POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN YUGOSLAVIA; MORALE AND ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE TOWARD TITO AND THE PRESENT REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00415R010600070001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 20, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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~o~NT>~Y Yugoslavia
SECURITY INF~DRMATION
CENTRAL. INT?LLlGENCE AGENCY REPORT
1~VF~~1~~~-'~'~tyN ~EP~~'T? CD N0.
CLASSIFICAT{fli~ S~R.T;'X'~GOiVTRQL ro UoS~ OFFICIALS ONLY
SUBJECT Falitical and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia;
morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito
and the. Present Regime
t'LACE
ACQUIREi3
?ATE OF
INFO.
REf~
THFB gOCSpENT CgNTAIN9 INFORYATIOH AFFECflNB THE RATIONAL DEFEN86
0! THE DNlTED BTATEB. 1NITNIN THE NEA911NG OF TITLE /D, IIECTIONS 7!9
pRD 764. OF TILE 0, S. CODE, AS AgYNDED. iT8 TRANBdIBStgN OR REYHt-
ATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO qR RECEIPT DY AM DNA4TNORiZEO 9ERSON
f8 PRONtDITED BY i.A7f YNS REPRODUCTION qR THIS 'PORN IB BRONi81TED.
Stability of the Regime
1~ It maybe taken for granted that the Tito regime is in no danger of being
overthrown by the action of the Yugoslav population, not because the over?
whelming majority of the Yugoslav people are not dead set against it, but
because they are entirely impotent to do anything about ito The Yugoslav
population Maas grown more anti~Tito and anti~i'egime than it was between
19lty and the middJ.e of 19~C7a Physical power has become much more con
solidated and widespread in the hands of the Security Police (UD$), whose
tent~c?.es now reach as far down. as .the community councils (opstinski odbor)a
2~: If Tito and his regi.+ne stand in any danger of being overthrown, :tt is by
a "Palace coup" or an armed forces coup engineered by Cominform elements
of the Yugoslav Communist Arnay4 However, this, too, appear$ highly
improbable. It was very difficult to evaluate the situation in this
respect, since particular],y at that time, it was very difficult to obtain
an accurate picture of the strength of Yugoslav Cominformism, its
dynamism and its means of pulling off such a caupn There are many people
in Yugoslavia today who believe that a majority of the .Yugoslav Communists,
particularly the hard cars, are Cominformistao When they are asked. why,
in that case, the Cominformists are not in control mf Yugoslavia instead
CL,~,SSIFICATION SECRET'/C0~''TROL ~ UpS, OFFICIALS ONLY
STATE ~'~ X ftAVY _ ~ NsRS DISTRI~iUTlQ~1
ARMY .__: X AtR ~ FBI URR Ev. ~
DATE DISTR. 20 Febo A9~2
N0. Of PAGE5 18
0.01= ENCLS.
SUPI~LEMENT TO
REPORT N0.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
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S$CRET/CON'r'R~pL = U~S~ ?F1~SCIALS ONI,Z
CENTRAL INTFF,LxI~.NCE ACHY
oaP Tito, that'. inform ?oui "83mply because Tito, by kespinp them irs
the dark About his ititent3,aas visma-via the Caoinfox~ until- he xas
reac~r to act,. gc-t the wrap on them and made them po~rerlesso" S~?.50X1-HUM
ssqudnt pur,~esp partiaulAr~.y 3n the UDe and the Armed eer^vicesa
incapacltatad the Ganinfoxmists fram orgsni$ingo
60
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SECRET/CONTR4I. ~ IInS~. C?FFiCTALS 0141T.~f
80
Wild. the Yugoslav People support Titus to ftesiat Aggression3'
9a Tt is apparent. that the stability of the Tito regime rests not on the
support of the Yugoslav people but entire3,y on force and the physical
impotence of the Yugoslav ~peap:Le to upset its This. sort of stability
cannot be pexvranentb at canstitutoa n weakness in ~ oelavig~ s 50X1-HUM
potential of resistance fiur ~3oviet~-inspired aggression
the stability of the Tito regime, hc~~rever maintained has been the
determining factor against Soviet-inspired aggresslan from within
Yugoslavia, it is equal.2,y certain that, in the event of aggre$sian frays
withoutp the factor of Yugoslav resistance will shift to the yrillingnese
of the Yugoslav people to reepel Lhe aggreesion~
1.0o It is evident that Tits cannot continue to force Communism down the
throats of the Yugoslav peap~.e and at the- same tune sac ect their support
to repel aggressior~F even Soviet aggresaian4 it is asx 50X1-HUM
error to contend that the Yugc~s7;av geaple wi31 ~eupport Tito against
So~aiet or govietaaata~.].ite aggreasi.an because9 by comparison the. Tito
regime is the leaser of tt,A t.~ ?~ ~ ,~. 50X1-H U M
'fie P~PIe would recap.
