LEBANON'S PORTS: GATEWAYS FOR INSTABILITY AND TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Q
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Directorate of
Intelligence
and Terrorism
Lebanon's Ports:
Gateways for Instability
PR()J'DC.T NUMBER Q (~~? - d ]~ ~ ? Ff "T
IWM~7K
PAGE NUMBERS
TOTAL N[JMBER OF OOPIES ~f ~J~ 0
DISSEM HATE 2~
ExTRA CoPZES
RECORD c~~R
00~1~~OIOO~OIOn~t~~~~
O AID~-$C10 ~i'~3IlIt~~~~r.~o~c_---
Secret
Secret
GI 87-10013
February l 987
~oPy 3 ~ 5
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Lebanon's Ports:
Gateways for Instability
and Terrorism
This paper was prepared by analysts in the Near
East Branch of the Office of Global Issues. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to
the Chief, Geographic Issues Division, OGI, on
Reverse Blank Secret
C/ 87-100/ 3
February 1987
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Summary
/n/ormation available
as oj3/ December 1986
was used in this report.
and Terrorism
Lebanon's Ports:
Gateways for Instability
achieve a settlement.
Cpcrpt
The state of Lebanon has lost control of almost all of its coastline and, with
it, associated customs revenue and the ability to regulate the flow of people
and goods across its borders. The proliferation of illegal ports, part cause
and part effect in the dissolution of Lebanon's central government, is now a
major contributor to the strength and independence of subnational political
factions and foreign powers like Syria. Before the start of the civil war in
1975, Lebanon's port system was the most important gateway for Middle
Eastern commerce. Since then, as the central government disintegrated
and the country plunged into chaos, factional militias began to take control
over portions of the country's official ports and to construct makeshift
ports. Today, most operations in Lebanon's ports are illegal and beyond the
reach of the government. Although the ports still thrive-and play a key
role in the economy of the region-the economic and political benefits flow
to parties whose interests are generally at odds with achieving a balanced
political solution for Lebanon. Prospects for reversing cantonization, the
process of ministates emerging at the expense of the central government,
and returning the ports to eovernment control are slim unless Syria can
terrorist groups.
Factional control of the ports undermines US interests in the region and
further complicates the Middle Eastern peace process. Terrorists will
continue to use Lebanon as a base and a safehaven for their seaborne
operations against Israel. Nations that support terrorism-notably Syria-
will remain able to use Lebanon as a staging area for unattributable
terrorist forays into Europe and other parts of the Middle East. Arms and
munitions destined for armed factions-including the Druze and other
Soviet clients and terrorist organizations-will also continue to flow into
Lebanon. Personnel and arms shipments of one faction will continue to pass
through the ports of another faction to the profit of the facility operators.
Unknown numbers of Palestinian fighters will continue to move into and
out of Lebanon in this way. Likewise, narcotics that are exported via
certain ports-especially the ones in the Maronite heartland, around
Beirut, in the Frangieh area south of Tripoli, and in the Syrian-occupied
areas in the north-will continue to support the treasuries of militias and
The economies of Lebanon and, to some extent, Syria are hurt by factional
control of the ports. Lebanon's central treasury once derived about 40
percent of its revenue from the ports-25 percent from Beirut port alone.
Secret
GI 87-100/ 3
February 1987
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
ecr
Projected revenue for 1984 neared the $500 million mark, but only $70
million was actually collected, with about half of this coming from Beirut
port alone. Today, nearly all revenue-producing traffic moving through
Beirut has almost stopped and virtually no customs revenue is collected in
the other ports. Lebanon's domestic manufacturing has practically col-
lapsed, in part because of the competition from duty-free imports. Syria's
foreign reserves are being drained by the same illegal trade of basic and
luxury goods smuggled overland from Lebanon's ports. A complete and
long-term closure of either the Lebanese ports or the Syria-Lebanon border
would severely curtail wholesale and retail business in Syria and would add
to domestic unrest by depriving Syrians of essential consumer goods. Were
Lebanon's port not available, Syria would not be able to replace the lost ca-
pacity without inordinate expense or difficulty.
The 33 ports that are operating, suspected of operating, or under construc-
tion in Lebanon today are under the influence of either Syria or Israel or
are directly controlled by a variety of factional leaders in the Sunni,
Christian, Shia, and Druze communities. The Hizballah faction, backed by
Iran with Syrian acquiescence, is the only major indigenous group without
direct access to the sea. The Arafat branch of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) lost direct access to the sea with the Israeli expulsion
from around Beirut in 1982 and the follow-up expulsions by Syria from the
Tripoli area in 1983 and 1985. Today the PLO and other Palestinian
groups must purchase, barter for, or extort access to the sea through ports
controlled by others.
Over the next year or so, it is unlikely that the government of Lebanon will
be strong enough to assert control over its ports. Indeed, the longer they re-
main out of the government's control, the weaker-economically and
politically-the central government will become relative to the factions
currently vying for a share of power in the country. The widespread illegal
port activity contributes to the prospects for permanent partition. Because
the ports are central to the finances and military muscle of the competing
factions, any change in their status would be strongly resisted and would
most likely have to come in response to interventions by an outside power
or to formation-however unlikely-of a coalition of two or more of the
major factions. However it is accomplished, selective closure of some of the
ports could be instrumental in shifting the internal balance of power.
Closure of all of the ports would benefit only the Iranian-backed
Hizballah.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
The Political Economy of the Ports
Impact on Lebanon's Public and Private Economies 5
The Syrian Economic Connection
Implications for Regional Security
Where the Ports Are and Who Operates Them
23 25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
Figure 1
Northeastern Mediterranean
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
Lebanon's Ports:
Gateways for Instability
and Terrorism
A Situation Out of Control
Lebanon's central government no longer controls any
of the country's 225 kilometers of coastline or the flow
of people and goods across its Mediterranean border.
Factional regional militias and surrogate forces acting
under the influence of Syria or Israel have effectively
usurped the government's powers to collect customs
duties and port charges on seaborne trade and to
regulate entry into and out of this politically divided
country. Before 1975 the government had chartered
only five ports to handle passengers and general
cargo-Tripoli, Juniyah, Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre-
and by 1984 had also permitted three ("special")
facilities to handle only specific commodities: Shikka
for cement products, Ra's Sil`ata for grains and
sulphates, and Az Zahrani for petroleum products.
These are Lebanon's only legal ports. Since 1975,
however, competing political factions and fighting
groups have opened 25 other, unofficial-or illegal-
ports. Today, activity at most of these ports is entirely
beyond the government's reach, lying in the hands of
special interests whose ambitions tend to leave the
government divided and ineffectua
The problem for the Lebanese Government is both
economic and political. Without port resources, it
lacks access to a critical source of revenue at a time
when other sources are few. In addition, while the
operators of some of these ports allow normal com-
merce and fishing, in most cases they also conduct a
variety of other activities that undermine the central
government. For most of Lebanon's factions-includ-
ing those that regularly support or practice terror-
ism-the ports serve as central points of entry for
arms and munitions and transfer points for civilians
and militiamen. Thus, the factionalization of Leban-
on's ports simultaneously weakens the central govern-
ment and strengthens the control of confessional '
' Seats in Lebanon's National Assembly and government jobs are
reserved for religious groups according to the size of the group in
proportion to the entire population. The size of each group is
determined by the number of persons confessing affiliation to it.
