THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE THREAT TO NATO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00217R000200070009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2009
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 20, 1984
• Content Type: SNIE

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Director of Top Secret
--4= Central
Intelligence
The Soviet Offensive
Chemical Warfare Threat to NATO
Special National Intelligence Estimate
WARNING: The material in this document is
sensitive. Distribution of this Estimate is strictly
limited to those officials who require access to
the subject matter for the performance of their
duties.
Top Secret
SNIE 11/1 7-2-84 L
20 November 1984
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S N I E 11/17-2-84/L
THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE
CHEMICAL WARFARE THREAT TO NATO
WARNING: The material in this document is
sensitive. Distribution of this Estimate is strictly
limited to those officials who require access to
the subject matter for the performance of their
duties.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... V
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 1
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
Current Soviet Offensive Chemical Warfare Capabilities ............. 7
The Soviet Chemical Agent Production Base and Stockpile ..... 7
Chemical Munitions and Delivery Systems ................................ 7
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Protective Capabilities....... 7
Soviet Intent To Use Chemical Weapons Against NATO ............. 8
Factors Bearing on Soviet Chemical Weapons Doctrine........... 8
First Use/Preemption ................................................................... 9
Nuclear Warfare ........................................................................... 9
Nonnuclear Warfare ..................................................................... 9
The Evolution of the Soviet Offensive Chemical Warfare Threat
to NATO .................................................................................... 10
The Nature of the Evidence ........................................................ 10
Before the Mid-1970s ................................................................... 11
After the Mid-1970s ...................................................................... 11
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia ................................................... 12
The Future Soviet Chemical Weapons Program ........................... 13
Intelligence Gaps .............................................................................. 14
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate outlines our knowledge of present and projected
Soviet chemical warfare capabilities, and focuses on the question of
Soviet intent to employ chemical weapons under the various conditions
that might pertain during a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. The Estimate
identifies the areas of agreement within the Intelligence Community,
and carefully defines those areas in which the opinions of the agencies
divide. A comprehensive treatment of the entire Soviet chemical and
biological warfare program will be presented in NIE 11/17-85, sched-
uled for publication in May 1985.
This issue is uniquely significant because of the asymmetry of
chemical warfare capabilities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. On
the one hand, the Soviets have a chemical warfare capability that could
inflict substantial damage on selective NATO targets, while NATO's
limited ability to reply in kind-based on aging US chemical muni-
tions-has forced the Alliance to threaten nuclear retaliation for a Pact
chemical attack. On the other hand, the dearth of hard, directly
pertinent evidence of Soviet forward chemical posture or training could
signify a lack of interest on the part of the Soviets in pursuing offensive
chemical operations against modern military forces in Western Europe.
This Estimate considers Soviet and Pact use of lethal chemical
agents against NATO. We have no evidence concerning Soviet inten-
tions regarding the use of incapacitants and other nonlethal agents, and
have not addressed the conceivable uses of such agents during a
European war. Nonlethal agents are discussed in the section on future
Soviet chemical weapon developments only to indicate the full scope of
Soviet interests
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NOFOR N/NOCONT RACT/ORCON/W NI NTEL
KEY JUDGMENTS
The Soviet Union maintains the world's largest and most compre-
hensive chemical warfare capability. We believe there is sufficient risk
of Soviet use of chemical weapons that NATO must take them into
accoun~
We are agreed that:
- The Soviets have a large chemical stockpile, at least several
times as large as that of the United States.
- The Soviets currently are producing chemical warfare agents at
least at a level sufficient to replenish stocks, train production
personnel, and provide test agents. We believe they are capable
of producing more than enough chemical warfare agents to
fulfill their wartime requirements.
- The Soviets give high priority to research on and development
of new or improved agents and have developed chemical
warheads and munitions for virtually all types of Warsaw Pact
short-range ballistic missiles, ground attack aircraft, and artil-
lery that enable them to engage targets throughout the full
operational depth of the battlefield.
- They have approximately 45,000 personnel assigned to chemical
troops in the Ground Forces alone, and there is evidence of
Chemical Service personnel, equipment, and units in the Soviet
Air and Air Defense Forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces, and
the Navy.
- Training of Soviet officers in the employment of chemical
weapons continues in specialized schools. The Chemical Service
continues to receive instruction in chemical warfare subjects.
- The Soviets believe chemical weapons to have military utility, as
demonstrated by their use of such weapons both in Afghanistan
and in Southeast Asia-although their use in those areas is
related to the nature of the enemy as well as the low risk of
either retaliation in kind or significant escalation.
