GIEREK'S POLAND: THE SEARCH FOR PROSPERITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000120035-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: February 5, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
O. N. E.
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Gierek's Poland: The Search for Prosperity
and National Identity
Cif
Secret
5 February 1973
Copy 10
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v,uvi~L .L
GIEREK'S POLAND: THE SEARCH FOR PROSPERITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
Table of Contents
Page No.
The Lesson of 1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
More For the Consumer . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A Green Revolution? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Toward Economic Reform 8
The Defense Burden 9
Toward a Broader Political Base . . . . . . . . 11
Foreign Policy Trends 16
Trouble Ahead? 22
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
5 February 1973
GIEREK'S POLAND: THE SEARCH FOR PROSPERITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
Poland is the USSR 'a largest all;, in the Communist world and
in Europe; yet it has unusually strong historical ties with the
West. With the USSR now embarked on ar., active and forward policy
of detente in Europe, developments in Poland have taken on an added
significance. Tc what extent are the Poles asserting their national
interests undor the rubric of detente? How far will the Russians
permit them to go? Is communism in Poland evolving toward something
new and different? Questions such as these can not yet be answered,
but developments in Poland during the past two years permit them to
be addressed in a new light.
Since the riots of December 1970 and the assumption of power
by Edward Gierek, the material cir:tvrstanees of most Poles have
improved measurably; the internal cZitical climate has become more
open; and Warsaw has been conducti,ii j a more "active" foreign policy,
though without challenging the ,5oulets. AZZ of this represents
steady if unspectacular progress ;(''or Poland and perhaps, in the long
run, for Western interests in Eur.)pe as well. Gierek owes his success
partly to a more tolerant Soviet 2ttitude toward East European non-
conformity, partly to his own prudence and resourcefulness, and partly
to the new faces surrounding him, The Gierek team, in fact, represents
a rather different kind of Communist leadership and one which could
prove to be a model for other East European states.
This memorandum was prepared in the Office of National Estimates and
discussed with appropriate offsces in CIA., which are in agreement with
its principal judgments.
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The Lesson of 1970
1. In a sense, Gierek passed his most difficult test two
years ago. The winter of 1970-1971 was traumatic. Gomulka's 1970
reforms involving a controversial wage incentive plan and an untimely
increase in food prices triggered riots in several Polish cities.
Gierek's skillful handling of the situation -- his repeal of the
Gomulka directives, his reassuring visits to the scenes of the dis-
orders, and his winning of the USSR's benevolent neutrality -- steered
the country away from what he describes (perhaps with some exaggeration)
as the "brink of civil war." Poland did not suffer the fate of Hungary
in 1956.
2. Yet Gierek may be under greater handicaps than was Hungary's
Kadar 14 years ago. Poland's condition was no- nearly so bad as
Hungary's; Hungary had nowhere to go but up. Unlike Kadar, Gierek
was not Moscow's hand-picked man, replacing someone the Soviets con-
sidered a traitor; nor were his country's economic resources in total
disarray; nor, finally, were his people stunned and depressed by Soviet
military intervention. For the longer term, as we observed in 1971,
"Gierek may find his job tougher than Kadar's -- the Soviets more
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suspicious, his people more impatient, and his economy harder to
operate on."*
More For the Consumer
3. Like most typical "socialist" states, Poland traditionally
has emphasized production goals for industry, especially heavy
industry, rather than those sectors of the.economy of direct interest
to the consumer. Yet because the crisis which toppled Gomulka
reflected worker and consumer grievances, the new regime has found it
necessary to promise the Polish people repeatedly that consumer needs
will be greatly upgraded in Polish economic planning.
4. Though such promises are obviously self-serving (and are
treated with skepticism by the average Pole), the tangible gains in
real wages and employment made to date and scheduled for the near term
are impressive and suggest that Gierek wishes to assign these goals
much higher priority than Gomulka. Thus, in 1971, the regime programmed
an 18 percent rise in real wages through 1975. Revised estimates
presented to the Polish parliament (Sejm) in December 1972 indicate
that this target will be equalled or exceeded by the end of 1973.
