LIBYA'S QADHAFI: THE CHALLENGE TO US AND WESTERN INTERESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S02113R000100310001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: SNIE

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Director of Secret L 6
Central
Intelligence
Libya's Qadhafi: The Challenge
to US and Western Interests
Special National Intelligence Estimate
a Secret
SNIE 36.5-85
March 1985
Copy 3 5 7
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SNIE 36.5-85
LIBYA'S QADHAFI: THE CHALLENGE
TO US AND. WESTERN INTERESTS
Information available as of 28 February 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board
on that date.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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SCOPE NOTE
Diplomatic and other foreign policy initiatives undertaken by
Libyan leader Qadhafi over the past few years suggest a greater focus
on undermining US interests. This Estimate addresses policies Qadhafi
is likely to pursue over the next 18 months, threats those policies will
pose to other states-both regionally and around the world-and their
impact on US interests. It also assesses Qadhafi's personality and
motivations, his susceptibility and reaction to external pressure, and his
relationship to the USSR and other radical states.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE
...................................................................................... iii
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 1
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
Character of Qadhafi's Foreign Involvement ................................. 7
Libyan Capabilities and Constraints ............................................... 8
Qadhafi's Military Reach .............................................................. 8
The Economic Factor ................................................................... 11
Political Capabilities ..................................................................... 12
Libyan Diplomatic Style .............................................................. 12
Qadhafi's Allies .................................................................................. 13
The USSR ...................................................................................... 13
Third World Radicals ................................................................... 14
The Libyan Threat ........................................................................... 15
Targets in the Middle East and North Africa ............................ 16
Targets in Sub-Saharan Africa ..................................................... 19
Targets in Central America and the Caribbean ......................... 20
Targets in Asia and Oceania ........................................................ 20
Qadhafi's Prospects ........................................................................... 20
Some Recent Successes ................................................................. 20
Negative Prospects ........................................................................ 21
What Could Blunt Qadhafi's Efforts ............................................... 21
Qadhafi's Opponents: Limited Strength but Growing Support 22
Inept Operatives ........................................................................... 22
Implications for the United States ................................................... 22
ANNEX: Chronology of Libyan Troublemaking, 1980-84 ............... 25
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KEY JUDGMENTS
During the past few years, Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar Qadhafi
has increasingly identified the United States as a key threat to his
regime and as a major obstacle capable of thwarting his ambitions in the
region and. beyond.' While Qadhafi's fundamental goals have not
changed, he has devoted increasing efforts to trying to counter per-
ceived US pressures by moving against US interests on a worldwide basis
and by working with other anti-US radical states.
Qadhafi has enjoyed considerable success recently in combining
anti-US moves with exploitation of diplomatic and political/military
opportunities that strengthen his ties to US allies-thereby reducing US
influence with those allies on Libyan policy.
We believe that Qadhafi in the coming 18 months will continue to
pursue a multifaceted policy that could have significant impact on US
interests worldwide. We expect him to:
- Continue subversion-possibly accompanied by carrot-and-stick
efforts at co-option-against such unstable regional states as
Chad, Sudan, and Tunisia, where he will continue to have
significant impact.
- Seek new opportunities for increasing influence within Morocco
as long as the Libyan-Moroccan union lasts-influence that
Qadhafi will try to exploit when the union ultimately founders
and he turns sharply against King Hassan.
- Make diplomatic overtures to. West European states designed to
play on their desire for potentially lucrative trade with Libya-
and to stymie any coordinated US effort to bring pressure to
bear on the Qadhafi regime.
Pursue common goals with other radical states-particularly
Iran, Syria, Cuba, North Korea, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, or possibly
the PDRY (South Yemen)-against US interests globally.
'.The Director, Bureau-of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that singling out
the United States as the primary focus of Qadhafi's foreign policy confuses his rhetorical priorities with
his real ones. Clearly Qadhafi regards the United States as a major obstacle to attainment of his goals.
Throughout the text where the primacy of attacking the United States is mentioned, however, it is INR's
view that the reader should keep in mind the judgments in paragraphs 46 and 66-that Qadhafi's top
agenda item is to destroy his Libyan opponents, both at home and in exile; his second priority is regional
dominance.
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- Continue support to rebel or dissident movements in pro-
Western countries as farflung as the Philippines, New Caledo-
nia, Pakistan, and Zaire, where Libyan influence is limited.
Qadhafi is also funding leftist opposition political groups in the
Western Hemisphere, in countries such as Dominica, St. Lucia,
and Costa Rica.
Qadhafi believes he has successfully manipulated the disparate
interests of several key NATO allies-France, Italy, Greece, and
Turkey-to help ensure their continued neutrality toward him. A major
objective of Qadhafi's efforts to improve ties to Europe will be to gain
access to Western military equipment and spare parts for embargoed
US materials. We are particularly concerned
about Libya's enhanced
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military relations with Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The Libyan defense
agreement with Malta bears watching.
Qadhafi's focus on the United States has stemmed partially from
his perception of an increasingly hostile US administration determined
to limit his reach and to weaken his position. Qadhafi demonstrated his
willingness to directly target US personnel and installations in the
1970s-in at least Sudan, Egypt, and Italy-but backed off when he
knew the United States had learned of his plans and would retaliate
against him. Currently, we believe Qadhafi would directly target US
personnel or installations if:
- He believed he could get away with the attack without US
retaliation.
- He believed that the United States was engaged in a direct
threat to his person or was actively attempting to overthrow his
regime.
Qadhafi's success so far in countering US policy toward Libya in
Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, in the Arab world will
encourage him to take greater risks in his efforts against US interests. He
may become more willing to back terrorist operations against US
personnel or facilities or to order his armed forces to respond to what he
deems "provocative" US military activities near Libya. In any military
confrontation with Washington, Qadhafi would cast Libya as a small
Arab country victimized by a superpower in an attempt to weaken US
influence in the Arab world. Such a posture would meet with very little
practical response in Arab capitals, however, except from radical
comrades-in-arms.
The increasing inclination by Qadhafi to implement operations
that cause an international uproar and project an image of Libyan
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power impacts on the credibility of US economic and security commit-
ments. Qadhafi's actions are likely to prompt persistent requests by US
friends in Africa and the Arab world for immediate military and
economic assistance to lessen their vulnerability to Libyan pressure.
Moderate leaders, particularly Arabs, risk discrediting themselves with
repeated and desperate calls for US support. By demonstrating their
dependence on the United States, they highlight the failure of their
economic and security policies and may promote popular opposition to
close US ties. Under such circumstances, continued Libyan pressure,
mixed with blandishments, could prompt some pro-US governments-
such as Sudan and Tunisia-to adopt a more nonaligned posture.
Qadhafi's continued disregard for international law and conven-
tion-reneging on international agreements, abusing diplomatic privi-
lege for terrorist purposes, and blatant use of violence against oppo-
nents-undermines international norms of behavior and may, over
time, encourage other states or groups to do likewise. The international
perception of a gap between US rhetorical criticism of Qadhafi's
behavior and actual US policy toward him also undermines US
credibility on this issue.
European states that have moved to improve ties to Libya have
done so mainly for economic reasons. Continued financial dealings with
Libya by American companies have raised serious questions from
several quarters about the sincerity of US policy toward Libya. The
French and Egyptians in particular have publicly emphasized the
economic ambiguity in the US relationship with Libya.
Qadhafi is strongly driven by fear of the exile movement-which
he views as US backed. Qadhafi will devote primary attention to the
physical elimination of these enemies and to denying them refuge in
any country. Qadhafi's desire for closer relations with European and
other Middle Eastern States will be in part influenced by his desire to
neutralize Libyan exiles in those countries.
Over the last several years, Libya has provided money, weapons, a
base of operations, travel assistance, or training to some 30 insurgent,
radical, or terrorist groups. Tripoli operates approximately 10 training
camps that provide instruction in politics and the use of explosive
devices, hijacking, assassination, and various commando and guerrilla
techniques.
Qadhafi's long-range goals have not shifted significantly, despite
his increased focus on the United States as the primary external enemy.
Qadhafi will continue to seek:
- To be a recognized leader of the Arab world.
- To strike at Israel.
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- To make Libya the dominant state in North Africa.
- To establish Libyan political leadership in black Africa, elimi-
nating the French position and influence there.
- To spread his vision of Islam as an instrument to rally the
oppressed of the Third World against colonialism and
imperialism.