- Finally, the Soviet Union is engaged in research and develop-
ment programs that could yield improvements in traditional
chemical weapons. Biotechnology-based novel agents could be
available for test and evaluation within five years
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We are also agreed, however, that:
- Since the mid-1970s, Warsaw Pact writings and plans concern-
ing the use of offensive chemical weapons have decreased. In
contrast to the earlier period when detailed allocations of
chemical weapons to Pact combat units were featured in Pact
writings, we have received very few indications of such alloca-
tions in the past decade despite our access to the same kinds of
sources.
- We have noted a decline in chemical-warfare-related subjects in
the curriculums of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy, from
which graduation is required of all officers before they can
occupy any command position at or above regiment level, or
any primary staff position at or above division level. Profes-
sional writings originating in Soviet military academies have
continued to address the application of nuclear, conventional,
and, increasingly, improved conventional munitions, but we
have not seen references to offensive chemical munitions
employment since the mid-1970s.
- In sum, we find little evidence during the last decade of Soviet
planning and training for the use of chemical weapons against
NATO
Despite these uncertainties and inconsistencies, we do agree that
major changes have taken place in the Soviet approach to chemical
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warfare. Indeed, the views expressed in this Estimate represent a
significant departure from NIE 11-14-81, Warsaw Pact Forces Oppo-
site NATO, the last Intelligence Community estimate concerning Soviet
intentions to wage chemical warfare in a war against NATO
In this regard, we agree on the following points:
- The Intelligence Community previously held the view that if
the Pact were to employ chemical weapons against NATO it
would do so on a "massive" scale. This term was not defined,
but left the impression that if the Pact were to employ chemical
weapons it would use a great number of chemical munitions
across the full depth and breadth of the European theater. We
now believe that the Pact would not use chemical weapons in
that fashion. We have chosen the term "selective" to represent a
lower scale of use.'
- The use of chemical weapons is not a standard, integral feature
of the nonnuclear phase of war. We believe the initial release of
chemical weapons would require a decision at the highest Soviet
political and military levels. The Soviets might authorize the
selective use of these weapons against key targets as a part of a
strategy to undermine NATO's escalatory capability during the
transitional period from conventional to nuclear warfare.
- We also believe that the likelihood of the Soviets' initiation of
chemical warfare would be low as long as their conventional
operations against NATO proceeded satisfactorily. However,
the use of chemical weapons would become more likely if
NATO initiated chemical warfare or if hostilities entered a
transitional period from conventional to nuclear war.
- All but Army agree that, if the Soviets decided to employ
chemical weapons, such use would most likely occur simulta-
neously with or subsequent to nuclear operations. While the
Soviets would seek to defeat NATO by using only conventional
means, they would not discount the likelihood of escalation and
probably would attempt to preempt a NATO nuclear or
chemical attack
' Army believes that the terms "massive" and "selective" need additional clarification. The Soviets now
have sufficient nuclear weapons to execute their nuclear battlefield doctrine without using chemical
weapons as gap fillers. Although this does affect the quantity of chemical weapons allocated during the tran-
sitional and nuclear phases of warfare, it does not affect that aspect of Soviet chemical doctrine that still
provides for the delivery of chemical munitions by tube artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and aircraft.
This apparent decrease in quantity from "massive" to "selective" reflects an increase in nuclear capability.
Chemical warfare can be separated from nuclear warfare and must be considered in that perspective.
Chemical weapons are available for use during both the nonnuclear and nuclear phases
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The core of our disagreement, then, is over the issue of the Soviets'
intent to use chemical weapons selectively in the nonnuclear phase of a
war with NATO, even though such use is not a standard, integral
feature of their doctrine. Indeed, we have a few
to small-scale use of offensive chemical weapons being practiced by
elements of front-, army-, and division-level units. There is also limited
evidence indicating that some Soviet units continue to train for
chemical fire missions at the unit level. Even so, this evidence is
fragmentary and probably inconclusive. Thus, given the paucity of
direct evidence, agency views are based on inferences from capabilities,
past experience, and differing interpretations of these and other factors:
- DIA and the Services believe that, because the Soviets have a
significant capability to conduct chemical warfare and have
demonstrated the will to engage in it, they would be likely to
use chemical weapons selectively in the nonnuclear phase under
some circumstances. These include Warsaw Pact reversals and
possibly when the Soviets perceived NATO forces to be in a
poor protective posture or to have inadequate retaliatory capa-
bility-even at the outset of hostilities.
- Army believes that chemical weapons are no longer a necessary
component of Soviet nuclear fire planning, but are still a fire
planning option available to the commander. The Soviets now
have sufficient nuclear weapons to execute their nuclear battle-
field doctrine without using chemical weapons as "gap fillers."