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This means that the increase during the first three years under
Gierek will match that of the last 10 years under Gomulka. And
whereas Gomulka did not stress full employment, the Gierek regime
has, and to this end is seeking to create nearly a million new jobs
by 1975. The report to the Sejm last month suggests that employment
too is expanding at a faster rate than originally planned.
5. To satisfy expected increases in consumer demand, the regime
has been employing a number of short-term measures. The price freeze
on basic food items, established two years ago, has been extended
through 1973, although Gierek told the Polish trade union congress
last November that the regime could not afford to subsidize the freeze
indefinitely. Food and other consumer goods have been imported in
large quantities (with the help of a Soviet hard currency loan of
about 100 million dollars). A liberalized tourist agreement of
January 1972 between Poland and East Germany resulted in such a massive
shopping spree by the Poles (more than 9 million visited East Germany
last year) that the Gierek regime had to apply currency restrictions
at the end of the year; but meanwhile a lot of Poles had obtained
needed consumer items. And for the past two years the regime has
permitted Polish firms producing consumer goods to resort to such
costly means as overtime and extra shifts in order to increase the
availability of their products.
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L)J.:.vi.J.:I
6. Gomulka's planners would have avoided such measures, on
principle; even more of a denarture are this regime's priorities over
the longer term. For the dogmatists surrounding Gomulka, private
automobiles represented unnecessary luxuries, housing construction
was less worthwhile than other endeavors because it is "nonproductive,"
and the idea of prosperity of private farmers seemed immoral. The
Gierek planners simply do not view matters the same way. By virtue
of Warsaw's well-publicized agreement with Fiat, for example, Poland
will begin to produce relatively inexpensive automobiles in 1973.
Polish economists stress that it is not merely a question of satisfying
the demand for automobiles but of creating a spinoff effect in other
sectors of the economy.
7. Similarly, the regime's frontal attack on the housing
problem is designed both to satisfy individual consumers and to
repair a serious and long-neglected weakness in the infrastructure.
Four out of every 10 habitable rooms in Polish urban areas were
destroyed during World War II. Under Gomulka the housing problem in
Poland remained acute. In 1970 only 140,000 apartments were con-
structed, and this represented a decline from the previous year. The
housing shortage not only imposed enormous social costs on the popula-
tion, but severely restricted the rational exploitation of the labor
force and the geographic dispersal of investment.
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8. Gierek has promise4 that each Polish family will have its
own suitable dwelling unit by 1990. Polish officials
estimate that about 7 million new apartments or houses will have to
be completed between 1971 and 1990 in order to meet this goal (there
are only about 8 million units of various types in all of Poland now).
The regime's efforts are reflected in the Sejm's projections for
housing in 1973 -- about 225,000 new units. The regime has also
stated it will encourage private investment in housing construction.
But even in the best of circumstances, the Poles will not make much
progress in easing the housing shortage before the 1980's.
9. Since the decollectivization phase of the 1950's, Polish
agriculture has been about 85 percent private and by East European
standards is quite productive. However in recent years Gomulka's
planners tridd to reduce the profit margin of the private farmer,
and this misguided policy helped to create shortages of high quality
foods. The measures adopted so far under Gierek seem intended to
enhance the economic and social status of the private farmer and
thereby his incentive to produce such foods. In so doing Gierek
has virtually abandoned whatever commitment his predecessors had made
to the eventual collectivization or "socialization" of the countryside.
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y.i.yl~i..1.
10. The first phase of the new agricultural policy was
announced in April 1971 and implemented last January. The regime
abolished the unpopular system of compulsory deliveries, increased
state procurement prices, granted property titles to about a million
private farmers, adopted tax laws to make easier the purchase of state
lands, and extended free health care to~private farmers and their
families. The second phase went into effect on 11 January 1973 and
involves a major realignment of the rural administrative structure.
More than 4000 rural "communities" are now replaced by some 2000
"parishes," each one under a "parish chief."* In the process a large
.number of local officials, including Communist Party (PUWP) and Peasant
Party officials, are to be retrained as agronomists, forcibly retired,
or as a Politburo member has explained, simply sent "back to work at
their farms."
11. What is basically involved here is the abolition of
certain organizational vestiges of the collectivization era. Under
the old system private farmers had to contend with a large number of
poorly educated bureaucrats who had the power to meddle but not to help.