Essentially, Qadhafi is not controllable. He h .li ve his own
2r cg~nts, and no array of external pressures is likely to alter his policy
goals or his will to adventurism. He is independent of real restraint from
his close advisers. A fundamental belief in the righteousness of his cause
prevents compromise, and his recent foreign policy successes encourage
him to stay the course. Increased political and economic pressure have
not permanently modified his behavior. Although he may temporarily
back down under threat of strong retaliation, opposition enhances his
feelings of self-importance and increases his determination to take
revenge.
Nonetheless, oil production is the mainstay of Libya's economy and
the ultimate source of its political and economic influence. The abrupt
withdrawal of US oil and service companies from Libya could result in
a substantial short-term drop in the country's oil production. Any
resulting production decline, however, is likely to be temporary and to
inflict only limited hardship on the government because Libya could
rely on increasingly skilled domestic personnel and workers from
Western Europe and Canada for assistance.
Although Libya's oil-derived income has dropped sharply in the
last few years because of the soft world oil market, Qadhafi will
continue to have sufficient funds to support most of his subversive,
terrorist, diplomatic, and political activities. He will be forced, however,
to be more selective in providing larger handouts-although even
modest sums by Libyan standards can have major impact on impover-
ished African and Latin American states. He will continue to provide
significant economic support to friendly states under US pressure.
Libya greatly values its relationship with the USSR. The massive
amounts of weapons Qadhafi has purchased have been supplied
overwhelmingly by the Soviets. Tripoli will continue to look to Moscow
for many types of sophisticated weaponry that have been denied Libya
by Western manufacturers. Soviet technicians keep a large portion of
Libya's most sophisticated weapons operable, while Soviet instructors
help Libyan operators develop the skills to use the weapons effectively.
Qadhafi also seems to hope that his ties to Moscow will offer some
protection from the United States. He probably hopes that allowing
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Soviet warships and military aircraft to use Libyan facilities since 1981
suggests that he enjoys Soviet protection, although Moscow has scrupu-
lously avoided giving him such a commitment.
Moscow, for its part, has broadly benefited from its relations with
Tripoli, despite occasional complications to Soviet policy from some of
Qadhafi's actions. In particular, Qadhafi's efforts to undermine Western
interests in various parts of the world generally coincide with the
USSR's own aims. Arms sales to Libya remain a major source of hard
currency for the Soviets.
Mutual distrust inhibits more active Libyan-Soviet cooperation.
Senior Soviet officials have frequently expressed frustration with
Qadhafi's unpredictability. Both sides, however, appear to believe that
the benefits outweigh the costs. Moscow can reap the range of benefits it
derives from Qadhafi's anti-Western activity around the world while
officially remaining uncommitted and distanced from those activities.,
Tripoli, in turn, can maintain its own independence of action while
receiving Soviet arms and security support.
Qadhafi is unlikely to "give" facilities to the Soviets-he has long
condemned the use of Arab territory for foreign military bases-but he
probably hopes that threats to do so will deter Washington from
increasing pressure on his regime. If he perceives a growing US threat to
Libya, however, he probably would offer Moscow significantly
increased access to Libyan facilities, possibly including use of the large
Soviet-built Al Jufra fighter/bomber base now nearing completion.
Qadhafi today is at least as dangerous as he has ever been and is, in
some ways, a more formidable actor on the international stage. His
primary long-range goal-to become the preeminent leader of the Arab
world-continues to elude him. The passage of time has not diminished
his urgency to accomplish his goals, despite his having faced the reality
that he will not achieve them quickly. With the years, Qadhafi has
become more calculating in blending political skills with tactics of
terrorism and intimidation as he shrewdly exploits opportunities. Re-
cently, Qadhafi has scored some significant successes that lead him to
believe he is winning greater international acceptance. Although he will
not be satisfied until he achieves his ultimate objectives, these successes
have bolstered his self-confidence and spur him on to further-and
potentially more dangerous-adventurism.
Over the past six months-and extending back several years-
Qadhafi has managed to put together a broadly conceived worldwide
range of activities that suggest a kind of knowledge and vision unlikely
to spring entirely from Qadhafi personally. There is a considerable gap
in our knowledge of the group around Qadhafi which assists in the
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conception, planning, and execution of this broad range of international
contacts requiring a relatively detailed grasp of worldwide operational
intelligence. The US Intelligence Community needs to consider the
sources of influence and advice to Qadhafi that enable him. to draft and
pursue his policies-including the possibility of policy-planning assis-
tance from other radical states or the Soviet Bloc.
Qadhafi's continued adventurism-whether driven by frustration
or the momentum of success-could ultimately bring about his down-
fall. In several key areas, Qadhafi may overreach himself, possibly
triggering more concerted external opposition against him. Further
actions against Egypt, for example, would dramatically increase the risk
of decisive retaliation from Cairo. A blatant military failure could
prompt a move against Qadhafi by his own forces. Moreover, his lawless
behavior has already increased the inclination of several states to
sponsor Libyan dissidents.
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DISCUSSION
Character of Qadhafi's Foreign Involvement
1. Libyan leader Qadhafi has been determined to
play a leading role in eliminating Western political
influence in the Third World ever since he seized
power 15 years ago. He sees himself as a leader and
agent of historic forces that will reorder both Libyan
society and Third World politics. His vision provides
both a motive and a rationale for providing military
and financial aid to radical regimes, and for under-
mining moderate governments by supporting-or cre-
ating-subversive groups and on occasion. abetting
international terrorists. His deep-rooted sense of mis-
sion and hostility to what he regards as Western
"imperialism" are heavily influenced by Libya's lega-
cy of bitter and brutal colonization by Italy.
2. Qadhafi's radical worldview and self-image are
shaping his determination to pursue several overriding
and sometimes interrelated objectives:
- Dividing the United States from its allies on
policy toward Libya. Qadhafi's efforts to im-
prove relations with Western Europe, his union
agreement with Morocco, and sporadic political
overtures to Sudan, Somalia, Egypt, and Saudi
Arabia support this goal.
- Promoting a more unified and militant Muslim
posture toward Israel and asserting his leadership
in the Arab world. Actions undertaken in pursuit
of this objective include:
? Continuing political and military support for
Iran and Syria.
? Financial aid and arms shipments to Lebanese
leftists and radical Palestinian groups.
? Participation by small numbers of Libyan
troops in Lebanon in Syrian-led fighting that
drove PLO Chairman Arafat from Tripoli in
late 1983.
- Undermining moderate, pro-Western regimes in
the region. Examples include:
? The aerial bombing in March 1984 of a radio
station near Khartoum, Sudan, and the mining
of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez in July
1984.
? Increased support for subversion in Sudan, So-
malia, and Zaire (the first black African state to
reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel).
Eliminating the threat from Libyan dissidents at
home and in exile. Examples of Qadhafi's deter-
mination to end opposition activity include:
? His intense security crackdown following the
abortive May 1984 coup attempt.
? Libyan pressure on West Europeans and on
moderate Arabs such as Morocco, Tunisia, and
Saudi Arabia to return dissidents to Tripoli.
? The renewed campaign to kill Libyan exiles in
Europe in 1984.
? Libyan attempts to smuggle weapons and explo-
sives into Saudi Arabia for use against Libyan
dissidents during the 1984 Muslim pilgrimage.
- Establishing Libyan political leadership in Africa
and eradicating French influence and presence
there. Qadhafi has pursued this objective by:
? Plotting against Chadian President Habre and
reneging on his agreement with France to with-
draw from northern Chad last November.
? Making political overtures designed to exploit
growing uncertainties in West Africa over
French security commitments.
- Strengthening fellow radicals under US pressure.
Libyan political, military, and economic support
for Nicaragua is an example of Qadhafi's pursuit
of this objective.
3. Qadhafi's actions during the past two years have
been heavily focused on undermining US and, to a
lesser extent, French interests and policies-the princi-
pal impediments to his broader aims. At the root of his
longstanding hostility toward the United States is
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Washington's support of Israel and his view of the
United States as the center of world imperialism.
Qadhafi also perceives US influence over moderate
Arab regimes as precluding any hope of uniting the
Arabs in a more militant stand against Israel-one of
his most cherished objectives. Qadhafi's opposition to
France, on the other hand, stems largely from his
belief that French political predominance in France's
former African colonies is thwarting his ambitions for
regional leadership.