with horror ttasir experiences un er a us anss or the ss~te7,Iites and.
would readily admit that they certain~r did net wan
ftussiatYa~, the Rungarians ar the Bu~..gariana, .not one 50X1-HUM
wou3.d evade this question; others wauld reply "Hut this the Vito regime)
is evil, toad" Sti11, others mould sayp "Would you fight far anything 50X1-HUM
evil7" or "Why shou~.d T ah~-d my blood ar send ~9' son to be ki7.~.ed far
th3.s (the-Tito regions}?" When .asked what they would do in the svQnt of
an attack on Sugoslaviap they ansWerBd they would do nothing ter they would
flee to the waads~
Attitude of Peasants toward thee. Regits
(this feeling of bitterness
against the Tito regime was not the e~aressian of transie~ts.a~gr~ry
but was a genuine and deep rooted teeling:> The peasants complained
bitter~.y about their lot9 which they said was go3.ng frrom bad to warseg
from year to yeas^o The Yugoslav peasants 3ooked miserab~.e~ and were as
~.hgy described themselvae "go3 i bos" (naked and barefooted) An old
Serb, 3.unching on Mack bread and green pepperg9 under a tree not far
from Nis9 after heaping abuse upon the regime {in which four, or fi'~e
other peasants present participated) for the multiform suffexingB ~.he
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SEGRBT~CDNTROL ~ UoS, OFFICIALS QNILY
CF1dTEiAL :f~NTELLIQ~E AGCY
regime has visited upon the pt~asants (which' it his case reached the
limit xhen "the government authorities took all fat i s and th ee
lean ones"
12r. A fsw miles from Zagrebp a caravan of peasants,
some on cartsp others on foot, returning from a religious celebratiaQ
at ?Saris Biatricao Those on foot and menu who iun-aed from the eerts_
v condemnation
of every aspect of the reginne a situation among 2abo:r~ere and white-collar workers to be
creat+s any kind crf consciou~riees by fox~ceo"
Laborar~r and White-Co12ar Workers
a Tito s theory that 'Democracy ~,$ not a matter of decree, but a
question. of ~e cansoiousneea~ of the citizen~a~; The more consciauaness
and the fewer enemies of socia?,i~rt, the more will our demxracy b'~'a'~" ~
if peasants dial not dismiss the matter w:l.th a shrug of the shoulder~~
they answered to the effect that {,~$ one peesant put it} s:"One._ cannot'
impossibility to rely on TitoQs pre~mie~e~r 3a~ pixrigen~~y-=expxeseedby them,
in thin manner: "T3.to speat~ of one th3,ng, thinks of something elsss,
dose still something else arnd we {the pea$antsj came Iastot' Edith regard
t ~
.32. Tie connection $ritt- .the ias,rlrinn ~'.oe
.33~
use a si s of the road, a few miles out of Banda I,uka, in +Bosniao
Food was plentiful9 and the guests drank and sang to the accompaniment
ref an accordion and a guitar There wag high merriment and a convivial
n
much cheaper rents {in itself etcet an unal7loyed blessiag inasmuchpasothey~
have no choice eoncerning their place of abode ncar of their dwelling
partners} they are much worse off than under, the fozmer Yugoslav regime9
although they mu~t,WOrk.harden b~ausa of fibs Harm systemo In addition
to thiss9 they are not free agerttc~~
or$rs are eep di~eatisfi.~ad~ They e a with the exce ti
fM
50X1-HUM
cQmpany~ Since they sang nothing but Tito songs, even to the exclusion
of national foatc songs, it was e~bvious that aZ1 of thon+t :present were
poli.tica.3.3yy homageneouao The accordion p7layer~y a truck driver who son
verses satirizing drivers and their tradao
SECRET~~AtT'1~GL ~ U:> S~ QFFTCIALS ONLY
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s~cR~c,~c~~rr~o~ 4 u,s~ aF~zc~~,s oNLY
4
a~TR~. xxz~.zxc~NC~ a~vcy
50X1-HUM
They declared that all of the 50X1-HUM
people at the Wedding fastitritie9 Were nparti+~ci" (Party member~)$
several of them county and cammun3.ty official.sc The bridegroom Was
an official of the C
officials Ware happyo 50X1-HUM
NQn Nationalized Art#.aana
31t~ .One of the small.classaa in Yugoslavia Who have na lave for the mite.
