USSR MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Directorate of
Intelligence 25X1
.;.mot ~~~Z~ g~
~~~ ~A~K ON
USSR Monthly Review
January 1983
SOV UR 83-001
January 1983
Copy'
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
USSR Monthly Review
January 1983
table of contentsl
The USSR Monthly Review is published by the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries
regarding the articles are welcome. They may be
directed to the authors, whose names are listed in the
Secret
SOV UR 83-001
January 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Secret
i
25X1'
Contents
Politics and Policy Perspective: The Brezhnev Succession-Andropov's Initial Move~~ 1
in the New Soviet
Leadership Yuriy Andropov, seemingly well entrenched as General Secretary two
months after Brezhnev's death, has moved rapidly to infuse Soviet
politics and policy with a sense of positive direction and movement.
Nevertheless, he must still consolidate his personal political power if he
is to implement significant changes in domestic policy. Among the
potentially controversial domestic questions he must consider is wheth-
er-and to what extent-to reform the economy. Andropov must also
grapple with complex foreign issues, the most pressing of which
concerns arms control policy, and he seems likely to have greater
freedom of action in this area.
The Politburo moved quickly to name Yuriy Andropov to replace
Brezhnev as party General Secretary. Andropov's position is secure,
and his political authority seems to be greater than the power exercised
by either Khrushchev or Brezhnev at a comparable point in their
tenure, particularly in the foreign policy area. Nevertheless, while
Andropov can shape the Politburo consensus, he is still bound by it, and
the collective restraint on him is most evident in domestic policy.
25X1
The Leadership Ranks in Transition
Andropov is moving cautiously to place his stamp on key personnel
decisions. There is widespread expectation in Soviet elite circles that
major personnel actions are in the offing, but most of the changes made
thus far appear to have been a product of compromise, and some may
have been decided on before Brezhnev's death.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
The Economy Under Andropov
The poor performance of the economy during the latter years of the
Brezhnev regime has driven home to the Andropov Politburo that there
are relatively few opportunities for quick fixes and that the economic
problems of the current decade may spill over into the 1990s. Thus, its
policy decisions may be more forward looking. Andropov will be
acutely aware that severe disruption of the economic system by the
implementation of hasty, ill-conceived policies might be a quick route
to both economic and political disaster.
The Foreign Policy Agenda of the New Leadership
Andropov and his colleagues face a complex international environment
that provides opportunities for new initiatives as well as incentives to
reduce potential threats to their policies. The prominence in the
leadership of the key actors in national security affairs (Andropov,
Defense Minister Ustinov, and Foreign Minister Gromyko) and the
strained international environment for the USSR provide the necessary
consensus and rationale for change in foreign affairs
25X1
25X1
Impact of Soviet Succession on Moscow's Policy Toward Eastern 21
Europe ~~
Brezhnev's passing will probably accelerate the retreat from his
strategy of subsidizing East European consumerism in return for
political conformity. There probably will be no precipitous policy shifts
in the short run, but Andropov's more forceful approach and the
support of key interest groups and leaders for a more demanding policy
are likely to translate over time into Soviet pressure for a policy of
austerity in Eastern Europe augmented by ideological and police
Secret iv
25X1
25X1
' 25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Other Topics Soviet Attitudes Toward Poland After One Year of Martial Law 25
The Soviet leadership apparently is confident that the worst of the
Polish crisis is past and is basically pleased with Jaruzelski's perform-
ance as head of the martial law regime. In the coming year, however,
General Secretary Andropov's preference for a more decisive leader-
ship may translate into increased pressure to hasten the "normaliza-
tion" of Poland.
Viewpoint Andropov's Bid for Leadership'
Andropov is now the recognized spokesman of the new leadership,
although as yet he has instituted no new programs and has exerted only
a limited influence over cadre appointments. If he is able to consolidate
power, Andropov may rule over a power structure in which the armed
forces and the political police, at least initially, have substantially more
political might, and the party apparatus less, than in past decades.
Andropov's Power Base
Andropov probably owes his selection as General Secretary not to
diktat by the KGB or the military establishment, but to support from a
broader coalition of Politburo members-among whom Ustinov is
probably the most influential. Andropov's freedom of maneuver is
currently constrained by the need to pay close heed to the personal and
institutional interests of those who put him in office. He is likely to be
able to increase his power in the Politburo only gradually through
policy-based alliances with senior members of the group, bribery or
blackmail of others, incremental alterations in the Politburo member-
ship, and cultivation of personal relations with subordinates of Politbu-
ro members
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Secret
Politics and Policy in the
New Soviet Leadership
Perspective: The Brezhnev Succession-
Andropov's Initial Moves
In his first two months as the USSR's new party leader, Yuriy Andropov
has sought to overcome the apparent drift and stagnation that character-
ized Brezhnev's last years, and to give Soviet politics and policy a sense of
decisive direction and movement. One result is that many Soviet officials
privately assert to foreigners their relief that the "deathwatch" is over and
that the USSR can now address its foreign and domestic problems.
Precisely how Andropov emerged as the top party leader as well as the ex-
tent of his power remain subjects of some controversy, as is evident in the
articles in the "Viewpoint" section of this issue. Nonetheless, most
observers agree that Andropov seems firmly entrenched as General
Secretary. He is widely regarded within the Soviet elite as intelligent,
sophisticated, and capable. He has confidently established himself as the
Soviet Union's principal foreign policy spokesman-a feat that took
Brezhnev several years to accomplish. On the domestic scene, removal of
the often criticized Minister of Railways has signaled that Andropov
intends to back up criticism with action and that the succession process has
not led to political paralysis.
At the same time, Andropov has not fully consolidated his power or
attempted to set a distinctly new course in domestic policy. The personnel
changes made so far, as noted in the article "The Leadership Ranks in
Transition," reflect his influence but they have not been his choices alone
and have not measurably altered the power balance within the leadership.
He must still operate within the Politburo consensus and seek to lead it. He
still lacks the power to impose major policy changes over the opposition of
his colleagues as discussed in the lead article of this issue.
Andropov seems to recognize this, and his initial public remarks have
indicated that he intends to move cautiously in developing a new domestic
program.
Secret
SOV UR 83-001
January 1983
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Andropov for the present has concentrated on noncontroversial
topics, implementing decisions already approved and taking such obviously
necessary actions as improving transportation and attacking low-level
corruption. More radical changes may take shape in the next year or two as
the 1986-90 Plan is formulated (see "The Economy Under Andropov"). He
evidently has delegated responsibility for developing potentially controver-
sial economic reform proposals to the newest and least experienced party
secretary, Nikolay Ryzhkov, perhaps as a way of distancing himself from
the process and avoiding close identification with the results.
Andropov seems to have more room to maneuver in the area of foreign poli-
cy, but here too he and his colleagues face important challenges. Eastern
Europe remains a source of potential political instability and a drain on the
Soviet treasury. While the Soviets have little choice but to shoulder the
burden, Andropov may with time demand greater belt tightening and
ideological controls from the Bloc to complement Soviet efforts (see
"Impact of Soviet Succession on Moscow's Policy Toward Eastern
Europe").
The Soviet leadership is likely to assume a more activist posture on other
foreign policy problems as well (see "The Foreign Policy Agenda of the
New Leadership"). It has affirmed the broad outlines of Brezhnev's foreign
policy, but the effort to seek improvement in Sino-Soviet relations has
gathered new steam, and arms control initiatives and pressures on the West
Europeans to stop INF deployment have intensified as the West German
elections draw closer. Soviet interest in restoring the centrality of Soviet-
US relations also has been revived. Most important, Andropov has
developed a consensus sufficiently strong to launch new initiatives and
respond quickly to those placed before him.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3 _
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
An Assessment of
Andropov's Power
General Secretary)
General Secretary Yuriy Andropov is the most au-
thoritative leader in the Politburo and has demon-
strated impressive political power from the outset. He
certainly has more strength than Brezhnev had at the
beginning of his long tenure (in 1964). Andropov's
status as top leader was most evident in his meetings
with foreign leaders only days after he became Gener-
al Secretary. Moreover, he has already been given
pride of place in protocol rankings and in leadership
listings, and a few officials have begun to refer to him
as the "head of the Politburo," an accolade not given
to Brezhnev until several years after he was named
Brezhnev was alive.
The Politburo's decision to promote Andropov almost
certainly reflected an informal understanding-at
least among a core group of members-that the
country needed a strong leader, that Andropov was
best qualified to assume the post, and, more impor-
tant, that Konstantin Chernenko-his chief rival and
Brezhnev's choice-was weak and unacceptable.
Andropov undoubtedly exploited such negative views
of Chernenko in his successful efforts in May to
maneuver his way back into the Secretariat in order
to become a major contender in the succession sweep-
stakes. While Brezhnev's patronage gave Chernenko
some obvious advantages in this contest, this strength
was not institutionalized and evaporated with Brezh-
nev's death. We believe the speed of Andropov's rise
reflected a leadership desire to project an image of
decisiveness abroad and avoid any signal of conflict
and political paralysis, not a prearranged decision
made last May when Andropov entered the Secretari-
at. Chernenko's own visibility and activity in recent
months suggest that the contest remained open while
The Lineup
We do not know how various Politburo members
voted in the AndropowChernenko contest or even
whether a formal vote was taken, but Moscow rumors,
Andropov seems to have had strong backing from
Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, Foreign Minister
Andrey Gromyko, and Ukrainian party boss Vladimir
Shcherbitskiy. With their political fortunes still ahead
of them, the two youngest Politburo members-party
secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and Leningrad First
Secretary Grigoriy Romanov-may have joined this
strong coalition as well, at least on this vote. Cher-
nenko probably received support from the two Brezh-
nev loyalists-Prime Minister Nikolay Tikhonov and
Kazakhstan First Secretary Dinmukhamed Kunayev.
Viktor Grishin, the Moscow party chief, may have
joined this group, possibly in the hope of becoming a
compromise choice. Octogenarian Arvid Pelshe was
very likely too sick to play a role in the decision.
Chernenko apparently did not fight the decision to the
bitter end, opting instead to close ranks behind
Andropov and preserve his position as "second" secre-
tary, astrategy that for the present has been success-
ful. Only Grishin-to judge from his slippage in
protocol rankings-seems to have fought excessively
and suffered for it.
Andropov thus has institutional support where it
counts. The national security apparatus, particularly
the military-industrial complex and the KGB, is
behind him. Such backing gives him added room for
maneuver but, at least in the case of the military,
cannot be taken for granted. He will, in addition, need
to strengthen his position within the party apparatus.