This confessionalization of power sharing is expressed in all facets
of life in Lebanon and is central to issues fueling the civil strife.
foreign-dominated political groups over discrete sub-
national territories. From a broader, international
perspective, the factionalization of the ports is also
instrumental in permitting Syria, various Palestinian
groups, and, to a lesser extent, Libya and Iran to exert
political influence over events in the country and to
use Lebanon as a staging area for terrorist forays into
Europe and other parts of the Middle East
The parties to Lebanese reconciliation talks have
repeatedly struggled to resolve the disposition of the
ports, whose importance to the economy of the coun-
try, the finances of the major factions, and the future
of the emerging ministates continues to grow. In July
1986,
talks between representatives of
three major factions-the Shia Amal, the Druze, and
the Christian Lebanese Forces (LF}-and the Govern-
ment of Lebanon over returning control of the ports to
the government were broken off by Syrian interven-
tion. In later talks, however, the parties agreed to
return control of the ports to the government by late
September 1986, but only the Maronite Christians
subsequently allowed their unofficial ports to revert to
the government. After less than a week the plan
collapsed. During this brief period, the government
derived some revenues from the official ports that
temporarily reverted to its control but found that
these ports could not compete with the unofficial
ports, which continued to charge the cheaper fees. In
retrospect, the brief closure of the Maronite ports in
early October was probably no more than a calculated
good will gesture rather than a reflection of Maronite
expectations that the status quo would change. The
situation in the near term stands in a stalemate. In
our view, the factions will not voluntarily forfeit
control over either the unofficial ports or those por-
tions of the offical ports they operate for fear of
jeopardizing supply lines and economic interests that
could be taken over by nonconforming port operators.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
Figure 2
Lebanese Ports and Areas of Partition. Winter 1986
Ports are numbered in north-south
order to simplify cross-referencing.
Tripoli
~Jedit~rran~al~
o~ ~$
~Shikke
BA/ Hir- '
slabs/ an Nuriyah~~
~~Ra's Sil`ata
3A/ Batrun South
~?Kafi `UbaydB~
22Flfth Basin
X10..:.../ S...I.
~sA/ Fdar/Nahr Ibrahim' Christian
31 Mazra'at 'Ayn~.
al Qanla~
Israeli
coastal
patrols;
j ~ l Contested
~.
/sraeli-
controlied
security
.cone r?
/ ~
~ ~ Golan
N3aqu ah~ ~i j Heights
~~ Asp
Contested ---Toccupied
Syria
AMASCUS
Ports
? Official
~ Unofficial
8ountlery repre senfetlon is
not necassanty authoritative
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
The Origins and Current State of Cantonization
The roots of cantonization lie in Lebanon's troubled
social and geopolitical history. Pressure exerted by
West European countries led to the creation of an
autonomous Christian area called the sanjak of
Lebanon during the waning of the Ottoman Empire.
After World War I, France and Great Britain re-
ceived the League of Nations mandate over Greater
Syria-today's Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan.
By 1924, France had created an entity called Leba-
non by grc~ting Muslim and Druze areas onto Mount
Lebanon. Eventually, q/'ter independence from France
in 1946, the new government recognized 17 religions
and gave each the responsibility to establish and
adjudicate civil laws in accordance with its own
beliefs. From the start, then, Lebanon had the poten-
tial to unravel organizationally but was held together
through several generations of economic well-being
by a combination ojpolitical compromise and in-
trigue
After more than a decade of civil strife and two
Israeli invasions, the various factions are now re-
structuring Lebanon, breaking it into small regions,
or ministates, on the basis of the traditional religious
distributions of the population. Within each region a
single faction is economically, politically, and mili-
tarily dominant. To date the two most politically and
administratively cohesive of these ministates to
emerge are the predominately Maronite Christian
Zones of Influence
Indigenous factions and external forces now have
established zones of influence, and in some cases
direct control, at points and along segments of nearly
all of the Lebanese coastline. In a generally north-to-
south order, influence along the coast is maintained
by the Syrians, Sunnis, Frangiehists, Maronites, Shi-
as, Druzes, and the Israelis. Pro-Arafat Palestinians
gain access to the sea only by purchase, barter, or
extortion, but Syrian-supported anti-Arafat Palestin-
ians probably have direct access to the sea from the
unoffical ports of Nahr al Barid, Al `Abdah, and Ra's
Burj an Nahr, all north of Tripoli. Only a small
stretch of coastline near Sidon is actively contested
heartland and the Druze area ojthe Iglim al Kharrub
and Ash Shut: In both, distinct institutions have been
established to perform a variety of governmental
functions.?
? To levy and collect taxes and provide rudimentary
social services.
? To train and maintain armed forces.
? To design and construct public works projects.
? To conduct social science research that examines
the history and prospects of the peoples in the
region.
? To a/ford a political voice within the region and the
country.
More embryonic ministates exist in other places. The
Shias occupy three principal areas-the western and
southern areas of Beirut, the traditional Shia area
south of Sidon, and the Bekaa Valley, particularly
north of Zahlah. Amal, the moderate branch of
activist Shias in Lebanon, maintains nominal control
in these areas but is suffering both from internal
dissent and from challenges for control by the rival
Iranian-backed Shia fundamentalist group, the Hiz-
ballah. The mixed Maronite and Greek Orthodox
Christian area north of the Maronite heartland is
small, and political leadership is provided by a
Maronite, Sulieman Frangieh, former President of
Lebanon. The area has no viable economic base and
survives at the sufferance of the Syrians. ~~
Each faction asserts its influence in ways and to
degrees peculiar to its interests and its circumstances:
- Syria occupies most of the land and associated
coastline in the north. Much of the territory it
occupies in the Al Biqa` (Bekaa Valley) and in
parts of coastal Lebanon, however, is home to
factions not under its influence, and jurisdiction
over these areas is ill defined. Despite the length
among different factions.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
of the coastal area Syria occupies, it exercises
direct control over access to the sea only through
the official port of Tripoli.
Sunnis, largely urban dwellers, have had continu-
ing but contested access to the sea for military
purposes at the unofficial port on the Al Mina'
Peninsula northwest of Tripoli and through the
official port of Sidon in the south. For purposes of
normal commerce, Sunni merchants have proba-
bly arranged to pay for port services in nearly
every port in Lebanon.
Along segments of the coast controlled by Syria,
Frangiehists import and export industrial material
and products through their ports with little Syrian
interference On the basis of the US Embassy in
~we judge that, Franeieh's Worts are also
used to export narcotics.
The Maronites, in possession of naval patrol ves-
sels under militia control, are the only indigenous
faction to control both the land and offshore zone
along the coast of their ministate. Through the
nine or so ports they control, the Maronites con-
duct most of Lebanon's sea-based trade and pas-
senger traffic, import arms and munitions, and
probably export narcotics
Among the Shias, Amal has direct access to the
sea from the short section of coast along neighbor-
hoods it controls in western Beirut. Their mini-
state in the south could be served through the port
of Tyre and linked by sea routes to West Beirut,
but these opportunities are by and large denied
because Israel controls the sea south of the Nahr
al Awwali (Awwali River). We have no evidence
that Hizballah has direct access to the sea from
any point along the Lebanese coastline.
The Druze may soon become the second indige-
nous faction to control both the territory and
seaward approaches to their territorial enclave.
They have established three port facilities near
Khaldah and one farther south at Al Jiyah, and
they may be acquiring naval vessels to patrol their
coast.
- It is probable that the PLO s former naval operat-
ing facilities in Lebanon are no longer available to
them. The PLO has indirect access to the sea,
however, through ports operated by other factions,
notably the Druze and the Maronite Christians,
and we expect them to try to reestablish indepen-
dent naval operations from their own ports in
southern Lebanon.