.regime are the '~pri~raten art3.s~me, such as shoemakers, tailors, a~hirt~
makers, Liairdreasers, et cQterap Thg tease levied upon than are so
emarbitant that they can scarce- eke out an ex3.stenc?? still th
refuse to become z~ationalizeda
the sha~xnaker,
began to recite the woes of all sma3.l shapawners ' o
se un er this inhuman reg3.m? which doers nod hesitate to drlva people
into starvat~.an in order to force than into the caoperativesn~ He said
that he cau~d net a~'ford niara than ens he:~perP `'but? the more he3pers the
greater the ~ that heed to be paid As ~.t isB ~ ha had been forced tc>
ssl]. one 'af h3a sealing ma-chinea during th~a previoxs year in order to pay
his taxes and this year, he expects to have to e+all hie radio Never-
the3ess;, he said that there ~rere athera who were even Worse off than ha
xas~ He knew of one col.].eagtae who had only one sexing machine -and no
helper, and had a W3.fe and four children to ~ppart~a A feW months before,
he stated, "fhey descended upon him" for taxes-and, as he could not
possibly pay the taxes, they took away has p~acshine, his one and only
means of livelihoo " port his fami3,g7 x'hey did
not earefl A.r+d no 'would you blame him if 50X1-HUM
he dreg his guru {Pro a he a one an ;~ 4 them all dead? o o U
But, We,Will not fain the coaperati^ve8~ we wial not submit tc> daily
indignities for a chunk of bx?eada" a hairdresser 50X1-HUM
who had had m prosperous busihesa b ore a War, u new both he and
his business vats 3x-dascriba~-; * run + w
the same as that of the shaemaltar~. 50X1-HUM
Tito cannot "create a saei at state #.n Yugasla a ~mn
ge a peep a to defend 3tg thus perpetuating it, any mots than one can
eat his cake and have it face
50X1-HUM
Is the Regime bring Damocrat~.zed?
35~ Since Titap s bz~+eak ? with the Cominfarm and since the WestBxr, orientation
of the Yugoslav regime,, efforts have been asaertediy made to "democratirce"
the regimen To this ends a number of laze,have b?ert enacted, among Which
the decentr+a2.3.wation last and the Heal criminal Saw have been given
prominence, ae vell as a number of executive measures Which have been
takenQ Procedure has been revised With a view to relaxing the controls
and easing the pressuroa emp3.oyed by the regime to maintain itself .and
impose its program upon an unwilling peoples These efforts ha4e made
little impre~asion upon the peasants e~cGapt in their relations with the
ChurchQ The terror under which they have been living ma3r have been
slightly mitigated, but it is atilt there; they are still spied upon
and fear to speak their thoughts, and go to fail if they fail to ~'canfor+n~"
even if far shorter terms than: beforer~ They are sti1.1 compe3.l.+~d tct attend
. "conferenceal~, though net as rigidly ar frequently as before; they are
forced to perform "voluntargi4 labor; they are arargatod Without warrants
detained Without trials sent to Sail by administrative action9 et catera~
Consistent With Communist rt~Raditi.on", laxs era still. published only to
be read,- and important prc~nounce+nenta affecting the lives of the people
ax?Q Mill made by important persons an2y to be heardo The decentralization
law, for eacenaple, has only made it easi$r for top-level. bureaucrats to
evade responsibility, actual.].y it has given na polder or right of
initiative to the Workers or to the e~cecutive boards of enterprisa~sn
Workersa Councils are sti31 chosen from ]fists furnished by tho Communist
Aari~.v! a~ftRnn?ti va Y~nnrAa n e+~ n7 aan~.ori i n 7 ~ lru ~narmAw nrA ~F.hai r ~nemhcarc
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$EE;RF~T~CaNTEt(~L ~ U~ S~ OFFTCTALS ONLY
CIIdTRAL INTEL~G~FCE AGENCY
~. 11 ' o
stilX da as Party representatives direct; and Party repre,sentativea
themselves still take orders from Pang header .With reward to the near
n con rae o s there ware numerou$ recent
50X1-HUM
. ns cea w ere people had been arrested ar detained without trial o
sent to Sail, blr administrative actiono
36~ xn his speech at Snezica, Tito made reference to the much~advertizedf
admission of Aleksand:,sx~ Rankavf.c #.rt his report to the fourth "plentm+;"
of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to the effect
that mrr~y people had been un~uat3:y prosecuted and wiled or given un?