He lacks a strong regional base and must depend on
officials whose careers he has had little influence in
shaping.
Opportunities and Flexibility
Andropov, nonetheless, has come to power with what
seems to be solid backing and without resorting to a
major political bloodbath. This situation has allowed
him to assume a more authoritative stance in the
leadership than Stalin, Khrushchev, or Brezhnev did
at a comparable point in past successions. His promo-
tion has given a new momentum to leadership deci-
sionmaking. Indeed, for the first time in years the
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Soviets have a leader who puts in a full day. From
what we can tell, his colleagues recognize and value
his ability and perceive him to be intelligent. They
know from his tenure as KGB chief that he can be
counted on to be decisive in preserving the party's
legitimacy and social order. They probably expect
him-within limits-to be a bold, forceful leader, and
they are likely to give him some room to be one. As a
result, he is probably in a strong position to influence
and lead the Politburo consensus.
Andropov seems to be in a particularly good position
to chart the course of Soviet foreign policy. He has
considerable experience and' knowledge in this area
and is obviously inclined to take an active role.
Foreign policy initiatives, moreover, have the poten-
tial for producing beneficial results more quickly than
changes in domestic policy, a matter of considerable
importance for a leader who wants to build his power.
He is not as likely, in addition, to encounter the sharp
factional infighting and debate that occurs over pro-
posals for domestic shifts, particularly in economic
management.
This situation effectively means that the Soviet Union
will not be paralyzed in the foreign policy arena.
Andropov has room for maneuver here and can be
expected to propose initiatives and respond to those
from abroad he deems serious. In doing so, however,
he will rely heavily on two of his colleagues on the
Defense Council, Defense Minister Ustinov and For-
eign Minister Gromyko, for advice. He would certain-
ly need their support to get the Politburo's assent to a
major shift in Soviet foreign policy or to make major
modifications in arms control negotiations with the
United States. Andropov will probably count on his
personal and political alliance with Ustinov and ap-
parently good working relationship with Gromyko to
help create the Politburo consensus required for im-
portant departures.
It seems likely that the three have been key figures in
formulating the Soviet foreign policy line pursued in
Brezhnev's last years. They were probably major
actors in the decisions regarding the invasion of
Afghanistan and Soviet policy toward Poland, and
were associated with Brezhnev's conciliatory remarks
toward China shortly before his death. As long as
they remain united and stay within the broad parame-
ters of established Soviet foreign policy, the Politburo
is likely to follow their lead. If, on the other hand,
there are significant disagreements between them on
future foreign policy steps or tactics, Andropov would
not be likely to force the issue, at least in the near
Constraints
This flexibility on foreign policy, nonetheless, does not
mean that Andropov has carte blanche from the
Politburo. While he can lead and shape the consensus,
he is still bound by it. The Politburo remains a
collegial body, and its current membership is neither
beholden to Andropov nor under his thumb. Andropov
is indebted to many of his Politburo colleagues,
particularly Ustinov, and is dependent on their collu-
sion and support until he can reshape the Politburo, a
process that could take several years.
Some of Andropov's colleagues, moreover, are evi-
dently trying to hold back his advance. The failure to
name a replacement for Brezhnev as Chairman of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet indicates conflict.
The personnel changes made since Andropov became
party chief, while almost certainly endorsed by him,
seem to have served the interests of others within the
leadership (Ustinov and Chernenko, for example) as
well.' Even if Andropov is eventually named Soviet
president (perhaps at the summer session of the
Supreme Soviet), he must still push through even
more politically important personnel shifts in the
Politburo and Secretariat to consolidate his position
and to dominate policy.
The collective restraint on Andropov is likely to be
particularly evident in domestic policy. While the
entire leadership is undoubtedly committed to solving
Soviet economic problems as a top priority, consensus
on what the solution should be has not been reached.
Economic issues are inherently political, complex, and
'These personnel changes have included shifting Geydar Aliyev
from head of the Azerbaijan Republic party to Moscow as a voting
member of the Politburo and a first deputy premier, and shuffling
the heads of the Komsomol, the Central Committee Pro aganda
Department, the KGB, and the MVD
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3 __
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
controversial. The bureaucratic obstacles to signifi-
cant changes in economic management are immense.
Andropov is probably generally knowledgeable about
the economy and is certainly well informed about
issues affecting internal security, but he has little
personal experience in economic management and his
closest supporters are more concerned with foreign
and security policy. Moreover, as Andropov empha-
sized to the Central Committee, no one has all the
solutions to the country's economic difficulties. As a
result, he is likely to move cautiously in this area-a
strategy he said was needed in his plenum speech.
Domestic and Foreign Policy Linkage
Significant movement toward resolving the nation's
economic problems might, in fact, require that Andro-
pov first achieve some relaxation of tensions with the
United States or China, or both. Only by doing so can
he justify to his colleagues and the military some
reallocation of resources from defense to investment,
an essential step in any plan to address the country's
economic problems.
In this regard, the next two years are particularly
crucial for Andropov and the Politburo. The planning
cycle for the 12th Five-Year Plan (1986-90) is already
under way. We know from historical precedent that
the Soviet military's assessment of the external threat
is an essential element in this cycle and will be
formally developed during 1983. The Politburo in
1984 will act on this military assessment in allocating
resources for the next five-year defense plan. This will
be the new Politburo's first formal and comprehensive
ordering of internal priorities between economic in-
vestment and defense procurement. Without reduc-
tion in international tensions, which some in the
military such as Chief of the General Staff Nikolay
Ogarkov contend are exceedingly high, the rate of
defense growth will be politically hard to reduce. But
failure to reduce growth in defense spending will
make it very difficult to address Soviet economic
problems and over the long run will erode the econom-
ic base of the military-industrial complex itself.
Conclusion
On balance, the speed with which the new General
Secretary was appointed, his assertion of a leading
role in foreign policy, and his self-confident state-
ments on international issues reflect real strengths
that were not present in Brezhnev's final days. The
personnel actions taken by the new regime in the
several weeks it has been in office (see following
.article) suggest a new momentum in leadership deci-
sionmaking. Moreover, the new leadership, so far, has
been able to demonstrate a unity of purpose. In sum,
all the available evidence points to a strong regime
that can act decisively and forcefully, particularly in
the foreign policy field
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
The Leadership Ranks
in Transition
Yuriy Andropov is moving cautiously to place his
stamp on key personnel decisions. While a number of
changes have been announced since he became Gener-
al Secretary, most appear to have been the product of
compromise, and some may even have been decided
before Brezhnev's death. The cumulative effect of the
actions already taken, however, has given the impres-
sion of decisive movement after the stagnation of
Brezhnev's last years,
major new appointments are likely in the spring.
Opportunities and Constraints
Andropov appears to have a unique opportunity to
influence within a relatively short span of time the
selection of the next generation of party and govern-
ment leaders. As a result of the failure of the old
guard to rejuvenate the top and middle ranks of the
party leadership, a record number of positions are now
or soon will be vacant. To judge from his words and
actions, moreover, Andropov intends to capitalize on
this situation and use a campaign against corruption party secretary Konstantin Chernenko-in key insti-
and bureaucratic inefficiency to weed out deadwood tutional positions is also likely to restrict Andropov's
and bring in people of his own. ,ability to remake the bureaucracy in his own image.
Andropov has some obstacles to overcome, however,
in expanding his influence within the party and
government. His experience in party work has not
been extensive enough to develop a network like
Brezhnev's of personal contacts and clients that he
can draw on to staff key positions. While he can and
probably will continue to use his KGB associates for
this purpose, any attempt to pack the party machinery
with them would almost certainly create political
opposition. As a result, he is likely to rely on recom-
mendations from his Politburo allies in making per-
sonnel decisions-Shcherbitskiy already seems to be
working closely with Andropov in this regard.
Such dependence will give his colleagues some politi-
cal leverage and will tend to reinforce continued
collegiality within the Politburo. The presence of two
Brezhnev cronies-Premier Nikolay Tikhonov and
Signs oJ'Resistance
The failure of the Politburo to pick a new president
suggests that an effort is being made to contain
n ropov was unable to push his rival Chernenko into
the post, to persuade his ally Gromyko to take it, or to
into the post later or to gain it for himself-but they
have not been able to dispel entirely the impression
that the Politburo is in some disarray on this issue. ~
.5X1
25X1
25X1
1X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Changes at the Top
The decisions actually made, moreover, had probably
been in the works before Brezhnev's death. Andrey
Kirilenko was removed from the Politburo and party
Secretariat. Planning official Nikolay Ryzhkov was
named to the Secretariat, and Azerbaijan party boss
Geydar Aliyev was elevated to full membership on the
Politburo. Two days later, at the Supreme Soviet
session, Aliyev's appointment as First Deputy Chair-
man of the USSR Council of Ministers was an-
nounced.
The Ryzhkov Appointment. Ryzhkov's career has
been focused entirely outside party apparatus work.
Since 1979 he had been a first deputy chairman of
Gosplan with responsibilities for heavy industry and
machine building, and before that he served for many
years as manager of a huge machine-building complex
in Sverdlovsk. He presumably owed his Gosplan
position to Andrey Kirilenko, who headed the Sverd-
lovsk party organization in the early 1950s. Ryzhkov's
close connections with the Sverdlovsk group suggest
that his appointment may have been part of a prior
political deal linked to securing Kirilenko's departure
from the Politburo. Ryzhkov i~
he kind of energetic manager
Andropov is looking for, but Andropov is unlikely to
Ryzhkov has been
brought into the Secretariat to head the newly estab-
lished Economics Department. This department re-
portedly will be responsible for studying ideas for
economic reform, particularly in the industrial sector
of the economy.
The Aliyev Appointment. The appointment of Aliyev
to the Council of Ministers was the most puzzling
action taken. His elevation in the Politburo was not
unexpected (there had been rumors of it earlier in the
summer), but his government appointment was; it
caught even the Supreme Soviet deputies by surprise,
judging by the animated stirring in the hall when his
appointment was announced.
Aliyev is Andropov's man and has been brought in to
spearhead the drive to ferret out bureaucratic ineffi-
ciency and corruption and enforce managerial ac-
countability at all levels of the government. He will
reportedly have specific responsibility for the troubled
transportation sector. Aliyev's subsequent attendance
at a meeting at the Railways Ministry (which was
sharply criticized by Andropov at the plenum and is
now undergoing a shakeup) would seem to bear this
out.
have been acquainted with him.
25X1
25X1
~Fx~
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
man in the Council of Ministers,
he is slated to replace~I`ik one
premier before spring. Before the plenum, however,
Shcherbits-
kiy a core member of the
Andropov group-would be premier in a new Andro-
pov leadership. He has had far broader experience for
the post than Aliyev.
While Aliyev has made a name for himself rooting out
corruption in Azerbaijan and has been credited with
the republic's remarkable economic recovery, he nev-
ertheless would seem to lack important qualifications
for the premiership, and even for the deputy post. He
is not himself entirely free of the taint of corruption
(there have been rumors that some of his republic's
economic achievements are based on falsified data).
He has had no experience at the national level and
does not know his way around the Moscow bureaucra-
cy. Moreover, his Muslim background is not likely to
endear him to the largely Slavic Moscow bureaucracy
and is perhaps the most important strike against him
for the premiership
The choice of Aliyev as first deputy premier (rather
than some other more qualified official, such as
Shcherbitskiy) is all the more puzzling in view of
Aliyev's mixed political allegiances. He reportedly
was closer to Brezhnev's protege, KGB First Deputy
~liyev had been solidly in the Brezhnev-Cher-
nen o camp until recently and may have owed his
promotion to the Politburo in part to their backing.
Aliyev was Chernenko's
choice to replace Andropov as Chairman of the KGB
in May 1982, but he lost out to Vitaliy Fedorchuk, the
Ukrainian KGB chief, who reportedly had the solid
backing of Shcherbitskiy and Andropov
In fact, Aliyev probably owes his elevation to support
from both camps, but he will almost certainly be more
sensitive to Andropov's interests. Andropov, in addi-
tion, may feel that Aliyev's wide range of ties will
deflect away from himself some of the resentment
that is sure to develop if Aliyev's efforts to crack the
whip and "get things done" run into resistance.
Andropov also would probably be willing to disassoci-
ate himself from Aliyev if he becomes too controver-
sial.
The Shrinking Secretariat. As anticipated, the Cen-
tral Committee plenum dropped Kirilenko from the
Politburo and Secretariat on the stated grounds of ill
health. The reason for Kirilenko's eclipse is something
of a mystery, but considerable evidence suggests that
illness and a scandal involving a member of his family
earlier this year made him vulnerable to the machina-
tions of political rivals. In any event, he had already
been excluded from the leadership for some time
before Brezhnev died, and his removal at the plenum
was only a formality.
With Brezhnev's death, the death of Suslov earlier in
the year, and now Kirilenko's retirement, the number
of senior secretaries (those with full membership in
the Politburo) has dropped from five to three: Andro-
pov, Chernenko, and the secretary in charge of agri-
culture, Gorbachev. Party secretary Vladimir Dol-
gikh, who oversees the heavy industry sector and had
been filling in for Kirilenko during his absences, was
expected in Soviet circles to be elevated to full
membership in the Politburo at the plenum to replace
Kirilenko, but the move may have run into some
political difficulty. He is from Krasnoyarsk, a Siberi-
an region known to receive special attention from
Chernenko
Chernenko Hangs In
Chernenko appears to be performing the functions of
unofficial "second secretary"-the same functions
that Suslov carried out under Brezhnev-and he has
recently been ranked right after Andropov in Politbu-
ro lineups. He evidently has taken over Suslov's
former responsibilities on the party Secretariat for
culture, propaganda, and ideology as well, and there is
tenuous evidence that he has some responsibility for
overseeing personnel assignments.
Chernenko has reportedly given up his job as head of
the General Department (the Politburo's executive
officer). He probably no longer has a good claim to
this position, as it has traditionally been the General
I
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
1X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Secretary's prerogative to have his own man as execu-
tive officer. A permanent replacement for Chernenko
has apparently not yet been named, however. His
longtime assistant, Klavdiy Bogolyubov, is rumored to
have been given the job for the time being.
Chernenko and Andropov appear to share many views
on policy issues and may have formed a working
arrangement. The new practice of publicizing regular
Thursday Politburo meetings, for example, seems to
reflect Chernenko's longstanding interest in promot-
ing amore open style of leadership, and the first
reported item on the Politburo agenda-work with
letters from Soviet citizens-is one with which he has
been closely identified. The present arrangement is
inherently unstable, however, in view of the two men's
political rivalry, and it is clearly in Andropov's inter-
est either to ease Chernenko out of the Secretariat or
to bring someone else in to act as a counterweight.
The Pace of Personnel Actions Picks Up
Following the plenum a number of important appoint-
ments were made to second-level party and govern-
ment posts, but again some of them would appear to
have been in the works since earlier in the year. In a
musical chairs round of appointments:
? First Secretary of the Komsomol (youth organiza-
tion), Boris Pastukhov, was replaced by one of his
deputies and transferred to the less important post
of chairman of the state publishing committee.
? The former head of the state publishing committee,
Boris Stukalin, in turn, moved up to replace the
chief of the Central Committee's Propaganda De-
partment, Yevgeniy Tyazhelnikov.
? Tyazhelnikov was given an ambassadorial post.
There were rumors shortly after Suslov died in Janu-
ary that both Tyazhelnikov and Pastukhov would be
fired as part of an effort to remove Suslov people from
positions of power. Chernenko's apparent assumption
now of Suslov's former responsibilities suggests that
he probably had some hand in carrying this out-
although Andropov's approval would have been re-
quired
The most important reshuffling of assignments since
Andropov took over was the replacement of Brezh-
nev's close associate Nikolay Shchelokov as head of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) by KGB chief
Fedorchuk and the elevation of the First Deputy
Chairman of the KGB, Viktor Chebrikov, to succeed
Fedorchuk. These moves have allowed Andropov to
expand his control over both security organs. The shift
is one of the clearest signs of his authority to date.
On the face of it, the appointment represents a
demotion for Fedorchuk; but his initial assignment to
the KGB post last May was unusual (typically a
professional security officer is not picked for this role)
and one for which he did not appear to be well
qualified. The choice was probably made with succes-
sion-related politics in mind rather than the require-
ments of the KGB. Andropov presumably supported
Fedorchuk in May as part of an effort to bring
Shcherbitskiy into his camp and to block any Brezh-
nev-Chernenko candidate, whether it was Aliyev or
one of Brezhnev's men among the KGB deputies.
Having accomplished this, Andropov was presumably
willing to reconsider the appointment after he
emerged on top. There is certain to have been wide-
spread unhappiness, particularly among senior offi-
cials in the organization, at having Fedorchuk (a
relatively junior KGB professional) appointed to the
top KGB post, and Andropov's interests may have
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Secret
been better served by having Fedorchuk move to the
MVD post. Fedorchuk reportedly has a mandate to
clean up the corruption-riddled police organization
and has since been promoted to the rank of general.
The new KGB chief, Chebrikov, like Andropov; has a
background in party work. He served for many years
in the Dnepropetrovsk party organization (Brezhnev's
political bailiwick in the Ukraine), and he was trans-
ferred to the KGB in 1967 along with two other close
Brezhnev associates soon after Andropov was appoint-
ed head. Chebrikov has worked closely with Andropov
for the past 14 years, however, and they reportedly
are on good terms.
Winds oJ'Change
The pace of personnel actions appears to be quicken-
ing. Anumber of officials at the deputy minister level
have been fired and a major shakeup of the media and
propaganda apparatus appears to be under way. The
editors of several newspapers have reportedly been
replaced, and both the head of the Central Commit-
tee's International Information Department and his
deputy have been reassigned.
the various vacancies in the top leadership will be
filled at a Central Committee plenum to be held early
this spring.
The cumulative impact of these changes, real and
anticipated, contributes to the impression that the
long-delayed rejuvenation of the party and govern-
ment ranks is finally under way, after the near
paralysis of Brezhnev's last years. Moreover, Andro-
pov seems to be perceived by the Soviet elite as firmly
in control of this process, even if he has not been the
principal initiator or sole beneficiary of each individ-
ual action.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3 __
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Secret
The Econom Under
Andropov
The poor performance of the economy during the
latter years of the Brezhnev regime has driven home
to the Andropov Politburo that there are relatively
few opportunities for quick fixes and that the econom-
ic problems of the current decade may spill over into
the 1990s (see inset). Thus, its policy decisions may be
more forward looking. Andropov will be acutely
aware that severe disruption of the economic system
by the implementation of hasty, ill-conceived policies
might be a quick route to both economic and political
disaster. The Soviets will continue to be dependent on
the West for significant purchases of agricultural
products and machinery and equipment for both
agriculture and industry, but-in view of their disap-
pointing experience in commercial dealings with the
United States-they probably will respond skeptically
to US initiatives
Changes in Decisionmaking Process
The new leadership probably will continue to favor
bureaucratic centralism rather than move voluntarily
toward fundamental systemic change. These lead-
ers-because of the stringent economic situation and
their own personalities-are likely to rely more on
tightened discipline and control to effect economic
policies of long standing than on coaxing desired
behavior through increased incentives. Andropov's
long tenure in the KGB has given him experience in
using administrative measures to modify behavior.
Moreover, the Soviet people, faced with unsettling
economic and social problems, seem ready to accept a
leader who would demand greater discipline. ~~
This trend, however, would not rule out a mix of
liberal and authoritarian measures. Greater depend-
ence on the private sector, for example, is a distinct
possibility that could be classified as liberal, while
harsher penalties for labor absenteeism and misman-
agement, though authoritarian in nature, need not
mark a return to Stalinis
continuity, and because it may take some time to
develop a strong consensus, new policy lines may not
appear until 1984-85, when the Five-Year Plan for
1986-90 has been drafted. Some indications of change
are likely to be discernible earlier, however, as discus-
sion and debate about policies for the late 1980s
ensues and annual plans for 1984 and 1985 are
formulated.
The hardest policy decision for the Andropov leader-
ship will be how to allocate resources among the
major claimants. Maintaining historical growth in
defense spending would squeeze investment and con-
sumption further. Keeping investment growth at cur-
rent rates as well might result in an absolute decline
in consumption.
The Military. For the past several years we have seen
little or no growth in military hardware procurement.
More resources are needed to break economic bottle-
necks, and a slowdown (or even zero growth) in
military procurement for a few years would have little
negative impact on forces already in the field; mod-
ernization of these forces could still proceed. We
believe the groundwork for such a course may have
already been laid in Brezhnev's speech to top military
officers on 27 October 1982. In any event, this course
will be required if the Andropov Politburo wants to
improve economic performance substantially
Investment. A strong candidate to receive more in-
vestment funds is the machine-building sector-be-
cause of the need to modernize Soviet industry and
because of constraints on importing foreign machin-
ery and technology. Modernizing machine building
would also help justify a temporary slowdown in
defense hardware procurement, as such moderniza-
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
tion could ultimately enhance military hardware pro- 25X1
duction. The new leadership, with its longer time
horizon, might launch such an effort.
