SOVIET SECURITY POLICY TOWARD AUSTRIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP07C00121R001000700001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
An Intelligence Assessment
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Toward Austria
Soviet Security Policy
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Toward Austria
Soviet Security Policy
This paper was prepared by I the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Regional Policy Division, SOV
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Top Secret
SOV 88-10057CX
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Soviet Security Policy
Toward Austria 25X1
security interests.
Key Judgments The Soviet Union under Gorbachev has modified its policy toward Austria
Information available as part of a larger effort in Western Europe to demonstrate new flexibility
as of 20 July 1988 and cooperation in foreign policy. Although the Soviets continue to hold
was used in this report.
Austria to a high standard of neutrality on sensitive bilateral issues-such
as Vienna's cooperation with the European Community (EC) and its
acquisition of guided missiles-they appear to be exploring potential
political and economic benefits they might gain from Austria's increased
cooperation with the West. Moscow's policy reflects the tension between its
desire to show greater tolerance on these issues and an interest in
maintaining a restraining influence on Austrian policies affecting Soviet
The Soviets view the status of Austria-together with that of other
European neutrals-as one indicator of whether the postwar "correlation
of forces" between East and West is being maintained. Austria, in
particular, poses certain challenges to Soviet security interests. The Soviets
see it as a potentially destabilizing influence on the East Europeans-
particularly the Hungarians, who tend to view Austria as a political and
economic model.
In the Soviet view, this Western bias, combined with Austria's
strategic location, makes it unlikely that Austrian territory could remain
outside a NATO-Pact war.
The Soviets work both directly and through their East European allies in
Austria to pursue broader security interests in Europe. Austria's benign
operational atmosphere is particularly important to the Soviets for the
acquisition of restricted high technology and for the staging of intelligence
operations targeting third (Western) countries. The Czechoslovaks and the
Hungarians are the most effective surrogate representatives of Soviet
security interests in Austria: both countries have aggressive programs to
acquire science and technology equipment and information.
As the Soviets continue to engage Western Europe on political, economic,
and security matters, they will promote relations with smaller countries
like Austria to demonstrate how cooperative relations could develop under
Gorbachev's concept of a "European house." Thus, Moscow will publicly
emphasize the closeness of bilateral ties (as witnessed by the current,
unusually large number of high-level exchanges). Nevertheless, the Soviets
will continue to press the Austrian Government-quietly, if possible-to
prevent it from taking actions on key issues that go further than Moscow's
tolerance (and security interests) will allow.
Top Secret
SOV 88-10057CX
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Soviet Use of Surrogates
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The Austrian Communist Party (KPOe) 4
Soviet Acquiescence on the Current Austrian Path: How Much Leeway? 10
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Scope Note This paper examines how Austria fits into Soviet security perceptions of
Western Europe. It describes and analyzes the strategic opportunities and
constraints Austria provides for Soviet policies toward Western Europe in
both peacetime and in the event of a crisis or war. The paper focuses on the
security area and on issues relating to Soviet security concerns; broader
political, economic, and cultural relations between the two countries are
treated only to the extent that they bear on the security issues. 25X1
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Soviet Security Policy
Toward Austria
Soviet relations with European neutrals appear to be
most strongly influenced by their geographic location.
This is reflected in Soviet treatment of Finland versus
Sweden in Northern Europe and of Austria versus
Switzerland in Central Europe: in both cases the first
country clearly occupies the more sensitive territory in
Soviet security calculations. Indeed, Finnish and Aus-
trian security and economic policies are given more
careful scrutiny-and more pointed commentary-by
Soviet officials than those of all other European
Soviet public writings on the concept of neutrality
correspond in many aspects to traditional Western
ideas of neutrality. The Soviets, for example, confirm
the traditional view that a neutral state has the right
to use armed force in self-defense and that a neutral
must remain impartial and unaligned militarily both
in peacetime and in the event of a war between other
states. Moreover, Soviet unclassified literature de-
clares that the air, water, and territory of a neutral is
"inviolable" and may not be used in a theater of
The Soviet View of the European Neutrals
neutrals.
rope.'
oscow in
particular views the status of Austria, Sweden, and
Yugoslavia as a key indicator of whether or not the
"correlation of forces" in Europe is being maintained.
The Soviet leadership would view close association by
any of these countries with NATO as indicative of a
fundamental change not only in these countries' atti-
tudes but, more important, in NATO's attitude and
willingness to accept the postwar status quo in Eu-
role models for other West European countries.
The Soviets do not consider individual European
neutrals as military threats. Nevertheless, Moscow is
sensitive to these countries' security positions because
it regards the neutrals as swing players in East-West
security dialogues and, in certain cases, as behavioral
Austria's Importance to Soviet Security in Europe
On purely military grounds, Austria's strategic loca-
tion in Central Europe makes it the most important
neutral in Soviet security calculations.' This loca-
tion-directly between NATO and Warsaw Pact
he Soviets consider it less likely that
NATO forces would use Finnish territory in a NATO-Pact war.
case, consider Sweden a more conclusive indicator.
' The Soviets almost certainly consider a change in Sweden's
relationship with NATO as a more realistic (albeit remote) possibil-
ity than a comparable change in Finland's status and thus, in this
military operations (TMO).
