YUGOSLAVIA - USSR: CAN GORBACHEV LURE BELGRADE BACK?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S01350R000300910001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Directorate of
Intelligence
Top Secret
Yugoslavia-USSR: Can Gorbachev
Lure Belgrade Back?
An Inteffigence Assessment
Top Secret
EUR 87-10031L
SOV ,R7-1(M7 I
December 1987
Copy 096
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
Yugoslavia-USSR: Can Gorbachev
Lure Belgrade Back?
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by analysts of the Southeast European
Branch, Office of European Analysis, and the European Branch,
Office of Soviet Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate
of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may by directed to the
Chief, East European Division, EURA, or the Chief,
Regional Policy Division, SOYA
Reverse Blank Top Secret
EUR 87-10031L
SOV 87-10075 L
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
December 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Top Secret
Key Judgments
Information available
as of 30 November 1987
was used in this report.
Yugoslavia?USSR: Can Gorbachev
Lure Belgrade Back?
We believe the current warming trend in Yugoslav-Soviet relations?the
most significant in decades?will continue for the foreseeable future and
will adversely affect some important US interests. Nevertheless, we believe
the chance is remote that Belgrade will fundamentally realign its indepen-
dent policy toward Moscow to the detriment of critical Western security
interests.
Belgrade's main goal in improving its relationship with Moscow is to gain
economically while avoiding any political strings. It almost certainly will
remain deeply distrustful of the USSR and view the Warsaw Pact as the
only credible threat to its security. This suspicion, coupled with Moscow's
unwillingness to offer significantly increased economic assistance and other
inducements, is likely to constrain any major expansion in cooperation. The
United States probably can have little direct influence on Yugoslav-Soviet
ties, although it could circumscribe them by giving continued political,
military, and economic support to Belgrade.
The Soviets under General Secretary Gorbachev are pursuing a more
dynamic and flexible set of political, economic, and security policies toward
Yugoslavia aimed at expanding channels of influence and areas of
cooperation. Gorbachev's push for reforms within the USSR and his
commitment to "new thinking" in foreign affairs probably will lead to an
expanded number of agreements between Moscow and Belgrade on a range
of issues in the next few years. Over the long run, these broader contacts
will probably give Moscow greater opportunities to influence Yugoslav
policies by building an atmosphere conducive to even closer cooperation
and perhaps some greater degree of Yugoslav accommodation.
Improved ties during the two years since Gorbachev came to power have
been marked by:
? A dramatic increase in high-level visits, including the first party summit
since 1980.
? Somewhat broader military relations, including Yugoslav purchase of 16
MIG-29 fighter aircraft and Belgrade's decision this fall to expand
servicing for Soviet and other foreign warships in Yugoslav ports.
? More frequent public agreement on foreign policy questions such as
nuclear arms control and the role of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM).
111
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Top Secret
EUR 87-10031L
SOV 87-10075L
December 1987 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Top Secret
Over the next three years, Belgrade is likely to cooperate with the USSR
even more than in the past two, but only in areas where it sees net benefit:
? International political issues. So long as Gorbachev convinces the
Yugoslays that he is prepared to seek cooperative solutions, Belgrade is
increasingly likely to back him on conventional arms control, more
frequently support anti-US stands in the NAM, and play down its
concerns about Moscow's policies in the Third World. Such shifts,
however, could undercut the pressure on Moscow from more pro-Western
NAM states for compromise on Afghanistan, Cambodia, and other
regional issues.
? Bilateral relations. The Yugoslays probably will sign a new declaration
of principles covering bilateral ties?a symbolic reinforcement of rela-
tions?if Moscow continues to demand this as a precondition for a
Gorbachev visit late this year or early next year. They also are likely to
expand political and cultural exchanges, giving Moscow greater opportu-
nities for intelligence gathering.
? Security and economic ties. Yugoslav dependence on the USSR, as both
a major market and supplier, has grown significantly over the past
decade, providing Moscow with greater potential leverage in trade
relations. Belgrade, thus, will probably purchase even more Soviet
civilian and military equipment, including another 16 MIG-29s. Several
joint ventures are also under discussion, as is purchase of a Soviet nuclear
reactor. Broader economic ties to Moscow could convince Belgrade that
it has greater leverage in debt relief talks with the West.
Nonetheless, we believe Moscow has little prospect of turning expanded
contacts into broad influence over Belgrade's policies. Belgrade almost
certainly will not significantly alter specific domestic or foreign policies to
suit Soviet objectives. Nor do we foresee any decision to join the Warsaw
Pact or become a full member of CEMA. While avoiding confrontation
with Moscow, the Yugoslav leadership will probably continue to exercise
its independence by:
? Opposing efforts by Soviet surrogates such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Angola to dominate the NAM and align it more overtly with the Soviet
Bloc.
? Preserving ties to the United States and other Western economic
partners, including the seeking out of high-level exchanges to match
those with the Soviets.
Top Secret iv
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Too Secret
Reverse Blank
? Opposing Soviet moves that could reestablish a Soviet-led world Commu-
nist movement, in part by reinforcing its own ties to independent
Communist parties.
? Pursuing domestic economic and political policies
Basic US interests, therefore, are unlikely to be significantly affected. As
during earlier warming trends with the Soviets, Yugoslavia almost certain-
ly will maintain its strong economic, political, and cultural links to the
West. Indeed, it is likely to continue its halting internal political and
economic evolution away from the Soviet model to become the first country
in the Communist world to adopt significant elements of Western-style
pluralism. It also will continue to station its best military forces against the
Warsaw Pact and almost certainly would be neutral or hostile to the USSR
in wartime.
