USSR MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T01083R000100160004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 58
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Lz
USSR Monthly Review
Top See. et
SOV UR 84-004
March 1984
copy 30l
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USSR Monthly Review
The USSR Monthly Review is published by the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries
regarding the articles are welcome. They may be
directed to the authors, whose names are listed in the
March 1984
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table of contents
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Contents
Arms Control Issues Perspective: The Soviet Attitude Toward Arms Control
Despite recent failures in arms control strategy and expressed
pessimism about the prospects for bilateral agreements, the Soviets
apparently want to preserve the basis for a constructive dialogue in
this area. But, although some movement is possible on secondary
issues, they are unwilling-for a variety of reasons-to offer
significant concessions of their own to facilitate progress in the
major negotiations.
Moscow's departure from the INF talks represented a major
political and military setback for the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in
the aftermath of their walkout, the Soviets have not foresworn any
of the tactics that they used or threatened in their effort to prevent
NATO's deployments. We believe that for the immediate future
Moscow will concentrate on offsetting these deployments while
seeking to exacerbate political tensions within NATO to prompt
conciliatory policies.
The Soviet Approach to START and the Implications for Soviet 9
Strategic Forces
The Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in 1982 and 1983
demonstrated fundamental differences between the sides on the
basic approach to reductions. Moscow advocated SALT II criteria
and an INF accord as the framework for the negotiation of a
START agreement, whereas the United States resisted any linkage
between the two negotiations and proposed changes to the primary
units of account established in SALT II that would limit deliverable
nuclear power. The Soviets apparently have tried to ensure that any
proposed restrictions are consistent with the requirements of key
weapons development programs and do not disrupt the momentum
of current and future force improvements.
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The MBFR Ne otiations: Searching for Ways Around the 13
Data Problem
Recent Soviet strategy in MBFR has been to offer flexibility on
verification issues if the West will soften its demand for complete
agreement on existing troop strength in Central Europe before any
reductions. Some US allies are lobbying for a revised Western
position on data that seeks to build upon the East's new approach.
This issue will confront policymakers with trade-offs between
inherent intelligence uncertainty in monitoring manpower and the
political benefits of a more productive conventional arms control
dialogue with the East
The Status of Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and Implications for 17
the ABM Treaty
Since signing the ABM Treaty, the Soviets have continued to pursue
research and development of new ABM systems, large phased-array
radars, and advanced technologies that could have ballistic missile
defense applications. They also are upgrading the Moscow ABM
system. Nonetheless, we believe Moscow still sees advantages in
promoting the continuation of the Treaty and probably will continue
to abide by at least the letter of its provisions so long as there is no
significant shift in the US-Soviet strategic relationship
Soviet Proposals for Arms Control in Space
The Soviets are focusing their public efforts for arms control in
space on a new draft multilateral treaty that would ban the use or
threat of force in or from space. Their primary objective, however,
appears to be a resumption of US-USSR talks on antisatellite
systems.
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The suspension last fall of the principal East-West negotiations on
arms control brought increased international attention to other
forums, particularly the Conference on Disarmament in Europe and
the UN Conference on Disarmament. General Secretary Chernenko
further underscored their potential significance by implying that,
because of the impasse on INF and START, the best prospect for
improved US-Soviet relations lay in progress on less prominent
issues, including the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, a comprehensive
test ban treaty, and negotiations to ban chemical weapons. The
Soviets, however, have given no indication of willingness to moder-
ate their positions on any of these issues, except for chemical
warfare, to facilitate an agreement
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The Soviet Diplomatic Note on US Noncompliance With Arms 31
Control Agreements F_~
The Soviets almost certainly believe that their diplomatic note of 27
January 1984 on alleged US noncompliance with strategic and other
arms control agreements was a necessary response to President
Reagan's 23 January report on Soviet arms control violations.
Virtually every point appeared designed to counterbalance one of
the President's charges. The Soviets may believe that their note has
diluted, if not neutralized, the effect of the President's report on
significant elements of US and world public opinion.
The Soviets appear to have adopted a two-pronged strategy on arms
control, taking an inflexible line on INF and START while
expressing willingness to move ahead on other security issues and
signaling that a breakthrough in US-Soviet relations is possible if
Washington shows flexibility in these other areas. The Soviets
continue to probe US positions on a range of issues, with the aim of
extracting the maximum price-particularly in regard to their
fundamental concerns in START and INF-for any demonstration
of improved relations before the US elections.
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Other Topics
Soviet Nuclear Targeting of Pershing Its and Cruise Missiles I 139
sance system can locate Pershing and GLCM operating areas
The Soviets have a variety of strategic and tactical nuclear missiles
and aircraft available for nuclear strikes against NATO mobile
missiles in Europe. We believe they probably would first use missiles
to barrage Pershing and cruise missile operating areas and then
conduct followup strikes by aircraft. The degree of their success
would depend most heavily on how well the Soviet target reconnais-
Soviet-Finnish Trade and Moscow's Foreign Trade Policy
materials
Moscow has turned increasingly to trade with Finland as a means of
acquiring Western-quality machinery and equipment without be-
coming dependent on imports from the United States and its allies.
Further growth of this trade will, however, be constrained by
Finland's modest capability to produce high-technology goods and
by the limited appeal of Soviet exports other than fuels and raw
Update on 1982 and 1983 Soviet Grain Crops
Soviet Plans for Export of Oil and Gas to Eastern Europe
Status of Jewish Emigration From the USS1
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Arms Control Issues
Perspective: The Soviet Attitude Toward Arms Control
The Soviets have been openly pessimistic for some time about the prospects
for arms control agreements with the United States. In the INF talks, they
failed to achieve their military objective of preventing deployment of
Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, leaving them with a
new military threat. Politically, they were unable to exploit West European
interest in controls on theater nuclear weapons to divide the United States
and its NATO Allies. Having walked out of INF, rather than marking
time at the negotiating table while they "reevaluated" their "strategic
position," they probably now find themselves with little flexibility to
undertake diplomatic maneuvers at a time when they face a possible
deterioration in their strategic posture (see "The Soviets After INF:
Picking Up the Pieces").
At START, the Soviets advocated using SALT II units of account and
definitions as the basis for negotiation. They were confronted with a US
approach which-by changing the primary units of account-would limit
deliverable nuclear power and threaten long-established plans for the
development of their strategic forces (see "The Soviet Approach to START
and the Implications for Soviet Strategic Forces")~
Moreover, Moscow probably believes, particularly in view of US programs
to press ahead with the new MX and Trident missiles, that the SALT II
Treaty and the administration's "no undercut" policy have not constrained
US weapon programs significantly, a major Soviet arms control objective.
The Soviets, in fact, may suspect that one product of the arms control
process and the post-SALT US defense debate has been a deeper
commitment by the United States to new defense programs that are
potentially threatening to the strategic posture of the USSR.
SOV UR 84-004JX
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The Soviets are also likely to be concerned about recently announced US
plans for US strategic defenses and their effect on Soviet strategic
defensive systems and the ABM Treaty (see "The Status of Soviet Ballistic
Missile Defense and Implications for the ABM Treaty").
The Soviet posture toward current multilateral negotiations is somewhat
different. These forums provide the USSR with opportunities to exacerbate
frictions within the NATO Alliance by presenting itself as a dedicated
participant in the process of arms control and contrasting its own
"principled" policy with alleged irresponsible US behavior. In MBFR,
Moscow is seeking to induce the West to drop its insistence on a prior
agreement on manpower data and to accept newly revised Soviet proposals
on verification (see "The MBFR Negotiations"). At the Conference on
Disarmament in Europe (CDE), the Soviets have been sharply critical of
US arms control positions and may be preparing to present a draft treaty
banning chemical weapons on a global basis (see "Other Arms Control
Issues")
Moscow also has continued to call attention to the Soviet position on other
subjects such as space weaponry, nuclear testing, and nuclear nonprolifera-
tion. Andropov's space weapons proposal of August 1983 was aimed at
checking US plans to develop advanced antisatellite and ballistic missile
defense systems (see "Soviet Proposals for Arms Control in Space"). The
Soviets have periodically reiterated their proposal for a comprehensive test
ban, seeing it as an effective counter to the US offer to renegotiate the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty. They are also maintaining the dialogue with
Washington on nuclear nonproliferation, particularly as unfriendly coun-
tries like Pakistan and South Africa move closer to a nuclear capability.
Moscow may also wish to minimize the disruptive effects of public
exchanges and "public diplomacy" in the arms control area. In this
context, the Soviets presumably designed their January 1984 note on
alleged US noncompliance with arms control agreements to contain and
perhaps end the public dialogue in this area (see "The Soviet Diplomatic
Note on US Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements").
Although Moscow apparently has decided not to retreat from its conditions
for resumption of major bilateral negotiations with the United States, the
Soviets may still have several incentives to return. Without ongoing
discussions, they lose a valuable means for hampering US technological
advances that might prove threatening to them, influencing US perceptions
and strategic goals, and diminishing, if not reversing, the impact of US ap-
proaches on the Soviet strategic force posture. Some of their spokesmen, in
fact, have suggested that informal "back channel" discussions with the
United States on some subjects-prior to or parallel with negotiations in
yet-to-be-defined forums-might prove productive.
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The Soviets, however, appear to have a complex and not entirely consistent
attitude toward dealing with the current US administration on arms
control issues. They seem desirous of preserving the basis for a constructive
dialogue in anticipation of the President's reelection. But at the same time,
they appear unwilling to undertake any actions that could be interpreted as
either yielding to the administration's position on arms control or enhanc-
ing its reelection prospects.
Chernenko's assumption of power as General Secretary does not appear to
have changed this Soviet attitude dramatically. In the past, he firmly
supported Brezhnev's policy of improved relations with the West, including
the United States, and he has suggested a personal interest in toning down
rhetoric and in hard bargaining. But more recently, when responsible under
Andropov for ideology, he has also accused the United States of attempting
to torpedo detente, to spur on the arms race, and to revert to a cold war at-
mosphere. In any case, while Chernenko may now tailor his public foreign
policy references to the demands of a broader constituency, Foreign
Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister Ustinov are likely to continue to
exert considerable influence on arms control measures. Thus, while
Chernenko has hinted that some progress on secondary issues may be
possible, recent statements by all three officials have reiterated the Soviet
insistence that new initiatives on major bilateral arms control topics must
In sum, the Soviets appear to have adopted a two-pronged strategy on arms
control, taking an inflexible line on INF and START while expressing
willingness to move ahead on other security issues and signaling that a
breakthrough in US-Soviet relations is possible if Washington shows
flexibility in these other areas. The Soviets will continue to probe US 25X1
positions on a range of issues, with the aim of extracting the maximum
price for any demonstration of improved relations before the US elections,
particularly with regard to their fundamental concerns in START and
INF (see "Soviet Interest in Arms Control Negotiations in 1984").
The positions of Eastern and Western countries on various arms control
Q negotiations are summarized in a foldout table at the end of this
publication
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The Soviets After INF:
Picking Up the Pieces
Moscow's departure from the INF talks represented a
major political and military setback for the Soviet
Union. We believe, nevertheless, that for the immedi-
ate future Moscow will concentrate on offsetting
NATO INF deployments while seeking to exacerbate
political tensions within NATO to prompt concilia-
tory policies.
Setback
Moscow's political objective in entering the talks was
to erode the tenuous NATO consensus in favor of
INF deployments. The Soviets sought to achieve this
through intensive and constant diplomatic consulta-
tions in Western Europe that would create suspicion
and mistrust between the NATO Allies. Moreover,
through vigorous cultivation of influential elements of
Western public opinion, including the use of active
measures such as covert support of peace groups, the
Soviets also sought to mobilize other channels of
political pressure to reverse NATO's deployment de-
cision. Moscow, however, underestimated the resolve
of the NATO governments to carry out the deploy-
ments and overestimated the influence of the Western
anti-INF peace movement. The USSR was unable to
exploit public interest and debate on arrangements for
controlling the use of theater nuclear weapons, and
the West European governments successfully de-
flected the issue.
Moscow also failed to achieve its military objective of
preventing deployments of Pershing II cruise missiles
in Western Europe. Throughout the INF negotiations,
the Soviets repeatedly asserted that both of these
systems were first-strike weapons because of their
accuracy and short flight time. They also character-
ized them as "strategic," that is, capable of striking
their homeland. They claimed that a balance or
symmetry of "medium-range" weapons already
existed in Europe and said that the deployment of
Pershing II and cruise missiles would drastically shift
the balance of forces between the United States and
the Soviet Union. Moscow's calculus included US
aircraft in the European theater (described as "for-
ward-based systems"), together with French and Brit-
ish strategic nuclear systems, in the balance against
the USSR's inventory of intermediate- and medium-
range bombers and missiles. This concept of "symme-
try" was central to Moscow's overall position.
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of NATO forces, especially ballistic and cruise missile 25X1
units, enhances the ability of these forces to elude
Soviet targeting. Soviet statements appeared to sug-
gest uncertainty about the USSR's ability to target
and destroy the systems before or during nuclear
operations.'
Missile Submarines. In his 25 November statement
in Pravda, General Secretary Andropov threatened to
deploy "in ocean regions and seas" weapons that 25X1
would place the United States under the same threat
that the USSR would face from the new US INF
weapons. Submarine deployments probably represent-
ed one of the few near-term responses available to
' See "Soviet Nuclear Targeting of Pershing Its and Cruise
Missiles" in this issue for a more detailed discussion of this subject.
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SRBM Deployments. In January 1984 the Soviets
announced that units with "operational-tactical mis-
siles of enhanced range" had been moved into
Czechoslovakia and East Germany as part of the
response to US INF deployments. The Soviets proba-
bly intend to station at least two SS-12/22 brigades in
East Germany and two more in Czechoslovakia.
The SS-12/22 SRBM system had not been previously
deployed outside the USSR. We believe its arrival in
Eastern Europe is in fact linked to NATO's INF
SS-20 Bases. As a longer term response to NATO's
INF missiles, the USSR in November 1983 an-
nounced the end of its moratorium on SS-20 deploy-
ment against NATO
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intends to deploy SS-20s outside the USSR. Most
targets in Europe are covered by SS-20s deployed in
the USSR, where the missiles are relatively safe from
Western tactical weapons. Deployment further
afield-Cuba, for example-probably entails too
great a risk for the military benefits involved
Other Systems. The Soviets are progressing rapidly
toward deployment of three long-range land-attack
cruise missiles. The air-launched version-the
AS-X-15-could be operational by mid-1984. The
on new SSNs such as the M-, S-, and modified
Y-class units, as well as on additional V-111s, in 1984
or 1985. The ground-launched version-the
SSC-X-4
Strategic Implications
These counterdeployments appear designed at least in
part for their political impact on NATO. Moscow
probably wanted to show the United States and
NATO that it could respond expeditiously to NATO's
new deployments. The Soviets also probably want to
demonstrate that NATO has not enhanced its securi-
ty by accepting the Pershing and cruise missiles.F_
The Soviets, however, appear to believe that NATO's
deployments have increased the threat to strategic
targets in the USSR. They see the P-11 and GLCM as
qualitative improvements over other US forward-
based systems, because of the combination of range
and accuracy associated with each. In the Soviet view,
this combination creates a new risk for important
strategic targets in the USSR-including nuclear
delivery and control means-that are critical to the
Soviet ability to wage intercontinental as well as
theater nuclear war.
Soviet statements, both private and in the open media,
indicate a concern for the short flight time of the
Pershing II and an attendant short reaction time. The
Soviets fear that this short reaction time would
complicate their plans to execute a launch-on-tactical-
warning option if Pershing Its were launched in
conjunction with or as a precursor to a US interconti-
nental attack. The ground-launched cruise missile's
flight time, which is much longer, makes it less of a
threat to time-urgent targets, but its small radar cross
section will make it difficult to locate and track in
flight, and its range and accuracy make it just as
threatening to key targets associated with nuclear
storage and force reconstitution
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A force of 108 Pershing Its-the total number now
scheduled to be deployed by the end of 1985-would
not be able to destroy the USSR's command and 25X1
control structure, as the Soviets have charged. That 7tiyi
command and control structure is highly redundant, 25X1
range would be a Soviet worst case scenario.
hardened, and lies in part beyond the range of the
Pershing II. The Soviets presumably fear that initial
deployment of 108 Pershing Its would open the door
for later deployments of more missiles, possibly with
enhanced range or capabilities. Deployment of signifi-
cantly more than 108 Pershing Its with increased
The Soviet walkout from the INF negotiations, there-
fore, probably was motivated by a combination of
political and military factors; the Soviets perceived
that their strategic situation was worsening with US
deployments, and they were taken aback by their
inability to even slow down the deployment schedule.
