WORLDWIDE ACTIVE MEASURES AND PROPAGANDA ALERT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Directorate of
Intelligence
and Propaganda Alert
Worldwide Active Measures
February 1987
D/ WAMPA 87-001
February 1987
Copy 6 0
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
d1f~L'~E'~f` Directorate of Secret
~~1 Intelligence
Worldwide Active Measures
and Propaganda Alert
This paper was prepared by and coordinated within
Secret
DI WAMPA 87-00/
February 1987
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23: CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
1 Active Measures and Propaganda Developments in 1986: Implications for the
Futur
The year 1986 witnessed several important developments in Soviet propaganda
and active measures. While these developments have been largely evolutionary,
they have significant implications for future Soviet tactics
5 Afghanistan: Propagandizing the Ceasefire and National Reconciliation
Initiatives
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1.1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
9 Western Europe: Moscow Targets the Cyprus Settlement Process) 125X1
25X1
16 Middle East: Moscow Pushes at the Margins
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23: CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
17 South Asia: Soviets Tailor Programs to Local Circumstances
20 East Asia: Courting the Insuruents in the Philippines, Trying To Make Headway
25 ,Soviet Active Measures Against the CIA: Playing on Third World Fears
The Soviet Union conducts a major active measures program to exploit Third
World fear of alleged CIA-sponsored subversion. The program employs overt
propaganda and covert operations involving agents of influence, forgeries, press
placements overseas attacking the CIA, and the dissemination through various
means of lists of alleged CIA officers and agents
29 Soviet Reli ious Pro a anda: Gearing Up for the Millenium of Russian
Soviet propaganda organs are preparing a major international campaign for the
upcoming Millenium in 1988 of the establishment of Christianity in Russia. While
the campaign is unlikely to have an appreciable impact on the arms control views
of Christian communities in the West-Moscow's principal target-the openness
of many of the invitees to Soviet "peace",initiatives will ensure a steady, yearlong
stream of pro-Soviet propaganda abroad.
33 Soviet Economic Active Measures: Targeting Multilateral Organizations
While most Soviet active measures are directed toward political objectives,
Moscow in recent years has accorded a higher priority to using them to support its
economic policies. Although we are aware of only a few Soviet economic influence
operations since the early 1980s, we expect Moscow to push a more intensive
agenda in the future as a result of General Secretary Gorbachev's activist foreign
economic policy. In our view, multilateral economic organizations will be among
the USSR's principal targets
37 Calendar of Key Events, 1987
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
This quarterly publication is designed to provide timely updates of ongoing active
measures and propaganda campaigns by the USSR and its allies. This issue covers
the period 15 November 1986 to 1 March 1987. It is also designed to provide
warning of future campaigns. The quarterly is composed of four parts:
? A perspective, which provides a look at recent trends in active measures.
? Brief overviews of both worldwide and regional campaigns.
? Articles containing detailed analyses of trends in the entire political influence
arena-active measures, propaganda, and public diplomacy-and speculation on
future developments.
? An annotated calendar of key events that we anticipate will figure prominently
in campaigns by the Soviets and their allies
Reverse Blank ~ SeCret
D/ WAMPA 87-001
February 1987
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
Perspective
1986: Implications for the Future
Active Measures and Propaganda Developments in
The year 1986 witnessed several important develop-
ments in Soviet propaganda and active measures.
While these developments have been largely evolu-
tionary, they have significant implications for future
Soviet tactic
Continuing Lackluster Performance by the Fronts
The 1986 balance sheet for Moscow's traditional front
group apparatus was unlikely to have been viewed
favorably within the party's International Depart-
ment. As evidenced by the failure of its World Peace
Congress in Copenhagen, for example, the World
Peace Council continues to have difficulty attracting
supporters outside pro-Soviet circles because of its
obvious connections to Moscow. Similarly, tight Sovi-
et control and public awareness of that control con-
strained Soviet efforts to energize the Afro-Asian
People's Solidarity Organization.
television and telecommunications age. The results of
these efforts were particularly evident in arms control
propaganda targeting Western audiences. Nonethe-
less, Soviet disinformation aimed primarily at Third
World audiences was not markedly different from
previous years. For example, major Soviet campaigns
alleging US involvement in assassinations, the over-
throw of Third World leaders, and the production of
the AIDS virus were continuations of disinformation
themes that Moscow pushed in previous years.
Moscow in February.
We believe that, while the continuing mediocre per-
formance of the fronts is a matter of concern to Soviet
propagandists, this concern is unlikely to result in any
decision to scale down their activities significantly.
Since most of the cost of the fronts is borne in soft
currency and shared among Moscow's allies, the net
costs to Moscow are probably not very burdensome.
The prospect is rather that the fronts will be denied
any sizable infusion of additional resources. In addi-
tion, the Soviets will probably attempt more direct
contacts with Western peace activists by subsidizing
events similar to the international peace forum held in
25X1 More Sophisticated Propaganda, But Crude
Disinformation Continues
Moscow made major efforts to improve the quality of
its propaganda last year by appointing sophisticated
observers of the Western scene to key propaganda
positions, by stepping up its public diplomacy offen-
sive, and by taking steps to move the Soviet propagan-
da apparatus from the print and radio era to the
It is difficult to assess changes in the "quality" of 25X1
Soviet disinformation, but we have not seen compel-
ling evidence that these campaigns are becoming
more sophisticated. Moscow apparently believes that
its traditional disinformation techniques continue to
be effective, particularly with Third World audiences.
While we could see major changes in the operating
style of the KGB's Service A and Soviet press repre-
sentatives, particularly in Western Europe and Japan,
the immediate prospect in the Third World is likely to
be a continuation of rather blatant attempts to under-
mine US credibility that rely heavily on timing,
repetition, and fear arousal to achieve their objectives.
25X1
Growing Use of "Openness" as a Propaganda Theme
Over the past year Moscow has increasingly propa-
gandized the changes in Soviet society that are gener-
ally described as "openness" (glasnost). As part of this
effort, Moscow has given extensive publicity to the
release from exile or prison of some Soviet dissi-
dents-such as Andrei Sakharov-and stage man-
aged aseries of press conferences for Soviet emigres
returning to the Soviet Union. At the same time,
Moscow stepped up its disinformation campaign on
human rights violations by the US Government,
including charges in a recent Soviet book that the
CIA perpetrated the Jonestown massacre to prevent
Guyanese residents from emigrating to the Soviet
Union. 25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
In our view, the KGB's highly publicized efforts to
break up demonstrations by Soviet dissidents in Mos-
cow in mid-February illustrate the continuing diffi-
culties Moscow is likely to have in making its open-
ness campaign credible before international
audiences. Moreover, loosening of restrictions on pub-
lic statements by Soviet citizens could help undermine
the credibility of Soviet positions on a variety of
foreign policy matters. Andrei Sakharov's statements
on the existence of Soviet programs comparable to
SDI is one example. The reticence of some senior
Soviet and East European scientists to endorse Soviet
claims that the AIDS virus is a product of US
biological warfare experiments is another.
Implications
These developments suggest that, while Soviet propa-
ganda and active measures continue at high speed,
Moscow's programs are by no means invulnerable to
US countermeasures. In our view, publicity about the
nature of Soviet fronts is likely to continue to make it
difficult for Moscow to market its propaganda suc-
cessfully. Further, calling attention to Soviet manipu-
lation of "dialogue" groups such as International
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War is also
likely to be effective. While the improvement of
Soviet propaganda targeting Western audiences poses
a particularly demanding challenge, the continuing
relative crudity of Soviet disinformation in the Third
World suggests that US success in countering these
efforts may depend more on timeliness and persis-
tence than sophistication of effort. With regard to
glasnost and Moscow's efforts to advertise it, we
believe that the overall propaganda benefits will out-
weigh the problems that accompany it. Nevertheless,
publicity calling attention to examples of openness
will serve in part to remind foreign audiences of the
essential character of Soviet society.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Worldwide Campaigns
Arms Control Remains a Top Priority
past year or so.
During the past quarter, Soviet propaganda and ac-
tive measures planners continued to assign a top
priority to influencing arms control issues worldwide.