Alternatively, Yugoslav-Soviet relations could experience a new downturn,
bringing with it a moderate loss of Soviet influence in Belgrade. Although
US interests would benefit, this might require greater Western assistance
to shore up Belgrade than in past decades when Yugoslavia was more
solvent.
A dramatic improvement in Soviet-Yugoslav ties?in our view less likely
than either previous scenario?would probably make Yugoslavia, for the
first time, a major channel for the diversion of Western technology to the
Soviet Bloc. Moscow probably would win greater Yugoslav backing in both
the NAM and international Communist movement and could possibly gain
active Yugoslav cooperation against Western intelligence services.
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
2i8X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Too Secret
Contents
25X1
Page
Key Judgments
111
Scope Note
ix
Ups and Downs in Soviet-Yugoslav Relations
1
Moscow's Goals: More Pro-Soviet Yugoslav Policies
1
Belgrade's Goals: Economic Support, Friendship, but Independence
2
Soviet Tactics: Building Bridges
2
Political Cooperation
4
Economic Ties
4
Military Cooperation
7
25X1
Belgrade's Likely Reaction: Improved Cooperation
7
Areas of Greater Cooperation
8
Factors Inhibiting Closer Ties
9
Reaffirming Independence
10
Implications for the United States
11
Alternative Scenarios
12
Moscow Loses Influence
12
Moscow Gains Greater Influence
13
Opportunities for the West
15
Reverse Blank
vii
To Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Top Secret
Scope Note
Reverse Blank
This paper analyzes the prospects for change in Yugoslav-Soviet relations
over the next three years. It assesses Gorbachev's tactics, evaluates
Belgrade's likely reaction, and examines those types of cooperation most
likely to develop. It also highlights Yugoslav policies that are unlikely to
change, notwithstanding Soviet enticements or pressures. The paper con-
cludes with an examination of the implications of the emerging Soviet-
Yugoslav relationship for US interests.
25X1
25X1
ix Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Ton Secret
Yugoslavia-USSR: Can Gorbachev
Lure Belgrade Back?
Ups and Downs in Soviet-Yugoslav Relations
Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev's planned visit to
Belgrade in the near future is part of the most
significant warming in Yugoslav-Soviet relations
since Khrushchev normalized relations in 1955-56 by
accepting Tito's demand of respect for Yugoslav
independence. Gorbachev's self-proclaimed "new
thinking" on domestic and foreign affairs appeals to
Yugoslays because Moscow's current policies on arms
control, tolerance of domestic criticism, and economic
reform are closer to longstanding Yugoslav positions.
His public endorsements of diversity within the Com-
munist world and a greater role for the Nonaligned
Movement (NAM) have flattered the Yugoslays and
moderated their longstanding suspicions of Soviet
objectives. Moreover, Gorbachev's knowledge of Yu-
goslav affairs is impressive
For its part, the Yugoslav collective leadership also
favors improved bilateral ties
It is still emerging from Tito's shadow,
preoccupied with internal economic problems, and
lacks Tito's self-confidence and proclivity for bold
shows of independence. In the absence of blatant
Soviet provocations, it prefers to emphasize harmony
over disagreement so it can focus its energies on
domestic priorities. The leadership wants to use a
Gorbachev visit to enhance its prestige and reaffirm
Soviet recognition of Yugoslavia's independent
course.
"Cominformist" agents in 1974-75. The 1979 Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan again undercut Yugoslav
hopes for an improvement of ties.
Moscow's Goals: More Pro-Soviet Yugoslav Policies
Gorbachev's overall goal, in our view, is largely the
same as that of his predecessors: to increase Moscow's
influence over Yugoslav policies in order to move
them in a pro-Soviet direction. But while Moscow sees
Yugoslavia as a member of a broad "socialist com-
monwealth" beyond the Warsaw Pact, Gorbachev,
unlike Brezhnev and others of his generation, proba-
bly harbors no illusion that Yugoslavia for the fore-
seeable future will abandon key foreign and domestic
policies such as its support for an independent NAM
or its maverick system of workers' self-management.
Nevertheless, bilateral relations have historically fol-
lowed a roller coaster course, and relations could sour
again. Khrushchev's efforts to improve relations were
soon undercut by the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary
and Moscow's attempt the following year to gain
Yugoslav recognition of Soviet leadership of world
Communism. Improvements in ties in the early 1960s
and the 1970s came to a halt, respectively, with the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and
Belgrade's arrest of hundreds of pro-Soviet
1
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Top Secret
Belgrade's Goals: Economic Support, Friendship, but
Independence
Belgrade's goals vis-a-vis Moscow allow for improved
ties but often are at loggerheads with broad Soviet
objectives and many of Moscow's more specific goals.
The Yugoslays clearly hope to gain economically
while avoiding any political strings.
Belgrade wants to keep political
relations generally smooth, a policy it believes reduces
the threat of Soviet military or covert intervention in
Yugoslavia. Moreover, Belgrade continues to view
Yugoslavia as part of a broad, international "progres-
sive" movement that shares a common ideological
perspective on many issues with Moscow. At the same
time, Belgrade's frequent use of its "Soviet card"?
implied threats of a turn toward Moscow?in talks
with US officials suggests how much it also values
good Soviet ties as a source of leverage with the West.
More specifically, Belgrade wants to:
? Protect its political and economic independence.