However, this does not affect that aspect of Soviet chemical
doctrine that still provides for the delivery of chemical muni-
tions by tube artillery, short-range ballistic missiles, multiple
rocket launchers, and aircraft. Chemical warfare can be sepa-
rated from nuclear warfare and must be considered in that
perspective. Army believes that the Soviets' concern about
NATO's nuclear retaliatory capability would have been calcu-
lated in the prewar Soviet estimate of the correlation of military
forces. Thus, a decision by the Soviets to go to war would imply
confidence in their ability to deal with this NATO retaliation
capability. Were chemical weapons to appear to make a critical
difference in the likely combat outcomes, it would be highly
surprising to see the Soviet commanders deny themselves this
critical advantage.
- INR believes that under certain circumstances in the nonnucle-
ar phase the Soviets might decide to use their substantial
advantage in chemical warfare. INR bases its judgment on the
unpredictability of developments in any European war. In the
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absense of convincing evidence on current doctrine and plan-
ning, INR cannot subscribe to more specific judgments regard-
ing the likelihood of chemical warfare use.
- CIA believes that, while selective use cannot be ruled out, it is
unlikely that the Soviets would use chemicals before deciding to
initiate nuclear warfare. Soviet chemical weapons requirements
for a NATO war have been reduced by improved conventional
capabilities, small nuclear weapons, and a conventional war-
fighting strategy. Selective use of chemicals would force Mos-
cow to balance the increasingly limited advantage of such an
attack against the danger of a NATO nuclear response.
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DISCUSSION
Current Soviet Offensive Chemical Warfare
Capabilities
1. The Soviet Union maintains the world's largest
and most comprehensive chemical warfare capability.
This includes a chemical production base and stockpile
that are adequate to meet the Soviets' combat require-
ments, delivery systems that can range the depth of
the battlefield, and integrated protective systems for
their armed forces
The Soviet Chemical Agent Production Base and
Stockpile
2. We have limited evidence on which to base our
estimates of Soviet chemical agent production capaci-
ty. We monitor 13 plants in the Soviet Union that are
capable of producing toxic agents. Of these, three are
particularly configured to produce chemical warfare
agents; one of the three is active for two to four
months a year. We assess that current Soviet produc-
tion is sufficient to replenish stocks, train production
personnel, and provide test agents. We believe that the
Soviets, even without activating all their plants, are
capable of producing more than enough chemical
warfare agents to fulfill their wartime requirements.
3. To date, we have identified
level chemical warfare depots
war are agents an nuclear, gical, and chemical
equipment and materials. Intelligence Community
estimates on the size of the Soviet bulk agent stockpile
range from a low of less than 70,000 metric tons (CIA)
to a high of at least 300,000 metric tons (DIA and
Army)
Sufficient toxic chemical
railcars and trucks are held in reserve in and around
these depots to permit the rapid transfer of bulk agent
to forward locations. There is little intelligence avail-
able on the storage of chemical munitions. Some filled
chemical weapons may be stored at depots in the
Soviet Union and the forward area
I INR does not believe there is sufficient evidence on which to
base an estimate of the Soviet bulk agent stockpile; it could be
significantly higher or lower than the limits presented hereF_~
Chemical Munitions and Delivery Systems
4. The Soviets continue to produce and stockpile a
variety of chemical agents and munitions, give high
priority to research on and development of new or
improved agents, and have developed chemical war-
heads or munitions for virtually all types of Warsaw
Pact short-range ballistic missiles, ground-attack air-
craft, and artillery. The Soviets can engage targets
throughout the full operational depth of the battle-
field. Moreover, the improvements in the accuracy
and reliability of current and future Soviet weapon
systems further improve their capability to deliver all
types of munitions including chemicals.
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Protective
Capabilities
5. The Soviets have a capability to sustain opera-
tions on a contaminated battlefield. The Soviet Chemi-
cal Service is a special service of the armed forces
dedicated to protecting military operations from the
effects of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
Chemical Service units are organic to Soviet and
Warsaw Pact ground forces from front through regi-
mental level. We assess the peacetime manning of the
chemical troops in the Ground Forces alone to be
approximately 45,000 personnel. Reserve strengths
may double that figure in wartime. There is evidence
of Chemical Service personnel, equipment, and units
in the Soviet Air and Air Defense Forces, the Strategic
Rocket Forces, and the Navy.
6. Soviet Chemical Service personnel are equipped
with nuclear, biological, and chemical detection, iden-
tification, and decontamination equipment. The prin-
cipal wartime tasks of the Chemical Service are:
- Locating nuclear bursts.
- Conducting nuclear, biological, and chemical
reconnaissance.
- Monitoring radioactive and chemical contamina-
tion.
- Assessing the radiation and chemical situation
following use of weapons of mass destruction.
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-- Determining effects and carrying out safety
measures when chemical and nuclear weapons
are used.