4. Qadhafi's longstanding antagonism toward
Washington has developed into a personal hatred of
the current US administration. He is particularly
concerned about what he regards as Washington's
acute lack of consideration for Arab concerns and its
militant posture toward Libya and other radicals
around the world. A number of factors influence
Qadhafi's assessment:
- Public US condemnation of his regime and US
attempts to impose diplomatic and economic
sanctions against it.
- The shootdown of two Libyan fighter aircraft by
US pilots in 1981 and the continuing US military
challenge to Libya's territorial claims over the
Gulf of Sidra.
- Washington's continuing rebuff of unpublicized
Libyan political overtures.
- US intervention in Egypt and Sudan to thwart his
threats to those countries.
- Washington's campaign to deprive Qadhafi of
the chairmanship of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) in 1982 and 1983.
- US opposition to the radical Sandinista regime in
Nicaragua.
- US military intervention in Grenada.
5. Qadhafi also believes that Washington is working
toward his removal. A series of security incidents in
Libya, beginning in late 1983 and culminating in the
unsuccessful attack on his headquarters last May, has
heightened Qadhafi's fears that Libyan exiles will
exploit rising popular discontent in Libya. Qadhafi
views the exiles as the tools of the United States and
the moderate Arabs, and his fear of the exiles is out of
proportion to their capability to topple him.
Libyan Capabilities and Constraints
6. Qadhafi's pursuit of his immediate objectives is
accompanied by a more realistic sense of how he can
use Libya's limited political and military capabilities
and financial resources. His reappraisal almost certain-
ly stems in part from his long list of past foreign policy
failures. His difficulty in creating viable political
unions (the union with Morocco in August 1984 was at
King Hassan's initiative), his failure to become OAU
chairman in June 1983, and strong US opposition have
given Qadhafi a greater appreciation of the political
constraints he faces. In addition, his disastrous military
adventure in Uganda in 1979 underscored the.inability
of Libyan forces to project a sustained military pres-
ence beyond the country's contiguous neighbors. Fi-
nally, Qadhafi's unsuccessful efforts to translate finan-
cial aid into lasting political influence in most regions
or to promote revolutions by dispensing money to
subversive groups have encouraged him to give greater
focus to how he uses Libya's declining financial
resources.
Qadhafi's Military Reach
7. Libya is marginally capable of projecting mili-
tary force beyond its immediate neighbors. Training,
manning, and maintenance limitations preclude pro-
jecting a major Libyan presence farther away than
Chad or Niger. Qadhafi, however, can use his limited
air or naval assets to disrupt, embarrass, or intimidate
Third World countries in the region. (See map on page
10.) Physical damage caused in most of these attacks,
barring a lucky hit, would be slight, but Qadhafi
almost certainly would use them to underscore his
opponent's military vulnerability.
8. Several assets are available to Qadhafi for strikes
well beyond Libya's borders:
- TU-22 bombers. These aircraft have a combat
radius of over 1,500 nautical miles and can reach
into central Africa, Southwest Asia, and Europe.
A pair of TU-22s, conducting a surprise attack,
could inflict considerable damage on a target of
opportunity. Finding and destroying a selected
target-such as an embassy or a dam-are prob-
ably beyond the capabilities of Libya's TU-22
crews, however. The Libyan TU-22 that struck
Omdurman, Sudan, in 1984 failed to seriously
damage the designated target-a large radio and
TV station-because of poor crew training and a
lack of guided munitions.
-Naval mines. Libyan (or Libyan-chartered) mer-
chant ships could plant mines covertly in shallow
maritime chokepoints anywhere in the world. A
single ship could sow 100 or so mines with little
difficulty if precision were not a prerequisite.
Libya's recent mining of the Red Sea and the
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Gulf of Suez illustrates the disruptive capacity of
such an operation. Libyan submarines, warships,
bombers, and transport aircraft could each sow a
small number of mines in the Mediterranean but
at greater risk and with less effect.
- Frogmen. Libyan frogmen could be carried any-
where in the world on merchant ships. They are
reported to be well trained in underwater demo-
lition and long-distance swimming, and could
sink moored ships or conduct limited sabotage
ashore.
- Submarines. Libya's small fleet of F-class subma-
rines could covertly deliver small numbers of
mines or frogmen nearly anywhere along the
Mediterranean littoral. They could also identify
and sink a particular ship at anchor. Given their
poor state of training, however, Libyan subma-
rine crewmen would have only a slim chance of
finding and sinking a specific ship on the open
seas with torpedoes.
- Conventional forces. Except for Chad, Qadhafi
has been unwilling to commit a large military
force outside Libya since his disastrous interven-
tion in Uganda in 1979. He is willing, however,
to send a small force-up to 1,400 men-to areas
where an ally is willing to host them. A small
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Libyan Military Reach
on
~ aris*
Libya
. Khartoum,
Sudan
Qadhafi's TU-22 bombers and F-class submarines
can reach well beyond Libya's borders to disrupt,
embarrass, or intimidate, even though they would
cause limited damage. Qadhafi could also send
merchant ships to plant naval mines or frogmen
to sabotage maritime or coastal targets throughout
the world.
*Addis
Ababa
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number of Libyan troops helped Syrian forces drive
mainstream PLO units out of northern Lebanon in
1983. The presence of such troops may increase
Libyan prestige and influence in a regional conflict,
but would rarely affect the military balance.
9. We believe that Qadhafi will use these military
assets only for isolated and infrequent attacks. The
occasional use of tactics such as the Omdurman
bombing or the Red Sea mining offers him an impor-
tant element of deniability. Frequent use, however,
would increase Libya's vulnerability to exposure and
retaliation.
10. The prolonged slump in the international oil
market has diminished-but not eliminated-the eco-
nomic leverage Qadhafi has in his international deal-
ings. The sharp decline in Libya's foreign exchange
reserves from $14 billion in 1981 to $3.5 billion in
1985 has made him more aware of the tradeoffs in
providing financial assistance, and he has responded
by threatening to cut off funds to groups that refuse to
adopt a more militant posture toward pro-Western
governments and the United States. At the same time,
he has come through with sizable amounts of money-
over $300 million to Ethiopia and approximately $400
million to Nicaragua-to governments he believes are
vulnerable to US economic pressure.
11. Although the Libyan economy faces severe
difficulties, it still has a "boom" atmosphere compared
with other economies in the region. Libya's potential
as a source of hard currency has been instrumental in
luring Morocco and several West European govern-
ments into improving relations with Tripoli, despite a
large backlog of unpaid bills and efforts to barter
petroleum in exchange for imports. Should lower oil
revenues further restrict Libya's liquidity, however,
Qadhafi's access to, and success with, West European
governments will diminish.
12. Money is not the only source of economic
leverage at Qadhafi's disposal. Approximately 500,000
expatriates currently hold jobs in Libya, mostly as
manual laborers. Table 1 shows the approximate num-
bers of expatriates, by nationality, in Libya in 1984.
Morocco's King Hassan cited the prospect of more jobs.
for Moroccans in Libya as an important factor in his
willingness. to propose union with Qadhafi. Qadhafi
also has used the threat to expel Tunisian and Turkish
expatriate workers in an effort to intimidate their
governments into responding to his political overtures.
Table 1
Expatriates in Libya, 1984
Soviets and East Europeans
70,000
Turks
60,000
South Koreans
18,000
7 25X1
25X1
13. Qadhafi's ability to use access to Libya's high-
quality crude oil as a foreign policy tool has been
sharply limited. As a result of refinery modernization
in Europe and the United States, Libya's oil now
accounts for only a small percentage of most consu-
mers' oil imports and could be replaced easily. Table 2
indicates the Communist and non-Communist coun-
tries purchasing Libyan oil in December 1984.-
14. Qadhafi probably could increase his influence
with poorer, Third World countries if he gave them
Libyan oil or sold it to them at cut-rate prices, but he
has not yet chosen to employ his petroleum resources
in this manner as a foreign policy tool. Moreover, in its
dealings with Third World governments, Tripoli has
established a reputation as an unreliable supplier and
for being stingy with price or other financial conces-
sions. Qadhafi's ability to use oil as a weapon would
increase quickly, however, if supplies from the Persian
Gulf were cut off. Libya has 25 percent of available
non-Communist excess oil capacity outside the Persian
Gulf, and production-currently at 57 percent of
sustainable capacity-could be increased in a matter
of weeks.
15. Qadhafi also has little leverage in nonoil trade.
Table 3 shows trade with Libya by selected non-
Communist countries in 1984. Libya accounts for only
small percentages of its partners' international trade,
with the exception of Italy, Spain, Turkey, and
Greece. The Libyan leader, however, has been able to
use the prospect of substantial purchases of military
hardware to his advantage in dealing with various
West European governments.
