NIGERIA: PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY AND RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 9, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Je et
Central
Intelligence
Nigeria: Prospects for Stability
and Relations With the
United States
9 June 1981
Copy 2 3 5
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N I E 64.2-81
NIGERIA: PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY
AND RELATIONS WITH THE
UNITED STATES
Information available as of 30 May 1981 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Energy.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
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CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS ....................................................................................................
1
DISCUSSION ..............................................................................................................
3
1. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................
3
A. Nigeria's Importance to the United States ..............................................
3
B. Legacy of Instability .................................................................................
3
II. THE CIVILIAN REGIME'S FIRST YEAR .................................................
5
A. The Political System .................................................................................
5
B. Economic and Social Situation .................................................................
8
C. Foreign Policy ...........................................................................................
10
III. THE NEXT FIVE YEARS: FACTORS FOR CONCERN .........................
11
A. Role of the Military ..................................................................................
11
B. Presidential Leadership ............................................................................
12
C. Traditional Rivalries .................................................................................
13
D. Libyan Adventurism .................................................................................
14
E. Economic Problems ..................................................................................
14
F. Coping With Social Problems ..................................................................
15
G. Corruption .................................................................................................
16
H. Political Party Evolution ..........................................................................
16
IV. AREAS OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH THE UNITED STATES.
17
A. Southern Africa .........................................................................................
17
B. Big Power Activities ..................................................................................
17
C. Economic Expectations .............................................................................
17
D. Domestic Turmoil .....................................................................................
18
E. Nuclear Proliferation ................................................................................
18
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Nigeria's return in late 1979 to an elected civilian government after
13 years of military rule offers promise for the country, but is not
without risk given Nigeria's troubled and violent past. The civilian gov-
ernment, off to an auspicious start during its first year in office, seems
likely to continue until the 1983 national elections and is buttressed by a
vibrant, oil-based, entrepreneurial economy. But the longer term out-
look is guarded. Population and urban growth pressures, together with
administrative inefficiency, will prevent any rapid improvement in liv-
ing conditions for rural and urban Nigerians. In addition, inflation,
corruption, and political conflict rooted in ethnic, sectional, and reli-
gious rivalries could again lead to a breakdown of the new constitutional
system. A political breakdown most likely would again lead to military
intervention under a new generation of military officers.
The Nigerian military leadership wants civilian rule to succeed.
But the continuation of civilian rule will ultimately depend on the
Army which considers itself the final defender of Nigerian unity and
public order. Civilian leaders will continually have to take into account
the interest of the military in internal politics, economic policy, and
foreign affairs. At the same time, the civilians must satisfy the military's
professional and personal needs despite the many competing demands
of Nigeria's developing economy.
Libya's new role in Chad and Qadhafi's ambitions in West and
Central Africa are new and unpredictable factors in Nigeria's future.
Growing Libyan interventionist activities, tacitly supported by the So-
viets, could create foreign policy crises for the Nigerian Government.
Libyan encouragement of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria's
predominantly Muslim north could undermine the civilian government
by upsetting the internal balance of cooperation among regions and
tribes that is needed by the civilian leaders to maintain the new political
system.
From the perspectives of size, population, relative wealth, the eco-
nomic leverage of its oil resources, and its influence in Africa, Nigeria
would undoubtedly be a valuable asset for the Soviets. It is unlikely,
however, that Moscow will be able to develop significant influence in
Nigeria. Nigerian relations with the Soviet Union are outwardly correct,
but beneath the surface are marked by considerable suspicion. Lagos is
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wary of Soviet activities throughout Africa, but the government believes
that a continued relationship with Moscow is necessary for its policy of
nonalignment. Nigerian nonalignment, however, is tempered by the re-
alization that the West has more to offer in the drive for modernization
than does Moscow and its allies. Whether under civilian or military rule,
there is little likelihood that Nigeria would depart far from its position
of nonalignment vis-a-vis the major powers.
Nigeria has purchased a significant amount of military equipment
from the Soviets, but generally follows a policy of diversifying its pur-
chases to avoid excessive dependence on any one source. Collectively,
Nigerian arms purchases from the West outweigh those from the Soviets-
even though Moscow is Lagos's largest single supplier. Because Nigeria
is able to pay for its arms from the Soviets, Lagos has not been forced
into the kinds of assistance agreements that have enabled Moscow to
expand its influence in less affluent African countries.
The US has a stake in the success of Nigeria's civilian government.
Not only is Nigeria our second-ranking source of imported crude oil, but
its Constitution is modeled after that of the United States in the hope it
will serve to overcome the country's deep ethnic, regional, and religious
divisions. The civilian regime also seeks to broaden significantly US
involvement in Nigeria's development through increased investment
and technical assistance. However, if a US commitment to moderniza-
tion programs were perceived to be inadequate, the United States could
become a convenient and popular scapegoat for domestic failures. In
addition, Nigeria would react negatively to perceptions that Washing-
ton was hindering its potential entry into the nuclear world.
US policy toward southern Africa remains the touchstone of US-
Nigerian relations. In the event Lagos determines that US policy is con-
trary to Nigerian and African interests in southern Africa, Nigeria
might apply selective economic measures against the United States,
which could include moves such as nationalization of the remaining
equity ownership of US oil companies or a ban on their purchase of
government-owned oil and denial of new contracts to US companies. An
embargo on all oil exports to the United States would be most unlikely,
however, given Nigeria's domestic revenue needs and the difficulty of
shifting elsewhere all the oil previously sold to the United States.
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DISCUSSION
A. Nigeria's Importance to the United States
1. With the largest population and richest economy
in black Africa, the potential power of Nigeria to play
an important role in African politics has been evident
since its independence in 1960. Since the early 1970s,
Nigeria has assumed increasing importance to the
United States largely because of its development as a
major oil exporter. Now, Nigeria's growing political
weight and ability to influence African and Third
World issues also impact directly on US interests, rang-
ing from such concerns as racial progress in southern
Africa to the North-South economic dialogue. Ni-
geria's position can affect US relations with individual
African states and the Organization of African Unity.
2. Nigeria is second only to Saudi Arabia as a source
of crude oil to the United States (15 percent of total US
imports) and ranks behind South Africa and Liberia as
a site of US direct investment in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The total book value of US investment in Nigeria,
largely in the oil industry, is $250-350 million, al-
though its replacement value is much higher. Because
of oil imports, the US trade deficit with Nigeria ($10
billion in 1980) is second only to that with Japan and
has a substantial impact on US efforts to improve its
overall foreign trade position.
3. US prestige is becoming more entwined with Ni-
geria's domestic fortunes. Lagos has adopted a con-
stitution modeled on the US document in hopes of
overcoming its legacy of instability. The United States
is trying to forge closer economic ties to accelerate
Nigeria's economic development and to reduce the US
trade deficit and improve political leverage with La-
gos. Nigeria's progress is closely watched, particularly
in West Africa. Political failure or economic disrup-
tions in Nigeria would encourage the efforts of the
Communists to undermine western efforts on the
Continent.
4. Though officially nonaligned, Nigeria feels more
potential affinity for the United States than for any
other country, including its former colonizer, the UK.
Accordingly, Nigeria is especially sensitive as to how
its aspirations and interests are viewed by the United
States. Perceived slights are taken seriously by Nigeri-
ans and are readily exploited by anti-American ele-
ments in and outside of Nigeria.
5. American institutions and technology and goods
are much admired by the Nigerian people. Nigerians
have an almost insatiable appetite for obtaining higher
education in the United States. Some 25,000 Nigerian
university students now compose the second largest
body of foreign students after Iranian in the United
States. The US military establishment also is viewed as
a "model" by Nigeria, which has the second largest
army after Ethiopia in black Africa. Nigeria is the
fourth largest foreign purchaser of US military train-
ing, and in 1980 sent over 1,000 miltary personnel to
the United States for advanced schooling.
