-7
. While there are some prospects for constructive activity at a bilateral and
regional level, cooperation in multilateral organizations probably will
continue to be limited. Even where agreements can be reached, variations in
legal systems and domestic policy considerations often create enforcement
problems. We believe strong collective action will be elusive in organizations
such as the Council of Europe and the Summit Seven, where declarations are not
legally binding.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303320001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7
EC Foreign Ministers Counterterrorist Actions in 1986
January 27. The Ministers decided to establish a permanent working body to
promote and monitor common action to discourage terrorism, particularly in the
areas of security at airports, ports and railway stations; visa and border
controls; and abuse of diplomatic immunity. They also agreed to ban the export
of military equipment to countries that support terrorism, and to try to
prevent their citizens and industries from taking commercial advantage of
antiterrorism sanctions.
April 14-21. The Ministers met at the request of Italy and Spain, following
Libyan threats to attack targets in those countries. They agreed to restrict
the movements of Libyan diplomats, reduce their numbers, and demand stricter
visa requirements of Libyan nationals. The ministers met again April 17 in
Paris and urged the US not to strike Libya again. On April 21 the foreign
ministers met in Luxembourg and agreed to additional measures. The new steps,
adopted over the objections of Greece, included:
-- A "significant" reduction in the number of Libyan diplomatic personnel
and missions in the EC and of EC diplomats in Libya.
-- Restrictions on the movement of Libyan diplomats within the EC,
including travel prohibitions confining them to the capitals or cities
where Libyan missions are situated.
-- A study on the number of Libyans nationals working in other Libyan
organizations like airlines or trade offices.
-- The expulsion of all Libyans suspected of terrorism and a ban on their
residing anywhere else in the EC.
November 10. After the UK broke off diplomatic relations with Syria, the
Ministers--unable to reach agreement on 28 October--finally agreed to implement
a package of sanctions against Syria, including banning arms sales, suspending
high-level visits, curbs on Syrian diplomatic activity, and tighter security
around the state-run Syrian Arab airlines.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303320001-7
Bonn Economic Summit Declaration (July 1978)
The heads of state and government, concerned about terrorism and the taking
of hostages, declare that their governments will intensify their joint efforts
to combat international terrorism.
To this end, in cases where a country refuses extradition or prosecution of
those who have hijacked an aircraft and/or do not return such aircraft, the
heads of state and government are jointly resolved that their governments
should take immediate action to cease all flights to that country.
At the same time, their governments will initiate action to halt all
incoming flights from that country or from any country by the airlines of the
country concerned. The heads of state and government urge other governments to
join them in this commitment.
At the June 1984 London Summit members pledged:
-- closer cooperation and coordination between police and security
organisations and other relevant authorities, especially in the exchange
of information, intelligence and technical knowledge;
-- scrutiny by each country of gaps in its national legislation which might
be exploited by terrorists;
-- use of the powers of the receiving state under the Vienna Convention in
such matters as the size of diplomatic missions, and the number of
buildings enjoying diplomatic immunity;
-- action by each country to review the sale of weapons to states
supporting terrorism;
-- consultation and as far as possible cooperation over the expulsion or
exclusion from their countries of known terrorists, including persons of
diplomatic status involved in terrorism.
At the May 1986 Tokyo Summit leaders issued a joint statement vowing to fight
terrorism "relentlessly and without compromise." While singling out Libya by
name as a target for action, it stopped short of imposing economic sanctions.
Six political and diplomatic actions were set forth that the summit nations
could take against nations supporting terrorism. These measures included:
-- a ban on arms exports;
-- strict restrictions and possible closure of diplomatic missions;
-- improved extradition procedures;
13
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303320001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303320001-7
-- the denial of entry into any of the seven countries of terrorist
suspects, including diplomats, banned from one of the others;
-- stricter immigration and visa requirements; and
-- the closest possible cooperation between police and security services.
Members also agreed to make the 1978 Bonn Declaration more effective in
dealing with terrorism affecting civil aviation.