While Western Europe remained the number-one
target, the Soviets were also active in Latin America
(see "Latin America: Moscow Focuses on Disarma-
ment, Cuba Targets the Caribbean"), East Asia, and
India, where Moscow exploited its close ties to New
Delhi to secure endorsement of Soviet disarmament
policies (see "South Asia: Soviets Tailor Programs to
Local Circumstances"). Soviet tactics have empha-
sized the use of public diplomacy and back channels,
continuing a pattern that has been developing over the
During the past few months, the Soviets have devoted
considerable resources-through public, diplomatic,
and back channels-to marketing their views on post-
Reykjavik arms control issues in the West. In what
has become standard Soviet practice, Moscow dis-
patched special envoys in late November and early
December throughout Western Europe, and to Cana-
da and Japan to present its version of the latest round
of Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons. Both
in their meetings with government officials and in
numerous press conferences, the Soviets contrasted
Moscow's "reasonableness" and "flexibility" on arms
control with Washington's alleged intransigence on
key issues such as SDI, according to US Embassy
reporting. Norwegian Prime Minister Brundtland and
Finnish Foreign Minister Vayrynen heard similar
arguments in Moscow in meetings with General Sec-
retary Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevard-
nadze, respectively. With few exceptions, however,
the Soviets found little support for their positions,
according to the Embassy reporting
Moscow has also continued to make heavy use of back
channels to government officials, former government
officials, opposition party leaders, journalists, aca-
demics, and others to push specific and oftentimes
accurate views on the prospects for arms control
negotiations. Before Gorbachev's 28 February offer to
negotiate a separate agreement on intermediate-range
nuclear forces (INF), the Soviets used this method to
express optimism about the possibility of such an
accord. They have also used it since Reykjavik to
suggest that Moscow is willing to compromise on its
hard line against SDI.
Intensive Soviet efforts to derail SDI have continued
unabated in recent months:
? The Soviets have repeatedly taken advantage of
diplomatic venues to attack SDI. While the bulk of
their efforts have focused on the West, they also
target selected Third World countries.
? In what the US Embassy in Freetown believes to be
a Soviet placement, the 16-23 January edition of a
Sierra Leone newspaper carried afull-page article
presenting the Soviet case against SDI.
? Radio Moscow broadcasts to Japan have castigated
Tokyo's decision to participate in the SDI program
by claiming that it would exacerbate military ten-
sion in the region and lead to a deterioration in
Soviet-Japanese relations. TASS's Tokyo correspon-
dent stated publicly in late November that Japan's
position on SDI caused the postponement of General
Secretary Gorbachev's prospective visit.
? In December, the US Embassy in Moscow reported
that the Soviets released a new book on SDI entitled
Weaponry in Space: The Dilemma of Security.
Aimed at the technically knowledgeable readers in
the West, the book is a more sophisticated attack on
SDI than usual, eschewing much of the biased
rhetoric typical of Soviet anti-SDI propaganda.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
-inti-SDl propaganda entitled "No Militarization of Si~ace."This
patter K~as produced ht' the Soviet-controlled Women's Interna-
The international peace forum held in Moscow, on
14-16 February represented, in our view, the culmina-
tion of a number of significant trends in Soviet active
measures and propaganda activities:
? It was organized outside Moscow's traditional front
group apparatus, with organizations such as the
Soviet affiliate of International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War and the Soviet Academy
of Sciences taking the lead.
? It targeted professionals---scientists, physicians,
clergy, and businessmen, for example.
? It emphasized the notion of "dialogue," with a series
of eight. roundtable discussions on various aspects of
nuclear disarmament.
chev
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
We believe Moscow probably was pleased with the
outcome of the forum, especially in light of the
debacle surrounding the last major Soviet-sponsored
peace conference, held in Copenhagen in October.'
According to US Embassy reporting, Moscow suc-
cessfully induced roughly 1,000 people, including
many respected Western and nonaligned cultural and
professional figures, to attend-probably by picking
up all expenses-thereby adding credibility to the
event. By holding the proceedings in Moscow, the
Soviets were able to control the agenda, precluding
the kinds of anti-Soviet demonstrations that marred
Copenhagen. In addition, Gorbachev's participation
assured substantial international media coverage.
In the coming months there is little doubt that arms
control issues will continue to figure prominently in
Moscow's political influence activities.
arms control initiatives under the motto "for a world
free of weapons; for peace and mankind." In its
program of action for 1987, the Soviet-controlled
World Peace Council assigned top priority to SDI,
They also intend to continue promoting or ac ev s
Given the relative
success o t e Fe ruary peace forum, we expect the
Soviets to try to make even greater use of "dialogue"
sessions with prominent Western professionals as a
means of increasing support for their disarmament
proposals.
Afghanistan: Propagandizing the Ceasefire and
National Reconciliation Initiatives 125X1
Moscow and Kabul are conducting a major propagan-
da and disinformation campaign associated with the
Soviet-inspired cease-fire and National Reconciliation
initiatives announced in January by Afghan Commu-
nist Party boss Najib. This campaign targets not only
the Mujahedin insurgents, but also public opinion in
Pakistan, other Moslem states, and the West. In our
view, the Soviets hope to create the illusion of move-
ment toward peace in Afghanistan as a means of
blunting international criticism of their role in the
war. They are also using this campaign to increase
domestic pressure on Islamabad and better position
themselves to blame Pakistan and the United States
in the event that UN-sponsored peace negotiations
Immediately after the initiatives were announced,
Afghan and Soviet officials tried to create the impres-
sion that they were being accepted by regime
opponents:
? The Afghan Government invited Western journal-
ists to Kabul in mid-January to observe the begin-
ning of the National Reconciliation effort to get the
Mujahedin to lay down their weapons and partici-
pate in a coalition government.
? Two days after the cease-fire took effect, the Af-
ghan Consul in Peshawar, Pakistan, asserted in an
interview with a prominent Pakistani newspaper
that 50,000 Mujahedin already were supporting
Najib and that eight Afghan political parties, previ-
ously in opposition, had joined the government.
? In early January the Soviets planted a story in a
major Pakistani newspaper claiming that three
prominent officials from previous Afghan regimes
had given up their self-imposed exile in the West
and returned to Kabul, according to the US Embas-
sy in Islamabad. The story received considerable
attention in Pakistan until denied by the three
Afghans, all still in exile.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
Worldwide Campaigns
? In February, a regularly scheduled Afghan airline
flight from Kabul to New Delhi was delayed while
25X1 an Afghan Government television crew filmed a
"return" of Afghan refugees from India.
Moscow and Kabul have repeatedly tried to project an
image of sincerity in seeking a solution to the Afghan
problem. On several occasions, for example, General
Secretary Gorbachev has publicly stated that Soviet
troops would eventually be withdrawn from the coun-
try. State Department reporting indicates that Soviet
academics have reinforced this view in meetings with
US scholars in Moscow. Soviet officials have even
spoken about the possibility of a neutral or non-
communist government in Afghanistan, according to
the US Embassy in Moscow. For its part, Kabul has
indicated publicly that coalition partners in a new
government would be on an "equal footing" with
Najib.
Moscow's efforts to propagandize the cease-fire and
National Reconciliation initiatives have extended well
beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan:
? In the Middle East, the Soviets were engaged in a
diplomatic "blitz" aimed at preventing criticism of
the USSR and Afghanistan at the Islamic Summit
Conference held in Kuwait at the end of January,
reporting, Wakil's criticism of the "negative attitu-
des" of the United States and its allies toward
Kabul's initiatives received substantial favorable
press coverage in the Indian media.
? In Denmark, the US Embassy reported that five
Soviet front groups, led by the Danish Communist
Party, held a public debate in January entitled
"How Can the Afghan Conflict Be Solved?"
? At the United Nations, the Soviets have expressed
concern that the United States may try to scuttle
the Afghan cease-fire, according to the US Mission
to the United Nations in New York.
The campaign's impact thus far has been mixed. In
the West, it generally has been viewed as a propagan-
da ploy. Participants at the public debate in Denmark,
for example, cited the need for a Soviet troop with-
drawal, despite predictable attempts by the event's
pro-Soviet sponsors to blame the United States for the
war. Skepticism is prevalent in the Moslem world as
well, as evidenced by the Islamic Conference's stron-
ger-than-usual resolution calling for an end to Mos-
cow's occupation of Afghanistan, although a senior
Kuwaiti official in recent talks with the US did assert
a new "Soviet flexibility" on Afghanistan. In Paki-
stan, by comparison, the campaign appears to have
had some success in exploiting domestic discontent
over the presence of Afghan refugees and fears about
the consequences of a Mujahedin defeat. Although
most Pakistani media commented critically on the
peace initiatives, Islamabad has been seriously re-
viewing the proposals,
25X1
L~X1
according to US Embassy reporting.
? Afghan Foreign Minister Wakil used a visit to New
Delhi in early February to expound on the National
Reconciliation theme. According to US Embassy
In the coming months, we expect Moscow and Kabul
to continue portraying the cease-fire and National
Reconciliation initiatives as serious proposals. Creat-
ing the appearance of movement in its Afghan policy
may be intended to buy Moscow time to consolidate
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
the current regime or create rifts between the moder-
ate and hardline leaders of the seven Mujahedin
factions. In our view, this tactic will, at a minimum,
better position the Soviets to blame the United States
and Pakistan if the UN-sponsored talks between the
USSR and Pakistan fail. As a means of undermining
Islamabad's policy of supporting the Mujahedin, the
Soviets are likely to step up their efforts to exploit
growing discontent in Pakistan over the refugee pres-
ence. Moscow's tactics may include increased bomb-
ings in the Northwest Province by Afghan intelligence
agents, disinformation about the degree of internal
support for the Najib government, and propaganda
distorting Islamabad's position in the UN negotia-
Nicaragua: Exploiting Church-State Relations
In the last few months, the Sandinista regime has
been promoting the idea that its relations with the
Nicaraguan Catholic Church are improving, despite
church officials' views to the contrary. By trumpeting
its "willingness" to negotiate with the church, Mana-
gua, in our view, hopes to improve its international
image, especially in Western Europe, where support
for the regime is waning.