B. Legacy of Instability
6. Since independence, the major problem for Ni-
geria's various rulers has been to find a political system
that can accommodate the country's tribal, regional,
and religious diversity within a framework of national
unity. This quest has involved sharp and often violent
political change as well as civil war. With a heteroge-
neous social environment characterized by numerous
contenders for authority, Nigeria has faced an enor-
mous task in forging and maintaining national unity.
Sixty percent of its over 80 million people belong to
three main tribes: the Muslim Hausa-Fulani in the
north, the mixed Christian and Muslim Yoruba in the
southwest, and the predominantly Christian Ibo in the
southeast. Each group has vied for supremacy, as have
the smaller tribes in the Middle Belt zone between the
north and south which fear domination by the large
ethnic groups.
7. Under a British-inspired parliamentary system,
Nigeria's first postindependence experiment in multi-
party democracy failed. It was a weak federation of
three regions, each dominated by one of the major
tribes. The system fueled bitter competition that re-
sulted in ethnic loyalties taking priority over concern
for national unity. The vastly larger and more popu-
lous northern region controlled the federal govern-
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Nigeria: Federal States and Major Tribal Groups
Cross-
Rivers
Lake
Chad
Cameroon
Territory' Plateau
J ('7VIIDDLE BELT-,,
Kadunat-, P
Nci_g?e r\ ~
~Capital'r a,..
Federal t
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ment, and the prospect that this domination would be-
come permanent deepened ethnic antagonisms. Poli-
tics became increasingly characterized by blatant
corruption and tribal violence as the north sought to
extend its political control over other regions.
8. In January 1966 a bloody coup by Ibo army of-
ficers brought down the increasingly unpopular par-
liamentary regime. The new military government
later decreed a unitary form of government as its solu-
tion to Nigeria's political problems. But suspicion that
the Ibo were intent upon absolute domination led to
major riots against Ibo residents in the north and to a
northern-led countercoup in July 1966. The second
coup brought Middle Belt officers to the fore under
the leadership of General Gowon, who acted as a
broker among the principal tribes.
9. In 1967, Gowon moved to reduce the power of
the large tribes by decreeing the establishment of 12
states to replace the regions. Shortly thereafter, the
Ibo-led eastern region seceded as the Republic of Bia-
fra, and civil war followed until 1970 when the Ibos
were defeated. Gowon remained in power through the
war and played an important role in overseeing the
country's postwar reconstruction and the reintegration
of the Ibo east into Nigerian society. As the years
passed, however, the Gowon regime became increas-
ingly corrupt and ineffective, and sentiment for a re-
turn to civilian rule began to mount among both the
populace and the officer corps.
10. Gowon was overthrown in a bloodless coup in
July 1975 by military officers whose declared objec-
tives were to end economic stagnation, reduce corrup-
tion, and to start the process toward restoration of
civilian rule. But the new prominence of Hausa and
Yoruba officers in the government provoked an abor-
tive coup in February 1976 by Middle Belt officers in
which the Hausa head of state, General Muhammed,
was assassinated. During his brief tenure, however,
Muhammed's vigorous attack on domestic problems
and assertion of a more dynamic foreign policy did
much to reestablish a sense of national purpose in
Nigeria. His policies were continued by his Yoruba
successor, General Obasanjo, under whose leadership
Nigeria was returned to civilian rule in October 1979.
11. The turbulent period since independence has
altered popular consciousness in ways favorable to the
new political system of the Second Republic. Although
Nigerian politics is still marked by pugnacity, corrup-
tion, and impatience, there is a far stronger awareness
by the traditional competing ethnic groups of national
identity and the need to compromise. Even so, the fear
that uncontrollable political instability could again
emerge from Nigeria's tribal, regional, and religious
diversity-at a time when enormous political, social,
and economic changes are in progress-will be a
continuing source of anxiety for whoever rules the
country.
A. The Political System
12. The New Constitution. Nigeria's newest con-
stitution, written by an elected constituent assembly of
civilians during the last military government, is de-
signed to contain political strife and to ensure fair rep-
resentation of ethnic and regional groups. The drafters
sought to correct the shortcomings of Nigeria's First
Republic and its British-imposed constitution.
13. Modeled after the US Constitution, the Nigerian
Constitution provides a strong federal structure with
broad human rights guarantees and a rigorous system
of checks and balances. The Constitution formally
transfers to federal jurisdiction powers that had pre-
viously fueled regionalism and which were gradually
assumed by successive military governments in 13
years of Army rule. The Constitution provides for a
federal president and vice president who can serve no
more than two terms; a federal national assembly com-
posed of a senate of 95 members (five from each of
Nigeria's 19 states) and a house of representatives of
449 members allocated on the basis of population; and
an independent judiciary with a supreme court at its
apex. The legislative process parallels that of the US
Government.
14. Each state has a governor and deputy governor,
a unicameral assembly, and an independent judiciary.
At the local level there are elected government coun-
cils. All federal, state, and local executives and legisla-
tors are elected concurrently for four-year terms. The
Constitution attempts to provide safeguards against
corruption. It mandates the establishment of a corrupt
practices bureau and a public complaints office. All
elected officials must declare their assets every four
years and can lose office if found guilty of corruption.
The constitutional amendment process is designed to
prevent frivolous changes. Passage of an amendment
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requires approval by two-thirds of both houses of the
national legislature and by two-thirds of the state
assemblies.
15. Among the constitutional features that are in-
tended to enhance a national outlook in political activ-
ity is the provision for a strong executive president to
serve as a national unifying force. To be elected, he
must win a plurality of the popular vote nationwide
and one quarter of the vote in two-thirds of the 19
states or face a runoff election. This procedure com-
pels countrywide coalition building by political parties
and makes it impossible to win on the basis of narrow
ethnic support. The president and vice president must
come from different states. The president's Cabinet
must also include at least one member from each of
the 19 states to ensure a cross section of ethnic and
regional representation.
16. The 19-state federal structure, which replaced a
12-state system, divides the core areas of the three ma-
jor tribes and better reflects Nigeria's ethnic pluralism.
It helps to dissipate regionalism and the risk that any
one big tribe can again monopolize national politics,
while giving minority tribes their own political outlet.
17. Recruitment for the federal civil service and
military must be representative of all the country's
ethnic groups. Agencies at the state level must be eth-
nically representative of that state's population. Politi-
cal parties, to be registered and to contest elections,
must demonstrate that they have a national appeal
rather than a tribal or regional focus. Membership in a
given party must be open to all Nigerians and each
party must have an organization and leadership cadre
in at least two-thirds of the 19 states; prospective par-
ties thus must develop a multiethnic base.
18. The federal structure, despite built-in rivalries
among branches and levels of government, has broad-
ened popular participation by spreading elective gov-
ernment throughout the country and affords full scope
for cooperative efforts to govern. Much of national
politics is decentralized to the state and local levels
where stress can be absorbed without serious threat to
the national fabric. Each political party sits in the fed-
eral legislature and controls at least one state govern-
ment, giving it a base of patronage and an opportunity
to create a government record to contest future elec-
tions. This is a powerful incentive for continuing the
present political system, rather than trying to under-
mine it.
19. The Political Parties. Nigeria's present five
political parties claim varying degrees of national sup-
port, but all have regional bases and are descendants of
parties that existed in the First Republic. With one
exception, they are relatively pragmatic and mod-
erate. The three major parties reflect the old triangle
of electoral competition in the early 1960s in which
the Hausa-Fulani north, the Yoruba west, and the Ibo
east battled each other for support of minority tribes.
The minorities, especially in the Middle Belt, are now
in a position under the electoral rules of the Constitu-
tion to influence the outcome of presidential elections.
20. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN), headed
by President Shagari (a Muslim Fulani), is the most
broadly based and conservative party. It is a coalition
of the northern Muslim establishment, some Yoruba
and Ibo tribesmen, minority tribes in the southeast to-
gether with some in the Middle Belt, and many of the
country's top businessmen. The main opposition, the
strongly populist Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), is
overwhelmingly Yoruba with a minimum of ethnic
support elsewhere in the country to qualify it as a na-
tional party. It is led by Obafemi Awolowo who, al-
though he projects a strident and often uncompromis-
ing image, seems to be working within the system and
building a record in the states his party controls. The
third-ranking, Ibo-based Nigerian People's Party
(NPP), led by Nnamdi Azikiwe, has some Middle Belt
support and is allied uneasily in the federal legislature
with the National Party, which lacks an absolute
majority there.
