FINLAND: ELECTION POLITICS AND PERSONALITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000302930001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 10, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90T00114R000302930001-1 ^25X1
DAT 7 /'//-&-
D NO ,~,Gt aoO3~
OIR 3
P $
c igcncc gcncy
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
10 March 1987
Finland: Election Politics and Personalities
Summary
Finnish Prime Minister Sorsa's center-left
coalition government faces parliamentary election on
15-16 March, in which personalities and jockeying for
position in next year's presidential elections appear
more important than issues. The voting will provide a
testing ground for the competition between Prime
Minister Sorsa, Chairman of the SDP, and Foreign
Minister Vayrynen, Chairman of the Center Party, both
of whom would like to be president. Vayrynen will run
against President Koivisto in the 1988 presidential
election, although he is likely to lose; Sorsa will
probably attempt to succeed fellow Social Democrat
Ko
ivisto by running for president in the 1994 election.
F __1
Sorsa's Social Democratic Part
(SDP
y
) dominat th
ese
current coalition and is likely to be the major partner
in a post election coalition government; only an
extremely strong showing in the Conservative party is
likely to shake SDP dominance. Privatization of state
enterprises, tax reform, and the future of nuclear
power will probably be among the major domestic issues
facing the next government, but none of the parties
have made them contentious election issues. Regardless
of the outcome of the parliamentary elections, Finnish
foreign policy will continue the traditional consensus
of armed neutrality, balanced relations with the US and
Office of European AnalysisP e y
Questilons and comments are welcome
O
a fd may be addressed to
Division Chief, West European
This memorandum was pre ar d b
EUR-M87-20039
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90T00114R000302930001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
Soviet Union, and closer economic ties to Western
Europe and the Nordic countries. The so called
Paasikivi- Kekkonen policy of good neighborly relations
with the USSR will remain the main pillar of Helsinki's
foreign policy; only in the unlikely event of a
Conservative-dominated government could Fenno-Soviet
Issues and Personalities
Because there is a general consensus on foreign policy and on
most domestic issues and because the president selects the prime
minister, Finnish politics tend to be highly personalized.
Most observers regard the parliamentary election as a prelude to
the more important presidential contest next year. Koivisto of
the Social Democratic Party remains the most popular figure in
Finnish politics and will likely win the presidential election in
1988. According to recent polls, about 57 percent of the Finns
favor Koivisto, and he will receive substantial support from
members of the Center and Conservative Parties, despite the fact
that each of these parties will nominate its own presidential
candidate. The personal rivalry which highlights the March
parliamentary elections has focused on current Prime Minister and
Social Democratic Chairman, Kalevi Sorsa, and Finnish Foreign
Minister and Center Party Chairman, Paavo Vayrynen. Both Sorsa
and Vayrynen would like to be president after Koivisto, and
traditionally the prime ministership has been the stepping stone
to the presidency. Although Vayrynen is already the announced
Center Party candidate for the 1988 presidential election, he
nonetheless covets the prime ministership in any coalition the
Center Party might join after the March elections. Prime
Minister Sorsa has taken the position that no announced candidate
for the presidency in 1988 should be prime minister in 1987--a
shaft aimed at Varyrynen. In our view, the Sorsa-Vayrynen
rivalry will play a major role in the post-election bargaining,.
and in the shape of the n
ew government.,
Changes within the parties have enlivened the interparty
competition for the parliamentary elections. Although Green
candidates have matched the gains of similar European
environmental groups in the pre-election polls, there has been a
decline in support for the Finnish left in general; the formal
split in the Finnish Communist Party (SKP) into a minority
Stalinist faction (SKP-Y) and a majority Eurocommunist faction
= Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
 F,~ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90T00114R000302930001-1
25X1
Party Support in Finland (percent of respondents)
Conservatives
(KOK or National
Coalition Party)
Center Party/
Liberals (KESK
or KEPU)
Communist/
Popular Demo-
cratic Front
Social Demo-
crats.(SDP)
Election
March May May Jan Nov Seats in
1983 1984 1985 1986 1986* Parliament (as of 3/87)
26.7 24.9 25.2 25.6 25.9
22.1 20.4 22.7 23.9 23.8
16.6 17.7 19.9 19.7 18.5
14.0 12.6 11.9 11.7 10.4
Rural Party 9.7 9.6 6.2 5.5 4.9 17
(SMP)
Swedish People's 4.9 4.8 4.7 5.4 n/a 11
Party (RKP)
Christian League. 3.0 2.8 3.4 3.3 n/a 3
(SKL)
Greens 1.5 6.7* 5.4* 4.3* 5.0* , 2
Rightest Con- 0.4 0.5 0.6.. 0.6 n/a
s'titutionalists
(POP)