Political Implications
Despite these highly publicized counterdeployments,
the Soviets have not permitted relations with those
West European countries that accepted the new US
missiles to be adversely affected. Judging from their
actions, they do not want to risk serious damage to
their larger and longer term political relations with
Western Europe and seem to be especially concerned
with preserving their economic ties, particularly with
West Germany.
Although they failed to forestall the beginning of
deployments, the Soviets appear to be devoting con-
siderable efforts to limiting, reversing, or precluding
their completion. Moscow has maintained its insist-
ence that INF deployments must cease and systems
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be withdrawn before a productive dialogue between
the sides can be resumed. Soviet officials constantly
reiterate to their West European counterparts that the
arms control impasse and the general-deterioration of
East-West relations are due to US intransigence and
belligerence.
The Soviets probably hope that their frequent consul-
tations with the West Europeans and direct reassur-
ances of the USSR's benign intentions will undermine
the NATO consensus for completion of the planned
deployment. They almost certainly will seek to nur-
ture some West European inclinations toward recom-
mending a moratorium on further deployments and
will also hope that the Belgians and Dutch will decide
against endorsing the deployments of the systems on
their soil later in 1984. Given the lengthy deployment
schedule, the INF issue will permit Moscow to contin-
ue its long-range objective of undermining West
European solidarity with the United States.
Outlook
Soviet military activities in response to NATO's npw
INF missiles could continue over a period of years and
move beyond the initial "political" counterdeploy-
ments already mentioned. For example, Moscow pre-
sumably will undertake efforts to improve its techni-
cal reconnaissance and data-processing capabilities to
meet the new targeting problems associated with
NATO's deployments. The Soviets may also deploy
more SS-12/22s in Eastern Europe and raise the level
of readiness of their forces to forestall a NATO
preemptive strike. Submarines with new cruise mis-
siles also may be temporarily deployed off the coasts
of the United States.
The Soviets are unlikely to return to the negotiations
unless or until they see some prospect of gain by doing
so, or-conversely-until it becomes apparent that
their absence from the talks is counterproductive.
Moscow almost certainly recognizes that if talks are
to resume it will have to move away from its demand
for removal of US missiles as a precondition. Having
failed to stop or even delay deployments by their last
effort, however, the Soviets probably will continue to
attempt to achieve a moratorium-at least for the
next several months. Their ultimate goal probably will
be to cap, if not reverse, US deployments. They also
are likely to hold out for some promise that British
and French systems will be accounted for in some
forum.
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The Soviet Approach to START
and the Implications for
Soviet Strategic Forces F---]
The five sessions of the Strategic Arms Reductions
Talks (START) held in 1982 and 1983 demonstrated
the fundamental differences between the sides on the
basic approach to reductions. Moscow advocated
SALT II criteria and an INF accord as the frame-
work for negotiation of a START treaty, while the
United States opposed any linkage between the two
negotiations and proposed changes to the primary
units of account. These changes would have the effect
of limiting deliverable nuclear power and forcing a
restructuring of the Soviet strategic posture.
The Soviet Approach to START
The Soviet approach to START reflects Moscow's
desire to ensure that proposed arms control restric-
tions are consistent with its current force posture and
do not disrupt the momentum of planned force im-
provement programs. Development, production, and
procurement of strategic weapon systems in the Soviet
Union is a complex process that requires long lead-
times for key decisions. After a strategic missile
program is authorized, for example, preflight develop-
ment normally lasts about seven years. Although final
deployment levels usually are not established until the
first or second year of flight-testing, the weapon's
basic design will have been finalized and preparations
for production begun at least four years earlier.F_
It is therefore not surprising that the Soviets adopted
an approach to START that retained the primary
units of account, definitions, and other criteria of the
SALT II Treaty and rejected US proposals that
reflected a radical departure from this frame of
reference. Many of the key decisions that are govern-
ing the development of Soviet strategic forces during
the 1980s were made during the latter stages of the
SALT II negotiations. Moscow seems to have been
satisfied that its obligations under the SALT II
Treaty would not interfere with these plans. The
Soviet START position appears intended to protect
those key strategic force development programs for
the remainder of the decade.
Moscow's approach to START also has been related
to the INF talks, specifically to the prevention of
Pershing II and cruise missile deployments in West-
ern Europe. During the SALT II negotiations, the
Soviets suggested that any reductions in strategic
forces beyond the levels specified in the SALT II
Treaty would have to take into account the existence
of US forward-based systems and third-country stra-
tegic systems. After INF deployments began, Soviet
START negotiators told the US side that the
"changed strategic situation" required a reexamina-
tion of their negotiating position and made clear that
this reanalysis would require a disruption of the
START negotiating schedule. While subsequent de-
velopments suggest that Moscow is willing to resume
exchanges on some secondary arms control issues, it is
still adhering publicly to an inflexible position on INF
and has been noncommital on START.
Moscow's START Proposals ...
Moscow's basic point of departure for START has
remained the unratified SALT II Treaty with only
slight modifications
Quantitative Limits. In an effort to meet US insist-
ence on "deep reductions" in strategic forces, the
Soviets proposed in a draft treaty presented in March
1983 that both sides reduce their ICBM and SLBM
launchers and heavy bombers in stages to a level of
1,800-some 450 less than allowed in the SALT II
Treaty. (Such reductions, according to informal Sovi-
et statements, would be completed by 1990. 25X1
Within this aggregate, their draft would establish
sublimits-also to be reached in stages-of 1,200 for
MIRV launchers and bombers, 1,080 for MIRV
launchers, and 680 for ICBM MIRV launchers. The
Soviets also proposed limits on the total number of
nuclear warheads and bombs carried on all strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles, but have not tabled specific
numbers.
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Limits on New ICBMs. Moscow would retain the
limits on "new types" of ICBMs in much the same
form as they appeared in the SALT II Treaty. A
"new type" of missile would be defined in terms of a
number of parameters and capabilities (that is, its
length, largest diameter, number of stages, launch
weight, and throw weight). A change in the number of
stages in a currently deployed ICBM or a change of
more than 5 percent in its other capabilities would
constitute the creation of a "new type" of ICBM.
Such limits would permit the modernizing and up-
grading of deployed missiles without their being de-
fined as a "new type" of missile. This is probably of
critical importance to the Soviets because of their
practice of producing evolutionary modifications to
deployed systems. We believe, for example, that a
liquid-propellant follow-on to the SS-18 is in the
preflight stage of development and expect that the
Soviets would claim it as a "modernization" of an
existing system-and not a "new type" of ballistic
missile-within the framework of their START draft.
Limits on Heavy ICBMs. The Soviet draft bans the
production of any new type of heavy ICBM and
prohibits the conversion of launchers of light ICBMs
(or of older types of ICBMs deployed before 1964)
into launchers of heavy ICBMs. It thus carries over
the SALT limit of 308 heavy ICBM launchers into
the START agreement.
The draft does not, however, call for specific reduc-
tions or sublimits on heavy ICBMs. In the past,
Moscow has spurned US proposals in this area as the
equivalent of demands for unilateral concessions at
the expense of one of its key systems. The Soviets,
moreover, completed a program of conversion of
heavy missile launchers at the end of 1980 and now
possess 308 operational SS-18 ICBM launchers at
active ICBM complexes. They clearly are reluctant to
reduce this force-the backbone of their hard-target,
counterforce potential. We expect the Soviets to re-
tain most of their heavy ICBM launchers well into the
1990s.
suggests that these plans would be consistent with
Moscow's START arms control limitations. We be-
lieve that Soviet force goals include:
? An improved first-strike capability against hard-
ened targets as ICBM systems become more
accurate.
? Increased survivability, through deployment of mo-
bile ICBM launchers and additional MIRVed
SLBMs.
? An improved bomber force.
? Deployment of long-range land-attack cruise
missiles.
? Increased use of solid-propellant ICBMs (which
permit increased mobility and reduced vulnerabili-
ty).
In the ICBM area, the Soviets are flight-testing two
solid-propellant missiles that could be deployed near
the end of 1985 or in early 1986. One, the SS-X-24, is
the Soviet-declared "new type" ICBM-a MIRVed
system with 10 RVs that will replace some current
silo-based MIRVed ICBMs (starting with the SS-17)
and may also be deployed on rail-mobile launchers.
The second, the SS-X-25, is a single-RV system that
the Soviets claim is a modernized SS- 13. It will
probably be deployed primarily on mobile launchers
and will replace currently deployed silo-based SS-11s
and SS-13s. Under Moscow's START proposals, we
would expect about 320 SS-X-25s to be deployed.
In the SLBM area, the Soviets are flight-testing a
new MIRVed liquid-propellant missile-the
SS-NX-23-that could be deployed in 1986 as a
replacement for the SS-N-18 on D-III-class SSBNs.
Analysis of their START proposal suggests that they
expect to retain 17 D-III and six Typhoon nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) with
MIRVed launchers and 280 single-RV SS-N-8
SLBM launchers on D-I and D-II SSBNs. They
would probably retire aging Y-class launchers to meet
some of their own reduction requirements.
In addition to the systems already noted, we expect
Bear H ALCM carriers and the new Blackjack heavy
bomber to replace the majority of the Bison and older
... and Soviet Strategic Forces
Our estimate of Soviet plans for the development of
strategic forces over the remainder of the decade
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ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers s 1,800
MIRVed missile launchers and heavy bombers 1,200
equipped with ALCMs
MIRVed missile launchers 1,080
MIRVed ICBM launchers 680
US proposal
Total ballistic missiles 850
Heavy and medium ICBMs 210
Heavy ICBMs 110
Heavy bombers (including Backfires) and cruise 400
missile carriers
Note: The Soviets have also proposed limits on the total number of
nuclear warheads and bombs carried on all strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles, but have not tabled specific numbers.
Bear heavy bombers by the early 1990s. The resulting
force would possess substantially improved penetra-
tion and weapon delivery capabilities. The Soviet
draft suggests a heavy bomber force, excluding the
Backfire, of 120 aircraft.
Moscow's Forces and the US START Position
The Soviets have opposed those elements of the US
START proposal that, in their view, would limit their
flexibility to determine the composition of their stra-
tegic forces. Their spokesmen at START have
claimed that the US position would require rapid,
expensive, large-scale, and unwarranted restructuring
of these forces. They probably believe the major
effects on their forces would include the following:
? Changing the traditional Soviet emphasis on
ICBMs by requiring an increase in reliance on
SLBMs within the framework of a substantially
reduced intercontinental nuclear force. ICBMs cur-
rently account for approximately 60 percent of
Soviet ballistic missile launchers, approximately 80
percent of their aggregate throw weight, 75 percent
of their ballistic missile RVs, and all of their hard-
target-capable RVs. The Soviets have serious con-
cerns about the survivability of their SSBN force
and thus are likely to continue to resist a START
force posture that requires half of their ballistic
missile warheads to be on SSBNs.
? Substantially cutting the Soviet hard-target weap-
ons capable of attacking Minuteman launchers.
- Because only 110 "heavy" SS-18s and 100 "me-
dium" ICBMs (SS-19s or SS-X-24s), as well as a
total of 2,500 ICBM RVs, would be permitted
under the US approach, the Soviets would have to
make some significant choices to modify their
'land-based strategic forces. Currently they have
308 SS-18s and 360 SS-19s, and these missiles
alone have the capability of carrying over 5,200
hard-target warheads. One Soviet START advis-
er has stated that Moscow would insist on retain-
ing the option to replace its SS-18s with newer
versions in the future. We believe that, under an
arms control agreement requiring deep reduc-
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mum possible number of heavy ICBMs.
- The Soviets would have to choose between the
SS- 19 and the SS-X-24 to remain within the
subaggregate for "medium" ICBMs. The current
SS-X-24 carries 10 warheads, four more than the
SS-19, but its warheads are smaller and are less 25X1
capable of destroying hard targets. Moreover, if
the Soviets chose to deploy the SS-X-24 instead
of retaining SS-19s, they could deploy fewer
single-RV ICBMs because of the ICBM RV
sublimit. On the other hand, the prospect of not
deploying the SS-X-24, a key component of their
new generation of strategic missiles, is hardly an
attractive one for the Soviets.
? Limiting the number of deliverable missile war-
heads to less than the estimated minimal Soviet
requirements for targeting. Our analysis indicates
that the Soviets probably believe they would need to
deliver at least 4,000 ICBM and SLBM warheads
for a successful comprehensive strike on North
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America. To achieve this, they probably require an
inventory exceeding 5,000 RVs because of targeting
requirements beyond North America, maintenance
schedules that reduce weapons availability, and the
need to compensate for unreliable weapons and
potential attrition through hostile action.
? Reducing significantly the number of modern
SSBNs. The number of SSBNs deployed with
MIRVed SLBMs would have to be substantially
reduced to stay within RV limits. In one likely
scenario, for example, the Soviets would probably
have to reduce their currently deployed D-III units
from 15 to 12 and would be able to deploy no more
than five Typhoons.' Moreover, nearly all other
Soviet SSBNs and their launchers would have to be
dismantled. We believe that the Soviets would try to
retain their D-I- and D-II-class SSBNs through the
1990s, a force option that their START proposal
would permit.
? Terminating production of Backfire bombers in the
mid-1980s to accommodate US "heavy bomber"
restrictions. By the early 1990s Backfires would
have to be dismantled as compensation for newly
deployed Blackjacks. Soviet negotiators have criti-
cized the US proposal for a ceiling of 400 heavy
bombers, stating that they have no intention of
agreeing to the US plan to include the Backfire
bomber within this sublimit and have no plans to
build other heavy bombers up to that ceiling.
Conclusion
A Soviet strategic force developed within the frame-
work of Moscow's draft START Treaty would pro-
vide a significant improvement over present Soviet
capabilities. Although missile launchers and bombers
would decrease, the number of warheads would in-
crease because RV fractionation would more than
offset the reductions. Such a force would also have an
improved hard-target capability and would be more
survivable as a result of the deployment of mobile
ICBM launchers. On the other hand, it is also true
that, with no limits on fractionation or deployment
levels, the Soviets could make a dramatic increase in
the total number of warheads on ballistic missiles-
probably to more than double the current level-and
deploy larger numbers of their newer systems by the
mid-1990s.
For the present, we believe that the Soviets will avoid
actions that destroy the strategic arms negotiating
process as a bridge to the United States. Nevertheless,
it is likely they will vigorously resist a substantial
deviation from their established START negotiating
position.
We believe, therefore, that Moscow will remain reluc-
tant to seriously discuss proposals that are not more
consistent with its views on:
? Units of account-especially the use of missiles
rather than launchers.
? Required or preferential reductions or abandonment
of their heavy and medium ICBM launchers or,
alternatively, the use of throw weight as a con-
straint-without significant concessions from the
United States.
? The relationship between the total number of war-
heads and cruise missiles (and their delivery sys-
tems) available to the United States and the frac-
tionation limits that may be imposed on the USSR.
? Third-country (British and French) and US for-
ward-based nuclear systems
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The MBFR Negotiations:
Searching for Ways Around
the Data Probtem
Moscow's decision to return to the MBFR negotia-
tions after a temporary suspension following initial
NATO INF deployments has heightened pressures
within NATO for a more flexible Western stance on
the longstanding impasse over the number of Warsaw
Pact troops subject to MBFR-the so-called data
dispute. Some Allies believe that a revised Western
approach to the data problem is necessary because of
Eastern moves over the past year on verification issues
(see inset). These recent moves have drawn the East-
ern position on verification closer in principle to that
of the West and, in the eyes of many Allies, have
gained the tactical and public negotiating initiative
for the East
There is also some sentiment among European mem-
bers of NATO that, in view of Moscow's continued
boycott of START and INF, the West should seek to
use MBFR to allay public anxieties about the future
of US-Soviet arms control. The Soviet leadership
succession could add impetus to these sentiments by
provoking calls within NATO for a new MBFR
initiative as a gesture to reduce East-West tensions.