The Israelis control both territory and sea along
the littoral of the security zone they occupy with
the Army of South Lebanon (ASL) in the south.
They have built a port at An Naqurah to generate
revenue and facilitate logistics for the ASL. Fur-
ther north to the Awwali River, the Israelis
control only maritime affairs in what amounts to a
coastal security zone.
The Political Economy of the Ports
Despite ups and downs, Lebanon's ports remain cen-
tral to its economy and important to the economy of
its neighbor, Syria. Between 1945 and the start of the
Lebanese civil war in 1975, Beirut was the mercantile
center of the Middle East and its port was preeminent
in the region. Trade links between East and West
have crossed through Lebanon for thousands of years.
A large part of the Allied war effort in the Levant
during World War II was supplied through Beirut
port, to the enrichment of both Christian and Sunni
merchants. The creation of the state of Israel in 1948
and the closing of the Suez Canal in 1967 bolstered
Beirut's trade-oriented economy, making it the best
port city for commerce between Arab nations and the
West
Beirut's role as the principal entrepot for legitimate
commerce between the Middle East and the West
began slipping in 1975, but illicit trade quickly took
up the slack. The start of the civil war in April 1975
caused disruptions within the capital that affected the
security and timeliness of maritime traffic through
Beirut's port. In June of that year, the Suez Canal
reopened, permitting the use of routes that were more
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
Physical Geography of Lebanon's Coastline
Physical conditions along the coast of Lebanon influ-
ence the location olports. The coast north of Beirut,
especially up to the vicinity of Anfah but less so
beyond Tripoli, is rocky with many headlands and
protected embayments. Water depths near the shore
are good, but rugged topography limits the number of
areas where it is possible to get to the water s edge
from the landward side. ~~
Geographic conditions south of Beirut are significant-
ly different. The coastline down to Al Bayyadah is
composed of long stretches of gently sloping sandy
beach with shallow waters near the shore. In a few
places, the coast is broken by rocky outcrops with
fairly deep water near the shore, most notably near
the seaside village of Al Jiyah and the port cities of
Sidon and Tyre. Elsewhere, approacheslrom the sea
are generally shallow, and the southern coastline is
subject to wave erosion and drifting sand. Unlike the
situation in the north, access by road to the water's
edge is fairly easy.
Oceanographic conditions along the coast are mild.
Surface currents in the Mediterranean basin are
driven by predominantly westerly winds, causing cur-
rents along Lebanon to.flow northerly along the
coast. Surface currents are normally less than 1 knot
but can reach 4 to S knots during gale conditions.
Tidal currents are weak and tidal ranges slight, a
foot or so in most places under ordinary conditions
and less than 2leet during spring tides.)
Beirut port was safe and open because customs fees
were avoidable at these ports, and activities other than
these rogue economic enterprises also prospered in the
atmosphere of failing security. The illegal ports were
pressed increasingly into the service of local militias,
arms suppliers, narcotics traffickers, and terrorist
organizations
Impact on Lebanon's Public and Private Economies.
Over the last decade, illegal activity in the ports and
operation of illegal ports have seriously reduced the
once-substantial flow of customs revenue into the
treasury of Lebanon's central government while en-
riching many of the factions opposing it. Before the
1975-76 civil war the government relied on customs
fees for 35 to 40 percent of its annual revenues,
according to Lebanese Government reports. The ports
provided the lion's share of these. During the increas-
ingly troubled period from 1977 to 1983, Beirut port
alone still accounted for nearly 80 percent of customs
revenues from all of Lebanon's ports, about 60 per-
cent of customs revenues from all entry points, and,
thus, about 25 percent of the government's total
revenues. As late as 1985 the government continued
to look to customs revenues for nearly 40 percent of its
income, with most of this coming from a single port.
Although anything approaching a precise estimate is
impossible, the government could have realized signif-
icant increases in these receipts had it been able to
control the illegal ports as well
From 1979 customs revenues continued to fall, caus-
ing ever-widening gaps between projected and actual
state customs revenues. By 1985 the situation wors-
ened when the government also lost control of most of
efficient than those through Lebanon. Small-scale
illegal port activity-to avoid customs, to ship narcot-
ics, and to move small arms, munitions, and militia
personnel-had been common in Lebanon for genera-
tions. As security conditions deteriorated in Beirut
during the post-1975 decade, however, illicit traffic
grew and otherwise legitimate Lebanese businessmen
arranged to use illegal ports to maintain their trade
with longstanding clients in Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Ku-
wait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
The ports they established prospered and continued to
operate with near impunity even during periods when
its official ports and hence over access to the sea from
along virtually all of its coastline. Only small portions
of the port of Beirut remained under official jurisdic-
tion, although the government also continued to earn
a trickle of revenue from Tripoli after Syria asserted
its control over the port and expelled illegal operators
during the purges of pro-Arafat Palestinians and their
fundamentalist Sunni allies in October 1985. The only
exception to the steady downward trend in Beirut's
port customs revenues after 1979 occurred in 1983
when the government's Lebanese Armed Forces
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
Figure 3
Comparison of Annual Customs Revenue
at Four Official Ports, 1977-84
Tripoli
Juniyah
Beirut
(LAF) closed the Fifth Basin and Ad Dubayyah in
March. Relative calm prevailed in the port while
Israel briefly maintained a guarded presence in the
mountains overlooking the city. As security conditions
deteriorated into the summer and fall, customs re-
ceipts began to drop off again, and the unofficial ports
later reopened.
While all this was happening, income skyrocketed for
illegal port operators and their associated political and
religious factions. Press reports from October 1984,
for example, stated that operators of illegal ports
charged a flat fee of approximately $220 per 20-foot
container-substantially below government fees for
high-value products. In April 1985 the LF was earn-
ing about $425,000 monthly from illegally collected
fees in the Fifth Basin (the portion of Beirut port they
controlled),
ary 1986 the LF leased the ports of the Fifth Basin,
Ad Dubayyah, Juniyah, Aquamarina, and As Safra'
in one package to entrepreneurs for about $2 million a
month-more than three times the amount earned
from customs revenues by the state in May 1985-but
significantly less than what the central government
would have collected through port fees and customs
duties if it controlled the ports. Not only is the
amount of lost revenue substantial but so too is the
actual financial gain to the factions that have dis-
placed the government in a key part of the vital tax
collector role.
The flow of potentially dutiable imports through the
ports is, according to a variety of open sources, now
enormous: textiles and garments from Hong Kong;
leather and shoe products from Italy; tobacco prod-
ucts from Cyprus; beer and soft drinks and raw
materials like cement products, jute, and wood from a
variety of places. Many luxury items also enter
Lebanon through its uncontrolled ports: alcoholic
beverages, kitchen appliances, televisions, videocas-
sette recorders, radios, and other consumer electronics
equipment can be imported illegally for a fraction of
the cost incurred had they come into the country
through legitimate means. The ports likewise handle
large volumes of goods that have lost market appeal
elsewhere in the world because of changing technol-
ogy or consumer tastes and can be acquired cheaply
from manufacturers who dump unwanted surpluses
on the Lebanese market. In contrast, few items
continue to be imported legally via the vestiges of the
official port of Beirut, and these are mainly bulk
goods on which the fee schedule is low and little
customs revenue is consequently earned. These in-
clude wheat, sugar, and refined petroleum products.