-- Providing protective and decontamination
equipment to friendly forces.
- Decontaminating troops, equipment, buildings,
and terrain.
- Employing smoke generators, and flame and
incendiary devices.
from storage depots to firing units
7. In addition to the capabilities of the Chemical
Service, personnel of the combat arms are trained in
nuclear, biological, and chemical defense measures
and are equipped with full protective clothing and
masks. Many combat and combat support vehicles
possess collective protection systems and alarms. Taken
together, these systems enhance Pact capabilities to
operate on a contaminated battlefield.
Soviet Intent To Use Chemical Weapons
Against NATO
Factors Bearing on Soviet Chemical Weapons
Doctrine
S The two most important factors affecting a So-
viet decision to release chemical weapons for use
against NATO are the anticipated military utility and
the potential for a NATO retaliation. The Soviets
would also consider the vulnerability of friendly and
enemy forces
9. The Military Utility of Chemical Weapons.
Chemical weapons have a distinct utility in Soviet
military operations. Chemical weapons are wide-area-
effect weapons specifically designed to reduce the
combat effectiveness of the enemy by killing or
incapacitating personnel and contaminating equip-
ment and terrain. Among the battlefield advantages
the Soviets believe chemical munitions provide over
conventional munitions in some circumstances are:
Denying areas to potential adversaries through
chemical contamination.
- Causing target neutralization without physical
destruction.
- Enlarging the lethal area.
Effectively attacking sheltered targets.
Slowing down enemy advances and restricting
enemy ilia neuverability.
- Rendering enemy equipment unusable until
decontaminated.
- Causing large numbers of casualties when used
against unprepared troops.
- Wearing down enemy troops both physically and
psychologically.
lethality.
10. On the other hand, the Soviets appear to have a
healthy respect for the side effects and limitations of
chemical weapons. They recognize that:
- Terrain and weather may reduce the effective-
ness of toxic agents, and break up or prevent the
formation of the secondary toxic cloud.
- Consideration must be given to the minimum
distance from friendly troops that agents may be
used.
- Countermeasures can be taken on short notice
and, if properly implemented, could significantly
degrade chemical weapons effectiveness.
- Operations in a protective posture are restrictive.
- Chemical contamination of the battlefield could
slow the pace of operations for both sides, which
the Soviets believe in some cases could assist a
defender.
- Chemical weapons employment increases the
complexity of planning and executing offensive
operations.
11. NATO Retaliatory Capability. Retaliation has
been a prime determinant in considerations of the use
of chemical warfare since World War I. Concern for
chemical escalation was the principal deterrent to the
use of chemical weapons by all sides during World
War II. Since that time, another form of escalation
that must be considered is nuclear weapons.
12. The Soviets certainly are aware of statements by
authoritative US and NATO spokesmen that NATO
might be forced to respond to a Soviet chemical attack
with theater nuclear weapons because NATO has a
limited chemical weapons capability. Sensitive Pact
writings also predict that NATO would resort to the
use of nuclear weapons to forestall defeat on a conven-
tional battlefield whether or not chemical weapons
were used, and the Pact is well aware of NATO
exercises that portray such a chain of events.
13. We are aware of an essentially accurate Pact
assessment of the US chemical stockpile conducted
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during the 1970s that stresses the age and obsolescence
of US munitions. Nevertheless, Soviet and Pact writers
continue to reflect their concern about NATO's chem-
ical capabilities and their profound respect for US
chemical technology. The Soviets credit the United
States and NATO with an extensive offensive chemical
capability, and suspect that the US binary weapons
program is designed to evade the limitations that
might be posed by future chemical weapons treaties.
14. The Soviets are aware that an effective use of
chemical weapons by NATO could inflict significant
casualties, depending on the warning time and type of
agent used. The Soviets recognize that a debilitating
casualty rate would undercut their preferred strategy of
a fast-moving offensive against NATO and, as a result,
they appear to have adopted a strategy of deterring
enemy chemical use by maintaining a substantial offen-
sive and protective capability
The Soviets have classified chemical and nuclear
munitions as weapons of mass destruction-along with
others like biological weapons, incendiary weapons, and
fuel-air explosives-although they regard only nuclear
weapons as capable of being decisive in war. The Pact
continues to define these as "weapons of mass destruc-
tion," although they would use some of them-such as
fuel-air explosives and napalm, which do not require
release at the highest political level-during the con-
ventional phase of a European conflict.
First Use/Preemption
15. The Soviets deny that they would be the first to
use chemical or nuclear weapons. Authoritative East
European sources, however, report that the Soviet
policy is to preempt if necessary. Pact sources indicate
that their forces would begin preparations to preempt
immediately upon detecting NATO preparations to
employ weapons of mass destruction. At least in the
nuclear arena, classified writings of recent years
strongly suggest that the Soviets are deeply concerned
that they would not have time to preempt.
