SEMINAR POLICY on the CONCEALED INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY by Foy D. Kohler State Department

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00662R000100050050-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: October 30, 1946
• Content Type: REPORT

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30 het 4
1NAR REPO.FiT ~'
""~ '~'"~''i 25X1
~orized
Commandant, N?r"TC
,.
.l-L on the
CUNCE~IL~;D INSTFtUi~~LIV'I'S uF
Su_ VIl~J"P FU~REIGN PuLICY
by
Foy D. Kohler
State Department
Presented at
The Natinnal War College
Washington, D.C.
October 30, ~I~fi
~5:
C'T
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Seminar F
Mr. Foy D-. Kohler. State Department
'~''
;
Presented
,3t7 October 1916,
CUNC~EALED INSTRUMENTS OF SUVIUT FUFtEIGN PuLICY.:
Preface'
It is only fair to warn the reader at the ~~ztset of the many
limitations of this report. Aside from my own shortcomings, the limi-
tations of time and space--a few .grief weeks and a paper of same 10J000
words--are clearly insuff icient for investigation and analysis of a
question which has f ascinatedy baffled and alarmed the world fir a
quarter of a century.
The topic itself would indicate that the subject is nit a
matter of public record, This is to a certain extent true. The Soviet
Government has understanda~ay attempted to hide from the public eye the
identity and activity ~f its agents and ,the machinery with which they
operate.. But in a world of 'human beings perf ect concealment is impossible
even for a totalitarian dictatorship. There is accordingly a surprisingly
large quantity of direct evidence availabley as well as a mass of pertinent
fact .and circumstance and of testimony of varying reliability.
I have been unable, within the time limits imposed to investi-
gate mare than a portion of-the materials available in the English language,
Vast fields of possible inquiry, particularly in other languages and in the
fruitful realm of biography,, have been untouched? I have found enougYi'
however, to persuade me that more extensive research would serve rather
to confirm than to alter the picture here presented.
I may here add a comment on two phenomena which, while not
directly connected with the subj?at~ struck me with particular force
during my investi~;ationss
1. Our unnecessary ignorance as ~~egards Soviet organization
and intentions. Uncritical acceptance of the thesis that Russia is an
insolvable riddle can be compared only to the world's unfortunate
equanimity in dismissing Mein Kampf as the ravings of a madman rather.
than a "Blueprint for World Conquest,"
2, The fallacy of seizing upon the latest Soviet soporific as
proof of a permanent change- of heart? Those who wishfully follow this
popular fashion would d~ welly for examples to ponder current developments .
in the Balkans in the light of the resolutions on that area adopted by the
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Fifth Comintern Conress in July, 192. ^1h~se directed t he Communist
party or~anizati~ns ~i?n. the'B~~.llt;~ns to w~rlt, not only fir thr:ir n7.tinnal
r~:;volutionary movements, brut for "the ~~r~~~~ti:on ~?~' ~rry,atay , S1~v~:niaJ.,_?
and ~':~cedonia" in. Yu~;nslavia, and "th. principle; of Balkan ~' ederation of
~;qual a,nd indep:,ndent 'ork~~rs' and Pe~.santas Fienublics". The questions
raised- by "the nc~N. par#.iti.on nf; ~~?~-iced~ai?iis::at~~~T~lr~~c~'",;.the,y declared,
"must bc; solved by th.c; Balk~~n Federation of comm~nst p=:axties thr~?u~h
the developm~:nt of the proletarian r~volutinn." 1/
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`TABLE ~F~ ~:CuNTl!~NTS
~~ Page
..
Preface . ~ , ? .? . i
iii
. - ,
~
..
Table ~f Contents
'
1
? ? . , .!
I. INTR~7DUCTIUN : ...
~f Soviet Foreign'P~licy ..
i
~
ves
Object
?
II. INSTRUP~I:F.NTS ~'OR'I'HE ACCO~~IPZISI.~Z~~NT l7F PuLICY. ..
A. ?'Legitimate Instruments ~? ?.
2
2
3
1. Development of Economip Str,erigth
3
2,. Internal Psych~l'~gical Contr!a1s
~
4~
.
3? The Soviet Armed Farces . ;
i
ff
i
1
a
rs
gn A
Narkoinihdel' --~ Thy Soviet Ministry of Fore
~.~?