*May include other parties; reporting is unclear
**November 1986 reporting is incomplete.
Source: Suomen Gallup OY
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90T00114R000302930001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
(SKP) has splintered the communist vote.* At the same time, a
center-right combination is becoming a more realistic
possibility. So far, each of the three main parties (Social
Democratic, Center, and Conservative) has avoided preelection
deals with the other parties to form a government. The
Conservative Party (known also as the National Coalition Party)
has moderated its position on privatizing nationalized
industries, and publicly has supported friendly relations with
the USSR--steps designed to make the Conservatives a credible
coalition partner for the Social Democrats or the Center Party.
The Economy and the Elections
The sparseness of debate in the campaign reflects the general
stability of the Finnish economy. Finland has successfully
undergone a transition from an agrarian-based economy before
World War II to an increasingly high-tech industrial and service
economy. The absence of salient issues also reflects the
electorate's preference in recent decades for broad coalition
governments that dilute the differences among parties. None of
the parties seriously challenges the role,of the government in
providing social welfare programs, although the SDP tries to draw
ideological distinctions between itself and the Conservatives.
In fact, both the Conservatives and the SDP increasingly have an
urban, middle-class constituency, which tends to blur the
distinctions between the philosophy of the two parties when
policies are actually implemented.
Short-run indicators have provided little ammunition for any
of the main parties to sustain a campaign either against current
policies or in favor of major shifts in policy. For example,
although GDP grew at only 2 percent in 1986, recent forecasts
have displayed optimism that growth may reach 3 to 4 percent in
1987. In addition, the joint government-labor Committee on
Incomes Policy recently reported that real household disposable
incomes rose by 2.5 percent in 1986 and may increase by 4.,.5
percent in 1987. These gains are attributable mainly to lower
inflation--down from 5.9 percent in 1985 to 3.6 percent in
1986--and to adjustments in income tax rates to offset inflation.
*The current total parliamentary strength of the Communists
is 17 seats for the majority Eurocommunists and 10-for the
Stalinist minority. The Communists will probably lose 10 to 11
,_ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90T00114R000302930001-1
Although unemployment has risen--primarily because of the
negative impact on trade with the USSR following the 1986 oil
price collapse(see Appendix B)--an improved outlook for the labor
market is probably minimizing the electorate's focus on
joblessness as an election issue. While unemployment rose from
6.3 percent in 1985 to as high as 7.7 percent in February 1986,
the overall 1986 rate was about 7 percent. In October, Vayrynen
predicted "mass unemployment" if wage earners did not forego pay
increases awarded in last spring's settlements. This warning,
however--which was probably part of Vayrynen's campaign of
attacking his Social Democratic coalition partners for allegedly
risking economic growth by not doing enough to maintain trade
with the USSR--alienated Vayrynen from the other parties and even
from many members of his own party. The preeminence of achieving 25X1
consensus, in fact, proved to be the main constraint on
Vayrynen'aggressive efforts to stake out a unique position.
There are several economic issues that could emerge after
formation of the next government, but they have not yet
significantly influenced the low-risk, personality-dominated
campaign. For example, the next government may begin to examine
whether to privatize some of Finland's 19 state-owned firms, and
may assess the impact of an increasingly internationalized and
technological economy on Finland's national identity.
Finnish-Soviet trade has emerged briefly in political rhetoric
and will almost certainly continue to be of prime concern to
Finnish policymakers, especially as the 1989 expiration of the
current five-year framework trade agreement approaches. Other
economic issues--including the deregulation of financial markets
and foreign exchange laws, tightening controls on reexport of US
technology to ensure continued access to it, controlling
inflation to improve competitiveness, and determining the furture
of the nuclear energy program--have not been given much attention
during the campaign, but they will certainly continue to be
central to Finnish policy. The Conservatives have joined the SDP
and the Center Party in voicing opposition to a fifth nuclear
power plant, although the Conservatives would probably be quick
to reverse course if public sentiment shifted more favorably
Possible Post-Election Scenarios
Several post-election coalitions are possible, and while we
,expect the Social Democrats to continue their predominance, in
our view the Center Party could be the pivotal party in forming a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90T00114R000302930001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
new government. If the competition between Vayrynen and Sorsa
can be muted, the Center Party will continue to be a viable
partner for the SDP. If these differences cannot be resolved,
however, Vayrynen may decide that a Center Party alliance with
the Conservatives would advance his political ambitions. The
Conservatives might find a deal with the Center Party an
attractive arrangement, especially if it brought them back into
government. The role of smaller parties such as the Swedish
People's Party and the Greens will probably increase, while the
Rural Party, like the Communists, will probably decline in
support. (See matrix.)