25X1
- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303320001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7
Venice Summit Terrorism Statement (June 1987)
We, the Heads of State or Government of seven major democracies and the
Representatives of the European Community assembled here in Venice, profoundly
aware of our peoples' concern at the threat posed by terrorism:
Reaffirm our commitment to the statements on terrorism made at previous
Summits, in Bonn, Venice, Ottawa, London and Tokyo,
resolutely condemn all forms of terrorism including aircraft hijackings and
hostage-taking, and reiterate our belief that whatever its motives, terrorism
has no justification,
confirm the commitment of each of us to the principle of making no
concessions to terrorists or their sponsors,
remain resolved to apply, in respect of any state clearly involved in
sponsoring or supporting international terrorism, effective measures within the
framework of international law and in our own jurisdictions,
welcome the progress made in international cooperation against terrorism
since we last met in Tokyo in May 1986, and in particular the initiative taken
by France and Germany to convene in May in Paris a meeting of ministers of nine
countries, who are responsible for counterterrorism,
reaffirm our determination to combat terrorism both through national
measures and through international cooperation among ourselves and with others,
when appropriate, and therefore renew our appeal to all like-minded countries
to consolidate and extend international cooperation in all appropriate fora,
will continue our efforts to improve the safety of travellers. We welcome
improvements in airport and maritime security, and encourage the work of the
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) and IMO (International
Maritime Organization) in this regard.
Each of us will continue to monitor closely the activities of airlines
which raise security problems. The heads of state of Government have decided
on measures, annexed to this statement, to make the 1978 Bonn Declaration more
effective in dealing with all forms of terrorism affecting civil aviation,
and commit ourselves to support the rule of law in bringing terrorists to
justice. Each of us pledges increased cooperation in the relevant fora and
within the framework of domestic and international law on the investigation,
apprehension and prosecution of terrorists.
In particular, we reaffirm the principle established by relevant
international conventions of trying or extraditing, according to national laws
and those international conventions, those who have perpetrated acts of
terrorism.
The following annex was released with the statement:
They recall that in their Tokyo statement of International Terrorism they
agreed to make the 1978 Bonn Declaration more effective in dealing with all
forms of terrorism affecting civil aviation. To this end, in cases where a
,~ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303320001-7
country refuses extradition or prosecution of those who have committed offenses
described in the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation and/or does not return the aircraft
involved, the heads of state and government are jointly resolved that their
governments shall take immediate action to cease all flights to that country.
At the same time, their governments will initiate action to halt all
incoming flights from that country or from any country by the airlines of the
country concerned.
The heads of state and government intend also to extend the Bonn
Declaration in due time to cover any future relevant amendment to the above
convention or any other aviation Conventions relating to the extradition or
prosecution of the offenders.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303320001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7
DDI/EURA/IA/RPI
24 June 87
SUBJECT: Western Europe: Ongoing Counterterrorist Cooperation
Distribution
External:
Bowman H. Miller, State
Eugene Price, State
Mark Steinitz, State
Harry Gilmore, State
Ray Caldwell, State
Barry Lowenkron, State
Martin Van Heuven, State
Robert Homme, State
James Cooper, State
Edward A. Casey, Jr., State
Lynn Lambert, State
Marshall Carter-Tripp, State
Mark Lissfelt, State
Walter Andrusyszyn, State
Michael A. Morse, FAA
Tom McNamara, NSC
Barry Keeley, NSC
Tyrus Cobb, NSC
Peter R. Sommer, NSC
Fritz Ermarth, NSC
Frank Gaffney, DoD
John Maresca, DoD
George Bader, DoD
Dr. Wynfred Joshua, DoD
Internal
1 - O/DCI-DDCI Exec Staff
1 - NIO Europe
1 - DDI
1 - DI/PES
1 - D/EURA
1 - C/EURA/IA
1 - C/EURA/IA/RPI
2 - EURA/PS
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - Originator
1 - EURA/IA/RPI Chrono
17
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303320001-7