Sandinista and Soviet Bloc eH'orts to manipulate the
issue of church-state relations recently focused on the
Eucharistic Congress held in Managua on 16-23
November. The congress was sponsored by the Nica-
raguan Catholic Church and attended by church
leaders from the United States, Western Europe, and
Latin America:
tions.
? On 15 November President Ortega addressed a
conference of "international volunteers" hosted by
the pro-Sandinista Evangelical Committee for De-
velopment Aid on the role of religion in Nicaragua.
US Embassy reporting indicates that the speech,
which praised "improved" church-state relations,
was subsequently replayed widely in the state-
controlled Nicaraguan media, apparently in hopes
of influencing the foreign clergy attending the
congress.
? On 17 November, TASS ran an article arguing that
the congress was proof of the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment's readiness to establish normal relations with
the church.
? On 22 November the Sandinista newspaper Barri-
cada ran a long editorial on religious freedom in
Nicaragua and commented favorably on the renew-
al of church-state talks, which began in September.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
Worldwide Campaigns
In addition to exploiting the congress, the Sandinistas
and their allies have taken steps to influence public
opinion on church-state relations in general. For
example:
? Cuba's Prensa Latina news service carried an article
on 10 January stating that the talks between the
Nicaraguan Government and the Catholic Church
were being conducted in an atmosphere of moderate
optimism and that relations between the two had
improved.
? Following an early December visit to Nicaragua by
Cardinal Joseph Hoeffner, president of the West
German Conference of Bishops, Ortega gave a
speech indicating he had told Hoeffner that religion
and the revolution were coexisting peacefully and
that the church-state dialogue was progressing,
according to US Embassy and press reporting. ~
In our view, the campaign is paying some dividends
for the Sandinistas.
the West German Social
Democratic Party (SPD) welcomed the Sandinista's
renewed dialogue with the church. The SPD believes
that its talks with FSLN National Directorate mem-
ber Bayardo Arce in West Germany last August
prompted Managua to act. In addition, George
Foulkes, the British Labour Party's deputy foreign
affairs spokesman, told US Ambassador Habib in
January that the recent signs of improvement in
church-state relations provided evidence of a pluralis-
tic system there, according to US Embassy reporting.
25X1 ~t the same time, however, there is evidence that
support for the regime continues to erode in other
West European circles. According to the US Embassy
in Madrid, West European Socialist International (SI)
representatives told visiting Sandinista officials in
mid-February that SI might withdraw its support
unless Nicaragua demonstrated some progress toward
accepting political pluralism. Press reports indicate
that a French government official, at a 16 February
news conference in Costa Rica, stated that Paris is
Nicaraguan President Omega's meeting in
December with visiting West German Cardinai
disappointed with the Nicaraguan regime and has
decided to redistribute its foreign aid in favor of
democratic countries.
negotiating table for the forseeable future.
To help counter this trend, we believe the Sandinistas
in the near term will press ahead with their religious
propaganda in hopes of demonstrating to foreign
audiences the regime's sincerity in seeking a solution
to church-state problems. They probably will play up
the recent "improvement" in church-state relations as
evidence of their flexibility as well as their commit-
ment to political pluralism. For their part, Nicara-
guan Catholic Church officials realize that the Sandi-
nistas are manipulating the current dialogue for
propaganda purposes. But their concern over a nega-
tive public reaction if they broke off the talks-which
would provide the regime with an excuse for further
crackdowns-is likely to keep church leaders at the
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
Regional Activities
Moscow Targets the Cyprus Settlement Process
While arms control issues remain the USSR's number-one target for active 25X1
measures and propaganda operations in Western Europe (see "Arms Control
Remains a Top Priority"), the Soviets have also made a determined push during
the past year to influence political developments in Cyprus. A hiatus in UN efforts
to mediate a solution to the Cyprus conflict presented Moscow with an opportunity
to intervene-in conjunction with the Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL to tr
to garner support for Gorbachev's January 1986 Cyprus proposal.
The cornerstone of Moscow's campaign has been a sophisticated public diplomacy
offensive aimed at influencing political elites in Cyprus. During the past year,
senior Soviet officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited Nicosia on four
separate occasions to promote the Soviet proposal, while Cypriot envoys travelled
to Moscow twice, according to press and US Embassy reporting. During amid-
January visit to Cyprus, Soviet special envoy Rodionov pushed President
Kyprianou to request the United Nations to hold an international conference on
the Cyprus problem-a key element of Gorbachev's proposa
In addition, the Soviet Embassy in Nicosia has stage numerous
press conferences on the issue. Last November, for example, Soviet press attache
Chizov contrasted what he depicted as selfless Soviet interest in a Cyprus
settlement with a US policy he said was driven by strategic interests "similar to
their obsession with Star Wars." 25X1
Government."
Since last summer, Yuri Folkine, the new Soviet Ambassador to Cyprus, has led
the diplomatic push. Younger and more dynamic than his predecessor, Folkine is
projecting a radically different Soviet image in Cyprus, according to the US
Embassy in Nicosia. He has been strikingly active in public relations, making a
favorable impression on both the Cypriots and the diplomatic corps. The Embassy
reports that last fall he skillfully promoted the Soviet line at a working lunch with
local journalists by refraining from traditional anti-US rhetoric. Ina 21 January
press conference, Folkine stated that the Soviet proposal had found "broad
support" in Cyprus and had become "part of the official position of the Cyprus
Beyond diplomacy, the Soviets and AKEL have tried to manipulate mass public
opinion with traditional disinformation tactics. AKEL's official newspaper
Haravghi, for example, has published numerous allegations aimed at fomenting
public opposition against the United States and the presence of British military
bases on the island, the removal of which is called for in Gorbachev's Cyprus
proposal:
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
in the event of a crisis in the Mediterranean.
? In late January and early February, Haravghi gave prominent coverage to
allegations that the United States was preparing to mount a military action
against Lebanon from the British bases. The 3 February issue, for example,
charged that the "imperialists" intended to use Cyprus as a "springboard for
aggression," probably against Lebanon. These allegations are similar to ones
that surfaced last June within the Cypriot Government. Shortly after the visit of
a Soviet delegation, a paper circulated among senior Cypriot officials alleging
that Washington had asked London for permission to use one of the British bases
Ambassador-by surfacing a forgery "proving" the allegations.
In the near term, we do not forsee any significant change in Soviet strategy. Given
the favorable response to their proposal by the Cypriot Government, we expect the
Soviets to at least maintain, or perhaps intensify, their public relations campaign.
At the same time, Moscow may try to take advantage of the local uproar stirred by
Haravghi's reports of US military activity in Cyprus-which included a telephone
call in January from the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the US
Moscow continues to have success in Africa with its disinformation campaign on
AIDS, but its long-term influence-building efforts-including economic and
military assistance, cultural agreements, and scholarship offers-appear to be
yielding mixed results, with gains in Nigeria, for example, offset by problems in
Guinean
Soviet-generated half-truths and fabrications about AIDS, coupled with local fear,
ignorance, and resentment over perceived attempts by the West to "blame"
Africans for the AIDS problem, probably will sustain a successful disinformation
campaign in Africa during 1987. Since the African phase of the worldwide
campaign began in mid-1986, the press in 15 African countries have repeated
charges that the United States is responsible for creating and spreading AIDS. In
Tanzania, Nigeria, and Ghana, such stories-which seek to heighten local concern
by accentuating racial aspects of the AIDS problem-have run for weeks despite
US protests. In Ghana, for example, a January press article described alleged US
Government interest in using Africans for human testing of an AIDS vaccine.
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Regional Activities
"The British Chief Medical
Officer, also let it known
that l46 Britons had died of
AIDS by the end of August,
1986. Yet, despite the con-
clusive evidence suggesting
the origin of AIDS in
Europe, the Westerners are
still trying to convince the
world to the contrary ".
~.~~ ~B~t,:ra
Ghana X CT~H. ~ COB7lNHAN78tb~
spat
r."r` s w~
c 18 atc~
o G ~~
sTOpaux, ~ ~ ~~ ~"'~
Pn~?~~~E"~'"p BEA,vTz f
n~~~,~ a saa"'"?
" Y ~A
i
.
s
~~~oc c+M~~
~?
~,,,,,~ AIDS was created in the laboratories of
the Pentagon, " PRA VDA, 28 October 1986
Soviet-inspired disinformation about A/DS has made press
headlines in lS African countries since mid-/986.