In our view, the most likely outcome of the parliamentary
elections will be a continuation of the current coalition
government (SDP, Center Party, Swedish People's Party, and Rural
Part
) dominated b
4- t,
y
y
SDP
While there have been strains between the SDP and its Center
Party partners, SDP members prefer a renewed coalition with the
Center Party to a coalition with the Conservatives. The main
.obstacle to renewing the current coalition is personal it rather
than policy.
a figure from a small th if
ird party was named Prime Minister,
President Koivisto might be able to promote Sorsa as his
successor in 1994 by making Sorsa Foreign
Minister--a position we believe he wants. This, in turn, might
lessen Vayrynen's appeal to the public and to-the Center Party
and reduce his attractiveness as a presidential candidate in 1988
or 1994. In our view, however, such a tack risks having the
Center Party refuse to join a renewed coalition with the SDP and
either work with the Conservatives or go into opposition forcing
the SDP to form a minority government.
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
The second most probable ost-election possibility is a
coalition between the SDP, Conservatives, and Center Party, a
coalition of the three major parties. Foreign Minister Vayrynen
has publicly promoted the idea of a -government of the big three
parties, apparently assuming that such a coalition would enhance
the role of the Center Party as the pivotal party between the
Social Democrats on the left and the Conservatives on the right.
Vayrynen may rethink this strategy after the election, since the
Center Party would have the least weight in a grand coalition.
if, on the other hand, the SDP made overtures to the
Conservatives to join a government, the Center Party might agree
to cooperate if only to stay in government and maintain some
cabinet posts.
If the current SDP-Center coalition government does not
survive the parliamentary elections or'post-election personality
rivalries, anda deal between the SDP and the Conservatives
cannot be worked out, a minority SDP government is possible until
after the 1988 presidential election.
We believe the SDP might be willing to struggle with a
minority government position for a year, hoping it will be in a
stronger position after the presidential election in 1988. A
minority SDP government could almost certainly depend upon
parliamentary support from the Communist/Popular Democratic
Front,~(SKDL see Appendix A), the Rural Party (SMP), the Swedish
People's Party (RKP) and the Greens. We doubt the Social
Democrats would join the Communists in a formal coalition, since
the SDP would be unlikely to risk a possible cut-off of Western
technolo
b
b
i
gy
y
r
nging the weakened SKP into government.
A short-lived minority SDP government would probably not face
major challenges from the Conservatives or the Center Party. The
traditional rivalry between the two might even leave a minority
SDP government in the position of being wooed by both in any new
coalition bargaining following the presidential election iki, 1988.
Finally, because of likely Conservative election
i
ga
ns, a
Conservative dominated government isa possibility. The
Conservative Party, out of government since 1966, is in a better
position than it has been in years, and polls show its strength
is slowly growing. The Social Democrats and Center Party have
been courting it, which lends credibility to the idea that the
Conservative Party could be a viable coalition partner. A
government which included the Conservatives but was not balanced
by Social Democratic partipation, however, might be too
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
"rightwing" for Finnish taste. We think the other parties would
prefer to test the Conservatives in a safer coalition, one the
Conservatives would not dominate.
Moscow and the Finnish Election
the Soviets are concerned about the outcome of the 1987
parliamentary elections because of the remote possibility that an
entirely nonsocialist government coalition might be formed
between the Conservative Party, Center Party, and the small
nonsocialist parties. The split within the Finnish Communist
party has added to the problems Moscow faces in judging the
Finnish political scene. While the Soviets have supported the
Stalinist minority Communist faction, SKP-Y, in the past, they
gave formal party recognition to the majority Eurocommunists
(SKP) last year, indicating that Moscow would have no objections
to Eurocommunist participation in a coalition government. The
Soviets have publicly stated that they will treat both factions
-- 11 F- I
The formal split of the Finnish Communist Party has, in the
short term, probably reduced the appeal of either faction to the
Finnish electorate or the Soviet Union. The Soviets have made
efforts to cultivate the Social Democratic Party and the Center
Party and they may establish formal party-to-party relations with
the Conservative Party after the parliamentary elections,
especially if it appears that the Conservatives will enter a
Implications...