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Table 2
Purchasers of Libyan Oil,
1 December 1984
1,000 barrels
per day
Liftings of Percent of
Libyan Oil Purchaser's
Oil Imports
a The USSR accepts Libyan oil in barter for arms. This oil is shipped
directly to Soviet clients in Eastern Europe-primarily Bulgaria and
Yugoslavia-and little or no Libyan oil is used domestically in the
USSR.
b Italy resells about half of its Libyan oil to third parties.
16. Oil is the mainstay of Libya's economy and the
ultimate source of its international political and eco-
nomic influence. Libya remains vulnerable to the
vicissitudes of the international oil market, which
alone has taken the greatest toll on` the economy. The
regime could face severe financial problems this year
if oil prices or exports declined sharply.
17. Four US oil companies still operate.in Libya.
Although these firms help to maintain Libya's produc-
tive capacity, their withdrawal would not damage
operations or hinder long-term oil production. A
coordinated trade embargo including West European
countries and US subsidiaries' abroad would be neces-
sary to significantly reduce Libya's oil production
below the current level.
18. The abrupt withdrawal of US oil and service
companies could result in a substantial short-term drop
in Libyan oil production by as much as 300.000 barrels
a day. (A phased withdrawal would be much less
successful.) Any resulting production decline. however.
would probably be temporary and inflict only limited
hardship on the government because Libya could rely
on increasingly skilled domestic personnel and workers
from Western Europe and Canada for assistance.
Much of the foreign labor force of US oil firms
operating in Libya probably could be persuaded to
remain.
Political Capabilities
19. Qadhafi's ability to project political power is
based on his military arsenal and oil revenues, and his
willingness to use them in support of revolutionary
causes. Qadhafi has created for himself a reputation
for ruthlessness and for exploiting the domestic vulner-
abilities of Third World regimes that will not do his
bidding. In general, the intimidating effect of Qadha-
fi's will to adventurism diminishes the farther away
from Libya he tries to exert his influence. African
states feel the most threatened. Qadhafi's ties to local
leaders and political groups in South Asia or the
Caribbean, on the other hand, are driven more by the
prospect of financial assistance than by fear.
20. Qadhafi has limited powers of political persua-
sion. His pretensions to be the successor to Egypt's
Gamal Abd al-Nasir as a charismatic leader of non-
aligned nations frequently lead him to rely on the
strength of his personality alone and to overplay his
hand. His abrasive and heavyhanded exhortations and
lectures to foreign statesmen generally alienate the
very leaders he is trying to court. In the Arab world,
certain aspects of his moralizing-particularly on
Arab-Israeli issues-strike a responsive chord, and
some Arab leaders would feel obliged to give him pro
forma support if he were attacked militarily by the
United States. Nonetheless, most Arab leaders would
greet Qadhafi's demise with relief and pleasure.
Libyan Diplomatic Style
21. Qadhafi's ventures into diplomacy are ham-
pered by his stranglehold over an inept and misman-
aged foreign policy decisionmaking establishment. His
personal conduct of foreign policy has rendered it
erratic and sometimes ill formed. Visits by foreign
dignitaries often are uncoordinated with relevant
.agencies. Protocol arrangements frequently are ig-
nored. Appointments with Qadhafi are canceled with
little notice. Promises of financial aid to foreign
governments or dissident groups often go unfulfilled
because they were not cleared in advance with Qadha-
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Table 3
Trade With Libya by
Selected Non-Communist Countries, 1984 a
Exp
Lib
orts to
ya
Percent of
Exports
Imports From
Libya b
Percent of
Imports
United States 19
7
0.1 10
NEGL
Netherlands 18
5
0.3 330
0.5
Turkey 17
0
2.6 589
5.8
a Estimated.
b Virtually all oil.
Million US $
(except as indicated)
fi, or because he changed his mind or was misunder-
stood by his deputies.
22. The situation has been exacerbated since Qa-
dhafi dismantled Libya's traditional diplomatic estab-
lishment in 1979. The replacing of embassies by
"people's bureaus," manned largely by noncareer
diplomats, has alienated many governments. Many of
the personnel-some little more than thugs-are pro-
Qadhafi extremists who share his contempt for diplo-
matic procedure. Some appear to have virtually a free
hand in dispensing large sums of money and running
clandestine operations. Recommendations of the few
experienced diplomats still in place are frequently
ignored.
23. Qadhafi's appointment of Abd al-Salam al-
Turayki, formerly Libya's UN Ambassador, as Foreign
Minister in 1984 is slowly improving Libya's tarnished
political image in the international community. Tur-
ayki has worked assiduously to restore the Foreign
Ministry's influence with Qadhafi and to minimize the
number of pro-Qadhafi zealots assigned to diplomatic
posts abroad. Turayki's broad contacts among diplo-
mats throughout the world has made him a key
Qadhafi emissary.
24. The Soviet Union's willingness to sell Qadhafi
large quantities of weapons-about $15 billion since
the early 1970s-provides him with the military
wherewithal to pursue his radical objectives. Tripoli
continues to look to Moscow for. many types of
sophisticated weapons that have been denied Libya by
Western manufacturers. Soviet technicians keep many
of Libya's most sophisticated weapons operable, while
Soviet instructors help Libyan operators develop the
skills to use the weapons effectively.
25. Qadhafi probably also believes that a close
relationship with Moscow will offer some protection
from the United States. He probably hopes that allow-
ing Soviet warships and military aircraft to use Libyan
facilities since 1981 suggests that he enjoys Soviet
protection, although Moscow has scrupulously avoided
giving him such a commitment. Qadhafi periodically
tries to play the "Soviet card" against the United
States-as he did in 1984-by announcing that he
might open the Libyan coast to the Soviets and "give"
them facilities.
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26. Qadhafi is unlikely to "give" facilities to the
Soviets-he has long condemned the use of Arab
territory for foreign military bases-but probably
hopes that such threats will deter Washington from
increasing pressure on his regime. If he perceived a
growing external threat to Libya, however, he proba-
bly would offer Moscow significantly increased access
to Libyan facilities, possibly including use of the large
Soviet-built A] Jufra fighter/bomber base now nearing
completion. We do not believe, however, that the
Soviets have told Qadhafi that they would assist him in
a confrontation with the United States. Indeed, Mos-
cow has refused to support Libya's claims regarding its
"territorial waters" in the Gulf of Sidra.
27. Moscow, for its part, has largely benefited from
its relations with Tripoli, although Qadhafi's actions
have complicated Soviet policy at times. Qadhafi's
efforts to undermine US interests in various parts of
the world generally coincide with the USSR's own
aims. Examples of Libyan activities that indirectly
serve the Soviets by aiding US opponents and threaten-
ing US-supported governments include:
- Direct military intervention in Chad.
- Provision of arms to Sudanese and Somali dissi-
dents and to Nicaragua.
- Aid to Pakistani terrorists who seek to overthrow
President Zia.
28. Moscow also has acquired considerable military
and economic benefits from its ties to Tripoli. Soviet-
Libyan military cooperation has expanded since the
US-Libyan air clash over the Gulf of Sidra, and the
Soviets now frequently use Libyan air and naval
facilities to monitor US military movements in the
eastern Mediterranean. The approximately 50,000 So-
viet and East European technicians in Libya earn
considerable hard currency that 'supplements the sub-
stantial sums their countries earn from selling arms to
Tripoli.
29. Nevertheless, the Soviets avoid explicit associa-
tion with Qadhafi's adventures and do not always
support his regional policies:
- Moscow denied a request to help transport Liby-
an troops into Chad in 1983.
- The USSR, which generally restricts the transfer
of its major weapon systems, has cautioned Trip-
oli about selling such equipment to Iran for use
against another valued Soviet customer, Iraq.
- Moscow supports PLO chief Arafat and a negoti-
ated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, while
Qadhafi backs radical Palestinians who reject
compromise.
- The Soviets probably also are concerned that
Libya's union with Morocco will complicate So-
viet-Algerian relations.
30. Mutual distrust inhibits more active Libyan-
Soviet cooperation. Senior Soviet officials have fre-
quently expressed frustration with Qadhafi's unpre-
dictability. Both sides, however, appear to believe that
the benefits outweigh the costs. Moscow can reap the
range of benefits it derives from Qadhafi's anti-
Western activity around the world while officially
remaining uncommitted and distanced from those
activities. Tripoli, in turn, can maintain its own inde-
pendence of action while receiving Soviet arms and
security support.