16. The majority of available evidence that refers to
chemical warfare portrays Pact chemical strikes simul-
taneous with or subsequent to nuclear operations. We
believe that, if the Soviets elected to use chemical
weapons against NATO, they would be most likely to
employ them to complement nuclear munitions or to
neutralize certain sensitive targets immediately before a
nuclear strike. We believe there is sufficient risk of such
actions that NATO must take them into account. (See
Army comment in paragraph 19.)
17. Soviet military doctrine since the late 1960s
appears to be that an initial period of combat with
NATO, in which the USSR would seek to degrade
NATO's nuclear capability, might be limited to the
use of conventional weapons. This initial period is
referred to by the Soviets as the "nonnuclear phase of
war."
18. The use of chemical weapons is not a standard,
integral feature of the nonnuclear phase. Soviet inten-
tions for such use are unclear and the evidence
ambiguous. Nevertheless, the comprehensive chemical
warfare capabilities of the Soviets require that the
prudent planner consider the possibility of chemical
weapons use from the outset of hostilities. We believe
the initial release of chemical weapons would require
a decision at the highest Soviet political and military
levels. We also believe that the likelihood of Soviet
initiation of chemical warfare against NATO would be
low, as long as conventional operations proceeded
satisfactorily. However, the use of chemical weapons
would become more likely under certain conditions-
such as if NATO initiated chemical warfare or if
NATO were perceived to be preparing to use chemical
weapons. In addition, the Soviets might authorize the
use of chemical weapons against key targets as part of
a strategy to undermine NATO's escalatory capability
during the transitional period from conventional to
nuclear warfare. Use under other circumstances is
more difficult to determine.
19. There are differences of opinion as to which
other circumstances might result in a Warsaw Pact
chemical attack:
- CIA believes it unlikely that the Soviets would
use chemical weapons until a decision had been
made to initiate nuclear warfare. While we
cannot rule out the small-scale use of chemical
weapons against selected targets, we believe such
use would be counter to Soviet doctrine. The
Soviets would necessarily be forced to weigh the
expected limited gains to be achieved by such
attacks against the standing NATO threat to
respond and escalate. CIA does not credit the
Soviets with the capability to engage in more
than limited and selective use of chemical weap-
ons. Such limited use would be inconsistent with
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the acknowledged Soviet intention to conduct the
war conventionally. The Soviets continue to em-
phasize the decisive nature of nuclear weapons,
and the critical importance of retaining the
initiative for their use. A limited and selective
use of chemical weapons would be inconsistent
with the Soviets evident doctrinal intention to
maintain their self-assessed advantage by waging
war conventionally.
DIA and the Services believe that the Soviet
Supreme High Command retains the flexibility
to authorize the employment of chemical weap-
ons to supplement the conduct of the nonnuclear
phase. According to this view, the Soviets judge
NATO unlikely to escalate automatically to the
use of tactical nuclear weapons in response to the
selective use of chemical weapons. Therefore,
tinder certain conditions in the nonnuclear phase,
the Soviets would probably selectively employ
chemical weapons.
- A perception by the Soviets that their enemy
was in a weak protective posture, incapable of
conducting effective decontamination, unable
to operate effectively in a contaminated en-
vironment, or incapable of retaliating effec-
tively-even at the outset of hostilities.
- A Warsaw Pact reversal or loss of momentum,
especially if Pact commanders perceived that
using chemical weapons would measurably en-
hance their prospects for success.
Army believes that chemical weapons are no
longer a necessary component of Soviet nuclear
fire planning, but are still a fire planning option
available to the commander. The Soviets now
have sufficient nuclear weapons to execute their
nuclear battlefield doctrine without using chemi-
cal weapons as "gap fillers." However, this does
not affect that aspect of Soviet chemical doctrine
that still provides for the delivery of chemical
munitions by tube artillery, short-range ballistic
missiles, multiple rocket launchers, and aircraft.
Chemical warfare can be separated from nuclear
warfare and must be considered in that perspec-
tive. There is no objective reason ruling out use
during either the nuclear or the nonnuclear
phase. Once release authority has been given,
Soviet commanders could decide to employ
chemical weapons against targets for which they
are best suited to accomplish the commander's
objectives. Army believes that the Soviets' con-
cern about NATO's nuclear retaliatory capability
would have been calculated in the prewar Soviet
estimate of the correlation of military forces.
Thus, a decision by the Soviets to go to war
would imply confidence in their ability to deal
with this NATO retaliation capability. Moreover,
decisions to use chemical weapons at the tactical
and operational levels would be based on con-
tinuing calculations of the correlation of forces.