Finnish foreign policy is unlikely to change regardless of
the outcome of the March parliamentary elections. With the
presidential election in 1988, the parties and candidates will
probably be preoccupied with renewed election campaigning over
-- The next government is likely to continue Helsinki's
current efforts to improve economic ties to the US.
Finland has recently tightened its export control
legislation in an effort to accommodate Western
governments concerned about reexport of controlled
technology to the USSR. We believe Finnish cooperation on
this matter is likely to continue, because the Finns fear
the damage to their competitiveness that would occur if
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
25X1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
their access to Western advanced technology were
curtailed. In addition, Finnish high-tech firms are
likely to become increasingly attracted to the US market
and will increase their investment here. Expanded
economic ties run the remote risk that Helsinki may feel
obligated to balance potential criticism from Moscow by
looking for ways to criticize the United States, for
example, suggesting that the US naval presence in northern
waters heightens regional tension.
For the Soviet Union
-- Unless there is a Conservative-dominated coalition after
the'elections--which we think unlikely--there probably
will not be major changes in Fenno-Soviet relations.
Helsinki's efforts to maintain friendly relations with
Moscow will remain the cornerstone of foreign policy.
Twenty percent of Finland's trade is with Soviet Union,
and the effort to balance that trade will remain the
barometer of Fenno-Soviet relations. Although the Soviets
will probably continue to promote an increase in the
number of joint venture projects with the Finns, any
expansion of such bilateral economic ties would likely
occur slowly, mainly because of Finnish uncertainty about
the long-run benefits to Finland of Soviet economic
reforms. The new government will strive to maintain good
relations with the countries of 'Eastern Europe--especially
with Yugoslavia-- although Finnish trade with Eastern
Europe is slight.
For Relations with Western Europe and Nordic Countries
-- Finland will continue membership in the European Free
Trade Association and the Nordic Council. About 35
percent of Finnish trade is with the EEC countries, and
Helsinki will probably seek to expand that trade,
especially in high technology products. Finnish re:l,ations
with Sweden will continue to have an especially high
priority. Swedish Prime Minister Carlsson made his first
official visit abroad to Finland, and both countries are
concerned about Soviet activities in the Baltic and
-- Finland is also likely to continue to keep debate about a
Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NNWFZ) alive, although
it will not take the lead to implement it. Helsinki will
continue to oppose SDI and to promote an expansion of the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90T00114R000302930001-1
1972 US-Soviet agreement for preventing conflicts at sea.
The Finns will also continue to seek Confidence Building
Measures in the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea, where
they perceive a growing concern over what many Nordic
politicians claim is an escalating naval arms race. We
will probably see increased discussions with the Nordics,
the US,and Soviets about reducing Warsaw Pact and 70
naval deployments in Northern waters.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90T00114R000302930001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
25X1
Appendix A
The Finnish Communists
Although the divisions within the Finnish Communist Party can
be traced back to the World War II period, the formal split of
the party into a minority Stalinist Communist Party (SKP-Y) and a
majority Eurocommunist Party (SKP) occurred in 1986 when the
Eurocommunist Party (SKP) expelled the Stalinists from the SKP.
Each party will run its own candidates in the election, dividing
the Communist vote*. The minority faction has tried to improve
its image by electing new leaders, including a Finnish actress,
Kristiina Halkola, as the new chairman of DEVA. Real power,
however, remains in the hands of Taisto Sinisalo, chairman of the
SKP-Y. The majority party, the SKP, has also tried to improve
its image with a new party draft program that reduces traditional
Marxist rhetoric and concentrates on creating socialism in
Finland. The emphasis would be on reducing the influence of the
Conservative Party while promoting the nationalization of Finnish
banks, insurance companies, large industrial companies, and
energy produuct
on
The SKP may be facing an identity problem in the future that
will compound the problem of its declining support. For economic
reasons, the SKP will even be forced to share office space and
facilities with the non-Communist "left-socialists" who, along
with the SKP, use the SKDL as an electoral front. This may tend
to blur the distinction between the Communists and the "left
socialists." In fact, the SKP's efforts to appeal to the Finnish
public may increasingly place it in competition with the Social
Democratic Part
th
l
y,
e
argest and most popular party.