Changes in Policy
The new leaders will surely bring changes in economic
policy. Because they have laid particular stress on
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Outlook for the Soviet Economy in the 1980s
Soviet economic growth will continue to decline in the
1980s as average annual rates of increase in labor
and capital decline and productivity gains fall short
ojplans. We expect average annual GNP growth to
.fall below 2 percent per year in the 1980s:
? The IaborJorce will grow more slowly than it did in
the 1970s-at an average annual rate oJ0.7 percent
compared with 1.5 percent.
? Growth in the productivity ojSoviet plant and
equipment, which haslallen substantially since
1975, will continue to drop as the cost of'exploiting
natural resources rises and Moscow is.forced to
spend more on irE/rastructure.
? Continued stagnation in the production of key
industrial materials particularly metals-will in-
hibit growth in new machinery, the key source for
introducing new technology.
? Energy production will grow more slowly and be-
come more expensive, whether or not oil production?
falls.
? With continued growth in domestic energy require-
ments, Moscow will face a conflict between main-
taining oil exports and meeting domestic needs.
? Agriculture will remain the most unstable sector of
the Soviet economy, with performance in any year
highly dependent on weather conditions.
Slower growth of production will mean slower expan-
sion in the availability of goods and services to be
divided among competing claimants-resources for
future growth (investment), the consumer, and
defense:
Consumption. A leadership prone to authoritarian
solutions is likely to be more pragmatic in its consum-
er policy and may place more stress on tying wages
and perquisites more closely to production results.
? Rapid growth in defense spending can be main-
tained only at the expense ojinvestment growth.
? Slower expansion of'investment will be compound-
ed by the increasing demandJor investment goods
in the energy, transportation, metallurgy, and ma-
chinery sectors.
? An increased share oI investment in heavy indus-
tries, together with continued large allocations to
agriculture, will depress the expansion oJhousing
and other consumer goods and services.
Making up production shortfalls through imports
will become more expensive as the need for imports
increases and Moscow's ability to pay (hard currency
earnings) declines:
? The Soviet need for imports of Western grain and
other agricultural commodities will remain high in
the 1980s, as will requirements for Western ma-
chinery and technology.
? We expect real export earnings to decline between
now and 1990 as sales of natural gas fail to offset
the drop in oil earnings, and opportunities to ex-
pand exports of other commodities remain limited
by their low marketability and tightness in domes-
tic supplies.
? The availability of Western credits will be crucial
for Moscow to maintain or increase its imports
from the West; a tighter credit market would
complicate Soviet economic problems and make
resource allocation decisions more painful.
Retail prices may also be raised on all but essential
goods and services, and an expansion of privately
operated consumer services may be in the offing.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3 _
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Reform. The Politburo's predilection for administra-
tive measures and bureaucratic centralism would
severely limit the extent of future economic reform.
The difficult economic situation argues against re-
form measures-like those launched in Eastern
Europe-that have never been tested in the USSR.
Some movement toward a regionally organized econo-
my might be thought more suitable to today's prob-
lems-for example, exploitation of energy and raw
materials in Siberia.
Agriculture. Moscow will continue to support the
farm sector but might decide to favor the industries
that support agriculture and those that process its
output. The Food Program already does this to some
extent, but an actual cut of investment inside the farm
gate would be a stronger signal of the new leaders'
dissatisfaction with the returns from agricultural
investment
Labor. In addition to instilling tighter discipline, the
Andropov leadership is likely to focus on automating
manual labor (consistent with more investment in
machinery) and developing social and cultural infra-
structure in labor-deficit regions. The latter would
provide some inducement for workers to emigrate
from labor-surplus areas and would reinforce a re-
gionally differentiated pronatalist policy favoring the
labor-deficit areas.
East-West Trade. With economic problems pressing
from every quarter, the leadership might welcome-
though perhaps not publicly-the opportunity to ex-
pand economic ties with the West in general and with
the United States in particular, especially if decisions
are taken to maintain slow growth in military hard-
ware, step up investment in machinery, and reduce
investment dedicated to the farms. Under these cir-
cumstances, Moscow might find it advantageous to
press for (1) economic ties that provide the USSR with
technology and goods for both civilian and military
purposes and (2) arms control arrangements .that limit
Western advances in military technology which they
would find difficult and costly to counter.
Impact of Changes. These changes in approach and
policies will not be a panacea for the Soviet economy's
ills. Nevertheless, they could bring marginal improve-
ments in key areas and allow the leadership to
redistribution of resources
continue to muddle through even in the face of
economic conditions probably worse than they had
expected. Of primary importance to the Politburo,
these policies would not require the surrender of
power and would continue to allow it the freedom to
impose its will on the smallest economic or adminis-
trative unit. In this way, the leadership could feel
assured of its ability to handle such problems as
public unrest, external economic or military threats,
or internal disasters that would require an emergency
Economic Relations With the United States
Notwithstanding the importance of expanded eco-
nomic ties with the United States, the Soviet experi-
ence in commercial relations with Washington has
been disappointing to Moscow since the mid-1970s,
and it would probably take a strong US initiative just
to get the attention of the Soviet leaders. Although an
offer to renew close economic ties with the USSR
might be welcome, it would probably be greeted
skeptically by the Soviet leadership as primarily a
tactical' maneuver-a further retreat by Washington
(following the grain and pipeline decisions) brought
about by US-West European economic competition
and pressures from US business circles. Needing to
consolidate his power, Andropov could not-even if he
wished-respond unilaterally to such an initiative, but
would have to move within a leadership consensus
strongly influenced by the views of Foreign Minister
Gromyko and Defense Minister Ustinov, who would
urge caution. Thus the Soviets might:
? Accept part of the offer as a means of coping with
particularly acute bottlenecks, especially in technol-
ogy and food supplies.
? Seek to avoid long-term economic dependencies on
the United States.
? Exploit any new atmosphere of mutual accommoda-
tion as a means of reinforcing support in the United
States and Western Europe for cutbacks in defense
spending and arms control measures favorable to
Soviet interests.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
The United States, for example, could again become
an important source of Soviet purchases of agricultur-
al products and machinery and equipment for both
agriculture and industry. The need is there, if the
"price" (including sanctity of contract) is right. Soviet
agriculture could benefit substantially from US tech-
nology in livestock feed production, fertilizer applica-
tion, and animal breeding, and the United States is
still Moscow's best long-term bet for grain imports on
a large scale.
The USSR faces increasing dependence on the West
in developing and processing its oil and gas resources
in the 1980s. The United States is the preferred
supplier of most types of oil and gas equipment
because it is by far the largest producer, with the most
experience, the best support network, and often the
best technology. In some products-for example,
large-capacity downhole pumps-the United States
has a world monopoly (albeit one that could be broken
in a few years by entry of other Western producers),
and the most critical needs of the Soviet oil industry
are for just such equipment.
Because the prospects for Soviet hard currency earn-
ings in the 1980s are far from bright, Western credits
will have to cover an increasing proportion of Soviet
imports from the West. An increase in the availability
of US Government-backed credit could look very
attractive to the new leaders in Moscow.
On balance we would expect the Soviets to give any
US initiative low-key treatment, publicly casting
doubt on US motives, but at the same time seeking to
engage the administration in a dialogue about it. A
US offer to return to a "business as usual" basis
would probably not result in any surge in orders for
US companies beyond the sectors in which the United
States is already an important supplier. Moscow is at
least as likely to use the opportunity created by a US
offer to put commercial pressure on the West Europe-
ans and Japanese and exacerbate existing tensions in
the Alliance. At a minimum, Moscow would press for
US Government guarantees regarding fulfillment of
contracts, and it might seek repeal of the Jackson-
Vanik and Stevenson amendments. In either case, it
would refuse to make any' significant political conces-
sions in return-which Andropov probably could not
deliver even if he desired. If this process permitted the
Soviets to acquire more technology on acceptable
terms from the United States, they would do so-but
not at the expense of established ties with Western
Europe and Japan, or of their own long-term econom-
ic independence.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Secret
The Foreign Policy Agenda
of the New Leadership
Precedents
During previous succession periods in the 1950s and
1960s there were definite new departures in foreign
policy. In the post-Stalin period, the Soviets worked
more actively toward resolving the Korean conflict,
signed a peace treaty accepting Austrian neutrality,
reopened diplomatic relations with Israel, called off
disputes with Greece and Turkey, and moved toward
summitry with President Eisenhower. They also made
their first moves to counter Western influence in the
Third World. In Brezhnev's first years, the Soviets
developed a policy of selective detente with France,
then slowly did the same with West Germany before
turning to improved relations with the United States.
Partly in response to worsening relations with China,
the Soviets also pressed for a series of arms control
measures that led to the nonproliferation treaty and
SALT I. At the same time, they began the buildup on
the Sino-Soviet border, gave impetus to a massive
Soviet arms program, and began aiding North Viet-
nam's effort to take over the South.
the attendant threat to Soviet strategic forces and
command and control capabilities was behind Andro-
pov's decision to go public on the Soviet START and
INF initiatives in order to build European and per-
haps domestic US opposition to INF deployment. In
the wake of the Warsaw Pact's recent offer of a
nonaggression pact, there could be further moves on
arms control issues in conjunction with the resump-
tion of START, INF, and MBFR talks and the
Geneva Disarmament Conference in late January and
early February.
Gromyko's visit to Bonn was a convenient forum to
reinforce Soviet arms control initiatives. The visit also
provided an opportunity not only to put the United
States on the defensive but to increase divisions
between the United States and its NATO Allies.
Gromyko lobbied for increased Soviet-West Europe-
an cooperation and trade, which provide political as
well as economic benefits for the Soviets. The removal
of US sanctions imposed after Afghanistan and the
nominal return to normalcy in Poland probably added
Areas of Concern
The new leadership has already taken pains to reaf-
firm the broad outlines of Brezhnev's foreign policy
and to signal the importance of improved ties with the
United States. The failure to effect some change in
Soviet-American relations directly will probably pro-
vide the Soviets greater incentive to play their "Euro-
pean card" against US interests on the Continent or
to create the impression of improved relations with
China. Andropov's decision to meet with Vice Presi-
dent Bush and Secretary of State Shultz within hours
after Brezhnev's funeral indicated the Kremlin's in-
terest in some normalization of US-Soviet relations,
though the harsh anti-US rhetoric that has followed
suggests no change in fundamental attitudes
In view of the prospect of an enhanced US strategic
challenge in this decade, there is ample incentive for
Andropov to try to curb new US arms programs and
particularly to prevent or at least delay the deploy-
ment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). The
specter of Pershing II missiles in West Germany and
to the credibility of Gromyko's brief in Bonn.