The Eastern Position
The East's recent strategy in MBFR has been to
induce NATO to forgo its demand for resolution of
the data dispute before any reductions by offering
potential Eastern acceptance of enhanced verification
provisions-including limited on-site inspection. The
current Eastern negotiating position thus calls for
limited US-Soviet withdrawals "by example," that is,
before any treaty is signed, but with agreed verifica-
tion measures in place during these initial withdraw-
als. These withdrawals would be followed by a freeze
on the forces of all MBFR participants. The Soviets
and their allies have argued in Vienna that the
experience gained from the initial withdrawals would
provide the confidence necessary to proceed with
formal treaty signature and further reductions to
NATO-Warsaw Pact parity in manpower. In con-
trast, the West's current proposal calls for data
agreement and treaty signature prior to any East-
Current Proposed Verification
and Confidence-Building Measures
Eastern Proposals:
? Notification of initiation of withdrawals.
? Voluntary invitation of observers to reductions of
"most substantial contingents" of forces.
? Noninterference with NTM.
? Notification of completion of reductions and com-
pliance with the common ceiling.
? Data exchange following completion of reductions.
? Thirty days' prior notification of ground move-
ments-exceeding 20,090 troops into the reduction
area.
? Thirty days' advance notification of exercises ex-
ceeding 20,000 troops.
? Ban on exercises exceeding 40,000 to 50,000 troops.
? Establishment of three or four permanent on-site
checkpoints, manned by observers, to monitor the
exit or entry offorces into the reductions area
following achievement of the common ceiling.
? On-site inspection "by request, " which may be
rejected. if a "sufficiently convincing explanation" is
given by the challenged side.
? Creation of a consultative commission.
Western Proposals:
? Advance notification of out-of-garrison activities by
one or more divisions.
? Exchange of observers at prenotifted out-of-garri-
son activities.
? Thirty days' prior notification of movements into
the reductions area by one or more divisions or
25,000 troops within one calendar month.
? An annual quota of 18 inspections.
? The establishment of checkpoints manned.by ob-
servers from the other side, through which all
forces must transit.
? Exchange of data upon signature of an agreement.
? Noninterference with NTM.
West troop withdrawals.
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The East's revised negotiating strategy almost cer-
tainly reflects awareness of growing frustration within
NATO over the troop data issue. West Germany, for
instance, has been lobbying for a revised NATO
negotiating approach that would defer East-West
agreement on troop data until after initial US-Soviet
withdrawals. As the price for such withdrawals, how-
ever, the East would be required to accept the West's
proposed package of verification measures designed to
ensure Eastern compliance with reductions and limi-
tations (see inset). Other Allies, notably the United
Kingdom and Belgium, are reluctant to fall off
NATO's existing stand on data agreement but share a
sense of concern that the West needs to begin rethink-
ing its overall strategy on data. In general concept,
therefore, most Allies are willing to varying degrees to
explore the trade-offs between enhanced verification
provisions and potential Western flexibility on data
agreement
Significance of the Data Dispute
NATO currently estimates Warsaw Pact forces in the
MBFR area at approximately 1.2 million men. As
shown in table 1, these estimates exceed Eastern
figures tabled in Vienna by 244,000. More than seven
years of discussion on this discrepancy have failed to
reconcile the radical differences between Eastern and
Western data.
The significance of the data dispute in a negotiating
context stems from the fact that whatever level of
forces is agreed upon as the basis for reductions will
determine de facto the size of each side's reductions to
parity. Both sides have endorsed the goal of parity at
about 700,000 ground personnel and 900,000 ground
and air personnel for each side. The West, conse-
quently, has endorsed prior mutual agreement on data
as the basis for its underlying contention that the East
should take radically asymmetrical troop reductions
in order to reach the agreed common ceilings. The
East, on the other hand, has viewed the data discus-
sions not as a means for determining the reasons for
the data discrepancy but essentially as a bargaining
process aimed at fixing an agreed total for Eastern
forces that would result in reductions ratios accept-
able to the East.
In the past, Eastern negotiators have hinted that an
acceptable level of Eastern asymmetry might be on
the order of 50,000 troops. Early in the talks, for
Table 1
Warsaw Pact Manpower in
Central Europe a
Western
Figures
Eastern
Figures
Discrepancy
Total
1,223,255
979,000
244,255
Ground
979,465
796,700
182,765
Air
243,790
182,300
61,490
a Western figures are based on NATO estimates as of 1 January
1983. Eastern figures are based on data last tabled in September
1980.
example, a senior Soviet representative told his US
counterpart that-in light of various advantages at-
tributed to the West-50,000 was the largest amount
of asymmetry that the East would be willing to
absorb. More recently, however, the East has become
adamant in its contention that Western data are
artificially inflated in order to embarrass the East
politically, and, during the most recent rounds of
negotiations, Eastern representatives have simply re-
fused to discuss the data issue.
The Nature of the Discrepancy
Our current understanding of why the East's figures
differ so dramatically from Western estimates is
based on analysis of the extensive and detailed record
of the data dialogue in Vienna
the discrepancy in figures for Eastern
? Genuine differences over whether specific Eastern
forces should be counted. For example, the Polish
Sea-Landing Division is counted by the West but
not by the East, which claims that the unit is
subordinate to the Polish Navy. (Naval forces are
not subject to MBFR.) Our evidence, however,
shows that the division is under Army command.
? Possible Western overestimation of Eastern man-
power levels for some categories of forces, such as
divisions, which the East has included in its tabled
figures.
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? Deliberate, systematic Eastern exclusion of entire
categories of forces (mainly rear services and nation-
al-level institutions) from figures for Polish, Czecho-
slovak, and East German manpower
the difference results from t ast's deliberate exclu-
sion of certain categories of Polish ground forces
personnel, mainly in rear service units.
Information on how Polish rear service personnel were
excluded from the East's official data suggests that
the East applied this same exclusion principle for the
forces of each East European participant and perhaps
for Soviet forces as well. Indeed, throughout the early
period of the data discussion, Eastern negotiators
argued that the East should be compensated by the
West for large numbers of Warsaw Pact personnel
that performed duties analogous to those performed
by civilians in NATO forces. In support of this so-
called civilian analogue issue, Eastern negotiators in
the 1975-78 period contended that whereas Eastern
official data included all combat, combat support, and
some service support personnel, there was in fact a
fourth category of forces which was predominantly
filled by civilians in the NATO force structure but by
uniformed military personnel in Pact forces.
The East, however, did an abrupt about-face on its
civilian analogue argument when it apparently be-
came clear, as a consequence of persistent Western
questioning, that the West did not intend to bargain
on the size of the discrepancy but rather to hold the
East accountable for an explanation of its official
data. The East, in response, resorted to the categorical
assertion that Eastern official data tabled in 1976 did
indeed include all Warsaw Pact personnel in the
MBFR reductions area, exactly as defined and under-
stood by the West. This contradiction now constitutes
a basic political obstacle to progress on the MBFR
data dispute. In effect, the discrepancy, as defined on
the basis of current definitions and counting rules,
cannot be reconciled without an Eastern admission
that its originally tabled data deliberately excluded
large numbers of personnel subject to MBFR criteria
and that previous Eastern contentions to the contrary
on the negotiating record were false
Alternative Approaches to Data
Western demands for Eastern reductions that are
radically asymmetrical relative to those of NATO will
almost certainly be rejected by the East on the
grounds that such reductions would be highly prejudi-
cial to Soviet military and political security require-
ments in Eastern Europe. Likewise, the East will
continue to reject any Western effort to reopen the
data discussion if it is not clear from the outset that
the West, in effect, is willing to redefine the catego-
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ries of Eastern manpower subject to MBFR in a 25X1
manner that reduces the size of presumed Eastern
reductions relative to those of NATO. Politically,
however, a Western redefinition approach might
prove difficult for Western policymakers to endorse if
such a revised approach implied a willingness to
concede a de facto Eastern advantage in uniformed
military manpower, whether on the basis of the
civilian analogue argument or some other scheme to
reallocate Eastern manpower with respect to the
MBFR data base
An alternative approach, which has been informally
discussed from time to time within NATO circles,
would be to focus the discussion of data on the major
combat and combat support elements of Eastern
ground forces, thus deferring or even excluding rear
services support personnel from consideration in
MBFR. This would have the logic of focusing man- 25X1
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ening and militarily significant portions of Eastern
forces. Additionally, because combat and combat
support forces are structurally more coherent and
distinct than service support forces, such an approach
would focus the verification problem on those Eastern
units that are most observable and identifiable by
national technical means of intelligence monitoring.
From an Eastern perspective, however, a combat
forces approach to data is unlikely to be seen as a
viable basis for reconstructing the MBFR data base.
Although this approach would allow the East to
reenter the data discussion under new counting
rules-thus avoiding the question of what was exclud-
ed from previous Eastern data-it would not reduce
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Table 2
Combat/Combat Support Data Breakout for
NATO and Warsaw Pact Ground Forces
Combat and
Combat Support
Major
Headquarters
and Service
Support
Total
Warsaw Pact
total
726
253
979
Soviet
409
78
487
NSWP
317
175
492
NATO total
580
225
805
150
65
215
430
160
590
to any significant degree the ratio of East-West
asymmetry required to reach manpower parity (see
table 2). In fact, depending on the forces to be covered
and the definition of residual ceilings for combat
forces, the degree of Eastern asymmetry required to
reach parity with Western combat forces could easily
approximate the 3-to-1 ratio for reductions required
in the current Western proposal.
An approach that would defer data resolution until
after limited US-Soviet withdrawals-as favored in
concept by some NATO Allies and by Moscow as
well-has the political attraction of allowing a fairly
straightforward agreement on troop reductions, unen-
cumbered (at least initially) by the legacy of the data
dispute. As noted previously, Eastern negotiators in
Vienna have hinted that in order to achieve such an
agreement the Warsaw Pact states may be willing to
accept a series of verification provisions designed to
give the West assurance regarding Eastern compli-
ance obligations
From an intelligence perspective, the actual size of
Soviet forces withdrawn from Central Europe under a
limited US-Soviet accord could be monitored with
generally high confidence if the time and place of
such withdrawals were openly stipulated and if the
West's proposed on-site verification measures were in
place during the reductions process. However, in the
absense of a prior East-West redefinition of overall
Eastern- forces subject to MBFR, the West would
continue to estimate Eastern force totals according to
existing understandings of Eastern force structure and
manpower levels. This, in turn, would result in a
continued substantial divergence between Eastern and
Western claims for Warsaw Pact troop strength in the
area and, in effect, simply postpone a renewed data
dispute until after limited troop withdrawals
The intelligence problems associated with these vary-
ing hypothetical approaches to data resolution in
MBFR highlight the fundamental problem of moni-
toring manpower as the unit of account for MBFR
purposes. Manpower remains essentially invisible to
national means of verification, and in the aggregate is
far too numerous and diverse to be encompassed by
any practical or negotiable on-site inspection scheme.
A direct implication of this problem is that any
MBFR accord based on manpower will require that
Western policymakers accept some measure of uncer-
tainty regarding strict Eastern compliance. The de-
gree of this uncertainty can be narrowed to the extent
the West can engage the East in a detailed discussion
of those forces subject to MBFR, but the degree of
intrusiveness inherent in such a discussion will raise
serious objections from the East. In practical terms,
therefore, differences between Western and Eastern
data might well be narrowed but not eliminated.
From the policy perspective, the recurrent dilemma
presented in MBFR will continue to be the relative
security trade-offs between intelligence uncertainty
and the benefits of a more productive East-West
conventional arms control dialogue
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The Status of Soviet Ballistic
Missile Defense and Implications
for the ABM Treaty
Status of Soviet ABM Defenses
Since signing the ABM Treaty in 1972, the Soviets
have continued research and development on conven-
tional ballistic missile defense (BMD) and large
phased-array radars and have pursued research in
advanced technologies that could have BMD applica-
tions. Since 1979 they also have been upgrading the
Moscow ABM Activity. The single-layer defense of
Galosh long-range interceptors at Moscow is being
converted to a two-layer defense using a mix of
Galosh and SH-08 short-range, high-acceleration in-
terceptors. When completed, the upgrading will pro-
vide the Soviets with a more capable defense against a
small US attack or increasingly sophisticated third-
country missiles. In a large-scale attack, the 100
ABM interceptors allowed by the Treaty would quick-
ly be exhausted, but they might be effective in
defending selected targets in the Moscow area, such
as national command and control facilities
the Soviets now have
100 Treaty-accountable ABM launchers-the maxi-
mum number allowed by the Treaty. As shown in
figure 1, there are 32 operational aboveground Galosh
launchers and 68 silos under construction-16 in the
E-ring defenses, 40 in the B-ring, and 12 at site C-02.
Not counted are a silo-like structure at site C-02 that
could be a command and control or electronics sup-
port facility and a disassembled launcher at the
Kubinka ABM training facility. We believe that the
E-ring sites will be loaded with a silo-launched version
of the Galosh, while the B-ring sites and the C-02 site
will be loaded with SH-08s.
Galosh launchers. We believe that the site could be
completed in two to three years after silo construction
begins.
Construction continues on the large phased-array
ABM radar and the adjacent launchsite (C-02) at
Pushkino. The radar appears to be externally com-
plete, but it probably will be at least 1986 before its 25X1
electronic components are installed, tested, and ready
for operation.
In mid-1982 the Soviets began to modify a former
SA-2 site, apparently to convert it to an ABM launch-
site. In April and May 1983, construction materials,
possibly silo facing blocks, were stacked within the
site perimeter and construction was suspended. With
the number of launchers in the Moscow deployment
area so close to the Treaty limit, any silos built at that
site will require dismantling operational aboveground
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Figure 1
Ballistic Missile Defenses at Moscow
ABM training
facility
Dog House radar
E-24 N 8 silos ~O 8 Galosh launchers
^ Operational Galosh launchers
(above ground)
0 ABM sites under construction
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Large Phased-Array Radars. The Soviets are con-
structing a nationwide system of five new large
phased-array radars (LPARs) that, when complete,
will enhance their ballistic missile early warning
(BMEW) capabilities and their ability to assess the
scope and objectives of a ballistic missile attack C
The locations and orientation of the radars,
with the exception of one under construction near
Krasnoyarsk, are consistent with previous Soviet de-
ployment of BMEW radars. Although we believe
these LPARs were designed and intended for BMEW,
their precision tracking capability gives them the
inherent potential to perform space tracking and
limited battle management support. We estimate that
all of them will be operational by 1990.
The radar near Krasnoyarsk (also known as the
Abalakovo LPAR) is physically similar to LPARs the
Soviets have said are to be used for BMEW. If it is for
this purpose, however, its location and orientation
raise serious questions of compliance with the ABM
Treaty, which states that BMEW radars must be
located on the periphery and be oriented outward. The
Krasnoyarsk LPAR is 740 kilometers from the near-
est border and overlooks nearly 4,000 kilometers of
Soviet landmass. Despite Soviet claims that it is to be
used exclusively for space tracking, the elevation
angle, orientation, and location of the radar suggest
that its primary role is BMEW. The radar would
provide little additional coverage to the Soviet space
tracking network.
Directed Energy. Since the mid-1960s, the Soviet
military has sponsored research in high-energy lasers
for ground-based ballistic missile defense. We believe
that these efforts are still in research and that the
Soviets probably have not yet made a decision to
develop and deploy a laser weapon for terminal BMD.
Such a decision would probably await the results of
feasibility tests of an experimental laser device
against RV targets. If the Soviets were to fund a high-
priority program to design, develop, and produce a
prototype by 1985, we estimate that the first weapon
could become operational by the year 2000.
which interceptor missiles would find difficult to
engage. Since it does not use a nuclear device to
destroy targets, a laser weapon would not add to the
problem of radar blackout. The potential rapid refire
capability and large number of shots from a laser
BMD system would give it a distinct advantage over 25X1
conventional ABM systems. A ground-based laser 25X1
BMD system, however, suffers serious disadvantages.