*The SKDL--the Communist/Popular Democratic Front--is the
electoral front of the SKP. DEVA--Democratic Alternative--is the
electoral front of the minority SKP-Y.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1 25X1
Appendix B
Finnish-Soviet Trade
The clearing account mechanism based on the 1948 Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance is essentially a
barter arrangement under which.Finnish export earnings from the
USSR can only be used to purchase Soviet goods. The trade
relationship has become a major component Finland's of postwar
effort placate Moscow and safeguard autonomy. Moscow sells
mostly oil to Finland, while Finland generally sends finished
engineering and forestry products and large-scale construction
projects to the USSR.
Moscow and Helsinki negotiate five-year frameworks on trade,
and make annual adjustments in the trade protocols that spell out
the goods to be traded in order to eliminate imbalances that
develop. When one of the partners finds itself building up a
trade surplus, it can try to maintain its trade value while
limiting its actual clearing account surplus--and technically
abide by the overall agreement--through a number of stopgap
measures, including shipment delays, lags in recording shipments,
overdraft credit limits (usually about 7 percent of total
bilateral trade), and transfers of purchases to a hard-currency
basis. If imbalances persist, however, the countries will
probably need to negotiate export cuts and import increases by
1986 was a particularly trying year for this bilateral trade
system because the collapse in oil prides--which cut the value of
scheduled Soviet exports to Finland by about one-third--led to a
growing bilateral surplus on the Finnish side that reached $800
million by the end of the year. During the year, Finland had to
reduce,'-its exports to the USSR by about 11 percent below planned
levels to limit the mounting surplus. By the time negotiations
on adjustments to the 1987 trade protocol were underway late in
the year, Helsinki had become increasingly worried that Finnish
exports would have to be cut by another 20 percent to balance
trade. Instead, they were pleased that Moscow agreed in January
to maintain trade at 1986 levels, and 1987 bilateral trade may
even rise if oil prices stay above $17 per barrel.
The new agreement--which accompanied reassurances by Soviet
Prime Minister Ryzhkov that Finland will remain the cornerstone
of Soviet European policy--cuts the Finnish clearing account
;. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TOO114R000302930001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP9OT00114R000302930001-1 25X1
surplus by permitting Finland to boost'its oil imports and by
converting about half of the surplus into a ruble loan to the
Soviets repayable with interest over five years. Helsinki may
grow concerned, however, that domestic factors in the USSR will
lead to shortfalls in the expected additional energy exports to
Finland. The Finns may also grow anxious about the future of
this relationship as the 1989 expiration date of the current
framework agreement approaches. In particular, they will watch
Gorbachev's economic reforms for signs'of whether Moscow's new
policies, such as permitting some Soviet manufacturers to make
their own contacts with Western firms, lead to a deemphasis of
the balanced trade stipulation that is the underlying principle
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
 Finland'., Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
Party`:`: Personalities Policies
----------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Social Democratic Party President Mauno Koivisto --Supports traditional Finnish
(SOP),p Prime Minister Kalvi Sorsa, neutrality
Chairman SDP --Desires closer ties to Western
Europe and US
--Opposes SDI,-
--Supports Nor=dic Nuclear-
Weapons-Free-Zone Dialogue
--skeptical Gorbachev's reforms
will benefit Finnish-Soviet trade
---------------------------------------------------7----------------------------------------------------
Conservative Party Ilkka Suominen, Chairman --Supports traditional Finnish
(KOK or National Harri Holkeri, Presidential neutrality
Coalition Party) Candidate ---Supports privatization of state-
owned f i rms
--f'av or-s nuclear- power if public
mood is right
--would not take the lead on
Nord-is-NWFZ dialogue
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Center Party/Liberalsm Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen, --Former Agrarian Party
(KESK or KEPU) Chairman Center Party --small-farm constituency
--Strongly supports Finnish-
Soviet trade
--Opposes nuclear power
)Liberals will run --Supports traditional Finnish
separate candidates neutrality
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Communist/Popular Democratic Esko Helle, Chairman
Front (SKOL)x
Eurocommunist Majority Arvo Aalto, Chairman --Supports traditional Finnish
--Supports increased
nationalization of industry
--ostensibly tolerant of limited
private enterprise
XSKDL is electoral front of --Supports 35-hour workweek
Communists and Left Socialists --Desires expanded social welfare