A continuing inability to effect some visible reduction
of tensions with the United States will generate even
greater Soviet interest in improving Sino-Soviet rela-
tions and exploiting differences between Washington
and Beijing. The Soviets clearly do not want contin-
ued antagonism on "two fronts" at a time of more
assertive US policies, a mounting US defense effort,
and ever-increasing economic problems at home. For
these reasons, the Soviets may have sufficient incen-
tive to entertain a unilateral move that could involve
withdrawal of several divisions from Mongolia or the
Sino-Soviet border
Although a reduction of force in any area would be
highly controversial within the Soviet military, a
significant diminishing of the Soviet military role in
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Afghanistan would offer considerable potential
rewards:
? Removal of a key obstacle to improved relations
with both the United States and China.
? Elimination of a source of embarrassment in the
entire Islamic community.
? Improved relations with key European countries as
well as India.
? Savings in both lives and resources.
In the Third World, the new leadership is giving every
indication of a willingness to be more assertive on
behalf of beleaguered clients. Senior Politburo mem-
ber Viktor Grishin's anniversary speech in December,
for example, reaffirmed Soviet support for Cuba and
Vietnam. The apparent decision to deploy SA-5 long-
range, high-altitude surface-to-air missiles at two sites
in Syria marks the first export of this system to the
Third World and a fundamental change in Moscow's
commitment to Damascus. This decision, which would
make Soviet personnel at these sites vulnerable to an
Israeli preemptive strike, contrasts markedly with
Soviet caution in the wake of the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon last summer. In tying their prestige more
closely than ever to Syria's military fortunes, the
Soviets are running a far greater risk of being drawn
into Syrian-Israeli hostilitiesa
Elsewhere, there are no likely targets of opportunity
in South America at this juncture, and the Soviets
will probably be content to pursue their gradual and
incremental strategy in Central America. In Africa
they will concentrate on complicating the Namibia
talks in which they also find themselves as "odd man
out." They also will be alert to opportunities in
southern Africa-such as in Mozambique-to expand
the Soviet and especially the Cuban presence.~~
The American Angle
From the Soviets' perspective, there are also areas in
which they may anticipate US pressure or blandish-
ment that would have an impact on their ability to
improve their international position. Indeed, Andro-
pov must realize that the United States is well placed
in certain respects to challenge the international
position of the USSR and to exploit Moscow's fear of
encirclement:
? The Soviets presumably recognize that the United
States could play the role of spoiler in the Sino-
Soviet-US triangle by holding out to the Chinese the
promise of increased defense cooperation, expanded
technological ties, and a more equivocal position on
Taiwan.
? Any US willingness to modify the "zero option" at
INF could undercut Soviet initiatives in this area
and might help sustain support for US deployments
in Western Europe (although such modifications
might have other, less desirable consequences for
the West).
? The Soviets probably judge that US pressure on
Israel and South Africa to become more concilia-
tory would enhance Washington's prestige and le-
verage in the Middle East and southern Africa.
Conversely, Moscow may anticipate some restoration
of the centrality of Soviet-American relations that
could enhance the USSR's international position and
ameliorate its economic problems:
? The new Soviet leaders may try to encourage eco-
nomic initiatives by the United States, particularly
some easing of limits on credits and technology
transfer. (See "The Economy Under Andropov.")
? Notwithstanding recent Soviet references to
strengthening defense, Moscow would like to ame-
liorate amajor US arms buildup, which it would be
hard pressed to match right now, and sees arms
control as the best way to achieve this.
? Less acrimonious atmospherics and a dialogue with
the United States on Third World trouble spots
would also be attractive to the Soviets, although
past experience strongly suggests they would not
alter their behavior
` 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3 _
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Outlook
The Soviets have already suggested that they are
looking for ways to restore the notion of the centrality
of Soviet-American relations in international affairs,
and they presumably realize that some relaxation of
tensions would ease the problems of making their own
choices on future allocation of resources as well as
ease the pressure from the national security apparatus
for increased military spending. The rise in stature for
Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko suggests the emer-
gence of a consensus on national security issues in
general and the prospect of some flexibility on specific
issues. Such putative critics of Andropov as Konstan-
tin Chernenko and Viktor Grishin would probably
support the triumvirate's efforts to improve relations
with the United States in view of their earlier support
for Brezhnev's detente and arms control initiatives.
The key role will be played by Ustinov, who appears
to be in a position to block those intiatives that do not
protect the equity of the military
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Impact of Soviet Succession
on Moscow's Policy Toward
Eastern Europe~~
Brezhnev's passing is likely to accelerate the retreat
from the policy of subsidizing East European consum-
erism and tolerating diversity within the Bloc-a
retreat already under way in response to Soviet
economic problems and events in Poland. General
Secretary Andropov, although unlikely to favor pre-
cipitous changes in Moscow's East European policy,
probably will prove more forceful than his predecessor
in weaning the East European allies from Soviet
assistance and promoting CEMA integration. In the
next several years, support for a more demanding
policy among key institutional actors and younger
leaders who are likely to move into positions of greater
power probably will translate into much stronger
pressure for more economic austerity in Eastern
Europe, greater conformity to the Soviet model, and
stricter ideological and police control
Brezhnev's Policy
Until the last year of the Brezhnev era, Soviet policy
toward Eastern Europe tolerated a fair amount of
diversity, while setting definite limits on modification
of the political system. Moscow demanded certain key
commitments-maintenance of the party's leading
role, social stability collectively enforced under the
Brezhnev doctrine, and fidelity to the Warsaw Pact
and CEMA. In return, the Soviets not only counte-
nanced considerable internal autonomy, but encour-
aged an expansion of ties to the West as part of their
detente strategy and, particularly after 1973, under-
wrote the cost of East European consumerism through
major subsidies to their allies.
Beginning in late 1981, however, Soviet and East
European economic problems and events in Poland
were leading to some retreat from this policy. In late
1981 Moscow ordered reductions in subsidized oil
deliveries to several key East European allies and took.
other steps to reduce its economic support. Moscow
also stepped up efforts to increase CEMA integration
and reorient Eastern Europe toward meeting more of
the USSR's economic needs. It did so, however,
without cutting Eastern Europe's important economic
ties to the West, since this would have further under-
mined economic stability in the region.
Short-Term Prospects
In the short term (one to two years), it appears
unlikely that the departure of Brezhnev will result in
precipitous shifts in the Kremlin's policy toward
Eastern Europe:
? Soviet policy in the Brezhnev era was made by
consensus within the Politburo. While Brezhnev's
input probably was crucial, the continued domi-
nance of the current Politburo seniors in the new
leadership team will make short-term continuity far
more likely than during the last two successions in
1953 and 1964.
? Moreover, the new General Secretary himself has
played a key role in the development of Brezhnev's
East European policy of the 1970s and the modifica-
tion of it already in train. Andropov is, therefore,
unlikely to favor a precipitous change in this policy.
Andropov has had considerable experience with policy
toward Eastern Europe as Ambassador to Hungary
(1954-,571. Bloc secretary (1957-67), and head of the
KGB.
he has excellent rapport with the chief of the Central
Committee department that oversees relations with
Bloc countries, Konstantin Rusakov, who was his
deputy when he headed the department.
Overall, Andropov's track record points to a tough-
minded approach in times of crisis. He clashed with
the Yugoslavs over ideological diversity in the 1960s,
opposed Czech reform in 1968, and took a critical
attitude toward Polish regime policy in 1980-82. He
will demand strict adherence to Soviet security and
foreign policy goals but will probably permit some
modification of the Soviet model in Eastern Europe.
In the past he has favored tactical flexibility in
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
ideological policy by publicly approving some econom-
ic and political diversity within the Bloc, advocated
improved East-West relations, and supported Kadar's
reforms in Hungary.
In the near term Andropov is likely to continue the
broad lines of the policies pursued by Brezhnev during
the last years of his regime. He seems committed to
the current policy of weaning Eastern Europe from
Soviet subsidies, and in his public statements since
November, he has advocated further CEMA integra-
tion, an effort initiated last fall before Brezhnev's
death. Like Brezhnev, he has publicly endorsed Hun-
garian economic reforms, and he may favor introduc-
ing them elsewhere in the Bloc to promote efficiency
so long as these reforms do not significantly affect the
political structure.
Although Andropov's policies may initially differ
little from Brezhnev's, he will probably pursue a more
activist policy in the region than his predecessor given
his familiarity with East European issues. He has
already been far more assertive in his tactical han-
dling of East European leaders. His brusque behavior
with the Yugoslavs-who characterized him as
"harsh, not pleasant"-after Brezhnev's funeral indi-
cated his willingness to deal firmly with the USSR's
East European neighbors. Andropov also felt suffi-
ciently confident of his relationship with his Warsaw
Pact allies not to meet with the East European party
heads immediately after Brezhnev's death-unlike
Brezhnev who sought consultations with East Eurone-
ans after the Khrushchev ouster,
tions of his subsequent meetings with Warsaw Pact
leaders-particularly Jaruzelski and Ceaucescu-at
the Soviet Union's 60th anniversary celebrations last
month indicated some disagreement, leaving the im-
pression that Andropov will be more demanding than
his predecessor and less likely to sweep controversy
under the rug.
Despite his apparent dominance in the foreign policy
area, Andropov will have to contend with the diverse
concerns of his Politburo colleagues and key interest
groups that have a stake in policy toward Eastern
Europe. Andropov's bested rival Chernenko, for one,
will probably attempt to play an important role as
watchdog for the collective leadership and as protec-
tor of Brezhnev's policies at home and in Eastern
Europe. Chernenko has also taken a rather flexible
approach to policy toward Eastern Europe by accept-
ing the legitimacy of "different roads to socialism"
and favoring East European economic reform and, on
this issue, at least, seems in accord with Andropov.
Chernenko's appointment as head of the Supreme
Soviet Foreign Affairs Commission, formerly headed
by Suslov, suggests he has already assumed some of
Suslov's responsibilities for ideological and foreign
policy issues and may play a significant role. Andro-
pov will also have to be particularly solicitous of the
representatives of the military, the foreign policy
community, and regional party organizations. (See
"An Assessment of Andropov's Power.") ~
Longer Term Prospects
While most of the senior Politburo leaders, including
Andropov, seem favorably disposed to continuing
Brezhnev's mixed strategy of economic flexibility and
political orthodoxy for the immediate future, albeit
with possible important adjustments, factors favoring
greater change will mount over the next three to five
years. Economic problems are likely to prove the most
important factor causing the Soviets to reassess their
policy. A renewal of the leadership could also work to
bring in leaders less committed to Brezhnev's strate-
Among the current Politburo juniors in their early
sixties or late fifties, acceptance of Brezhnev's mixed
strategy seems less sure, particularly if, as we expect,
Soviet economic difficulties intensify. In their public
statements, major regional leaders like Vladimir
Shcherbitskiy or Grigoriy Romanov, who could move
into key positions in the central apparatus over the
next few years, have seemed less flexible on foreign
policy in general, critical of building social stability on
consumerism, and more adamant on the need to
maintain ideological orthodoxy. They have also taken
a harsh line on East European dissent and unrest and
seem disposed to favor stepped-up ideological vigi-
lance and police control to avert unrest.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Secret
On balance, significant change in the USSR's rela-
tionship to Eastern Europe in the late 1980s seems
probable. The new Soviet leadership that will emerge
is more likely to call for a policy of austerity in
Eastern Europe, backed up by more ideological and
security service vigilance, and reduced dealing with
the West. A gradual trend in this direction, in fact,
was already emerging under Brezhnev, but it is likely
to be pushed more aggressively by several influential
interest groups-including the military, police, and
party officials-as economic problems in both the
USSR and Eastern Europe mount. This would cause
friction between the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies
and generate a more complex environment for a US
policy of differentiation
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Secret
Other Topics
Soviet Attitudes Toward
Poland After One Year of
Martial Law
One year after the imposition of martial law in
Poland, the Soviet leadership seems confident that the
worst of the Polish crisis is past. The Soviets remain
concerned, however, with the continued disarray in
the Polish party, the widespread alienation of Solidar-
ity supporters from the regime, and the persistence of
Poland's economic problems. Although Moscow re-
gards Jaruzelski as the best guarantor of its interests
now on the scene, Soviet leaders have disagreed with
him on important tactical issues
~In the coming year, Andropov's preference for
more decisive leadership may translate into increased
pressure to hasten the "normalization" of Poland,
especially with regard to returning the party to some
semblance of its former role.
Moscow's View ojJaruzelski
The Soviet view of General Jaruzelski has fluctuated
considerably over time. In the first half of 1981,
Jaruzelski-like party leader Kania-was viewed as
too conciliatory by many Soviet officials. After Jaru-
zelski replaced Kania as First Secretary in October
and particularly after the imposition of martial law,
however, his stock in Moscow rose sharply. This was
apparent in the high-level protocol treatment given
him during his March 1982 visit to Moscow and the
stamp of approval he got at the Crimean meeting with
Brezhnev in August. More recently, Moscow has
subtly disassociated itself from criticism leveled
against Jaruzelski by Tadeusz Grabski, a prominent
Polish hardliner, who accused him of allowing the
party to atrophy.
The Soviets' willingness to support Jaruzelski against
his internal party critics probably was due primarily
to his success in suppressing Solidarity. Moreover, his
strategic goals-political stabilization, the monopoli-
zation of power by the regime, and the revival of the
economy-are shared by Moscow. In addition, he has
been able to pursue these goals while projecting an
image of tactical independence from the Kremlin-a
feat that has helped undermine Western support for
economic sanctions.
none of the potential
successors to Jaruzelski, such as Stephen Olszowski,
are warmly regarded by Moscow.
Soviet approval of Jaruzelski, however, is far from
unqualified.
after the impose ion o mar is aw, o icers
about Jaruzelski's loyalty and political wisdom and
the views of some of his close advisers. Soon after
Brezhnev's death one senior Polish official said that
General Secretary Andropov himself remains con-
cerned about Jaruzelski's weak responses to internal
challenges.
Friction Areas
Over the past year, moreover, friction has developed
between Jaruzelski and the Soviets on several issues.
These have included:
? The status of Solidarity and treatment of the
opposition.
,25X1
`25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
-- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
? The influence of the Church and the question of a
papal visit.
? The status of the party and the need to return it to
its "leading role."
One of Moscow's key expectations from martial law
was the removal of Solidarity as a political threat and
its replacement with reliable unions under regime
US economic sanctions and might be viewed as a sign
of Andropov's flexibility.
Moscow, however, probably agreed to Walesa's re-
lease only with considerable trepidation given the
Solidarity leader's volatility. Soviet anxieties were
probably fed by Walesa's higher public profile in
December, and expressions of concern from Moscow
may have reinforced the regime's attempts to intimi-
date him, including his detention on the eve of the
16 December anniversary celebration in memory of
the Gdansk strikes of 1970.
ate _ eptem oscow pressed Jaru-
zelski to end his temporizing. It was partly in response
that the Poles finally took the somewhat risky step of
delegalizing Solidarity on 9 October.)
Soviet-Polish differences also surfaced on Warsaw's
handling of the internees, the Solidarity underground,
and the broader intellectual opposition. Although the
Soviets were satisfied with the performance of Polish
security forces in breaking up demonstrations and
strikes, some evidence suggests that they would have
preferred harsher sentences for Solidarity activists
An article in Literaturnaya Gazeta in Septe
ber renewed earlier Soviet attacks on key Solidarity
leaders in detention or still at large and vehemently
attacked former Solidarity head Walesa, suggesting
Moscow would not look favorably on a wholesale
release of internees. The same newspaper also carried
an attack on Polish intellectuals in the fall, charging
them with supporting the underground.
Despite Soviet misgivings, the Polish regime released
large numbers of internees in July and again last fall.
On 10 November-the day Brezhnev died and major
Solidarity demonstrations fizzled-it ordered Walesa
released. Moscow was almost certainly informed in
advance and approved the step. Indeed, a prominent
Soviet academic specialist strongly hinted that Mos-
cow hoped such gestures would lead to the lifting of
Another area of friction has been regime relations
with the Church and particularly the question of a
papal visit initially proposed for last August. Moscow
has, on occasion, valued the Church's role as a
moderating influence. However, when street demon-
strations broke out in May and continued sporadically
until October, Soviet media took a more critical line
toward the Church, and implicitly toward Jaruzelski's
collaboration with it. Soviet criticism peaked in late
June and early July when a papal visit for August was
being discussed. US Embassy officers reported that
Soviet officials, in a conversation last summer, dis-
played near paranoia about the Church's influence
and particularly about the Pope's role in inspiring the
Solidarity movement during his visit to Poland in
1979. The Soviet press hinted that the visit would be a
political mistak
the Soviets flatly vetoed the visit for that month
There is no evidence that Moscow ever opposed the
scheduling of a papal visit for June 1983. Presumably,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
the key issue last summer was one of timing-the visit 25X1
coming on the eve of aSolidarity-announced offensive
for August-and secondly one of Soviet annoyance
over Jaruzelski's procrastination in rejecting the visit.
Now that the threat of unrest has diminished, the
Soviets may believe a visit would improve the regime's , 25X1
legitimacy and project an image of normalization.
However, Moscow will seek to keep the visit apolitical
and will not hesitate to veto it again if the political
situation becomes unstable.
A third major area of friction has been the declining
status of the party. While Moscow had pressed Jaru-
zelski to impose martial law well before December
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Secret
1981, there is evidence that many Soviets expected
martial law to be replaced after a short time with a
more traditional form of civilian party rule. Soviet
media treatment of the internment of former First
Secretary Gierek and other party officials indicated
Moscow's sensitivity toward the unceremonious treat-
ment of former party officials by the Polish military
council. On 5 January Pravda made it clear that
Moscow opposed the creation of a new party, an idea
reportedly broached by some of Jaruzelski's liberal
While the Soviets have indicated that de facto martial
law or some form of emergency power will continue
for a protracted'period, they have periodically applied
pressure on Warsaw to revive the party and restore it
to its leading role. Prominent Soviet spokesmen have
called for purging the Polish party of "ballast"-those
party members who had vacillated during the crisis-
an idea that has also surfaced occasionally in the
Soviet media. Brezhnev's and Tikhonov's congratula-
tory telegram on the Polish national holiday in July
particularly underscored the party's "leading role." A
Western political scientist with excellent Polish con-
tacts told the US Embassy in Warsaw that Soviet
party secretary Rusakov, who is responsible for Bloc
affairs, pressed Jaruzelski in May to set a timetable
for return to party rule.
The New General Secretary's Views
and Prospects Jor 1983
Poland will be the most immediately pressing East
European issue for General Secretary Andropov. By
virtue of his experience with the suppression of unrest
in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Andropov probably
realizes that the Polish problem is too complex for
quick solutions, and he is likely to continue Brezhnev's
general approach
Substantial progress has been made over the last year
in attaining Moscow's strategic goal of "normalizing"
Poland, but there is still a long way to go. The regime
has gained the initiative and controls all the key
political levers, but martial law has been suspended in
name only and the party has not yet been returned to
its leading role. Finally, the economy remains a source
Recognition of Poland's continued economic weakness
probably will lead Andropov to continue Soviet eco-
nomic assistance at close to current levels. According
to an announcement made by Warsaw in early No-
vember, the Soviets have permitted Poland to retain a
greater share-50 percent instead of 15 percent-of
goods produced under coproduction agreements using
Soviet-supplied raw materials. They also agreed to
continue a 1-billion-ruble trade deficit ceiling for
1983. Both are major concessions to the Poles and
may have been tied to Soviet satisfaction over the
delegalization of Solidarity in October
Given his preference for a more decisive approach to
Polish problems, Andropov probably will approve, and
perhaps even encourage, economic reforms already
under way, including efforts to cut consumer subsidies
through price increases, as a means of stimulating
greater efficiency and economic recovery. He might
hold out Kadar's Hungarian experience-repression
followed by reform-as a model for the Poles. He will,
however, veto any reform moves that threaten to
revive the opposition in the factories or which might
lead to a revival of Solidarity's influence, even under a
different label.
On the political front, Andropov may press more
aggressively than Brezhnev for a return to traditional
party rule if the opposition remains quiescent this
winter. While Moscow seems likely to support Jaru-
zelski for the near term as the best candidate to
maintain control, Andropov's skepticism about Jaru-
zelski's capabilitie
might lead him to
prefer a new first secretary if the difficult hurdle of
finding an acceptable candidate can be cleared. He is
not, however, likely to engineer a coup against Jaru-
zelski short of a major disagreement, but he probably
will exert pressure for astep-by-step return to a more
normal pattern of civilian rule
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
There may also be continued friction over tactics
during the next six months. Jaruzelski's handling of
the upcoming papal visit will be carefully scrutinized
by Moscow. Revival of the party reforms could be a
major bone of contention. Jaruzelski has periodically
hinted he favors retaining the party electoral reforms
of 1981 after martial law is lifted. The Soviets,
particularly former chief ideologist Suslov, had
strongly objected to them at the time, and Moscow
may no longer see any purpose in living up to any such
concessions that were made before martial law. Sharp
disagreement could emerge if the Poles make other
rumored changes in their political system, including
creating a strong presidency, passing a liberalized
electoral law, and reforming the civil service to de-
crease party control over appointments.
_ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Secret
Viewpoint
The following articles represent the views of individual analysts; the
judgments and conclusions do not represent a CIA consensus.
Andropov's Bid for
Leadership
Instead of the turbulence and deep crisis that the Chernenko's poor credentials, which made him unac-
world long had expected to follow Leonid Brezhnev's ceptable to some of Brezhnev's key associates.
death, there was the rapid choice of a successor, the
shrewd and knowledgeable manager Yuriy Andropov,
and a seemingly smooth transfer of power. Is the crisis
of succession over, then? Did Brezhnev's death trans-
mute the acute political conflict of his last months
into political order and a harmonious collective lead-
ership? Not likely. The political contest that placed
heavy additional demands on the aging ruler and may
have contributed to his death continues after him, but
with the shifting loyalties and changing alliances
characteristic of Soviet politics in times of instability
and uncertainty.
The ongoing contest will decide not only the composi-
tion of the leadership and the character of its policies
but also the balance among the key instruments of
rule-the party apparatus, the economic bureaucracy,
the political police, and the military. That balance
could change in fundamental ways, making the Soviet
Union of Brezhnev to which we have grown accus-
tomed something quite different.
Throughout 1982 two powerful factions struggled for
power, one led by Brezhnev and his protege, Konstan-
tin Chernenko, the other by Yuriy Andropov. The
Andropov faction's main strength was in the political
police, with islands of support in the military, the
party apparatus, and the media. The Brezhnev-Cher-
nenko team's support was chiefly in the party appara-
tus, especially outside Moscow, and in the highly
bureaucratized government. It had serious vulnerabil-
ities arising from Brezhnev's age and frailty and
When Brezhnev died on Wednesday, 10 November,
Andropov moved quickly to take advantage of the
resulting disarray among his opponents. The next day
Pravda announced that the funeral commission would
be chaired by Andropov, thus pointing to Brezhnev's
successor as General Secretary. The following morn-
ing an "extraordinary" session of the Central Com-
mittee, actually a rump session of selected members,
formally chose Andropov General Secretary. While
Chernenko probably would not have succeeded Brezh-
nev even in a carefully prepared deliberative meeting,
his faction might have been able to block the erstwhile
KGB head, perhaps enabling a compromise figure like
Viktor Grishin to gain the office.
After its major early success, the Andropov faction
encountered setbacks. Ten days after the Central
Committee's "extraordinary" meeting elected Andro-
pov General Secretary, the Committee met in regular
session, but this time the opposing faction, having had
time to regroup its forces, prevented Andropov from
securing Brezhnev's second key post as head of state.
This sequence conforms to the pattern of the two
previous successions, when Stalin died in 1953 and
when a coup ousted Khrushchev in 1964. In all three a
powerful faction moved to seize control in the first
hours, provoking a counterattack from the opposition
and a subsequent redistribution of power.
___ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
The two factions have since maintained an unstable
balance. Andropov is mentioned prominently in the
press and is now the recognized spokesman of the new
leadership. Several regional leaders who were among
Chernenko's strongest supporters while Brezhnev
lived have since been in the forefront of those ac-
knowledging Andropov's ascendancy. As yet, howev-
er, Andropov has instituted no new programs. His
rival, Chernenko, continues to be presented as the
"second" Secretary, as he was under Brezhnev, and
some of his pet projects, such as soliciting letters from
the Soviet public, are being fostered. Moreover, by
newly publicizing the Politburo's regular meetings,
the post-Brezhnev leadership has paid tribute, at
least, to the principle of collective leadership.
Andropov's ability to make appointments appears to
be narrowly limited. The relatively few shifts of
personnel that have occurred do not testify unequivo-
cally to his power. The transfer of Andropov's prote-
ge, Vitaliy Fedorchuk, from State Security (the KGB)
to Internal Affairs (the MVD) after only a few months
in office may have been due to pressure from the
military leadership. (Fedorchuk had for many years
specialized in counterintelligence work in the armed
forces.) The new KGB head, Viktor Chebi?ikov, was a
Brezhnev protege and may have retained ties with
Chernenko. The only new Politburo member, Geydar
Aliyev, a longtime Chernenko booster, may have
switched sides, although it is also possible that he has
managed to make himself acceptable to both camps.
Moscow rumors have it that Minister of Defense
Dmitriy Ustinov is formally aligned with Andropov,
but this is questionable. Although Ustinov advanced
to the first rank of Politburo leaders following Brezh-
nev's death (along with Andropov, Chernenko, gov-
ernment head Nikolay Tikhonov, and Foreign Minis-
ter Andrey Gromyko), in recent newspaper photo-
graphs he is back in the second rank. An alliance
between the former KGB head and the current
Defense Minister, if there has been one, has sinister
implications for the Soviet people, but it poses
dangers for the principals as well.
The present instability in the leadership and the
shifting balance among the regime's institutions leave
the situation fluid. Andropov's efforts to capitalize on
this fluidity to win personal control of the party
apparatus and to consolidate personal power face
formidable obstacles. If he is able to consolidate
power, Andropov may rule over a power structure in
which the armed forces and the political police, at
least initially, will have substantially more political
weight, and the party apparatus less, than in past
decades.
The balance of forces between the two sides is
unusually difficult to assess, in part because the
political weights of the regime's key institutions seem
to have changed. For almost three decades the appa-
ratus of full-time party officials has been sovereign in.
Soviet politics, imposing its will on the economic
bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the political po-
lice. Nikita Khrushchev was especially determined to
maintain the party's supremacy and assure the subor-
dination of the military and the KGB. Brezhnev,
however, altered the balance somewhat, increasing
the political status of both the military and the KGB,
whose chiefs became voting members of the Politburo
after 1973. Throughout the 1970s the military was
nourished by constantly growing defense budgets,
while the KGB acquired increased resources and
prestige to deal with the consequences of detente:
organized dissidence and increased contacts of citi-
zens with foreign visitors.
Brezhnev still ruled chiefly through the party appara-
tus, but he allowed his personal control of it to be
diluted as he engaged more actively in foreign diplo-
macy. Yet he refused to allow new blood into the
Secretariat, which consequently lost vigor and became
less effective in enforcing party directives. In this way,
Brezhnev's prolonged preoccupation with protecting
his own power and his belated decision to push
Chernenko forward as heir-presumptive weakened the
apex of the political structure. This provided an
opening for Andropov last May, when Brezhnev was
unable to prevent his moving from the KGB into the
Secretariat. After Brezhnev's death in November,
Andropov, still basing himself largely on the KGB,
succeeded in winning the top office in the party
apparatus. By failing to protect itself from the intru-
sion of outside forces, the party apparatus displayed a
vulnerability that raises the question of whether it is
still the decisive actor in Soviet politics.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Secret
Andropov's Power Base
The nature of Yuriy Andropov's current power de-
pends decisively upon how he came to be chosen
General Secretary. But critical aspects of this process
remain obscure. We do not know whether the succes-
sion was "prearranged" in the months preceding
Brezhnev's death. We do not have a confident grasp
of the factional alignments and politics within the
Politburo in this period. Finally, we do not have any
substantiated picture of the sequence of events, proce-
dures, and participants involved in the nomination of
Andropov in the period between Brezhnev's death on
10 November and the convening of the Central
Committee plenum that formally confirmed him on
12 November. Thus, whether Andropov emerged as
leader of the party through a basically consensual
process or through the kind of political intrigue
characteristic of Soviet leadership politics since Le-
nin's time is still a mystery. What evidence there is
suggests that there was a struggle for the succession,
that it continued until late in the game, and that the
choice of Andropov was not unanimous
Andropov undoubtedly enjoys certain important ad-
vantages in comparison with Konstantin Chernenko,
at least in the eyes of those who turned out to have the
dominant voice. He is decisive, well informed about
foreign affairs, probably identified with "sound" posi-
tions on national security issues, experienced in re-
pressing all forms of dissent (national, working class,
and intellectual), and a .leader-not a staff man. It is
probably true that Andropov was perceived as the
member of the Politburo best equipped to deal vigor-
ously with the problems confronting the USSR in the
1980s. Yet he was far from an ideal candidate. His
KGB ties represented an implicit threat to party
apparatus hegemony, he himself had not risen to high
office through line leadership posts in the territorial
party apparatus (as had Khrushchev and Brezhnev),
he was relatively old and not in the best of health, and
he had no experience whatever in either industry or
agriculture-those areas most in need of "strong
leadership." As much as anything, his rise to power
was conditioned by the eclipse of Andrey Kirilenko,
the restriction of Mikhail Gorbachev to agricultural
matters, and Brezhnev's success in preventing the co-
option into the Politburo of younger, more dynamic
party officials with broad organizational and econom-
ic supervisory experience.
Was Andropov's Selection Dictated
to the Politburo?
However much Andropov may have maneuvered to
gain the succession, he ultimately owes his selection to
the decision of others-his power from the outset has
been mortgaged. But who holds this mortgage? It is
conceivable, although unlikely, that former KGB
chief Fedorchuk and Minister of Defense Ustinov
employed their organizational power to intervene
decisively in some physical sense to "dictate" Andro-
pov's selection. If this is the case, the Soviet political
system may have undergone a fundamental, if silent,
transformation
One might postulate a number of scenarios:
? Scenario 1: Communications control and/or physi-
cal force are applied to prevent some Politburo
members from attending the Politburo meeting(s)
held after Brezhnev's death to decide who should be
"recommended" to the Central Committee for the
post of General Secretary.
? Scenario 2: In meeting after Brezhnev's death to
discuss the succession, the Politburo (or a pro-
Chernenko group of members) is threatened either
with personal retribution or with an actual military
assumption of power (perhaps along Polish lines) if it
does not accede to the selection of Andropov.
? Scenario 3: Threats of personal retribution and/or a
military assumption of power are employed to com-
pel amajority favoring Chernenko at the Central
Committee plenary session on 12 November to
switch allegiance and confirm Andropov.
___ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
? Scenario 4: Communications control, constraints on
transportation, and/or physical force are employed
to influence the composition of a group larger than
the Politburo but smaller than the full Central
Committee that may have met at some point be-
tween 10 and 12 November to consider any Politbu-
ro recommendations and discuss the succession prior
to the full plenum on 12 November.
? Scenario 5: At any point in the proceedings, Mar-
shal Ustinov declares his support for Andropov's
candidacy, perhaps indicating that Andropov "en-
joys the confidence" of the military establishment.
? Scenario 6: At any point in the proceedings, or
beforehand, Andropov engages-if only slightly-in
political blackmail based on KGB-gathered deroga-
tory information to neutralize individual opponents.
A "normal" or "regular" succession may be defined
as one that is acceptable to the "selectorate" (namely,
the Politburo membership) and has been legitimized
by precedent. The essential elements of such a process
would include:
? Factional conflict within the Politburo, probably
involving maneuvering by one or more inner power
clusters, and possibly extending to broader circles
outside the Politburo.
? Settlement of the issue without resort to physical
means or threat of these means.
? Choice of the new General Secretary fundamentally
through co-option by the Politburo itself, not by the
diktat of any other institution (least of all the KGB
or military establishment).
? Consideration of the opinion of different elements
within the political elite.
? Confirmation of the Politburo's recommendation by
a full plenary meeting of the Central Committee, at
which dissonant viewpoints can be expressed.
Judged by this measure of "regularity" (which has
only a slight resemblance to the "democratic" process
of election by the Central Committee that is formally
stipulated by the party rules), scenarios 1, 2, and 3
would clearly be "irregular," and could be said to
represent a coup d'etat; scenario 4 would fall short of
a coup, recalling the kinds of activity by the KGB and
military that occurred in June 1957 and October
1964; and scenarios 5 and 6 would fall well within the
bounds of tolerable "political" action. There is no
evidence indicating that scenarios 1-3 occurred in the
Andropov succession. Scenario 4 is suggested by
several as yet unconfirmed newspaper accounts (see
Dusko Doder, The Washington Post, 21 November
1982, and The New York Times, 15 November 1982).
Scenario 5 (which could be combined with scenari
and 6 is indicated
and scenario 6 is possible in
~e Iig~t of evidence that, over the past year, Andro-
pov used derogatory information about Brezhnev's
relations and associates to undermine Brezhnev's po-
litical position.
Limited Freedom of Maneuver More Likely
Much more likely, Andropov owes his selection to
support from a broader coalition of Politburo mem-
bers, among whom Ustinov is probably the most
influential. In any case, Andropov's freedom of ma-
neuver is constrained by the need to pay close heed to
the personal and institutional interests of those who
put him in office.
At the time of his confirmation as General Secretary,
no full member of the Politburo had ever served under
Andropov, and none were indebted to him for their
careers or owed their Politburo membership to him.
At most, Andropov might have been-or might be-
in aposition to exert pressure upon individual mem-
bers of this group through political blackmail. Among
the nine candidate members, at least one (Geydar
Aliyev), and perhaps several, had enjoyed Andropov's
patronage, but such a group could not approach a
majority. And among the three junior Central Com-
mittee secretaries who were not even candidate mem-
bers of the Politburo, only one (Konstantin Rusakov)
was clearly an Andropov client. Even if we assume
that the elections on 24 November of Aliyev to full
membership in the Politburo (and to the post of First
Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers) and of
Nikolay Ryzhkov to the Secretariat were steps taken
with Andropov's approval (which, on balance, is most
likely the case), he still enjoys only the most marginal
client base within the leadership.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3 -
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Secret
In other words, Andropov must deal with independent
political actors in the Politburo who, apart from
conceivable subterranean debts, owe him nothing.
Some of them, of course, are only local barons with
bases in the provinces-Dinmukhamed Kunayev, Gri-
goriy Romanov, and Vladimir Shcherbitskiy. But
others are in Moscow and are lords of broader
domain-Chernenko, Gorbachev, Viktor Grishin,
Andrey Gromyko, Nikolay Tikhonov, and Ustinov.
Accumulating evidence suggests that Ustinov has
assumed a powerful role in the new leadership~~
blackmail of other members, promotions to "vacan-
cies" in the Politburo and age-related replacements
(for example, of Arvid Pelshe or Nikolay Tikhonov).
Consolidating power, as in past successions, will take
Control Over Economic Policy Also Limited
In the economic policy sphere, Andropov's direct
control is similarly circumscribed. Chernenko may
still exercise significant control in the Secretariat over
appointments to middle-level jobs. The junior secre-
tary who has long been responsible for cadres in the
Secretariat, Ivan Kapitonov, also remains in office.
Although the personnel changes which have been
made in the economic area have almost certainly been
approved by Andropov, they may also have been
perfectly acceptable to the rest of the Politburo (for
example, the promotion of the First Deputy Minister
of Railways to replace the disgraced Minister of
Railways). The struggle in the Secretariat over the
power to control personnel appointments has probably
not yet ended. Until Andropov dominates cadre ap-
pointments, attempts to implement changes in eco-
nomic policy will be severely shackled.
part. The same applies to the "anticorruption" cam- Meanwhile, the key post of Chairman of the State
paign now rapidly picking up steam. Planning Committee (Gosplan) is still held by Nikolay
As a group, the Politburo members have a strong
personal stake in maintaining "collectivity." However,
they appear to be willing to delegate operational
authority to Andropov. This grant may be fairly
broad-particularly if a consensus has been reached
that the existing problems are severe enough to
require strong administrative action, including higher
level personnel changes. The sequence of personnel
shifts initiated since Andropov became General Secre-
tary-particularly those involving Central Committee
departments, the Komsomol, MVD, and KGB-while
not all redounding exclusively to Andropov's favor-
do indicate considerable political momentum on his
Nevertheless, Andropov's authority is, for the time
being at least, contingent upon the approval of his
peers. He must seek to accommodate Ustinov's con-
cerns with respect to military affairs and to find
common language at the very least with Ustinov and
Gromyko in foreign policy. His rival, Chernenko, at
the moment still occupies one of the highest spots in
the leadership rank order and, equally important, still
sits in the Secretariat. Both Chernenko and Gorba-
chev are full participants in Politburo meetings, pre-
venting Andropov from being the sole spokesman of
the Secretariat at these meetings or the sole spokes-
man of the Politburo at Secretariat meetings. 0
If the constraints on Andropov's freedom of action are
as described, he is likely to be able to increase his
power in the Politburo, only gradually through policy-
based alliances with senior members of the group,
formation of alliances with their subordinates (for
example, Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov), bribery or
Baybakov, an influential architect of economic policy
since 1965 and a strong supporter of the status quo. In
addition, the Secretariat/Council of Ministers
"team" for industrial affairs has been only partially
restructured. In the Secretariat, Ryzhkov will share
authority with Vladimir Dolgikh (who is probably not
in Andropov's good graces, but nevertheless outranks
Ryzhkov), while in the Presidium of the Council of
Ministers, Aliyev-whatever his precise responsibil-
ities may be as one of two first deputy chairmen-will
have to deal with Tikhonov and an unchanged cast of
deputy chairmen. As yet there has been no change in
top-level personnel responsible for agriculture in the
Secretariat, Presidium of the Council of Ministers,
Ministry of Agriculture, or Gosplan.
Andropov's Tactical Advantages
and Disadvantages
Andropov does enjoy important assets in attempting
to expand his power, and he is evidently already
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
beginning to employ some of them. As General
Secretary, he is able to exercise strong influence over
agenda setting and policy initiation in the Politburo.
He may be following Khrushchev's example of using
selective publicity about the conduct of leadership
business to promote his own political interests, al-
though amore open information policy has been
advocated by other leaders (for example, Chernenko)
and may serve a variety of other political purposes.
Brezhnev's precedent-and Andropov's own knowl-
edge-have made it possible for him to begin immedi-
ately playing a leading and overt role in Soviet
diplomacy. If he is not already Chairman of the
Defense Council, the chances are that his colleagues
will be persuaded to entrust this post to him, which
will heighten his influence in military and military-
budgetary affairs. As head of the Secretariat, he can
intervene in high-level personnel removals and ap-
pointments, which he is already doing. He can also set
in motion policy studies, order Central Committee
departments to take action affecting economic and
other bureaucracies, and initiate broad public discus-
sion of certain policy issues (for example, economic
reform).
Within the system at large, Andropov's influence is
limited by weaknesses in his constituency base. Most
importantly, he lacks clientele in the party apparatus
outside the foreign policy-security-ideology areas-
particularly among line officials at the Oblast level,
who are heavily represented in the Central Commit-
tee. Ryzhkov's appointment suggests that Andropov
may have "inherited" at least part of Kirilenko's
clientele. If this is the case, we might also expect to
see the promotion of Ryzhkov's associate from Sverd-
lovsk and current First Deputy Chairman of Gosplan,
Yakov Ryabov. However, the inheritance would be
limited and dependent upon Andropov's demonst*ated
ability to provide rewards. Andropov likewise lacks a
broad clientele in the Council of Ministers and eco-
nomic bureaucracy.
But Andropov does enjoy certain constitutency
strengths:
? His influence over the KGB, access to derogatory
KGB information, opportunity of using the KGB as
a pool to fill other jobs, and the general intimidating
effect of public awareness of his KGB connection.
? His ties in foreign policy and ideological circles.
? His ability to tap the frustration of thousands of
younger, better educated, and-perhaps-more
competent officials whose careers were stymied by
Brezhnev's policy of "stability of cadres."
? His presumed capacity to meet the need widely felt
among both elites and the population at large for a
"strong leader" who will enforce "discipline" and
combat pervasive corruption
Andropov will attempt to use these resources to
consolidate his power. He will try to manipulate
policy issues (especially economic stagnation) to justi-
fy those personnel changes required to solidify his own
personal position, while at the same time employing
his enhanced power to implement whatever broader
policy changes-such as structural innovation in the
economy-he decides to back. But there are big risks
involved, particularly in the purge strategy that his
own political resources and relatively advanced age
would appear to dictate. If his handling of the dissi-
dents over the last decade is any guide, he is likely to
proceed at a measured pace.
This does not mean that large changes in personnel
and policy will not occur in the weeks and months
ahead. Significant changes were introduced during
the consolidation phases of both Khrushchev's and
Brezhnev's rule when prior policies were clearly bank-
rupt, new situations occurred, or when all factions-
for their own reasons-reached agreement. With a
mandate for movement, Andropov can identify him-
self with what is, in fact, change acceptable to a
majority of his Politburo colleagues, while working to
secure a still more powerful position for himself. ~
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
 Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30 :CIA-RDP84T01083R000100010005-3