THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010030-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: January 30, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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~ ~ Top Secret ~ ~
MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
Top- Secret
112
30 January 1967
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30 January 1967
Local elections for village councils and hamlet
chiefs in South Vietnam are now scheduled for April,
May, and June of phis year?
T. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
No major engagements were reported between allied
and Communist forces on 30 January (Para. 1)o Two
US Marine companies battled an enemy force of unknown
size for more than 1~ hours yesterday (Para. 2). A
South Vietnamese Regional Force company engaged the
Viet Cong in a 15-minute battle in Kien Hoa Province
on 2 8 January (Para . 3 ) o
IIo Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Elections for local village councils and hamlet
chiefs are now scheduled for April, May, and June of
this year in accordance with a government decree on
local administrative reforms (Parase 1-2)o Y Bham
Enoul, leader of the dissident tribal autonomy move-
ment FULRO, failed to attend a recently scheduled
conference with CVN and US representatives concerning
his request far exile in Thailand (Paraso 3-4).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to reporto
V. Communist Political Developments: An analysis
by the US E assy in Saigon finds t at the recent
Hanoi commentary on the DRV foreign minister's remarks
on the DRV reaction to a US bombing halt are "a mmst
significant signal" (Paras. 1-3)m
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a
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SOUTH VIETNAM
''
',~ ~ 3O JANUARY
i
' O 25 50 75 100 Mies
? '.~ 0 25 50 75 t O Kilometers
:; 4 ',i 25X1
65594 1-6 C.IA i
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1. US combat forces are participating in 11
of the 32 battalion-size or larger allied ground
operations currently in progress throughout South
Vietnam. No significant contact was reported in
any of these operations on 30 January, however.
2. Two reinforced US Marine companies, pa-
trolling an area about 12 miles south of Da Nang
in the coastal flatlands of Quang Nam Province on
29 January, encountered an enemy force of unde-
termined size. A 13-hour battle followed. While the
marine units were in blocking positions on 30 Jan-
uary, an artillery barrage was conducted against the
enemy force. Preliminary reports for the action
indicated that five Americans were killed and 19
wounded, with Communist losses of 26 killed, one
captured, and seven suspects detained.
3. According to a delayed report, a South Viet-
namese Regional Force company briefly engaged a Viet
Cong force of unknown size on 28 January about 13
miles southeast of Truc Giang in the Mekong Delta
province of Kien Hoa. As a result of the 15-minute
encounter, four South Vietnamese were killed and
five are missing. Enemy losses were reported as
10 killed and one captured.
NOTE: The 722 Viet Cong listed as "taken prisoner"
sn Operation CEDAR FALLS in the 27 January
Situation in South Vietnam included 210
captured and 512 suspects detained.
30 January 1967
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II, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Local elections for village councils and
hamlet chiefs are now scheduled for April,"May,-and
June of this year in accordance with a government
decree on local administrative reforms promulgated
in late 1966. The timing of these elections will
be phased. so that 30 percent of the villages in each
province will elect councils on 2 April, 30 percent
on 9 April, 20 percent on 16 April, 10 percent on
23 April, and 10 percent on 30 April. Similarly,
30 percent of the hamlets in each province will
elect chiefs on 14 May, 30 percent on 21 May, 20
percent on 28 May, 10 percent on 4 June, and 10 per-
cent on 11 Juneo These percentages apply to hamlets
and villages under government control.
2. Presumably, the advantage in phased elec-
tions is that security forces can be concentrated to
protect the elections from Viet Cong harassment. In
most other respects, the elections will .resemble the
Constituent Assembly elections of last September.
Refugees will be permitted to vote if they are in
areas where elections are held. Altdzough there is
no length of residence requirement for voters, candi-
dates for village councils and hamlet chiefs must
have resided in their areas for at least one year
prior to filing for candidacy.
FULRO Leader Fails to Appear at Scheduled Meeting
with GVN and US Representatives
3, Y Bham Enoul, leader of the dissident tribal
autonomy movement FULRO, failed to attend a scheduled
conference with US and GVN representatives on 28 Jan-
uaryo Y Bham, who has been in hiding in Cambodia,
recently had requested assistance in seeking politi-
cal asylum in Thailand, and the meeting on 28 January
had been set up for this purpose. It is not yet
clear whether Y Bham deliberately passed up the meet-
ing, or whether his couriers failed to reach him in
time to confirm the time and date of the meeting. US
officials estimate that it could be a week or ten days
before an explanation becomes available because of
poor communications with Y Bham,
30 January 1967
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4o News of the prospective meeting between Y
Bham and GVN and US representatives caused a highly
favorable reaction among FULRO supporters and other
montagnards in the aan Me Thuot area of Darlac Prov-
ince. Montagnards apparently interpreted the govern-
ment's willingness to attend such a meeting as an-
other indication of the government's recent respon-
siveness toward:. montagnard affairs. The outcome
of an additional return of FULRO supporters to gov-
ernment control, scheduled for next week, should
provide more concrete indications in this regard.
30 January 1967
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i ~~ ?
C',' I N~ A
`DorigVan
~1 ~.
Ching?hsi
?
.~
Lang Son ~"~~ _~
Vinh Linh
~~\DEMARCATION LINE
Dong Ha
.Quang Tri
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"""~' 25X1
ument Denied
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010030-5 iX1
port.
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
30 January 1967
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010030-5 ;X1
1. The US Embassy in Saigon has analyzed the
29 January Hanoi commentary on the DRV foreign
minister's statement to Wilfred Burchett that "it
is only after the unconditional cessation of US
bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV
that there could be talks between the DRV and the
US." The embassy comments that this appears to
be "a most significant signal, indicating either
an effort to have the bombing of North Vietnam
suspended, or a possible shift toward the opening
of direct dialogue with the US on a settlement of
the war,"
2, The embassy points out that the DRV treat-
ment of the foreign minister's statement, including
underlining of the above quote, indicates that his
remarks are meant as an important official statement.
The North Vietnamese commentary, however, constitutes
more of a gesture that involves a softening of the
formulation rather than any issue of substance, ac-
cording to the embassy analysis. The embassy also
points out that the timing of these "signals," just
before the Tet truce, is obviously calculated to
exploit the possibility of prolonging any cessation
of bombing.
3. The vagueness of the wording by the DRV
foreign minister still leaves open the key question
of Communist reciprocity on the military side, ac-
cording to the embassyv The embassy analysis con-
cluded that these latest public signals by Hanoi may
reveal, however vaguely, some slight movement in
Hanoi's heretofore implacable position. On the
other hand, according to the embassy the tenor and
method of their presentation are carefully calculated
to put maximum pressure on the US to give something
of substance while Hanoi gives no more than a vague
statement that talks "could" begin.
30 January 1967
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