~uatifiedly severe sentences Then Tito added, "Th3s~ demonstrates our
tendency and progres$ toward don-ocratissatian in our countzy." Rankovic
pointed out, indeed, the indignities perpetrated by the Security Polies,
according to the people; however, the latter maintain thatq since noes
of those in fail. ware released, this affirmation an the part of Rankavia
can hardly be said }tb -,fit` out any "tendency toward democratization"' o
Ae further .proof that legisxation paaa+ed by the Communists or p a
,made by them era of no value, an individua3, in Belgrade showed a
new form oYf sur+nnona,, recently 'issued by .the UI7~H "to fool. the fareign~sre~~ o
This aun~mons pxcrvidea fear the name and addreaat of the individual summaneda
the reason for the summons (~+hethar as a wittteae or as defendant), tr50X1-HUM
nature of the charge or charges, and also provides a place for the
signature of the chief s~f the UDC station concerned4 Al.together~ tha,ar
would be a docLUnent showing a "tendency toward democratizati~+n" and rearrest
of the ri hts of individua7~s, if it were complied xith~, The summons 50X1-HUM
had actually been served an an individual., but it containec~~UX1-HUM
nothing mare than this persr~nA ~s name and address, the time aril the place
of hie appearances and several unintel.,~.igible curveas purporting to be
initial.e ~ the space provided fnr the signature, without any title a
-any other sign to _.~dentify the authority issuing the summonso
Ithis 50X1-HUM
ways cam~on prat aQ, which showed a terndencq net toward democratisation
in Yugoslavia, but rather away from its The UDH is ati~i3, a. law unto
itself in Yugoalaviaa
Tito' s iPReforma~' i
3T, Theforegoing ia- not to deny that Titovs new attitude toward the West
and tha subsequent relaaat3.an of the regimes oppressive attitude towards
the people have ameliorated they difficult and tense aituatian in which the
great ma3ority o~ the Fugoalavs have been livingsince the liberatican~
It ~.s to emphasi~te the fact that the amelioration is simply sugar over
the pill and that fundamentally, na change, has taken plane, The ~u~^c''~~
people are aware. of the situation, al.thaugh they welcr~ne the re3isf50X1-HUM
afforded them by the comparative "de brutalising" of the contral.s and
pressures. empl.vyed by the regime to fc+rce its "socialimt atate~' en the
people Certainly there is nothin in this change to justify the
,optimism of certain Western observers that s3.awly, but v50X1-HUM
gradually, Tito a,s moving toward accial.iam or a western-type -
democx~acy9 anci that the. Yugoslav peaples9 s vi.ev of the regime -has definitely
.become at least toJ~eraat~ if not quits benevalento
~ 50X1-HUM
Effect of Tito' a "Reforms" .:n the Cauntrgrside
380 As indicated ear3~,er, this air of "reform'R, quite stmngly manifest in
the cities, is va],y slightly gesrceptible in the countryside, e~ecept insofar
a,e it affects the 8hurch~
ere xaa a. mare orence in the attitude of the Communists toward
the Church; they have not became eupporter$ of the ~Chus?ch, but blr
comparison to their former attitude, they have become more tolsrant~
Na longer da they resort to terroristic tactics,. petty administrative
devices, and frequeQnt persecutianfl to keep the pea.le from Qin to church
or attending to other religious obligations 50X1-HUM
i
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50X1-HUM
SEGRET~C~DNTROL = U o S. QFFICI'ALS ONLY
C~ITRAL iNTg},LIO'~TCg A{~1GY
4 ~ .a
50X1-HUM
the Yu~a~ ativ
people xere certainl~r pleased rel.r~tive to the apparemt f:o3eranz~, attitucla
of Vito and the Communist regime toward tht+ tihurch, bent if there was anyq
such change in the fee3~3.n a of the eo le t xa na g ercept:~ble ones
In the first place the yug,,s1~50X1-HUM
people da not feel any gratitude toward Tito for giving them back
something which he had taken ax
~outwardl~r this resembled the praxar situai:ion in Be:~grade9 but that 50X1-HUM
actually grices wr~r+v ao faotaatically high that, no one could pass~b~.yr
afford to bar anyi~,hing~ ere wsa nath3.ng in the ~a~ltward50X1-HUM
appearance of thirigs that suggested anything at,normal. Osten~ibly~
tour3ste xere Wort, fa3,lo~red9 and they xere free to ga xhc3raver they wisr.ed
and to task xith whomever they pleasedo
h4a There xas nothiag in this atmosphere of He3,grada (tak~.nt; Belgrade s,s ~
examp~.e of the mituation prevailing in a~,l of th,~ larger ?YugosZav cities)
that suggested aterror--ridden Communist country, and many ,unobi~exwing
touristaF xha were content Frith what they pax or did not, bather ~
?scratch beneath the surface'+;+ harre.bean deceived by th:~.s atanasphe50X1-HUM
In contrast to -the actual- situation of the permac+ent rea~idents of
Belgrade (not the. thousands of X slave xhn moved the~rc~ since the
liberation
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X10
SECRET/C?NTI~3G m UoSo OFFICIALS ON~.Y
CENTRAL INTEZ.LI6E~TCE AC~iCX
_i~..,
50X1-HUM
To the people of Belgrade (overwhelmingly pra-West ~ 50X1-HUM
syn+laathy and political arientatian, a sympathy far Which they have
heretofore been re2entlesal3r persecuted) , this ch~-nga of attitude hoe
correspondingly brought a definite relief reflected in the outward
manifestatiana of normalcy and palm of everyday 1J?feo Harrever, it has
not radically changed the attitude of the people toward the regime, far
it has not earsentially changed either-the eoncapts or the aims of the
regimens philosophy of a Communist state, nor its methods in trying to
achieve such a Mateo The Tito regime has not oeased tc- regard and treat
the overwhelming ma~arity of the people of Belgrade as '~~enemiea of the 50X1-HUM
regimen
e city a eared to
8 three ar four years, but the change
have changed dur3,ng th?