Belgrade views continued Soviet recognition of Yu-
goslavia's "separate road to socialism," codified in
agreements reached between Tito and Khrushchev
in 1955 and 1956, as the minimum requirement for
good bilateral relations. Belgrade strongly resents
even Soviet suggestions of solutions to Yugoslav
internal problems,
? Pursue an independent foreign policy. We believe
the Yugoslav leadership continues to regard its
nonaligned foreign policy as critical to its domestic
Ton Secret
legitimacy and international stature.
continuation of an independent for-
eign policy is one of the few issues that unite
politicians across the Yugoslav political scene.
Obtain as much as possible from its economic ties
to the USSR. Belgrade,
consistently tries to assure itself a stable
market for exports that it cannot sell elsewhere and
to obtain maximum Soviet deliveries of oil and raw
materials by bartering goods. At the same time, it
resists Moscow's demands for better quality exports,
which Yugoslavia prefers to sell in the West for
hard currency, and for greater imports of Soviet
finished goods.
? Gain Soviet help in dealing with Eastern Europe.
Public statements indicate
that the Yugoslays want Moscow to terminate
Bulgaria's public claims that the ethnic-Macedo-
nian minority really is ethnically Bulgarian, which
are the basis for a potential territorial claim on
Yugoslav Macedonia.
Soviet Tactics: Building Bridges
Gorbachev is pursuing more dynamic and sophisticat-
ed policies for influencing Belgrade than his predeces-
sors. Moscow appears determined to simultaneously
explore a number of potential channels of influence
with the Yugoslays-
avoiding gratuitous public slaps that marred the
relationship in the past. Unlike Brezhnev, Gorbachev
is actively promoting an image of flexibility and
conciliation in public relations with Belgrade to bur-
nish Yugoslavia's national pride. Thus, he has public-
ly affirmed the legitimacy of Belgrade's policy of
nonalignment and doctrine of separate paths to social-
ism.
2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Top Secret
Figure 1
Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe
Austria
Hungary
Italy
SLOVENIA
CROATIA
(SERBIA)
Vojvodina
Romania
BOSNIA AND
HERCEGOVINA
(SERBIA)
Serbia Proper
0 300 Kilometers
0 300 Miles
MONTENEGRO
(SERBIA)
Kosovo
Bulgaria
Soviet Union
Albania
MACEDONIA
Black
Sea
3
- Republic boundary
Top Secret
Greece
711935 (A03220) 12-87 25)(1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Top Secret
Political Cooperation
The Soviets are trying to strengthen political links by
increasing the number and frequency of bilateral
party and governmental contacts. Even more than in
earlier warming periods, the stream of visitors be-
tween the two countries at all levels has increased
markedly in 1986-87. The first meeting between
Communist party leaders of the two countries since
Tito's death in 1980 took place in December 1986,
when then Yugoslav party President Renovica visited
Gorbachev in Moscow. Gorbachev is scheduled to
return the visit late this year or early next year. Soviet
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze went to Belgrade in
June 1987?the first visit at that level since 1983?
and Soviet KGB chief Chebrikov visited Yugoslavia
in December 1986, the first visit by such a security
official in almost 10 years.
The Soviets probably value these visits as a means to
obtain firsthand information on Yugoslav internal
conditions and local leaders, aid their search for new
pressure points, and privately air their displeasure
with some of Belgrade's policies.
Moscow
also pursues a broad range of contacts because, unlike
other East European countries, party-to-party ties
play a secondary role in Belgrade's foreign relations
and offer Moscow only limited opportunities for exert-
ing influence on Yugoslavia.
The Soviets under Gorbachev also are pursuing con-
tacts with all of Yugoslavia's eight constituent re-
gions, which since Tito's death have become more
powerful vis-a-vis the federal government and party
in Belgrade. Moscow probably uses contacts with
regional-level leaders to keep a finger on the pulse of
ethnic nationalist sentiment and to establish ties to
regional power brokers. Such ties, however, can come
close to interference in Yugoslavia's sensitive nation-
ality issues
Top Secret
Economic Ties
Yugoslav dependence on the USSR, as both a major
market and supplier, has grown significantly over the
past decade, providing Moscow with greater potential
leverage in trade relations. The USSR is Yugoslavia's
largest export market?accounting for 30 percent of
total shipments?and absorbs many low-quality prod-
ucts that have no markets in the West. The Soviets
also meet a large share of Yugoslavia's needs for oil
and other raw materials on a clearing account basis.'
Benefits flow both ways, however?Moscow obtains
many Yugoslav goods and services that its own econo-
my cannot supply and conserves hard currency in the
process.
The Soviets have become increasingly annoyed with
Belgrade's unwillingness to accept Soviet solutions to
Yugoslavia's substantial bilateral trade surpluses (see
figure 2). Since 1985, as the price for Soviet oil
exports has fallen, the Yugoslav surplus has mounted,
and in 1986 it totaled $1.3 billion. Moscow now finds
itself roughly $1.5 billion in debt to Belgrade, under-
cutting some of the leverage it had in the late 1970s
when it was a net creditor as a supplier of an
expensive commodity?oil?on soft barter terms.
Moscow, is now pushing
Belgrade to purchase more manufactured goods, in-
cluding almost $1 billion in military hardware such as
MIG-29s. Belgrade is anxious
to balance trade, ending its de facto interest-free loans
to Moscow, but through increased Soviet deliveries of
oil and raw materials rather than manufactures.