31. Unlike his ties to Moscow, Qadhafi's links to
other radical regimes in the Middle East and else-
where in the Third World give him little in terms of
economic or military benefits. He clearly values the
political support these radicals give him, however, and
may feel that such support deters regional moderates
from taking action against him.
32. Competing philosophies and egos have limited
the extent of cooperation among Third World radicals,
and we expect these limitations to continue. We do.not
believe, however, that Qadhafi's allies would support
him in a confrontation with the United States, beyond
providing rhetoric and diplomatic initiatives in inter-
national bodies such as the UN. The use of US military
force against Libya, however, probably would prompt
Qadhafi to press for joint terrorist operations against
US interests.
33. Iran. The Iranian regime's anti-US focus is
likely to lead to expanded contacts with Libya at the
working level, but Qadhafi's role in the disappearance
in 1978 of Lebanese Shia leader Musa Sadr while on a
trip to Libya, and Tehran's distaste for Qadhafi's
ideology, will continue to limit cooperation. There is
considerable speculation about Iranian support for
Libyan terrorist and intelligence operations, but we do
not know if both parties have participated in either the
planning or implementation stages. At the same time,
the use of Shia terrorism against US facilities and
personnel in Lebanon and Kuwait may embolden
Qadhafi in the direction of further anti-US plots, and
we cannot rule out Tehran's providing some logistic
support.
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34. Syria. Qadhafi has been somewhat more suc-
cessful in gaining support from the Syrians. Damascus
has provided enough pilots to man a MIG-23 squadron
since 1979, when Qadhafi feared he was vulnerable to
Egyptian attack and requested such support. This unit
is one of the best in the Libyan Air Force and
frequently responds to US air and ship movements off
the Libyan coast. We believe that Damascus would
allow Qadhafi to use these pilots to defend Libyan-
claimed territorial rights and airspace in an encounter
with US forces. Qadhafi values Syrian political support
in international forums and will welcome any efforts
by Damascus to upset movement toward peace negoti-
ations with Israel by moderate Arabs.
35. Although Tripoli, - Damascus, -and Tehran are
talking about increased cooperation against Iraq and
Israel, moving from rhetoric to action will be difficult.
Neither Qadhafi nor Syrian President Assad wants to
see a Shia regime under Tehran's influence emerge in
Iraq or in Lebanon. At the same time, Iran and Syria
are suspicious of Qadhafi's motives in concluding a
union agreement with Morocco last August.
36. Ethiopia. Ethiopia-which formed a Tripartite
Alliance with Libya and South Yemen in -August
1981-is of considerable utility to Qadhafi in support-
ing subversion against regional moderates. Ethiopia is
the main conduit for Libyan arms, equipment, and
funds supplied to the Sudanese insurgents, as well as to
Somali dissident groups. Libyans based in Addis Ababa
probably also have been involved in the onward
shipment of weapons in support of terrorist or guerrilla
operations elsewhere in Africa.
37. Despite .indications of some unhappiness be-
tween Addis Ababa and Tripoli, - we anticipate that
Ethiopian leader Mengistu will continue to support
Qadhafi's efforts to topple the Sudanese and Somali
leaderships and to voice -support for Libyan-backed
Chadian dissidents, but- not to become involved in
other Libyan initiatives. Libya has already provided
Ethiopia over $300 million in foreign exchange, and
Addis Ababa does not want to jeopardize promises of
an additional $500 million in project assistance.
38. South Yemen. Relations with the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen),
Libya's other partner in the Tripartite Alliance, have
deteriorated because of Tripoli's reneging on promised
economic aid and meddling in Aden's internal politics.
Qadhafi's attempts to convince Aden to reactivate the
National Democratic Front against the Yemen Arab
Republic (North Yemen) and to provide.it with Libyan
arms are not likely to be successful at present. How-
ever, if hardline ex-President Ismail returns and radi-
cal elements again become dominant in the Aden
government, Libyan-South Yemeni cooperation could
be revived and directed against moderate states of the
Arabian Peninsula.
39. North. Korea. Qadhafi's relations with North
Korea have been surprisingly active and are based
largely on a common desire to undermine US interests.
Although the closeness of the ties is difficult to gauge
because of serious gaps in information, available evi-
dence does suggest that cooperation exists on military
and security matters. P'yongyang also may have pro-
vided limited support last year for at least one Libyan
terrorist plot.- We believe that Qadhafi will continue to
seek North Korean assistance in selected instances
because such aid is useful in concealing Libyan in-
volvement. As many as 100 North Korean military
personnel are in Libya, and up to several hundred
others are engaged in economic activity.
40. Cuba. Havana probably welcomes Libya's par-
ticipation in opposing US interests in Central America
and will work with Tripoli to provide military equip-
ment and training to radical elements in the region.
Beyond these areas, however, cooperation is likely to
be limited. Qadhafi and Castro have never developed
close personal ties because of their inflated egos and
different revolutionary philosophies. Moreover,
Havana sees as poorly timed and counterproductive
the current Libyan pressure on Caribbean leftists to be
more militant. Cuba may believe that violent anti-US
activity in the Caribbean will be perceived in Wash-
ington as directed from Havana and could prompt a
strong US response.
The Libyan Threat
41. Although his ambitions well outrun his capabili-
ties, Qadhafi's role in fostering terrorism and instabil-
ity and in abetting conflicts, even on a regional scale, is
one of the most prominent in the world. (See the map
on page 17.) The prospect that Qadhafi will use his
more refined sense of Libyan capabilities to exploit
growing signs of political instability represents a seri-
ous threat to some moderate countries near Libya. -
42. Threats, support for terrorism and subversion,
offers of military and financial aid, and economic
intimidation are the tools of Qadhafi's foreign policy.
Qadhafi's choice of tactics at any given time often is
impromptu and motivated by opportunism. He almost
always mixes his tactics-frequently offering political
and economic cooperation to lay the groundwork for
renewed subversion. His overtures for closer diplomat-
ic and commercial ties to Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and
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several West African states-combined with financial
and logistic support of dissidents-exemplify Qadha-
fi's approach.
43. Qadhafi demonstrated his willingness to direct-
ly target US personnel and installations in the 1970s-
in at least Sudan, Egypt, and Italy-but backed off
when he knew the United States had learned of the
threats and would retaliate against him. Currently, we
believe Qadhafi would directly target US personnel or
installations if:
- He believed he could get away with the attack
without US retaliation.
He believed that the United States was engaged
in a direct threat to his person or was actively
attempting to overthrow his regime.
44. Should Qadhafi decide to initiate terrorism
against US personnel and facilities directly, US targets
abroad will be more vulnerable than those inside the
United States and more accessible to Libyan terrorists.
Qadhafi would be hard pressed to mount a successful
terrorist operation in the United States. The closure of
the Libyan People's Bureau in Washington four years
ago has made direct Libyan recruitment of assassins in
the United States difficult. Nonetheless, Qadhafi could
still recruit foreigners-as he often does-to carry out
operations within the United States.
45. There is no indication of threat to American
citizens living in Libya. Qadhafi has treated these
persons well to avoid alienating US businesses and to
put the lie to Washington's warnings about the dangers
of dealing with him. A threat to the US personnel in
Libya is not likely unless Qadhafi feels a greatly
increased threat from the United States.
46. We believe the Libyan leader will continue to
pursue his traditional targets: Libyan dissidents and
moderate Arab regimes. Qadhafi's determination to
kill the leaders of several of these regimes-Egypt's
President Mubarak, Sudan's President Nimeiri, Chad's
President Habre, Iraq's President Saddam Husayn,
and Jordan's King Hussein-will continue to fuel
Libyan terrorism for the period of this Estimate.
Libya's generally inept direction of such operations
and the-tight security surrounding these leaders when
they travel abroad, however, minimize Tripoli's
chances of conducting a successful assassination. Libya
has had greater success in assassinating opponents of
the. Libyan regime, although many have been relative-
ly-low-level figures. The embarrassment of the recent-
ly foiled attempt to kill former Libyan Prime Minister
Bakush in Egypt will keep both anti-Qadhafi exiles
and Egypt at .the top of Qadhafi's hit list. .