It would, for example, be more susceptible to adverse
weather conditions than a conventional ABM system.
In fact, under some weather conditions, it probably
would not work at all
There is evidence,that the Soviets are seeking to
develop space-based laser weapons, which would not
be hampered by adverse propagation conditions creat-
ed by the atmosphere. We believe, however, that the
first such weapon will be used in an antisatellite role.
The fragility and orbital predictability of satellites
make them more vulnerable targets than ICBM and
SLBM boosters. Moreover, the requirements for con-
tinuous coverage by launch-detection systems and the
large numbers of orbiting laser weapons and launch-
ers required to ensure the rapid destruction of missiles
make BMD the most difficult and costly of potential
space-based laser applications
ATBMs-A Potential Problem Area. Modern tech-
nology has eroded the distinction between defensive
systems that could be used only against tactical
ballistic missiles and those that could be used also 25X1
against strategic offensive weapons. While defensive
systems designed to defend against strategic offensive
missiles are limited by the ABM Treaty, those meant
to engage tactical ballistic missiles are not.F____1 25X1
Development and deployment of antitactical ballistic
missiles (ATBMs), therefore, could provide the Sovi-
ets with technological and operational advances di-
rectly applicable to their ABM efforts. Moscow, for
example, currently is developing a SAM system-the
SA-X-12-that probably will have ATBM capabili-
ties. The mobility of ATBMs and their potential
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A laser BMD weapon offers several advantages over
conventional ABM systems. Because a laser beam
would reach its target almost instantaneously, it could
be particularly useful against maneuvering RVs,
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Treaty-related questions. The Treaty obliges the par-
ties not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based
ABM systems and prohibits the deployment or trans-
fer of ABM systems to other states
Outlook
The same considerations that led the Soviets to sign
the Treaty are likely, in our view, to cause them to
continue to abide by the letter of its provisions-at
least for the near term-and to promote its continua-
tion. The Soviets probably entered into negotiations
for the ABM Treaty, despite their commitment to
strategic defense, because they believed that the
problems associated with defense against ballistic
missiles were difficult to solve and that their ABM
technology was substantially behind that of the Unit-
ed States. In addition, the threat posed by the US
ballistic missile forces (which had expanded rapidly
after the early 1960s and were being further improved
by programs for MIRVs and penetration aids) clearly
had outstripped Soviet efforts to counter them. Thus,
in the late 1960s the Soviets evidently preferred to
avoid unlimited competition in an area where they
perceived themselves to be technologically inferior
and concluded that it was in their best interests to
limit US ABM deployment options, even if they had
to limit their own to do so.
By continuing to support the ABM Treaty, the Soviets
probably believe they can count on at most a modest
US ABM effort and thus will not need to channel
resources away from other high-priority defense pro-
grams or alter the momentum attained in upgrading
the Moscow defenses or in developing the ABM-X-3
system. They want to avoid a defensive arms race that
would force them into head-to-head technological
competition with the United States. Continued adher-
ence to the ABM Treaty will forestall the risk of
greater US technology advances in conventional
ABM systems, thereby preserving a rough parity with
US ABM systems more than a decade old.
The Soviets can continue to improve the Moscow
defenses, perhaps by constructing three additional
phased-array radars within 150 kilometers of the city,
and still be within Treaty limits. These radars could
be oriented to support deployment of additional
launchers at Moscow or provide ABM battle manage-
ment support to a broader deployment area should the
Treaty be modified or abrogated.
Deployment of nonconventional ballistic missile de-
fenses probably will not become a Treaty issue for
perhaps another decade. Even so, the Soviets may
propose changes that would specifically address ad-
vanced weapons concepts in an effort to control or
negate planned US programs. In fact, if they fail to
engage the United States in space arms control
negotiations to achieve these objectives, they could
use the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC),
which was established as a joint forum to address
Treaty issues, to oppose the US Strategic Defense
Inititative-a proposed research and development
program to investigate the feasibility of using lasers
for a space-based ABM defense. They could charge
that the United States was undercutting Article V of
the Treaty, which bars the development, testing, or
deployment of space-based ABM systems or compo-
nents. The Treaty does not prohibit the creation of
ABM systems based on "other physical principles,"
but, if either party wishes to propose specific limita-
tions on such systems, this would require discussion in
the SCC and could result in Treaty revision. The
Soviets probably would balk at such a proposed
revision until they were confident of their own efforts
to develop exotic defenses.
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Soviet Proposals for
Arms Control in Space
The'Soviets are focusing their public efforts for arms
control in space on a new draft multilateral treaty
that would ban the use or threat of force in or from
space. Their primary objective, however, appears to be
a resumption of US-USSR talks on antisatellite
(ASAT) systems.
The 1983 Space Arms Control Offensive
The Soviet Union launched a major campaign for
space arms control in 1983 following President Rea-
gan's 23 March announcement of US plans for the
development of a space-based ballistic missile defense.
Moscow made space-related arms control the center-
piece of its disarmament activities at the 198.3 UN
General Assembly, and the Soviet political leadership
and scientific community devoted increasing attention
to the issue:
? In an interview with Der Spiegel in April, General
Secretary Andropov urged the adoption of an agree-
ment prohibiting the use of force in or from space
and called for consultations between Soviet and
American scientists to explore the consequences of
developing ballistic missile defenses.
? Within the Soviet scientific community, Yevgeniy
Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of
Sciences, played a particularly prominent role, serv-
ing as host to a Moscow meeting of world scientists
to discuss space-related arms control, addressing the
issue in both foreign and domestic media, and
attending several other international forums to pro-
mote Soviet outer space proposals.
? In August, during a meeting with several US Sena-
tors, Andropov proposed a new outer space treaty,
which shortly thereafter was introduced before the
UN General Assembly. He also displayed concern
with a more specific space-related threat by an-
nouncing a unilateral Soviet moratorium on the
launching of ASAT systems.
during the 1978-79 US-USSR ASAT talks or the
1981 Soviet initiative to ban the deployment of any
weapons in outer space (see foldout, page 25). It
appears directed at stopping US plans for a space-
based ballistic missile defense and goes beyond earlier
proposals by:
? Prohibiting the use of space-based weapons against
objects in the atmosphere and on Earth as well as in
space.
? Barring the threat as well as the use of force.
? Banning the testing of ASAT and other space-based
weapon systems.
? Eliminating existing ASAT systems.
? Prohibiting the testing and use of manned space-
craft for all military uses (presumably including the
military-related activities in which the Soviets en-
gage during their manned spaceflights).
The ASAT Moratorium. The public announcement of 25X1
a moratorium was a move without precedent in
Moscow's previous space-related arms control initia-
tives, although the Soviets did suspend testing of their
orbital interceptor on an earlier occasion-during the
1978-79 US-USSR ASAT talks.' The present mora-
torium, according to Andropov's statement, is to
remain in force as long as other countries follow
Moscow's lead and refrain from "putting into space
ASAT weapons of any type." The moratorium does
not commit Moscow to dismantle its operational
interceptor or interfere with its development of air-
borne and ground-based laser weapon systems. It
does, however, bar the Soviets from launching and
space testing their operational or developmental orbit-
al interceptors. In return, the United States-which
has no operational ASAT system-is to refrain from
testing in space its developmental ASAT; the minia-
ture homing vehicle (MHV).
' The Soviets suspended testing following the first session of the
talks when they were told that abstention from testing would
increase the possibility of reaching an agreement on ASAT weap-
The 1983 Draft Treaty. Moscow's new treaty propos-
al is more comprehensive and ambitious than the
limited agreement the Soviets were willing to accept
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Soviet Priorities and Prospects
The special concern with ASAT weapons evidenced
by the moratorium proposal reflects Moscow's recog-
nition that Washington's ASAT plans are closer to
fruition than US plans for the development of other
space-based weapons that would be covered by the
draft Soviet treaty. Indeed, the MHV entered flight-
testing on 22 January of this year
The announced moratorium probably also reflected
the Soviets' concern about the limitations of their
orbital interceptor ASAT and about the difficulty of
developing the technology necessary for new systems.
The Soviet Union began testing a nonnuclear orbital
interceptor in 1968, and only nine of the 15 tests have
been successful. Between 1976 and 1981, there were
five tests of a developmental version incorporating a
probable passive electro-optical sensor; all were fail-
ures
The Soviets are aware, if only from US press report-
ing, that the MHV employs technology considerably
more advanced than that developed mainly during the
1960s for their own ASAT system. We also believe
that a potentially more threatening Soviet space-
based weapon, a laser, is still in the research and
development phase. Moscow's concern about the US
ASAT weapon is probably heightened by its aware-
ness that its overall dependence on space systems is
growing as a consequence of the ongoing upgrading of
its space capabilities
USSR's problem
with space-based laser weapons does not lie in a lack
of ability to develop the necessary technology but
rather in the time required to convert such technology
into an operational system. We estimate that a mega-
watt-class prototype-that is, one with a range of
several hundred kilometers and a capability to cause
physical damage to a satellite-could not be tested
until the late 1980s at the earliest and probably not
until the early 1990s. Meanwhile, it is in Moscow's
interest to delay the development of US ASAT
systems
The Soviets are not likely to be optimistic about
achieving this goal in light of the US position that
compliance with the conditions of Andropov's morato-
rium would leave the USSR with an ASAT monopo-
ly. They have, however, continued to use their press,
the UN forum, the Conference on Disarmament, and
other unofficial channels to criticize US ASAT devel-
talks.
opment and hint at the need for US-Soviet ASAT
over the past few months several Soviet officials,
stated that
the USSR was willing to engage in unofficial ASAT
talks
It is unclear at this time what future role the Soviets
will assign to their ASAT moratorium now that MHV
testing has begun. By continuing to adhere to the
moratorium, Moscow might hope to depict itself as
committed to achieving an ASAT agreement. If the
Soviets do resume their own ASAT tests, they are
likely to claim it is a response to MHV testing and
seek to blame the United States for starting an outer
space arms race.
The Soviets will continue to use their proposed multi-
lateral treaty as a means of pressuring the United
States on arms control for outer space, but they
apparently would prefer a resumption of US-USSR
bilateral ASAT talks as a more promising forum for
negotiations. Even without progress toward real nego-
tiations, the Soviet proposals serve to support the
propaganda portrayal of the USSR as the main
advocate of disarmament and the United States as the
principal obstacle.
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Soviet Positions on Arms Control in Outer Space,
1978-83
US-USSR ASAT Not considered.
Talks 1978-79
1981 proposal for a Weapons of any kind
multilateral treaty to in orbit, installed on
ban the deployment a celestial body or
of any weapons in deployed in any oth-
outer space er way.
1983 proposal for Any space weapons
multilateral treaty in orbit deployed on
banning the use of celestial bodies or in
force in and from any other manner for
space hitting targets on
Earth, in the atmo-
sphere, or in space.
Destroying, damaging,
or changing the trajec-
tory or orbit of a space
object in which the US
or USSR had an inter-
est.
Destroying, damaging,
or disturbing the normal
functioning or flight tra-
jectory of space vehicles
that are not weapons.
Use and threat of force
in, to, and from outer
space. Destroying, dam-
aging, or disrupting the
normal functioning or
flight trajectories of
space vehicles.
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Treatment of the Exceptions
Space Shuttle
Test suspension should Insisted on right to take
apply to the US shuttle. action against non-weap-
ons-related satellites
whose mission it consid-
ered hostile, such as di-
rect broadcast satellites.
Would ban the use of Treaty language would
the shuttle for weapon allow retention of ASAT
deployment. weapons for use against
deployment of ASAT
weapons by other side.
Would ban testing or use None.
of the shuttle for mili-
tary, including ASAT,
purposes.
Testing,
Dismantling, and
Development
Test suspensions should Discussed verification by
apply to "any means" of national technical means
damaging, destroying, or and agreement not to inter-
changing the trajectory fere with such means.
of a space object. De-
layed discussions of dis-
mantling existing sys-
tems and banning
further development.
No provision included. Use of national technical
means available and ban on
interference with monitor-
ing facilities of other states.
Ban on testing of space- Use of national technical
based weapons capable means available and ban on
of hitting targets on interference with monitor-
Earth. Ban on develop- ing facilities of other states.
ment and testing of new
ASAT weapons. Elimi-
nation of existing ASAT
systems.
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Other Arms Control Issues
The suspension last fall of the principal East-West
negotiations on arms control brought increased inter-
national attention to discussion in other forums, par-
ticularly the Conference on Disarmament in Europe
and the UN Conference on Disarmament. General
Secretary Chernenko further underscored the poten-
tial significance of these forums by implying that,
because of the impasse on INF and START, the best
prospect for improved US-Soviet relations lay in
progress on less prominent issues, including the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, a comprehensive test ban
treaty, and negotiations to ban chemical weapons.
Except for chemical warfare, however, the Soviets
have given no indication of willingness to moderate
their positions on any of these issues. In particular,
Soviet reluctance to provide what the US would
consider adequate information for verifying compli-
ance remains a major stumblingblock to agreement on
all of them.
Conference on Disarmament in Europe
Moscow's strategy so far at the CDE, which opened in
Stockholm on 17 January and recessed on 16 March,
has been to profess deep interest in arms control and
to reiterate earlier Eastern proposals, while opposing
confidence- and security-building measures that
would provide significant additional information on
Warsaw Pact military activities. The Soviets also have
used the forum to denounce NATO defense policies,
particularly the deployment of new intermediate-
range nuclear missiles.
In the weeks following the suspension of major East-
West arms negotiations in the fall of 1983, the Soviets
appeared uncertain over how to approach the upcom-
ing CDE, and the Finnish press reported on 14
December that Foreign Minister Gromyko had told
the Finnish Foreign Minister that he had not yet
decided whether to take part in the conference.F__
arms control issues. Nonetheless, the Soviets sought to
ensure that they not appear to have softened their
position. A TASS commentary of 31 December char-
acterized the US announcement of the upcoming
bilateral meeting as a "publicity statement" intended
to "instill complacency" in Western Europe and the
United States and asserted that neither the CDE nor
bilateral contacts could substitute for the suspended
talks in Geneva
Gromyko underscored this point by delivering a tough
speech to the conference on 18 January. He accused
the US of exporting "militarism, enmity, and a war
psychosis" to Europe, of wrecking the dialogue on
limiting nuclear weapons in Europe by deploying its
new missiles, and of embarking upon military expan-
sion with "maniacal obsession." He said that the
USSR was ready for serious negotiating but would
not participate in talks used to cover "militarist
plans," and he called statements that the US was
ready to talk while INF deployments continued "ver-
bal camouflage."
Gromyko also outlined Soviet proposals, none of
which were new. He called upon other states to follow
the Soviet example of unilaterally renouncing first use
of nuclear weapons and urged NATO to respond
favorably to the Warsaw Pact proposal of January
1983 for a treaty on the mutual nonuse of military
force. He said it would be worthwhile to address the
problem of reducing military spending, referred to the
desirability of ridding Europe of chemical weapons-
an allusion to the Soviet proposal of 10 January-and
reiterated Soviet support for a nuclear-free zone in
northern Europe. He also suggested that further
attention be given to reaching agreements on prior
notification of major military exercises and move-
ments and of air and naval exercises adjoining Eu-
rope
The decision that Gromyko would attend the confer-
ence and meet with Secretary Shultz presumably
reflected Soviet concern not to appear less reluctant
than the US and its allies to maintain a dialogue on
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Gromyko expressed Soviet determination to resist
proposals for confidence- and security-building meas-
ures that would result in "unilateral advantages"-
that is, require the USSR to reveal military informa-
tion which the US, as a non-European power, would
be exempt from revealing. A subsequent article in
Pravda, and comments by Soviet officials, also
stressed this point. Meanwhile, the persistence with
which Soviet representatives argued for Western
agreement to a nonuse-of-force treaty prompted the
chief of the US delegation to charge them with
making this a "precondition" for discussing the issues
The Soviets do not appear to be planning any major
new initiatives at Stockholm, although they are likely
to elaborate upon the proposals outlined by Gromyko
by tabling specific confidence- and security-building
measures. These probably will include:
? Prohibition of military exercises involving more
than 50,000 troops.