'The clearing account is the bookkeeping mechanism used to value
and account for barter trade. Although goods are priced in clearing
dollars in Yugoslav-Soviet trade, actual hard currency does not
change hands1
4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2bA-1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Top Secret
Figure 2
Yugoslavia: Trade Balance With the
USSR, 1981-86
Million US $
1,500
0
-250
-500 I981 a
82a
83 a
84a
85 a
86 b
315035 12.87
Overall, Moscow has had little success in changing
Yugoslavia's negotiating position, despite a threat to
cut imports of Yugoslav goods significantly if no
agreement on reducing the surplus is reached. The
1987 trade protocol signed last March apparently
called for a compromise closer to Belgrade's terms?
large increases in Yugoslav imports of Soviet raw
materials and energy (including an additional 20,000
barrels per day of oil), increased Yugoslav purchases
of certain categories of Soviet machinery and equip-
ment, and a slight decrease in Yugoslav exports to the
USSR. Yugoslavia
nevertheless may run a surplus again this year, proba-
bly because Soviet oil deliveries will not reach prom-
ised levels while oil prices remain depressed.
5
The Soviets will likely keep up?and may even in-
crease?the pressure to narrow the trade imbalance
on their terms. During his Belgrade visit in June this
year, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze termed the Yu-
goslav surplus a "political" as well as an economic
problem, indicating that Moscow views Belgrade's
willingness to take appropriate remedial steps as a
sign of its commitment to better relations.
The Soviets meanwhile are urging the Yugoslays to
expand other areas of economic cooperation.
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Top Secret
Yugoslavia: Inventory of Soviet Weaponry
Currently Dependent on Self-Sufficient for Built by Yugosla-
Soviet Parts or Maintenance Parts or Maintenance a via Under License
AFVs
Older model tanks (T-54/55, T-34, PT-76) X
Modern main battle tanks (T-72) X
Other armored vehicles b (BRDM-1/2, BTR-50/60) X
Aircraft
Fighter aircraft b (MIG-21) X
MIG-29 X
Transport aircraft (YAK-40, AN-12, AN-26) X
Helicopters b (KA-27, KA-25, Mi-8, Mi-4, Mi-14) X
Small arms b X
Artillery b
122-mm D-30, 152-mm D-20 X
ZSU-57-2 SPAA, 152-mm ML-20, 122-mm M-1974 X
Guided munitions
Surface-to-air missiles
SA-2 X
SA-3 X
SA-7 X
SA-6 X
SA-9 X
Antitank guided missiles
AT-2 X
AT-3 X
Air-to-air missiles
AA-2 X
Surface-to-surface missiles
FROG-7 X
SS-N-2A (Styx) X
SS-N-2B (Styx) X
Naval vessels
Torpedo boats b
OSA-I X
Shershen X
Surface combatants b (modified Koni-class FFG) X
a Assessment based on capabilities of Yugoslavia's defense industry,
stocks of weapons and parts, and the availability of spare parts on
the international arms market.
b Yugoslavia also builds similar weapons of its own or Western
design.
Top Secret 6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Top Secret
Military Cooperation
that increased
military cooperation represents another avenue of
influence the Soviets are seeking to exploit more
actively. The USSR currently supplies Yugoslavia's
armed forces with sophisticated equipment, including
most of Belgrade's advanced aircraft and guided
weapon systems. It also licenses Yugoslav production
of Soviet weapons, such as the T-72 tank. Belgrade's
likely acquisition of more Soviet-manufactured weap-
onry, particularly the MIG-29, would increase depen-
dence on the USSR for training and spare parts, at
least for the near term.
a small number of Yugoslav officers receive staff and
technical training in the USSR. In addition, since
1974, Yugoslavia has allowed limited servicing of
Soviet warships in one of its Adriatic ports.
Moscow probably hopes to expand its influence
among the Yugoslav military through high-level ex-
changes. The Soviets most likely calculate that the
Yugoslav military leadership would play an increased
political role in the event of serious domestic instabil-
ity and might even seize power sometime in the
future. Although the Yugoslav military remains a
staunch advocate of Belgrade's independence, Mos-
cow may believe that the military's relatively ortho-
dox views on domestic issues would work to the
Soviets' advantage during a domestic crisis.
The Soviets probably also will try to exploit Bel-
grade's recent decision to increase Soviet and other
foreign naval access to Yugoslav Adriatic ports. Al-
though Belgrade stoutly maintains that its policy of
nonalignment does not permit foreign military bases,
in September 1987 it raised the limit on foreign
warships that may be serviced in a Yugoslav port at
any one time from two to three per country. Also, it
may have opened a second port for such business,
Moscow
for years has pressed for greater access, but Bel-
grade's move will not significantly improve Soviet
naval capabilities. As a result, the issue for Moscow is
as much political as it is military and economic.
7
Belgrade's Likely Reaction: Improved Cooperation
We believe that over the next three years Belgrade
will cooperate with Moscow more than it has in recent
decades in a number of areas. Belgrade, however,
almost certainly will reject any fundamental changes
in its economic, political, or foreign policies, even
when these policies conflict with Moscow's.
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Top Secret
Areas of Greater Cooperation
Belgrade is likely to take a number of steps pleasing to
Moscow, particularly in areas where it believes the
Soviets have shifted closer to Yugoslav views:
? International political issues. So long as Belgrade
remains convinced that Gorbachev is more prepared
than his predecessors to seek cooperative solutions,
it is likely to voice fairly unqualified support for his
initiatives. For example, Belgrade probably will
more frequently back new anti-US stands in the
NAM and may try to convince other members that
Moscow is serious about resolving major inter-
national problems, such as Afghanistan. Moreover,
Belgrade is more likely to support current Soviet
positions on arms control and East-West relations.