47. Libya has the capability to launch a variety of
paramilitary and terrorist-style attacks, but its opera-
tives are often inept. Qadhafi often prefers to recruit
agents abroad or hire mercenaries rather than use
Libyan citizens to conduct operations. Libyan diplo-
matic missions help oversee operations, distribute cash
and weapons, and arrange travel, but the use of
surrogates prevails. This trend is likely to continue, as
Qadhafi is not eager to have terrorist acts traced
directly to Libya, damaging his pretensions of being a
responsible Arab statesman.
48. Support for subversive groups is especially ap-
pealing to Qadhafi because it usually provides oppor-
tunities to train dissidents in Libya and to indoctrinate
them in his personal philosophies of revolution. Over
the last several. years, Tripoli has provided money,
weapons, a base of operations, travel assistance, or
training to some 30 insurgent, -radical, or terrorist
groups. Libya operates approximately 10 training
camps that provide instruction in politics and the use
of explosive devices, hijacking, assassination, and vari-
ous commando-and guerrilla techniques.
49. In the final analysis, those most threatened by
Qadhafi. remain those most vulnerable to him: first,
the Libyan people themselves, then Libyan dissidents
abroad and Libya's weaker neighbors. Because he is
determined to eliminate Libyan opposition and those
who support it, we can expect to.see increased target-
ing of moderate Arab and African interests in coming
months.
Targets in the Middle East and North Africa
50. Sudan. President Nimeiri's deteriorating politi-
cal position makes him the Arab leader most vulnera-
ble-to Libyan pressure. Moreover, the Sudanese Presi-
dent's support for Egypt and the Camp David accords,
his willingness to participate in military exercises with
the United States, and his role as a principal backer of
Libya's largest dissident organization make him Qad-
hafi's principal Arab target. Tripoli is one of the
leading sources of arms, funds, training, and logistic
support to Sudanese dissidents. Such Libyan pressure
strengthens the prospect that Nimeiri eventually will
cut a deal with Qadhafi to test the Libyan leader's
professed willingness to negotiate a reduction in sup-
port for each other's dissidents. An effective invasion
of Sudan is probably beyond Qadhafi's ability, espe-
cially as a sizable number of his limited forces are tied
up in Chad.
51. Tunisia.. While Qadhafi is able to contribute to
internal turmoil and instability in Tunisia. as well as
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Ln;
South
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Miller Cylindrical Projection
Scale 1:85,000,000
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U.S.
Qadhafi's Global Activities, 1980-85
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Sudan, he is unable to ensure the outcome of any
power contest. Qadhafi will almost certainly exploit
political uncertainties when 82-year-old President
Bourguiba dies. If Bourguiba dies soon, Qadhafi prob-
ably will confine himself initially to throwing his
political support behind a contender in an attempt to
manipulate the succession process. Libya also probably
will step up efforts to expand its clandestine network
in Tunisia, and to infiltrate dissident Tunisians cur-
rently being trained in Libya. Over time, Bourguiba's
demise and the succession struggle will provide Qa-
dhafi with opportunities to fan domestic unrest, espe-
cially if the new government fails to ease growing
popular discontent. Qadhafi's willingness to send his
armed forces into Tunisia will depend on his assess-
ment of the government's prospects as well as the
chances of French, US, and Algerian military inter-
,vention to stop him..
52. As is the case with Sudan, Qadhafi is likely to
employ. a two-tiered approach with Tunisia-threats
alternating with or accompanied by efforts at co-
option-in order to achieve his ends.
53. Morocco. Despite the current union of their
two states, Qadhafi has long sought the fall of Moroc-
can King Hassan because he is a moderate pro-US
leader. The union provides growing opportunities to
increase Libyan influence within Morocco, which
Qadhafi will try to exploit when the union ultimately
founders and* he turns sharply on Hassan. The eco-
nomic benefits for Morocco have been slow to come so
far, and the union may become a factor contributing
to domestic difficulties there.
54. Other Arab States. Qadhafi also is interested in
subverting Egypt and Algeria, but he realizes that
their military superiority limits what he, can do. He is
interested in toppling the leaders of Jordan and Iraq,
but distance and lack of assets seriously constrain his
efforts, barring the persistent threat of assassination by
Libyan operatives. during their travels abroad. Qadhafi
almost certainly will again attempt to embarrass or
intimidate Cairo by conducting operations similar to
the covert mining of the Red Sea.
Targets in Sub-Saharan Africa
55. The situation in Chad risks becoming a com-
plete Libyan victory, and Tripoli shows every indica-
tion of. occupying the northern part of the country
indefinitely. Libyan troops there will continue to pose
a serious threat to President Habre, , particularly if
Paris falters in its resolve to counter any future Libyan
military offensive southward. In addition, Qadhafi's
leverage over Chadian dissidents ensures a Libyan role
in French efforts to engineer a power-sharing arrange-
ment that reconciles Habre, a northerner, with leaders
from southern Chad. Habre's heavyhanded efforts to
suppress dissident activity in the south will continue to
spur resentment there and create a climate conducive
to Libyan meddling.
56. Libya also has prospects for contributing to
destabilization elsewhere among black African states.
These states-where frequently only a few dollars will
buy loyalty, or where a few guns can make a major
difference-provide considerable scope for expansion
of Libyan influence. But even here Qadhafi has little
ability to dictate the outcome of a power struggle.
57. Pro-Western Niger is potentially the most vul-
nerable Libyan target because of military weakness
and the fragility of its economic, political, and social
structures. Also, the country's remote northern re-
gion-which has rich uranium resources-is easily
within reach of conventional Libyan military forces.
Moreover, two airfields currently under construction
in extreme southwestern Libya-one of which strad-
dles the border-probably are intended in part to
strengthen Libyan military capabilities against Niger.
An extensive Libyan military intervention against
Niger would be likely to await a resolution of Libyan
.efforts to install a pro-Libyan regime in N'Djamena
unless instability in Niamey presented Qadhafi with
.new opportunities. Qadhafi will continue to rely main-
ly. on subversion and sabotage to create a climate
suitable to the installation. of a pro-Libyan. regime in
Niamey.
58. Zaire has given political and military support to
Chadian President Habre, and this, along with its
decision to reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel
in 1982, has made President Mobutu another one of
Qadhafi's principal targets. Tripoli has increased sup-
port for Zairian dissidents and has been implicated in
several terrorist incidents in Kinshasa over the past
year, but the weak and divided opposition organiza-
tions have little chance of toppling Mobutu in the near
term.
59. Other African regimes with close ties to France
and the United States will become more susceptible to
Libyan blandishments and will attempt to forestall
Libyan meddling by placating Qadhafi if government
authority erodes. Qadhafi's dispatching of his Foreign
Minister and other envoys to various Francophone
African capitals indicates that Tripoli is anxious to
exploit African doubts about French security commit-
ments since the French pullout from Chad.
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Targets in Central America and the Caribbean
60. Central American governments and groups are
wary of Qadhafi, but not averse to accepting his
largess. US involvement in Central America makes
operations in the US "backyard" of particular interest
to Qadhafi, who seeks to strike back at the United
States for building close ties to Libya's neighbors.
Libyan involvement in Central America is, however,
also motivated by Qadhafi's desire to demonstrate his
leadership ability to the Third World.
61. Continued Libyan political, military, and eco-
nomic support to Nicaragua will help prop up the
regime and will indirectly enhance the Sandinistas'
ability to subvert neighboring states. Qadhafi is also
funding leftist opposition political groups in countries
such as Dominica, St. Lucia, and Costa Rica. Al-
though Libya probably will try to strengthen revolu-
tionary movements elsewhere in the region and pro-
mote more militant activities against the United States,
its prospects will continue to be constrained by dis-
tance, cultural differences, a longstanding suspicion of
Qadhafi by Latin American leaders, rivalry with
Cuba, and a bias against terrorist activities on the part
of many Caribbean leftists.
Targets in Asia and Oceania
62. The difficulties Libya faces in expanding its
influence in this region are similar to those in Latin
America. Qadhafi will readily support insurgents in
such pro-Western nations as the Philippines and the
French territory of New Caledonia if he calculates
that such support will weaken their ties to Washington
or Paris. Qadhafi backed a coup plot against Bangla-
desh last year and can be expected to do so again if the
opportunity arises. Libya will probably want to pro-
vide limited symbolic support to the Tamil rebels in
Sri Lanka.
Qadhafi's Prospects
63. Despite his overall failure to achieve interna-
tional acceptability, Qadhafi has in recent months
achieved a series of foreign policy successes that have
reduced his international isolation and bolstered his
confidence. They include:
- Union with Morocco, a US ally.