? Lowering the threshold for advance notification of
exercises from 25,000 to 20,000 troops and extend-
ing the leadtime from three weeks to one month.
? Requiring withdrawal of nuclear-armed ships from
the Mediterranean Sea and prohibiting nuclear
weapons in those Mediterranean countries where
they are not already deployed
The Soviets may also give more prominence to their
proposal for a treaty banning chemical weapons from
Europe. In general, however, they appear to have little
expectation of substantive achievements at the CDE
over the near term (the first phase is expected to last
until November 1986), and they are likely to continue
treating the conference primarily as a propaganda
forum, while opposing Western efforts to secure an
agreement on greater exchange of data.
Threshold Test Ban Treaty
The past year brought no change in the divergent
positions of the United States and the Soviet Union
regarding the unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty
(TTBT) of 1974, which limits the yield of nuclear tests
to 150 kilotons. The issue of verification remains the
chief stumblingblock. The Soviets claim that imple-
mentation of the treaty would result in an exchange of
information adequate for verifying compliance, while
the US insists that better means of verification must
be negotiated before the treaty can go into force.
The compliance issue was raised to a new level of
visibility in late January, when the President sent to
Congress a report charging the Soviets with noncom-
pliance with several arms control agreements. On the
TTBT, the report concluded that a number of Soviet
tests were in "likely violation." The Soviets quickly
responded by presenting the US with an aide memoire
of their own-which they subsequently published-
charging a number of US violations of arms control
agreements. It stated that the USSR has data indicat-
ing "numerous cases" in which the US has exceeded
the TTBT's 150-kiloton limit.
General Secretary Chernenko, in a speech on 2
March, cited ratification of the TTBT as one of a
number of actions the US could take on security
issues other than INF and START that could initiate
a dramatic breakthrough in US-Soviet relations. He
gave no indication, however, that the Soviets are
prepared to moderate their opposition to enhanced
verification procedures, which has been the principal
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
As with the TTBT, US and Soviet positions on the
issue of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTB), which
would outlaw all nuclear explosions, remained essen-
tially static through 1983. In 1980, the United States
suspended participation in CTB talks with the UK
and the USSR as a protest over Soviet action in
Afghanistan. In July 1982, the new US administra-
tion, seeing an urgent need to modernize US strategic
systems, formally withdrew from the talks on the
grounds that verification capabilities were insufficient
to provide an adequate basis for negotiating a treaty.
Since then, the principal venue for nuclear test ban
discussions has been the Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva, where the US has sought to keep discus-
sion focused on verification, while the USSR and
nonaligned countries have argued for expanding the
scope of negotiations. In addition, some members of
the Western group have privately urged the US and
UK to move in this direction
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The Soviets have repeatedly called for resumption of
the CTB trilaterals, most recently in Chernenko's
speech of 2 March. The US has responded that the
CD provides an adequate forum for seeking the
improved verification capabilities necessary for an
effective nuclear test ban. The USSR has charged the
US and UK with using this issue as a "smokescreen"
to delay progress toward negotiations and is likely to
make an intense effort during the current CD session
to isolate the US on this issue. Regardless of tactical
maneuvering, however, the differences between the
US and USSR make it extremely unlikely that there
will be meaningful progress at the CD on this issue,
and the Soviets have given no indication that they will
take any substantive initiative that would facilitate
resumption of the trilaterals.
Chemical Warfare
Discussion of chemical warfare (CW) during the past
year also centered on the UN Conference on Disar-
mament in Geneva. The US seized the initiative last
spring when Vice President Bush called for acceler-
ated negotiations and US delegates submitted a de-
tailed statement on the content of a CW convention.
On 17 January, Secretary Shultz announced at the
Stockholm conference that the US would table a draft
treaty to ban chemical warfare globally within the
next few months.
In an apparent attempt to regain the initiative,. the
Soviets announced on 21 February that they are
prepared to accept the principle of continuous interna-
tional monitoring of destruction sites. Previously, they
had indicated that they would be willing to accept
international inspection only on a quota system,
whereby a certain number of inspections would be
permitted each year. The Soviets continue to reject
the principle of compulsory inspection by challenge,
whereby a party could invoke special on-site inspec-
tion procedures whenever it had reason to believe a
violation might have occurred.
the decisiori to alter the Soviet pose ion
was made late last year and was intended to preempt
the expected tabling of a US draft.
The Soviets took a separate initiative in January of
this year when they presented NATO representatives
in Moscow with a proposal to ban chemical weapons
from Europe, an idea originally broached in the
Political Declaration of the Warsaw Pact summit of
January 1983. The proposal called for a meeting later
this year of states interested in such an agreement. In
making the proposal, the Soviets stated that it was
meant to be separate from but parallel to the negotia-
tions in Geneva. The Soviet move may have been
intended in part to play upon divisions between those
NATO members who support the idea of a regional
ban and the US, which prefers a global agreement.
General Secretary Chernenko further highlighted the
chemical warfare issue in his speech on 2 March,
when he said that conditions are "beginning to ripen"
for an accord :and hinted that the Soviets might be
prepared to negotiate further on the issue of verifica-
tion. Despite his relative optimism, however, it re-
mains to be seen whether there indeed is sufficient
flexibility in the Soviet position on verification to
allow for significant progress toward an agreement.
Meanwhile, the US and USSR have exchanged public
charges of misconduct in relation to chemical warfare.
The President's report to Congress on Soviet noncom-
pliance with arms control agreements charged that
the USSR repeatedly has violated its legal obligations
under the Biologic and Toxin Weapons Convention of
1972, and customary international law as codified in
the 1925 Geneva Protocol, by maintaining an offen-
sive biological warfare program and by involving itself
in chemical warfare activities in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan. The Soviet aide memoire issued in re-
sponse to the President's report charged the US with
obstructing negotiations on chemical weapons and
accelerating production of chemical agents, but did
not accuse the US of violating specific agreements.F-
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The Soviet Diplomatic Note
on US Noncompliance With
Arms Control Agreements-
On 27 January 1984 the Soviet Union delivered to the
US State Department a diplomatic note containing
several charges of alleged US noncompliance with
arms control agreements. This occurred a few days
after the President had sent Congress a report on
Soviet noncompliance. Soon afterward, TASS pub-
lished the text of the Soviet note.
The Soviets in the past have raised questions in the
US-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)
about US compliance, calling attention to activities
that they said were inconsistent with relevant agree-
ments. They have usually eschewed publicity, howev-
er, and have periodically rebuked the United States
for failing to maintain the confidentiality of SCC
proceedings. Thus, although Soviet leaders were prob-
ably aware that Washington was considering some
publicity on the subject, they probably were discon-
certed by the creation of a public dialogue, by the
substance of the questions aired, and by the relative
explicitness of the subsequent discussion)
The Soviet Approach to Compliance
The general Soviet attitude toward compliance with
provisions of accords has several characteristics:
? Moscow observes those agreed provisions that are
specific and detailed, are policed by strong US
monitoring capabilities, and include arrangements
for addressing compliance issues.
? Compliance has been to the letter, rather than the
spirit, of such provisions, with the Soviets availing
themselves of the flexibility inherent in ambiguous
treaty language and asymmetries in information to
make their activities appear consistent with their
obligations.
statements or interpretations.
under the SALT I Interim Agreement, for example,
and have remained within the numerical limits for
system components mandated by the ABM Treaty.
When challenged about ambiguous situations arising
in these compliance areas, they have either undertak-
en what they probably believed were corrective ac-
tions or provided answers that they may have thought
solved the problem.
In its responses, however, Moscow has never acknowl-
edged wrongdoing; in fact, despite occasional remedi-
al actions, its rhetoric has at times been abrasive.
When answering a US query, moreover, the Soviets
have carefully set forth precisely the amount of data
required, in their view, and no more. On balance,
Moscow has probably viewed its own activities related
to SALT I as legally defensible.
Toward the unratified SALT II Treaty, the Soviet
public position always has been one of calculated
ambiguity. On the one hand, Moscow has stated that
the Soviet Union is always true to its word, would not
undercut the Treaty, and would not jeopardize ongo-
ing talks. On the other, it has stated that its compli-
ance is voluntary and hinted periodically that its
abstinence from actions inconsistent with the unrati-
fied Treaty cannot be taken for granted indefinitely.
In recent months, new developments in Moscow's
weapon programs have strained the system by which
several strategic arms restrictions have been honored,
with the United States questioning Moscow's inter-
pretation of, and compliance with, some provisions of
the ABM and SALT II agreements. Nevertheless,
during past arms control negotiations, the Soviets
bargained with apparent vigor both to preserve weap-
on programs in progress and to ensure that the
language of the provisions being discussed would be
consistent with those programs. In this context, the
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In several significant compliance areas, Soviet activi-
ties have illustrated these attitudes. The Soviets have
followed the regimen for compensatory dismantle-
ment of strategic offensive weapons that is required
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Soviets probably believe that they can justify their
current actions, including those discussed in the Presi-
dent's report, as basically correct and consistent with
their obligations.
Moscow's Charges Against the United States
There is a degree of polemic associated with Mos-
cow's presentation, of course. Nevertheless, the Sovi-
ets may feel that they have substantive reasons for the
most significant of the charges made in their note of
missiles. As it became apparent that the Protocol
would expire before its issues were resolved, Soviet
military commentators, as well as Soviet diplomats on
the SCC, voiced reluctance to consider reducing other
strategic weapon systems.
the contents of the Protocol related to
ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles
(GLCMs and SLCMs) were an integral part of the
Treaty and had been taken into account when the
other aggregate limitations were negotiated
27 January.'
Ratification of SALT H. The Soviets have stated
several times in the SCC that, because the SALT II
Treaty has not been ratified, it is outside the purview
of the compliance framework and beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the SCC. Although they have provided some
information on activities limited by SALT II in
response to US queries, they have, in general, been
slow to answer SALT II questions and have expressed
disapproval of any extension of the SCC to deal with
SALT II issues.
Deployments of INF Systems to Western Europe as
"Circumvention" of SALT II Limits. Throughout
most of the SALT negotiations, the question of
restrictions on US forward-based systems has been a
contentious issue. For the most part, the Soviets
insisted that such systems be included-or at least
"taken account of"-in any agreement limiting stra-
tegic arms. They also stated that any reduction of
central systems beyond the levels specified in the
SALT II Treaty would have to take into account the
existence of these forward-based systems.
The Cruise Missile as an Unresolved Protocol Issue.
Soviet military officers and civilian sources have
frequently expressed concern over the threat that US
cruise missiles could present to the USSR. For rough-
ly a decade, the Soviets have tried to use various
strategic arms negotiations to preclude or severely
restrict their deployment.
After the expiration of the SALT II Protocol at the
end of 1981, then General Secretary Brezhnev called
for a continued ban on SLCM and GLCM deploy-
ment, and at arms control negotiations in 1982 and
1983 the Soviets continued their efforts to restrict
these systems severely. At START, they insisted that
cruise missiles be considered as part of any reduction
scenario, and at INF they stressed the urgency of
banning GLCM deployments altogether. With the
beginning of INF GLCM deployments in 1983, they
stated at both forums that their arms control propos-
als would have to be revised to take account of the
"changed strategic situation." The Soviets, therefore,
have objected to the US handling of the cruise missile
issue throughout the strategic arms negotiation
process.
Minuteman III Missiles in Minuteman II Silos-the
"Shelters" Issue. Between 1972 and 1979, the United
States undertook to improve the survivability of the
Minuteman ICBM force by hardening Minuteman
launch silos. At some of them, shelters of about 2,100
and 2,700 square feet were used to protect the work
from the weather. These were larger than the environ-
mental shelters used during initial silo construction
(about 700 square feet) and at other silos being
upgraded (about 300 square feet). The Soviets raised
this question in diplomatic channels in 1973 and at
the SCC in 1975, claiming that the shelters impeded
their verification by national technical means (NTM)
of US activities at these launcher sites. In 1981 they
raised a similar question regarding the use of a shelter
In the period after the SALT II Treaty and Proto-
col-with its temporary restrictions on these sys-
tems-were signed, the Soviets appear to have expect-
ed an expeditious resolution of the status of cruise
over a Titan ICBM launcher in Kansas.
Despite the problems with Minuteman shelters, mem-
bers of the Soviet SALT II delegation in the mid-
1970s affirmed repeatedly to their US counterparts
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that the USSR could distinguish between launchers of
the un-MIRVed Minuteman II and of the MIRVed
Minuteman III. One Soviet delegate told a US col-
league in 1976, for example, that Soviet NTM had
provided proof that certain US launchers had been
constructed or converted for Minuteman II and others
for Minuteman III ICBMs.
In 1978, however, the sides agreed to MIRV launcher
counting rules that would require Moscow to place
some launchers containing non-MIRVed missiles in
the MIRV launcher aggregate-and at this point the
Soviets reversed themselves on their ability to distin-
guish between Minuteman launchers. They stated
that, unless the United States presented convincing
evidence to the contrary, all Minuteman II launchers
should be subject to both the MIRV aggregate and
the subceiling on MIRVed ICBM launchers; they
added that the problem of distinguishability was
aggravated by the large shelters over US ICBM silos
undergoing modification.
In June 1979, when the SALT Treaty was signed, the
United States confirmed that all shelters had been
removed from the launcher sites and promised that no
shelters that impeded verification by NTM would be
used over ICBM silo launchers. The Soviets in turn
acknowledged US statements that Minuteman III
ICBMs could not be launched from Minuteman II
launchers and agreed that the United States had 550
launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs.
At the fall 1980 session of the SCC, the Soviets again
raised this distinguishability issue. They observed that
reports in US media of US interest in deploying 50 to
100 Minuteman III missiles in Minuteman II launch-
ers were inconsistent with earlier US official assur-
ances that Minuteman II launchers could not launch
Minuteman III ICBMs. The US side responded that
Minuteman II launchers would have to be converted
before being capable of launching Minuteman III
missiles and that such activities could be detected by
Soviet NTM. This answer was deemed "useful" by
the Soviet side-a response that did not preclude
reopening the topic. Soviet representatives, in fact,
alluded to the "unsatisfactory" record of the US side
on this subject in 1981, when discussing the Titan
shelter mentioned above. If all 1,000 Minuteman
launchers had to be counted as MIRVed, the United
States would be at variance with the 820 figure for
the MIRVed ICBM launcher subaggregate in the
SALT II Treaty
Shemya Island and Pave Paws Facilities as ABM
Radars. Throughout the negotiations leading to the
1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, the United States 25X1
repeatedly emphasized that large phased-array radars
(LPARs) had the inherent capability to detect and
track a number of small objects, such as ballistic
missile reentry vehicles, at great distances. This posi-
tion grew, in large part, from a serious concern that
the Soviet phased-array radars then in use for early
warning (the Hen House system) could contribute to
an upgrading of widely deployed Soviet air defenses so
as to give them an ABM capability. The United
States, therefore, consistently sought to have the
proposed agreement incorporate limits on all large
phased-array radars. 25X1
The Soviets believed that the ABM Treaty should
place limits only on radars specifically designed for
ABM purposes. It should not limit other large phased-
array radars (such as those used as NTM or for space
tracking), they maintained.
In the final Treaty, the restrictions on the capabilities
and deployment of ABM and early warning radars
reflected the attempt to reconcile (1) an acknowledg-
ment that there were legitimate, non-ABM uses of
large phased-array radars with (2) a realization that
these facilities had some inherent capabilities to per-
form in an ABM role. In a Treaty-related unilateral
statement focused on Hen House radars, however, the
United States reiterated its concern about improve-
ments to non-ABM facilities that could erode the
effectiveness of ABM Treaty provisions.