LISA warman~gers
manufactured AIDS
A,~ ?:~~~
,,
~.~ ~~,x~~3r~~
sera
CKprp KoMNTESA ~'~ ~
^.
KTABPA 1988 rog4~~
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Nigeria continues to be one of Moscow's most important targets for active
measures in Africa. During the past several months, the Soviets have coupled
cultural, economic, and scholarship incentives with awell-orchestrated anti-US
disinformation campaign:
? In addition to the usual steady stream of anti-US articles appearing almost daily
in Nigerian media, an apparently Soviet-supported disinformation campaign is
aggressively targeting US officials in Nigeria. According to a US Embassy
report in late December 1986, a Nigerian magazine editor received an anony-
mous letter charging three US officials with responsibility for the mid-October
letter-bomb killing of a prominent Nigerian news magazine editor. Several days
earlier a long article-falsely attributed to a USIS officer-attacking US
military doctrine appeared in the Lagos daily Vanguard. This forgery subse-
quently was delivered to several other Nigerian newspapers, according to US
Embassy reporting.
overseas have been tasked in recent months with doing more to counter "US
propaganda operations abroad.'
In Guinea, by contrast, Moscow is experiencing some setbacks in its efforts to
maintain influence there. Despite pressure tactics, bribery, and incentives such as
scholarships, training, and military support, Guinea is becoming progressively
resistant to Bloc educational opportunities inferior to those offered in the West,
and to bilateral agreements that have traditionally favored Moscow. For example:
? The Guinean Navy did not sign a new military assistance agreement with
Moscow last December despite Soviet offers before the formal negotiations of
additional ships, technical advisers, and military training courses,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
In our view, Conakry's hard line with Moscow is based upon its belated recognition
of the Soviet failure to deliver economic relief as well as its apparent gains from at-
tractive Western economic and military assistance programs. Although Moscow
almost certainly views these developments unfavorably, its overall influence in
Guinea probably is not in jeopardy. The USSR's 500-person official presence-an
important asset in conducting active measures-is not at risk, and the Soviets still
have considerable economic influence stemming from a recent $150 million credit
to aid the country's fishing and other industries. 25X1
During the coming months, we expect Moscow to enjoy continued propaganda
benefits from the AIDS campaign. In addition to surfacing the story elsewhere in
Africa, the Soviets may also try to exploit recent AIDS-related incidents that play
on fear and racism. Cameroon, for example, closed its border with Nigeria
temporarily in December because of an AIDS scare. According to US Embassy
and press reporting, British-Kenyan relations have been strained since the January
disclosure and subsequent press sensationalism of a British military decision to
prohibit troops from using recreational facilities on Kenya's sea coast. The decision
was attributed to reports of an AIDS epidemic there. Meanwhile, there are
indications that Moscow is seeking to expand its already extensive media influence
activities in Africa. According to a Nigerian press report, a new International
Institute of Journalism for Africa is to be established there under the auspices of
the International Organization of Journalists, a Soviet front. In addition, the US
Embassy in Accra reported in February that Soviet financial incentives may have
been instrumental in the Ghanaian decision to join Intersputnik-Moscow's
satellite telecommunications network.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
Moscow Focuses on Disarmament, Cuba Targets the Caribbean
Soviet political influence activities in Latin America continued to overshadow
Cuban operations as Moscow pushed a heavy agenda of disarmament propaganda
and anti-US disinformation in a number of countries.
During the past few months, Moscow broadened the scope of its regional "peace"
offensive, in particular intensifying efforts in Peru as well as in Panama, Brazil,
and BolivianNovosti personnel frequently were in the lead:
he Novosti chief in Lima
instructed one of his Peruvian employees in November to try to convince the
editors of influential, rightwing publications to support the Soviet line on arms
control by presenting nuclear disarmament and SDI as apolitical issues that
transcend ideology.
its outcome, the Peruvian media largely ignored the event
? The Lima Novosti office also organized an arms control roundtable on
18 December with Peruvian media representatives, influential citizens, and
scientists, In addition to being part of Moscow's
worldwide campaign against SDI, the meeting was also intended to lay the
groundwork for the creation of a Peruvian nuclear disarmament organization.
Although the Soviets were pleased with
? In Panama) the President
of the Association of Soviet Jurists was promoting amanifesto-to be signed by
famous jurists worldwide~utlawing nuclear war. He asked the Panamanian
Communist Party for assistance in identifying a prominent Panamanian jurist
who would be willing to cooperate in the effort.
? In Brazil, the Novosti office in Rio de Janeiro mounted a major campaign late
last fall to publicize General Secretary Gorbachev's peace initiatives in the
Brazilian media In addition to
providing news items, the Novosti correspondent convinced the president of the
Rio de Janeiro Writers Union to initiate a campaign calling for a nuclear
moratorium that included a written manifesto addressed to the leaders of the
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
United States and the Soviet Union. The manifesto defended Soviet positions on
arms control, and bore the signatures of international literary figures, including
two Nobel Prize winners.
? In Bolivia, the Soviets sponsored a public disarmament forum on 15 January at
the Bolivian-Soviet Institute for Culture and Friendship, 25X1
ry of Gorbachev's proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000, was
well attended by the Bolivian public and local media representatives.
The meeting, which commemorated the first anniversa-
In addition to their disarmament campaign, the Soviets also surfaced anti-US
disinformation in several countries:
? In November, articles appeared in two Bolivian newspapers charging that two
USIS officials were CIA operatives attempting to recruit local journalists to
write in favor of a continued US military presence there. The allegations were
made by the Communist-dominated Federation of Bolivian Press Workers, an
organization that the US Embassy in La Paz believes is a major conduit for in-
serting Soviet Bloc disinformation into Bolivian newspapers.
? On 18 December, Critica, the newspaper controlled by the Defense Forces of
Panama, published a news item-provided by Novosti-alleging that the US
Department of Defense controlled the US communications media, according to
the US Embassy in Panama. The article also claimed that "the Pentagon
operates its own journalism school which graduates two thousand propaganda
professionals a year."
radiation.
? On 4 January, the largest Brazilian daily, Folha de Sao Paulo, carried a TASS
item alleging that the United States is deliberately exposing female peace
demonstrators at the Greenham Common Military Base in Great Britain to
Cuban efforts focused on the Caribbean, where Havana has been trying to erode
Libyan influence among local leftists. 25X1
Havana fears that Tripoli might persuade a leftist group there to carry out actions
that would provoke a US retaliation and thus threaten Cuban interests. Havana
also views the Caribbean Nation Movement (CNM)---a coalition of pro-Libyan
leftist groups over which it has little control-as a rival to the Cuban-sponsored
Caribbean Anti-Imperialist Consultative Committee, 25X1
25X1
Havana was pleased by an article that the head of the PLP wrote later in the
month criticizing the Caribbean left's dealings with Libya and recommending
closer ties to Cuba. 25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
If Gorbachev visits Latin America-perhaps in the latter half of this year-we
believe Moscow will be promoting its arms control positions even more intensely.
While we expect the Soviets to continue a broad campaign across the region, they
probably will nay suecial attention to the countries on Gorbachev's itinerary.
In Argentina, the Soviets
already are trying to mitigate recent negative press coverage of Soviet domestic
25X1 and foreign policy by paying co-opted journalists to write pro-Soviet articles,
Moscow also is likely to supplement its
"peace" rhetoric with more anti-US disinformation tailored to the local scene, at
25X1 least until Gorbachev's arrival, in hopes of bolstering local receptivity to the visit.
In our view, Havana's efforts to unite Caribbean leftists and bring them under its
influence will continue to be hampered by established Libyan inroads there. While
the PLP leader's press article may temporarily cool relations between regional
leftists and Libya, Cuba will have to convince the leftists that it is more able to
provide assistance than Libya in order to achieve its long-term objectives. Because
of limited financial resources, however, Havana will have to rely heavily on the
more extensive material assistance it can offer, such as the free printing of leftist
propaganda and campaign literature.
During the last quarter, the Soviets continued to push on several active measures
fronts in the Middle East, including Syria, Tunisia, and the Persian Gulf. While
not suggestive of any change in Soviet capability in the region, these activities
demonstrate Moscow's knack for capitalizing on available opportunities and
reinforcing local predispositions.
The Soviets were particularly active in placing anti-US items in the press of
Middle Eastern countries:
theme ran a number of times during the quarter and,
impending US and Israeli attack in the region. On 25 January, Tishrin, one of
the three major Damascus dailies, ran a front page headline (attributed to
Novosti) entitled "Moscow: American Forces Ready to Intervene in the Middle
East with Six Land Divisions and More Than Six Hundred Tactical Aircraft."