The new system is designed to develop a corps of officials who have
both the expertise to assist the farmers and the authority to adapt
central directives to local conditions. Each parish is to become a
kind of econoY;:ic and political microregion, with the parish chief
acting somewhat like the director of a large enterprise.
The term "parish chief" dates from the pre-Communist era.
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12. So far the results of Gierek's agricultural policy have
been favorable. Polish agriculture produced eight percent more in
1972 than in 1971, a rate of progress "not recorded in recent years,,",
a regime spokesman told the Sejm last month. In particular, the over-
all output of meat supply in the first half of 1972 was more than 24
percent higher than in 1971; an expected rise in state purchases of
pork should boost that figure much higher in the next year or so.
Milk purchases and butter production were about 20 percent higher last
year than in 1971. Moreover, without unduly disrupting domestic supplies
of potatoes, Poland last year was able to export a large quantity to
the USSR on an emergency basis. Self-sufficiency in each branch of
agriculture does not seem an attainable goal (or, economically, a very
useful one) in the near future. but if present trends continue, Poland
should be able to reestablish its traditional position as a net food
exporter even while better satisfying domestic demand.
Toward Economic Reform
13. The Gierek regime is moving cautiously in the direction
of decentralizing economic decision-making and encouraging a greater
role for material incentives and market mechanisms, but it has
encountered several internal obstacles. Aside from the expected
resistance of functionaries in the Party apparatus and government
bureaucracy, there are some honest differences of opinion among Polish
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economists trying to blueprint the reforms. Not all of them agree,
for example, on how to phase out inefficient firms without causing
serious unemployment.
i4. The tendency of the Polish reformers is to follow the
Hungarian model, which is the most advanced in the Soviet camp, but
still far short of a free market economy. A January 1973 reorganization
of a few selected industrial enterprises, designed to give them greater
latitude in determining investments and wages is a case in point. It
is a cautious, limited experiment; even the word "reform" is proscribed
in the decree. Of course all such discussion seems rather remote to
the Polish consumer, who after all does not much care how an industry.
is organized, or whether the prices are fixed or free, so long as
better products are available and he has the money to pay for them.
The Defense Burden
15. During the last five years of Gomulka's tenure, Polish
defense expenditures rose steadily in absolute terms and as a
percentage of the total budget and of GNP. And under Gierek they
are still rising. In 1970 they represented just over nine percent
of the total budget, while the announced budget for 1973 indicates
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they are almost. 10 percent. The censored Polish press seldom refers
to the defense burden, but the average Pole seems well aware of it.*
16. A body of reporting frow diplomatic and clandestine
channels indicates that Gomulka was vexed by the size of Polish
defense expenditures but that Gierek is more determined to reduce it.
Exactly how he proposes to do this is not yet clear. Meanwhile he
reportedly has under consideration a program for using a number of
active duty military officers ;n non-military assignments. His
rationale is that such officers have the education and administrative
efficiency to perform well in civilian leadership posts, and that the
regime actually needs them in such positions. (Because there is no
great surplus of Polish officers, perhaps even a shortage, such a
reassignment program could not be adopted on a large scale unless
accompanied by reductions in the number of enlisted men as well.)
17. There seems to be considerable resistance in the Polish
high command to reductions in the Polish armed forces, and to the
* For example, a tape recording of Gierek'a January 1971 meeting with
the shipyard workers in Szczecin (which recently became available in
the West) includes his quotation_gf lines from a so-called "Szczecin
Ballad," among them: "He LGomulka kept bread from the Polish nation,:
but not tanks, because he got those from the East; Land so the PoZe/
caZZed Gierek to the helm." Gierek dissociated himself from the
statement but did not cha"??enge its validity.
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whole nation of MBFR. Interestingly, this attitude is due, not to any
fear that the Germans or others are about to attack Poland, but rather
to a feeling that the nation has become a rather solid Number Two
in the Warsaw Pact and ought not to risk any loss of that status. Some
of Gierek's civilian advisers may be sympathetic to this line of argu-
ment. Gierek certainly pays attention to it. He recognizes that the
high command as a group stood with him and against Gomulka in December
1970. The military voice in the leadership is therefore somewhat
louder than it was two years ago, and the Defense Minister is now a
full member of the Politburo.