? Bilateral political issues. Belgrade probably will
sign a new declaration covering bilateral ties?
provided it unambiguously reaffirms Yugoslav inde-
pendence?despite concerns that this might be mis-
construed in the West as a significant shift toward
Moscow. The Yugoslays also may agree to more
frequent exchanges of working-level party officials,
such as study teams on political and economic
reform and cultural cooperation groups.
? Economic and security relations. Some Soviet de-
mands for "higher forms of economic cooperation"
and the purchase of more Soviet weaponry and
other finished products will probably be met.
A joint venture arrangement to
produce TU-204 civilian airliners is also under
discussion, Such pur-
chases would provide serviceable manufactures?
albeit not equivalent to Western goods?and help
assure the continued flow of Soviet raw materials.
At the same time, it would protect critical access to
the Soviet market. Purchase of a nuclear reactor,
for which Moscow has bid, is less likely to occur,
largely because of growing antinuclear sentiment in
Yugoslavia and doubts about the safety of Soviet
equipment.
TOD Secret
A New Belgrade Declaration?
The new document would supplement the Belgrade
and Moscow Declarations of 1955 and 1956, respec-
tively, which formally repaired the breach in govern-
ment and party ties that followed Yugoslavia's break
from the Soviet Bloc in 1948. These documents have
served as the foundation for Yugoslav-Soviet rela-
tions. In the Belgrade Declaration, Moscow officially
accepted Yugoslavia's independence, pledging "mutu-
al respect and noninterference in internal affairs for
any reason?whether of an economic, political, or
ideological nature?because questions of internal
structure, differences of social systems and differ-
ences of concrete forms of developing socialism are
exclusively a matter of the peoples of different coun-
tries." Yugoslavia is the only Communist country
with which Moscow has such an agreement.
The Soviets, who have criticized
the Yugoslav party's loss of strict control over
domestic affairs, probably hope to use a new agree-
ment to reaffirm the leading role of the party in
Communist systems, as well as to highlight areas of
consensus on foreign policy. Notwithstanding its sus-
picions of Soviet motives, Belgrade probably would
sign a new agreement provided it explicitly endorses
Yugoslav independence and contains no language that
could be interpreted as a sign that Yugoslavia is
moving closer to the Soviet Bloc.
8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2bx1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Top Secret
Belgrade's recent decision to grant Moscow expanded
peacetime access for servicing warships reflects the
trend toward closer ties.
rationalized that this entails no
violation of its sovereignty and would mean extra
business for its financially troubled shipyards.' More-
over, Belgrade may have believed that expanded
access would neutralize any Soviet complaints about
what Moscow reportedly claims is special treatment
for US naval forces?for example, Yugoslavia permit-
ted a scheduled port visit in 1985 by the USS
Saratoga despite its key role only days before in
capturing Abu Abbas, who planned the Achille Lauro
hijacking.
Factors Inhibiting Closer Ties
A range of factors, however, will keep Yugoslavia
from responding favorably to Soviet pressure and
inducements in ways that would imply its rejoining
the Bloc. These factors, for the most part, have
changed little in decades and probably will remain
more important to Belgrade than Gorbachev's "new
thinking."
Above all, Belgrade will remain suspicious of Mos-
cow's long-term goals. It will most likely remain
convinced, as it has been since 1948, that Moscow is
ultimately committed to drawin Yu oslavia back
into the Soviet cam
Similarly, Yugoslav leaders almost certainly will con-
tinue to believe the Warsaw Pact is the country's only
credible external military threat.
the Yugoslav Army has focused its
efforts during the past four years on units?already
its best equipped and trained?that face Warsaw Pact
2 Because expanded access applies to other countries as well,
Belgrade probably hopes to generate more foreign exchange from
hard currency customers such as Libya.
9
borders. Belgrade in 1969 and 1974-76 reviewed the
Army's officer corps to eliminate possible Soviet
sympathizers, removing several senior generals,
Moreover, Belgrade con-
tinues to try to avoid dependence on Moscow for key
weapons systems, even when it purchases Soviet de-
signs. It manufactures most of its own equipment; has
established indigenous support facilities for most of its
Soviet-origin weapons, for example, MIG-21s and
surface-to-air missiles; and prefers to build Soviet
weapons under license, as it does the T-72 tank, rather
than purchase them. Belgrade almost certainly will
try to build an independent support infrastructure for
its MIG-29s, particularly if these aircraft become the
mainstay fighter.
Belgrade probably calculates that Soviet tough talk is
empty. Belgrade, in our view, believes it can ignore
Moscow's private criticism in light of Soviet failures
to follow up past attacks with meaningful sanctions.
since the last years of Tito's reign
previous Soviet leaders repeatedly
voiced many of the same criticisms of Yugoslavia that
Gorbachev recently drove home to Belgrade.
Yugoslav leaders also probably believe that, while
potential gains from expanded economic cooperation
with Moscow are significant, the Soviet Bloc in the
long run has only limited potential as an economic
alternative to the West.
`25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2)(1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Belgrade probably realizes, furthermore, that too
close a relationship with the Soviet Bloc would endan- 2!25X1
ger Yugoslavia's access to the sophisticated Western 25X1
industrial technology it desperately needs.
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Top Secret
We believe Gorbachev will fail to generate wide-
spread public enthusiasm in Yugoslavia that has been
evident in some other East European countries be-
cause Yugoslav society decades ago experienced re-
forms that Gorbachev is only beginning to test.
Rather, the populace is likely to press harder still for
access to the West as a relatively Westernized youn-
ger generation comes of age. US diplomats and other
Western travelers already find both pro-American
feeling and suspicion of Moscow widespread among
Yugoslays, even if Gorbachev has scored high on
public opinion polls.