xaa all superficial,
there are today 60,000 50X1-HUM
ou mo ~ oWnera rom Bosnia and the Lima, in Belgrade? They get what they
Want; ?~gy fill the cafes and ?the Streets; .they are the representativet~
of Tito s ~ bettRer lifeB o Yau +~o not see many real Belgrade citizens in
any of those cafes; they cannot afford ito"
Student Indoctrination a Failure
4~~ It Was apparent that the regime has made ncr headWa~-- among students in
Yugoslavia, particularlg among the etudeats in the universit~.ea and
high schools Practically all of the university students are obliged 50X1-HUM
to 3oi.n ~e Student P'x~xit Orgar~.xatian if they wi.ah to continue their
studies, and many students simulate belief in Cot~muni~u, especially those
students Who moat depend on finanoia7. aid from the government or governmentG
sponsored organiaatioaa to ariatrle theta to carry an their atudieso However,
the vast ma,~or~.ty of the etuderkts hold steadfastl3r to their anti-Communist
and anti~aCegitna principlss~,
Macedonian Problems
The high .. echelon Macedonian officio]., already referred to, probably a
disil.~.usioraed Communist, not on~.y condemned the coll,ectiviasatic~n po~:icy9
but also stressed that even the industrial working population, the
supposed "elites under the Communist system, lived under car~ditiona conm
siderably below the level of prewar industr3ak xorkerso 0ppaaition to
the regime ox~ the part of the Macedonian population in general is of the
same character and intensity as in the rea?'r of Yugoa3.av~ao Macedonia,
however, presents other characteriati~a not to be .found elsewhere in
Fugoslavia, ex~sept perhaps, in a much milder form among the AAbanian
population of the Kosmet, and Whichp in cane cif the Sovietminsp~,red
aggreaaic~m against Yugoslavian Wau~.d undoubtedly add to TitQVs weaknesses
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SECRET/(~3N'rR~L~ ~ UoSa OFFICIALS 4NS~Y
CEfTTRAL xDi :~ELLI G~dC E A GENC Y
-lt~m
b5o
to? reaistanceo These ors: {~.) the latent pro?~Bu~garian sentiment
and {2j the intensively and apparently studiously cu~.tivated ethnic
chauvinism in Macedania~ 50X1-HUM
this pro~Hulgarian sentiment, dra
its strength from a cultural and linguistic affinity to Bu3.garia, and
always strong in Macedonia, was aLnost extinguished during the last war
as a result of the brutality of the Bulgarian occupa~iono Hewever, since
the war, it has been considerably revived, passively but pointedly mani-~
fasted in the popularity of Hul.garian .folklore and fa}.ic songs, as a farm
of reaction against the present regime which is laakc=d upon as worse than
the Bulgarian occupatiana
l~ba The cultivation of Macedonian nationalism is apparen?.ttt all levels of
Macedonian officialdom and constitutes the principal effort of Macedonian
propaganda It is not the usual "national" recogi~ition {$ea~b, Croats
Slovene, Mantenegrin9 et cetera within the framework of Yugoala~v
n~tianalimn, sanctioned by Communist philosophy and given expreasinn in
Yugoslavia by the policy oP "brotherhood and unity"~ 'its latter.palicy
is not entirely forgotten in Macedonia, but the Iacoa~ ~-_xith_, which_,it~
is referred tc> aarves only to emphasize the sariouaneaA and intensity 50X1-HUM
with which .Macedonian s ro a atedo ,Duri.og" the annual tom
festival of Gnlicnik, a ala evening
perfarmanca at a new movie theater in former days
there. -woe no movie theati~r _ in the tom, an ea : v ie#~ sera held
in the toxn church squats, 3n the streets of the tor~+rt ar in the harass of
the various 'villager~~ They would also hold mans ~*eddings on that d,~+p
in farmer times, and the wedding ael.ebrationa xhich were open to e~rerybody
went on for a waska Qn the same day a wedding took place in the t~r~aza
fibs church ceremciny was followed by an eating and drsnking ritual in the
Churchyardo Various geopla grwnbled that, in former days, the father of
a bride in that toxn Would have kil~.ed at least a doae~n sheep on h~.e
daughtarrs wedding day and the festivities xould have continued far tin
entire xeak, but that now people had ne cheap cif ~?ir owno The cinema
.presentation was an exhibition of Gannnuniat cu3.ture in songs and
recitations by selected groups of young people; but was especially
significant-for the highl,,y Macedonian nationalistic speeches delivered by
local officials and guest speakers from Skopl,~sa In hie c7~oaing speech,
the master of ceremonies rneda reference to "brotherhood and unite", but.
it xas a transparent effort to ali,minate tho sting from thQ ehauvitaietic
harangues of the evaning~
~t7 o Perhaps by bestowing its bleabsing an this "pr~otian~ of Maredoniari
nationalism, Balgrada takes cognisance of the seriousnesa~ osthe pro
Bulgarian sentiment and amplr~ya this means to counteract it, since, ob?