Such calculations would involve both nuclear and
nonnuclear assessments. Were chemical weapons
to appear to make a critical difference in the
likely combat outcomes, it would be highly sur-
prising to see Soviet commanders deny them-
selves this critical advantage.
INR believes that under certain circumstances in
the nonnuclear phase the Soviets might decide to
use their substantial advantage in chemical war-
fare. INR bases its judgment on the unpredict-
ability of developments in any European war. In
the absense of convincing evidence on current
doctrine and planning, INR cannot subscribe to
more specific judgments regarding the likelihood
of chemical warfare use.
20. The Soviets might perceive the selective use of
chemical warfare to be advantageous against the
peripheries of NATO and against amphibious forces.
We believe they might use chemical weapons in
northern Norway or eastern Turkey to take advantage
of local situations. Use of chemical weapons in such
peripheral areas would be difficult to confirm rapidly
and, in Soviet eyes, might carry less risk of retaliation
than use in Central Europe.' The Soviets might consid-
er the use of chemical weapons against amphibious
forces. Troops engaged in heliborne and surface as-
saults would also be good targets for chemical weapons
where personnel casualties are the goal.'
The Evolution of the Soviet Offensive Chemical
Warfare Threat to NATO
21. In addition to the assessed capabilities of the
Soviets to conduct chemical warfare, we have relative-
CIA believes that there is no evidence that the Soviets would
consider chemical attacks against flanking NATO countries to have
less risk than that associated with similar attacks in Central Europe.
Further, the CIA holds that the limited tactical gains that could be
achieved by chemical weapons in secondary theaters would in no
way compensate for the strategic risk involved. Finally, the CIA
believes that physically distant areas such as northern Norway do
not represent strategically peripheral problems for either the United
States or the Soviet Union. (s)
INR believes that considerations beyond the Central European
battlefield have not been properly examined to the extent they can
be included in this Estimate. (s)
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ly few references to chemical warfare in the substan-
tial body of evidence describing Soviet military doc-
trine. We have an extensive collection of Soviet and
Warsaw Pact doctrinal writings within which the
percentage addressing chemical warfare
never large-has steadily decreased.
and above the division level and by tactical and
strategic aviation. In addition to advocating the use of
chemical weapons because of their own unique utility,
the authors considered them a supplement to nuclear
weapons. Soviet writings suggested that chemical
weapons could be used to compensate for a shortage of
tactical nuclear weapons. The planned allocations of
large numbers of chemical warheads in some writings
may have been the result of this approach.
26. Soviet and Warsaw Pact professional military
education during this period also stressed chemical
weapons employment. The curriculums of the Voro-
shilov General Staff Academy-from which gradua-
tion is required of all officers before they can occupy
any command position at or above regiment level, or
any primary staff position at or above division level-
included blocks of instruction on offensive chemical
warfare and protective measures. Soviet and Pact
combined-arms officers destined for command or staff
assignments with field forces were taught how to plan
for and direct the employment of all types of muni-
tions. Chemical fire planning was taught at specialized
schools.
23. Despite these uncertainties and inconsistencies,
we do agree that major changes have taken place in
the Soviet approach to chemical warfare. These
changes have led us to conclude that recent Estimates
were incorrect when they implied that if the Pact
were to employ chemical weapons it would use a great
number of chemical munitions across the full depth
and breadth of the European theater. We now believe
that the Pact would not use chemical weapons in this
fashion. We base our new belief on the following
evidence.
24. From its inception, the Warsaw Pact's strategy
has been based on reacting to-or preempting-a
NATO attack against one or more Pact nations. Be-
cause the Pact has enjoyed a considerable advantage in
conventional forces over its NATO counterparts, Pact
planners have assumed that NATO would initiate the
use of nuclear weapons and have tailored their plans to
chemical weapons.
using nuclear and
25. Warsaw Pact operational art as reflected in
sensitive documents and writings of the period before
the mid-1970s envisioned large-scale offensive/retalia-
tory chemical weapons employment. Pact authors
addressed the use of chemical weapons by troops at
27. In addition to writings and classroom instruc-
tion, there was limited but clear evidence of practical
training for the offensive use of chemical weapons at
28. Warsaw Pact war-fighting strategy has under-
gone a gradual transformation. As tactical nuclear
weapons entered the Pact inventory in sufficient
numbers to counter the NATO nuclear threat, Pact
authors and planners acknowledged the possibility that
a European conflict might begin with a brief conven-
tional phase of warfare leading to a nuclear exchange.
By the late 1970s, Soviet planners had embraced the
concept of attempting to defeat NATO using only
conventional means. To this end, they have upgraded
their conventional war-fighting capabilities while
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force to balance NATO's nuclear deterrent.