+
5. International urganizations ?. ?
.5
B. Semi-concealed Instruments ~ ???
`
6
~
.
l; ~ ~aT~mber and Pu et Republics
pp~
'
Interne-~ti~nal Politics - G~estward Expansion -.
Eastar-n Possibilities -Cases of Azerbaijan
and Armenia ~
q
2? Religion . .
The Eastern Orthodnx,Chureh -The .
'.iohammedan s
11
3, Pan-Slavism (A11-Slav 'Jlovement) ~ ?
~Inscow ell-Slav Comrnittec - American
Slav Congress
13
~~ State agencies of the U.S.S.R. . ? ? '
VuKS - Amt~rg - Tass -- Preslit - Artkino
5.. The ti"~orld Federation ~f Trade Uninnts ('~ti~'TU)
15
Soviet Inter titi~ar Isolation - urgani~ation
of VdFTU -American L3bor~s Position -ILO
vs. WFTU -Labor vs. Politics
C.. Concealed Instruments: International Communism and 17
the World Revolution ? ?
1. The IIIrd or Communist International (Comintern). 17
let Congress 1919 - ~d Congress and Organization -
Conditions for Admission -Subsequent Congresses -
Program adopted at VIth Congress 1828 -Stalin
vs. Trots4cy - 1935 Dissolution-and Significance -
urganizatinnal Adjustments and Decentralization -
Browder Case as Signal 25
2. Agents of Int ernati7nal Communism ~.
Biography as Clue -Lenin Institute -
University of the Peoples of the Last.
i ii
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3. National Communist Parties as.~ubversive Toa1s 2$
a. Domestic front ~ org2.nizations"~~~'?=
CrEatinn as in Natihnal Committee t~ ~ '
Vtiin the Peace - P~;netratien as in Chicago
,C~nference of Progressives
,b., Fifth Cnlumr~ lVetw~rke..
.NI~VI? Syst~;m - Cnrll~titern ~~r t'arty System'- ?
>'~ilitary System ~--1.~~1?.dramatic f'r;es~:ct;s ~f Latter.
u ,c, :Individual Ccrr~nunists. ~ ~ .. .
The idenl~gical read t~ ?subversi~n
III. CUNCL~USIUI~
Appendix ~- xmerican Cnmmunist~~t1Frcnt" Ur~~nzati~ris~
F~ntn~t es ... . , .
{V
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_ ~ ~
INTkUU UCTIvN
"~i1e are living not merely in a Statc,._ but in a System of estates,
and it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should c~ntinuc; to exist
far a long period side by side-with imp.r~ list ~ states.. Ultimately,, one
or the oth~:r must c~nquar..!' Benin, 1918.
"Unly.bloekheads or masked enemies .., can deny. the danger of
mi7_itary intervention and ref attempts at restoration a's long as the
capitalist atycirclement exists .,. the political .assistance of the working
class in the bnur.geois cnuntrie~for tree working class ~of nur country must
be organized ,.," Stalin, 1938? '
'~Betwaen us and Am.eriea th.er:; is an unbridge:~ble chasm. VITu are
two worlds. They cannot be united, de have with us the strength ~f the
rnasses. v~h.en we are yict~ri~us over the Am,.rican wn.rld, the world will be
one." riarda~].j, 1945.. .
An understanding of the goals which the Soviets expect to mach
seems essential to a proper evaluation of the instruments.thay plan to use
in the pursuit of these goals. A detailed ax,:arnination of thcs philosophy
and. objectives of the Soviet Government in the field off' foreign affairs
liar beyond nur responsibility in the: present study, but I believe we can
agree that
(1) The Soviet regime seeks power, prestige and security
for itself a'nd for the/ t~~rritnry which it rules;
(2) The Soviet leaders believe` this security can not ba
assured in a ~rvorld divided between communism and
capitalism; trey era accordi~igly c~~nvince;~d that they
must eventually achieve world domin-~tion;
(3) Stalin and his colleagues haves a keen appreciation
of the relativity of national power "in. ,a' system of
states"; they accordingly seek maximum present security
and the attainment of their final goal nit only through
an absolute increase in the power potential of the
U.S.S.R.. but alsr} in a decreases in thy; strength of
other. nations,
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INSTRUi,~~,NTS FUR. THE 1~CCu.~~!~LISF~?II~sNT ut~ YULICY
"It is necessary ... t~ use any ruse, cunning, unl~~.wful m~:~triod,
. evasi.nni? concealment of truth. ,..:.u , ~Le~in;. 192Q.
and indirect.
