ANGOLA: FITFUL MOVEMENT TOWARD THE WEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00317R000300130003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Seeret
Intelligence
Toward the West
Angola: Fitful Movement
ALA 84-10121
December 1984
Copy 279
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Angola: Fitful Movement
Toward the West
This paper was prepared by
Operations.
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Regional Issues Branch, Africa
Division, ALA,
Secret
ALA 84-10121
December 1984
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Angola: Fitful Movement
Toward the Westl 25X1
Key Judgments The Marxist regime in Angola headed by President Jose Eduardo dos
Information available Santos is dependent on critical aid from the Soviet Bloc and Cuba to
as of 19 November 1984 survive against an insurgency that now infects three-fourths of its territory.
was used in this report.
That dependence, we believe, is likely to remain as long as the insurgent
threat remains serious. We nevertheless find from a review of the regime's
statements and, to a lesser degree, its actions over the past several years
that the Angolan leadership is increasingly united in a desire to loosen its
ties to the East and establish more substantial relations with the West.
Although there are differing reasons for a tilt to the West among the ruling
elite, we believe that the dos Santos regime wants to move in this direction
because:
? It finds the model of a "nonaligned" socialist and nationalist regime with
an independent foreign policy appealing because it would allow Angola to
keep its political dignity amid economic dependence on the West and
security dependence on the East.
? It would like to acquire large amounts of Western aid, technical
assistance, and investment-over and above its already critical hard
currency oil revenues-to revive Angola's moribund economy.
? It seeks US political support to press South Africa to cease its direct at-
tacks on Angola and its indirect intervention through Pretoria's aid to the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).
? It wants West European help in persuading Washington and Pretoria to
stop making a settlement in Namibia contingent on a Cuban troop
withdrawal from Angola.
? It seeks a sharp reduction of Cuban and Soviet Bloc influence in Angolan
internal affairs.
Over the past three years, Luanda has taken several cautious political steps
and made direct approaches to the West to explore the possibility of
initiating a more evenhanded policy. These have included engaging in
direct negotiations with the United States and South Africa and making
numerous overtures-especially to Portugal, France, Brazil, and Italy-to
cultivate political and economic relations.
Despite the differences that have so deeply divided the regime in the past,
we believe that President dos Santos has developed a consensus behind this
policy that allows him to proceed cautiously toward enhancing ties with the
West. His key constraint, we believe, is the imperative that he not move so
fast that he threatens Soviet Bloc and Cuban military support as long as it
remains critical to his regime's survival.
Secret
ALA 84-10121
December 1984
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The Soviets and Cubans, for their part, have attempted to limit Luanda's
move toward the West by manipulating political figures at senior levels of
the regime and by using their military and economic assistance as a tool to
influence the government, the military, and the economy. Moscow's carrot-
and-stick tactics in turn have heightened Angolan unhappiness with Cuban
and Soviet Bloc aid, which they believe is overpriced, heavyhanded, and of
poor quality. Nevertheless, continuing military pressure on Luanda from
South Africa and UNITA has left Angola increasingly dependent on
Moscow and Havana.
The pace of Angola's opening to the West has also been checked by the
limited Western response to Angolan appeals for aid, trade, and invest-
ment. Although Western companies have increased their participation in
Angola's oil sector and there has been a modest increase in Western trade
and assistance, these have not been enough to rejuvenate the country's
economy or to displace the nearly 10,000-man Soviet Bloc and Cuban
civilian advisory presence in Angola.
Although Luanda has improved its political ties with the West, it has not
been able to realize its principal objectives. Western pressure probably
played a role in convincing South Africa to undertake a partial pullback
from its occupation of southern Angola, but Luanda has failed to break
South Africa's insistence on a linkage between a withdrawal of Cuban
troops from Angola and a settlement in Namibia. Nor has Luanda been
able to use its new ties with the West to bring relief from the expanding
UNITA insurgency.
The MPLA regime's desire to cut back its ties with the Soviets and Cubans
serves the US goal of mediating a Namibian settlement that opens the door
for a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Indeed, Luanda's increas-
ingly open expressions of dissatisfaction with its fate as a Soviet dependent
represent a potential erosion in the Soviet position on southern Africa-
particularly when coupled with the more obvious reorientation of Mozam-
bique's policies away from Moscow in early 1984. Nevertheless, UNITA's
mounting pressure and the ever-present South African threat limit how far
and fast the regime can move-either in the short term toward a package
southern African settlement or in its long-term quest for a more balanced
position between East and West.
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Quest for Western Ties
Desire To Disengage From Moscow and Havana
3
Military Constraints
6
Continuing Price of Dependence
7
Prospects for Nonalignment
7
Implications for the United States
8
Probing the West
11
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Scope Note This research paper reviews Angola's halting efforts over the past several
years to establish new ties with the West and examines what we believe are
the elements of Luanda's long-range foreign policy agenda. Although the
dos Santos regime's foreign policies are now dominated by pressing
national security objectives-namely, maintaining critical Soviet and
Cuban military assistance to combat military pressure from the UNITA
insurgency and South Africa-this study suggests the direction the dos
Santos regime might take if the immediate pressure on it were relaxed.
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Angola: Fitful Movement
Toward the West
The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) regime is today heavily dependent on the
Soviet Bloc and Cuba because of the critical assist-
ance in arms and manpower they provide against the
growing UNITA insurgency. Although this relation-
ship is an uncomfortable one for most of the regime's
leaders who dislike Moscow and Havana's deep intru-
sion into Angola's life, it is likely that the dependency
will continue until the threat from both the domestic
insurgency and South Africa subsides.
we belie
many key members of the regime would like to loosen,
although not end, their ties to Moscow and Havana
and to move somewhat closer to the West in an effort
to achieve what they consider a more genuine degree
of nonalignment.
Many Angolan officials, especially the regime's senior
members, had extensive exposure during their long
struggle for power to countries like Algeria, Zambia,
Congo, and Yugoslavia and found their model com-
pelling. To the Angolans, these countries represent
one-party, socialist regimes not tied closely either to
Washington or Moscow-attributes consistent with
Angola's principles of nationalism and socialism. The
regime's interest in a more middle-of-the-road ap-
proach was expressed by a number of its senior
officials. According to a Western diplomatic report,
Angola's Foreign Minister in mid-1977-a post then
filled by now President Jose Eduardo dos Santos-
told a Belgian diplomat that his country sought
"active nonalignment" and claimed that Angola re-
fused to be "integrated into any bloc." Later in the
same year, the MPLA
party congress, although emphasizing the importance
of ties with the "socialist bloc," also stressed the goal
of obtaining strict nonalignment "in the Yugoslav
After some apparent hesitation, President Neto en-
dorsed a more balanced international approach with
increasing enthusiasm until his death in 1979.
ing to one informed observer, to cultivate special ties
with Yugoslavia and Romania
Luanda's desire to achieve a more genuine degree of
nonalignment is now a standard feature in Angolan
foreign policy pronouncements. Senior Angolan offi-
cials who make frequent trips to a variety of non-
aligned states appear to hold Yugoslavia and Algeria
in particularly high regard. Dos Santos, who became
President after Neto's death in 1979,
would prefer a status
he has also cited Yugosla-
via as a model. He has made several trips to Belgrade
since assuming the presidency, including two trips in
1984, during which he publicly praised Yugoslavia as
a model for Angolan foreign policy. For its part,
Belgrade was a staunch supporter of the MPLA
during the independence struggle and appears to
believe it has a unique relationship with Angola. It
provides medical care for government cadre and gives
the regime political, economic, and military assist-
ance.
We believe that the MPLA came to power deeply
wary of economic and political ties with the West.
ern Europe.
sense."
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Motives
The government began to develop formal relations
with a growing number of Western countries by the
late 1970s as President Neto became increasingly
disenchanted with his socialist backers, because, we
believe, of the poor quality of aid they offered and
their political meddling in Angola's internal affairs.
Angola was interested in a major opening to the West,
although it would still look to Cuba for critical
military assistance. One key step was the publication
in 1979 of a new foreign investment law that covered
most aspects of economic activity. Within a frame-
work of "socialist pragmatism," the law allowed
repatriation of profits, provided guarantees of com-
pensation in the event of nationalization, and granted
a number of exemptions from tax and customs duties.
Angola's opening to the West appeared to diminish
after Neto's death but regained momentum in late
1980 after an MPLA party congress evidently decided
formally to expand cooperation with the West. A
variety of reporting in subsequent months reflected
the regime's new commitment:
? According to diplomatic reports, Foreign Minister
Paulo Jorge told the French Foreign Minister in
January 1981 that Angola had recently decided to
expand ties with France and cited the then recent
party congress as authorizing the move. The empha-
sis in the discussion was on economic and technical
relations.
Another key reason that Angola sought closer West-
ern ties almost certainly was its strong desire to
relieve military pressure, both real and potential, from
South Africa, UNITA, and-Luanda believed-the
United States.
the Angolan leadership was extremely
worried about the southern African policy of the
Reagan administration. Luanda believed its fears
were confirmed in early 1981 when the State Depart-
ment asked Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment,
which in effect bans US covert action in Angola. In
our view, this move prompted the Angolans to place a
high priority on influencing Washington's European
allies to forestall a possible American reintervention
in the Angolan civil war. Luanda's concern about
American intentions also apparently prompted dos
Santos to seek direct contact with the United States in
December 1981.
Angola sought influence in the West to use as a tool
against Washington and Pretoria on other issues as
well, and, we believe, it singled out France-a mem-
ber of the Western Contact Group on Namibia (along
with Britain, Canada, West Germany, and the United
States)-whose new socialist government seemed like-
ly to be especially sympathetic to the Angolan posi-
tion-as a special target in its lobbying effort. One
key goal was to pressure Washington and Pretoria to
cease linking the proposal for a withdrawal of Cuban
troops from Angola with the UN-approved plan for
granting Namibia independence. Another was to per-
suade West European countries to cease all aid to
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UNITA. After a major South African invasion of
southern Angola in August 1981, Luanda also tried to
bring West European pressure on Pretoria to with-
draw its forces.
By mid-1982 Angola's effort to cultivate the West
was well under way. Senior Angolan officials had held
high-level meetings with officials from a variety of
West European capitals and appeared to focus espe-
cially on France, Portugal, Italy, and Brazil. Standard
features in these meetings were a request for diplo-
matic support against South Africa and the United
States and a long list of Angolan requests for econom-
ic assistance. They sought Western economic coopera-
tion in some cases in areas where the Soviet Bloc and
Cuba played a dominant role. In Portugal, France,
Brazil, and possibly other Western countries, Angolan
officials also sought various forms of military assist-
ance, ranging from training to the provision of hard-
ware The
government also secured involvement rom ri ish,
French, Italian, Yugoslav, Brazilian, Portuguese, and
US firms in offshore oil exploration.'
Results
We believe that Luanda views the results of its efforts
to court and cajole the West into an enhanced
political and economic commitment to Angola as
being, at best, mixed. Trade with the West has
increased but has not supplanted Angola's dependence
on the Soviet Bloc for many of the goods it needs to
import. The only economic sector that has significant-
ly expanded in the first half of the 1980s as a result of
Western involvement has been oil production. To a
lesser degree
Western and Japanese firms have relieved t e re-
gime's dependence on Cuba and the Soviet Bloc in the
fishing industry.
In our view, the regime's inability to engage more
Western economic involvement has been the result of
several factors. In some cases, the Soviets and Cubans
have actively sought to discredit Western businessmen
as spies and agents of insurgent groups,
Perhaps more important, the civil
war has inhibited investment in agriculture and
proving vulnerable to UNITA attack.
threatens to shut down the Western-dominated min-
ing industry. With the sabotage of an oil refinery in
Luanda in late 1982 and the destruction of an oil
facility in Cabinda in mid-1984, even the oil sector is
Outside of the mining and oil sectors, the climate for
Western investment is not very hospitable.
ventures are still sub-
ject to redtape, the whims of corrupt and incompetent
officials, and rom coun-
tries that may have fallen into passing disfavor with
the regime-occasional politically inspired hostility.
Imports, meanwhile, remain limited by Angola's
chronic hard currency shortages because of the finan-
cial demands of the war against UNITA
Improved political ties with the West have also failed,
so far, to realize Luanda's principal objectives. Large-
ly because of US pressure on South Africa, Pretoria
has ceased its direct attacks on Angola and has staged
a partial pullback from Angolan territory. Western
countries, however, have not forcefully pressed South
Africa to drop its insistence that implementation of a
UN-approved plan for Namibian independence be
accompanied by a Cuban troop withdrawal from
Angola. Although the regime continues to negotiate
with the United States and South Africa for a
Namibian settlement and an end to Pretoria's direct
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and indirect military pressure, it is also being forced 25X1
to negotiate the key question of the Cuban troop
presence in Angola it has long sought to avoid.
Desire To Disengage From Moscow and Havana
Luanda, in our view, has been driven to explore closer
ties with the West in part by a growing dislike of its
dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba. On the
one hand, the regime realized that it needs Soviet
Bloc and Cuban military support to survive against
increasingly acute military pressure from the South
African-backed UNITA insurgency and to withstand
the threat of another South African invasion of its
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territory. On the other, by the late 1970s, a deeply
rooted hostile impulse toward the Soviet Bloc and
Cuba pervaded much of the ruling party, the govern-
ment, the military, and Angolan society.
Disenchanted Leaders
Luanda's initial thrust away from the Soviet Bloc and
Cuba was led by Angola's late President Neto. An
avowed Marxist, Neto initially appeared to seek close,
almost exclusive ties only with the Soviet Bloc. We
believe, however, that his foreign policy views signifi-
cantly changed before his death.
many in the MPLA,
including Neto, suspected that the Soviets had backed
an unsuccessful coup against him in 1977-a suspi-
cion we are unable to substantiate-even though the
Cubans, after some delay, used their forces to put it
down. Neto also complained frequently about the
quality and quantity of Soviet and Cuban aid and
appeared to be seeking better relations with the West.
When Neto died in Moscow during an official visit in
1979, we believe that many in the government sus-
pected that the Soviets had killed him.
The decline of Soviet prestige at senior levels of the
government appears to have been arrested temporarily
after the assumption of the Presidency by dos Santos.
Dos Santos had been trained as an engineer in the
Soviet Union, had a Soviet wife-whom he has since
divorced-and apparently did not initially share
Dos Santos's hostility has a parently grown since
then. In January 1984,
he complained that the
Soviets were treating Angola like a colony. In April,
he decried the
total penetration of the MPLA Central Committee by
Cuban agents or toadies.
dos Santos complained in June that the
Soviets were exploiting Angola rather than contribut-
ing to the country's development. Although some of
dos Santos's statements may have been made to
convince a non-Soviet Bloc audience of his receptivity
to Western blandishments, we believe they reflect the
desire of the majority of the Angolan leadership to
slacken-although by no means end-the country's
relations with its Communist protectors.
Problems With Aid
One of the most serious causes of strain in Luanda's
relations with Havana and Moscow has centered on
Cuban and Soviet Bloc involvement in the Angolan
economy. the Ango-
lans have long had a litany of complaints about Soviet
aid: it is insufficient, shoddy, overpriced, exploitive,
and delivered with a heavy hand. Soviet Bloc and
Cuban advisers are typically viewed as corrupt, crude,
patronizing, and incompetent.
Luanda has responded by trying to limit Soviet Bloc
and Cuban participation in their economy. As early as
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Neto's distrust of Moscow
By 1981, however, we believe dos Santos had adopted
his predecessor's more critical view of Moscow and
Havana.
he went against the expressed wish of his Soviet
advisers to seek more diplomatic contact with the
1979, the government attempted to diminish Cuban
influence by sending a large number of advisers home
Angola refused to renew a fishing
Spain, and Japan for assistance.
the Angolans have
ment with Moscow.
sought to limit Soviet access to their fishing grounds
and have resisted signing a long-term fishing agree-
Angola has sought to block or to set strict limits on
Eastern Bloc participation in other economic sectors.
It has attempted to limit Soviet involvement in the
petroleum sector to the provision of onshore pipelines
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and storage facilities,
exploration and drilling have largely been under-
taken as Angolan joint ventures with Western firms.
Angola also has turned West instead of East for
assistance in diamond mining, apparently keeping the
Soviet Bloc largely out of that sector. In civilian
aviation, we believe Angolan authorities have tried
purchasing Western aircraft rather than Soviet equip-
ment, which is inefficient and requires too many
Soviet advisers.
Angola also has balked at Soviet involvement in long-
term capital aid projects.
a member of an Angolan delegation in
Moscow in late 1982 was tricked by the Soviets into
signing an agreement to proceed with the construction
of the Capanda hydroelectric dam on the Cuanza
River rather than an agreement to proceed with a
feasibility study, which the delegation's leader had
intended to sign. The Angolans evidently preferred
aid in agricultural and light industry instead of Soviet
involvement in a major industrial project.
Luanda has subsequently
resisted completing arrangements for the dam.
Another major source of irritation has been Soviet
and Cuban dunning of Luanda for payment of its debt
for commercial and military transactions.
Angola repeatedly
has asked that portions of its debt be deferred,
renegotiated, or forgiven. Frequently, bitter debates
also have arisen over the cost, quality, and terms of
both military and nonmilitary assistance.
Luanda
decided in May 1983 to treat a portion of its debt to
the Soviets as a grant and simply refused to repay it.
Moscow has used its ability to grant or withhold arms,
ammunition, spare parts, and other material request-
ed by Luanda as a carrot and stick to manipulate
Angolan Government policy. In a meeting with Soviet
officials in Moscow in early 1982, the Soviets denied
an Angolan request for sophisticated antiaircraft
weapons and refused many requests for subsidies,
according to diplomatic reporting. In the face of an
expanding UNITA insurgency and repeated South
African attacks deep into Angolan territory, Moscow
finally stepped up its military assistance to Angola
-
and apparently made concessions on aid terms. F
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We believe Moscow and Havana view Luanda's quest
for better Western ties with a mixture of hostility and
pragmatism. On a tactical level, they undoubtedly see
the necessity of some ties. Western oil companies
provide hard currency that allows Luanda to purchase
military equipment and services from Moscow and its
allies. The West also provides technical assistance and
financial aid that the Soviet Bloc is unable to furnish;
for example, Moscow has subcontracted a large por-
tion of the Capanda Dam project to a Brazilian firm.
We also believe that the Soviets and Cubans resigned
themselves in 1984-after several years of resist-
ance-to Luanda's effort to negotiate a package
settlement with the United States and South Africa
on Namibia. They apparently have not offered the
process any encouragement, however, and we suspect
they have strongly discouraged compromises with the
West or Pretoria that they feel might jeopardize the
regime's survival, or its ties with Moscow and Ha-
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Soviet and Cuban pragmatism appears to have sharp
limits, nevertheless, and runs counter to their instinct
to keep tight control over a regime they regard largely
as a client. We believe the main thrust of their policy
toward Angola remains bent largely on discouraging,
rather than promoting, contact with the West. Their
tactics for doing so have varied with circumstances.
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Military Constraints
The most powerful tool Moscow and Havana have in
keeping Luanda loyal has been the weight of their
military relationship. Because of military pressure
from South Africa and UNITA, that relationship has
grown significantly even as Luanda began its fitful
drive to improve relations with the West. Pretoria's
large-scale invasion of southern Angola in 1981 re-
sulted in South African occupation of a large tract of
territory that served as a base for frequent strikes
farther to the north. In addition, the UNITA insur-
gency began to spread to three-fourths of Angola's
territory in late 1982 and increased even more dra-
matically in effectiveness in August 1983 after
UNITA's capture of the Cuban and Angolan garrison
at Cangamba.
The response has included a major infusion of sophis-
ticated Soviet weaponry into Angola since 1982.
Luanda has acquired advanced early warning radar
systems, sophisticated antiaircraft missiles and artil-
lery, 14 MIG-23s, about 80 to 90 more MIG-21s, at
least 12 MI-25 attack helicopters, at least five
SU-22s, and a wide variety of support equipment.
Along with these new weapon systems have come
increased numbers of Soviet and Cuban military
advisers the MI-25s
are flown by u an pilots with Angolan copilots.
Some MIG-21s and all MIG-23s and SU-22s are
apparently flown by Cubans. The Soviets also have
expanded significantly their fleet of AN-26 transport
aircraft, which Soviet pilots use to provide logistic
support for Angolan and Cuban forces. In addition,
the Cuban expeditionary force has increased steadily
since mid-1981 as South African and UNITA pres-
sure has grown, raising the total to about 35,000.
Political Machinations
The Soviets and Cubans have attempted to manipu-
late the MPLA by backing a Mulatto-dominated
faction in the party headed by veteran ideologue
Lucio Lara,
This group has supported positions favored by Mos-
cow and Havana: maintaining strong ties with the
Eastern Bloc, pursuing a military victory against
UNITA, providing unswerving support to the South-
West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in its
struggle to take over Namibia, and resisting South
African aggression on Angolan territory.
In our view, some members of the hardline group,
including Lara, are nationalists who dislike their
country's heavy dependence on Moscow and Havana
but believe that a close military relationshp with them
is necessary to the regime's survival until Namibia
has been made independent and the threat from
UNITA is largely ended. Other hardliners-who and
how many is not clear-probably are controlled to
varying degrees by the Soviets, Cubans, or East
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The Soviets and Cubans also have attempted to
reduce the influence of individuals and groups they
believe oppose them and their friends within the
MPLA. Their key target, until its demise in the past
year or so, was a faction identified in a variety of
reporting as the "Catete group," a loose coalition of
black nationalists-many of whom were born in the
town of Catete in eastern Angola. This faction had
long been openly hostile to Moscow, Havana, and the
hardline Mulattoes. The Catete group also urged a
negotiated settlement with UNITA leader Savimbi
and favored stronger ties with the West
Through a series of moves between 1982 and this
year-the downgrading of both Catete and Lara
faction members, the creation of special governmental
bodies that report to him, and the arrest or ouster of
high officials who attacked him personally-dos San-
tos has strengthened his own power base so that he
has become the dominant figure in the MPLA. At the
same time, in our judgment, he has adopted many of
the policy positions of the now largely defunct Catete
group, and his effort to increase his relations with the
West is apparently backed by a consensus within the
MPLA. Even so, we believe Soviet and Cuban pres-
sure in the past three years has forced dos Santos to
be cautious about loosening Angola's military rela-
tionship with Cuba and the Soviet Bloc, although it
remains in peril from UNITA and, indirectly, from
South Africa
Ithe Soviets and
Cubans have sought to denigrate a number of close
associates of the President who they believe are
friendly to the West. In one recent instance, we
believe Moscow launched a campaign of disinforma-
tion designed to implicate Kito Rodrigues, one of dos
Santos's key backers and an architect and principal
participant in Luanda's negotiations with South Afri-
ca, in an oil scandal. We also believe they have been
critical of presidential adviser Jose Maria and Vice
Foreign Minister Venancio da Moura
torial waters.
Continuing Price of Dependence
One result of Cuban and Soviet Bloc pressure has
been that Soviet, East European, and Cuban advisers
continue to perform numerous technical assistance
functions-more, we believe, than the regime would
like. such advisers
in a variety of government ministries, although their
numbers may have diminished somewhat since the
early 1980s. We believe Moscow retains about 1,500
civilian advisers and economic technicians in Angola
while the Cuban and East European civilian advisory
presence is roughly 8,000. Soviet Bloc and Cuban
advisers still conduct numerous training programs for
Angolan youth and sponsor a variety of aid projects
and joint ventures throughout the country. A Soviet
fishing fleet also continues to overfish Angolan terri-
Angola also continues to pay a political price that
tends to compromise its independence in international
relations:
? Luanda dutifully supports the Soviet Union in inter-
national forums; it followed the Soviet lead in
boycotting the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los
Angeles, for example.
? Angolan's media still lavish praise on Luanda's
Communist allies.
? Luanda routinely exchanges political, military, and
"people's" delegations with Moscow, Havana, and
Eastern Europe.
? Angolan military facilities continue to service Soviet
aircraft and naval vessels that patrol the South
Atlantic.
Dos Santos's Views and Role
We believe the evidence is strong that dos Santos
remains personally committed to nonalignment and
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all that this implies-an economic and political rap-
prochement with the West and a slackening, although
by no means an ending, of ties with the East:
e hoped foreign investment wou
save his country. He claimed that he intended to
select the best investment offers without worrying
about maintaining a balance between East and
West.
? During his trip to Western Europe in September,
the major theme of his meetings with Western
leaders was expanded economic relations, according
to diplomatic reports.
? By taking the Foreign Ministry portfolio in late
October, he has become more directly involved in
the Namibian negotiations and, in our view, is more
firmly identified with the effort to reach a modus
vivendi with South Africa and a rapprochement
with the West.
Opposition to the opening to the West and to a
reduction in Cuban and Soviet influence has appar-
ently diminished among senior officials in the MPLA.
The Mulatto-led hardliners appear to lack the pow-
er-and perhaps, in the case of some, the desire-to
thwart dos Santos's efforts toward greater nonalign-
ment. They probably still serve as a drag, neverthe-
less, on how fast the regime can go in striking a
compromise with the West, and we believe they hold a
veto over how far Luanda will go to reach an under-
standing with Pretoria or, especially, UNITA.F_
In addition to dos Santos and some senior party
leaders, the impulse for a move away from the Soviet
Bloc and toward the West appears to be firmly rooted
in the party rank and file, the government, the
military, and among many of the Angolan people.
Economic planners,
continue to have a strong preference for dealing
with the West over the Soviet Bloc. Military lead-
ers-especially groups of younger officers sometimes
described as the "Young Captains"-frequently have
expressed a desire to jettison their Cuban and Soviet
Outlook
We believe the dos Santos government is attempting
to obtain a package Namibian settlement that it
believes would curtail South African support for
UNITA, rid southern Angola of South African mili-
tary forces, reduce the Cuban troop presence in
Angola, and end South African occupation of Namib-
ia. In our view, the Angolans probably believe that, if
those goals are achieved, they would be able to
neutralize UNITA through a combination of military
coercion and negotiations.
Under those conditions, we believe that Angola would
court even more assiduously Western aid, trade, and
investment. Although the West's ability to provide aid
would undoubtedly not match Angolan desires, we
believe trade and assistance from the West would
increase significantly over a five- to 10-year period as
internal security and communication improved.
At the same time, we would expect the regime to
attempt to maintain good relations with the Soviet
Bloc. It would, however, attempt to contain and in
many areas roll back Cuban and Soviet Bloc econom-
ic and political penetration.
So long as the Angolan civil war continues, however,
Luanda will make only slow progress in building on
the limited concrete gains of the past four years.
Under these circumstances, the regime will be unable
to reduce significantly its dependence on the Soviets
and Cubans for its survival. We believe Luanda will,
even in these conditions, continue to seek ways to
relieve its dependence on Moscow and Havana and to
expand its ties with the West. So long as the war
continues, however, Luanda's alternatives will remain
severely limited.
Luanda's fitful movement toward the West and the
MPLA regime's desire to cut back its ties with the
Soviets and Cubans serve the US goal of mediating a
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Namibian settlement that opens the door for a with-
drawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Indeed, Luan-
da's increasingly open expressions of dissatisfaction
with its fate as a Soviet dependent represent an
erosion in the Soviet position in southern Africa-
particularly when coupled with the more obvious
reorientation of Mozambique's policies away from
Moscow in early 1984.
Nevertheless, UNITA's mounting pressure and the
ever-present South African threat limit how far and
fast the regime can move-either in the short term
toward a package southern African settlement or in
its long-term quest for nonalignment. In a sense,
Luanda's dilemma in realigning its foreign relations
gives truth to the adage that actions speak louder than
words: even as Luanda talked in the early 1980s of
improving its ties with the West, its unswerving
support of SWAPO attacks in Namibia at least
partially provoked the military pressure on Angola
that makes it so difficult for Luanda to move now to
reduce its dependency on Moscow and Havana.
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Appendix
Probing the West
Thwarted Rapprochement With Portugal
Political relations between Portugal and Angola have
foundered badly since Luanda's ardent courtship,
which began in 1981, ended abruptly in early 1983
following Angolan charges that Lisbon harbors repre-
sentatives of UNITA. Although Luanda and Lisbon
recently have held two separate rounds of high-level
talks designed to improve bilateral relations,
Blossoming Relations
Portugal was one of the first Western countries to
which Luanda turned in 1981 for diplomatic support,
investment capital, and technical advisers. The Ango-
lans found the Portuguese receptive-lured, we be-
lieve, by the potential economic benefit, a lingering
sense of responsibility toward its former colony, and
the desire to resume the role of an international actor
of consequence. In March 1982 the two sides signed
an aid protocol in Luanda covering agreements on
science, culture, health, agriculture, transportation,
petroleum, and other areas of cooperation
By the end of
the year, Portugal also had agreed to participate in
still other economic projects, including the financing
and construction of a dam expansion project on the
Cuanza River
Throughout 1982 and early 1983, the two countries
and credit facilities.
discussed other ways to expand mutual cooperation
the Angolans also pressed Lisbon for counterinsur-
gency training in Portugal and the dispatch of a
military team to Angola.
cast a pall over the growing rapprochement
A Pall Sets In
The first problems in the burgeoning relationship
arose over rumors in the Portuguese press that South
Africa, with the tacit approval of the Portuguese
Government, was plotting with Angolan dissidents in
Lisbon to overthrow the government in Luanda. Al-
though the Portuguese adamantly denied the story, it
Bilateral ties began to deteriorate sharply,
when UNITA established
The relationship progressed further the next month
when Portuguese President Eanes was received warm-
ly during a visit to Luanda. The two governments
signed more cooperation agreements-on tourism,
technical aid, university exchanges, and transporta-
In May 1982 an Angolan delegation headed by
economic czar Lopo do Nascimento visited Lisbon
where it discussed a possible Portuguese oil-explora-
tion program in Angola, requested that Portugal
provide mining technicians, and discussed other pro-
grams for aid,
a front organization in Lisbon in early 1983. In the
wake of an escalating insurgency that was spreading
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the UNITA front to begin attacking Lisbon in the
press and in private for its "aid" to the insurgents.
Other problems also began to beset the relationship. A
socialist government came to power in Portugal in
June 1983 headed by Mario Soares, who knew and
was impressed by UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi,
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according to a source of the US Embassy in Lisbon.
Prime Minister Soares soon seriously offended the
Angolan Government by attempting to mediate be-
tween UNITA and the MPLA, according to a diplo-
matic report. Another problem may have been that
President Eanes-who was at odds with the Soares
government-had led the Angolans to believe they
would receive more aid than Soares was willing to
offer. Moreover, as one of Europe's poorest countries,
Portugal had only limited resources to invest in
Angola regardless of the ambitions of the Portuguese
Government. At the height of the courtship in mid-
1982, Angolan imports from Portugal had declined
significantly over the same period in 1981. F____1
Portugal also apparently had not provided as many
technical advisers as Luanda expected at the height of
the rapprochement. The chill over UNITA probably
had been the main reason why the number of Portu-
guese advisers was still relatively small, but Soviet
and Cuban disinformation also may have had some
effect. the Portuguese
believe that Moscow and Havana were attempting to
undermine Lisbon's position by claiming Portuguese
advisers were American spies or agents of the insur-
gents.
the Soviets and Cubans complained vigorously to the
Angolans about their opening to the West.
By late 1983 Angola announced it would undertake
"economic reprisals" against Portugual and formed a
high-level committee to review all technical assistance
agreements with Lisbon. Angolan enterprises were
told to look elsewhere for purchases, and the Portu-
guese oil company PETROGAL was excluded from
participation in an offshore oil development project,
contrary to previous promises.
the Angolans considere severing diplomatic
relations and moving their Embassy from Lisbon to
Madrid. They began to court Spain in mid-1983,
apparently as an alternative source of Western aid
and assistance and we believe to pressure Lisbon
further. Plans to shift the Embassy apparently have
been scrapped.
Lisbon was perplexed by
Luanda's about-face. Portugal denied that it had any
official contact with UNITA and, after a period of
puzzling over how to react, began a sustained effort to
revive relations. Portuguese Foreign Minister Gama
traveled to Luanda in February 1984 where he was
lectured by Angolan Foreign Minister Jorge about his
country's alleged support for UNITA
Relations seemed to improve briefly last spring. In
April a Portuguese official announced that Lisbon
would increase its existing line of credit to Angola by
$60 million to finance consumer goods and that
Portugal was negotiating an increased line of credit
equal to $50 million for the purchase of other goods.
The offer of new aid apparently brought a brief
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however, dos Santos personally criticized the Soares
government in a public interview, leaving Lisbon once
again bewildered.
Current Relations
Subsequent high-level political exchanges have appar-
ently been fruitless. A meeting in September between
an Angolan Politburo member and Soares, according
to a Western diplomatic report, provided an opportu-
nity for Soares to stress again his interest in better ties
as well as to make the point that his government
would not muzzle the Portuguese press or abridge the
rights of Portuguese citizens. President Eanes, with-
out the approval of the Soares government, also sent
an emissary to dos Santos in mid-September to
express a desire for better relations
Eanes's overture, however, was greet-
ed with strong expressions of anger over Portuguese
support for UNITA.
Bilateral trade has improved. Portuguese exports to
Angola during the first half of 1984 were four times
higher than in the same period of 1982 and twice as
high as in the same period of 1983. According to
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recent public statements by dos Santos, economic and
trade relations are "normal," although the Portuguese
were excluded from the Luanda trade fair in October.
Discussions about Portuguese military aid to Angola
that began in 1982 have proved unproductive. Al-
though the Portuguese might have played a limited
advisory role in training the Angolan Army, Lisbon
did not, in our view, have the will or ability to take
over the role of the Cubans. The only military assist-
ance the Portuguese apparently provide is given unof-
ficially by a group of some 60 to 80 reserve or retired,
leftwing military officers and mechanics who serve in
Angola in a training capacity
The recent showing of a documentary on Portuguese
television favorable to Savimbi is likely to be another
stumblingblock in bilateral relations. Angola had
strenuously opposed its showing, and, under pressure
from the Portuguese Communist Party and the gov-
ernment, its airing had been delayed three times.
Soares has publicly expressed his disapproval of the
showing, but we doubt that his protest will lessen
Angolan resentment.
Prospects
Lisbon will be likely to continue to seek closer ties
with Luanda, but we do not believe that the Soares
government will take any significant measures against
UNITA representatives in Portugual. Portuguese law
prohibits the kind of repression of UNITA sympathiz-
ers-many of whom have dual Angolan-Portuguese
citizenship-that Angola demands. Soares, an ardent
defender of human rights, would be unlikely to stretch
the law for the sake of improving relations with
Luanda. Even a move to take legal measures to curb
UNITA activities could pit Soares against the press,
the opposition Center Democrats, and members of his
own coalition partner, the Social Democrats.
We see little prospect that the rapprochement will
develop as both sides had hoped in 1982. With
UNITA representatives still operating freely in Portu-
gal, we believe that Luanda will continue to maintain
a chill in its relations with Lisbon. In the two years
since UNITA began its dramatic expansion through-
out three-fourths of Angola, the insurgents' isolation
from external aid and refuge has become an even
more important goal in Luanda's foreign policy[
We believe, however, that modest trade relations
between Angola and Portugal are likely to continue
growing despite the strained political ties. Aid ties are
likely to remain limited both by political difficulties
and, in the longer run, by Portugal's resources.
France is one of the key European countries Angola
has cultivated in its quest for expanded Western ties.
The relationship has yielded economic benefits, but
only limited political fruit
Political Goals
In the first years after coming to power, the MPLA
regime was cool to France, believing that Paris was
continuing to supply UNITA with arms. The two
countries established relations in 1977, but Angola
delayed sending an ambassador. to Paris until early
1980, mainly because of French involvement in sup-
pressing the Angolan-backed dissident invasions of
Zaire's Shaba Region in 1977 and,1978.
Angolan relations with France began to improve in
early 1981 during a visit to Luanda by French
Foreign Minister Francois Poncet. According to a
Western diplomatic report, the Angolans told him
that the MPLA congress in December 1980 decided
to develop relations with France in economic and
technical fields. The Angolans,'moreover, avoided
raising past disa reements that had retarded im-
proved relations.
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The relationship started to pick up even more after
President Mitterrand took office in May 1981. He
and several of his top advisers were concerned about
Soviet and Cuban influence in southern Africa and
believed that subtle diplomacy, economic support, and
occasional military assistance could wean "progres-
sive" regimes-most notably Angola-from their
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Communist patrons. As a result, the new government
shifted the direction of France's African policy by
proclaiming a greater distance between itself and
South Africa.
Luanda apparently attempted to trade on the new
French policy by prompting Paris to pressure the
United States to abandon the idea of linking a Cuban
troop withdrawal from Angola to a settlement in
Namibia. As a member of the five-nation Western
"Contact" Group charged by the United Nations to
find a settlement in Namibia, Paris appeared particu-
larly well positioned to play such a role
Although we believe French policymakers largely
ignored Angolan political advice, the Angolans may
believe their pressure on France succeeded. French
officials publicly condemned linkage, and, in late
1983, Paris-apparently at the initiative of Foreign
Minister Cheysson-dropped out of participation in
the Contact Group. The French action, however, did
not lead to the removal of the concept of linkage from
the ongoing negotiations on southern Africa.
The bilateral political relationship, meanwhile, has
not been particularly close. The reason, we believe,
may be traceable in part to Angolan bungling. The
Angolans, for example, angered Paris when they
issued a "communique" during the visit of a senior
French delegation to Luanda in 1981 that they had
failed to clear with their guests.
The French appear divided over how best to promote
a regional settlement. The Foreign Ministry's prefer-
ence for distancing France from any effort to link a
Cuban withdrawal to a Namibian settlement reflects
a belief that such efforts constitute external interfer-
ence in Angolan affairs and give South Africa a
pretext to remain in Namibia. On the other hand, US
Embassy reporting indicates that key Mitterrand
aides believe that a prior understanding on the Cuban
troop issue may be necessary to reach a settlement on
Namibia and that concerted Western pressure may
move Luanda toward a compromise. To increase that
pressure, we believe that France may be giving some
One result of French restraint has been Paris's reluc-
tance to sell arms to Angola.
Luanda has attempted to purchase French
military hardware, especially helicopters. Although
France may have sold Angola some helicopters-
which are also necessary to Luanda's oil industry-we
believe Paris has generally resisted arms sales for
Economic Cooperation
The Angolans have had more success with France as a
key source of investment and economic and technical
assistance. The two countries signed a cooperation
agreement in 1980 and have since implemented it in a
variety of areas.
Angola and France subsequently signed four aid
protocols funded at $300 million each. These are
largely for export credits and are insured up to 85
percent by a French Government agency.
Among the projects funded have been a technical aid
program for reviving Angola's nearly defunct coffee
industry, two technical schools to train mechanics and
electricians, and a fish-processing plant. We believe
the two countries have also undertaken a variety of
other aid projects and have provided a limited number
of scholarships for Angolan students to study in
France.
Angola also plans to invite France to participate in a
project that will expand the country's civilian air
traffic control system
French trade with Angola is largely one sided in
France's favor. France is second only to Portugal as a
source of Angola's imports from non-Communist
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Courting Brazil and Argentina
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By far the most significant French economic involve-
ment in Angola has been in oil exploration and
production. A French company, Elf-Aquitaine, is the
operator of a foreign consortium that is lifting oil
from an offshore field. Elf is expanding its exploration
in this block with credit from a consortium of French
banks arranged in the spring of 1984
Elf also has a 25-percent share in
another offshore field, and another French company,
TOTAL, has a 17.5-percent share in a third field.
Angola, meanwhile, apparently hopes its economic
cooperation with France will expand even further.
According to a diplomatic report, the Angolan Fi-
nance Minister invited the French to participate in a
long list of projects during a trip to Paris in July 1983.
According to other diplomatic reporting, the French
were astonished by the emphasis President dos Santos
and his delegation placed on bilateral economic ties
during an unofficial visit to France in September.
Planning Minister do Nascimento presented the
French with a request for financial help for a list of
projects, and dos Santos paid calls on a French
aerospace firm and the head of Elf-Aquitaine.
Prospects
The French-Angolan relationship is likely to remain
at its current state indefinitely. Even if Luanda were
to learn of French military assistance to UNITA, it
might choose to overlook it in order to preserve the
economic benefits derived from the relationship
through the oil connection and French-financed ex-
ports. Moreover, we believe the MPLA regime will
overlook its disappointment over the failure of French
political pressure to moderate Pretoria's policies or to
unlink the issue of Cuban troops in Angola from a
settlement in Namibia.
Luanda sought close relations with Brasilia immedi-
ately after independence in an attempt to establish a
fruitful trade and aid relationship. At a time when it
was largely ignoring the West, Angola apparently
looked to Brazil because it was a major Third World
power that accepted without criticism Angola's con-
tinuing dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba
and because the two countries shared the same lan-
guage and had a long history of bilateral trade.
Moreover, from Angola's standpoint, Brazil was a
potential source of replacements for some of the
400,000 Portuguese managers, technicians, and work-
ers who left Angola at the time of independence. For
its part, Brazil was pursuing an ambitious foreign
policy at the time designed to gain influence in the
Third World-especially in lusophone Africa-and
then thought it had financial resources to invest in
such a policy.
The relationship has nevertheless not yielded the
results that both sides had expected at'the time of
independence. When Angola's expectations were not
met, Luanda turned to Argentina in late 1982 as an
alternative source of aid.
Angolan-Brazilian Expectations
The economic relationship with Brazil was well estab-
lished although Angola was still under Portuguese
rule, but this had largely lapsed by the 1960s. In April
1976, however, Brazil sought a new beginning by
sending a trade mission to Luanda that sold $40
million in trucks and buses to Angola and bought
Angolan coffee,
Several months later, Brazil extended a $310
million line of credit to Angola to finance exports,
By
1980 Angola's trade with Brazil began to come into
balance as Luanda began swapping oil for a growing
amount of Brazilian imports.
The political relationship also produced at least some
of the limited benefits Luanda apparently sought.
Brasilia could be counted on to denounce South
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Africa's escalating aggression against Angola and to
support Namibian independence. If there was an
Angolan complaint, it was probably that Brasilia did
not denounce South Africa as vocally or as long as
one-sixth of Angola's population. Brazilian firms were
also involved in hotel construction and were bidding to
supply storage tanks for the oil refinery in Luanda.
Stagnation
By late 1981 the bilateral relationship appeared to be
stagnating. Brazilian exports to Angola were begin-
ning a decline, and,
Luanda had largely depleted Brazilian credits by
early 1982. Apparently in an effort to revive the
relationship, a senior Angolan delegation led by then
Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge visited Brasilia in Feb-
ruary 1982 where, he
requested at least $500 million in new credit to
finance continuing trade and expressed an interest in
purchasing Brazilian military hardware.
Since the peak in Brazilian-Angolan relations in 1982,
the economic relationship has continued to provide
Angola only small benefit. Brazilian exports to Ango-
la have continued to decline, and Angolan exports of
oil to Brazil increased dramatically in 1983, causing a
continuing trade imbalance. The Capanda hydroelec-
tric project has so far not materialized because of
Angolan foot-dragging.
the Angolans feel that the Soviets forced
the project on them, and, therefore, they have been
hesitant to start it.
ing ahead with the Capanda project.
Brazil, meanwhile, appears to remain interested in
cultivating Angola despite Luanda's hesitance in mov-
Brazil is now willing to sell arms to
Brasilia apparently demurred on military sales but
considered providing $500 million in new credit after
Jorge's visit, although the ultimate amount granted
for trade is not clear.
he two countries subsequently engaged in vari-
ous forms of commercial swaps and that Brazil may
Angola and is willing to issue a credit line of up to $60
million to finance the sale.
linterested
in the sale as a way of lessening his government's
dependence on Soviet arms. Brazil also announced the
renewal of a $250 million line of credit to Angola
following a September 1984 visit to Rio de Janeiro by
Angolan economic czar Lopo do Nascimento.
have extended credit for several loans.
Several months after Jorge's visit, the aid relationship
appeared to take a dramatic leap forward when Brazil
agreed to participate with the Soviet Union in build-
ing the massive Capanda hydroelectric project. A
Brazilian firm was slated to provide engineering
services, build the powerhouse, and install transmis-
sion lines for the project. Of the total cost of $2
billion, Brazil was to invest some $450 million-in
Argentina. We believe that Angola began to eye
Argentina as an alternative source of aid in late 1982
and began to court better relations with Buenos Aires
in early 1983.1
return for partial payment in oil.
Brazilian firms, meanwhile, were aggressively pursu-
ing new areas of commerce in Angola. Brazil's state
petroleum company, Petrobras, participated with the
Angolan state oil company and Belgian and British
firms in exploring for offshore oil in an offshore
Angolan oilfield, according to press accounts. A Bra-
zilian supermarket chain sold food supplies to about
disappointed that its commercial relations with Brazil
had not developed as the Angolans had expected and
that the level of Brazilian economic assistance had
remained low.
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The relationship, however, has been slow to develop.
The two countries have not established embassies,
although they have exchanged trade delegations.
Trade has been modest and Argentina's interest in
Angola appears slight. A senior Angolan economic
figure nevertheless traveled to Buenos Aires in Sep-
tember, where we believe he made a renewed pitch for
increased aid and trade.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300130003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300130003-1
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300130003-1