- Apparently expanding intelligence ties to Greece,
designed at least in part to facilitate Qadhafi's
efforts to suppress Libyan dissident activity cen-
tered in that country.
- Improved military relations with Greece and
Turkey, members of NATO.
- A defense treaty with Malta.
- Manipulation of France and continued occupa-
tion of northern Chad.
- Enhanced economic dealings and increasing mil-
itary cooperation with Italy.
- An enhanced diplomatic and military advisory
relationship with Central American governments
and groups, although Qadhafi has been largely
prevented from shipping major arms into the
region.
Qadhafi is particularly gratified because several of
these breakthroughs involve European countries and
can be identified as at US expense. Qadhafi subse-
quently is feeling confident and successful in his
efforts to break out of US political and financial
encirclement and he will continue to use economic
incentives to improve his ties to Europe. Qadhafi may
also in coming months be able to use improving
economic relations with Europe to defuse some of the
domestic unhappiness with his policies.
64. A major objective of Qadhafi's efforts to im-
prove ties to Europe will be access to Western military
equipment and spare parts for embargoed US materi-
als. We are particularly concerned about Libya's
apparently expanding intelligence ties to Greece, and
about Libya's enhanced military relations with Italy,
Greece, and Turkey. The Libyan defense agreement
with Malta bears watching, especially if it results in a
sustained Libyan naval and air presence.
65. European states that have moved to improve
ties to Libya have done so mainly for economic
reasons. Continued financial dealings with Libya by
American companies have raised serious questions
from several quarters about the sincerity of US policy
toward Libya. The French-perhaps largely for rea-,
sons relating to their own embarrassment over Chad-
and the Egyptians have publicly emphasized the
economic ambiguity in the US relationship with
Libya.
66. Qadhafi today is at least as dangerous as he has
ever been and is, in some ways, a more formidable
actor on the international stage. His primary long-
range goal-to become the preeminent leader of the
Arab world-continues to elude him. The passage of
time has not diminished his urgency to accomplish his
goals, despite his having faced the reality that he will
not achieve them quickly. With the years, Qadhafi has
become more calculating in blending political skills
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with tactics of terrorism and intimidation as he
shrewdly exploits opportunities. Recently Qadhafi has
scored some significant successes that lead him to
believe he is winning greater international acceptance.
Although he will not be satisfied until he achieves his
ultimate objectives, these successes have bolstered his
self-confidence and spur him on to further-and
potentially more dangerous-adventurism.
Negative Prospects
67. Although Qadhafi has managed to attract atten-
tion, he has in the process alienated Libya's neighbors
and lost most of his credibility in the developing
world. In coming months, he may be able further to
reduce his economic and even political isolation, but
he will not significantly increase his role as an interna-
tional leader.
68. Arab and African leaders pay lipservice to
Qadhafi's position as a brother leader. But they fear
his ambitions, do not trust him, and will hesitate to
place themselves in positions of dependence upon him.
Within the Libyan-Moroccan union, Hassan does not
trust Qadhafi, seeks only to use him, and will ultimate-
ly face Qadhafi's wrath when Moroccan perfidy is
uncovered. With the exception of Chad and Sudan,
Arab and African suspicions and vigilance will tend to
vitiate Qadhafi's efforts to overthrow or undermine
any of Libya's neighbors.
69. Nor will Qadhafi succeed in wiping out the
Libyan dissidents. The short-lived reign of terror after
an abortive coup attempt in May 1984 was a severe
blow to the oppositionist groups. They remain active,
however, and show signs of recovery and continuing
ability to operate. Of particular importance is growing
support for the Libyan exiles by Arab governments.
What Could Blunt Qadhafi's Efforts
70. Essentially, Qadhafi is not controllable. He is
independent of real restraint from his close advisers.
Nor do ties to moderate states serve to change his
behavior. A fundamental belief in the righteousness of
his cause prevents compromise, and his recent foreign
policy successes encourage him to stay the course.
Increased political and economic pressure have not
served to permanently modify his behavior. Although
he may temporarily back down under threat of strong
retaliation, opposition enhances his feelings of self-
importance and increases his determination to take
revenge.
71. Qadhafi does have a number of limitations and
weaknesses that serve to ensure that his desires exceed
his reach:
- Lack of appeal. Qadhafi's fanciful economic and
political theories do not have much appeal in the
developing world. The Third World respects
success, and Libya-despite its oil wealth and
postrevolution improvements in living stan-
dards-has not been able to eliminate shortages
of consumer goods, prevent a hemorrhage of
intellectuals from the country, keep peace with
its neighbors, or achieve international
respectability.
- Economic constraints. Qadhafi has been notori-
ously faithless in carrying through on promises of
financial assistance-behavior that has contribut-
ed to his loss of credibility in the developing
world. Libya's post-1981 economic difficulties
have not significantly weakened Qadhafi's ability
or inclination to meddle in other states' internal
affairs or to engage in terrorist operations. But
the need for austerity has caused him to reduce
the number of Libyan people's bureaus during
this past year, with a consequent reduction in
bases from which to spread Libyan influence and
subversion. Continued financial difficulties could
accelerate this trend and further restrict his
ability to purchase allies and finance terrorist
operations.
Increased Arab opposition. The Arabs have
sought for years to manage Qadhafi by maintain-
ing contact with him. They have periodically
tried cooperation, cajolery- and, and, in the case of
Egypt and Algeria, military pressure. Such tactics
have not served to change Qadhafi's behavior
over the long term but have on occasion tempo-
rarily moderated it. Instead, highly visible acts of
internationally unacceptable behavior-many of
them directly against Arab interests-appear in-
tegral to Qadhafi's agenda.
72. Arab concern has been increased by Qadhafi's
failure to withdraw from Chad, his continuing efforts
to destabilize Sudan, and his attempts to position
himself to take advantage of internal instability in
Tunisia when Bourguiba goes. During the past year,
several Arab states-including Egypt, Algeria, Sudan,
and Iraq-and Yasir Arafat's faction of the PLO have
significantly increased aid to the Libyan dissident
groups.
73. There are indications that perception of a com-
mon Libyan threat is drawing Egypt and Algeria
together. Despite ideological and other differences,
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Algeria and Egypt are jointly concerned over the
threat Qadhafi poses to regional tranquillity and secu-
rity. The Libyan-Moroccan union is seen by Algeria as
directed specifically against its own interests and
security. Cairo and Algiers probably are discussing the
possibility of coordinating support for. the Libyan
oppositionists.
Qadhafi's Opponents: Limited Strength but
Growing Support
74. Qadhafi's opponents still pose no major direct
threat to his tenure, although they clearly worry him
and heighten strains within Libya. Qadhafi's increased
preoccupation with Libyan oppositionists has acceler-
ated rather than diminished his aggressive behavior.
The opposition groups remain factionalized and large-
ly unable.to operate inside Libya. They probably have
made some progress in rebuilding the limited capabili-
ty they had before Qadhafi's crackdown against do-
mestic dissidents last year.
75. There are, moreover, some indications of con-
tact between internal dissidents, including persons in
the Libyan military, and external groups.. Augmented
Arab support for the dissidents will at least marginally
strengthen the dissidents' operational ability against
Qadhafi, but could also contribute to disunity and
rivalry. Improved dissident operational strength could
contribute as well to an increasing cycle of attack and
counterattack between Libyan exiles and Qadhafi's
agents in Europe. In coming months we expect Qadha-
fi to increase his attacks both on his opponents and on
the personnel and installations of those countries that
assist and harbor them.
76. But opposition to Qadhafi is the only common
denominator among the more than 20 opposition
groups-several of which represent only a handful of
people-whose philosophies range from Marxist to
Islamic fundamentalist to rightwing monarchist. We
see no signs that increased internal opposition to
Qadhafi has translated into support for Libyan person-
alities in exile or resulted in increased exile unity.
Should Qadhafi depart from the scene, returning
exiles-most of them former diplomats, teachers, or
other professionals and intellectuals-would be unlike-
ly to persuade the military to relinquish power.
Inept Operatives
77. Qadhafi's efforts to eliminate his opponents are
blunted by the general ineptitude of most of his agents
and the faultiness of his intelligence. Libyan dissidents
assassinated abroad have usually been rank and file,
not the leaders Qadhafi fears most. He has targeted
several leaders of other Arab states, but has failed to
assassinate any.