21. The two smallest parties are based primarily on
opposition sentiment in the north. The Great Nigerian
People's Party (GNPP) is an instrument of Kanuri
tribesman and millionaire businessman Waziri
Ibrahim, whose main support is in the non-Hausa
northeast. Nigeria's most "radical" party, the People's
Redemption Party (PRP), is strongest in Kano state.
Headed by Aminu Kano, a Muslim Fulani, it opposes
the north's traditional elite and advocates social and
political reform on behalf of northern lower classes.
22. Settling In. The civilian government is doing
better than many observers of Nigeria's troubled past
had expected. After a slow start, the regime has set its
national and foreign policy priorities and is showing
growing confidence. But it is still on trial, and the
process of adapting to the complexities of the new sys-
tem will take time. Shagari, an able, conscientious, and
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Nigerian Political Parties
Party Leader-Tribal Orientation
Affiliation
National Party of Nigeria President Shahu Shagari Northern Muslim-oriented and dominated by major
National Assembly
State
Governors
Senate
House of
(19 states)
(95 seats)
Representatives
(449 seats)
36
168
7
(NPN) (Fulani) Hasusa-Fulani ethnic group; has broadest national base
with important support among minority tribes in the
Middle Belt and southeast, plus some following among
the southern Yoruba and the Ibo; working majority in the
National Assembly in loose alliance with NPP; conser-
vative; modest populist goals, emphasis on stability and -25X1
continuity of past policies. ~i
Unity Party of Nigeria Obafemi Awolowo (Yoruba) Strong support among major southern Yoruba ethnic
(UPN) group, with little strength elsewhere; most strident
opposition party, fears erosion of Yoruba gains in national
commerce and bureaucracy; progressive, with strong
populist welfare aims.
Nigerian People's Party Nnamdi Azikiwe (Ibo) Bases heavily on major southern Ibo ethnic group (ex-
(NPP) Biafra), with some Yorbua and Middle Belt support; seeks to
regain greater national prominence through alliance with
NPN; moderate, centrist group.
People's Redemption Party Aminu Kano (Fulani) Mainly Hausa-Fulani Muslims opposed to traditional
(PRP) northern elite; Nigeria's most "radical" group; favors
social-economic restructuring along vague populist-
socialist lines.
Great Nigerian People's Party Waziri Ibrahim (Kanuri) Supporters are mainly Muslim Kanuri people in the
(GNPP) northeast, traditional rivals of Hausa-Fulani; mainly per-
sonal vehicle of its leader, one of Nigeria's richest busi-
nessmen; has no real policy program.
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honest administrator, has proven well suited for estab-
lishing the Second Republic. His low-key, consensus
approach has nurtured institution building while
preserving participation by all groups, and he has
shown an ability to defuse political crises. The lack of
a federal legislative majority by any party has also
contributed to cooperation among ethnic groups.
23. The states are starting to tackle real problems,
despite some intraparty violence, tensions with the
federal government, and, in Kaduna state, total dead-
lock between the governor and the legislature. Local
government, plagued by corruption, shaky finances,
and lack of staff, remains the weakest tier of the fed-
eral structure.
24. Most of the problems that arose in the first year
reflect ongoing argument over the limits of power be-
tween executive and legislature, the central and state
governments, elected officials and civil servants, and
party heads and party members holding elective of-
fice. However, the federal government and the execu-
tive branch are likely to remain dominant for the next
several years.
25. Although its weaknesses and strengths remain to
be tested, most Nigerians now defend the Constitution.
No significant group is seeking major changes. The
growing image of the judiciary as a political arbiter
and constitutional interpreter is also promoting accept-
ance of the new political institutions.
26. Sorting Out Priorities. Healthy foreign pay-
ments surpluses are providing Nigeria with greater
financial flexibility to pursue ambitious development
goals than at any time since the 1973-74 oil boom.
Foreign exchange reserves rose to a record $10 billion
last year and the current account surplus soared to
nearly $4 billion because of cautious spending policies
and a more than doubling of oil prices since 1978. The
Fourth National Development Plan launched in Janu-
ary 1981 seems a more solid development course than
the ones pursued by Shagari's military predecessors.
27. Shagari recognizes that Nigeria must reduce its
overwhelming dependence on limited oil resources by
shifting a large share of investment into agriculture
and commodity producing sectors capable of sustain-
ing economic growth and job expansion over the long
term. Past development plans have barely reduced
dependence on oil, which currently furnishes 35
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percent of GDP, 80 percent of government revenue,
and 95 percent of export earnings.
28. During his first year, Shagari resisted public
pressure for more expansionary economic policies,
while sorting out development priorities and seeking to
cut waste in public spending. This reflected his con-
cern to avoid past squandering on consumer imports
and misguided investments, and his desire to avoid
economic bottlenecks that resulted in inflation rates
near 35 percent during the mid-1970s. The new re-
gime deferred introduction of the fourth five-year
National Development Plan until 1981, only partially
lifted import restrictions imposed during the 1978
financial crunch, and turned down excessive wage de-
mands that were spurred by the end of a wage freeze
imposed by the military government and by continued
inflation. Expensive construction contracts awarded by
the previous regime were also reviewed, and some
were scrapped or revised.
29. Despite these stringencies, Nigeria still managed
to achieve real GDP growth of 7 percent or so in 1980.
But inflation may have risen above 20 percent, despite
official claims that it subsided to 10 percent.
30. Social and Economic Stresses. There is popu-
lar pressure for more effective action against problems
resulting from rapid and uneven economic growth,
burgeoning population growth, and a spectacular rate
of urbanization. The social and political stresses that
have resulted are intensified by wide income dispari-
ties between the privileged few and the masses.
31. Previous governments have made some strides
in using oil wealth for social betterment, but many
Nigerians remain untouched by the oil bonanza or are
experiencing a decline in living standards. Large ur-
ban areas and the already better-developed south have
gained most from oil spending, with the Yoruba tribe
being the leading beneficiary. Nigeria's population, es-
timated at roughly 80 million, is increasing 3.3 percent
annually. The labor force, now 34 million, is growing
at 2.3 percent with more than 750,000 Nigerians en-
tering the job market this year.
32. Nigeria has the largest and most rapidly grow-
ing urban population in black Africa, with some 20
percent of its population in towns of over 20,000.
About one-fourth of all urban dwellers are found in
the federal capital of Lagos, whose population exceeds
4 million. Urbanization has been spurred by a rapid
increase of income and job opportunities in cities and
towns relative to those in Nigeria's agricultural areas.
The urban influx, however, has resulted in deteriorat-
ing living conditions, with growing shortages of public
services and housing, and an increasing crime
problem.
33. Development Aims. The Fourth National
Development Plan calls for real GDP growth of 7.2
percent annually through 1985, although this target
seems optimistic. The government wants to reorient
investment away from construction activities and
costly import intensive projects toward agriculture and
more productive manufacturing enterprises that rely
on domestic resources. Improvement of housing,
health care, and education are other priorities.
34. Nigeria's manufacturing sector, the largest in
black Africa, has not benefited from government as-
sistance to large-scale industries-a result of bu-
reaucratic bickering and cost overruns. The govern-
ment plans to rely heavily on inducements such as tax
incentives to local manufacturers and small farmers to
stimulate economic expansion throughout the country.
Existing laws require varying degrees of Nigerian
participation in business enterprises. However, Lagos
hopes to encourage foreign investors by cutting bu-
reaucratic red tape and adding more attractive invest-
ment laws. The government will also seek joint ven-
tures with foreign investors when indigenous enter-
prises cannot provide the necessary capital and
know-how. To help meet skilled labor shortages, for-
eign business partners will be required to train their
Nigerian counterparts and staff.