18. The Soviets probably will settle this issue for the Poles
in the course of MBFR negotiations. If Moscow favors eventual reduc-
tions in the "indigenous" forces, the Polish armed forces by their
very size (more than 300,000) seem a prime candidate on the Warsaw
Pact side. Certainly the Polish high command would not be able to
resist pressure from both Gierek and Moscow for reductions.
Toward a Broader Political Base
19. In addition to improving the nation's economy, Gierek
is also trying to narrow the gap between the ruling PULP and the rest
of the population. For one thing, Gierek himself appears before one
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or another public gathering about once a week, and he has promised to
continue this practice. His fellow Politburo members and other Party
and government leaders follow his example. Although the Polish media
report virtually nothing of the discussions themselves, Poles and the
occasional Western observer concur that they are rather free-wheeling
affairs, with audience questions touching on even the most sensitive
subjects. Officials will frankly admit to these audiences that one
or another measure is impossible because the Soviets would disapprove --
"We cannot permit another Czechoslovakia."
20. Moreover, the regime has been permitting non-Party groups
a greater degree of autonomy. For example, workers are free to
reject labor codes drafted by government officials and to take manage-
ment to court for breaches of contract. That the courts often decide
in favor of the workers is one of several indications that the
judiciary is more independent than under Gomulka. The Writers' Union
has been allowed to readmit members previously expelled for non-
conformist views (e.g., sympathy for Czechoslovakia), and while authors
are still subject to censorship, mildly provocative articles and
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letters to the editor are permitted (even encouraged sometimes) by
the regime.*
71. Moreover the Catholic Church is harassed less often in
Poland nowadays than in any other Communist country, including
Yugoslavia. Indeed, the Gierek regime has written off largo unpaid
back taxes previously levied on church assets, eased the rate of
taxation, and restored church titles to hundreds of sequestered
buildings and lands. Last year the regime allowed religious leaders
to invite Cardinal Krol, the Polish-born leader of the US hierarchy,
to visit Poland (Gomulka had forbidden such an invitation), and Polish
authorities helped airlift some 1,500 Polish Catholics to Porno for
special religious ceremonies.
22. Thirdly, under the rubric of a new "cadre" policy,
Gierek is limiting or at least modifying the influence of the
PUWP apparat over the training and selection of leaders. Indeed
A cane in point is the Polirh treaatrk7nt of Ruonian author
Alokoandr Sol~henitnyn. In April 1972 the Soviet nmwnpaper
Trud carried a lengthy attack reprinted from a Polish rownpapar
on Solzhenitoyn'o Au.?unt 1914. In --oat ant European oountrian,
nowadays, that would have boon the and of the ,natter. Not no
in Gierek'a Poland. A few weaka later another Polish nr,wapaper
publioliad a long latter pointing out, aionj; other things, that
it was otrcn:ga indeed for Polon to attack a book not publiohod
in Poland, and stranger still that no one in Poland had ever
heard of thin critic, one "Jerzy Hcmarc.'nki" ("Romanownki" in in
fact not only a Polish family ncm,e, but a slang c prension for
"Runoian agent"). The letter-writer irrplied that then article had
been ,orr,*,onsd in Russian and than badly translated into Polish.
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(;lerek and his spokesman continue, to warn the PUWi', publicly and
prIvately, that the rural reform is only a link in a chain of
planned reforms in other area of Polish society, including the PUWP
apparat. Training and skill. rathr;r than Party loyalty, are to be the
operative criteria in the regime's selection of "cadres." There are
signs that Gierek favors the appointment of non-Party personnel to
certain positions fornx!rly held no a matter of course by Party members.*
23. Finally, Gierek has changed virtually the entire teary at
the top. Of the 20 men i n the PUWP Politburo and Secretariat, 16
attained their present positions after Gomulka's departure in
December 1970, and Gierek himself is the only full member of the
Politburo to predate the Party changes of taovenber 1968 (when Gomulka
began to lose effective control of the Party). All but 2 of the 19
provincial-level Party secretaries have been replaced since December
1970, and about half the PUWP Central committee. Further down the
line, Party officials havo already screened about two-thirds of the
general membership (of over 2 million), and additional changes in
PUWP men>t5ershi n ;,re on the horizon.