viously, it is powerless to suppregg its However, this indul.gsnce on
the pstrt of the re~xne toward a nationally minded people is cely to
prove a boameranga~ It would probably serve a8 at3 antidote to ;pro?Bulgarian
sentiment if the regime itsalfp within xhich Macedonian nationalism is
.obliged to exist, offered a, benevolent and humans contrast to promBu7.garian
sentimentso A,a it is, howe~*tx~, .it appears- doubtful that the Macesdoniarxs
x31.1 look upon the regime ai~i hnything but an inhuma~.x opprea~sQr, and
Macedonian nationalism Will tend to be identified ~:th prov8ul.gar$.an
sentiment to the detriment of Yugoslav "brotherhood and unity'"a l:t is
eerta~.n that it loosens dangerously the bonds of Yugoslav nationa'~ism,
and that it might prove destritative to Yugoslav resistance to aggresariaae
from the East, especially if the oppressor should hc+ld vut promis?a of
a united and independent Macedonia to a pBaple x3th an already aroused
nationalistic can.aciencea '
Morale of the Yu~oalav Army
~.$o It is difficult to Learn much about the morale of the Yugoslav armed
~orceso Aa a matter of fact, .since the main elements of az~ny morale are
intangible, and since manifestation of those 3.ntangibles is rigidly and
ruthlessly cgntrol.led in the Yugoslav army, it is eatr~aely diffic~.t
even among soldiers themselves to gauge $ccurately each athero.a mara].ea
. ~~R~mfr~r-~tnt. ~ rr ~ n'~Yn're~a ntar:v
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state of confusion, aggravated, the uiet but erisistent "e ever
sabotage" of the Cominformists~
Yugasiavs, who wears considered '"reactianariea", pi^edi.cted that ire the
event of attack, the arm would not last as?lang as the Regal Yugoslav ?
Artily lasted. in 19ta.Q while thc~ Yugaalav army l.aadere 50X1-HUM
are brava and fantastic, they are professianallg incompetent These xc11:-
informed Yugoslav "reactianarieaTM laugh at Kaca Papo~.Q as Ohief of Staff?
and point nut that the man who created and .led TitoQs partisan army during
World War IT was Area Javanovic, a regular Yugoslav staff officer, who
was shot on the Eiumanian border soon aftcsr the TitoyCaminf4rm break-while
ho was "attempting to escape into Rumania", according to official. Yugoslav
reparts~ Aa an ezemple of the :incompetence 5,n the axm~y, these Yugoslavs 50X1-HUM
po~.nt to the-armyes administrative services which they claim are irX a
looked well clothed and well.- fed ~Ce s many repo a yam' canned
as all of the soldiers seen ar met .50X1-HUM
If one were to fudge by the arn+y$s manifest discipline and its outward
~t9o In Zagreb there is a group of leading citiaetlss most of them former
high ranking army officers headed bg a generals who, cut of professional
interest, make it their business to .fol,lox the development and evolution
of the Yugoslav azmyo They are net an official organiaation~ however,
5t~ o
the present Yugoslav anng (u3:th tha_ exception cef
ter special utai.ts) is camplete3,y lacking in common mstive car moral
caheaian, and iffi kept together only by the farce of ruthless discipline,
Since the break with the Caminfarne, an ever growing state of suspicion
has been raising havoc among the offioer carps, according to-this groupo
Thin tendency has been manifested by frequent arrests., and transferee and
a~xsignments of officex$y who hitherto were considered "leaders" to
}
?~work and keep quietno
These per9ans never volunteered arty remarks about army morale or conditions
in the service, and when asked how they Liked arnty life, they replied,
t'T do scat knowQn It was common. knox~ledge that the relentless dieci,tal~?~~
of the political commissars and theeonstant: +~urveil..3.anee of 'the Oi}~ 50X1-HUM
Qf'fi.cera, made it dangerous far ~ aaldier to try to find out what other
soldiers thought about the army4 The general feelin,a anvears to be
innocuous instructor ~abso
50X1-HUM
some soldiers and aun men. who cam Meted- 50X1-HUM
their teens of compulsory military service
satis~isd`
the feelings of mast of the soldiersu
United States Prestige
ow can tiney as ,
this statement e~cpressed 50X1-HUM
5a~ The Yugoslav peopleps attitude toward the Unitead States? aXways vc~r
favorable3 is note l.sss eo taday,~ They nralntain that they do eat Like the
present united Statest policy of helping Tito; neverthal.ess~ they underm
stand it and they hope that it may serve to gradually fcarca Tito ~
grant them a democracy of the western type The Yugoslav pecaple be3ieve
deeply that any "reforms" Tito may have enacted have been imposed upon
.him by the United States,and na amount of Tito ar United Status proT
nouncements to the contrary will make-them-be~ievm atherwiseo A professor
at one af.the Yugasla~r universities is said to have made the remark that
the mare Tito gets from the United States.the more conesssians he will,
be farted to make and as a result, that wi].i, accdlerate the erect of
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~, 16
cif Communism in Yugosla~riap Ne.turallyy this is the feeling and attitude
of the anti~Communirst l~opulatis~n in Yugoslavian
The attitude-~ o:f .the Communiate toxard the United States,, on the other
hands although it ap~iesarad to ba by far more tc>lex~ant and even more
accommodating than ever beforesp is ~:ardly
a tzd
.endly
attitud
e;
it~
gh~
m~
.