Automobiles also continue to be imported by legiti-
mate means because titling processes begin at the
customs shedl
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
Figure 4
Annual Revenue for the Port of Beirut, 1977-86
Activity in illegal
ports increases
I i i i i
0 1977 78 79 80 81
Government closes major
illegal ports in March
Israel withdraws from
South Lebanon
~ i i i ~
82 83 84 85 86a
Apart from the immediate impact on the already
troubled public finances of the country, most observ-
ers agree that the goverment's failure to control the
ports and hence the flow of its commodity imports
appears to be further undermining a domestic econo-
my already in havoc because of the continuing civil
strife. The combination of a constant round of armed
unrest together with the ready availability of cheap-
and largely untaxed-foreign imports has managed to
bring a large portion of local industries to a virtual
halt. For both the government and individual firms,
rational economic planning has been rendered nearly
impossible because sources of supply and prices for
raw materials are uncertain. Lacking any effective
ability to levy tariffs or import controls, the central
government is unable to protect native industries from
unrestricted foreign competition. Although in the
short run the Lebanese consumer may benefit from
the relatively lower prices of foreign imports, in the
longer term the critical manufacturing infrastructure
of the country is withering, thus undermining exports.
If the fighting ever stops, the country will have to
confront a massive rebuilding program and huge
internal (domestic) public debt with deeply depleted
national resources and a devastated productive capac-
ity. The factionalization of the ports is both directly
and indirectly a key contributor to this proble
The Syrian Economic Connection. Historically,
Syria's main route to the sea always has been through
the area now occupied by the state of Lebanon, and
the Lebanese ports continue to play a critical role in
the Syrian economy. These ports are far closer to the
major population and economic center of Damascus
than are Syria's own ports, and import needs for
Damascus are more quickly and easily served by
Beirut than the more distant Syrian ports of Latakia
and Tartus. Moreover, the physical characteristics of
the Syrian coastline are less favorable than those of
the coastline to the south and serve to limit the
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
Damascus's access to the sea has been bt~'eted by
geopolitical events since World War I. The Ottoman
Empire was dismembered gf'ter the War and Greater
Syria was divided into mandates under the French
and the British. The French controlled Syria, which
included Lebanon until the 1920s when it became a
separate entity. The main `Syrian"ports o.1~Beirut
and Tripoli, to which the rail systems were oriented,
were left in Lebanon. In 1939 the distant port of
Alexandretta-now Iskenderun-was lost when
France returned the Hatay Province to Turkey. Syria
lost access to the port ojHaifa in 1948 when the state
oJlsrael was created. Today Damascus o.~cially
relies on the Syrian ports oJ' Tartus and Latakia,
which have neither Beirut's geographical advantage
ojproximity to the main population o.1~Damascus nor
a good natural harbor~~
number and distribution of Syria's own ports. Before
the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon and in spite
of the mountain ranges in between, Beirut was the
entrepot for Damascus and southern Syria. As recent-
ly as April 1986, about 80 percent of the luxury items
imported into Lebanon were destined for Syria, ac-
cording to Joseph Abud, the Christian entrepreneur
who operates the ports system in the Christian mini-
state under lease from the LF. In 1985 and in early
1986, the US Embassy in Damascus reported that
nearly 50 percent of Syria's total imports came
through Lebanon-and most of these were smuggled
across the border with official acquiescence. Were
Lebanon's ports not available, Syria would not be able
to replace the lost capacity without inordinate expense
or difficulty.
In economic terms, smuggling imported goods from
Lebanon into Syria has been adouble-edged sword for
Damascus. Because of Syria's limited port capacity
and the illegality of importing certain types of goods,
the Syrian economy is heavily dependent on imports
through Lebanon for both staples and luxury goods.
The fact that most of the goods move via nominally
illicit channels allows the Assad regime to maintain
the convenient fiction that its socialistic and ostensi-
bly tightly controlled economy is functioning without
access to key Western goods or luxury items. At the
same time, however, this illegal trade and associated
black-market currency exchanges deprive Damascus
of vital foreign exchange-although the losses would
probably be even higher if the Qoods were imported
through Lebanon legally
A complete and long-term closure of either the Leba-
nese ports or the Syria-Lebanon border would severe-
ly curtail wholesale and retail business in Syria and
would add to domestic unrest by depriving Syrians of
essential consumer goods. A good case in point oc-
curred between January and April 1986 when Syria
tried simultaneously to stop its economic downslide by
controlling this flow of smuggled goods and to punish
Christian Lebanese entrepreneurs in response to
Christian withdrawal from the tripartite agreement
signed in December 1985. Reports from the US
Embassies in Beirut and Damascus in April and May
were skeptical that Damascus could continue to stem
the flow once stockpiles of previously imported goods
were exhausted. Although some sectors of the Syrian
economy probably could last a year before their
supplies were fully consumed, by March many Dama-
scene businesses-from bakeries to produce markets
and appliance stores-were reportedly trying to main-
tain stocks by acquiring smuggled goods. Merchants
in Christian East Beirut, the source of most of the
smuggled goods that enter Syria, continued importing
goods at a pace that testified to their belief that the
land routes to Syria would soon be reopened. In July
the embargo broke and staples undeniably smuggled
from Lebanon were displayed openly in Damascene
retail shop windows.
Role in Factional Warfare and Terrorism
Economics aside, the factionalization of Lebanon's
ports is playing an ever more direct role in the almost
daily rounds of armed clashes and terrorism with
which the name of the country has become synony-
mous. Lebanon-and particularly Greater Beirut,Z
which lies about dead center along the coastline and
contains seven ports-serves as a land, air, and sea
transportation hub for terrorists and fighting groups
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
operating both in the country and in the Middle East
and Europe. By land, for example, Beirut is four hours
from Damascus, only about two hours from the
Lebanon-Israel border, and within easy access of
major Palestinian and Shiite strongholds within Leba-
non. By commercial carrier, Lebanon's principal air-
port at Beirut is four hours from Paris, and travel
time to at least a dozen other Middle Eastern and
European capitals is even less. By sea, Lebanon's
unregulated ports offer most of the armed factions
essential resupply points for guns and munitions.
They also give terrorist groups and state supporters
like Syria and, to a lesser degree, Iran and Libya, an
easy and untraceable method to move personnel,
weapons, and logistics between Lebanon and key
points in the Middle East and Europe. Above all, the
ports as uncontrolled yet conveniently located transit
centers provide Syria and major terrorist organiza-
tions like Abu Nidal an essential means for doing
business on an international scale while concealing
their involvement in specific terrorist operations.
The international transfer of personnel and equipment
is more anonymously handled through the ports than
through the more public and heavily scrutinized air
transportation system centered in Beirut. The ports
also provide an alternative to air travel, and for groups
with no access to Beirut International Airport (BIA)
they provide a viable link to air transportation
through Cyprus. Without access to the ports and BIA:
? Groups closely aligned with Damascus could proba-
bly continue to operate through international flights
serving Damascus. To do so, however, would weak-
en or negate Syria's ability to exercise plausible
denial of its involvement in terrorist activities.
? Groups not aligned with Syria would be hard
pressed to sustain a safehaven presence in Beirut,
especially if their access to BIA were simultaneously
reduced or denied. Cut off from the Beirut transpor-
tation node, it is unlikely that some of these groups
could continue to operate in Lebanon at all without
access to the sea.