! '1 !. /F l?)
in MY 1971 th .(J:. {.lir- l h o f .' :.' 7:4'' ; M
M .'x'...Maw akc naN,:., LiUar u R it if ?.'!a' )o :. d to I'(i? li rr that.
taa rr.r, or bank it iyar be a i'UW1'
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, mbar; in hLv ..l, r':i '::z::1 ";-'i I :rt / ;'r'cpt o" iiro "n up."rior in
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24. this infusion of neew blood has resulted In much more
than a simple change of entourages. the -.octal profile of the
Polish ruling elite has changed radically. In mid-19611, and even in
mid-1970, the top 20 In Poland rather resembled their 26 plodding
counterparts in Bulgaria, at least In terms of formal education and
years of Comnunist Party membership. Since then the Bulgarian elite
has grown longer in the tooth but otherwise retains the same basic
characteristics: less than half have college degrees or equivalent;
and all but four Joined the Communist Party before the end of
World War II. But now the educational background of the Polish
elite is unequalled in any other Conmunist regime -- five Ph.D.s,
eight others with master's degrees, the rest with diplomas from
college or Party schools. Moreover, 14 of the 20 Joined the Polish
Communist Party only after World War II had ended. Only one (Wladislaw
Kruczek, the unpopular trade union chief) was a member of the Polish
Co,t?t,,:r;ist Party before World War II began. The Postwar generation
of Coninunists has come to the fore in Poland to a degree not matched
elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
25. In estimating the likely behavior of Party leaders, age
and education can of course be misleading. Gustav Husak, the Party
First Secretary in Czechoslovakia, is much younger than Tito, and
received far more formal education than Dubcek, yet in Western terms
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Is for less "progressive" than either one. But, the Soclnl and educn-
tional level of the leadership as a whole A quite a different matter.
Measured against either their predecessors under Gomulka or their
counterparts elsewhere in Eastern Europe the Gierek men do indeed
seem to be bettor qualified, more flexible., and more imaginative.
26. They are not professional revolutionaries. but trained
administrators, searching for practical ways to improve the economic
performances and living standards of their own industrial society.
Probably because of their own impressive educational backgrounds.
they seem especially eager to consult expert opinion. whether it is
inside or outside the Communist Party or east or west of the Elbe.
They prepare their domestic policies thoroughly, and for the most
part carry them out consistently. Their approach to foreign policy
problems is somewhat analogous to their acconnodation before December
1970 to Gomulka's authority. That is, they accept present realities,
but they any opportunity for f yver4b1e change for
?he.r are alert ,. t ~c .~ - ..
themselves and for Poland.
27. Regime spokesmen frequently refer to the "activization"
of Polish foreign policy under Gierek, and presumably this rhetoric
is intended to signify Warsaw's efforts to displ4y more initiative
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in affair,. t,hnn was .tomary under Ijomulka. As .'r urvey of
the firstt, two year. of Ginrk' foreign policy would reveal, the
rhet.orir; i.,, rather inflated. ( lit for the Wnt.y with Bonn munt
he given to Gumulka, not Ginrek, 'loAt. Pole'': realize that President
Nixon's visit to Wnrsnw, howover sr.' isfying to the regime and pnpulh-
tinn. wa% a "+ideshoW to the Mti'.(ow tiri t and would not, havf? occurred
but for the 115-Soviet rtu*rting. Gierr*i 's visit to Fran:o was basically
only a .orotnonia1 rotiprocatinn for Pre?.idont do Gaulle'% rather murr_-
significant tour of Poland in 196/, tiorn"vr'r, Warsaw's enrrgr,t.ir;
pursuit of trade and aid 1grrvrncnt% with Wr;tern countries has been
successful to the extent it has 1argoly hecnu?.r? of the exCei lent credit
standing achieved in f;omulka's last five years. In power.'