Regional resistance also will undercut any shift to-
ward Moscow. The economically powerful and his-
torically Western-oriented republics of Slovenia and
Croatia would probably try to block any significant
policy shift toward the Soviet Bloc. They already have
shown signs of concern during the past year as
relations with Moscow have improved, according to
US diplomatic reporting.
Finally, we believe Yugoslav leaders will hedge their
bets on Gorbachev's chances of political survival,
which they now assess as only better than even.
Belgrade probably will be concerned that concessions
made to a "reasonable" Gorbachev could come back
to haunt them.
Reaffirming Independence
While the current Yugoslav leadership wants to avoid
open confrontation with Moscow, we believe it will
continue to pursue Tito's policy of independence in
most key areas.
Most visibly, Belgrade probably will continue to
oppose efforts by Soviet surrogates to dominate the
NAM. Belgrade almost certainly will seek to underpin
its standing as one of several moderate leaders of the
NAM while at the same time supporting some pro-
Soviet positions. It will oppose the radicals' efforts to
declare the movement a "natural ally" of the Soviet
Bloc or to use the movement as a more effective
weapon against Washington.
Ton Secret
Belgrade also will try to maintain good ties to the
United States and other Western economic partners.
Yugoslav leaders
remain committed to upgrading further their ties to
the United States and Western Europe. Belgrade
already is increasing its efforts to establish a regular
schedule of high-level exchanges with Washington,
according to US diplomatic reporting, probably to
balance its more vigorous interaction with Moscow
and to maximize its prospects of gaining greater US
economic support. Belgrade recently urged Washing-
ton to schedule a visit later this year by a member of
the collective State Presidency, pointedly saying that
Belgrade wants such a trip to balance Gorbachev's
planned visit to Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia almost certainly will continue to block
Soviet moves to reestablish a world Communist
movement guided by the USSR. Yugoslavia is deter-
mined to continue cultivating ties to other indepen-
dent Communists, such as the Italian and Chinese
Communist Parties,
Long opposed to any Soviet-sponsored world confer-
ence of Communist parties, Belgrade decided to at-
tend the November 1987 70th anniversary celebra-
tions of the Bolshevik Revolution only after Moscow
agreed to a broad gathering of leftist-oriented parties.
Moscow had hoped for a summit of Communist party
chiefs that would imply Soviet leadership of the
international Communist movement. Yugoslavia's an-
nouncement of attendance, moreover, coincided with
China's, suggesting Belgrade acted jointly, although
probably informally, with Beijing.
10
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Top Secret
Belgrade's Chinese Counterweight
Since the normalization of Sino-Yugoslav ties in
1977, Belgrade has used relations with Beijing?
along with its longstanding leading position in the
Nonaligned Movement and ties to major Western
countries?to balance extensive and lately growing
contacts with the USSR. Within the Communist
world, Yugoslavia has long cultivated special ties to
other nonconformist states, such as Romania, to
legitimize and encourage divergence from the Soviet
model. It has focused increasingly on China, however,
as the latter has adopted more pragmatic policies and
asserted a higher profile internationally.
In our view, Belgrade will continue to foster warm
ties to China because it perceives several tactical
advantages to be gained from this vis-a-vis the
Soviets:
? As another ruling party, the Chinese Communist
Party could provide key support to Belgrade in
opposing Moscow's efforts to host any future world
conference of Communists or in at least ensuring
that the attendance, agenda, and final documents of
such a conference are more on Belgrade's terms.
? Belgrade will use extensive subnational region-to-
region contacts with China as a unique balance to
those that Moscow is pursuing. Since 1980, when
Moscow began pushing for more regional ties, five
of Yugoslavia's eight regions have established rela-
tionships with Chinese regions. With the exception
of limited cross-border agreements with Hungary,
Bulgaria, Austria, and Italy, the Yugoslav regions
have no similar contacts with any other state.
? China's opposition to the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan and to the Soviet-backed occupation of
Cambodia assists Yugoslavia by helping protect
Belgrade from charges by leftist regimes of its being
a "stooge" for the West.
Finally, the Yugoslav regime probably will continue
to tolerate internal political and economic reforms
that Gorbachev has criticized These in-
clude the Communist world's most open media, a
national party almost devoid of centrally imposed
discipline, and increased room for many semiofficial
pressure groups
Implications for the United States
We believe the likely improvement in Soviet-Yugoslav
ties?especially Yugoslav moves to accommodate
Moscow?will adversely affect some important US
interests:
? More frequent Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation on
some international issues would complicate US for-
eign policy by undercutting more pro-US NAM
states, reinforcing hardline Soviet positions on issues
such as Afghanistan, and helping Moscow portray
Washington as responsible for failures to reach
arms control agreements in the future.
? Belgrade, believing its improved ties to Moscow give
it greater leverage with the West, might become
even more demanding in debt relief talks with
Western creditors.
? More frequent contacts and exchanges with the
USSR in military, political, and economic areas?
while unlikely to significantly influence Yugoslav
policy during the next three years?probably would
give Moscow greater opportunities to expand its
influence over the longer term by creating an atmo-
sphere conducive to closer cooperation. Moscow also
would gain marginally greater opportunities to col-
lect intelligence in Yugoslavia.