The ports are not linked equally to all terrorist or
fighting groups or their activities:
? The anti-Arafat Palestinian group the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Com-
mand (PFLP-GC) may have direct access to the sea
from the unofficial ports of Nahr al Barid, Al
`Abdah, or Ra's Burj an Nahr in the areas north of
Tripoli located near Mukhayyam Nahr al Barid
(Nahr al Barid refugee camp) and Mukhayyam Al
Baddawi (AI Baddawi refuge camp).
? Pro-Arafat elements of the PLO control no port and
have only indirect access to the sea.
? The LF has access to a variety of arms suppliers
through the ports it controls along the coastal fringe
of the Christian ministate. The official port of
Juniyah is a common point of entry for LF arms and
munitions, is home port for both their patrol boats
and what is left of the Lebanese Navy, is a terminus
for regular ferry service between Cyprus and East
Beirut, and, since at least July 1986, has been a port
of entry for pro-Arafat Palestinians returning to
Lebanon. The Fifth Basin, also controlled by the
LF, may be an additional entry point for Palestin-
ians in transit from Cyprus to Lebanon. It is
unlikely that other groups have used these facilities
in the last 12 months.
? Only bilk cargo, such as grains and petroleum, that
requires specialized handling equipment moves
through the official port of Beirut. This port was
essentially taken over by the LF in mid-October
1986 and, although we are unable to gauge their
will to do so, they can now exercise the option to
control the import or limit the distribution of these
important commodities.
? The Amal-controlled unofficial port of An Nabi al
Awaza`i (Awza`i), operational since August 1985, is
located next to the northern extension of BIA. A
variety of arms have moved through this shallow
port, unloaded from Syrian-flag and Algerian-flag
vessels. Amal is fractious, its members often belong-
ing to a variety of other groups, and through its port
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
they probably could acquire materiel by purchase
or barter, or, barring these cooperative means,
through theft or capture.
? The Druze provide access to the sea through Khal-
dah for any group with the means to pay. The port
has reduced Druze dependence on Damascus for
personal weapons and munitions provided by the
Soviet Union that once passed through Syria. They
are building a larger facility farther south near Al
Jiyah that could handle deeper draft vessels capable
of transporting heavy military equipment to the
Druze without going through Syrian hands. The
Druze are currently building another port in the
Greater Beirut area that, according to press ac-
counts, is intended for pleasure craft. When com-
pleted, this facility, called Khaldah North and
located near the southern end of BIA, could accom-
modate small-boat traffic between Beirut and
Cyprus.
? The Israeli-backed ASL maintains access to the sea
through its port at An Naqurah near the Israel
border. The port is used for both civilian and
military transportation requirements and the ASL
derives both logistic and revenue benefits from it.
Implications for Regional Security
The situation of nearly unrestricted access to the sea,
especially near Beirut, which connects to international
air routes, gives Syria and to a lesser degree Libya,
Iran, and major terrorist organizations an essential
means for doing business on an international scale
while concealing their involvement in specific terrorist
events. Within Lebanon, unrestricted operation of the
ports by various militias institutionalizes the country's
chronic chaos and strengthens the process of cantoni-
zation. Leaders in the de facto cantons will seek to
retain their ports-their access to arms and other
international markets-and defend them against any
form of revitalized central government. The ability of
the United States to protect its interests and to exert
influence on events in Lebanon and in the region,
consequently, is severely restricted under these
conditions.
Instability in Lebanon also is a major obstacle to
normalization of relations between Israel and Leba-
non, and the uncontrolled coastline is a substantial
contributor to the problems. From within this chaotic
environment armed factions operate with little fear of
police action or reprisal. A few of these groups-
including the PFLP-GC, the PLO, and possibly the
Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP~periodi-
cally attack Israel, at times by sea from the Lebanese
coast. These attacks invariably provoke sharp military
responses from Israel and have contributed to the
establishment of Israel's land and coastal security
zones in southern Lebanon.
Because the status quo of the ports provides Syria
with leverage in dealing with Lebanon's central gov-
ernment and the various factions, Damascus probably
will be content to see the ports remain operational and
factionally controlled until it works out a Lebanese
solution to its advantage. Such a policy would also
serve Syrian interests because it forces Israel to deal
with instability on its northern border without having
a viable Lebanese authority to negotiate with in an
effort to find a solution.
Finally, the port situation has given the Soviets a
direct entree into the Lebanese political situation. The
Soviet Union has been able to cultivate a relationship
with the Druze by providing personal weapons and
munitions to them through the Druze port of Khal-
dah. This relationship represents another step in the
Druze quest for independence from their protector,
Syria, but it comes at the potential cost of expanded
What If the Ports Were Closed?
It is unlikely that operations in or control of the ports
will change during the next 12 months unless there is
a major shift in the relative power of the strongest
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
Chronology ojTerrorist-Related Uses of
Lebanon's Ports
? In May 1985 arms provided by Libya and destined
jor use by the Sunni al Murabitun militia arrived
at the northern Lebanese port of Tripoli and were
trucked south, according to the Christian-operated
Radio Free Lebanon.
? During July 1986, Amal established an office in the
port area ojSidon to monitor the.flow olpro-Arafat
Palestinians returning to Lebanon, according to
Radio Free Lebanon.
? On 14 July 1986 three shiploads of weapons and
munitions arrived in Sidon for delivery to pro-
Arcjfat Palestinians, according to a Christian-
operated Voice ojLebanon radiobroadcast.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
Figure 5
Relative Advantages and Disadvantages of Port Operations
Under a Variety of Closure Scenarios
E=Economic ? Win
M=Military O Lose
P=Political p Draw
B=Best overall judgment
Factions
Location of
Ports
Status Quo
Official Ports Revert
To the Government
Northern
Ports Close
Central Southern
Ports Close Ports Close
All Ports
Close
Unofficial
Ports Close
Unofficial
Ports Remain
Open
Government of
Lebanon
Entire length
of coast
E O
M O
P O
E?
M?
P?
E G
M?
P?
E?
M?
P O
E O E?
M O M?
P O P O
E O
M O
P O
B O
B?
B O
B?
B O B?
B O
Syria
North
E O
M?
P C
E?
M O
P G
E O
M?
P?
E O
M O
P O
E? E O
M? M?
P? P?
E O
M?
P?
B?
B O
B O
B O
B? B O
B O
Israel
South
E?
M O
P O
E?
M?
P?
E O
M O
P O
E C
M?
P?
E O E G
M O M G
P O P C
E?
M?
P?
B C
B?
B O
B?
B O B?
B?
Sunnis
North
O
O
?
O
O O
O
Frangiehisis
North
?
O
?
O
? O
O
Maronites
Central
?
?
O
?
O ?
O
Amal
South
?
?
O
O
? O
O
Druze
South
?
O
?
O
? O
O
Hizballah
No ports
O
O
O
O
O O
O
PLO
No ports
O
O
?
O
O O
O
The chart expresses our judgments about relative
advantages and disadvantages for the 10 major
groups in Lebanon, including Israel and Syria, under
the status guo and under six plausible scenarios of
change to the operations gI'the ports in Lebanon.
Each of the indigenous factions and the PLO were
evaluated on awin-lose-draw basis, without regard to
how each scenario c~'ects its allies or foes. The three
countries most deeply entangled in Lebanon-the so-
called central government 4f Lebanon, Syria, and
Israel-are evaluated by a more complete procedure.
Because they are q~'ected economically, militarily,
and politically under any scenario, the three were
judged in each of these categories. Because wins and
losses in one or more categories might not be a~=
setting (that is, two wins and a loss may add to a
loss), c+l'ter the three initial categories were judged,
the three state players were reevaluated for an overall
judgment.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
factions or change is imposed by an external force.