After ratification, the Soviets were the first to raise
the issue of radar construction that might be incon-
sistent with the terms of the ABM Treaty. In 1975, at
the spring session of the SCC, they called attention to
the construction of a large phased-array radar (known
as Cobra Dane) on Shemya Island, Alaska (a site
outside any US ABM test range and not located at
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any of the permitted deployment areas), claiming that
it incorporated components tested and developed for
ABM purposes. They said that the situation was
"ambiguous" within the framework of the ABM
Treaty and asked the United States to clarify the
facility's status. The United States responded that it
was not an ABM radar, that Soviet NTM could
confirm its intended mission, and that its deployment
was consistent with the Treaty. The Soviets acknowl-
edged the US answer but reserved the right to return
to the subject
At the fall 1978 SCC session, the Soviets expressed
concern on a similar topic, citing the construction of
new radar facilities (known as Pave Paws) at Otis Air
Force Base in Massachusetts and Beale Air Force
Base in California. They noted that the technical
capabilities appeared to correspond to those of ABM
radars and that the Pave Paws-combined with other
radars in the United States-could create the radar
base for a territorial ABM system, a development that
would be inconsistent with the Treaty. The United
States responded in the spring of 1979 that the radars
were replacing obsolete early warning facilities, and it
provided technical data to confirm their early warning
mission. The Soviets again acknowledged the US
response but did not close the issue.
In the early 1980s, partially as a response to US
questions about Soviet construction of several new
LPARs that might be inconsistent with the ABM
Treaty, Moscow's SCC representatives renewed their
expressions of concern about Pave Paws, calling atten-
tion to US plans for modernization and new construc-
tion. The representatives also stated that the technical
data provided earlier by the US side did not answer
the questions Moscow had raised. This subject was
still unresolved in 1984, when the President's report
and the Soviet note were publicized.
they have been reluctant to discuss these issues except
in confidential channels. Their action was especially
striking because one of the Soviet complaints has been
that the United States continually violated the re-
quirement to maintain the confidentiality of discus-
sions in this area.
Moscow probably took a quick and firm position on
this subject to demonstrate Soviet determination to
resist US public pressures in the arms control area.
The note suggested to significant elements of US and
world public opinion that there is a corresponding
Soviet "case" against the United States and that the
President's report represented only selected facets of
more comprehensive problems. The action was proba-
bly also intended to demonstrate to the United States
that Moscow views its own behavior as legally defensi-
ble
The Soviets' note was less harsh in tone than their
statements immediately after the suspension of the
several arms control negotiations in late 1983. Mos-
cow therefore has signaled that it will not be the first
to completely abandon compliance-related efforts.
But by calling attention to the corrosive effect that
this exchange has had on attitudes toward obligations,
commitments, and "trust" between the sides, Moscow
appears to be warning that progress in the area of
arms control will be difficult amidst charges of non-
compliance with Treaty obligations
By refraining from a detailed public rebuttal of the
US charges, the Soviets have also probably signaled
that they wish to contain discussion and remove the
subject from the public arena. In any event, they
probably also believe that their diplomatic note was a
necessary response to the President's report and that
the demarche has diluted, if not neutralized, the effect
of the President's report on significant elements of US
and world public opinion.
Implications
The Soviets clearly were well prepared to respond
expeditiously to the President's compliance report.
The subjects in question had been discussed between
the sides for some time in diplomatic channels and at
the SCC, and the Soviets had previously set forth
well-defined positions, counterarguments, and coun-
tercharges in each significant area. The publicity they
gave to this diplomatic note was unusual; in the past
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Soviet Interest in
Arms Control Negotiations
in 1984
The Soviets appear to have adopted a two-pronged
strategy on arms control, taking an inflexible line on
INF and START while simultaneously expressing
willingness to move ahead on other security issues and
signaling that a breakthrough in US-Soviet relations
is possible if Washington shows flexibility in these
other areas. They presumably calculate that this
strategy enables them to stand firm on the central
issues of INF and START without appearing so
intransigent as to rally support for NATO's policies or
to demonstrate that they, not the US administration,
are responsible for poor US-Soviet relations. Mean-
while, they continue to probe for US flexibility on a
range of issues, with the aim of extracting the maxi-
mum price for any marked improvement in relations
or arms control issues before the US elections. The
Politburo will be wary of any major steps unless
convinced that significant gains are at hand for the
USSR, especially on their fundamental concerns in
START and INF
The Soviet Calculus
Two major considerations appear to be behind current
Soviet policies on arms control and US-Soviet rela-
tions: the need to keep the deadlocked INF and
START issues from seriously damaging the Soviet
political position in Europe-including the effort to
fan anti-INF sentiment-and calculations regarding
the US election campaign.
The Soviets appear interested in a dialogue with the
United States that would end the spiraling deteriora-
tion in relations. Nonetheless, they have made it clear
they are reluctant to do anything that would enhance
the reelection prospects of the present administration
by enabling it to claim a major success in the area of
US-Soviet relations. At the same time, they apparent-
ly believe that, if they appear unyielding, the adminis-
tration will be able to lay the blame for poor relations
on their doorstep and claim that its own attempts at a
bilateral improvement have been rebuffed. Moreover,
they appear not to have excluded the possibility of
some kind of agreement at this time if convinced it
The Soviets appear deeply pessimistic about the pros-
pects for a significant US concession on START and
INF and probably are sensitive to the possibility that,
by suspending arms control talks and taking military
countermeasures, they have made West Europeans
less receptive to arguments that the breakdown in the
East-West dialogue is due exclusively to US intransi-
gence and belligerence. They nevertheless may contin-
ue to hope that domestic pressures in the US, includ-
ing electoral politics, and increased concern and
pressure from Western Europe over the US-Soviet
stalemate could prompt the US to alter its current
stance to a position more acceptable to Moscow.
The Soviets already are trying to heighten these
pressures through direct appeals to West European
leaders, with whom Moscow has maintained close
contact despite earlier warnings about the conse-
quences of the first deployments. In private Soviet
demarches at this level, as well as in public commen-
tary, they have sought to demonstrate popular opposi-
tion to INF, claimed that the US has spurned Soviet
efforts to restore the East-West dialogue, and warned
that deployment of US missiles subverts the sover-
eignty of West European countries as well as their
"gains" from detente. Moscow might further try to
court West European opinion by hinting at willingness
to consider multilateral negotiations that would draw
the British and French into direct discussion of INF
and their own forces' role. It appears more likely at
present, however, that the Soviets will try to gain
credit by expanding upon their initiatives on non-INF
issues in existing multilateral forums such as MBFR,
the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, or the CDE.
The Soviets also will continue trying to cast the US in
the villain's role by encouraging opposition leaders in
the INF-basing countries-particularly the Social
Democrats in West Germany-to speak out forcefully
against INF deployments. Further, Moscow has
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maintained and perhaps even raised the level of its
direct and covert support to the West European peace
movement. The Soviets may hope that the existence of
deployed missiles-along with announced basing
sites-will provide a focus for renewed demonstra-
tions by the dispirited and divided movement. Mos-
cow's efforts in this area probably will be tempered,
however, by its wish to avoid the charge of manipulat-
ing the peace movement. In addition, it now must face
the possibility that elements of the movement could
direct their opposition activities against Warsaw Pact
countermeasures. Moreover, the Soviet exit from the
negotiations makes it difficult for Moscow to recap-
ture the high ground in the contest for public opinion.
Intransigence on Resuming START and INF Talks
Following Chernenko's accession, a brief hiatus in the
repetition of Moscow's demand that the INF missiles
be withdrawn suggested that the Soviets might be
hinting at greater flexibility on resuming talks. There
now have been several recent indications that Moscow
has decided to maintain its firm line against resuming
the Geneva negotiations. In a number of public
statements, Soviet leaders have said they will not
return to the Geneva talks unless the new US missiles
are removed from Europe. In talks from 10 to 12
March with senior US arms control specialists in
Moscow under the auspices of the Dartmouth Confer-
ence, as well as in Chernenko's talks on 13 March
with visiting leaders of the West German Social
Democratic Party, the Soviets also rejected the idea of
merging the negotiations. Some implied and others
asserted outright that neither negotiation could re-
sume unless NATO's new intermediate-range missiles
were withdrawn from Western Europe.
Soviet officials at the Dartmouth Conference also
dismissed as a solution to INF the "walk-in-the-
woods" formula. By rejecting both this formula and a
merger, these officials seemed to be closing the door
on two potential avenues that some Soviets had
speculated as recently as Januery could lead to a
revival of the talks.
could resume this year if the US agreed to a moratori-
um in the INF deployment schedule and to taking the
UK and French systems into account somewhere in
the arms control negotiations. The most recent state-
ment to this effect was made in mid-March by a
representative of the Institute for the USA and
Canada at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, who
said that INF talks could be resumed in 1984 if the
US met these two conditions. A first secretary and
presumed KGB officer at the Soviet Embassy also has
suggested that the USSR would be more interested in
resuming the INF talks if the US met these two
conditions. He also raised the possibility of an INF
negotiation involving the US, USSR, France, and the
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, in discussions with
correspondents, has taken a more upbeat stance on
the prospects for strategic arms negotiations than the
general line would indicate. His statements clearly
have been intended to portray the USSR, despite its
tough public stance, as sincerely interested in move-
ment, and thereby to put pressure on the administra-
tion for greater flexibility. His remarks also probably
reflect instructions to keep open a channel through
which Moscow's hoped-for movement from the US
side might be conveyed.
Prospects for Progress on Other Issues
Chernenko seemed to imply in his speech of 2 March
that an agreement on issues usually regarded as
secondary-particularly the banning of chemical
weapons and the demilitarization of space-could
prepare the way for a "dramatic breakthrough" in
US-Soviet relations despite the impasse in START
and INF. The suggestion that it might be possible to
bypass the most intractable issues and achieve prog-
ress elsewhere appears intended to improve the
USSR's image as a proponent of arms control and
reduced international tensions despite its continued
refusal to return to Geneva. At the same time, the
Soviets are probing for-flexibility on a range of issues
where progress would not necessarily require a rever-
sal of fundamental US or Soviet positions.
The Soviets almost certainly realize, however, that
they eventually must moderate their position if they
are to limit NATO INF deployments and US strate-
gic systems through resumed INF and START nego-
tiations. Some Soviets have hinted that INF talks
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The proposals Chernenko listed represent longstand-
ing Soviet goals and public positions:
? US ratification of the treaties limiting underground
nuclear weapons tests and nuclear explosions for
peaceful purposes.
? Resumption of negotiations on a comprehensive test
ban treaty, suspended by the US.
? An agreement to limit weapons in outer space.
? US acceptance of a freeze on nuclear weapons.
? An agreement to ban chemical weapons, an area
where he said conditions for an accord are "begin-
ning to ripen."
He hinted that the Soviets, who recently accepted the
principle of continuous international monitoring of
chemical weapons destruction sites, may be willing to
make further moves on chemical weapons verification.
He said that they favor an agreement under which
there would be effective control of the "whole process
of destruction-from beginning to end." "whole
[the Soviets are
preparing to table a draft treaty to ban chemical
weapons.
Soviet officials, particularly the Deputy Permanent
Representative to the UN, Vladimir Shustov, have
indicated that the USSR attaches high priority to
initiating "unofficial" talks with the US on limiting
the deployment of weapons in outer space. A Central
Committee staff member, Stanislav Menshikov, ar-
rived in the US recently with the primary purpose,
of helping organize
Chernenko's claim that a US-Soviet agreement on
these issues could signal the start of a sharp improve-
ment in bilateral relations suggests the Soviets might
consider such an agreement as partial grounds for a
meeting at the highest level. Soviet leaders have made
a point of insisting, however, that it is up to the US to
act first. Moreover, Moscow may well hold out for a
firm US commitment to at least negotiate on funda-
mental Soviet concerns in START and INF before
agreeing to any dramatic bilateral gesture. The Sovi-
ets will be looking in particular for signals that the US
is willing to consider major steps in accordance with
Soviet objectives, such as:
? A freeze on further INF deployments, particularly
Pershing IIs.
? An agreement to take into account UK and French
systems.
? An agreement to limit future deployment of US
strategic systems the Soviets consider most threat-
ening-sea- and air-launched cruise missiles, the
MX, or the D-5 SLBM.
The Soviets have been ambiguous on the extent to
which they hold progress in START dependent upon
US concessions in INF. For now, it appears that they
would refuse to resume the strategic negotiations
unless satisfied that their central INF concerns would
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part to probe US willingness to make such conces-
sions, and a definitive Soviet position is likely to
emerge only in response to specific US initiatives.
Chernenko also suggested that progress could be
made toward agreement on "norms" to govern rela-
tions between nuclear powers, particularly an agree-
ment to hold urgent consultations in the event of a
situation threatening nuclear war. This area would
appear to include current US-Soviet negotiations to
upgrade crisis communications and talks aimed at
significance.
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preventing a recurrence of the KAL shootdown. Cher-
nenko, however, raised this possibility separately from
those issues which he suggested could lead to a
"breakthrough" in relations, perhaps to signal that
agreement on this point would not be of comparable
Chernenko made no reference on 2 March to the
MBFR talks, and the Soviets appear to hold little
expectation of an early breakthrough. A deputy direc-
tor of the Institute for the USA and Canada said in
late February that the Soviets would not have agreed
to resume the talks had they been bilateral, a remark
that suggests Moscow believes the principal advan-
tage of the talks lies in the possibilities they offer for
dividing the US and its allies. This view probably has
been strengthened by Western press reports of differ-
ences between the United States and West Germany
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over the Allied position. Even if the Western allies
were to agree on softening their position regarding
prior agreement on data, the Soviets probably would
not accept Western proposals on verification to the
extent necessary for an early breakthrough in the
talks.
Since the beginning of the Stockholm Conference on
Disarmament in Europe, Soviet spokesmen have been
stressing the importance of an agreement on the
nonuse of force as a step toward improving the
climate of East-West relations. Chernenko, however,
did not refer to this proposal, and, although the
Soviets appear to attach greater importance than the
US to declaratory measures, it is doubtful that a
moderation of US opposition on this point alone would
evoke any response from them on more substantive
issues.
Soviet spokesmen have also listed a number of other
issues where they claim that agreement by the West
would lead to a significant lowering of international
tensions. These include a pledge not to be the first to
use nuclear weapons, a nonaggression treaty between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, an agreement to reduce
military spending, and the establishment of nuclear-
free zones, including northern Europe, the Mediterra-
nean, and the Indian Ocean. The Soviets doubtless
realize that these proposals, where they are not purely
cosmetic, would require major strategic concessions
by the West, and the proposals therefore appear
largely rhetorical, rather than serious attempts to find
common ground. By dint of repetition, however, they
may have acquired some real significance in Soviet
eyes, and it is possible that US willingness to consider
the more innocuous among them could be part of a
package to improve bilateral relations.
Uncertainties and Soviet Political Dynamics
Evidence of current power relationships and individ-
ual views on arms control within the Politburo is
admittedly sparse. We believe, however, that the
strategy toward relations with the US suggested in
Chernenko's speech reflects a Politburo decision that
We do not know the full range of differences within
the Politburo on US-Soviet relations. The extent to
which Chernenko and his colleagues will stand fast in
their demand for significant changes in US positions,
especially before the US elections, is unclear. They
appear to be concerned, however, that any show of
compromise in Moscow prior to some US move would
be interpreted as a Soviet retreat in the face of a
stiffening American defense posture
The evidence at least suggests, therefore, that the
Soviet leadership in the coming months is unlikely to
approve any measures that imply a major break-
through in relations unless they are convinced that
some US concessions will be forthcoming on signifi-
cant arms control issues
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Other Topics
Soviet Nuclear Targeting
of Pershing Its and
Cruise Missiles
The Soviets have a variety of strategic and tactical
nuclear missiles and aircraft available for nuclear
strikes against Pershing II ballistic missiles and
Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs)
in Europe. We believe they probably would use
missiles first to barrage Pershing and GLCM operat-
ing areas and then aircraft for followup strikes. The
degree of success the Soviets might expect in such
attacks is uncertain. It would depend on various
factors, the most critical of which is how well their
target reconnaissance system can locate Pershing and
GLCM operating areas.