Other Soviet-attributed stories warned of a joint US-Israeli attack on Syria. This
? In Syria, the Soviets resurrected allegations from last spring and summer of an
was buttressed by a formal message from the Soviet Communist
Party to the ruling Syrian Bath Party warning the Syrian Government of the
continuing danger of US-Israeli agression against Syria.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
? The Soviets were able to play this "war scare" theme elsewhere in the Middle
East. In Tunisia, for example, the Soviets openly placed a Novosti article on the
front page of the major government-owned daily under a headline warning of
possible American intervention in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. According to the
US Embassy, the Soviets have seldom before been able to place Novosti
materials in this paper, especially on the front page.
? In the Persian Gulf, Moscow took advantage of its growing presence there to
market anti-US disinformation. In January a major daily in Qatar carried a
Novosti story headlined "The Relationship Between Journalists and the CIA:
Hundreds of Them in International Press." The Soviets also placed articles in
the Kuwaiti press alleging US responsibility for AIDS; since the beginning of the
year, at least three such stories have appeared
25X1
25X1
Despite these successes, Moscow's media influence capabilities in the Middle East
will continue to be limited by government control of most newspapers as well as by
the region's Islamic culture. Indeed, Soviet press placement operations appear to
be substantially less successful there than in other regions such as South Asia and
parts of Africa. For example, Soviet propaganda is published in the Syrian media
only after approval by Damascus Given these 25X1
constraints, we may see increased Soviet use of entities outside the Middle East to
push Soviet propaganda and disinformation in the region. 25X1
25X1
Soviets Tailor Programs to Local Circumstances 25X1
Diverse patterns in Soviet active measures in South Asia over the last several
months indicate Moscow's ability to tailor its activities to local circumstances.
Moscow stepped up international efforts to pressure the Mujahedin resistance
forces and Pakistan on the Afghan war (see "Afghanistan: Propagandizing the
Cease-Fire and National Reconciliation Initiatives"). In Bangladesh, and to a
lesser extent in Nepal, Moscow's efforts involved support to opposition groups. By
contrast, in India, Moscow used its close ties to New Delhi to trumpet nonaligned
support for Soviet arms control proposals and continued its disinformation
activities to discredit the United States. 25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
In Bangladesh, the Soviets renewed efforts to bolster the rapidly growing
Bangladesh Communist Party (CPB) and several CPB-controlled front groups:
? With apparent Soviet approval, the CPB recently passed some Soviet funds to
several labor and professional fronts for use in protests against the government's
program of denationalizing banks and industries. Because of the largely
unorganized nature of Bangladesh politics, these CPB-controlled fronts have
often been able to mount public opposition disproportionate to their real strength
in the country.
? At its 10th Congress in Bulgaria last fall, the International Organization of
Journalists (IOJ), a Soviet front, granted affiliation to a newly formed group of
Bangladesh journalists, During the meeting,
the group accepted an offer from the IOJ and the Union of Soviet Journalists to
provide funding and training in exchange for support to Bloc propaganda efforts
in Bangladesh.
In Nepal, Moscow is apparently making efforts to influence the labor movement.
the World
e era ion o ra a coons, a ovie a or ron , un e a two- ay labor
education seminar. Soviet financing was used to pay attendees a daily per diem
more than three times the average daily wage in Nepal, making participation very
attractive to local workers. the Soviets are willing to
spend a significant amount o money or suc seminars as well as travel to Bloc
countries. In our view, Moscow's primary objective in these activities is to limit
Chinese influence in Nepal.
In India, to support Gorbachev's arms control proposals, the Soviets seized on the
Delhi Declaration, a joint communique issued by Gorbachev and Indian Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi at the end of the General Secretary's November visit to
New Delhi. The communique, which the Soviets pushed very hard, presents
general principles for achieving a world without nuclear weapons. Moscow has
made reference to the Delhi Declaration repeatedly in its own propaganda and
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
Gorbachev and Gandhi agreed upon the Delhi Declaration during
the General Secretary's November visit to New Delhi.~~
public diplomacy. For example, Moscow highlighted the declaration in its January
greetings to the Islamic Summit in Kuwait. Soviet ambassadors to Portugal, the
United Kingdom, and Pakistan have also cited it in press conferences.
Following the Gorbachev visit, the Soviets placed in the Indian press a variety of
disinformation stories that mostly featured new angles on recurring Soviet themes:
? Soviet officials in New Delhi prepared an article reviewing Soviet arms control
proposals during 1986
On 28 December, the Times ollndia headlined this story as
? Pushing once again the theme that the United States is trying to establish
military bases in South Asia, a United News Service of India story alleged US
construction of 32 airfields in Baluchistan near the Iran and Afghan border. In
our view a Soviet placement, the article was carried prominently in major
English-language dailies in New Delhi, including the Statesman, the Times of
India, and the Indian Express.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
? The pro-Soviet Blitz in Bombay charged in December that the sudden disappear-
ance of an Indian Air Force transport aircraft in March 1986 over the Arabian
Sea may have resulted from a collision with a US carrier-based F-14.
appeared in the pro-Soviet Patriot.
? Exploiting the US-Iranian arms deal and the diversion of funds to the
Nicaraguan rebels, the two major English-language wire services in India
carried Soviet charges that the United States has escalated its aggression against
Nicaragua in hopes of extracting itself from the "Irangate" affair; the story
Over the next several months, we expect little change in Moscow's active measures
tactics in South Asia. We may, however, see heightened attention to Bangladesh,
where the Soviets could make a special effort to capitalize on their growing inroads
into the journalistic community to support anti-US disinformation campaigns.
Courting the Insur ents in the Philippines, Trying To Make Headway
~
in Malaysi
During the past quarter, the Soviet Union continued its effort to gain more
influence among ASEAN members. Specifically, it stepped up its overtures
toward the traditionally anti-Soviet Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the
leader of the country's military insurgency, and initiated a new campaign to
penetrate the Malaysian press.
relations with the CP
In the Philippines, Moscow is continuin to explore the ossibilit of establishing
? The CPP reversed policy last year and is now willing to accept aid from the
Soviet Bloc.
? The Soviet Embassy in Manila is interested in meeting with the leaders of the
CPP and the KMU, the CPP's labor front.
assistance to the CPP.
We believe Moscow will have difficulty concealing significant amounts of
assistance to the rebels.
Philippine press already has alleged that the Soviet Bloc is providing military
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
In Malaysia, Moscow is trying to develop a political influence capability to
complement its renewed political and economic interest in the country
newspapers have little interest in publishing oviet news items, t aysian-
Soviet Friendship Society is inactive, and the Soviet Cultural Center has generated
scant interest.
in Malaysia, to head the Soviet Information Office in Kuala Lumpur.
appointed Yuriy Biryukov, a diplomat with local contacts from a previous posting
Moscow is trying to turn this situation around but has had little success. It recently
Biryukov helped 20 journalists from Chinese languages
tour the USSR last October with the expectation that they would write some pro-
Soviet stories. After the visit, the Information Office published an article that
quoted the reporters as being impressed with the availability of information in the
Soviet Union. The journalists refuted the article and claimed it deliberately
measures and propaganda.
We doubt that the Soviets will significantly improve their influence capability in
Malaysia, at least over the near term. Widespread popular animosity toward
Moscow's Cambodia policy and a general antipathy toward Communism among
ethnic Malays make Malaysia an inhospitable environment for Soviet active
Looking ahead, we expect Moscow to try to enhance its image among ASEAN
members by playing up its support for a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone (SEANWFZ), an Indonesian-backed idea that ASEAN heads of state will
discuss this December in Manila. It probably will portray SEANWFZ as
consistent with Gorbachev's call for an Asian collective security conference.
Moscow currently is propagandizing its decision to ratify the Protocols of the
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and the US refusal to do likewise.
During the past several months, Libya, embroiled in heavy fighting in Chad, has
employed a variety of propaganda and active measures techniques to support its
immediate and long-term foreign policy objectives there of securing Libyan control
of northern Chad and overthrowing the Habre government. These include covertly
supporting Chadian opposition groups overseas, organizing propaganda activities
abroad in support of the Libyan intervention, pressuring African countries to adopt
neutrality on the Chad issue, and encouraging foreign media and politicians to
condemn French involvement in Chad:
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
? In Malaysia, n;presentatives of the Libyan World Center for Anti-Imperialism,
the Libyan People's Bureau, and the Libyan Arab Cultural Society met early
this month to discuss actions that would support Libyan efforts in Chad,
Libyan Arab Cultural Center will organize apro-Libyan media campaign and
invite Malaysian students and academicians to the center for briefings on
Libya's position regarding Chad.
As a result of the meeting, the
? According to US Embassy reporting, the. French Ambassador to Togo told a US
diplomat that, following a 17 January meeting between Togolese President
Eyadema and a visiting Libyan envoy, the Libyan People's Bureau there was
instructed to shut down its covert activities. The French Ambassador believes
that Eyaderna and the Libyan envo}~ came to an understanding whereby Libya
forswears meddling in Togo in return for Togolese neutrality on the Chadian
issue.