35. The top priority is a "green revolution" aimed
at achieving agricultural self-sufficiency by 1985,
restoring cash crops as major exports as they were in
the 1960s, and stemming the flow of rural Nigerians to
urban areas. Sixty percent of the population are farm-
ers but output of commercial crops over the last dec-
ade has lagged badly. Growth in production of the
main food crops has slowed to 1.7 percent annually,
well below population expansion. Agriculture has suf-
fered from government neglect, largely necessitated
by spending for the civil war, alleviating the effects of
drought and disease, and providing subsidized food
and services to urban dwellers. Local food shortages
and urban income gains have also spurred a growing
preference for imported foods. Even with selective
controls, Nigeria imported more than $2 billion in
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food last year, or about one-sixth of its caloric needs.
Imports included peanuts and palm oil products,
which were important exports in the early 1960s when
Nigeria was practically self-sufficient in food pro-
duction.
C. Foreign Policy
36. The Shagari government thus far has made little
change in the foreign policy that was established by
previous military regimes. With apparent public ap-
proval, Nigeria's international stance remains based on
a combination of rather touchy nationalism, nonalign-
ment, a claim to African leadership, opposition to
South African apartheid, and close, pragmatic rela-
tions with the West. In handling foreign policy issues,
Shagari has appeared somewhat more passive and
moderate than his predecessors, though this probably
reflects his reserved personality and his preoccupation
with domestic matters. Recently, Nigeria has taken a
more active role in African affairs than it had done
during Shagari's first months in office.
37. The United States. Nigeria's relations with the
United States since Shagari assumed office have been
generally good. This reflects both a great interest in
American institutions resulting from Nigeria's adop-
tion of an American-style constitution, and a desire to
gain access to American technical and managerial
know-how for Nigeria's economic modernization.
Moreover, US southern African policies, if they have
rarely fully satisfied Lagos, have been sufficiently con-
gruent with Nigeria's own strongly held views to avoid
serious clashes over this sensitive issue. Good feeling
was reinforced by Shagari's official visit to Washington
in October 1980, and by then Vice President
Mondale's chairmanship of the US delegation at an-
nual bilateral economic talks in Lagos the same year
and more recently by Foreign Minister Audu's talks in
Washington with Secretary of State Haig.
38. In the name of nonalignment, Nigeria has
continued to sidestep most "cold war" issues, though it
spoke out against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
and the Iranian seizure of American hostages. It did
not, however, cooperate in the US effort to boycott the
summer Olympic games in Moscow.
39. The Soviet Union. Nigerian-Soviet relations
under the new civilian government have been out-
wardly correct, but beneath the surface are marked by
considerable suspicion on both sides and have become
even more distant than they were under the former
military regime. Lagos is suspicious of Soviet and Lib-
yan activities in neighboring Chad and Benin, which
are seen as potential bases for subversion against Nige-
ria. Nigerian discomfort with Soviet and Cuban in-
volvement in Angola and Ethiopia has also increased
in recent years. But the Soviets have always won points
with the Nigerians for Moscow's assistance to southern
African liberation movements, and Lagos reluctantly
continues to justify the Soviet and Cuban role in An-
gola as a necessary evil to defend the Luanda govern-
ment against South African-assisted Angolan insur-
gents.
40. Lagos has carefully avoided any serious deterio-
ration in relations with the Soviet Union and has not
terminated Soviet military or economic programs, de-
spite underlying unhappiness with their quality and
slow pace. Nigeria believes that a continued relation-
ship with the Soviet Union gives more credence to its
policy of nonalignment and supplements its basic
dependence on the West. The Soviet diplomatic mis-
sion operates fairly freely in Lagos, arranges for schol-
arships in the Soviet Union (500 students in 1980), and
promotes the publication of material favorable to Mos-
cow in the Nigerian press. The Soviets also fund some
Nigerian labor figures, but Moscow has not been able
to gain significant influence in the labor movement.
41. Nigeria has purchased large amounts of military
equipment from the Soviet Union since the civil war
when Britain and the United States curtailed arms
sales to the federal government. Nigeria has not
bought US combat equipment since the civil war al-
though C-130 transport aircraft have been purchased.
Lagos has since followed a policy of diversifying its
arms purchases to avoid excessive dependence on any
one source. Collectively, Nigerian military purchases
from the West outweigh those from the Soviet Union,
but Moscow has delivered more material than any
other supplier. Because Nigeria is able to pay for its
arms from the Soviets, Lagos has not been forced into
the kinds of assistance agreements that have enabled
Moscow to expand its influence in less affluent African
countries. There are about 40 Soviet military advisers
in Nigeria. Work is continuing on the Ajaokuta steel
mill, the only important Soviet economic project,
which has been under discussion since before the
Nigerian civil war and presently employs 500 Russian
construction personnel.
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42. Africa. Like the previous military government,
the Shagari administration seeks to exert a major diplo-
matic role in African affairs, and tends to be some-
what insensitive-though less so than its predecessor-
to the feelings of smaller African states. On both the
Western Saharan and Chadian issues, Lagos has used
its weight to seek consensus agreements that would
preserve African unity, even at the cost of progress in
resolving the problems. A continuing irritant in intra-
African relations, however, is Nigeria's refusal to sell
petroleum at concessionary rates to its financially
hard-pressed neighbors.
43. Shagari has sought to promote friendship with
some of Nigeria's neighbors, most notably with Ghana,
whose relations with the previous military government
had soured as a result of the execution of Ghanaian
military leaders in 1979. Relations with French-
speaking states, however, have remained somewhat
strained, partly because Nigeria tends to be overbear-
ing toward its weaker francophone neighbors and
partly because of its deep and continuing distrust of
French motives in Africa dating from the French sup-
port of Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. Lagos is
likewise suspicious of governments it sees as reflecting
French interests. Relations with Tanzania, cool since
that country supported Biafra during the civil war,
were set back again when Nigeria refused to endorse
Tanzania's military intervention to topple Uganda's
Idi Amin. Shagari's government was deeply disturbed
by the April 1980 enlisted men's coup in Liberia, in
which President Tolbert and 13 high officials were ex-
ecuted. It has moved only gradually to reestablish cor-
rect-if still cool-relations with the new Liberian
military regime.
gards an end to white supremacy in South Africa and
Namibia as a moral imperative. Moreover, he sees
Nigeria bearing a responsibility as black Africa's most
powerful nation in marshaling African opinion against
apartheid, and in pressuring other nations for support
at the UN and other international forums. He has
stated that Nigeria is prepared to consider using oil as
a weapon in support of this struggle.
III. THE NEXT FIVE YEARS: FACTORS FOR
CONCERN
A. Role of the Military
46. Ultimately, the survival of civilian rule depends
on the Army (numbering approximately 137,000),
which considers itself the final defender of Nigerian
unity and public order. A broad cross section of Ni-
gerians, including those in the military, believe that
the future rests with a civilian form of government. It
is doubtful that any group in the armed forces now has
an adequate power base to generate widespread sup-
port for a coup, either within army ranks or from the
civilian populace.
47. Having played the key role in overseeing the
reorganization of government and political party
structures that preceded the termination of military
government, the Army wants civilian rule to succeed.
There are pragmatic reasons for this as well. The
Army's credibility as a professional organization was
damaged in the long period of military rule, and the
officer corps recognizes that it lacks the specialized
personnel to manage Nigeria's increasingly complex
bureaucracy and economy.
44. Though Nigeria has remained emotionally
committed to promoting majority rule in southern Af-
rica, Shagari has been somewhat less strident on the
issue than was the former military regime. Relations
with the United Kingdom improved markedly as a re-
sult of the British role in bringing Zimbabwe to legal
independence under black majority rule. Nigeria has
sporadically sought to impose various secondary boy-
cott measures on Western firms and ships involved in
or with South Africa, but enforcement has remained
selective and more a nuisance than an impediment to
economic relations.
45. Nevertheless, Shagari-with general Nigerian
approval-has continued to press a policy which re-
48. The Army has adapted surprisingly well to the
realities of going "back to the barracks" and appears to
be accepting its new role with minimal complaint. But
the military maintains keen interest in internal poli-
tics, economic policy, and foreign affairs.