_
_
_
_
_
.
~ c~eseribe:~ as a correct but cautious attitudeo In Fria?n, an American
tourist was arrested on a market day far taking pictures of peasants
u...a. ._.~_ ti_t__ ___t __ ., _ _
the cities,
50X1-HUM
Alb~efu~eerY` Yugoslav Relations
5.3o The Yugoslav authorities era in c1?se: contact with the Albanian refugees
in the I~osm~et through the Albanian Refugee Cvmiaittee, which is sponaared
and financed by the Yugoslavs and functions under their #.ndireect supex?-~
visiane This committee is engaged in Welfare activities among the estimated
fire ar six thousand Albanian refugees in the Kostneto It is not aan~
ducting militar3r training of reffugees, nor is it apparently involved in
at~y military aetivitiea or clandestine. operations, esxcept for z-unning
couriers into Albania far the "eacmfiltration" of lercal leaders Qf eimila~e
political crly.entationa
Stabilf.ty of the Tits Regime
Alta The stability of Tito and has r+sgime dues not scam tea be in danger?
neverthele+sag since this s~abil;kty is not the product of papu~.Br suppc~rt~
but is dependent entirely upon fax~cey $t cannot be: regarded as of
pexinanent duration Its continuity depends upon the continuity of TitaQs
control. of then Yugoslav armod ,forces, which actually means,, control Qf
the officer carpe of those forceso Contrary opinions notwithstanding
the pereen of Tita is paramount to this Control; hence, axe jeopardy
to Titoa s life places in ~eoparc~r tine stability of the regimen
.Yugoslav Cssminformism: Its Strength and Effect
~$o Yugbs3aY pro~Cominf4rm Co~rmnuniate, whips of much greater strength than
.Commonly believed, are apparently we3.1 under contrca3, and of no dangerr
to the stability of they z~agi.meo Hoxeve;r, thcsy are a +33.r~organi~ing
influence, in all branchess.of administration, and furthermot?a, they con
stitute a threat. to Tito s ~.ife, In the event of mi3.itary emergency;
they definitely have the potential to became a serious menace to the
unity and effectiveness of the Yugoslav .fined faress~
The Yugoslav Pimple would not Support Tito to Fight A, ressioxa
5~o The averwhelmie~,g majority cf thes YugoaZav people are not disposed to
~~~~~uc~~ a people in genex^a:i is confirmed ~ ~'ir50X1-HUM
by leaders of the
opposition in Yugoslav}-as August Rosutic; Milan 4rol; Ivan Subasic;
Junr~ Suter; Kc~sta Ks~stic; (Serb Agrarian Party of Dro Milan t~avrilvvic'~:"
Milarad HcliC (Socia~.ist Party o_f Drs Zivko To atonic
a 3.uminarie~sa 50X1-HUM
these leader a sure a e ugaslav peoples are not
going to get kil]L?d to suppa~t T:tto; if they fight at ells they wi3.1
fight Communism whe~?eves~? they find ito Sane of the stated leaders of
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T
SECFiET~t;CN7.`R~JL .y Uo S ~, OFFICSA~,S 41v~.Y
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-1?-~
the appositis~n have been icnc~wn to be very emphatic an this subject
Remarks were made on several occasions to the effect that if the
American people think the Yugoslav peap3.e are doing to fight for Tito,
that' axe tragica3.ly mistakeno
Yugoslav Resistance Potential.
- .....
5?~ Assuming that under na circumstances will Tito abandon Communism in
ardor to obtain the willing support of the Yugoslav people, the potential
of Yugoal.av resistance to Soviot?inspired aggreas3.on must be viexed in
the light of two contingencies; (a} Titogs ability to maintain an c~r~
ganiaad and cohesive front Without being cr~mpe2led to give up the
greater part cif Yugoslav terx?i.toxy; and fib} his reduction to guerrilla
warfrxrr ~:
58o In the first 1nst+ancw he Would be in a positiara to control the movements
of the people as Well as of the soldiers-and his resistance potential.