? In early January, Tripoli issued instructions to Libyan People's Bureaus abroad
to initiate a propaganda ofi"ensive against France's alleged aggression in Chad,
me ~a out ets, Inc u mg e evasion, newspapers, and radio, in this campaign.
The bureaus were to use all available
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
In view of evidence suggesting that Libya is preparing to mount a major military
offensive in Chad, we believe Tripoli probably will step up its Chadian campaign in
hopes of stemming foreign criticism of its actions. At the same time, however, we
doubt that such an effort would have much success. Nigeria, for example, already
is angry with Libya for misrepresenting its alleged suppport of Tripoli's aims in
Chad, according to the US Embassy in Lagos. Following Libyan press reports in
January that falsely quoted Nigerian President Babangida as having both
accepted Libya's role in Chad and condemned France's imperialist intervention,
the Nigerian Government on 6 February publicly called for the removal of Libyan
troops from Chad. In addition, agovernment-owned Nigerian newspaper, which
has been fervently pro-Qadhafi in the past, published an editorial on 11 February
that strongly criticized Qadhafi's policy toward Chad.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
we feel many in the Third World find anti-
CIA disinformation credible because they already
believe the West is trying to stir up political unrest in
their countries and perceive US capabilities as virtual-
ly unlimited. We know that in at least one country,
India, the program has influenced government policy.
Moreover, US Embassy reporting indicates that the
lists of alleged CIA officers and agents have intimi-
dated and cast suspicion on many people. Nonethe-
less, Third World audiences have on occasion re-
25X1 sponded with indifference, skepticism, and anger to
Soviet Active Measures Against the CIA:
Playing on Third World Fears (c rtF)
CIA officers and agents.
The Soviet Union conducts a major active measures
program to exploit Third World fear of alleged CIA-
sponsored subversion. The program employs propa-
ganda and covert operations involving agents of influ-
ence, forgeries, press placements, and lists of alleged
Department of the CPSU participates in the overt
portions of anti-CIA campaigns through its control of
Soviet news agencies, Radio Moscow, the information
sections of Soviet embassies, and Soviet publications
25X1 distributed abroad.
primary responsibility for the anti-CIA program.
Covert Action
The KGB uses forgeries, press placements, and agents
of influence to intensif Third World fear of alle ed
CIA subversion.
We believe the KGB disseminates names of alleged
CIA officers and agents through the Soviet press,
books written by foreign authors, and anonymous
mailings to government officials, political parties, and
journalists. It undoubtedly hopes the lists will disrupt
US intelligence operations, cast suspicion on US
diplomats, and discredit journalists and government
officials it deems pro-United States or anti-Soviet.
One anonymous mailing that has appeared sporadi-
cally over the past decade is CIA Insider: News of
Facts From the Agency's Files. Last year, it surfaced
in India, Pakistan, Peru, Guyana, and several African
countries. The Libyan state news agency recently
used it to publicize names of supposed CIA agents in
25X1
25X1
25X1 iX1
Moscow prompts the writing 25X1
and subsidizes the sale of anti-CIA books by Third
World authors.
lone such book is the Devil and His 25X1
Dart: How the CIA is Plotting in the Third World by
Indian journalist Kunhanadan Nair. The US Embas-
sy in New Delhi reports that Nair, who is an East
European correspondent for the pro-Soviet Indian
publication Blitz, often writes disinformation about
the CIA. The book claims that the CIA:
? Was directly or indirectly responsible for the deaths
of 11 nonaligned leaders and tried to kill nine
others, including former Nonaligned Movement
(NAM) chairman Rajiv Gandhi.
? Seeks to destabilize developing countries by sup-
porting separatist movements.
? Uses its agents to sow discord within the NAM.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
C~A No.10 in 1986
IN THE ivONALIGNED PRESS
The book has received considerable international at-
tention-almost certainly with Soviet help:
against Prime Minister Gandhi.
countries. ment in the October 1986 assassination attempt
? In Ghana, the Daily Graphic, one of two national
daily newspapers, said the book proved that the In India, the Navbharat Times, the most widely
United States is implacably hostile toward the read Hindi language daily in the country, used the
NAM and uses the CIA to destabilize developing book as the basis for its speculation on CIA involve-
? In Bangladesh, the pro-Soviet newspaper Sangbad
underscored the book's contention that the CIA has
spent over 30 years trying to subvert developing
countries that pursue nonalignment.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
CIA writings of its own authors.
Moscow also gives foreign dissemination to the anti-
25X1 ~ Soviet embassies in developing countries place
Soviet press stories in local newspapers and subsidize
the sale of Soviet books in local stores. Some Soviet
anti-CIA publications target an educated readership.
For example, the authors of a 1984 book entitled The
CIA in Latin America attempt to support their argu-
ments with citations from US Congressional hearings
and the memoirs of retired CIA employees. Others try
to appeal to the unsophisticated. In 1982, the Soviet
weekly Literary Gazette published an article-later
replayed extensively in India--claiming that the CIA
was involved in the development of "killer mosquitos"
25X1 in Pakistan for use in germ warfare in South Asia.
~ve believe the
program rem orces anxiety in e~ veloping countries
about alleged US subversion. In our judgment, many
in the Third World find anti-CIA disinformation
credible because they already believe the West is
trying to stir up political unrest in their countries and
perceive US capabilities as virtually unlimited.
reported that the "Zimbabwean Government threat-
ened to fire the editor of the Harare Daily Herald
after he was listed. According to the US Embassy in
Accra, the Ghanaian Under Secretary of Information
believed that the government would perform a thor-
ough investigation of people on a list of alleged agents.
One of the Embassy's press contacts thought the list
could incite zealots in the overnment to apprehend
some people. 25X1
Nonetheless, Third World audiences have responded
with indifference, skepticism, and even anger to some
anti-CIA campaigns. For example, the US Embassy
in Islamabad reports that the editor of a leftist, pro-
Iranian newspaper in Pakistan received a copy of CIA
Insider last year, recognized it as a Soviet ploy, and
did not publish any information from it. 25X1
many educated Indians avoid heavily 25X1
discounted, pro-Soviet books by Indian authors be- 25h l
cause they assume the books are Soviet sponsored.
Last year the Ghanaian weeklies Voice and Free
Press denounced a list of supposed CIA agents that
was circulating in the country.
One recent campaign backfired. According to US
Embassy reporting, the Soviets circulated a vitriolic
anti-CIA pamphlet entitled Crimes Against Africa in
Uganda last year even though President Museveni
had made clear that he wanted to keep his country out
of superpower politics. The US Embassy briefed the
Foreign Ministry on the publication and contrasted
US developmental assistance for Uganda with Soviet
expenditures on disinformation. 25X1
25X1
The lists of alleged CIA officers and agents have
intimidated and cast suspicion on many people. For
example, the US Embassy in Kinshasa reports that an
editor of a Zairean newspaper who was a contact of
USIS feared that the government's security service
would interrogate him after his name appeared on a
list of CIA agents. The US Embassy in Harare
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
for the Millenium of Russian Orthodoxy
Soviet Religious Propaganda: Gearing Up
Soviet propaganda organs are preparing a major
international campaign for the upcoming Millenium
in 1988 of the establishment of Christianity in Russia.
The goals of this campaign are twofold: to create the
appearance that Christians in both the East and the
West are united in their support of Soviet disarma-
ment initiatives, and to foster the impression that
Christians and other religious adherents in the Soviet
Union are able to live in and contribute to a Commu-
nist society without discrimination or conflict of alle-
giances. While the Millenium campaign is unlikely to
have an appreciable impact on the arms control views
of Christian communities in the West-Moscow's
principal target-the openness of many of the invitees
to Soviet "peace" initiatives will ensure a steady,
yearlong stream of pro-Soviet propaganda abroad.
Celebrating the Millenium of
Russian Orthodoxy (988-1988)
Moscow's plans to manipulate the 1988 celebration of
the Millenium of Christianity in Russia for propagan-
da advantage have been under way for some time.
The Russian Orthodox Church, for example, has
invited hundreds of Western and Third World clergy-
men and other dignitaries to attend three major
conferences in the USSR on various aspects of the
Millenium and Russian Orthodoxy. The first confer-
ence took place in Kiev in June 1986 and dealt with
historical aspects of ancient Russia's conversion to
Christianity in 988. A second conference on religious
dogma is planned for the summer of 1987 in Moscow.
Finally, the actual celebration of the Millenium is
scheduled to take place in the summer of 1988 in
Moscow and other specially selected sites in the
country.
To ensure that foreign visitors will come away from
the celebration with a favorable impression, the Sovi-
ets have designated specific religious sites in major
cities as ecclesiastical "showcases" for Millenium
activity. US Embassy reporting indicates that these
"showcases" have recently been remodeled-and
Russian Orthodoxy: Still the State Church
Despite unrelenting state repression, the Russian
Orthodox Church (the Moscow Patriarchate) contin-
ues to maintain a sizable following in Soviet society.