49. A potentially important role for the armed
forces under civilian rule is the external projection of
power as an extension of government foreign policy.
Nigeria's participation in recent peacekeeping efforts,
such as with UN forces in Lebanon, and a shortlived
deployment to Chad in 1979, has indicated that the
military has difficulty sustaining even a battalion-size
force beyond national borders. The armed forces can
be expected to endorse strongly government foreign
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policies that take a tough stance, but nevertheless they
will be slow to develop the military capability to back
up those policies.
50. While many observers think the military will
refrain from intervention in politics for at least the
next several years, chances for a coup attempt would
increase if key elements in the armed forces believed
that civilian government was not providing the coun-
try with sufficient leadership and economic progress
or effectively meeting military needs. Then too, many
of the senior officers who orchestrated the return to
civilian rule are now retired and their successors may
not be as fully committed to maintaining a civilian
government. Perhaps more importantly, lower ranking
middle grade and junior officers must see adequate
opportunities for promotion and for better pay, and
other advantages which the higher echelons enjoy.
Otherwise, they could become a worrisome source of
discontent.
51. While some of the same conditions exist in the
Nigerian military that contributed to recent coups and
unstable rule in Ghana and Liberia, there are practical
barriers to an enlisted men's coup. The Army in Nige-
ria is large and dispersed geographically throughout
the country. It would be difficult for pockets of
disgruntled lower ranking personnel to organize suffi-
ciently without being detected. There are many poten-
tial centers of power that would have to be neutralized
to prevent loyal military units from crushing a coup
attempt. Further, a coup by enlisted men is made
more difficult by the standard practices of keeping
units ethnically mixed and of normally stationing sol-
diers outside their home areas.
52. Military leaders, despite their own peculations,
are concerned that financial resources and oil reserves
be used wisely. If they perceive that government
corruption is seriously interfering with national devel-
opment, the military could withdraw its support for
the civilian government. Competition for economic re-
sources could also lead to an erosion of military sup-
port for the government. The civilian government is
now responsible for the defense budget, which totaled
about $1.7 billion in 1980-an amount the military
considered barely adequate. The Shagari government
is committed to spending more money on economic
and social programs, if possible. It will be difficult for
the military to accept having defense appropriations
approved by civilian politicians, and any severe cuts in
the defense budget would cause military discontent.
The armed forces budget seems unlikely to suffer
significantly, so long as widespread civilian concern
continues about possible Libyan threats to Nigeria and
the government wants the capability to project its mili-
tary power.
53. Senior military leaders would also become
disillusioned if civilian authorities seem incapable of
ensuring a reasonable level of law and order in Ni-
geria's fractious society. The first line of defense, the
80,000-strong national police, is seriously undersized,
poorly equipped, demoralized, and rife with corrup-
tion. In most circumstances, effective riot control is
provided in urban areas by elite mobile police units. A
five-year program to upgrade the police and to more
than double its size is under way, but despite improve-
ment in police capabilities, social problems, such as
urbanization and crime, will continue to strain police
services.
54. Military concern over maintaining order would
become acute should the armed forces frequently be
called on to put down local disturbances, as occurred
in the recent religious uprising in Kano, when the po-
lice and civilian authorities allowed the situation to get
out of hand. Repetition of such episodes would weaken
military resolve to support civilian rule and help cre-
ate a climate favorable for renewed military interven-
tion.
B. Presidential Leadership
55. Next to the military, future stability probably
depends more on effective leadership from the center
than on any other factor. Shagari hopes that his low-
key approach to governing, if applied with sufficient
firmness, will minimize controversy and provide
enough direction to keep the country on an even keel.
There is a risk, however, that Shagari's efforts to estab-
lish himself as a "father-figure" above the fray of poli-
tics may instead generate a leadership image of drift
and indecision, serving to encourage the historic forces
of division and to erode confidence in the regime.
56. Sooner rather than later, Shagari needs to assert
firmer control over his party and the government
administrative machinery, to build more productive
ties with the new federal legislature, and to start trans-
lating promised domestic programs into reality. His
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Shchu Shagari
quiet personality, combined with the pluralism of Ni-
gerian society and the dispersal of power in the new
political system, does not make his task easy.
C. Traditional Rivalries
57. There is no lack of issues capable of exacerbat-
ing longstanding ethnic, sectional, and religious dif-
ferences. Despite institutional safeguards to encourage
unity, successful civil rule depends on a willingness by
rival groups to seek agreement through compromise
rather than pushing the political system to the limits of
tolerance. Resolution of such issues as creating more
states, revenue sharing, and conducting a census-all
controversial in the past-will be important tests. The
longstanding practice of discrimination against oppo-
nents by the dominant political party in a given ethnic
area must be restrained if the political system is to
remain relatively free and open to participation by all
Nigerians. Controversy over indiscriminate use of gov-
ernment power against opponents, however, is likely
to increase as party competition intensifies in prepara-
tion for the 1983 elections.
58. Religion may pose a latent danger, particularly
the rising tensions associated with the gradual revival
in recent years of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria's
predominantly Muslim north. If this trend continues
unabated, increasing intra-Muslim rivalry and Muslim
consciousness could undermine the delicate balance of
cooperation both within the north and with the non-
Muslim south that is essential to governing the country
and holding it together. For now, fundamentalist reac-
tion against established Islamic orders is confined to a
minority of rival Islamic groups and students, and
there is no sign that it will gain widespread popularity
among Nigerians any time soon.
59. Fundamentalist preaching plus agitation by
radical Islamic fringe elements will continue to fuel
smoldering conflict for the foreseeable future, with
occasional outbreaks of serious local violence. Efforts
by civil authorities to control and ameliorate these
problems require delicate handling, for they could
provoke divisive politico-religious demands on the
central government and further inflame religious ten-
sions in the country.
60. Barring significant foreign incitement, Nigeria's
Islamic fundamentalists do not seem likely to upset the
status quo at least for the next several years, though
they may prove increasingly troublesome. The north's
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Islamic diversity militates against the coalescing of a
united fundamentalists movement or the emergence of
a Nigerian "ayatollah" who might seek to promote
secession and a separate Islamic state. The leading fun-
damentalist group, led by Abubakar Gumi, seeks to
purify Islam within Nigeria's existing secular system
and looks to Saudi Arabia rather than to radical Arab
states for theological guidance.
D. Libyan Adventurism
61. The extension of Libyan hegemony into Chad
raises the strong possibility that Tripoli, if given the
opportunity, will use Chad as a base for subverting
surrounding states with Muslim populations to ad-
vance Qadhafi's vision of a militant Islam and his
dream of a pan-Islamic Saharan state.' Nigeria's
weaker francophone neighbors and Sudan may be the
main targets of Libyan adventurism, though northern
Nigeria with its porous frontiers and its political and
religious divisions is not immune from Libyan
machinations. But for the near term at least, Tripoli is
likely to be preoccupied with consolidating its hold
over Chad and coping with insurgent attacks against
its forces.
62. Although previously complacent, Nigeria has
awakened to the danger Libya poses in central Africa
and can be expected to react vigorously to any signs of
Libyan adventurism within its own borders. Should
Nigerian-Libyan relations deteriorate into hostility,
Tripoli could try to foment unrest in northern Nigeria
by clandestine encouragement of extremist Islamic
groups there or radical northern political opponents of
Shagari. Libya is suspected of having provided some
funds in recent years to various Islamic organizations
and northern politicians in search of friends and
influence.
63. The flow of Chadian refugees to Nigeria to-
gether with tribal, religious, and commercial ties be-
tween northeastern Nigeria and western Chad could
provide ways to infiltrate Libyan money, arms, and
agents provocateurs into Nigeria. Tribes from north-
eastern Nigeria are well represented in the Army's en-
listed and NCO ranks, which might provide a poten-
tial means for Libya to penetrate the Nigerian
military.
64. Resource management will become an increas-
ingly serious factor in policy deliberations because of a
need to conserve oil resources, on which Nigeria will
depend well beyond 1985 for the bulk of its export
earnings and revenues. Oil exports will be constrained
near the level of 2 million barrels per day because of
limited production capacity and rising domestic
consumption. As a result, Nigeria's economic health
will be closely tied to increases in world oil prices.