programs
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
 ~: Party =# Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90T00114R000302930001-1
`"-Stalinist Minority Kristiina Halkola, Chairman --Pro-Soviet
(DEVR*K or Democratic (Figurehead) --Wait and see on nuclear power;
Alternative) Taisto Sinisalo, head of want to avoid discussing
minority faction; Advisory Chernobyl accident
Committee to Executive Council --would nationalize private
industry
N*DEVR is electoral front of
Stalinist Minority
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rural Party (SMP) Pekka Vannamo, Chairman --Historically, foreign policy
not a major concern
--Opposes nuclear weapons
--Opposes nuclear power
--Supports traditional Finnish
neutrality
--Focuses on domestic issues
--City, small town constituency
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Swedish People's Party Chr-istoffer Taxell, Minister of --Originally party of Swedish-
(RKP) Justice, Chairman speaking Finns
--Supports traditional Finnish
neutrality
--Focuses on domestic issues
-------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Christian League (SKL) Esko Almgren --Supports traditional Finnish
neutrality
--Focuses on domestic and
morality issues
--Opposes nuclear energy
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greens* No evident chairman --Support traditional Finnish
Spokesmen: neutrality
Ville Lomsi, MP --Oppose SDI and nuclear
Kalle ronkkola, MP energy
MThe Greens have not Osmo Soininvaara, Executive --Focus on environmental and
created a formal party Cornmitte Secretary social welfare issues
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rightest (',onstitutionalists George E:hrnrooth, Chairman --pro-US
(POP) and Founder --Pro-Israel
--Anti-Soviet
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
r- =- -------------------------------------------------
Outcomes Par-ties Possible Seats Likelihood Implications
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Current Center/- Social Democrats 123 Very
Left Coalition Center Party
Swedish People's
Rural Party
Party
Likely
--Closer Cooperation with
Western Europe and US
--Increased Privatization
--Oppose SDI
--Support Nordic Nuclear-
Weapons-Free-Zone Dialogue
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. SDP/Center/ Social Democrats 139 Somewhat Likely --Could be 11caretaker until
Conservative Center Party - the presidential election
Coalition. Conservative Party --Closer Cooperation with
Western Europe and US
--Increased Privatization
--Oppose SDI
--Support Nordic Nuclear-
---------------Weapons-Free-Zone Dialogue
3. Minority Social Social-Democrats 57
Possible --Closer Cooperation with
Democratic _Government Western Europe and US
--Oppose SDI
--Support Nordic Nuclear-
Weapons-Free-Zone Dialogue
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
.4. Broad Party Social Democrats 177 Possible, not --Closer Cooperation with
Coalition Center Party likely Western Europe and US
Conservative Party --Oppose SDI
Swedish People's Party --Support Nordic Nuclear-
Rural Party Weapons-Free-Zone Dialogue
Communist/Popular
Democratic Front -
-717 -------------------------------------------------------------------------
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
 Outcomes Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TOO114R000302930001-1
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Red/Black Conservative Party 101 Possible, not --Closer Cooperation with
Coalition Social Democrats likely Western Europe and US
--Increased Privatization
--Oppose SDI
--Support Nordic Nuclear-
Weapons-Free-Zone Dialogue
---------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- --------
6. Minority Corrserative Conservative Party 44 Possible, not --Closer Cooperation with
Government likely Western Europe and US
--Increased Privatization
--Oppose SDI
--Less interest in support
for Nordic-Nuclear-Weapons-
Free-Zone Dialogue
--Least Acceptable to USSR
--Establishment. of CPSU/
Conservative Party
formal relations
7. Popular Front Social Democrats 105 Not Likely --Closer Cooperation with
Center Party Western Europe and US
Communist/Popular --Oppose SDI
Democratic Front --Support Nordic Nuclear-
Weapons-Free-Zone Dialogue
--Less Privatization
--Strengthen Communist/
Popular Democratic
Front
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000302930001-1
 i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90T00114R000302930001-1
SUBJECT:, Finland: Election Politics and Personalies
Distribution:
External:
1 - Steve Wallace-,--Pentagon JSI-4AMB-924
1 - DIA RTS 2B
1 - Joe Halgus, Pentagon, OASD/ISP, Rm.40762
1 - John Kachold, Pentagon, Rm. 40762
1 - F. Herbert Capps, INR/WEA/State/Rm.4742
1 - Ford Cooper, EUR/NE/State/Rm. 4513
1 - Dick Christensen, EUR/NE/State/Rm.4513
1 - Lee Ann Scheuer, Dept. of Commerce
Internal:
West Europe
DCI-DDCI Executive Staff
DDI
NIC/AG
CPAS/IMC/CB
MPS/PES
D/EURA
DD/EURA
C/EURA/WE
DC/EURA/WE
EURA Production Staff
EURA/WE Production file
Branch,
EURA/WE/UK Production file
0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90T00114R000302930001-1
25X1
25X1