Fi. Glerek and his associates have shrtwn no di spnsition to
challenge the Soviets on any major foreign policy issue, includin(t
especially those issues cnncernino Europe. On the contr4py, the
Polish leaders were distinctly uneasy over Romania's insistence at
the first round of CSC[ preparatory talks that all participants br_
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with This Gie.-r'k. rpdim+" fr ir' +,ni) otlwr that
l?nmania'', IPhavior mir,ht, causrt Mo`,'.rhl to tdflhtr.n. not. I0o' 'n. hold
over thn rest of (.astern i.urolm. Me Polls-, br,l1rve that thr+ d?omaninra
propo Itlon i unre.alistI : in any r: ':r; they accept, their junior ;tlLu-,
t.hr= I1SSl?, As a Polish diplomat. r'.e.ntIy noted, "Pound
ha: final Iy comr' to .r'rnr, wi th hi", tort'. rir(rg-.tphy and p(m(Ir. "
?.?. beyond thi',, thrwrri ,erm% to hr' a .tr(:onfl fooling in Warsaw
that Poland's alliance with the U')':R nerd riot be a; con fininq a; it
once wa . in thr wake of the i'rrrsidential vi ;its to d4o,cow and
ktar aw last year. nor pri}minent Polish c.nrsnr,ntator advanced the
intririuinrl notion that the "roll of thr .middlr powers'" (read: Poland;
"increases prcoportionately to th< proggrr: of detente in Iast-Wet
relation.." Apparently co-v, Poll; ,are evr'n ready to bel inye that the
Russian, w i l l ;r3r7r'day of ow `. a "'',o ~(3t,'?t %t:,rt'RFrr ai t+r to ..v+.u
gradually into a rather comfortable arr.an,tcne_r+t liVr! the! British
Co: '+onwealth. They arglue that Warsaw's "pro-(?ussian course" i.; no
lonr-xr incor-';tatible with other international association., including
t.ic,; with Poland's "traditional friend; in the West."
30. In the context of seeking tie. with "traditional friends"
the Gierek regirse has begun to ;hriw particular interest in "Polonia."
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the body of people pnrmanvntiy living abroad who are either
native Poles or of (lirec,t Polish extraction. slii:, does represent. a
departure from the pattern of postwar Polish foreign policy, Prior
to Gierek's accession, Warsaw was generally hostile or indifferent to
Polonia. and Polonia reciprocated in kind. lnrirrad from the rnid-1960's
onward relations with Polonia were under the. general supervision of
secret policeman tliecxyslaw Mocnar, whose jackbooted Jin(toisni offended
his presumed audience and who, in any case, devoted most of his energies
to factional struggles within the i'LJWI'.
31. Gierek made his first direct approach to Polonia in
Septen#aer 1971 -- not lone; after 1'oc,7ar' removal from power -- when
he unexpectedly showed up at the Conggre.ss of Polish Technicians and
appealed to the delegates from foreign countries "r 0. merely as Party
first Secretary. but is one who has lived abroad for 22 years and has
something in corivon with emigres." What Gierek asked for then, and
his subordinates have asked for Since, is not Just Polonia' s goodwill
but Polonia' "advice, friendly corrx!nts, and critical remarks" -- in
other words, expertise. Polonia's scientists and engineer:,, if they
are willing, should help Polish industry improve its products.
Polonia's businessmen should help market these products. And Polonia's
housewi ves and consumers should "buy Pol i :h. "
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V. As an ox-emigre Gierek may he overrating the importance
of Polonia, or at least his ability to use it to Poland's advantage.
Nevertheless, Polonia does represent a potentially rich and so far
unexploi ted resource. While the regime's statistics may be question-
able. it is clear that the Polish diat:pora is quite large relative to
the 33 million people presently in Poland.* Moreover, these Poles
abroad are located in countries which are of considerable interest to
Poland's exporters. Many of them are professional people and
(according to the regime's f'iqures) about 15,000 own businesses.
33. To gain Polonia'_, goodwill and cooperation, the regime is
offering, broadly speaking, an ethnic point of reference. Poles abroad
are now encouraricd to visit, vacation, study. even retire in the "old
country." Foreign authors of Polish ancestry are promised an oppor-
tunity to publish their works in Poland. Polonia's religious and
political leaders are now welcome. Permitting Cardinal Krol's visit
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,_?. f T 17 t1. ,,.:j'ti i}_/iiir: J, r. r.a t 1't' t'~, rTi : ?~~. ' PT, (. ..('J: : J: