TERRORISM REVIEW (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-01095R000100190002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 13, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Terrorism Review
MASTER FILE COPY
Do PDT DIVE 'T
CR MARK on
Secret
-Srere4-
GI TR 84-026
13 December 1984
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iI/OGI
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Highlights
DI/OGI
DI/OGI
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Turkey: The Threat of Resurgent Terrorism
DI/EURA
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DI/NESA
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The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta: Gone But Not F
orgotten
DO/CPN
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Chronology of Terrorism-1984
DI/OGI
This review is published every other week by the Direct
Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the
agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be cons
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directe
orate of Intelligence.
CIA as well as by other
idered for publication.
d to the Executive Edito
r
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Terrorism ReviewF--] 25X1
On 4 December at 0235 hours,' Kuwaiti Airlines Flight 221 from Kuwait via
Dubayy to Karachi was hijacked and forced to fly to Mehrabad Airport, Tehran.
Approximately 166 people were on board: 150 passengers (including three USAID
employees, and a US businessman), 11 crewmembers, and four hijackers.
The hijackers boarded the flight in Dubayy. Released passengers said the hijackers
were either Lebanese or Lebanese Palestinians. Reportedly, they were armed with
small automatic handguns and grenades.
The hijackers shot a Kuwaiti aircraft guard in the leg when they took the plane
over. Soon after the plane landed, the hijackers shot and killed USAID employee
Charles Hegna and threw his body from the plane. Iranian airport officials had
obstacles placed around the plane to prevent its departure. The hijackers
demanded that the plane be refueled, that food be brought on board, and that
Kuwait release the prisoners convicted for the 12 December 1983 bombings in
Kuwait." Z
Following is a chronology of the significant events of the next six days before the
incident was resolved:
4 December
1530 The hijackers first contacted the Kuwaiti charge in Tehran,
telling him they would blow up the plane if their demands
were not met.
1740 The hijackers released 19 passengers after the aircraft was
refueled. The passengers said that the hijackers did not have
any explosive material other than one or two grenades.
2000 According to a press report, the "17 September Organization"
in Beirut claimed responsibility for the hijacking. This group,
which purports to defend the Palestinian people, was first
heard from when it claimed credit for bombing the Kuwaiti
Embassy in Beirut on 16 November 1984.
2025 Twenty-four passengers and crewmembers were released. All
women and children were now off the aircraft.
1 Secret
GI TR 84-026
13 December 1984
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5 December
Morning AFP in Beirut received a message from an anonymous
spokesman for the Islamic Jihad Organization that professed
solidarity with the hijackers but asked them to move the plane
to Damascus, Cairo, or Baghdad so as to absolve the Iranian
Government of any responsibility in the incident.
0630 The wounded aircraft guard was released.
Before 1930 The hijackers released 23 more passengers. Swiss Embassy
officials in Tehran viewed the body of the dead passenger for
the first time. Their description, however, did not match that
of any US officials on board.
2030 The hijackers allowed a doctor to come on board to treat a
Kuwaiti passenger suffering from a heart problem. Two other
passengers also reportedly suffered heart ailments, and the
hijackers offered to exchange them for the Kuwaiti charge in
Tehran.
6 December
Morning The hijackers broadcast to the control tower the screams of a
passenger being tortured.
Before 0740 The hijackers reported they had killed two more passengers,
William Stanford of USAID, and a Kuwaiti. Only the report
about Stanford turned out later to be true. A Pakistani
passenger who had been taken outside the plane escaped death
by running away from the aircraft as the hijackers prepared to
gun him down.
0740 The hijackers first spoke with the Kuwaiti negotiating team.
The discussions lasted only 10 minutes. The hijackers
threatened to kill the remaining US citizens unless the
prisoners in Kuwait were released.
0915 A photographer was allowed to approach the door of the
aircraft and photograph bodies of passengers allegedly killed
earlier in the day. It subsequently transpired that the hijackers
had forced two Kuwaitis to lie down and play dead and had
sprinkled their bodies with ketchup.
Before 1045 The hijackers demanded that a new crew be supplied for the
aircraft.
1045 Kuwaiti officials refused to provide a new crew for the
aircraft.
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1110 An Iranian cleaning crew was allowed on the aircraft.
Afterward, the cleaners reported that the passengers had been
tied to their seats and that two bodies were covered on the
floor.
Before 1444 The Kuwaiti flight engineer, who was reportedly suffering
from a heart ailment, was released by the hijackers.
1730
A special Iran Air flight arrived in Karachi with most of the
passengers who had been released the two previous days.
1840 Four more passengers were released.
Later Twenty more passengers, all Pakistanis, were released.
Midnight The first deadline set by the hijackers for Kuwait to meet their
demands.
7 December
0700 The second deadline set by the hijackers after first deadline
passed without Kuwaiti compliance.
1906 Iran radio broadcast a statement by the hijackers that
condemned Kuwait and justified the killing of Hegna and
Stanford on the grounds they were CIA agents. They also
claimed they had killed two other persons and said the next
ones to be killed would be the remaining AID official and
three Kuwaiti diplomats.
2300 Eight more passengers were released: six Pakistanis and two
Iranians described as students, bringing the number of person's
released to 107. Those in the latest group said only two
Americans had been killed.
8 December
1130 Sixteen more persons were released, bringing the total released
to 123.
1330 After a hiatus of 36 hours, Kuwait announced it had renewed
contact with the hijackers.
1407 The hijackers told the airport tower that the Americans would
now be tried for unspecified crimes.
1730 The hijackers told the airport tower they would release all
those "not connected with this matter."
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1800 Tehran media carried a second statement by the hijackers. It
repeated the above offer and reasserted their intent toward the
remaining captives.
2015 The hijackers released 23 more hostages, all Pakistanis,
bringing the total released to 146 and leaving only 19 on board
the plane.
2030 The time, announced by Islamic Jihad in a telephone call to
AFP in Beirut, after which the hijackers would begin killing
the three Kuwaiti diplomats unless Kuwait released the
prisoners it was holding. The IJO caller reiterated the
organization's assertion that the hijackers were not members
of Islamic Jihad but enjoyed its full support.
Night The Iranian Foreign Minister returned to Tehran from
Hungary.
9 December
Morning The Kuwaiti negotiating team left for Istanbul, saying that
negotiations would be handled by diplomatic personnel on the
scene.
0903 The hijackers threatened to kill the remaining American
hostages unless a reporter and a video camera were provided.
Iranian reporters were allowed on board. They later reported
that two Kuwaitis and the two Americans had been beaten,
the Americans less severely than the Kuwaitis.
1100 Tehran radio reported that only 10 hostages were still on
board the aircraft.
1140 The hijackers, declaring they wanted to leave Tehran,
demanded a new aircraft.
1300 The hijackers beat a Kuwaiti hostage on the steps of the
aircraft and threatened again to blow it up.
1349 AFP reported that two unscheduled Syrian aircraft had
arrived from Damascus.
1400 The airport was closed because of the threat to blow up the
plane.
1500 The airport was reopened.
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1520 The hijackers broadcast their "last will and testament" to the
control tower, rejected offers of food, and broke
communications.
1630 The Iranians told Kuwaiti and Pakistani officials that they
would "shortly use force" to overcome the hijackers.
1635 The hijackers renewed communications with the tower. They
reported they had said their final prayers and had planted
explosives around the plane. They renewed their threat to blow
up the aircraft and again demanded another one.
2145 Seven more hostages were released, said to be six crew-
members and a flight engineer.
2345 The Iranian news agency IRNA reported that Iranian security
forces had "stormed" the plane. The hijackers came out with
their hands up and the remaining' hostages walked out.
According to the IRNA report, the troops had hidden close to
the plane and entered when the hijackers requested a cleanup
crew. Gunfire was reported, but no casualties announced. Two
Kuwaitis whom the hijackers had claimed to have killed were
among the nine hostages released, confirming that Hegna and
Stanford were the only passengers killed during the ordeal.
It is questionable how much force the Iranians needed to use to subdue the
hijackers and rescue the remaining hostages. Although there is no evidence that
the Iranian Government was involved in planning the hijacking, Tehran's behavior
throughout the six-day ordeal indicated strong sympathy for the hijackers' aims
and a willingness to exploit the opportunity that had arisen to gain the release of
the Iranian sympathizers imprisoned in Kuwait.
Tehran assisted the terrorists in several ways, including granting them access to
the media and twice refueling the aircraft without obtaining any concessions.
Moreover, initially Tehran refused to allow Kuwaiti officials to make contact with
released hostages or to allow Kuwaiti planes to participate in relief efforts. Some
Pakistani passengers later accused the Iranians of providing the hijackers with
handcuffs, rope, and additional firearms, but this has not been confirmed.
Only after additional killings were reported on the third day of the hijacking did
Tehran appear to become more concerned about its image. Only then did it
condemn the death of the first US official and-after pleas from Syria, Saudi
Arabia, and Pakistan, among others-the hijacking itself. The ease with which
Iranian forces took the aircraft and the lack of casualties among either hijackers or
hostages also suggest a degree of collusion between the Tehran authorities and the
terrorists.
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Many questions remain to be answered, including the exact identities,
nationalities, and affiliations of the hijackers, the degree of culpability of the
Iranian Government-or elements thereof.-and the role of Damascus, which
some press reports have credited with persuading Tehran finally to take action to
bring the episode to an end.
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Highlights
New Threat to US Embassy
On 28 November a Lebanese guard at the US Embassy Annex in Awkar
overheard an alleged member of the Hizballah say that a boobytrapped vehicle is
being prepared at an Iranian-Hizballah training facility in the Bekaa Valley and
that this vehicle is to be used to attack the US Embassy in Beirut very soon. The
Hizballah member claimed that this vehicle bomb would be much larger than the
ones previously used against the US Embassy and Embassy Annex. 25X1
there.
It is not clear whether the speaker meant the next target would be the US
Embassy in West Beirut, the Annex in Awkar, or the Ambassador's residence in
Yarze. The most attractive target for the terrorists would be the Ambassador's
residence, because most of the US personnel are currently living and working
attacks against US military installations in the past two years.
USS Vinson May Be Greeted by Terrorists
Japanese radicals plan extensive demonstrations in mid-December to mark the
upcoming visit of the USS Vinson to the port of Yokosuka. US installations in
Japan have been placed on heightened alert in view not only of the demonstrations
but also of the possibility of terrorist attacks during that period. The radical leftist
group Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction), which opposes both the US military
presence and the US-Japan security treaty, has conducted several incendiary
7 Secret
GI TR 84-026
13 December 1984
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Terrorist Atrocities Provoke Communal Violence
Terrorist attacks by Tamil separatists against members of the Sinhalese majority
have increased dramatically in number and ferocity since the beginning of
November. Among recent incidents:
? On 30 November members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam attacked
two Sinhalese farms in the Tamil-dominated Jaffna region, killing 65 to 80 men,
women, and children. Some of the victims were intentionally burned alive.
? That same night unidentified Tamils murdered 11 fishermen in a northern
village.
? On 3 December separatist guerrillas of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Army
(TELA) seized nine hostages at a cement plant on the Jaffna Peninsula and
demanded that the government pay a $400,000 ransom and free certain
imprisoned Tamil leaders. Apparently, the government refused to meet the
demands, for on 5 December TELA reportedly killed the hostages.
injured six
The Tamil attacks appear intended to provoke a Sinhalese backlash similar to the
bloody anti-Tamil riots that took place in the summer of 1983. Apparently, at least
two major reprisals have already occurred:
? On 3 December 20 Tamil terrorist suspects were reportedly killed while in
government custody in the town of Vavuniya in north-central Sri Lanka.
the jungle and in schools and shrines.
? On 4 December after the landmine explosions in Mannar, government forces
there went on a rampage, killing more than 100 Tamils, many in cold blood.
Reportedly, two buses were waylaid and their passengers killed; six postal
employees were lined up and shot to death; and about 40 Tamils were gunned
down while working in the fields. Some 2,000 Mannar residents took refuge in
toward the Sri Lankan problem should be.
The Tamils as a whole would not gain from a Sinhalese backlash unless that
provoked Indian intervention on their side. The fact that the latest outbreak of
Tamil violence occurred after the assassination of Indira Gandhi on 31 October is
probably no coincidence; it implies that the Tamil terrorists are hoping to force the
hand of a new Indian Government that has not yet figured out what its policy
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custody, awaiting possible extradition to the United States.
Narcoterrorist Threats Continue
On 26 November in Bogota, a car bomb exploded near the US Embassy, killing
one Colombian. Antidrug leaflets strewn about the car suggest that the bombing
probably was the work of narcoterrorists protesting the pending extradition of their
colleagues to the United States. Since then, no more such attacks have occurred,
but terrorist threats continue to be issued-including some against the Spanish
Ambassador. Four Colombian narcotics traffickers are currently in Spanish
Switzerland and Italy Arrested Lebanese Terrorists Were Planning Anti-US Attacks
On 18 November in Zurich, Swiss police arrested an Arab male in whose
possession they found a kilogram of explosives and four blasting caps as well as
documents indicating he was headed for Italy. On 24 November in a town near
Rome, Italian police checking out addresses provided by the Swiss arrested seven
Lebanese men. Judging by confiscated material and information developed
subsequently, the group was planning to attack the US Embassy and possibly to
mount other anti-US operations, including kidnapings of US officials. Not all of
the persons in the group have necessarily been arrested, and Italian officials
indicate a threat to US installations and personnel may persist.
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gangsters who otherwise would have been eligible for release in February.
Preventive Detention Reform Postponed
On 27 November the Italian Cabinet approved a temporary law permitting the
authorities to keep persons identified as dangerous criminals in preventive
detention even after the new preventive detention reform law goes into full effect
in February. The temporary legislation gives the authorities until next November
to finish processing the trials and appeals of especially dangerous terrorists and
Greece-Romania Jordanian Diplomats Attacked by Terrorists
On 29 November in Athens, an unidentified gunman tried to assassinate a top
Jordanian diplomat, but his gun jammed. No group claimed responsibility, but
Greek police later arrested an Arab male suspect as he was trying to leave the
country. On 4 December the deputy chief of the Jordanian Mission in Bucharest
was shot dead in front of his hotel. Romanian police immediately arrested the
gunman, a 27-year-old Palestinian student from the Israeli-occupied West Bank.
An anonymous spokesman later claimed that the Black September Organization
had been responsible for the assassination and was resuming "revolutionary
activities."
and threatened to resume doing so as recently as last October.
The Black September Organization, as the covert terrorist wing of Fatah was
known, has been inactive since the early 1970s. Considering that Fatah has been
improving its relations with Jordan recently, we consider it extremely unlikely that
mainline Fatah operatives would now be conducting attacks on Jordanian
diplomats. Moreover, the PLO representative in Bucharest, an Arafat loyalist,
denounced the attack. It is conceivable that the Fatah dissidents have decided to
resurrect the Black September Organization, but no specific evidence links them to
these attacks. Instead, the modus operandi of the attackers resembles that of the
Abu Nidal Group, which has attacked Jordanian diplomats repeatedly in the past
overshadowing the moderates.
PNC Meeting Punctuated by Terrorism
As Yasir Arafat presided over the meeting of the Palestine National Council
(PNC) in Amman from 22 to 29 November, Jordanian security forces had their
hands full fending off Palestinian terrorists bent on discrediting and
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reported that two other suspects escaped into Syria.
and 2 December, time bombs planted at US-affiliated offices in Amman were
found and defused. The Jordanians say the two bombs were similar to devices
previously used by the Abu Nidal Group. On 27 November a bomb exploded near
the PLO headquarters in Amman. Jordanian authorities arrested a member of the
Syrian-backed Popular Struggle Front (PSF) in connection with that bombing and
Although each of these groups has its own reasons for wanting to sabotage the
PNC meeting, it is also a fact that they are all supported by Syria, which is
determined to prevent King Hussein from opening negotiations with Israel on
behalf of the Palestinians. Few of these operations could have taken place without
Syrian acquiescence, although hard evidence proving Syrian complicity is lacking.
Organization of Socialist Muslims (ROSM) claimed credit.
UK Diplomat Murdered
On 27 November in Bombay, the deputy British high commissioner was shot to
death by two male attackers as he was being driven to work. The Revolutionary
Provisional IRA.
No arrests have been made in the case, and an initial search for two men
appearing to be Europeans, which suggested that Northern Irish terrorists might
have been responsible, has given way to the pursuit of two men who look like
Arabs, which lends some support to the claim by ROSM. That mysterious group
previously claimed responsibility for the similar murder of a British diplomat in
Athens last March, as well as for the kidnaping of a British journalist in Lebanon
a couple of months ago. ROSM's credibility is dubious, however, since it also
claimed responsibility for the recent bombing of the British Conservative Party
Conference in Brighton, which UK authorities are certain was conducted by the
the number of terrorist 25X1
incidents in November was roughly the same as in the two preceding months-
before the state of siege was imposed. In addition, since the first successful car
bombing on 26 October, five more have occurred, and a sixth car bomb was
discovered and deactivated before it could explode. Thus, although the
government's crackdown has stifled the moderate opposition, it has had little
apparent effect on the terrorists who were its ostensible target.F___1 25X1
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promise of asylum by the Ethiopian Government
Airliner Hijacked to Ethiopia
On 27 November three Somalis wounded a security guard and hijacked to Addis
Ababa a Somali Airlines flight scheduled to fly from Mogadishu to Jiddah
carrying 130 passengers and crew. The hijackers initially demanded the release of
14 Somali political prisoners and a commitment not to execute seven Somali
youths they believed were under sentence of death. The Somali Government
refused to release any prisoners, but Italian mediators, believing they had received
certain ambiguous assurances regarding the seven youths, guaranteed the safety of
the youths. The skyjackers eventually released all 130 hostages in exchange for a
actions of the Ethiopians.
The conduct of Ethiopian officials on the scene was clearly improper. One
eyewitness described them as having a relaxed rapport with the hijackers; another
alleged that the Ethiopians could have ended the episode at any time. Although we
do not believe the Ethiopian Government instigated the hijacking, it obviously
tried to manipulate the episode for political purposes. Somalia has condemned the
for the mid-1985 election intensifies.
ZANU-ZAPU Strife Leads to Political Assassinations
The assassination on 9 November of a senator from Beitbridge, representing the
majority Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), has set off a wave of
political terrorism and violence. ZANU supporters, blaming the incident on the
rival Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), looted and burned ZAPU homes
and businesses. The police reportedly stood by during the rioting, in which one
person died. As the violence spread, a ZANU central committee member publicly
stated that for every ZANU supporter killed, three ZAPU supporters would die.
On 25 November a ZAPU member of parliament was assassinated. Further acts
of violence between ZANU and ZAPU are likely, especially as the campaigning
succeeded in bringing the violence there largely to an end.
NRM Terrorists Strike in Capital
During the last 10 days of November, at least 16 terrorist attacks took place in and
around Kampala. Grenades, bombs, and gunfire exploded all around the capital,
often in market areas, resulting in numerous civilian and military casualties.
Insurgent forces of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) were probably
responsible for most of the attacks, although it is suspected that security forces
perpetrated some of them in order to loot the markets. By the end of the month,
security forces in Kampala had arrested several NRM terrorist suspects and
time.
The insurgents probably brought their conflict to Kampala for two reasons: to
demonstrate the government's inability to keep the capital secure and to divert
government soldiers away from the current NRM offensive in the Luwero
Triangle. They are capable of renewing their terrorist attacks in Kampala at any
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Terrorism in International Law
Jose Manuel Martinez-Balestegui was accused of
murdering a Spanish industrialist in 1978. Francisco
Javier Lujambio Galdeanu was wanted for a bombing
that killed two members of the Spanish Civil Guard in
1980. Jose Carlos Garcia Ramirez was charged with
killing four members of the Spanish Civil Guard in
1980. All three men were members of the Spanish
Basque terrorist organization Basque Fatherland and
Freedom (ETA). Earlier this year, like many other
ETA members wanted by the Spanish authorities,
they were living in France, where, because of a long
tradition of hospitality toward foreign political exiles,
they felt safe from extradition.F____1
Late last summer their safehaven evaporated.
Reversing its policy of tolerating the presence of ETA
members as long as they did not operate in France,
the French Government arrested the three men (along
with a number of other Etarras accused of lesser
crimes) in response to official Spanish requests for
their extradition. When brought into French court,
they demanded political asylum, arguing that their
acts were political, rather than criminal. The French
court had to address a fundamental question that
challenges the contemporary international legal
system: is terrorism a legally protected form of
political activity, or is it crime?
There is no international law even defining, much less
prohibiting, terrorism. Only piracy, the slave trade,
war crimes, genocide, and skyjacking are widely
regarded as international crimes. Twice in this
century there have been attempts to gain international
consensus on what behavior constitutes terrorism. In
1937 the League of Nations tried to get its
membership to agree on a definition of the term, but
only 13 nations concurred with the proposal. In 1972,
following the terrorist tragedy at the Munich
Olympics, the United States submitted to the General
Assembly of the United Nations a Draft Convention
for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of
International Terrorism. Again, however, agreement
proved impossible to reach
One reason it is so difficult to achieve universal
acceptance of a single conception of terrorism is that
the various legal systems of the world hold contrasting
views of "political crime." Systems based on the
common law, found chiefly in the English-speaking
countries, tend to view terrorism as common
criminality. Civil law systems, found in continental
Europe and Latin America, have tended to recognize
a political offense exception to the criminal law. 25X1
Under the idiosyncratic legal systems of many Third
World countries, appropriate political ends may be
deemed to justify almost any means. Thus, most
Third World countries have consistently resisted all
efforts by Western countries to establish limits to the
political offense exception
In Anglo-American law, activities that involve, in
other than a combat context, the willful taking of
human life, the purposeful commission of bodily
harm, the deliberate destruction of state or private
property, or the intentional infliction of mental
distress through the use or threatened use of force are
criminal acts. There are a number of defenses to 25X1
prosecution for criminal acts, such as mistake,
necessity, provocation, duress, and insanity, but
political motivation is not one of them. Thus, the
political offense exception finds little application in
Anglo-American courts.
The British Extradition Act denies extradition of a
fugitive offender if the request is made for the purpose
of punishing him for an offense of a "political
character." But, for an offense to be characterized as
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GI TR 84-026
13 December 1984
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political, two criteria must be met: (1) the act must
have occurred during a political revolt or disturbance
and (2) the act must have been either ancillary to, or
formed a part of, the same revolt or disturbance. The
narrowness of this definition is the basis of the
government's consistent refusal to grant "political
prisoner" status to convicted Provisional IRA
terrorists. It also explains why Britain is not as
popular as other European states among those seeking
political asylum.
Canada takes an even more rigorous line. Murder, or
the indiscriminate perpetration of serious bodily
harm, even if committed for political motives, are
deemed common crimes, and urban terrorists,
whatever their causes, are considered criminals. In
keeping with this position, Canada returned to the
United States the man charged with four counts of
arson and murder relating to the bombing of the
Army Mathematics Research Center at the
University of Wisconsin.
The United States recognizes political offense
exceptions to an extradition request only if there is in
force a specific bilateral extradition treaty or
convention allowing for such exceptions. In his 1972
speech before the UN General Assembly, US
Secretary of State William P. Rogers stated that
"Political passion, however deeply held, cannot be a
justification for criminal violence against innocent
persons ... [which] must be universally condemned,
whether we consider the cause the terrorists invoke
noble or ignoble, legitimate or illegitimate."0
By contrast, in the countries of continental Europe
and Latin America, a tradition of granting asylum to
fugitives accused of political crimes dates from the
late 18th century. The civil law systems of these
countries have long permitted the political offense
exception to be used widely as a defense. But the
growing problem of terrorism in the region is leading
some West European governments to modify their
positions on this question, at least on a selective basis.
In the cases of the three accused Spanish Basque
terrorists cited above, the French court made an
unprecedented decision to grant extradition to Spain.
The primary issue, according to the French court, was
the fact that the three were accused of "blood
crimes." In explaining its decision, the court
acknowledged that the acts the accused were charged
with were committed "because they are members of
ETA ... however, these are common law offenses that
cannot be viewed as having a political character or
being related to a political offense for any reason
whatsoever. The murder of a civil servant is therefore
not a political act.... unacceptable acts of violence
cannot be construed as the expression of a political
purpose." Instead, the crimes were "common law
offenses committed on the territory of a state which
respects freedom and rights." The court therefore
concluded that the Basques were not true refugees
and did not qualify for political asylum.
These developments in the French courts, however,
should not be viewed as establishing new, binding
legal precedents regarding extradition in French civil
law. Despite its ostensible legal justification, there is
considerable evidence that this decision to agree to
extradition was political rather than judicial, and
specific rather than universal, and that Paris currently
has no intention of applying the stated reasoning to
fugitives other than Basque terrorists. Other
foreigners accused of committing blood crimes for
political reasons have not been arrested, much less
extradited.
A generation ago, the International Court of Justice
observed that extradition "practice has been so much
influenced by considerations of political expediency in
the various cases, that it is not possible to
discern ... any consistent and uniform usage accepted
as law." The historical record shows that national
policy considerations take precedence over penalties
for criminal acts, when governments decide that this
is in their best interests. There is no reason to believe
this practice will change in the near future.
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Turkey: The Threat of
Resurgent Terrorism
Despite a drastic reduction in the incidence of
violence and the decimation of a number of
clandestine terrorist groups under the three years of
military rule that ended last November, we do not
believe that Turkey's effort to put an end to terrorism
has succeeded:
? Turkish security forces continue to find and
confiscate significant quantities of weapons and
make arrests.
? In the last several months, there has been a
recurrence of small-scale violence.
? Raids by Kurdish dissidents in August resulted in
several deaths and demonstrated that this problem
remains alive.
Foreign support for Turkish terrorism continues. The
Turks see Damascus-an ideological and historical
rival-as their main antagonist. There is also limited
evidence that the Soviets have in the past lent support
to Kurdish dissidents. The Bulgarians have sold arms
to both leftwing and rightwing extremists. In addition,
Arab and Iranian terrorist groups have begun
targeting each other and Western targets in Turkey.
Eliminating foreign support would not halt terrorism
in Turkey. In our judgment, Turkish terrorism has its
roots in the sweeping demographic, economic, and
sociological changes that have occurred over the last
three decades. Until significant improvements can be
achieved in dealing with the resulting problems-
unemployment, inequitable land and income
distribution, overtaxed urban facilities, and festering
religious and ethnic tensions-terrorism will remain a
threat.
We expect a gradual resurgence of violence, but we do
not expect it to take on dimensions serious enough to
threaten political stability over the next year or two.
Despite the return to civilian rule in November 1983,
martial law remains in force throughout most of the
country. Moreover, Turkish security forces have been
strengthened by improved training and financial
resources.
The strength of the resurgence will also depend on the
willingness of civilian and military authorities-now
represented by Prime Minister Ozal and President
Evren-to work together. We believe the competing
political and institutional interests of these two men
will complicate their relationship and perhaps weaken
the government's ability to contain terrorism.
Even a moderate upsurge in terrorism could threaten
US facilities and personnel in the country. The United 25X1
States is seen as the principal patron of the Turkish
Government, and US servicemen might again become
the targets of terrorists.
The Roots of Terrorism
A wave of violence that began in Turkey in the late
1950s was punctuated by military interventions in
1960, 1971, and September 1980. The violence had its
roots in the sweeping demographic, economic, and
sociological changes that have occurred over the last
three decades. Although the strains resulting from
economic change, population growth, internal
migration, urbanization, and ethnic/religious changes
are common in the Third World, they have been acute
in Turkey:
? Turkey's population of 50 million is nearly double
that of 30 years ago. It grew at an average annual
rate of 2.7 percent between 1950 and 1975-one of
the highest rates in the world.
? The urban population has grown even more rapidly
than the population as a whole. In 1960, 25 percent
of the population lived in cities; by 1980 the portion
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had risen to 50 percent. This has thrown together
diverse and sometimes antagonistic ethnic and
religious groups in unfamiliar city neighborhoods
with sometimes violent consequences. For example,
the southeastern city of Kahramanmaras, the scene
of large-scale rioting in December 1978, had
perhaps the highest rate of growth in Turkey during
the 1970s.
? The current official unemployment rate of about 20
percent has dropped only slightly from levels in the
1970s. Underemployment has been variously
estimated as high as 70 percent of the working
population in the sprawling shantytowns
surrounding cities such as Ankara and Izmir.
? Rural workers account for half the working
population but only 28 percent of the national
income, and much of this is concentrated among a
few individuals. In general, income distribution is
badly skewed. Land distribution also has become
less equitable over time.
Turkey's serious minority problems have also
contributed to the strains. Most troublesome are the
Kurds in the southeastern provinces, who are second
only to ethnic Turks in supplying recruits to radical
leftist groups. The estrangement of this community,
which makes up at least 10 percent of the population,
is due in large part to Turkish laws that prohibit
Kurdish language, literature, and ethnic
organizational activity; indeed, Turkish officials deny
the existence of a Kurdish minority. The Alevi
community, concentrated in eastern Turkey and
comprising perhaps 15 percent of the population, is
another significant minority. Alevis-ethnic Turks
who practice a version of Islam that draws from both
Sunni and Shia doctrine, as well as elements of
shamanism and Christianity-are viewed with
suspicion, intolerance, and open hostility by the Sunni
majority. Violence has flared frequently between
these groups.
The complexity of the causes of violence is matched
by the diversity of terrorist groups that have sprung
up in Turkey. More than 50 leftist groups were in
existence before the 1980 coup, and there was no
trace of a common organization. The fragmentation
of these groups reflects their highly personalized
leadership and undeveloped ideologies. Beyond fuzzy
Marxist notions, they appear to have only a vague
concept of the type of state they wish to establish, and
an anarchistic bent that has prevented the
development of a widespread base of support. Their
fragmentation, small size, and tight cell structure,
however, do afford some protection against police
operations
Weak Governments. Parliamentary governments in
Turkey have not measured up well to the challenges
posed by political violence. When terrorist violence
first emerged as a serious problem in the late 1950s,
the political institutions left by Ataturk had already
been discredited by corrupt and arbitrary rule. A
succession of weak and internally divided coalition
governments proved unable to agree on the causes of
or solutions to Turkey's problems.
Terrorism first took on significant dimensions under
the conservative and authoritarian Menderes
government, whose misrule led to a military coup by a
cabal of reformist Army colonels in May 1960. Their
temporary government produced a highly liberal
Constitution that opened the way to previously
repressed political and social forces. Radical political
parties and interest groups began to organize openly.
Trade unions were granted the right to strike, and
labor unrest began to grow. In this atmosphere of
ferment, political radicalism took hold in the student
community. The major political parties-the social
democratic Republican People's Party and the
conservative Justice Party-were preoccupied with
internal power struggles and unwilling to cooperate to
reduce the influence of these dangerous new forces.
The politicization of the universities and factories led
to street demonstrations and violence during the late
1960s and early 1970s as well as to the emergence of
clandestine radical groups. In 1971 the military
hierarchy intervened again, bloodlessly deposing the
conservative Demirel government. The government of
technocrats that followed, as well as subsequent
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elected cabinets, proved weak and equally incapable
of containing the unrest. Between the 1971 and 1980
military interventions, governments were debilitated
by the switching of party allegiances by deputies and
even Cabinet ministers, the need to seek coalition
partners among extremist groups, rampant
corruption, and the lack of consistent economic and
political decision making. Foreign developments, such
as the 1973/74 oil price hikes and the 1974 Cyprus
conflict, produced new economic difficulties and anti-
Western emotions that contributed to the growth of
radicalism. Dissatisfaction with the United States, the
rise of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the
Middle East, and the rise of formidable leftist groups
prompted the emergence in turn of Islamic and
neofascist groups.'
The first large-scale violence occurred in
Kahramanmaras in December 1978 between Sunnis
and Alevis. The killing of more than 100 people there
led the left-of-center Ecevit government to impose
martial law in 13 provinces, including the major
urban areas. Nevertheless, the situation deteriorated
rapidly, partly because the major political parties
were themselves riddled with extremists and unwilling
to cooperate against terrorism. By 1980, up to 20
Turks were dying every day in terrorist attacks. The
victims included a former premier, a deputy party
chief, a trade union leader, the country's foremost
journalist, and senior security officials. The military,
concerned that the. situation was fast approaching
civil war, finally intervened on 12 September 1980
and imposed military rule.
Results of Military Rule. Three years of military rule
produced significant gains in the battle against
terrorism. According to official claims and press
reports, political killings dropped from 5,000 during
I Although the emergence of the rightwing terrorist group, the Grey
Wolves of Alpaslan Turkes, was a major destabilizing factor before
the coup, Islamic-oriented extremist groups have not been potent
compared with other Turkish militants or even Islamic
fundamentalist organizations in neighboring countries. Most
Turks-leftist and rightist extremists, as well as mainstream
politicians-support the idea of a secular state despite otherwise
intense political differences and interpretations of Kemalism.
Turkey is an overwhelmingly Sunni nation, and the only significant
religious minority, the Alevis, does not have the dynamic clergy
associated with the Shias. The government historically has kept
religious leaders of all persuasions under fairly tight rein. F
Political Violence in Turkey
Before and After the Military Takeover
26 Dec 1978-
12 Sep 1980
13 Sep 1980-
11 Sep 1982
Explosions
6,365
370
Riots
1,163
68
Robberies
3,014
1,491
Student demonstrations
2,532
60
Other demonstrations
3,836
860
Wounded
10,427
850
Security officials killed
164
72
Terrorists killed
146
215
the nine months before the coup in 1980 to 442 in the
following year. Incidents of political violence were
down from 33,000 to 5,673 during the same period.
Security forces confiscated more than a half million
pistols and rifles, about 2.2 million rounds of
ammunition, nearly 10,000 explosive devices, 21
rocket launchers, and one mortar during the first year
of military rule alone.
The number of suspect terrorists arrested reached into
the tens of thousands. Some Turkish newspapers have
alleged that as many as 125,000 suspected terrorists 25X1
and sympathizers may have been arrested since the
initial imposition of martial law in 1978, although
many of these were subsequently released or
acquitted. A senior official of Ozal's party told the
press last spring that there are still 100,000 people in
jail, including 20,000 people in military prisons. The
government has described most of the prisoners as
leftists from urban areas.
In handing over power last year, the military tried to
ensure it would retain the means to deal with any
resurgence of terrorism. It kept the presidency in its
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own hands, in the person of Gen. Kenan Evren, the
former Chairman of the National Security Council.
The new Constitution enhances the powers of the
president, who now has wide authority to act in
emergencies and can control the selection and
discipline of civil servants. The military also imposed
new laws restricting party and electoral activity,
banning former party leaders from participation in
politics for 10 years, imposing sanctions for references
to past political quarrels, and setting stiff penalties for
violations of limits on labor and religious activity.
A cornerstone of the military's program to strengthen
the hand of the government is the State of Emergency
Law. Passed by the NSC last October, it offers a
mechanism for the government to deal with disorder
without implementing martial law. It gives the
government power to issue laws by decree, detain
suspects for extended periods, impose curfews, and
ban public meetings or publications for a period of up
to six months in the event of a disruption of public
order or natural disaster. Parliament has the
responsibility of approving the decision and of
extending the emergency in four-month increments.
The NSC also established new state security courts to
deal with offenses against the "integrity" of the
country. These courts are staffed by civilians but have
military judges and prosecutors. They can try cases
falling under the anti-Communist provisions of the
civil code, as well as violations related to labor laws,
illegal demonstrations and associations, and
smuggling.
In practice, the new law has served as a vehicle for
shifting administrative responsibility from military to
civilian authorities. Of the 26 provinces without
military rule, 11 have been placed under a state of
emergency. Martial law was extended in June in the
remaining 41 provinces.
Terrorism Not Eliminated
Despite the military's continuing crackdown on
radical groups, and the current relative calm,
practically all observers agree that terrorist violence
has not been permanently eliminated.
not out.
Domestic Groups. The government claimed in 1983
that nearly half of the illegal groups active at the time
of the coup were still in operation. Last August, in an
unusual announcement regarding the status of
clandestine organizations, the martial law command
in Ankara said that 25 groups had been practically
eliminated but that three groups were still engaged in
violence, while 17 others had increased their
activities. The command also announced that almost
6,000 suspects were still at large. A scattering of
violent incidents in Istanbul and around the country
supported contentions that the terrorists are down, but
The most active and dangerous organizations appear
to be the same ones that were notorious before the
1980 coup. According to their own manifestos, all
these groups aim to overthrow the constitutional order
through violent means and to force the removal of US
facilities from Turkey. Their main tactics are armed
assaults and bombings, and their main targets are
government officials and facilities, as well as rightist
opponents and leftist rivals.
The Foreign Dimension. In addition to the continuing
domestic terrorist threat, foreign terrorist activities on
Turkish soil add to the challenges facing the new
government. The war between Iran and Iraq and the
upheaval in Lebanon have produced a spate of
terrorism throughout the Middle East that
Armenian terrorism, although it has garnered more
headlines abroad, is a much less serious threat.
Armenian-sponsored terrorism for the most part takes
place outside Turkey and has not contributed
significantly to political instability. In fact, we believe
Armenian terrorism tends to unite Turks and
reinforce government efforts to portray the problem of
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terrorism simply as a result of foreign subversion.
Even so, attacks by the Armenian Secret Army for
the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice
Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) have
unnerved the Turkish foreign service, generated
unfavorable publicity about Turkey, and further
burdened the security services.
Although there is limited information about Soviet
activities in Turkey, Turkish officials are convinced
that Moscow plays a substantial role in fostering
leftist extremism. We believe Soviet influence over
Turkish militants is limited. Despite their avowed link
to Lenin, most Turkish groups appear to have more in
common ideologically with Mao and Marcuse.
Turkish terrorist groups feature rapidly shifting and
charismatic leaderships and a predilection toward
action instead of the establishment of a broad basis of
support within the labor movement. These factors
help explain why the pro-Soviet Turkish Communist
Party remains a marginal factor in the country's
politics. Throughout its 60 years of existence as an
illegal party, the TKP has focused its efforts on
unifying divergent leftist parties as a cover for its own
activities. The latest version of this approach is an
attempt to unite Turkish workers in West Germany.
The strategy has failed to produce any significant
electoral support or control over antisystem
movements.
The Kurdish problem is the one most susceptible to
foreign manipulation, given the predominance of
ethnic Kurds in southeastern Turkey and their cross-
border ties with compatriots in Syria, Iraq, and Iran.
Kurdish
organizations had become more active. Army officers
reportedly also have bcome more concerned of late
about the Kurdish problem, especially because of
Baghdad's decision earlier this year to grant limited
autonomy for Iraq's Kurdish tribes along Turkey's
southern frontier. Turkish concerns appear to have
been well founded. According to press reports and
government announcements, in mid-August Kurdish
guerrillas launched raids in several towns in eastern
Turkey. Several Gendarme officers were killed or
wounded.
Police Capabilities
The ability of the security forces, and particularly the
police, to cope with the threat posed by terrorism will
be crucial to the Ozal government. The Turkish
National Police (TNP), which has primary
responsibility for internal security, was discredited by
its failure to put down extremist violence in the 1970s.
As part of its efforts to improve the capabilities and
performance of the TNP, the NSC has appointed
Army officers to administer police training programs.
Although substantial progress has been made to
rebuild the TNP since 1980, it is still hindered by
material and personnel shortcomings.
In our view, it is questionable whether the police can
gain the upper hand over terrorism, both because of
their own shortcomings and because of the inherent
advantages of extremist groups in this kind of
struggle. The lack of cohesiveness and homogeneity
among Turkish terrorist groups-their small size,
highly personalized organization, and tight cell
structure-makes them extremely resilient. The
fragmentation of leftist extremists forces the police to
scatter their resources. In addition, Turkish terrorists
are highly motivated and by and large appear to have
a higher level of education than their TNP opponents.
The militants' access to sophisticated Western 25X1
weapons also puts the police at a disadvantage on
occasion.F___1 25X1
There are indications, too, that radical officers still
exist within TNP and military ranks. The US Consul
in Izmir reported in February that a large-scale police
sweep through several Aegean provinces was
conducted entirely by the Izmir police because of
concerns that local forces had been penetrated. About
500 military officers reportedly have been tried in
military courts since 1980 for political activity, and
retired and active-duty military officers have been
arrested for membership in Marxist groups. F_~
Ozal and Evren
The Ozal-Evren relationship, which has never been
entirely cordial, will be a critical factor in
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The Turkish National Police (TNP) has the primary
responsibility for law enforcement in urban areas of
Turkey. The TNP has 90,000 to 100,000 personnel.
It conducts antiterrorist sweeps, antismuggling
operations, security investigations, and operations to
penetrate extremist groups and is responsible for
surveillance of foreigners in collaboration with the
intelligence service. The TNP is subordinate to the
Interior Ministry, and its key officials are appointed
by the Prime Minister with the approval of the
President
The 125,000-member Gendarme is responsible for
maintaining order in rural areas and villages,
guarding prisons and major industrial installations,
and protecting the country's frontiers. Unlike the
TNP, the Gendarme's involvement in intelligence and
investigative activities is limited. Although the
Gendarme falls under the responsibility of the
Interior Ministry in peacetime, the Turkish General
Staff would take control in wartime. New laws also
make the General Staff responsible for training and
educating Gendarme personnel.
The Turkish National Intelligence Organization
(TNIO) is supervised by the office of the Prime
Minister. Its responsibilities include both domestic
and foreign intelligence. The internal directorate
conducts counterintelligence operations and
surveillance offoreigners, and gathers information on
illegal Communist, Kurdish, rightist, and religious
that the TNIO's primary purpose is to provide
information on the status of illegal groups, and it
appears to cooperate closely with the TNP despite an
determining the ability of the government to deal with
internal security problems. At present, there are no
apparent problems. Ozal has a solid majority in
Parliament and an established working relationship
with Evren. The two men have similar philosophical
outlooks, and they appear to have an informal
arrangement whereby Evren takes a greater degree of
responsibility for foreign and security affairs, while
Ozal concentrates on economic policy. According to
press reports, Evren chairs monthly meetings of the
new National Security Council, which consists of
Ozal; the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Foreign
Affairs; the chief of the General Staff; force
commanders; and the commander of the Gendarme.
We expect the formulation of internal security policy
to become progressively more difficult as Ozal's
political imperatives come into conflict with Evren's
interest in security and in maintaining the authority
of the military. Ozal probably will want to gain a
greater degree of control over the national and local
bureaucracy as a means of strengthening his hold on
power and ensuring that his controversial economic
policies are carried out. Evren, on the other hand, will
probably oppose any such effort, especially if it
involves the removal of former military officers
serving, for example, as provincial governors.
Outlook
In our judgment, the most likely outlook for Turkey is
a gradual resurgence of terrorism and violence. Under
the best of circumstances, the government will be
unable to eliminate the deep-seated roots of violence.
Strains are likely to emerge in the Ozal-Evren
relationship, creating uncertainty within the
bureaucracy and sapping the dynamism of the
antiterrorist effort. Both are strong-willed men, and
Ozal clearly is intent on asserting his own authority.
overlap in responsibilities.
TNIO activities are crucial to the success of the
counterterrorism program, but the TNIO's
contribution is far less apparent than the role played
by the TNP and the Gendarme. We believe
politicization has been a much less serious problem
within the TNIO than in the TNP, and it has
maintained a higher degree of professionalism.
Although we expect a gradual worsening of the
terrorist problem, we do not expect it to become so
severe over the next one to two years as to threaten
political stability in Turkey. Martial law remains in
effect throughout most of the country, and the
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government and security forces have ample authority
to take action under new laws. The powers and
authority of the president are, in our judgment, the
best assurance of a strong government approach to the
problem, and Evren's mandate runs until 1989.E
Even a modest revival of terrorism, however, would
pose fresh risks for US personnel in Turkey. In the
year or so before the military takeover, several US
servicemen were killed by Marxist terrorists. We have
no direct evidence of current anti-US planning, but it
is unlikely that there would be any advance warnin
perceived as a staunch supporter of the former
military government, we believe Turkish militants
might try to exact revenge by seeking out US
personnel. There is also a continuing threat from non-
Turkish terrorists, especially those entering Turkey
from neighboring Arab countries.
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The Shia Urge Toward
Martyrdom
The willingness of radical Shias to launch suicide
attacks, such as the Islamic Jihad bombing of the US
Embassy Annex in Beirut, in our view, evolves from a
complex relationship involving theology, faith,
superstition, and instigation.
Theological Underpinnings
The Islamic Jihad suicide bombers believe that they
are martyrs for Islam who will receive special rewards
in heaven. Martyrdom is only obliquely alluded to in
the Koran: "If ye be slain or die on the path of God,
then pardon from God and mercy is better than ye
have amassed." (Sura iii. 156.) The Hadith (sayings
and deeds of the Prophet), however, spells out
promises for those who die for Islam:
? The martyr will not have to answer for his sins
before ascending into heaven.
? The martyr does not have to pass through the
Islamic version of purgatory.
? The martyr can return to Earth up to 10 times if he
wishes to suffer martyrdom again.
Martyrdom is particularly important in Shia
theology. The Shias attach special political and
religious significance to the martyrdom in 680 A.D. of
their Third Imam, Husayn, who was the son of Ali
(the first of the 12 Shia Imams, as the Shia political
and religious leaders are called) and the grandson of
the Prophet Muhammad. Husayn was murdered for
refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of Yazid, the
Sunni Umayyad Caliph. The special religious
significance of his martyrdom is derived from his
standing as a direct descendant of the Prophet, his
betrayal by erstwhile followers who joined the
Caliph's forces just days before he was killed, and the
barbarous treatment to which he was subjected before
his death and to which his corpse was subjected
afterward. Shia traditions say that Husayn was killed
gradually, that his corpse was trampled,
dismembered, and left unburied for three days, and
that his severed head was carried to the Caliph in
Damascus.
Each year the Shias celebrate the martyrdom of
Husayn on the 10th of Muharram (corresponding to 5
October this year). Some make pilgrimages to
Karbala in Iraq, the site of his death and now one of
Shiism's holiest places; and many perform rituals
including self-flagellation to symbolize Husayn's
torture and death.
Faith and Superstition
Iranian efforts to export the revolution have
stimulated a transformation from "quietism" to
activism among economically disadvantaged and
politically disenfranchised Shias in many parts of the
Muslim world. The faith of the new activists, which
has been exploited to advance the objectives of
Khomeini and the other Iranian leaders, has often
been fatal to the individuals concerned. Self-
flagellation is one thing; martyrdom is a much bigger
leap even for true believers to make. To help them
make this leap, their cynical leaders and commanders
have encouraged them to believe things that might
appear nonsensical from a secular standpoint. Some of
Khomeini's followers, for example, have attributed to
him the righteousness and supernatural powers of the
Prophet Muhammad and of Husayn, even claiming
that he is the 12th, or Hidden, Imam-the last of the
true Imams, who, according to Shia tradition, went
into "occultation" in the ninth century A.D.
The same syndrome is illustrated by the recent use of
"magical keys" by captured Iranian soldiers.
According to Arab press reports, the soldiers were
told that if they drank water into which the keys had
been dipped they would be invisible to their Iraqi
captors. Iraqi military officers reported that captured
Iranians were dumbfounded when Iraqi soldiers could
still see them even after they had swallowed key-
infused water. (The fact that the soldiers were told
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this story suggests that their leaders were less than
confident that their religious beliefs alone were strong
enough to motivate them.)
The Expressway to Heaven
By referring to the United States as the "Great
Satan" and terming it a primary enemy of Islam,
Khomeini and the other Iranian fundamentalists
suggest to Shias that suicidal acts against the United
States parallel the courage of Husayn, the martyred
Third Imam. In the minds of the most impassioned
Shia believers, killing Americans is a way of
demonstrating the strength of their faith. According
to a number of reports, this belief is carefully
inculcated and reinforced in those who are tapped for
terrorist missions.
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The Revolutionary Coordinating
Junta: Gone But Not Forgotten[
In some ways a terrorist group can be likened to a
living organism-it is born, it matures, it gets old, it
dies. Unlike a cow or afish, however, which shortly
after its demise begins giving increasingly pungent
evidence of it, a terrorist group often just fades away
without our noticing. There are some well-known
exceptions: the West German 2nd of June Movement
and the Italian Prima Linea publicly announced their
own disbandment; and the West German and British
police put an end to the Kexel-Hepp Group through
the simple expedient of arresting all but one of its
members. Yet it is likely that a good number of the
terrorist groups found on most lists of such groups
really do not belong there any longer. Following is a
description of how one such group has maintained a
ghostly presence in the files of counterterrorism
organizations of several governments.
The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) was
formed in 1974 by several like-minded South
American terrorist groups in an effort to facilitate
international cooperation.' Initially, this group seemed
to pose a formidable threat to several governments in
the region. It did in fact carry out-or was anyway
implicated in-a number of terrorist incidents. The
last known event that may have involved the JCR was
recorded in 1977. Since then, no confirmed reporting
of any activity of the group has been received.
Recently, inconsistencies in the file prompted a
thorough review of available information concerning
the JCR. One thing uncovered was a 1979 study of
the JCR that concluded the group was "moribund at
best" and should no longer be considered a terrorist
threat. Similarly, current issues of CIA publications
that list terrorist and insurgent groups no longer
The founders of the JCR were:
? The People's Revolutionary Movement (ERP) of Argentina.
? The National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros) of Uruguay.
? The Army of National Liberation (ELN) of Bolivia.
? The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) of Chile.
contain references to the JCR; and a recent DIA
compendium that contains a useful historical
treatment of the group notes a dearth of current
information concerning the group's leadership,
strength, weapons, equipment, and funding. At the
same time, however, a number of fairly recent reports
appeared in the aggregate to provide confirmed 25X1
information that the JCR was still functioning.
A closer examination, however, revealed a pattern of
circular reporting that tended to provide false
verification because of time delays and variances in
It is not unlikely, moreover, that some creative writing
crept into these reports. Where details were present,
they were of the sort that anyone who knew something
about terrorism and read current newspapers could
easily invent. The motivation is understandable: it is
often convenient for a security service to have a
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scapegoat that cannot respond to or refute
accusations, one that can be accused of exerting
external influence on a country's internal problems,
one which poses such a threat as to justify an increase
in the service's budget.
Earlier this year, an unsourced report carried in a
South American newspaper prompted a series of
intergovernmental queries, the responses to which
nearly "confirmed" the existence of a nonexistent
terrorist group. Under the pressure of short deadlines,
information of dubious accuracy
and relevancy as if it were pertinent fact. An
assumption that the group existed caused certain
information to be interpreted as evidence the group
existed, when in fact the contrary interpretation was
more appropriate and should have led the assumption
to be challenged.
These cases suggest that it may not be uncommon for
terrorist groups to be perpetuated in reporting long
after they cease in actuality.
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Chronology of Terrorism-1984
events covered elsewhere in this issue in greater detail.
Below are described noteworthy foreign and international terrorist events and
counterterrorism developments that have occurred or come to light since our last
issue. Events and developments that have already been described in previous
issues are not included unless new information has surfaced. Asterisks denote
*Chile: FPMR Attacks Police Bus
A police bus carrying 16 members of a special forces unit was hit near Valparaiso
by a remote-controlled claymore-type device. The blast killed four carabineros and
injured the other 12. The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) claimed
refuge in the Swedish Embassy, where they demanded asylum.
*Chile: FPMR Attacks Police Station
In Santiago, three FPMR terrorists aboard a stolen truck assaulted the 10th
Precinct Station of the National Police using automatic weapons and grenades.
Two carabineros died and four were wounded. Subsequently, the attackers took
Sudan: Libyan-Backed Dissidents Arrested
In Khartoum, four Sudanese dissidents arrested 25X1
in Chad and expelled to Sudan claimed to have been sent on a terrorist mission
against high-level Sudanese officials and American di lomatic and business
target;. 25X1
14 November Zaire: Canadian Clergyman Killed
A Canadian Methodist minister-pilot was shot after landing in Moba during a
rebel attack. US Embassy officials suggest the guerrillas were probably unaware
of his identity, because in his dress and appearance he resembled a mercenary and
he carried two army officers as passengers
Colombia: Police Seize ELN Hideout
In Bogota, five former students were arrested when police raided a safehouse of
the National Liberation Army (ELN). Ammunition and powerful explosives were
Bolivia: Home of Former President Bombed
A powerful blast shook the home of former President (1971-78) Hugo Banzer
Suarez without causing any damage. No group has claimed responsibility. F
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Peru: Binational Center, Government Buildings Bombed
Among the buildings damaged in a bombing attack in the northern city of Piura
were the US-affiliated Peruvian-American Cultural Institute and local offices of
the Ministry of Labor and Agriculture. There were no reported casualties.
Philippines: American and German Held by MNLF
In the Sulu Archipelago, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) claimed to
be holding an American and a German as "trespassers" and demanded a 500,000-
peso ransom. this
"kidnaping" was a publicity stunt and the two, along with seven other
foreigners, would be freed in mid-December
21 November Italy: Seven Suspected Terrorists Arrested
In Naples, Italian police arrested seven suspected terrorists accused of belonging to
the "Communist Guerrilla Nucleus" (CGN). Two other suspects remain at large.
leanings
Greece: 21 November Announces Its Arrival With Bombs
In Athens, bomb explosions at four sites including the offices of the bar association
and an opposition party news service caused extensive damage and injured four
people. A telephone caller claimed the attacks were conducted by the "21
November Organization," a previously unheard-of group of unknown political
Istanbul
Turkey: Hizbullah Extremists Arrested
In Istanbul, police arrested 15 members of "Hizbullah," a Turkish Islamic
extremist organization that advocates converting Turkey into an Islamic republic.
The police also confiscated five weapons and 1,000 rounds of ammunition that had
been buried on the grounds of a mosque. Police believe Hizbullah members have
been responsible for more than 20 robberies of banks and jewelry stores in
between the Bolivian Government and narcotics traffickers.
Boliva: Attempted Kidnaping of Bolivian Congresswoman
In La Paz, three unidentified men tried but failed to kidnap Nora Matienzo de
Lopez outside her residence. She is a member of the Chamber of Deputies and
Vice President of the Congressional Mixed Commission investigating links
subsequently died.
*Chile: Naval Guard Attacked
Near Talcahuano, south of Santiago, unidentified terrorists attacked a naval
patrol guarding a high-tension tower. One of the guards was wounded and
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American Center for Oriental Research (ACOR).
*Jordan: Bomb Found at US Research Center
In Amman, police defused a bomb found in a flower box at the US-affiliated
been present while King Hussein and Yasir Arafat gave their speeches.
Jordan: Abu Nidal Operatives Arrested
In Amman, Jordanian arrested two Palestine National
Council observers identified as members of the Abu Nidal Group. The two had
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25 November Greece: 21 November Continues Bombing Campaign
The new group 21 November claimed credit for three more bombs. One heavily
damaged a truck in the port city of Pireaus. The second, housed in a flashlight,
injured a man when it exploded in his hands. The third was found and removed
from an Athens hotel after a phone caller tipped off its location to Greek security
26 November *Chile: Car Bomb Explodes Near Municipal Building
In Santiago, a car bomb containing about 25 kilograms of ammonia gelatin
exploded near a municipal building. Two vehicles were completely destroyed, two
were damaged, and the windows of the municipal building and nearby houses were
their compatriots to the United States.
Colombia: Explosion at US Embassy
In Bogota, a car bomb exploded near the US Embassy compound, killing a
Colombian citizen. The bombing was believed to be the work of Colombian
narcotics traffickers angered at the government's decision to extradite several of
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El Salvador: D'Aubuisson's Vehicle Attacked
The personal armored vehicle belonging to Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, leader of
the National Republican Alliance, was riddled by automatic weapons fire as it
patrolled streets near his home. D'Aubuisson was not in the vehicle at the time. No
group has claimed responsibility.
Mexico: Congressman Murdered
Unidentified gunmen ambushed and killed Mexican congressman Roque Spinoza
Faglia of the ruling Revolutionary Institutional Party and two of his cousins as
they rode in two cars along an isolated stretch of road in the state of Veracruz.
Spinoza was a former leader of the National Union of Sugarcane Growers. The
reason for the attack is not known, and no one claimed responsibility.
27 November *Jordan: PSF Bomb Explodes Near PLO Headquarters
In Amman, a bomb consisting of 2 kilograms of TNT exploded in a vacant lot
adjoining the PLO headquarters building. The bomb caused no casualties and only
slight damage to the building.
Guatemala: Gunmen Kill Official
Gunmen in an automobile and a motorcycle fatally shot Beatriz Charnoud, the
head of Guatemala's waterworks, along with her bodyguard, as they were driving
to work. No one has claimed responsibility for the murders.
Colombia: Spanish Ambassador Threatened With Death
The Spanish Ambassador to Colombia received death threats from Colombian
narcotics traffickers in response to the arrest in Madrid on 15 November of eight
Colombian narcotics traffickers. The Spanish Government is now considering
whether to extradite two of the detainees to the United States.
India: UK Diplomat Assassinated
In Bombay, Britain's deputy high commissioner was killed by two unidentified
gunmen as he was being driven to work. The Revolutionary Organization of
Socialist Muslims (ROSM) claimed credit for the act.
28 November Argentina: Bomb Blasts Office of Military Lobbying Group
In Buenos Aires, the office of the Center of Argentine Officers for Democracy, a
recently formed group of retired military officers, was bombed. No group has
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center in a week
Peru: Peruvian-American Cultural Center Bombed
Two bombs exploded adjacent to the auditorium of the Peruvian-American
Cultural Institute in Lima, but caused no injuries. Police believe members of
Sendero Luminoso were responsible. This was the second attack on a binational
released inside Ethiopia.
Ethiopia: Three Hostages Released
In Kassala, Ethiopian guerrillas released to the Sudanese two Britons and one
Australian who had been held since 19 October when the rebels seized the town of
Lalibela. Three other captives (two Americans and one Briton) had earlier been
Organization of Socialist Muslims (ROSM) was responsible.
Lebanon: Bombing of British Airways Office
In Beirut, a bomb heavily damaged the British Airways office, but caused no
injuries. An anonymous caller to AFP claimed that the Revolutionary
machinegunned the US Embassy. No injuries were reported.
El Salvador: FCER Strafes US Embassy
The Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front (FCER), a dissident faction of the FPL,
in the Andean city of Huanuco.
Peru: General Strike Punctuated by Bombs
Five bombs exploded during a general strike protesting the national government's
human rights record and austerity policies. Bomb blasts ripped through an
English-language school and two banks in Lima, as well as government buildings
Moroccan passport.
*Greece: Jordanian Diplomat Attacked
In Athens, an unidentified gunman attempted to assassinate the deputy chief of
the Jordanian Mission, but his gun jammed. The gunman escaped on a motorcycle
that had been rented by a man with a Moroccan passport. The next day police
arrested a suspect at the Greek-Yugoslav border carrying an apparently forged
northeast coast.
*Sri Lanka: Tamil Tigers Massacre. Settlers
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam claimed responsibility for two separate
massacres of Sinhalese. In the first incident 65-80 men, women, and children,
mostly from a former prisoner rehabilitation program, reportedly were herded into
houses and barns and killed by gunfire or grenades, or incinerated when the
buildings were deliberately set ablaze. In another incident the same night, 11
Sinhalese fisherman were apparently killed by unidentified Tamils on the
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claimed credit for the attempted bombing.
Greece: Conservative Leader Target of Bombs
In Athens, two bombs were found and removed from under a platform where
opposition leader Constantine Mitsotakis was scheduled to speak. No group
the night.
Corsica: Violence Erupts at Nationalist Rally
One policeman was killed and two were wounded by bombs in a night of violence
spurred by a rally held in support of imprisoned Corsican nationalists. Press
reports indicate several other small bombs exploded throughout the island during
Greece: Bombs Planted Under Iraqi Embassy Vehicles
In Athens, a Greek explosives expert was killed while attempting to disarm one of
four bombs planted under Iraqi Embassy vehicles. The other three bombs were
safely detonated by police. In a phone call to AFP in Paris, the Islamic Action in
Iraq Organization, an Iranian-backed group of Iraqi dissidents affiliated with the
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, claimed credit for the bombings.
Abu Nidal Group was responsible.
*Jordan: Bomb Found Near Citibank Offices
In Amman, Jordanian police defused a bomb found near Citibank executive
offices in the American Life Insurance Company building. This device was very
similar to the bomb defused on 24 November at the ACOR building in Amman.
No group claimed credit for placing either bomb, but the US Embassy believes the
compatriot had been found nearby.
Mozambique: Second Italian Technician Found Dead
Near a Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) camp in Maputo Province,
the Mozambican Army discovered the body of the second Italian technician who
had been abducted by RENAMO on 12 September. Earlier, the body of his
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in the past.
*Romania: Jordanian Diplomat Assassinated
In Bucharest, the deputy chief of the Jordanian Mission was shot dead in front of
his hotel. Police arrested the gunman, a Palestinian student, at the scene. An
anonymous caller claimed credit for the attack in the name of the Black
September Organization, an unlikely story. The modus operandi of the attack was
similar to that of the Abu Nidal Group, which has attacked Jordanian diplomats
Mrs. Marcos.
Philippines: LAFM Leaders Condemned
In Manila, four leaders of the outlawed "Light-a-Fire Movement" (LAFM) were
convicted of a 1979 arson campaign and sentenced to death. They were also found
guilty of conspiring to commit rebellion and plotting to assassinate President and
4-10 December *Kuwait-Iran: Hijackers Kill Passengers
In Tehran, the four hijackers of a Kuwaiti airliner were overpowered by Iranian
security forces and their remaining hostages were released unharmed. During the
six-day ordeal, the hijackers killed two Americans and injured at least six others of
various nationalities, while demanding that Kuwait free those Iraqis and Lebanese
convicted in the 12 December 1983 Dawa Party bombing of the US and French
Embassies in Kuwait. The hijackers are therefore believed to be associated with
the Iranian-supported Dawa Party.
the garage of the British Council
Greece: British Council Escapes Bombing
In Athens, Greek explosives experts disarmed a bomb discovered in a bag outside
plant on 3 December.
*Sri Lanka: Tamils Kill Nine Hostages
In the Jaffna Peninsula, separatists of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA)
were reported to have killed nine Sinhalese hostages they had seized at a cement
*Chile: Police Station Attacked
In the working-class district of Santa Adriana in Santiago, numerous assailants in
three vehicles attacked the police station with handgrenades and automatic
weapons, killing a police officer and wounding another officer and a passer-by. F_
military convoy that killed three soldiers and wounded 11 others.
Spain: ETA Bomb Kills Three Soldiers
In Mungui, members of ETA claimed responsibility for a bombing attack on a
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8 December *Chile: Bomb Explodes on Subway Tracks
In Santiago, a bomb exploded on the subway tracks during rush hour, halting
service in the entire western sector of the city. At least one person was injured in
the explosion, which also damaged the tracks, electric installations, and a ticket
booth.
independence.
Portugal: Grenade Attack on NATO Headquarters
In Oeiras, members of the leftist group, Popular Forces of 15 April (FP-25)
claimed responsibility for a grenade attack on NATO's Iberian headquarters. In
their claim they stated that the four grenades fired into the facility were part of a
struggle against NATO, against US "imperialism," and for national
Pakistan: Bus Bombed
In the Northwest Frontier Province, a bomb exploded on a bus, wounding 14
people. Pakistani officials say they suspect the explosion was an act of sabotage by
"Afghan terrorists," whose activities they claim have lately been increasing. F-
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