11
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Top Secret
The Phantom of Soviet "Leverage"
The current expansion of Yugoslav-Soviet relations
almost certainly will create an atmosphere that en-
courages both sides to consider more frequently the
wishes and sensitivities of the other. Yet history
suggests that Moscow will have only limited success
in turning broader ties into a lever that can be applied
to gain specific policy objectives:
? Yugoslavia has relied almost solely on Soviet ar-
mored fighting vehicles, surface-to-air missiles, and
military aircraft of all types since the Second
World War, yet its Army has long been stationed to
face the Warsaw Pact, which Yugoslav commanders
view as the only credible military threat.
? Yugoslavia has broadened its technological, finan-
cial, and cultural ties to the West, despite Soviet
criticism and concurrently with an increase in the
Soviet share of Yugoslav foreign trade from 10
percent to 28 percent over the last 15 years.
? Extensive contacts between Yugoslav and Soviet
officials and businessmen as trade has risen also
have not helped Moscow persuade the Yugoslays to
buy more Soviet manufactures, despite energetic
Soviet efforts.
? High-level political exchanges in themselves have
not been either an accurate indicator of improved
ties or of increased Soviet leverage. Tito and Brezh-
nev met several times during periods of increased
tension in the late 1970s with few apparent gains for
Moscow.
Top Secret
The expected warming in relations, even if it is
greater than those in the past, will nevertheless pose
little threat to fundamental US concerns:
? Periodic increases in Soviet-Yugoslav economic, po-
litical, and military contacts in the past have not
fundamentally affected Belgrade's independent ori-
entation and are unlikely to do so in the future.
? Yugoslavia will maintain its strong economic, politi-
cal, and cultural links to the West.
? A domestic evolution toward significant elements of
Western-style pluralism is likely to continue, mov-
ing the country still further from even Gorbachev's
looser version of Soviet Communism.
? Belgrade probably will continue to restrict access of
Soviet personnel to Yugoslav military facilities, to
station its best forces and equipment to handle
Warsaw Pact aggression, and, at worst, to remain
neutral in any Western conflict with the USSR. US
and Soviet naval access will probably remain equal
in peacetime.
Alternative Scenarios
Two other scenarios affecting US interests are possi-
ble but less likely over the next three years. First,
Yugoslav-Soviet relations could experience a sharp
downturn. Alternatively, Moscow could gain signifi-
cantly greater influence in Belgrade than we expect.
The first of these two alternatives is moderately more
likely than the second in light of historical trends and
Belgrade's sensitivity to Soviet actions in other parts
of the world.
Moscow Loses Influence
We believe relations could worsen, and Moscow could
lose some of the influence it now has in Yugoslavia, in
the event of some combination of the following
developments:
? Internal Soviet economic difficulties or increased
commitments to Soviet allies elsewhere could lead to
reduced economic incentives to Belgrade for a closer
relationship.
12
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Top Secret
? Soviet miscalculation in applying economic pres-
sure, even to solve trade problems, easily could
antagonize Belgrade and reinflame the spirit of
obstinate independence from Moscow.
? Gorbachev could lose power to more conservative
leaders within the USSR or veer toward greater
orthodoxy himself, leading Moscow again to attack
more openly Yugoslav "deviations."
? The Soviets might meddle aggressively in Yugoslav
internal affairs or expand intelligence gathering at
the regional level, prompting a sharp reaction by
Belgrade.
? An improvement in Soviet-Albanian relations, al-
though unlikely, would increase Yugoslav fears of
encirclement.
? Moscow might reawaken Belgrade's fears for its
independence if the Soviets intervened militarily to
quell instability in one of their East European allies.
Soviet armed aggression against another nonaligned
country would have a similar, but probably lesser,
effect.
US interests could make some gains under this
scenario:
? Yugoslavia would be more likely to side with the
United States against Moscow on a few foreign
policy issues, such as verification questions in con-
ventional arms control talks, although Belgrade's
adherence to a NAM consensus on most issues
would limit any change toward a more pro-US
foreign policy.
? Belgrade, seeking to avoid a two-front confronta-
tion, probably would be more responsive to specific
Western concerns, such as international terrorism,
human rights, and other issues.
? A deterioration in the Soviet-Yugoslav economic
relationship?marked by declining trade, fewer bi-
lateral contacts, and more public disputes about the
value of increased economic cooperation?would
undercut the potential leverage Moscow has gained
through the bilateral trade expansion of the past
decade.
13
? Yugoslavia might be more inclined to deny Moscow
rights to periodic overflights to client states in the
Third World.
? Belgrade almost certainly would reject any further
growth of Soviet naval access, might even rescind
the recent expansion, and probably would try harder
to purchase major weapon systems from the West.
Washington's gains would be limited by several fac-
tors, however:
? A reduction in Soviet-Yugoslav trade probably
would increase the cost to the West of economic
support for Belgrade. Yugoslavia would need an
outlet for stocks of uncompetitive export goods
having no market at home. It also would have to pay
scarce hard currency for raw materials and oil that
Moscow has been supplying on a clearing account
basis, reducing its ability to service its foreign debt.
25X1
? A downturn would not necessarily result in im-
proved US-Yugoslav ties, particularly if the two
sides were involved in acrimonious debate about 25X1
debt, terrorism, or other issues. Belgrade could turn
increasingly inward or look first to Western Europe,
or to China and the NAM for at least moral
support. 25X1
Moscow Gains Greater Influence
Although we believe it unlikely, Soviet-Yugoslav rela-
tions possibly could improve beyond our most likely
scenario. Moscow could gain much greater influence
in Belgrade in the event of some combination of the
following developments:
? A prolonged impasse between Belgrade and West-
ern creditors could impel Belgrade to pursue closer
economic ties to the USSR.