65. Barring major discoveries in as yet unexplored
deep offshore and interior areas, Nigeria's oil reserves
(estimated at 12 billion barrels) would be depleted by
the end of the century at current production levels.
Major companies so far have rejected terms offered for
new exploration because they provide inadequate
financial return and little guarantee of future access to
oil supplies. Nigeria has enormous proven reserves of
natural gas (an estimated 44 trillion cubic feet) which
could provide significant export earnings, but the huge
construction costs involved in the government's plans
for the world's largest liquefied natural gas plant may
defer development of this asset for many years to
come.
66. If revenue needs dictate and the market per-
mits, Nigeria could raise its oil production to 2.3 mil-
lion barrels per day. Oil production will probably peak
at 2.4 million-2.5 million b/d by 1985 and then gradu-
ally decline. Domestic consumption will rise to at least
300,000 barrels per day by 1985.
67. Even if oil prices do not increase in real terms
over the next few years, Nigeria probably can sustain
economic growth in the 6-7 percent range without se-
riously straining its resources.' Nigeria's strong credit
rating would allow it to borrow sufficient sums abroad
to cover prospective current account deficits. To im-
prove on this performance would require a combina-
tion of restraint of domestic consumption; allocation of
a larger share of spending for capital goods and more
productive projects; increased growth of the skilled la-
2 During 1974-80, Nigeria achieved average real economic
growth of 6.4 percent, while registering oil production of 2.1 million
b/d.
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bor force; and more effective utilization of available
resources across the board. While structural shifts in
the economy and better management of resources
could promote real growth of 8 percent annually, this
rate will be difficult to sustain through 1985.
68. Formidable obstacles must be overcome to
achieve the 4-percent annual agricultural growth tar-
gets outlined in the Fourth Plan. Agriculture is slated
to receive an unprecedented 12.9 percent or about $2
billion of federal capital expenditures this year. The
goal to make Nigeria self-sufficient in food production
by 1985 and a net exporter by 1987, however, would
require unrealistic jumps in production of more than 6
percent annually over the next five to seven years.
Even under the best of circumstances, few LDCs have
been able to sustain agricultural growth higher than 4
percent annually. Institutional reform and construc-
tion associated with agricultural plans will take time,
and there are serious financial, administrative, and
cultural obstacles. Meanwhile, consumer preferences
for imported foods are likely to expand and the poten-
tial for food disturbances will grow if import restric-
tions and food prices bind too tightly. Rising food im-
ports will also drain substantial foreign exchange away
from other development needs.
69. In manufacturing, the target of 15 percent
yearly after inflation is slated to increase that sector's
share of GDP to 10 percent by 1985. This goal will also
be hard to achieve because sufficient leadtime will be
needed to establish new industries and to construct
support facilities. In the meantime, import-dependent
operations will continue to experience slower growth if
the government has even a modicum of success in
maintaining selective import controls. In the two years
since these restrictions have been in place, real growth
in manufacturing has averaged little more than 10
percent annually.
70. If increases in real oil prices average more than
5 percent a year through 1985, the government faces
absorptive capacity constraints in channeling its oil
wealth into productive activity. During the oil-price
boom of 1973-74, failure to recognize skilled labor
shortages and transport limitations resulted in massive
physical bottlenecks, soaring inflation, and a flagrant
waste of resources. In these circumstances, rapidly ris-
ing domestic prices of key commodities deflected
potential investment away from productive enterprises
into speculation and trade. Although Shagari's cautious
spending policies so far suggest a keen awareness of
these constraints, revenue needs for the Fourth Devel-
opment Plan will make it difficult for him to cut back
on oil production.
F. Coping With Social Problems
71. Regardless of economic performance, Nigeria
faces population and urban growth pressures that will
frustrate any rapid improvement in living conditions.
The number of people leaving rural areas for the cities
will continue to grow during the next five years be-
cause of high birth rates and the long leadtime needed
to reduce rural-urban disparities in income, housing,
health care, and education.
72. Although continued economic expansion and
growth of federal and state bureaucracies may help to
generate additional lucrative wage earning jobs, most
new entrants to the labor force will have to settle for a
range of lower paying and less secure jobs. A growing
problem is likely to be the integration of increasingly
large numbers of school leavers entering the economy.
This will result from the country's universal primary
education program that got under way in 1976. The
first graduates will leave school in 1982. Lacking skills
and access to further schooling, and bolstered by
heightened expectations, many will flock to urban
areas in search of jobs. Moreover, deteriorating eco-
nomic conditions in many neighboring west African
countries are likely to stimulate further foreign migra-
tion to Nigerian cities, where tensions between locals
and foreigners have already begun to surface.
73. Most recent migrants to the cities manage to
subsist if not to advance somewhat on the economic
ladder, or they return to rural areas. In the urban
areas, they also are assisted by a variety of social cush-
ions that reduce discontent. These include obligatory
assistance provided by the extended family system, a
host of voluntary self-help associations, and the belief
that opportunities for upward mobility and economic
success still exist through individual endeavor. By and
large, Nigeria's few self-made rich are not targets of
hostility but are greatly admired and held up as mod-
els to emulate.
74. Urban labor has the potential to become a
disruptive element. In its first year, the civilian gov-
ernment faced pent-up wage and benefit demands
from Nigeria's million or so unionized workers, two-
thirds of whom are employed by the government and
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large foreign corporations. Despite some 265 brief
strikes, workers did not push confrontation very far,
but inflation is likely to fuel continuing labor
restiveness. In coming years, the government may be
forced to take a firmer line with labor that could result
in a more acrimonious relationship with unions and
even greater worker militancy.
75. Nigeria's ideologically and tribally divided cen-
tral labor federation has weak control over its 42
industrial type member unions, a factor that encour-
ages wildcat strikes. Since independence, Nigerian la-
bor has been split between a pro-Soviet and a sizable
pro-Western faction. However, labor elections in 1981
reinforced the grip of leftist leaders over the Nigerian
Labor Congress for the next three years. These leaders
who received limited subsidies from the Soviets, favor
increased labor militancy, and promote training for
increasing numbers of Nigerian trade unionists in the
Soviet Union and East European countries.
76. If leftist labor leaders show signs of greater
effectiveness than in the past in unifying and leading
the labor movement, the Shagari government will seek
to undercut their influence by encouraging the forma-
tion of an alternative labor federation and taking other
steps to strengthen pro-Western unionists. The leader-
ship of Nigeria's recently unionized and potentially
powerful oilfield workers is firmly in the hands of
moderates. Various opposition political parties are
maneuvering to exploit Nigeria's labor divisions and
are trying to woo trade union support, but none seems
likely to gain a significant advantage any time soon.
77. The expansion of higher education has spawned
a growing, politically aware, and vocal elite of univer-
sity and secondary students. They are prone to see
themselves as "guardians" of Nigeria's national in-
terests, and are keenly interested in a host of
noneducational issues. Xenophobic nationalism is their
most potent rallying cry. As in the past, student agita-
tion and violent protests can erupt periodically over
issues of concern to the students and have the potential
to stir wider social unrest unless checked quickly.
G. Corruption
78. Traditional, endemic, and ineradicable, corrup-
tion pervades both Nigerian society and government.
As in other African and Third World states, in Nigeria
bribery and favoritism are accepted as features of a
burgeoning economy. When corruption is seen to ex-
ceed a certain level or to enrich one group at the ex-
pense of others, however, it can be seized on as at least
partial justification for attempting a coup. Corruption
is rooted in patron-client relationships in which Ni-
gerians at all levels seek to enlist the help of those
richer and more powerful than themselves to advance
their lot in life. Under civilian rule, greatly broadened
participation in decisionmaking has significantly in-
creased opportunities for higher level corruption.