"The reserve forcers n+ the rev~lutinn.;.are ~#. t.w~,~knds, direct
"Direct h.eserve;ss~
" "1' The peasantry and -the int~;rm~;da~e:."strata of "
the population of ones oyvn, aount~y,.". ,
"2. Thy proletariat of neihboring c~iunt'ries~.
. - ". " 3. Thy; r ~;volut ionary mov emcnt in anlo,nial ,and
. dependent cauntri~s.
"L,.,. ; ~: The. erynquests and achievements ~f' t he dictatnr-
ship of the proletariat. Th~~ .p~?nletariat may
temporarily renounce one of these e~nqu~;sts hr
achievements, in order to buy nff a powerful
adversary or secure a respite, ,
".3~.,, Ant_a~onisms and c~nfl icts, b:tween non-prolE:;tarian
classes of one's ~?wn country, which' tYi~ pr~l~:tari~.t
ca,n turn to account in ~rde,r t~ ~rreaken ari adversary
cr str.epgthen its .own reserves.
. "2' ?Anta};onisms, conflicts, >.n stag, disputes. which the proletariat
,:;ct~.n turn to account fnr its own .purposes--rnaybe ~,n
? "?ff~~nsive, maybe rnan~uve~r to cover an enforced
retr~:z~t." Stalin, 1924?
A.;. L~l".~'.I~,4ATE INS'I'RUi~IENTS..
In N1.artist-Leninist-~tali.n~st:-denlrygy the end justifies the
means.. ":T'h~-vi;cti~rio~s pr_!a1,~:tar,~~n:dict~~tn.rship substitutes its rywn sc,~,le
~f values,f;or:.tta~se vahich .hav,e.;hitharto, px~=vailed, in the civilized world:
~....
Thc, Soviet statesman chooses his weapon from the arsenal ryf Soviet
foreign p~+licy solely on the basis of .its utility in any given eircurnstance.
He is influenced by .c~nside;rations of established international pr.~~ctice
2~
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~` AFC ~ `'~"'~
and tzsa~e only in sn f ar as-they .affect the utility ~f the weapon in
qu~stinn. He sees no advantage in playing the game accryrding to the
rules,. which he .regards as `suspicious devices of the antagonistic ':~!~estern
~lVorld. The: d.ividirig line between 'the "legitimate" and the "concealed"
instruments of Soviet foreign policy thus bi;c~ime;s blurred a,ndshifting.
~Nc may d~ well to have a glance around the nut~;r ch?~~mber before attempting..
to p%ne;tratc to the; inni:r recesses of .thy Soviet, arsenal. ?Jt'hat weapons
do we find exposed t^ -our view? '
1. Development ~~f Economic Stren~tYl. ? '
''Lenin put the question s quarely: ~Eith~:r perish or ovErtake
and outstrip the advanced countries economically. ~" ~~olotnv, 1938-.~
"Only under such conditions,~fulfillmtrit o:e economic goals)
will our country be insured against any cwc;ntualty. Perh?~ps thrive new_
five:-~e:~ar plans will.. be rc;quired to aehicv~. this, if not more.." Stalin,
1946.-~
The sustained and successful Swint drive for thF.~ development
of the basic ec^nomic strength of the; Soviet Union from 1925 to 1941,
under the first three five-year plans,. is a matter of recorded history.
The prompt post-V~~r resumption of th t drives in the face of the wartime
devastation of the c~untry? and the needs ~:P the ling-suffering hussi..an
pe2ple,~.. is .a ri,m::~rizabl.e manifestation df will and det~~rrninatior., Tree
direction. is again tawrd the development of basic extractive ~hnd heavy
industries
All this is clear, Vuheth~;r the resulting plant, tivill be used to
incrE~ase-the producti^n of guns or butter is nit sry clear, despite the.
appar~:nt sigpificance of 3t Alin f s ~Abwe-quoted remark. , . ,
It may. thus be n~tcd that t~talitaria.n ecnnomi~s contain elements.
and possibiliti~s~.nf,conc