29. Since the mid-1970s, Warsaw Pact writings and
plans concerning the use of offensive chemical weap-
ons have decreased. In contrast to the earlier period
when detailed allocations of chemical weapons to Pact
combat units were featured in Pact writings, we have
received very few indications of such allocations in the
past decade despite our access to the same kinds of
source
30. We have noted a decline in chemical-warfare-
related subjects in the curriculums of the Voroshilov
General Staff Academy. Professional writings originat-
ing in Soviet military academies have continued to
address the application of nuclear, conventional, and,
increasingly, improved conventional munitions, but
we have not seen references to offensive chemical
munitions employment since the mid-1970s. Appar-
ently, the most promising Soviet and Pact middle-
grade and senior officers no longer receive training in
the integration of chemical warfare into combined-
arms operations, Some Soviet officers continue to
receive training in the employment of chemical weap-
ons in specialized schools, and the Chemical Service
continues to receive instruction in chemical warfare
subjects, in addition to a greatly expanded coverage of
nuclear warfare subjectsl
by elements of front-, army-,
and division-level units. Limited evidence indicates
that some Soviet units continue to train for chemical
fire missions at the unit level. We believe this level of
training is probably not sufficient to maintain the
degree of familiarity with chemical warfare necessary
to enable front and army staffs to conduct large-scale
chemical attacks, although it probably is sufficient to
allow selective employment of chemical weapons
(DIA, Army, and INR believe that it is sufficient to
conduct selective attacks).
32. We have noted some change of emphasis by the
Soviets in the scale of employment of chemical weap-
ons. There is a trend toward an increasing percentage
of improved conventional munitions in the warhead
trast to the situation in the 1960s when chemical
munitions had second priority and, in some cases, were
the predominant munition
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia
33. The Soviet Union provided Lao and Vietnamese
forces with lethal chemicals and toxin agents that have
been used on H'Mong and Lao resistance forces and
villages since 1976. Storage facilities have been identi-
fied in Laos and Soviet advisers supervise the Lao
chemical warfare program. Similarly, lethal chemical
and toxin agents have been used by Vietnamese forces
in Kampuchea since 1978. The USSR also provided
chemical weapons to Afghan Government forces,
which used them for six months before the Soviet
invasion. Soviet forces employed chemical and toxin
weapons throughout the country against Mujahedin
guerrillas and villages until late 1982. Since then, there
have been a few reported attacks, most notably (luring
the 1984 spring offensive into the Panjsher valley, but
these reports have not been confirmed.
smoke may also have been used.
34. Lethal chemical weapons used in Southeast Asia
and Afghanistan have included sprays, bombs, rockets,
mines, and artillery shells. In addition to toxins arid
incapacitants, such traditional agents as phosgene,
diphosgene, nerve agents, mustard, lewisite, and toxic
35. The Soviets' use of chemical and toxin weapons
in Afghanistan and their willingness to supply allies
the means to wage chemical warfare indicate that the
Soviets will not be constrained in a European war by
humanitarian or legal responsibilities. It must be as-
sumed that the decision to use and supply chemical
and toxin weapons, in violation of two international
treaties, was made at the highest levels in Moscow.
readily available chemical munitions
36. We assess that the use of chemical weapons by
Soviet air and ground forces in Afghanistan and the
supplying of chemical weapons for use by allies in
Southeast Asia indicate that the Soviets perceive chem-
ical weapons have a continued military utility in
combat, that they have the will to employ chemical
weapons in specialized circumstances, that they have
some troops trained in the employment of chemical
weapons, and that they maintain an inventory of
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37. CIA further believes that the use of chemical
weapons by the Soviets and their surrogates in Afghan-
istan and Southeast Asia is driven primarily by the
issue of retaliatory capability. In no case are the
victims of these attacks capable of retaliating in kind
or escalating the conflict in response to the chemical
attacks. Furthermore, the Soviets recognize that chem-
ical weapons have their greatest effect upon unpre-
pared opponents lacking physical protection, warning,
or adequate training. These criteria provide a good
description of the Third World targets of Soviet
chemical warfare, yet even there the attacks have
been episodic and decidedly limited in both number
and effect. This activity parallels Soviet doctrinal
writing which, while not ignoring chemical warfare,
nevertheless views it as a complicating factor with
theoretically high but operationally low military utili-
38. DIA and the Services believe the Soviets may
calculate that the abhorrence of chemical warfare is
slowly being eroded as the development and use of
chemical weapons by an increasing number of coun-
tries becomes an accepted norm. This may lead the
Soviets to calculate that their use of chemical warfare
in future European wars would not automatically
generate a NATO decision to retaliate with chemical
or nuclear weapons, especially if the Soviet use was
selective
The Future Soviet Chemical Weapons Program
39. In the early 1970s the Soviets embarked on a
multifaceted research and development program de-
signed to overcome a perceived significant US lead in
chemical warfare. A special panel was set up to guide
future Soviet chemical warfare efforts and improve
the Soviet position. In general, this program was to
concentrate on emerging areas of science in search of
significant breakthroughs that could result in a new
generation of chemical weapons to be fielded in the
1985-95 time frame. Specifically, the program was to
improve the storage, effectiveness, deliverability, and
safe handling of traditional and emerging chemical
warfare agents. In addition, it would develop new
lethal or incapacitating agents with reduced detect-
ability and the capability to penetrate chemical pro-
tective equipment. By contrast, research on classic
nerve agents has decreased steadily since the mid-
1960s, although this effort continues. Soviet research
on mycotoxins, which spans over 40 years, also contin-
Historically, the difference between biological and
chemical weapons was determined by definition. Bio-
logical agents were defined as living disease organisms
that exist in nature. Toxins are chemical substances
produced from biologic materials or synthesized. Living
agents can be selectively bred to increase their toxicity
or change other properties. Classic chemical agents
were limited to nonliving toxic substances produced
through industrial processes. The novel agents now
being developed share characteristics of both groups.