79. The regime's challenge is to set an example of
relative probity by keeping official corruption within
tolerable bounds. Although Shagari has tried to re-
strain the venal instincts of colleagues and has moved
quickly against blatant examples of corruption, the
ruling party is nonetheless intent on reaping the spoils
of office. Corruption is seen by many to be at an all-
time high and seems likely to worsen, especially if the
1983 elections entrench Shagari's party more strongly
in power.
H. Political Party Evolution
80. Some party realignments and factional vio-
lence-possibly threatening to internal stability-are
likely either before or after the 1983 elections. The
ethnic base of politics militates against well-organized
and disciplined parties and encourages perennial fac-
tionalism. As a result, the party scene is fluid and each
party is beset with internal conflicts. The three smaller
and less cohesive parties (NPP, GNPP, PRP) have fac-
tions leaning toward both the major parties-Shagari's
governing NPN and Awolowo's opposition UPN. At
some point, the minor GNPP and PRP may be ab-
sorbed, resulting in a three party system. The third
place NPP may well end its alliance with the NPN by
the 1983 elections to try to broker its support on better
terms to whatever major party is seen as the likely
national victor.
81. The main threat would come from a coales-
cence of multiethnic support for one of the major par-
ties on a scale that is perceived by another as threaten-
ing its survival. Barring serious miscalculations, the
NPN probably will grow stronger at UPN expense be-
cause it already has broader multiethnic appeal and
control of federal patronage. The UPN has had some
success in developing a working relationship with the
GNPP and a PRP faction. But unless the threat of
growing NPN dominance compels opposition parties
and factions to overcome ethnic differences which
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prevent wider cooperation among them, they seem
unlikely to coalesce into a broad opposition front un-
der UPN leadership that could upset the NPN.
82. If at some point the UPN finds itself dan-
gerously isolated and beleaguered, the Yoruba west
could become unstable as it was in the First Republic.
This is unlikely as long as the UPN remains united and
predominates in the Yoruba states, but failure to im-
plenment the party's ambitious program there or the
passing of the aging Awolowo (with no clear successor)
could produce social unrest and serious factional in-
fighting. The Yoruba see themselves as Nigeria's most
disliked people, and a serious erosion of their influence
in national commerce, the civil service, and the Army
at the hands of the federal regime could also help
move the west into antigovernment activity.
belief that the United States was taking African con-
cerns, especially aspirations for majority rule, more se-
riously. Until the mid-1970s, Lagos saw little basis for
political cooperation with or trust in US southern
African policies, although economic relations devel-
oped apace. There are still some influential Nigerians
who feel the United States lacks the will to influence
events of vital importance to Lagos. Residual resent-
ment dates from Nigeria's civil war, when the United
States embargoed arms to the federal government and
the American public-heavily influenced by propa-
ganda from Biafra and its supporters-sympathized
with the secessionists. Skepticism was reinforced by
subsequent US failure to oppose South African in-
volvement in Angola's civil war and has been revived
by controversy over the proposed repeal of the Clark
Amendment.
83. In the final analysis, the UPN has some capacity
to stir up antiregime worker and student violence. The
party has some pro-socialist elements that might also
seek clandestine assistance from the Soviets. Moscow
strongly backed the federal side in the Nigerian civil
war, however, and most likely would continue to es-
chew major involvement with Nigerian dissidents. Be-
cause of Nigeria's growing regional importance, the
Soviets apparently believe that the best hope for
expanding their limited influence in Nigeria lies in
dealing with the established government, regardless of
its ideology.
IV. AREAS OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH
THE UNITED STATES
84. The issue of race relations and majority rule in
southern Africa is the area most likely to cause serious
problems for continued close Nigerian-US relations.
The majority of Nigerians view the problem of white
minority rule with intense emotion and harbor an
exaggerated belief that it could be eliminated if only
the United States would bring its full weight to bear. A
major shift in American policy toward South Africa
could provoke serious Nigerian reactions. Events in
South Africa-especially sudden or extensive violence
against blacks there-could also trigger anti-American
feelings capable of disrupting Nigerian-US relations.
85. The marked improvement in bilateral relations
in the past five years has stemmed from a Nigerian
86. To many Nigerians, US expressions of support
for majority rule in southern Africa seem belied by
substantial American economic investments there and
by suspected political sympathy for the present South
African regime. US explanations of the limits of US
power to effect racial change are not readily accepted.
The feeling of US hypocrisy that results may present
more dangers for the US relationship with Nigeria
than would an open admission that US and Nigerian
interests in southern Africa do not fully coincide.
B. Big Power Activities
87. Confrontation with Nigeria is also likely to arise
over suspicion of US collusion in any future Western
military intervention in Africa. Nigeria, like many
other African governments, does not want Africa to
become a theater for increased superpower rivalry. It
takes a dim view of involvement by non-African
forces, except against South Africa or in cases where
South Africa is seen as threatening an independent Af-
rican state. These attitudes derive from Nigeria's as-
pirations to African leadership which cause it to seek
African solutions to African disputes and to try to
minimize external exacerbation of African problems.
C. Economic Expectations
88. In its eagerness to get on with the task of devel-
opment, Nigeria is looking increasingly to the United
States for technical and managerial know-how and
hopes that increasing American investment will be
forthcoming and serve as the mechanism for its trans-
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fer to Nigeria. An array of bilateral economic, scien-
tific, and technological cooperation agreements signed
last year has contributed to a growing sense of partner-
ship between Nigeria and the United States for Ni-
geria's economic development. The promise of closer
economic ties, however, runs the risk of raising Ni-
gerian expectations to unrealistic levels.
89. Serious disillusionment may arise if US invest-
ments and technological assistance are not forthcom-
ing in sufficient quantity or if the results fall short of
Nigerian expectations. In agriculture, the hope that
the US can provide quick answers to make Nigeria's
"green revolution" a success may prove especially
deceptive. Among the many disincentives to more
substantial American investment in Nigeria are in-
flated costs, excessive red tape, bureaucratic in-
efficiency, lack of reliable services, and-perhaps
most important of all-pervasive corruption. As in the
past, many American firms may prove unwilling to
make the necessary adjustments to investing and doing
business in Nigeria; indeed, regarding the common
practice of paying bribes to secure special favors, US
law prohibits them from doing so.
90. There is a further pitfall in a closer US-Nigerian
economic relationship. Nigeria in the past has shown a
readiness to use resident multinational firms as targets
of its political pique over southern Africa. An ex-
panded American business presence in Nigeria could
make the United States more vulnerable to Nigerian
temptations to use its economic power for foreign
policy purposes.
91. A prolonged slump in oil sales could lead to ir-
ritation with the US Government. When sales fell in
1978, for example, the Nigerians were disturbed when
Washington did not buy some of their surplus oil. At
some point they may decide to test the strength of
their support in Washington by offering to sell some of
their crude for inclusion in the US strategic petroleum
reserve.
92. Nigerian-US relations are always subject to un-
predictable stresses and strains that can arise in periods
of severe domestic turmoil in Nigeria, usually accom-
panied by outbursts of xenophobic nationalism. In
such circumstances, the United States can become a
convenient and popular scapegoat for domestic fail-
ures. Nigeria's adoption of the US Constitution as a
political model may well lead to backlash against the
US if its new political system should break down in
chaos. Then too, to the extent that Islamic fundamen-
talism does gain ground in northern Nigeria, it is likely
to have a strongly anti-Western cast and to include the
US among its targets. Even when Nigerian resentments
are directed at other Western powers, US interests can
also suffer because the US is seen as a highly visible
symbol of the West.
E. Nuclear Proliferation
93. There is a potential for confrontation between
Nigeria and the United States over nuclear develop-
ment. Citing the threat posed by South African nu-
clear weapons capabilities, prominent Nigerians have
publicly advocated launching a domestic nuclear
power program to support a Nigerian nuclear weapons
option, which popular opinion assumes would follow
automatically. At present Nigeria has no nuclear
expertise; the danger of a Nigerian nuclear weapons
capability is therefore remote. There is a fair chance,
however, that Nigeria will decide to begin a nuclear
power reactor construction program over the next five
years and will turn to the United States for the nec-
essary technology. The United States would then face
awkward choices in its nonproliferation policy
objectives.