The central government lacks the political or military
clout to bring the ports under its jurisdiction. Without
new incentives for compromise or the formation of
alliances between factions, the present chaos in the
country is likely to worsen and the government to
remain weak. Nevertheless, changing the status of the
ports could represent a potentially potent instrument
for influencing the balance of power in Lebanon as
well as that country's role in Middle Eastern terror-
ism. Each of the neighboring countries and internal
political factions would experience positive or negative
impacts from any change in control over the ports-
and it is worthwhile to speculate what these might be.
Figure 5 presents several scenarios for change in
control of the ports and gives our assessment of the
resulting impact on each party involved in the current
chaos in Lebanon
U'the northern ports were closed, Syria's political and
military involvement in Lebanon and its home econo-
my would be harmed-more so under this than any
other scenario. Although only part of Syria's black
market is fed through northern Lebanese ports, we
judge that Tripoli is an important entry point for
smuggled Syrian imports. Although it is difficult to
accurately measure the dependence of Syrian surro-
gate groups on access to the sea in either economic or
logistic terms, denial of such access would affect their
relationship with their sponsor. They would look to
Syria to supplement their losses, thus eroding what
independence they now have from the Assad regime
and fostering a relationship that may be too close for
comfort for Damascus. The Frangiehists would lose
greatly because they would be forced into a more
dependent relationship with Syria. The Maronites and
Israel would stand to gain the most, while the other
significant players would experience little change
from the status quo
(f the central ports were closed, the Maronites would
be hurt the most, while the Druze, Amal, and Syria
would benefit, thus unpredictably changing the politi-
cal-military balance. Israel would also stand to be a
U'the southern ports were closed, the Druze and
Amal would suffer while the Maronites gained, pre-
cipitating ashift in the political-military balance in
their favor, at least for the near term. The PLO would
likewise be hurt, but Israel would gain significantly.
The prestige of the central government would drop
with the closing of the ports in Sidon and Tyre, but
these ports are economically insignificant and the
government would gain militarily.
If all the ports were closed, all but possibly one of the
major groups would be harmed. Syrian intrigue in
Lebanon could continue relatively untouched, but
Syria's ability to use Lebanon-particularly if BIA
were closed-as a staging area for terrorist activities
would be seriously weakened. This scenario might also
strike a significant blow to the Syrian economy. Israel
would make marginal gains by the weakening of the
PLO's overall military capabilities, but the Hizbal-
lah-which does not currently have direct access to
the sea and, thus, has little to lose-as the only
indigenous faction not directly harmed by this scenar-
io might derive some relative advantage.
loser, while Hizballah would derive moderate gains.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Appendix
Where the Ports Are
and Who Operates Them
The 33 ports in this study are controlled by an
assortment of factions, each of which occupies parts of
Lebanon's coast. This appendix is geographically or-
ganized, with Lebanon divided into three general
areas-the North, Central Lebanon, and the South-
using boundaries that separate factional areas along
the coast. The accompanying maps and photos use a
north-south numbering system to simplify cross-refer-
encing the ports; the number for each port appears
after the first reference to it in the following text. Not
all ports are mentioned in the text, but each port is
identified on the ma sand is represented in the
imagery section.
The North
Ambiguous Syrian Control. Syrian military and sur-
rogate forces, including anti-Arafat Palestinian
groups, occupy much of northern Lebanon, including
the coastal area from the Lebanon-Syria border in the
north to the mouth of the Nahr al Jawz (Jawz River).
Although this presence implies control over access to
the sea, the Syrians directly exercise this control only
at the port of Tripoli (5). North of Tripoli, four
unofficial ports operate with little Syrian interference.
we judge that
two of these-Nahr al Bari (1) an Ra's Burj an
Nahr (4)-are linked to Palestinian Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command
(PFLP-GC) units in nearby Palestinian refugee
camps that were purged of pro-Arafat elements by
Syrian-backed forces in 1983 and again in 1985.
The two other
ports, Al `Abdah (2) and Al Minyah (3) are operated
by Christian and Sunni merchants principally for
normal commerce, but they are also used for the
export of narcotics, according to press
reports. Because of its proximity to the Nahr al Barid
refugee camp, it is likely that Al `Abdah would be
used by those in control of the camp. ~~
The port of Tripoli fell to the Syrians in October 1985
with the eviction of the Islamic Unification Move-
ment (IUM), fundamentalist Sunni allies of Arafat.
Both general cargo and passenger traffic now move
through the port. Press reports sourced to Tripoli port
authorities claim ship visits to Tripoli in 1985 in-
creased by 32 percent over 1984 979 versus 739 port
calls). during the
same period offloaded tonnage decreased by 48 per-
cent and exports dropped by about 16 percent. We
judge that actual import-export volumes correlate
with the increased ship visits and the decrease in
reported volume reflects the collapse of governmental
control and a rise in false cargo declarations in the
port during 1985. The latest import volume figures
derived from press reports suggest that the Syrians
have reinstituted at0least part of the cargo declaration
process that collapsed in 1985 and the government of
Lebanon may be collecting some revenue at Tripoli.
Sunnis: Troubled Militias and Urban Merchants.'
The Syrian-backed purges of Tripoli effectively ex-
pelled the IUM organization. Only small cells of the
formerly dominant organization continue limited ac-
tivity in the city. If these cells have any access to the
sea at all, it is through the makeshift port on the Al
Mina' Peninsula (6) increased activi-
ty at this port since the IUM's ,expulsion from Tripo-
li's main port in October 1985.
The Sunni merchants of Lebanon have been deeply
affected by the proliferation of illegal ports and the
absence of a strong Sunni militia. Sunni merchants
throughout the country probably have consequently
suffered in competition with merchants of other con-
fessions who enjoy access to the sea provided or
protected by their militias.
' The distribution of Sunnis in Lebanon does not conveniently fit
the geographic regions listed here. For additional information on
Sunni shippin activity, see also the portion of this appendix titled
"The South."~
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
Figure 6
Northern Lebanese Ports
Syrian or Syrian
surrogates
Sunni
Frangiehist ~~~ ~'~'
Unknown
Arms/armed
personnel
Terrorist-related
activities
Unless otherwise noted, the operational status of each
port is active..
~ Shikka
C ~L, ~'~'.`~
9 Jabal an Nuriyah ~ri
r
~'~'J~~',.,
~ o Dayr an Nuriyah ~
"
~~
~'~ C'/~l Batrun ~
~'~
"
Anfah
T:.
~ ~ A/ Batrt7n , -
P, a ~~r Qs.::... ~,.::.,.~ ;. _ `...
~i~~t~If~PP'~1P-c~1Pl ~ Nahr al Barid
.. ,9
s~L~
3 AI Minyah
Nahr al BJ r
5 Kilometers
I~ I
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
Frangieh's Area oJlgfluence. The Frangiehists have
access to the sea from at least five ports located
between Tripoli and south of Al Batrun.? Two of the
ports controlled by the Frangiehists are chartered by
the central government to handle selected commod-
ities. Ra's Sil`ata (11), probably the deepest port in
Lebanon, handles grain and Shikka (7) handles ce-
ment. Another unofficial facility-Jabal an Nuriyah
(9}-is being upgraded. Because of limited water
depths, smuggling in volume through the unofficial
facilities probably is best accomplished by shuttling
small craft to mother ships waiting offshore and is
further hampered by limited access to road
Frangiehists
maybe usmg tTie ports to export narcotics, but we also
judge that they are not used for arms shipments.