The spiritual and administrative head is its presiding
bishop, the Patriarch of Moscow. Upon the demise of
the last pre-Revolutionary Patriarch, Stalin was
planning to have the office abolished, but the German
invasion left Stalin in need of ways to rally the Soviet
people to the war ejfort. As part of Stalin's appeal to
Russian nationalism, the church was revived, but in a
tamer, "Leninized"reincarnation.
The Soviet leadership is now less coercive in its
dealings with the Russian Orthodox hierarchy, but
the parameters of `permissible" domestic religious
activity have changed very little under succeeding
Soviet leaders. Moreover, the extent to which the
church is exploited for propaganda purposes has
steadily increased. This religious policy has been
described as "no politics at home, nothing but politics
abroad. "
Because Soviet mechanisms of control within the
Russian Orthodox Church and other religious bodies
are so pervasive and ingrained, they are often not
readily apparent to Western observers. Thus, the
natural penchant for projecting one's own experiences
onto another society works to Moscow's advantage.
Western visitors to the Soviet Union observe open,
functioning churches and assume that behind this
ostensible evidence of religious freedom lies achurch-
state dynamic similar to that in their own societies.
sometimes completely reconstructed-for the purpose
of hosting visiting clerics. The Soviet state, for exam-
ple, is restoring the ancient Danilov Monastery in
south-central Moscow for use as the church's down-
town administrative headquarters.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
.ante relations in the USSR.
General guidelines and specific directives re~~arding
Soviet foreign policy positions and corresponding
propaganda activities are coordinated withi,~2 the ln-
ternntionnl Department (IDJ of the CPSLt Central
Committee. Within the ID is a section responsible for
"mass organizations" and their international activi-
ties. The Council for Religious fairs (CR,4J, a
.subordinate body of the Council of Ministers, is
responsible for maintaining overall control c1'church-
gious communities.
We believe that guidance regarding religious propa-
ganda flows from the ID to the CRA, and thence to
specific religious organizations and persons. Nonethe-
less, several other foreign policy components--such
u.c the Ministry of Foreign f(ffairs (MFAI, various
institutes of the Academy of Sciences, and the KGB's
Service A (Active Measures) can be involved in
these activities. Domestically, the regional heads of
the local Committees on Religious fairs control the
nations and statements of elerAVmen through net-
works of~ informants that infiltrate the various reli-
do htcrward.
The Russian Orthodox Church is integrated finan-
cially a.s well as structurally into the Soviet foreign
propaganda apparatus. Regular, sizable contributions
ofhutdsfrom the church's still ample coFfers to the
cal/icial Soviet Peace Fund is a longstanding aspect of
the "gentlemen's agreement" between church and
state in the USSR. This fund is controlled 'Sv the
Soviet Peace Committee, which coordinates the activ-
ities of all Soviet front organizations. Nonetheless,
the tncrjor Soviet-controlled religious front, the
Christian Peace Coherence (CPC), will pla~~ only a
peripheral role in the Millenium campaign. The
actual celebration will take place in the Soviet Union,
hosted h.y the Russian Orthodox Church in conjunc-
tion with the MFA and the ID. The role of the CPC
mn.ct likely will be limited to conveying invitations to
religious leaders in Western Europe and the Third
World and replaying the Soviet-generated ~~ropagan-
The Danilov Monastery rn Moscow undergoing
restoration before the Miltenium celebrations.
Soviet propagandists plan to use such church "show-
cases" to convey an atmos here of religious tolerance
to visiting clerics. the
Soviet clergymen assigned to meet with foreign guests
have been carefully chosen on the basis of their
reputations as reliable purveyors of official Soviet
propaganda formulations. Western and Third World
clerics visiting the Danilov Monastery will be lodged
on the grounds in a hotel built by Moscow specifically
for the Millenium; they will therefore have limited
opportunity to learn about the church's real role in
atheistic Soviet society.
To burnish its image of religious tolerance, Moscow
has recently accorded the church and its ofhicials
greater prominence and publicity. In 1986, for exam-
ple, two articles featuring the Russian Orthodox
Church appeared in Soviet Life, a glossy publication
distributed overseas. Both articles give the impression
that Russian Orthodox clergymen-and, by implica-
tion, all religious leaders--are widely respected mem-
bers of Soviet society. Similarly, Patriarch Pimen has
been accorded a place of unprecedented prominence
in the recent anti-SDI and nuclear weapons test
moratorium campaigns. In June 1986, a lengthy
"open 1e1.ter" to President Reagan attributed to the
Patriarch was given front-page coverage by Izvestiya
and broadcast worldwide through the TASS wire
service.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
Patriarch Pimen of Moscow and All Russia
(Izvekov, Sergei Mikhaylovich)
Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church ...born
10 August 1910 ... permanent member of the Holy
Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church since 1961
...under his leadership the Church has played an
increasingly active role in supporting Soviet poli-
cies-sent widely publicized 'personal" letters to
President Reagan in March 1983 and June 1986
calling.for a nuclear moratorium and endorsing the
1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ...won several
awards Jor his `patriotic activities in the delense of
peace"...member of the Soviet Peace Committee
and the World Peace Council ...promoted within the
Russian Orthodox hierarchy in the late 1950s and
early 1960s, during Khrushchev's antireligious crack-
Another aspect of Moscow's campaign to show its
religious tolerance is the recent relaxation of regula-
tions regarding clerical activity in Soviet society.
These liberalizations of Soviet law on religion, pub-
lished in the January 1986 issue of the Journal of the
Moscow Patriarchate, significantly extend the scope
of legally sanctioned religious activity to include, for
example, allowing clergy to visit believers in hospitals
and prisons. A foreign Orthodox clergyman resident
in Moscow told the US Embassy that the new guide-
lines are merely more window dressing in anticipation
of the Millenium celebration and will have no percep-
tible effect on the actual life of the church in Soviet
society.
The Millenium will be commemorated beyond Soviet
borders as well. The Russian Orthodox Church is
planning a "Goodwill Cruise" of church clergy and
lay leaders to other Orthodox patriarchates in the
Mediterranean Sea. According to the Embassy source
cited above, a ship with as many as 200 people will
embark on a voyage, possibly in May 1987, to Roma-
nia, Bulgaria, Greece, Syria, Cyprus, and Turkey.
Church planners are also exploring the possibilities of
visiting Jerusalem and of an audience with Pope John
Paul II in the Vatican.
Outlook
In our view, Moscow's overall goal is to attract as
many prominent Western clergymen as possible as a
means of legitimizing the inevitable barrage of propa-
ganda that will accompany the religious aspects of the
Millenium celebration. A convincing show by the
Russian Orthodox Church that Soviet society is toler-
ant of religious belief and genuinely committed to
achieving nuclear disarmament could have an impor-
tant impact on visiting clerics, many of whom are
being invited because of previous expressions of open-
ness to Soviet "peace" initiatives. Consequently, a real
prospect exists that a substantial number of the
attendees will return home as active supporters of
Soviet arms control proposals. Nonetheless, we doubt
that this would result in a significant shift in views on
SDI, US nuclear weapons testing programs, or other
Western strategic force modernization programs
among West European and North American Chris-
tians, Moscow's primary target audiences.
25X6
7~XR
25X6
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
Soviet Economic Active Measures:
Targeting Multilateral Organizations
While most Soviet active measures are directed to-
25X1 ward political objectives, Moscow in recent years has
accorded a higher priority to using them to support its
develop closer relations with them.
aware of only a few Soviet economic influence opera-
tions since then, we expect Moscow to push a more
intensive agenda in the future as a result of General
Secretary Gorbachev's activist foreign economic poli-
cy. In our view, multilateral economic organizations
will be among Moscow's principal targets. The USSR
laid some groundwork last year, when Soviet emissar-
ies contacted a number of such organizations-in-
cluding the World Bank and the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT~in an attempt to
Background
Soviet active measures planners generally have ac-
corded little priority to covert operations aimed at
influencing economic issues. Since the late 1970s,
the KGB has attempted
only a few such programs, including an effort to
weaken the dollar by driving up the price of gold in
world markets and a campaign against the US embar-
go of grain shipments to the USSR. In the early
1980s, for example, KGB officers were tasked to
advise their contacts that the embargo proved ineffec-
tive and only made US firms unattractive as trade
partners, Gorbachev's
more activist foreign economic policy, however, is
likely to lead to greater demand for economic active
measures in the future
Multilateral Organizations: High-Priority Targets
In a concerted effort last year, Soviet emissaries 25X1
expressed an interest in developing closer relations
with a number of multilateral economic organiza-
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
promoting Soviet trade interests there.