They include organisms that have been genetically
engineered to modify virulence, as well as chemical
substances. The chemical substances include toxins (nat-
urally occurring toxic biochemicals)-like snake ven-
om-and substances in the human body that ordinarily
perform regulatory functions-such as causing sleep,
pain, or anxiety-but which in excess can be damaging.
These chemicals could be produced by chemical syn-
thesis or biological processes, or both. Biologic synthesis
would permit long-term storage of small amounts of
many and varied organisms, which can be used to
initiate agent production in a variety of commercial,
large-scale fermentation plants otherwise used for non-
military products.
could be used to produce toxic materials and toxins
that previously could not be obtained in larger
amounts and to create entirely new agents. We believe
that some of these biotechnology-based novel agents
are within five years of transition from pure research
to the testing and evaluation stages of the development
cycle. We do not know if the Soviets are developing
new weapon systems to disseminate the new agents.
We believe that most of the new agents could be
delivered by existing systems, with perhaps minor
modifications.
41. The novel agent program will most likely parallel
the general progress of advanced biotechnologies, with
new methodologies put to use as they become available.
The novel agent program increases significantly the
number and variety of agents that could be developed,
while making large-scale production of different agents
more feasible. These agents can be developed, pro-
duced, and used in conditions under which hostile
40. In the 1970s, the Soviets began applying ad-
vances in biotechnology, such as genetic engineering,
to the development of new agents. These techniques
s For a more detailed account of this program, see SNIE 11 / 17-
84/CX: New Directions in Soviet BCW Agent Development and
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Intelligence Gaps
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Interagency Products
NIE 11-14-81D: Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite
Soviet Military Rear Services in East Germany
February 1984.
NATO, January 1982.
SNIE 11/17-84/CX: New Directions in Soviet
BCW Agent Development and Their Implications, 24
January 1984
SNIE 11-17-83: Implications of Soviet Use of
Chemical and Toxin Weapons for US Security Inter-
ests, 15 September 1983
SNIE 11/50/37-82JX: Use of Toxins and Other
Lethal Chemicals in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan,
2 February 1982.
National HUMINT Collection Plan No. 68: The
Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat, August
1984.
Central Intelligence Agency
The Soviet Chemical Warfare Stockpile (to be
published).
Soviet CW Casualty Medical Management Capa-
bilities May 1984.
Soviet Doctrine for Offensive Chemical Warfare
Against NATO June 1984.F-
Warsaw Pact Chemical Research and Development
January 1982.
Defense Intelligence Agency
Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities-
USSR February 1982.F-
Soviet Chemical Warfare Threat Summary 1982-
200OF-I Defense Intelligence Estimates Memoran-
dum, September 1982.
Soviet Front Fire Support
I February 1983.
Soviet Use of Chemical Warfare in a War with
Toxic Chemical Warfare Agents and Weapons
1983.
National Photographic Interpretation Center
Soviet Chemical Warfare Agent Munitions Storage
October 1983.
February 1984 July 1984.
Warsaw Pact CW Summary, 1 April 1983-29
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1. This document was disseminated by the Directorate of Intelligence. Because of the
sensitive nature of some source material reflected herein, this copy is for the exclusive
information and use of the recipient only.
2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable
security regulations, or returned to the Directorate of Intelligence.
3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a
period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should be destroyed
or returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding
agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified.
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