94. A resumption of US nuclear cooperation with
Pretoria would have a severe impact on Nigeria's rela-
tions with the United States. Regardless of any South
African nonproliferation commitments which presum-
ably would precede US nuclear cooperation, Nigeria
would remain distrustful of South African intentions
and of the efficacy of international constraints.
95. Despite Nigeria's problems, we feel there are
grounds for optimism about prospects for continued
stability at least until the 1983 elections. Looking fur-
ther ahead, domestic social and economic strains prob-
ably offer the greatest potential for political turmoil
and erosion of popular acceptance of the Shagari gov-
ernment. There also is the risk that Libyan subversion
against Nigeria and the spread of militant Islam in the
north could seriously fray the political fabric by add-
ing to internal strains.
96. The present Nigerian constitutional system of-
fers hope for more stable and representative govern-
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ment than existed in the ill-fated First Republic. The
constitutional structure should reduce chances that
political conflict rooted in traditional tribal, regional,
and religious rivalries will again get out of hand on a
scale to threaten severely national unity. Built-in
rivalries among branches and levels of government
will be a continuing source of inefficiency and peri-
odic stress, but not necessarily chaos. Civilian politi-
cians do not want to give the Army any excuse to re-
sume power. This, coupled with strong memories of
the mistakes that previously led to civil war and mili-
tary rule, would seem to give Nigerians sufficient
motivation to make democratic government work tol-
erably well over the next few years.
97. But the country's revamped political institutions
offer no magic formula for dealing more effectively
with longstanding social and economic stresses arising
from unequal regional development, wide income
disparities, accelerating urbanization, and continued
inflation. Popular expectations for quick movement
against entrenched social and economic problems do
not make the civilian regime's task easy. For all its
positive features, the new political system has also
made the government process more complex, un-
wieldy, and time consuming at both the federal and
state levels. This, together with corruption, sluggish
bureaucratic performance, and a shortage of skilled
managers and technicians, likely means that the civil-
ian record of social and economic betterment will be
slow and uneven at best.
98. The forces of instability in Nigeria appear to be
manageable so long as some visible improvement in
living conditions occurs and there is no explosion of
Islamic fundamentalism in the north. Should there be
a serious recession or rampant inflation, or should
corruption and government inefficiency be perceived
as intolerable, this could spur a military coup or urban
labor and student unrest on a scale to invite an Army
takeover.
99. Libyan activism it West and Central Africa will
test Nigeria's willingness and ability to exert its re-
gional leadership. Passivity in the face of Libyan en-
croachments would set back Nigeria's leadership
pretensions, and thus stimulate restiveness among Ni-
gerian Army officers. A military takeover could be
triggered if the civilian leadership was perceived as
weak or inept, either at home or abroad.
100. There is little in the value makeup of the Ni-
gerian officer corps to suggest that a resumption of
military rule would result in a fundamental wrench in
the country's economic and foreign policies toward a
radical, anti-Western approach, though these policies
might well reflect a more xenophobic bias. A military
regime's ability to govern would depend heavily on its
breadth of acceptance by ethnic groups within the
armed forces and the country at large. A narrowly
based military power grab would only serve to frag-
ment the armed forces and likely produce further, un-
predictable instability.
101. The stability of Nigeria's relationship with the
United States is dependent to some extent on internal
Nigerian political developments. But we believe that
the future of Nigerian-US relations under the present
or any other government that may come to power in
Lagos will depend, more than any other factor, on a
continued favorable perception of US support for
majority rule in southern Africa. Nigeria's desire for
greater US participation in its economic development
presents new opportunities and risks for the United
States, but it is unlikely to distract Lagos from its
preoccupation with southern Africa.
102. Serious doubt about US resolve to move for-
ward on southern African problems would revitalize
Nigerian suspicion of US motives and increase Lagos's
caution about working with the United States on Af-
rican problems. The result would be a deterioration in
relations and reversion to confrontational political tac-
tics. Nigerian acceptance of US African policy will also
tend to erode if Lagos sees it as being more concerned
with countering Soviet influence than with eliminating
white supremacy in southern Africa, which Nigerians
regard as the gravest threat to African interests. A
turnaround in relations with the United States, how-
ever, would not automatically result in warming ties
with the USSR.
103. Lagos has a range of economic and political
weapons, including withholding cooperation in inter-
national and African forums, from which to choose to
pressure the US in support of Nigerian foreign policy.
The actions selected no doubt would be intended to
provide Lagos with maximum propaganda benefit
among other Africans, while minimizing real damage
to Nigeria's own interests. Lagos probably would feel
compelled to use tough measures only in extreme cir-
cumstances. Important determinants of Nigerian
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behavior would be the prevailing state of the world oil
market and the health of Nigeria's economy.
104. An embargo on all oil exports to the United
States would be most unlikely, given Nigeria's domes-
tic revenue needs and the difficulty of shifting else-
where all the oil previously sold to the United States.
Less painful oil options are available, however, such as
a limited cutback on oil exports, a ban on American oil
company purchases of government-owned crude, or
nationalization of the oil companies' remaining equity
ownership. Nonoil measures might include limitations
on imports of US goods or investment, enforcement of
a secondary boycott of American firms active in South
Africa, or denial of new contracts to US companies.
105. Lagos may have the potential to influence US
African policy indirectly by selectively bringing pres-
sure against key West European countries. Nigeria is
the largest market and site of investment in Sub-
Saharan Africa for the UK, France, and West Ger-
many. Moreover, Nigeria is one of the top oil suppliers
to Bonn and Paris. The UK is in a particularly exposed
position. London depends on Nigeria for 30 percent of
its total exports and has the biggest investment of any
Western country in both Nigeria and South Africa.
106. We believe that the outlook for stability after
1983 .is more guarded. The 1983 elections will contrib-
ute to disillusionment with constitutional government
if they are marred by widespread popular suspicion
and controversial charges of blatant rigging as were
civilian elections in the early 1960s. The relatively
trouble-free 1979 elections, which preceded the
changeover to civilian rule, were supervised by the
military, and civilian authorities will be challenged to
match the military's authority and impartiality.
107. It is quite likely that the major electoral con-
test in 1983, as in 1979, will be between President
Shagari's northern oriented National Party and Chief
Awolowo's Yoruba-based Unity Party or recombined
national groupings of which these two parties are core
components. Awolowo's controversial and abrasive
style and the widespread resentment of the Yoruba by
the other tribes, coupled with the real possibility of
party fragmentation upon Awolowo's death, militate
against the Unity Party's chances for taking control of
the national government.
108. Another presidential defeat for Awolowo prob-
ably would not push the Yoruba into dangerous
obstructionism, although this cannot be ruled out.
Younger Unity Party politicians, particularly those
holding elective office with the most to lose, likely
would prefer to concentrate on easing Awolowo from
the scene in order to remold the party under new lead-
ership and to give it more national appeal in hopes of
dominating the next electoral contest.
109. Nigeria's internal political evolution could also
afford opportunities for greater Libyan meddling. In
the unlikely event the 1983 elections should install a
non-Muslim President such as Awolowo who is identi-
fied as pro-Israel, Qadhafi would have an excuse to
"champion" the political fortunes of northern Ni-
gerian Muslims. In time, Tripoli might be drawn to
strong support of the small, Muslim-based People's Re-
demption Party because of its "progressive" image and
antinorthern establishment credentials. If this faction-
ridden party can gain new cohesion and dynamic
leadership, it might develop appeal for both Islamic
fundamentalists in the north and politically homeless
radicals among students, unionists, and intellectuals in
the south.
110. If Shagari is reelected as we expect, foreign
policy probably would mean more of the same vis-a-
vis the United States. Policy continuity under an
Awolowo-led government would be somewhat less as-
sured. Awolowo's own instincts are quite conservative
and this would argue for a less activist and more pro-
Western foreign policy, with less stridency on southern
African issues. But such a course almost certainly
would embroil him in domestic controversy and pres-
sures for change from elements used to a more ener-
getic and nonaligned pursuit of Nigeria's leadership
ambitions.
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