Implications: Soviet Opportunities and Constraints
With a more activist foreign economic policy, we
expect to see more evidence of Soviet economic active
measures in the future. Moscow's tactics may include
disinformation designed to enhance the "openness"
image of the Soviet economy, take advantage of
conditions in international commodity markets, chal-
lenge the credibility of US trade policies, or weaken
US economic influence in the Third World while
In our view, an important ingredient to Moscow's
success in implementing economic active measures is
membership in one or more multilateral economic
to important economic decisionmakers.
organizations. The Soviets have already stated that
they would like to explore membership in both the
IMF and the World Bank, according to World Bank
documentation. In making the required capital contri-
bution to the IMF or the World Bank, Moscow would
be entitled to an executive director position on the
board of each organization, thus having an opportuni-
ty to influence management decisions. It also would
have direct access to confidential financial and eco-
nomic data that Soviet state bank and trading compa-
nies could use to better manage Soviet hard currency
reserves. In addition, a Soviet executive director's
inside knowledge of the World Bank's debt renegotia-
tions with developing countries would give Moscow
valuable information on their economic vulnerabili-
ties, especially those of intelligence interest. Finally,
such membership would allow the KGB greater access
The Soviets probably have GATT membership in
mind as well, given the fact that Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, and Romania are members, and
that Bulgaria and China are applicants.
(Once it became a member, Mos-
cow would be better positioned to view and possibly
take advantage of the trade conflicts between the
United States, Japan, and the EC. In addition, the
Soviets probably would conduct influence operations
designed to protect the image of the Soviet economy.
Judging by past practice, they would attempt to
control the organization's published information
about the Soviet economy by submitting incomplete
or misleading information or by attempting to censor
what it prints about the Soviet Union
We believe Moscow is likely to move slowly in its
efforts to exploit multilateral economic organizations
for active measures purposes. Exposure of KGB ma-
nipulation would severely damage Moscow's credibil-
ity in these organizations and raise questions about
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
the intent of Gorbachev's new foreign economic poli-
cy. Moreover, World Bank and GATT demands for
detailed, reliable economic information from their
members are in direct conflict with Moscow's desire
to distort Soviet economic statistics to its advantage.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
Calendar of Key Events, 198
UN Regional Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign, Beijing. Moscow
recently formed a working group-headed by Deputy Foreign Minister
Petrovsky-as a means of better exploiting UN disarmament conferences to its
advantage As a result, we expect the Soviets to 25X1
pay particular attention to this meeting, the Disarmament for Development
Conference in New York in August (see below), and the Third UN Special Session
on Disarmament scheduled for mid-1988. Petrovsky's expected presence in Beijing
reflects the importance Moscow attaches to attaining UN support for its arms
control proposals. Yasushi Akashi, apro-Soviet UN disarmament official, proba-
bly will try to tilt the conference communique in Moscow's favor. Although China
recently has developed ties to foreign peace groups, it probably will distance itself
from any Soviet call for a comprehensive test ban treaty to protect its own nuclear
testing program. 25)(1
als in light of Gorbachev's expected visit to Latin America this year.~
25X1
this meeting will probably link disarmament to Third World economic develop-
ment and urge Latin governments to divert military expenditures to social
programs. The meeting almost certainly will endorse Soviet disarmament ro os-
~
Latin American Peace Movement Meeting, Quito, Ecuador. Sponsored by the
Ecuadorean Peace Committee, which is affiliated with the Soviet-controlled
World Peace Council (WPC) and the Moscow-line Communist Party of Ecuador,
Working Group Meeting of the Christian Peace Conference (CPC), West Germany.
As the Soviets prepare to celebrate the Millenium of the Russian Orthodox
Church, the CPC-a Soviet front-will probably be looking for ways to convince
Western Christian leaders that there is freedom of religion in the USSR and that
the Russian Church should have a larger role in the World Council of Churches.
Week of Solidarity With Afghanistan. Given Moscow's recent push on Afghani-
stan (see "Afghanistan: Propagandizing the Cease-Fire and National Reconcilia-
tion Initiatives"), we believe that this WPC-sponsored event may get more
attention than Soviet fronts typically give to such "solidarity weeks." Thus, we
could see a fairly heavy slate of front activities-meetings, demonstrations, and
letter-writing campaigns, for example-in support of the unilateral cease-fire and
the National Reconciliation Program. 25X1
3 ~ Secret
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
Calendar of Key Events, 1987
Soviet disarnianten~ inifia~ires Hill n,p the
agenda at the World (_~un,~re,e~ oJ~ 6Vunrcvr ire
Moscow in ,tune. ~~
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
the October Revolution.
General Assembly Meeting of the Organization of International Radio and
Television (GIRT), Havana. The meeting of this Soviet front group will focus on
problems relating to the Intervision News Exchange Network-an GIRT subsid-
iary and Intersputnik, the network of Soviet communications satellites. Results
of a February meeting in Moscow indicate that improving Soviet Bloc and client
state propaganda on "socialist countries' foreign policy initiatives" is likely to be a
high priority, with particular attention to preparations for the 70th anniversary of
forum in Paris to Soviet advantage.
regional meetings leading up to an international conference on sanctions against
South Africa. Last June, for example, Garba, the WPC, and the Afro-Asian
People's Solidarity Organization-another Soviet front-stage-managed such a
Orchestrated by Joseph Garba, the pro-Soviet chairman o t e ,wit
support from Soviet fronts, the event almost certainly will be one of several
to apply or stiffen sanctions against South Africa,
European Regional Conference on Action Against Apartheid, Geneva or Vienna.
Sponsored by the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid (SCAA), this
conference is intended to mobilize West Europeans to pressure their governments
29 May-1 June Seventh Congress of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
(IPPNW), Moscow. Following tours by IPPNW leaders to the Middle East and
Latin America over the past year and a successful regional meeting in New
Zealand in February, there are signs that this Soviet-influenced organization is
moving to give more attention to local and regional nuclear issues. The Philippine
affiliate, for example, is pushing for "an enforceable nuclear-weapon-free constitu-
tional policy." While the meeting will certainly praise Soviet arms control
proposals, it is possible that the Soviet organizers will encourage national affiliates
to give even greater attention to local issues that benefit Moscow.
will include
of Third World debt.
directly affecting regional workers, we expect it will also endorse Soviet and
Cuban propaganda themes such as disarmament for development and cancellation
Although the conference will concentrate on issues
25X1
25X1
25X1
World Congress of Women and Ninth Congress of Women's International Demo-
cratic Federation (WIDF), Moscow. With the theme "Toward 2000-without
nuclear weapons! For peace, equality, development," this major propaganda
effort--sponsored by the Soviet-controlled WIDF-is intended to give the appear-
ance of being a continuation of the 1985 UN-sponsored Conference on Women in
Nairobi. 25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
gitimize the idea of government control of the media.
International Symposium To Consider the Effect of the 1978 UNESCO Declara-
tion on the Media, Finland. Although described as a UNESCO event, this
conference is sponsored by the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), a
Soviet front. The IOJ and other pro-Soviet groups probably will use it to try to le-
cultivation of the JCP over the past two years is reaping benefits.
he involvement of the Japanese Peace Committee, a front
of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), in the conference indicates that Soviet
anti-US publicity on the 42nd anniversaries of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
Meeting of the Disarmament Commission of the World Peace Council, Tokyo. The
first official WPC conference in Japan, it will be used to look for ways to generate
Soviet Greek Communist Party, taking the lead there.
International Week of Solidarity With Cyprus. Sponsored by the WPC, this
observance will seek to stir up support for Soviet proposals on Cyprus, particularly
Moscow's call for an international peace conference under UN auspices. Given
that Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, President of the Cypriot House of Representatives, is a
Vice President of the Soviet-directed Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization
(AAPSO) and the head of the local affiliate, AAPSO probably will give it high pri-
ority as well. Outside of Cyprus, Greece is likely to be a focal point for activities,
with the Greek Committee for International Detente and Peace, a front of the pro-
Perez de Cuellar on the anniversary of Hiroshima.
Presentation of the People's Appeal for Peace, New York, Moscow, and
Washington. The Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace controls this petition
campaign aimed at gathering millions of signatures on a document supporting
Soviet arms control positions. The sponsors hope to present the petition to
President Reagan, General Secretary Gorbachev, and UN Secretary General
24 August- Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, New
11 September York. This UN-sponsored conference will address a favorite Soviet and Third
World theme-a supposed link between the arms race and Third World poverty.
Originally scheduled for Paris, the United Nations changed the venue to New
York in hopes of prompting US participation.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
7-11 September International Conference on the Question of Palestine, Vienna. The International
Coordinating Committee on Palestine (ICCP), a Geneva-based affiliate of the
World Peace Council, is sponsoring this meeting and a series of regional seminars
that will precede it. The Palestinian question will be a major Soviet props ands
target in 1987, the 40th anniversary of the UN partition of Palestine. 25X1
among the most active in the organization.
Third European Congress of IPPNW, Prague. According to Czech organizers of
the meeting, the agenda will include discussion of the establishment of nuclear-
free zones and ways to achieve more effective cooperation among IPPNW's
members. The congress will probably give a further push to growing cooperation
between the East European and the West European national affiliates, which are
41 Secret
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23 :CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2