Central Lebanon
Maronite Heartland: Commercial Center for
Lebanon. Of the many ports in the coastal zone
controlled by the Maronite Christians between the
Jawz River and the Green Line in Beirut, nine are
known or suspected to be operating illegally. President
Gemayel shut down the Maronite-controlled ports in
November 1984, apparently hoping that public pres-
sure would force other port operators to follow the
Christian lead. Unconfirmed reports of nighttime
activity in the Maronite ports persisted throughout
the closure period, and many of the smaller non-
Christian ports also continued to operate. Most of the
Christian ports resumed full operations by May 1985.
Aquamarine port (19), located about midway between
Jubayl and Beirut, was one of the first ports to be
pressed into service by Christian militias for logistic
purposes after the beginning of the civil war. During
the late 1970s it evolved into a facility for smuggling
commercial goods as well as narcotics and arms. It
has probably seen its heyday, however, because the
docking facilities are small and shallow, requiring
that goods or personnel be shuttled between it and
ships waiting offshore. A number of small buildings
associated with the facility are occupied by a minor
contingent of LF troops. Other than anecdotical ac-
counts of nighttime operations at Aquamarine, we
have no evidence that the facility has been used for
shipping during recent months.
Just south of Aquamarine on the opposite side of Jun
Juniyah (Juniyah Bay) is Juniyah port (20), an official
general cargo port and passenger terminal. Patrol
boats belonging to the Lebanese Navy, all antiquated
and some in chronic disrepair, are still home-ported at
Juniyah. Some'boats belonging to the LF navy are
also stationed here. A commercial ferryboat service
operates between this port and Cyprus. Juniyah has
limited facilities for handling cargo and a small basin
used for pleasure craft and a basin for fishing boats.
The majority of Lebanon's seaborne commerce today
moves through the Maronite ports, where the charges
for handling cargo probably set the standard for all of
Lebanon. The charges are per container, providing an
incentive for importation of luxury goods over bulk
items. When the state was capable of enforcing
customs fees, luxury items were taxed at higher rates
25X1 than basic goods.
A triangularly shaped Syrian-free territory inland from the
coast-with the towns of Kusba, Ihdin, and Zgharta at the three
corners-is controlled by the Marada, the Frangiehis[ militia.
Vehicular traffic into and out of the zone is nominally controlled at
roadblocks manned by Syrian forces, but, as with many other
places in Lebanon, passage is negotiable in return for money or
Ad Dubayyah (21) and the Fifth Basin (22) 5 now
probably handle more than 50 percent of the maritime
trade for all of Lebanon, including containerized and
break-bulk cargo of all types. Commercial helicopter
service between Ad Dubayyah and Nicosia began in
mid-1985, but was too costly to make a profit and the
venture failed in less than two weeks. The helipad
remains in place and is used as a parking lot near the
port's open storage area
'The term Fifth Basin is somewhat misleading. Three fully formed
basins exist in the port. A fourth is planned and when complete will
be formed by the 13th, 14th, and 15th (not yet built) quays.
Construction activity in the port between 1975 and 1984 was staged
from a small, unnumbered basin built at the easternmost end of the
port. The area extending along the 14th quay to the contractor's
basin and all the space between has been referred to as the Fifth
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
Figure 7
Mediterranean
Sea
,ca
Tabarj$
..
~ s A,~ ~Safra'/rabarja .~1_
~.~
~sAquamarina~_yv ~f,U,-,'~
Central Lebanese Ports
Official Unofficial
~~ ~~
23 BalrUt POrt
? ~ , ~ 22 Fifth
`~ Basin
Unless otherwise noted, the operational status of each
port is active.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
All of the Maronite ports came under the control of
the LF and Christian elements of the LAF after
January 1986. Soon thereafter, Christian leaders de-
cided to relieve the LF and the LAF of the responsi-
bility to operate the ports and to consign port opera-
tions instead to a consortium of Christian
businessmen and port operations professionals headed
by Joseph Abud. The ports now presumably are run
more efficiently, but a large part of their import
market-Syria-at least temporarily has shrunk sub-
stantially and the expectea surge in profitability may
be delayed.
Beirut's Fallen Port. Once the most important port
for commerce between the Arabian and the Western
worlds, Beirut port (23) generates practically no offi-
cial revenues today. The port has been at the vortex of
hostilities for over a decade because it is located just
east of the Green Line, which divides Muslim West
from Christian East Beirut. Although it is nominally
a legal port controlled by the central government, it is
occupied by the LF and Christian elements of the
LAF. The LF collects duty on cargo as it leaves the
port regardless of the official government customs
duties that may have been paid within the port,
These double payments on goods imported
commodities into Muslim West Beirut.
through the legal port encourage importers to use the
unofficial Fifth Basin. Bulk imports of refined petro-
leum products and grains cannot be imported through
the Fifth Basin because of equipment limitations, so
these goods continue to arrive through the vestigal
("legal") sections of the port of Beirut. Customs duties
are collected against these low unit value goods. In
addition, vehicles-autos, busses, and trucks~ome
into Lebanon only through the "legal" port in Beirut
because the process of vehicle titling begins at the
customs shed. The active quays in Beirut port-
numbers 11, 12, and 13~ame under the control of
the LF after they reasserted control of the port in
October 1986, according to press reports. Quay num-
ber 14 has been actively used for months as part of the
Fifth Basin. Much of the first basin remains littered
with partially submerged vessels. The special bulk-
handling quays are still operating, certainly under
direct control of the LF, putting them in a position to
control the flow of basic foodstuffs into the city,
particularly important in regard to the flow of these
The South
Beginnings oJShia Access to the Sea. Amal has
controlled the former legal port in Tyre (32) since
mid-1985 and began construction of a new port at
Awza`i near BIA in late 1984. Some improvements to
expand wharfage at Tyre began in July 1986, but the
Awza`i facility (24) is far more important to Amal
because of Israel's near blockade over the south
Lebanon coastline. Construction on a third port under
Amal's control, Mazra`at `Ayn al Qantarah (Qan-
tarah) (31), started, probably during October 1986.
Amal is continuing construction of Awza`i, although
the facility became operational in August 1985. A
small-boat basin that was used for PLO naval activity
before the 1982 invasion has been filled in by the
construction. Syria has provided munitions to Amal
through Awza`i.
In recent press reports Barri has
claimed official status for the port of Awza`i, but we
have no evidence that this claim is valid.
Druze Tighten Control. Druze chieftain Walid Junb-
latt controls access to the sea along a section of the
coast extending from a point near the southern exten-
tion of BIA to the mouth of the Awwali River. The
Druze have established or are building four ports
along the portion of the coast they control-Khaldah,
Al Jiyah, Khaldah South, and Khaldah North.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
Figure 8
ssKhe/dah Northsrb -----'".
sr~-~sU~.
7e Kh~ldah
BEIRU ~" 9y~?
~RNATIUNAL? ~
AIRPORT " ~i~leYh
~iKh.l~ah ;
~ , ~~
.p . ~-----~~ A/ Dimdr ~~ p~
2T KhB/dsh South ? _- ehc ad
(operationatstatusunkrtown) ! /~j ~
~` Boundary repiesentation ie ;
noj; necessarilyauthoritetive.