would be proportionate to his ab313.ty to commandeer their suppox?to Zt
is apparent that this would Wert be an oast' task; infinitely mare
difficult than during c~orld Year IIo Tn any teas, it would be a support
imposed by coercion, and the resultant potential wou3.d have tck bay
+~valuated on that basis4 In the $acond instance, Tito would be forced
to depend to a very great extent on then x~9.ll.irig support of the Yugoslav
people; this wau].d be practically ni19 and. as a consequence, has
rer~iBtance potential would al.sci be practically nilR
59o Haweverr there is a third contingency; one in which the United States
would actively support Tito to resist aggressi.ona This Would have a
decisive impact on the reaction of tie Yugoslav people They would
fight resolutely with Tito if the United States action carried with it
the promise that preservation of Yugoslav independence wou3.d also being
liberation from Commun~.st tyranny and the e:~tablishment of wester
democracy in Yugoslavian If, on the other hand, the United Statsstaction
failed to carry any such promigej, it xouad result- in the a1.ie~nation c~i
United States! pre3stige i.n Yvgosl.avia and the further stiffening of the
Yugralav peapleo s attitude against Tito: Indeed, this would make Tito
a heavy liabil~.ty instead of am asset to the United States~>
United States ~'restige in Yugoslavia
bra Except in the c:ireu~nstance of a~,i,ens.tian of United Statesr prestige an
YugosT.avia as dearcribed in the praced.ing paragraph, .the United States
can count upon the loyalty of the anti~Communist element of the Yugoslav
peoples ~Iaxeger, the attitude of -the Gommun:~st elements of the Yugoslav
people toward the United States, if not ec~mpl.e:tely hostile gs in the
cave of -the pra~Cominform Communists, is to say the least, oxtz~eme3l;y
daubtfulo This t~ituatioraD in addition to a nuntbe:r of other indications
already mentioned, is particularly borne out by the fact that poli.t~.cal.
indoctrinatic-n in the Yugoslav Army,, as we513 as throughout the country,
where it is acao?-plished through various "conferences", although
violently antigSoviest and anti~Satell3,~c?? is po~.ntedly reserved to~'arei
the United Statesg if not :~.atently hasti3e~
610
Special Macedonian Dangers
In Macedonia, a x?ampant ethnical chauvinism, apparent~.y sanctioned by
33el.grade, loosens dangerously the bonds of Yugoslav national.ism9 ands
couple3t~ with a considerable underground pres~Bulgarian sentiment, wou.~d
constitu9~.e an additional. dange~.? to Yugoslav resistance effaa?tt~ of $
Sov'ietGinspired aggression, particularly if the aggressor shou9.d hul~?
cut promises s~f an independent Macedonia to a people al,rea~ wark?ad
up to a high pitch of Maceadot2ian nationa3.imn~.
SECN.F~T,~CDNT~L ~, U~So UFFICIAJ?S GNI~Y
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50X1-HUM
b2a The- situation among the Albanian population of the Iiosmetr has ele~-enta
of similarity to the situation in Macedonian although in a form nat
nearly ae acutea The main difference lies in the fact that the
Albanians could not be given promises of independence bqt only union
tirith the Albania of Enver Ha~shag which for them would bo ~~~iaag cut
of the frying pets into the fired The Eosmc~t situation, wou.3d on the
othex^ hand, become very serious fc~r Tito s defense effortie if, in the
meantime, Albania wore liber~ited from the Communist yakc~
Yugoslav Ex~l.aitatian of Albanian ftefugeea~
- ...
b3a Yugoslav close eannectieanwith and financial, support given to Albanian
refugees, al~ough apparently innocuous and of no po~.itical car military
significance at the memen~q is a c~iear sign of Yugosl.a~t interest in
A~.bania, and preparatory to such action as may promr~te Yugoslav dce_~i.gns
in A3.bania wharf appropriate circumstances arc created or an opportunity
presents itaei:ft
?ugoslav Army Mox~a3.e
5~~ With respect, to the morale- of the present Yugoslav a r~ny, iP the officers
are able to show goad 3~eadership and i.oyalty to Tito, the armq wi~.~. be
able to g3.ve a ,goad account of itself a though it will not fight ~i,th
entdius~.asmQ Judging Pram the reaction +~f the aoldi?~s~s to the regime
~a reaction which is aggravated by the tyrannical. discipline imposed
upon them and by the brutal treatanent recoived by their familf?s at
hamej, the morale of the soldiers cannot be good; and unless their
officers are sufficiently competent and able to hold their men togetherA
the consequences map be disastrous far Tito and-the present regime as
xell as for Yugaslavia~
6~~, The hatred of the anti~Commurt3.st Yugoslav population toward Tito and
the regime is apparently extremely pmfound9 and their attitude toward
Tito and the regime wi11 net be changed by any superficial. or even
substantial administrative changeaa, least of al.l by forcon The onlg .
.thing that woul.~ change-the e.ttitude o.f the people and revive theit?
morale is a complete change from the present Communist d~.ctatorship~
SECRET~Ct?NTRdi~ ~ LTA Se 4FFIC7:A.LS ?NLY
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