? Although unlikely, the Soviets could dramatically
step up efforts to woo Belgrade through new offer-
ings of credits or hard currency purchases, or larger
deliveries on a barter basis of raw materials and oil.
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Top Secret
? Ironically, Moscow also could make some gains if it
followed up for the first time a hard bargaining
position by selectively cutting exports of raw materi-
als or imports of Yugoslav goods.
? Western protectionism, a slump in world economic
growth, or a substantial loss of Yugoslav markets in
the West to newly industrializing Asian competitors
also could make Soviet economic ties seem more
attractive.
? The Soviets might encourage client states such as
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Angola to provide increased
support for Yugoslav positions in the NAM, thereby
playing to Belgrade's role as a leader of the
movement.
? Widespread domestic instability in Yugoslavia,
while unlikely, probably would strengthen the hand
of Yugoslav conservatives who want increased party
control over society and reduced Western influence.
Greater Soviet influence could show itself in a variety
of ways, including more frequent Yugoslav support
for Soviet policies and a rise in ties between Soviet
and Yugoslav institutions such as the military, the
security services, economic enterprises, and various
educational and cultural bodies
Nonetheless, we do not foresee in the next three years
any improvement in ties that would lead Yugoslavia
to join the Warsaw Pact or become a full member of
CEMA. Even in the event of successful US-Soviet
arms control agreements, including Atlantic-to-the-
Urals force reductions, Yugoslav perceptions of the
Soviet threat probably would not change sharply.
Yugoslavia still would perceive the Warsaw Pact as
its only real threat and be at least a neutral buffer in
wartime. Uneasiness in neighboring NATO countries
about a perceived sea change in Yugoslav security
policy nonetheless could grow.
Should Moscow gain significantly greater influence,
US interests probably would suffer as follows:
? The greater the development in ties between Soviet
and Yugoslav firms, especially through joint pro-
duction arrangements, the higher the risk would be
Top Secret
Selected Indicators of Increased Soviet Influence
The following developments would be indicators of
substantially closer Soviet-Yugoslav relations and
increased Soviet influence?a scenario we consider
less than likely. While no single development would
indicate a significant improvement in ties, several
taken together would strongly suggest that relations
were warming beyond our expectations:
? Belgrade decides to replace its fighter fleet largely
with MIG-29s, probably signaled by purchases of
more than 32 aircraft (sufficient to equip two of the
country's total of nine fighter squadrons).
? Party-to-party ties begin to supersede governmental
contacts as the most important channel for bilateral
political relations.
? The Yugoslays openly support?through prominent
participation in and media coverage of?Soviet
international front organizations such as the World
Peace Council.
? The Yugoslays in NAM forums and the United
Nations end opposition to, or begin supporting,
Soviet positions on Afghanistan, Nicaragua, or
Cambodia.
? Yugoslavia balances trade largely on Moscow's
terms, namely by purchasing more Soviet-
manufactured goods while the Soviets purchase no
more or even fewer Yugoslav exports.
? Both sides take concrete steps to establish several
major joint production ventures on Yugoslav
territory.
? The USSR and Yugoslavia sign a long-term S&T
cooperation agreement modeled on the CEMA 2000
S&T agreements.
that Yugoslavia would become a major channel for
the transfer of Western technology to the Soviet
Bloc.
14
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Top Secret
? Moscow could parlay increased Yugoslav support
for some of its international policies into greater
Soviet influence in both the NAM and international
Communist movement.
Opportunities for the West
The West will have opportunities to protect its inter-
ests in Yugoslavia regardless of the course of Soviet-
Yugoslav relations. Belgrade almost certainly will
calibrate its response to Moscow's statements and
actions in part based on its assessment of Western
policies. It will continue to want support from the
West to maintain its independence from Moscow:
? Economic assistance. The West can work to under-
mine potential Soviet influence through its own
extensive economic ties to Yugoslavia. Even if
Soviet-Yugoslav relations improve significantly,
Yugoslavia will want the West to help it avoid
excessive economic dependence on the Soviet Bloc.
Belgrade will look for continued debt relief, new
credits, and measures to expand trade, such as
continued most-favored-nation status and increased
quotas for Yugoslav exports.
? Security guarantees. Belgrade discreetly will seek
continued informal Western assurances of its sover-
eignty and support against the threat of Warsaw
Pact aggression even if its fear of the Pact threat
declines. It also will want Western military technol-
ogy, such as a jet engine and avionics for its planned
Reverse Blank 15
domestic fighter, to ease dependence on Soviet
sources. In addition, Belgrade might respond to
Western demands for equivalent treatment in areas
of relations now exploited by Moscow but not by
the West. Belgrade, for example, probably would
respond to demands for greater port access for
Western navies, such as for limited warship servic-
ing and for military overflight rights, by becoming
more resistant to Soviet requests for more
privileges.
? Political and cultural ties. Belgrade almost certain-
ly will welcome new contacts?such as academic
and cultural exchanges, ties to West European
Communist and Socialist parties, and visits by
parliamentary delegations?that balance Soviet in-
fluence. As a byproduct unintended by Belgrade,
these contacts can expose the Yugoslays increasing-
ly to Western thought and in the long run accentu-
ate and reinforce differences between Yugoslav
Communism and the Soviet system.
In sum, Washington is unlikely to face any significant
policy crisis in Yugoslavia arising from Belgrade's ties
to Moscow in any scenario we envisage over the next
three years. The expected improvement in Soviet-
Yugoslav relations nevertheless will likely present
challenges and occasionally adverse developments
frustrating to US policy goals.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4
Top Secret
-
o
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/18: CIA-RDP08501350R000300910001-4