Background
Soviet public statements about the deployment of
Pershing Its and GLCMs in Europe probably reflect
not only concern about the ability of these NATO
systems to hit targets within the Soviet Union but also
uncertainty about the USSR's ability to target and
destroy the systems before or during nuclear opera-
tions. Classified Warsaw Pact military writings indi-
cate that over 80 percent of NATO tactical units are
expected to change locations at least once prior to the
initiation of nuclear operations. This force mobility
increases the risk that some targets, especially highly
mobile NATO missile units, will elude the initial
Soviet nuclear strike and continue to pose a threat to
Soviet forces and installations.
Pershing and GLCM units would have high priority
as targets during either conventional or nuclear Soviet
operations in Europe. Attacks on them during conven-
tional operations, however, are outside the scope of
this article. The analysis here assumes that nuclear
operations commence early in a war, when most
fighting is still along the border between the two
Germanys. The nature of Soviet targeting of Per-
shings and GLCMs under other circumstances-after
a protracted conventional war, after a major nuclear
exchange, or in a protracted nuclear war-could
differ from that described in this article.
Political rhetoric aside, Soviet military pragmatists
are probably focusing on the problems of finding the
Pershing Its and GLCMs and striking them success-
fully.' The Soviets clearly would like to be able to 25X1
destroy the systems at their home bases, before
dispersal to operating areas, although they have to
assume that NATO missile units would attempt to
disperse before combat began. They recognize that
after dispersal the difficulty of locating and attacking
the missiles would increase substantially. This is true
of any mobile target, but it takes on a greater urgency
for military planners in the case of Pershing Its and
GLCMs because important installations in the USSR
are within their range.
NATO Mobile Missiles as Soviet Targets
Soviet press accounts of the Pershing II and GLCM
threat to the USSR mention that Soviet planners
might be forced to target "zones of dispersal" for
' In this article we do not discuss the capabilities of Soviet air and
ABM defenses to counter Pershing Its and GLCMs that have
already been launched. he most
effective means of countering these systems is to destroy t em
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these systems. This language seems to suggest that
they now practice point targeting and that the adop-
tion of area targeting would force them to deploy
more nuclear weapons for use in Europe. Our under-
standing of Soviet nuclear planning methods, howev-
er, is that area targeting is not new-it has always
been the only practical way for the Soviets to. strike
mobile missiles.
The Soviets expect that finding these missile units will
be difficult even though the total number will be
small-only 41 deployed units (see map).' Though
few, these units will have available 572 missiles-not
counting reloads-capable of striking the USSR.
and GLCM unit (unlikely, by their own estimate),
they might have to use as many as 80 high-yield
nuclear weapons, perhaps totaling 30 megatons, to
destroy this force.
The Soviets'
nuclear planning is conservative. Their goals for dam-
age against NATO missile units are high and would
normally require the expenditure of multiple'war-
heads over large areas to compensate for uncertainties
about target location.
' These include 29 GLCM flights of four launchers (16 missiles)
each, deployed throughout Europe, and 12 Pershing batteries (nine
launchers each), deployed in West Germany. These numbers
assume that no Pershing II or GLCM units would have been
Soviet Reconnaissance Requirements and Assets
Existing Soviet reconnaissance systems for use in
Europe are unlikely to find all NATO missile units
operating in wooded areas far behind front lines.
Because such units have few visual or electronic
signatures that would expose them to detection, they
probably would be most detectable when moving
between launchsites. On average, however, their peri-
ods of movement are planned to comprise less than 8
percent of the time they are in the field. Some
Pershing Its and GLCMs probably would be found,
but Soviet planners measure reconnaissance effective-
ness in terms of their ability to track all targets. A
single undetected Pershing battery would have nine
missiles available for potential NATO strikes against
the USSR.
The Soviets currently have several kinds of suitable
reconnaissance assets, of which Armed Special Pur-
pose (SPETSNAZ) Forces are probably the most
versatile. They could be used in either a commando
role to damage or destroy mobile missile units with
small-arms fire or a reconnaissance role to report
target location 'for subsequent nuclear or conventional
strikes. SPETSNAZ teams are limited in number,
however, and have a variety of competing missions,
including reconnaissance of airfields and nuclear stor-
age sites. The difficulty of inserting these teams 200
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Mbieev, orth
g Garda
car anrram
mDri-+-~--.r uaels-
~~c ;~Is
u ASchwabiscny' Osiovaki
p
Pershing II Total: 108
Neckarsulm 36
Schwabisch Gmund 36
Neu Ulm 36
GLCM Total: 464
Molesworth 64
Greenham Common 96
Woensdrecht 48
Florennes 48
Wischheim 96
Comiso 112
11 \---1'
/Morocco {
Mediterranean Sea
Tunisia}
km or more into NATO territory may not warrant
risking many of them in what could be a futile effort.
Agents already in place in peacetime would probably
attempt to track Pershing and GLCM units as they
dispersed from their garrisons, and others would be
sent behind NATO lines once war had begun. If they
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Malta
The United States Government has
not recognized the incorporation of
EstontU, In a, erld Lithuania into the
Soviet UpIov'Gther boundary
represontatien~is not necessarily
theritati,~ )
Gr6Wee Turkey
0 600
Kilometers
could follow such convoys without being detected, the
agents would still have the difficult task of reporting
target location data promptly and accurately.F
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Soviets would rely heavily
on both strategic and tactical aircraft to locate targets
for nuclear strikes and to attack identified missile
units prior to such strikes.
tiveness of reconnaissance aircraft would depend on
the extent to which the Soviets had achieved air
superiority over NATO's rear areas. WithQut it,
attrition rates would be high among Soviet reconnais-
sance aircraft, which would have to operate 150 km or
more behind front lines and behind NATO's air
Among Soviet satellite systems, only photoreconnais-
sance satellites have any capability to detect Pershing
and GLCM units. The usefulness of their information
on mobile targets would be limited, however, because
they lack real-time imaging capabilities, and deorbit-
ing and processing procedures can take several days.
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For Strategic Missiles. The combination of range,
yield, and number of Soviet MR/IRBMs-SS-4s and
SS-20s-makes them capable of delivering the most
efficient strikes against Pershing II and GLCM units.
Soviet weapon planning factors indicate that, if only
SS-4s were used, 65 missiles (each with a single
warhead) would be needed to destroy the launchers in
Pershing II and GLCM deployment areas. About 34
SS-20 missiles (102 warheads) could achieve the same
We have no exercise evidence of SS-4s being targeted
against Pershing or GLCM units, but a Soviet tar-
geter might choose the SS-4 for striking NATO
mobile missile units-mainly because its high yield
and poor accuracy limit its utility against most other
military targets in Europe.
shing and GLCM units.
A potential constraint on the effectiveness of these
strategic missiles, however, could be the time required
to retarget them if the target moves. We have no
direct evidence on the time required to program and
load Soviet missile guidance systems with target data
not previously stored. If it takes several hours, this
delay-combined with long target intelligence proc-
essing times-could seriously decrease the effective-
ness of SS-4 or SS-20 strikes against NATO's Per-
For Aircraft. We believe the Soviets would consider
aircraft strikes a useful alternative or supplement to
missile strikes against mobile targets. The Fencer
light bombers and the Badger, Blinder, and Backfire
medium bombers of strategic aviation probably would
be the primary aircraft for'such use in Central
Europe, and the bombers could reach the GLCM sites
in Sicily and the United Kingdom.
Outlook
The Soviets' recognition of the difficulty of targeting
NATO mobile missiles will probably compel them to 25X1
address this problem with greater urgency now that
Pershing Its and GLCMs have begun to arrive in
Europe. We expect to acquire new evidence from
writings and exercises to suggest how the Soviets will
attempt to solve this targeting problem. We believe
they would benefit most from improving their techni-
cal reconnaissance capabilities and data processing. 25X1
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Soviet Weapon Systems That Could Be
Used Against Pershing Its and GLCMs
Tactical missiles (Scud-B, Short flight times would limit warning to NATO Limited ranges restrict targeting of distant
SS-23, SS-12/22 targets. Accuracy and yields are well suited for NATO units. Coordinating tactical strikes with
targeting most Pershing and GLCM operating strategic strikes could pose problems. Effective-
areas. ness depends on good reconnaissance and easily
reprogrammable guidance systems.
Strategic missiles (SS-20, SS-4) Flight times to targets are short. Systems can Both are capable of area targeting; the SS-4 is
reach all Pershing and GLCM launchsites. better suited because of its higher yield. Both
require precise targeting data. Quick retargeting
in response to target movement may be beyond
current Soviet capabilities.
Tactical and strategic aircraft Light bombers and fighter-bombers could reach Effective air reconnaissance could depend on
(Flogger, Fitter, Fencer, most Pershing and GLCM units on the European Soviet air superiority. Light bombers and fighter-
Badger, Blinder, Backfire) continent. Medium bombers could reach all Per- bombers on armed reconnaissance missions have
shing and GLCM launch areas. limited loiter time between front missile strikes to
search for targets. Medium bombers would have
to operate without escorts against deep targets in
Sicily or the United Kingdom.
Armed Special Purpose Forces A small investment of manpower (rather than Operational difficulties of putting men deep be-
(SPETSNAZ) equipment) could meet damage goals against hind enemy lines could limit SPETSNAZ use.
NATO mobile missiles. Can provide target loca- Competing missions could restrict the number of
tion data for other strikes or can engage target SPETSNAZ teams for this use.
with small arms to pin it down or destroy it.
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Soviet-Finnish Trade and
Moscow's Foreign Trade Policy
Moscow has turned increasingly to trade with Finland
as a means of acquiring Western-quality machinery
and equipment without becoming dependent on im-
ports from the United States and its allies. Further
growth of this trade will, however, be constrained by
Finland's modest capability to produce high-technol-
ogy goods and by the limited appeal of Soviet exports
other than fuels and raw materials.
The Special Trade Relationship
Finland's special political relationship with the Soviet
Union has given birth to a special economic relation-
ship as well. Fenno-Soviet trade is essentially a barter
arrangement whereby Moscow can pay for imports in
rubles on the understanding that, at the end of each
five-year interval, its purchases and sales are to be
equal in value.' Even when allowance is made for the
impact of oil price increases, the economic relation-
ship has enjoyed impressive growth. Two-way trade
grew almost sixfold from 1973 to 1982, according to
Soviet data. Moscow's trade with Finland now ranks a
strong second to Soviet-West German commerce and
exceeds Soviet trade with Japan, France, Italy, and
the United States (see graph). While Soviet exports to
Finland consist mostly of raw materials, especially
petroleum, Finnish sales to the USSR are more
diversified and include a great variety of machinery
and equipment (see table).
Benefits to Moscow. The USSR's primary benefit is
assured access to Finnish machinery and equipment
that meet Western standards. In 1981 Finland ranked
second only to Japan among Western suppliers in the
value of manufactured goods sold to the Soviet Union.
Finnish manufactured exports to the Soviet Union
rose ninefold from 1972 to 1981, compared to an
increase of only 3.5 times for the rest of OECD.
Although high-technology goods represented only 4
percent of the country's total 1981 sales to the
'? The commodity composition and value of the trade are estab-
lished, in increasing degrees of specificity, by 15-year cooperation
agreements, five-year trade accords, and annual commercial proto-
cols. In recent five-year periods, the "requirement" that bilateral
trade be balanced has been honored more in the breach than in the
Leading Commodities in
Soviet-Finnish Trade, 1982
Crude petroleum and
oil products
Wood and paper
products
Wood and paper
products
Power, energy-related,
and handling equipment
Equipment for process-
ing timber and paper
Value
(million US $)
Percent of
Total
2,479
75
99
3
696
18
271
7
168
4
USSR-compared to 15 percent for West Germany,
12 percent for Italy, and 11 percent for Japan and
France 2-the USSR puts a high premium on the
equipment which Helsinki does provide, especially
' The definition used for this comparison was devised by Kravalis,
Lenz, Raffel, and Young in their article "Quantification of West-
ern Exports of High Technology to Communist Countries," p. 37,
in Issues in East-West Commercial Relations: A Compendium of
Papers, Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, 1979. This
definition, which consists of 25 commodity categories, is narrower
than the COCOM list for proscribed strategic technology exports to
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USSR-OECD: Trade Turnover
Triennial Averages, 1971-82
West Germany
Japan
France
United States
Italy
Netherlands
Others'
1971-73
1974-76
1977-79
1980-82
1971-73
1974-76
1977-79
1980-82
1971-73
1974-76
1977-79
1980-82
1971-73
1974-76
1977-79
1980-82
1971-73
1974-76
1977-79
1980-82
1971-73
1974-76
1977-79
1980-82
1971-73
1974-76
1977-79
1980-82
1971-73
1974-76
1977-79
1980-82
a Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Luxembou:g, Canada, Denmark,
Greece, Ireland, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and
United Kingdom.
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lumber processing machinery, merchant ships, off-
shore drilling vessels and platforms, and capital goods
needed to expand extraction of nonferrous metals,
particularly copper.
The Soviets also reap an important benefit by pur-
chasing Finnish products that incorporate technology
from other Western countries. For example, Finnish
shipyards often outfit the drilling rigs they sell to the
USSR with Western drilling tools and electronic gear.
Moscow commits large resources to construction proj-
ects built by Finnish contractors on Soviet territory.
The Soviets have awarded contracts for a broad range
of facilities, including "a goods terminal at one of
Moscow's airports, a railroad car depot near Lenin-
grad, and expansion of grain-handling facilities at the
Tallinn harbor. Most of Helsinki's "project exports"
are concentrated in the field of raw materials process-
ing
Trade with the Finns is also attractive to the USSR
because its imports do not have to be paid for in hard
currency.
Soviets negotiating with Helsinki in 1982 for oil
drilling rigs preferred dealing with their Nordic
neighbor because the bilateral barter arrangement
eliminated the need for significant hard currency
financing. The advantage to Moscow of trading under
a soft currency barter regime is lessened in periods
such as the present, however, when the Soviet hard
currency payments position is relatively strong. In
addition, while the USSR does not pay for Finnish
goods directly with convertible currency, it does pro-
vide Helsinki with oil and other "hard goods" that
could earn hard currency if they were sold on other
Western markets.
The Soviets apparently also prefer trading with the
Finns for political reasons. Given Finland's special
political relationship with the USSR, Soviet planners
probably believe that Helsinki is less likely to go along
with Western sanctions against the USSR than
NATO governments. Moreover, although Helsinki
has not been shown to be a transit point for shipments
of controlled technology to the USSR, Moscow pre-
sumably values its neighbor's refusal to adhere for-
Benefits to Helsinki. The main benefit the Finns
obtain from trading with the USSR is an assured
market for their goods. This market grows especially
important during recessions, when Western demand 25X1
declines. Moscow has bought an increasingly large
share of Finland's world sales over the last decade-
12 percent in 1972, 21 percent in 1975, and 25
percent in 1981.
Helsinki's dependence on the Soviet market, however,
is potentially risky. Any cutback in sales to bring 25X1
trade back into balance probably would cause unem-
ployment in the affected sectors. Soviet media have
cited estimates by "Finnish economists" that Soviet
orders account for 150,000 Finnish jobs.
Recent Trade Strains and Soviet Responses. In 1981,
when Finland used the Soviet market to buoy its
economy during the Western recession, a large Finn-
ish trade surplus started to accumulate. This surplus
amounted to an interest-free loan and as such was 25X1
resented by the Finns. As the value of oil-the
Soviets' largest export-fell, the USSR's new trade
deficit grew even more. By 1982 the two countries had
agreed to increase the maximum allowable imbalance 25X1
in the clearing account (the account through which
the barter is handled) to 300 million rubles. When the
Finnish surplus exceeded even that limit, they decided
to transfer 300 million rubles from that account into a
special interest-bearing account owned by Finland.
Throughout much of 1983, the USSR's total trade
deficit with Finland was around 600 million rubles
($825 million); a little more than half this amount was
in the interest-bearing account.
Throughout 1982 and 1983, the Soviets attempted to
solve the problem on their own terms, pressing the
Finns to purchase more Soviet arms and natural gas
and to buy a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power plant.
if Helsinki did not accept the Soviet offers on gas and
the power plant. The Finns resisted the Soviet pres-
sure, and Moscow failed to make good on its ultima-
tum. Helsinki's reluctance to increase its gas pur-
chases centered around the high price offered and the
mally to.OOCOM.