C %
~~ i
rJ~ i
~ ,~~
~
~, .~ -~ Per .:~~--
~B-~._ ~ ,
2e AlJ~yyeh AI Jiyah '~ r
(fndar consiruodan}~'` '~ -~ baSt`b r~ f ~'
~
-
'
~
S
Uasr al Bahr J ,.. '-i p h '~
dub%ect to
intermittent
Israeli blockades
'r~.U ~
z ZahrBni
~hr8n , _ strial
:,Syria
Seib%ect tie l
i~r+tarmitten#
tsraeii hlackades
~?
~
az Tye ~yra ~.-,
I ,
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
moved through the port also
In the past Junblatt has exhibited a willingness to sell
to anyone port services through Khaldah (26). Ships
flying Libyan, Greek, and Cypriot flags reportedly
brought Soviet-made arms to Khaldah for delivery to
pro-Arafat Palestinians and to Amal before Awza`i
opened. Both factions used this port when they were
fighting each other. Palestinian armed personnel have
1986, Israeli Naval units intercepted the Cypriot
yacht Anton with five Fatah persons aboard during its
transit between Limassol, Cyprus, and Khaldah.
Israeli press reports indicate that a ship carrying arms
and Fatah personnel from Cyprus to Khaldah was
intercepted by the INF in late August 1986.
The port of Khaldah serves a variety of Druze
military and commercial purposes. Using the Khaldah
facility, Junblatt has achieved a degree of independ-
ence by acquiring Soviet arms and munitions without
using Syria as a middleman. Because of limited water
depth, however, ships transporting heavy military
equipment are unable to call at Khaldah.
Water depths at Al Jiyah (28) exceed those at Khal-
dah, and larger vessels carrying heavy military equip-
ment may be able to call there. The Druze captured
the Al Jiyah oil-fired power plant and its port facili-
ties from the Christians in May 1985. The small port
formerly had been used to link local Christian villages
to the Christian heartland. Since November 1985,
the Druze have been expanding
the port to include extensive mole works with what
appear to be two quays and a large open storage area.
Although not yet completed, the facility may already
be in use for moving break-bulk cargo or personnel.
The Druze could use Khaldah and Al Jiyah ports to
support boat patrols along the coast. To do so would
speed the process of cantonization and make the
Druze the second indigenous faction to control both
land and sea along stretches of the Lebanese coast.
The Druze operate at least one and perhaps two other
ports. A fully constructed but as yet unused port is
less than 1 kilometer south of the port of Khaldah.
Khaldah South (27) was built between mid-1984 and
the summer of 1985, the same period during which
the Druze built Khaldah port. We cannot determine
who built Khaldah South or why, but it is in Druze-
controlled territory. Another port (Khaldah North,
25) is currently under construction about 1 kilometer
north of Khaldah across the coastal highway from the
southern end of the BIA. This facility is near the ill-
defined boundary that separates Amal and Druze
areas of control and near a recently established Syrian
roadblock. The facility is ostensibly planned for plea-
sure craft, according to September 1986 press ac-
counts, but it probably will be put to use for Druze
logistic requirements
construction is under way, but we are unable to
confirm that POL storage facilities are part of the
port enlargement plans. Such a development would
further strengthen Junblatt's position within his
de facto canton if he can obtain a stable source of
refined petroleum products. The exact location of the
proposed facility remains unclear. It could be located
at either Al Jiyah or Khaldah, and, while both have
advantages and disadvantages, we judge Al Jiyah to
be the likely location because of its more defensible
geography.
25X1
25X1
1X1
25X1
25X1
2;25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
The PLO's Slow Return. PLO naval personnel ex-
pelled from Beirut in 1982 and from Tripoli in 1983
have since returned to Lebanon,
and gradually
moved them south to Beirut, Ad Damur, and possibly
into Sidon by November 1985. Before their 1982
expulsion from Lebanon, PLO naval units operated at
least two vessels out of the small-boat basin in Awza'i
and two other vessels out of Qantarah. Amal seized
these assets after the 1982 PLO expulsion,
Because of Qantarah's relative isolation and its for-
mer use by the PLO, we judge it likely that the PLO
would want to reestablish naval units here. We judge
that the facility is currently under the control of
Amal, however, and, thus, it may become the focus of
future PLO-Aural fighting.
We have no convincing evidence that the PLO-
despite its repeated efforts-has secured independent
access to the sea from anywhere along the Lebanese
coast. Consequently, it now must rely on ad hoc
arrangements for the use of facilities controlled by
other factions in Beirut or elsewhere. On a routine
basis since June 1985 Khaldah served as such a port.
This access probably remains possible only on a
selective, high-cost basis. PLO personnel have re-
turned to Lebanon by sea through Juniyah since the
summer of 1986. The PLO also used Sidon 6 rather
freely until September 1985 when the INF increased
its patrols off the Lebanese coast and sank in Sidon
harbor a merchant vessel suspected of involvement
with PLO activity. Since the sinking of the merchant
vessel, the organization nominally in control of the
port, the Sunni Popular Nasserite Organization
(PNO), has repeatedly and publicly denied that it
provides the PLO access to the sea via Sidon. In
August 1986 the PNO claimed through Christian-
controlled Radio Free Lebanon that Fatah elements
were not returning to Lebanon through Sidon port.
b In the southern city of Sidon (29) the PNO maintains tenuous
control over the port area, but its influence is challenged by rival
Sunni factions in the city. The PNO's control of the port is also
vulnerable to the increasing strength of pro-Arafat Palestinians.
We judge it unlikely that the PNO could withstand a determined
effort by Arafat's forces to take over the port area. Moreover,
access to the sea from Sidon is strictly controlled and inhibited by
the blockade-like conditions imposed by the INF along the coast.
We judge, however, that Sidon probably remains the
most desirable point for PLO access to the sea.
25X1
25X1
25X1
In July 1986 Amal established an 25X1
office in the area of Sidon port to monitor the return
of Palestinian fighters, according to a Lebanese press
source.
The Israeli Coastal Security Zone. Israel currently
patrols the coastline between the mouth of the Awwali
River and the Israel-Lebanon border for a distance at
least six miles to seaward. Operating on a round-the-
clock basis, the patrols seek to interdict arms and
personnel posing a threat to northern Israel and the
security zone in southern Lebanon. A squad of Fatah
fighters was captured by the INF in transit to Sidon
in mid-August 1985. Less than a week later, elements
of Fatah's Force 17 were intercepted by the INF
while aboard a yacht en route from Larnaca, Cyprus,
to an undisclosed location in southern Lebanon. In
July 1986 the coastal patrol system was instrumental
in preventing four terrorists who were probably Syri-
an backed from reaching northern Israel. Forced
ashore south of An Naqurah, the terrorists and two
Israeli Defense Force soldiers were killed in an ensu-
ing firelight.
Israeli patrol craft challenge all vessels approaching
or departing the Lebanese coast anywhere in the
Israeli coastal security zone. Vessels are visually
inspected and photographed, and through radio con-
tact vessel masters are questioned regarding crew,
nationality, cargo, and last port of call. Decisions
regarding "authorization" for vessels to freely enter
or depart port or to have these "privileges" denied are
made by watch officers at INF headquarters in Haifa.
Delays encountered by some vessels awaiting "author-
ization" for movement have exceeded two weeks,
including vessels calling at An Naqurah (33), which
the Israelis built for their surrogate ASL. The autho-
rization process can be streamlined, however, perhaps
to as little as a few hours, if permission for vessel
movement in the coastal security zone is secured by
shipping agents before the vessel enters the zone.
Shipping agents capable of making these arrange-
ments operate from offices in Cyprus.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Next 29 Page(s) In Document Denied
Q
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/16 :CIA-RDP87T01127R001201150001-7