Implications for the United States
78. Qadhafi's more innovative use of his traditional-
ly aggressive tactics makes him a more dangerous
opponent of US interests and policies. Increased West
European opposition to US efforts to impose economic
sanctions and diplomatic isolation on Tripoli increases
the possibility that Libya will gain greater access to
sophisticated Western arms and technology. Growing
cooperation between Tripoli and some West European
governments, as well as between Libya and Morocco,
also may result in some compromise of intelligence
supplied by the United States to its NATO and other
allies.
79. Qadhafi's success so far in countering US policy
toward Libya in Western Europe and, to a lesser
extent, in the Arab world will encourage 'him to take
greater risks in his efforts against US interests. He may
become more willing to back terrorist operations
against US personnel or facilities or to order his armed
forces to respond to what he deems "provocative" US
military activities near Libya. In any military confron-
tation with Washington, Qadhafi would cast-Libya as
a small Arab country victimized by a superpower in
an attempt to weaken US influence in the Arab world.
Such a posture would meet with very little practical
response in Arab capitals, however, except from radi-
cal comrades-in-arms.
80. The increasing inclination by Qadhafi to imple-
ment operations that cause an international uproar
and project an image of Libyan power impacts on the
credibility of US economic and security commitments.
Qadhafi's actions are likely to prompt persistent re-
quests by US friends in Africa and the Arab world for
immediate military and economic assistance to lessen
their vulnerability to Libyan pressure. Moderate lead-
ers, particularly Arabs, risk discrediting themselves
with repeated and desperate calls for US support. By
demonstrating their dependence on the United. States,
they highlight the failure of their economic and
security policies and may promote popular opposition
to close US ties. Under such circumstances, continued
Libyan pressure, mixed with blandishments, could
prompt some pro-US governments-such as Sudan's
and Tunisia's-to adopt a more nonaligned posture.
81. Qadhafi's continued disregard for international
law and convention-reneging on international agree-
ments, abusing diplomatic privilege for terrorist pur-
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poses, and blatant use of violence against opponents- tween US rhetorical criticism of Qadhafi's behavior
undermines international norms of behavior and may, and actual US policy toward him also undermines US
over time, encourage other states or groups to do credibility on this issue.
likewise. The international perception of a gap be-
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ANNEX
Chronology of Libyan Troublemaking, 1980-84 2
1984
November Egypt: President Mubarak announces that four assassins sent to
Egypt by Libya to kill former Libyan Prime Minister
Bakush have been arrested and forced to send fake
pictures to the Libyan embassy in Malta showing Ba-
kush apparently dead. Official Libyan press sources
then claim Bakush had been executed by suicide squads
sent abroad "to liquidate enemies of the revolution."
September Italy: A Libyan exile found gagged and strangled in a Rome
hotel had been the subject of Libyan requests for
deportation to Libya.
Bangladesh: Libyan-sponsored coup plotters arrested in Bangladesh.
August United One of six Libyans awaiting trial for March 1983
Kingdom: bomb attacks in London found shot to death in a
London apartment. The victim may` have been si-
lenced by the Libyan Government.
Belgium: A bomb wrecks a car parked in front of the Zairian
Embassy in Brussels.
July Belgium: A bomb exploded in the Brussels office of Air Zaire.
Red Sea: Red Sea and Gulf of Suez mined by Libya, damaging
18 merchant ships of varying nationalities.
Greece: Two Libyan students found murdered in their apart-
ment had .been beaten, gagged, and ..strangled before
being shot twice in the back, in a crime reminiscent of
Libyan killings of anti-Qadhafi students in 1980-81.
June Greece: Anti-Qadhafi Libyan editor of an-Ara b newspaper in
Athens killed by two men on a motorbike.
A Libyan-born citizen known to distribute anti-Qa-
dhafi literature at his store shot by a Libyan employee
of Libyan Arab Airlines.
May Libya: Norwegian merchant ship seized in Tripoli, crew
accused of spying; released only after fine paid and
one crewmember had died while being interrogated.
Jana, the official Libyan news agency, announces "the
Libyan masses have decided to form suicide comman-
dos to chase traitors and stray dogs wherever they are
and liquidate them physically."
2 The incidents in this chronology are believed to have been sponsored by the Libyan Government,
although firm evidence is not available for some of the incidents, particularly bombings. Attacks against the
Libyan Government by its opponents are not included.
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April United A bomb hidden in an unclaimed suitcase probably
Kingdom: unloaded from a Libyan airliner explodes at London's
Heathrow Airport, injuring 25.
British policewoman killed and 11 anti-Qadhafi dem-
onstrators wounded by gunfire from Libyan People's
Bureau in London. After a siege, British authorities
find weapons and spent shell casings in the vacated
embassy.
Libya: A number of British subjects in Libya arrested on
trumped-up charges as hostages in order to pressure
British Government during siege of Libyan People's
Bureau in London.
March Zaire: Two bombs damage government buildings in Kinsha-
sa. Two killed, six wounded. Third bomb defused.
Central French airliner bombed in Bangui; 25 passengers
African injured.
Republic:
United Four bombs explode in London and Manchester near
Kingdom: homes of Libyan exiles or at businesses frequented by
Sudan: A Libyan TU-22 bomber strikes Omdurman, site of a
radio transmitter used by anti-Qadhafi oppositionists.
February Libya: Following annual Libyan General People's Congress,
the Libyan Revolutionary Committees announce that
all Libyan exiles must return to Libya or face "the
death penalty."
Demostrators set fire to the Jordanian Embassy in
Tripoli, destroying building but causing no personal
injuries.
Congo: Chadian dissidents ready to negotiate with Govern-
ment of Chad threatened in Brazzaville.
January Central Attempted bombings of a French school and French
African business in Bangui.
Republic:
them. Over 25 people injured. Three other bombs
.defused. Nine Libyan suspects arrested.
Zaire: Bomb damages French hotel in Kinshasa.
Suitcase from Soviet airliner blows up at Kinshasa
airport.
1983
September Italy:
August Upper Volta
(now
Burkina):
Four Libyans claiming to be seamen are arrested in
Rome : while following the US Ambassador's motor-
cade.
Libya gives material support to coup leaders.
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July Chad: Libya invades Chad for the second time. Occupation
continues into 1985.
June West Eight resident Libyan students, all members of an
Germany: anti-Qadhafi group, complain Libyan agents are ha-
rassing and threatening them.
February Libya: General People's Congress warns all Libyans in exile to
return home or face "the anger of the Libyan people."
1981
November Sudan: Several bombs explode near government installations
in Khartoum.
October Sudan: Planned assassination of visiting Chadian official, Hus-
sein Habre, fails when hit team surrenders.
Egypt: Two bombs explode in luggage being unloaded from a
plane coming from Libya via Malta.
August Libya: Two Libyan.SU-22s that fired at US Navy F-14s over
Gulf of Sidra shot down.
June Sudan: Bomb explodes in front of Chadian Embassy in Khar-
toum.
February Italy: Libyan gunmen open fire on passengers arriving at
Rome's airport on a flight from Algiers. Prominent
anti-Qadhafi exile was the target.
November United Anti-Qadhafi Libyan student brutally murdered in
Kingdom: London.
Two children of an anti-Qadhafi Libyan poisoned
with peanuts containing thallium.
October Chad: Occupying Libyan forces attempt to force a Libyan-
1980- Chadian union.
November
1981
October The Gambia: Libyan subversion causes break in relations. Senegalese
troops intervene under a mutual defense treaty.
United States: Anti-Qadhafi Libyan student shot in Fort Collins,
Colorado, losing his right eye. The Libyan-hired assail-
ant, an ex-Green Beret US citizen, is in jail. This is the
only known instance of a Libyan operation successful-
ly carried out inside the United States.
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June Italy: Anti-Qadhafi exile wounded in Rome.
Libyan exile killed in Milan within hours after expira-
tion of a deadline set by Qadhafi for all Libyan exiles
to return home.
May Italy: Libyan exile shot at: in Rome. The arrested Libyan
gunman says he was sent by Libya "to,kill an enemy
of the people."
Libyan businessman found strangled to death in
Rome.
Libyan exile killed in Rome by two gunshots in the
head.
Greece: Libyan exile killed in Athens, his throat slit.
West Libyan exile gunned down in Bonn.
Germany:
April United Libyan lawyer shot and killed in London.
Kingdom: Two gunmen kill an anti-Qadhafi Libyan journalist.
Italy: Well-known Libyan businessman killed. The arrested
assassin says the victim was an enemy of Qadhafi.
February Libya: Tunisian.and French Embassies in Tripoli sacked and
burned by a mob while Libyan authorities stand by
idly.
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