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cost of building the required pipeline extension. Con-
cern that energy supplies would exceed demand was
an important factor for both the gas and the power
plant, and political pressure from Finnish environ-
mentalists added to official coolness toward the power
plant.
The Finns, for their part, held out for stepped-up
Soviet deliveries of other raw materials to solve the
trade imbalance. In the autumn of 1982, they gave
Moscow a shopping list of goods they wanted included
in the 1986-90 trade agreement, including methanol,
copper, lead, silver, coal, coke, and wood pulp. In
response, the USSR promised in June 1983 to in-
crease its shipments of wood and chemical products
beyond the levels prescribed in the present trade
agreement
An even bigger factor in correcting the trade imbal-
ance was the Soviet decision to maintain large petro-
leum sales. In 1982 the USSR sold the Finns 1 million
tons of Libyan crude oil, which they resold for cash on
the West European market. (In addition, the Soviets
have been delivering around 10 million tons of domes-
tically produced petroleum to Finland annually.) Last
year the Finns had contracts to deliver 1.3 million
tons of crude oil, probably of Libyan origin, to the
international market, and for 1984 Moscow has again
acceded to its neighbor's request for more Libyan
crude. The current deliveries, which will probably
allow the Finns to continue hard currency resales, are
intended to produce a modest Soviet trade surplus
that will improve the overall 1981-85 trade balance.
This year's trade agreement also gives Finland an
option to increase its nonoil imports beyond the
protocol level by accepting less oil, but this probably
represents wishful thinking on Moscow's part. Helsin-
ki will have little incentive to accommodate the
Kremlin's' drive to sell more manufactured goods if it
is permitted to meet its import obligation primarily
through oil purchases. In early February, however,
Helsinki and Moscow did come to terms on gas sales,
with Finland agreeing to quadruple its purchases by
the year 2000. A Soviet decision to soften its position
on price apparently clinched the deal.
Prospects .
Moscow's willingness to make concessions to the
Finns on the trade imbalance issue reflects the impor-
tance of its commercial relationship with Finland. The
Soviets' main gain from the trade-access to West-
ern-quality manufactured goods-has become even
more important now that they are giving preference to
non-US suppliers in order to reduce vulnerability to
sanctions.
While Moscow has been willing to pay the price
necessary to maintain the level of trade, we believe
that this trade will not experience the same growth
that occurred in the past decade. The Finnish econo-
my's modest production of advanced technology will
significantly affect commerce if Moscow decides to
limit its hard currency outlays by giving priority to
high-technology imports. On the Soviet side, sales are
likely to be constrained by potential shortfalls in the
quantity of oil available for export and a continuing
inability to produce goods other than fuels and raw
materials that can readily be marketed in Finland.
With energy comprising more than 80 percent of the
USSR's exports to Finland, uncertainties in interna-
tional oil and gas markets cloud the medium-term
outlook for maintaining growth in the bilateral trade.
Possible fluctuations in future energy prices will make
it difficult for Moscow and Helsinki to fine-tune their
trade balance and eventually may temper the satisfac-
tion Soviet planners recently took in Helsinki's deci-
sion to sharply increase its gas purchases. Moreover,
Moscow may well be disappointed in its hopes to sell a
nuclear power plant to Finland.
Over the longer term, there may be more basis for
optimism. Both sides probably will be willing to
continue making some of the sacrifices needed to
prevent a downturn in trade because each perceives
large gains in maintaining strong economic and politi-
cal ties. Moreover, a Soviet decision to move forward
with developing the Barents Sea oil deposits will
provide considerable impetus to bilateral trade. Fin-
land would probably win some contracts under this
project, which is estimated to cost more than $10
billion.
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The same problems that will make it difficult to
sustain the size of future Fenno-Soviet trade also are
likely to affect the USSR's commerce with other
Western industrialized countries. Soviet trade plan-
ners will continue having trouble coming up with
those products that can be easily marketed to the
West, other than raw materials and fuels. Reduced
demand for energy exports, illustrated by recent
sluggishness in Finland's demand for Soviet gas and
the protracted talks over the price of Helsinki's future
purchases, will also affect trade prospects with the
West generally. The continuing oil glut has put
downward pressure on prices and demand, not only
for petroleum but also for competing energy sources.
On the other hand, the poor energy sales outlook is
probably susceptible to improvement in the long run,
assuming a strong Western economic rebound
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Deactivation of
SS-5 ForceF_
Briefs
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the Soviets have retired the last of 25X1
SS-5 IRBMs-at Taybola and Nigrande in the western USSR. Snow has not been
cleared from key launch areas, some buildings have been razed, most launch 25X1
equipment has been removed, and the level of activity has been generally low for
work more rapidly after 1977, when SS-20s were introduced.
The SS-5, a single-warhead liquid-propellant missile with a range of 4,100 25X1
kilometers, was first fielded in 1961. At peak deployment in 1965, missiles from
101 launchers could hit most theater targets in Western Europe and Asia. The So-
viets deactivated some SS-5s in the late 1960s and early 1970s but pushed the
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Update on the 1982
and 1983 Soviet
Grain Crops
tion of the SS-4 force, phasing the system out by 1987 or 1988.
In October 1983, then General Secretary Andropov asserted that all the SS-5 sites
had been deactivated, but evidence of this at Taybola and Nigrande has been
ambiguous until now. Some personnel are still at some launchsites there, and some
abandoned equipment is still in place, but the sites are not likely to be reactivated.
Deactivation of the SS-5 system leaves the USSR with 378 launchers for the
three-warhead SS-20 and 220 SS-4 medium-range single-warhead ballistic mis-
siles. As the Soviets build more SS-20 bases, they probably will resume deactiva-
production, yield, or state purchase statistics since 1980
On the basis of additional information gleaned in 1983 from scattered and
sometimes oblique Soviet press reports of grain production, yields, and state
purchases, we have increased our estimate of the 1982 grain crop from 165 million
tons to 180 million tons. With respect to the 1983 grain crop, General Secretary
Chernenko stated in his early March election speech that production "exceeded
190 million tons." In late March, a middle-level Ministry of Agriculture official
told Embassy officers that the 1983 grain crop was 10 million tons "below
average." His statement-made in the context of a comparison with the 1976-80
period-implies grain production of 195 million tons in 1983. Although we have
little additional evidence to support an estimate below 200 million tons, a 1983
crop of about 195 million tons would be within the range of error (?8 percent) as-
sociated with our methodology.' The USSR has not published overall grain
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A larger grain crop in 1982 helps explain why the USSR imported less grain
during the 1982 crop year (July 1982-June 1983) than we had expected, yet was
able to accelerate growth in the crucial livestock sector in 1983.2 A grain crop as
low as 195 million tons in 1983 would provide one rationale for the USSR's having
maintained grain imports through the 1983 crop year at levels close to those of the
previous crop year and some 40 percent above minimum levels committed under
long-term agreements.
Soviet Plans for The USSR plans to increase exports of natural gas to offset eventual reductions of
Export of Oil and Gas oil deliveries to Eastern Europe but will not cut oil deliveries substantially this
to Eastern Europe 0 year. The US Embassy in Moscow concludes that, although the Soviets cut oil sup- 25X1
plies to CEMA nations in 1982, they did not do so in 1983 and probably will not
this year. The USSR would like to increase exports of natural gas not only to sub-
stitute for scarcer oil, but also to use more of the delivery capacity in existing pipe-
lines. Poland reportedly has agreed to increase its annual purchases of Soviet gas
from 6 to 10 billion cubic meters, and Soviet trade officials in Bucharest have said
that gas exports to Romania will increase beginning in 1986. 25X1
Status of Jewish Only 1,300 Soviet Jews received permission to emigrate in 1983. This is half the
Emigration From total for 1982 and the lowest number in over a decade. The Anti-Zionist
the USSRCommittee of the Soviet Public, a "private" group established in April 1983, has 25X1
announced that emigration came to a "natural end" with the completion of family
reunification-the only legal justification for emigration. 25X1
The Anti-Zionist Committee's announcement provides semiofficial confirmation
that large-scale emigration has ended. The harshly anti-Semitic content of its
propaganda is a transparent effort to discourage Jews from applying for permis-
sion to emigrate. At a January press conference, the committee compared Zionists
to Nazis and stressed the threat of subversion by foreign Zionist agents. The new
leadership might reverse this policy in a bid to improve relations with the United
States, but there are less disruptive ways to achieve such an objective. The Soviets,
for example, could allow several dissidents of stature to leave the country.
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100160004-8
East-West Positions On Arms Control Talks,
as of 1 March 1984
Has proposed zero option. Has also proposed
as interim offer equal global limits on US and
Soviet INF warheads. Has offered to explore
limits on aircraft.
Has suspended talks until West "shows readi-
ness" to return to predeployment status. Has
offered to reduce SS-20s to about 140 (pri-
vately, 120) and freeze deployments in Far
East if NATO cancels deployment of P-11 and
GLCMs.
Has proposed limits on numbers of missiles,
throw weight, and heavy bombers (including
Backfire). Has proposed "build-down" where-
by a variable number of existing warheads
would be withdrawn for each new one de-
ployed, with at least 5 percent of deployed
RVs to be reduced each year till floor of 5,000
is reached. Also willing to discuss limits on
ALCMs.
Has suspended talks pending review of posi-
tion in light of NATO INF deployments. Had
offered to reduce missile launchers and bomb-
ers, excluding Backfire, to 1,800 by 1990, but
linked this to no NATO INF deployments.
Has proposed limiting ALCMs, banning
GLCMs and SLCMs.
Under review. Has wanted agreed manpower
data before reductions; believes East has un-
derstated ground forces by 150,000+. Has
proposed first-stage reduction of 30,000 Sovi-
et for 13,000 US troops. Wants permanent
verification, including on-site inspection.
Opposes prior data agreement and rejects
Western claim on East's data. Proposes
20,000 Soviet for 13,000 US troops in initial
reductions by example. Wants temporary veri-
fication measures, including limited on-site
inspection, to monitor initial withdrawals.
Reagan administration believes a comprehen- Supports Western proposals to expand Helsin-
sive test ban (CTB) could impede needed ki confidence- and security-building measures
modernization of US systems, withdrew from (CSBMs) dealing with prior notification of
US-UK-USSR talks on ground that reliable military activities and exchange of informa-
verification not currently feasible. tion about them, and to make these measures
verifiable and mandatory; opposes discussion
of Soviet declaratory measures or tabling of
additional Western measures at this time.
Other
Warsaw Pact
Countries
Support Soviet negotiating position but regret
Soviet suspension of talks. Romania refuses to
endorse counterdeployments and has publicly
implied that Moscow shares blame for the
impasse. GDR and Czechoslovakia concerned
by low-level popular opposition to counterde-
ployments. Hungary and Bulgaria hope to
avoid basing new INF missiles.
Started P-II deployments in December 1983;
first of 96 GLCMs to arrive in 1986. Kohl and
Genscher currently support adherence to bas-
ing schedule, but may come to favor adjust-
ments after first 36 P-IIs become operational
this year.
Will try to make basing decision in June, but
domestic support for INF weakest here. May
call for fewer than 48 GLCMs; wants to
eliminate other Dutch nuclear roles.
Scheduled basing of 48 GLCMs tied to con-
tentious budget and ethnic issues. Decision-
making style tries to avoid confrontation on
this issue, and timetables may slip as result.
Some delays in site construction already, but
Belgium probably will deploy GLCMs.
To base 112 GLCMs in Sicily; first 16 mis-
siles arrived during December 1983. Next
missiles will not become operative until early
1986. New government certain by that time;
may face additional debates. Could argue that
NATO should deploy fewer missiles.
Did not participate in NATO's decision but
has strongly supported INF deployments. Op-
poses inclusion of UK and French forces in
INF.
First of 160 GLCMs now being deployed.
Supports maintaining basing schedule. Will
not want domestic opposition to INF to spill
over to strategic force modernization pro-
grams and may come to favor reduction in
GLCM deployments.
Support Soviet negotiating position but regret
Soviet suspension of talks and hope for flexi-
bility from both superpowers.
Wants to see talks resumed, but would worry
if START reopened and suspension of INF
continued. Probably would support merger if
NATO consultative process continued and
SS-20s were included. May also support five-
power conference after START as way to deal
with UK, French, and Chinese systems.
Wants to see US-Soviet dialogue restored, but
would oppose resuming START and leaving
INF suspended. Wants both Washington and
Moscow to live up to SALT accords. May
support START/INF merger, but only if
NATO consultations continue. Would favor
including British and French missiles in sub-
sequent five-power talks.
Would worry about decoupling if START
resumed but INF did not. Would favor merg-
er only if NATO consultations continue and
would support five-power conference after
US/USSR agreement on START/INF mis-
sile reductions.
Main concern is to exclude British and French
forces from START as well as INF. Would
only participate in five-power conference after
deep reductions in US and Soviet arsenals.
Main concern is that START accord not
inhibit US-UK nuclear technology sharing.
Opposes consideration of UK forces in
START. Would favor merger of START and
INF only if UK and French forces excluded
and NATO consultations continued. Would
participate in five-power conference only after
US and Soviet reductions had been achieved
in START/INF.
Has called for resumption of talks. Is seeking Has repeated standard proposals, most of
to exploit US-UK reluctance to resume talks which were in January 1983 Political Decla-
to curry favor with nonaligned countries in ration of Warsaw Pact; likely to table specific
UN and Geneva-based Committee on CSBMs later and to give more attention to
Disarmament. Soviet proposal for regional ban on chemical
weapons.
Support Soviet negotiating position. Bulgaria Support Soviet negotiating position. Non-Bloc negotiations permit maximum con-
and Romania-not covered in area of reduc- tacts with NATO and neutral/ nonaligned
tions-probably hope troops removed from states. All except Romania support Soviet
Central Europe will not be redeployed near negotiating position. Bucharest presses own
their borders. CSBMs, including both declarative and sub-
stantive measures.
Strongly desires progress; eager to resolve
data problem. Has suggested alternative ap-
proaches on data and verification issues.
Eager to resolve data problem; would follow
FRG lead in more flexible approach.
Forces reduced after stage I. Issue has less
political visibility than in the Netherlands and
FRG, but Belgians now want a more direct
role, including bilateral talks with US.
Indirect participant; forces would not be re-
duced. Main concern is verification and asso-
ciated measures affecting flank countries, but
now willing to take more flexible approach.
Does not participate. Insists on exclusion of
French forces. Favors discussion of conven-
tional forces in CDE/CSE context.
Forces in FRG would be reduced. Strongly
supports US on data and verification issues.
Opposes reduction by example. Has suggested
discussion of conventional reductions in CDE.
Would favor resumption of talks. Abstained Most concerned among Allies with making
from vote on Soviet CTB call in UN, which progress at CDE; is maintaining NATO unity
US voted against. on Western CSBMs but believes the West
must eventually adopt a nonuse-of-force
(NUF) pledge to gain an agreement on
CSBMs; believes the West should devise pro-
posals limiting military activities and on noti-
fication of independent air and naval activi-
ties; remains interested in notification of
non-European forces transiting through
Europe.
Favors resumption of talks. Abstained from Shares view of FRG on NUF, constraints, and
vote on Soviet CTB resolution in UN, which transits.
US voted against.
Favors resumption of talks. Abstained from More cautious than FRG in moving forward
vote on Soviet CTB resolution. with new Western proposals, but still shares
view of FRG on NUF, constraints, and
transits.
Favors resumption of talks. Abstained from Believes eventual NUF pledge probably will
vote on Soviet resolution. be necessary; will support consensus on other
issues.
Would not participate in resumed talks. Con- More restrained than FRG in moving forward
tinues nuclear tests below ground in Pacific. with Western proposals, but acknowledges
Voted with US against Soviet CTB resolution. need for NUF and Western constraint propos-
als; prefers that constraints be addressed in
second phase of CDE; shares FRG view on
transits.
Would like to see talks resumed but sympa- Similar view to that of France; wants notifica-
thizes with US stand on need for verification. tion of transits.
Voted against Soviet CTB resolution.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100160004-8
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100160004-8