The Soviet concept of neutrality appears to place a
special emphasis on the responsibilities of neutral
countries in international political, security, and eco-
nomic forums. Particularly since the late 1950s, the
Soviets appear to emphasize the neutral's right (in
some writings, duty) to play an active role in the
promotion of what in effect is the Soviet definition of
world peace. This idea of the neutral as a promoter
and team player in the Soviet pursuit of a world
peace plan (characterized by diminished Western
influence and "zones of peace" that enhance Soviet
security) allows Moscow to identify interests and
goals in common with the European neutrals. By
stressing the neutrals' role as promoters of peace-
the Soviets have repeatedly praised Finland for its
role in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE)-Moscow holds up the neutrals as
role models for peaceful coexistence of states with
The Soviets have tried for years to maintain a sharp
distinction between neutral participation in interna-
tional organizations-which should be encouraged-
and participation in economic or political groupings
"related to military blocs." They have particularly
objected to formal ties between neutrals and the
European Community (EC).
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nations-along with Austria's military weakness and
decidedly Western orientation lead Soviet military
planners to believe that Austria would almost certain-
Austria's Importance to Soviet Political and Economic
Goals in Europe
Although Austria's strategic location is of primary
concern to Soviet security planners, its role as a
conduit of advanced Western technology to the East
and its comparatively risk-free operational environ-
ment adds to its importance in Moscow's security
calculations. One clear benefit of the Soviet-Austrian
relationship from the Soviet viewpoint is the conve-
nience of Austria for intelligence operations. Austria's
central location and concept of neutrality-which
involves actively seeking to arbitrate and host interna-
tional forums-allow easy access to third-country
officials, information, and technology.
' Although Austria in 1987 agreed to tighten its export licensing
system to encompass items listed by the Coordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), it is too early to judge
the full consequences this action will have on technology diversion
through Austria.
Implementing Soviet Security Policy Toward Austria
of the 1955 State Treaty ~
Because Austria is considered a "permanent" neutral
(whose status has been confirmed by international
ratification), the Soviets use the language of neutral-
ity-specifically, references to the 1955 Austrian
State Treaty (see figure 1)-when discussing Austrian
security relations. They particularly use such termin-
ology to register strong approval or disapproval for
Austrian policies that affect key Soviet interests. For
example, Soviet officials applaud Austria's active
participation and support for various East-West meet-
ings as the exemplary role a neutral can play to
promote East-West cooperation. At the same time,
the Soviets criticize Austrian economic or security
policies that run contrary to Moscow's perceived
interests as violations of either the spirit or the letter
Although the USSR is, we believe, satisfied with its
overall relationship with Austria, Moscow keeps a
careful eye on Austrian defense and trade policies
that potentially could conflict with key Soviet inter-
ests. On such issues, the Soviets communicate their
concerns directly through government channels,
stressing their interest as a State Treaty signatory in
Austria's maintenance of untarnished neutrality. On
less urgent issues, Moscow's views are often conveyed
informally, through Soviet officials and Soviet media
"discussions" of Austrian neutrality issues.'
In addition to their direct communications with the
Austrian Government, the Soviets pursue their securi-
ty interests in Austria indirectly by attempting to
influence public opinion and by supporting third
parties who advance Soviet aspirations in Austria (see
inset on page 6). Soviet active measures activities
Although Austria maintains that its neutrality is self-defined (and
was unilaterally declared-not as part of the 1955 State Treaty), it
is very sensitized to Soviet neutrality arguments concerning its
policies and has tended to anticipate and to be prepared-to
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Soviet participation in international organizations
provides some access to Western technology and to
potential recruits who will return to sensitive business
The Austrian Government's desire to avoid confron-
tation with the Soviet Government and to be a neutral
meetingplace makes for a limited, rather unaggres-
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or government positions in their countries.
sive Austrian counterintelligence force. Espionage
against third countries or even against Austria it-
self-except for specified Austrian military facili-
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diplomatic personnel is limited.
The Austrian attitude toward managing the espio-
nage environment, as expressed by Interior Minister
Karl Blecha, is that Austria is powerless to act
against foreign spies "unless we seal our frontiers,
which is impossible for a travel-oriented country like
Austria. " Until July 1986, visas were not required for
foreign diplomats and officials, and thus there were
no Austrian records of the flow of Soviet personnel in
and out of the country. Even with the 1986 regula-
tions, however, Austria's ability to monitor travel by
in Austria in recent years have not proven a very
effective way to influence Western public opinion.
Indeed, the Soviet viewpoint has gotten better expo-
sure in the Austrian press through regular media
interviews of Soviet officials attending international
meetings in Vienna. The primary means the Soviets
have used to indirectly pursue security interests
in Austria has been to support the Austrian Commu-
nist Party (KPOe) and, with far greater success, to
coordinate policies with Austria's eastern neighbors,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
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State Treaty for the Reestablishment of an
Independent and Democratic Austria
Prohibition of Special Weapons
1. Austria shall not possess, construct or experiment
with-a) Any atomic weapon, b) any other major
weapon adaptable now or in the future in mass
destruction and defined as such by the appropriate
organ of the United Nations, c) any self-propelled or
guided missile or torpedoes, or apparatus connected
with their discharge or control, d) sea mines, e)
torpedoes capable of being manned, f) submarines or
other submersible craft, g) motor torpedo boats, h)
specialized types of assault craft, i) guns with a range
of more than 30 kilometers, j) asphyxiating, vesicant
or poisonous materials or biological substances in
quantities greater than, or of types other than, are
required for legitimate civil purposes, or any appara-
tus designed to produce, project or spread such
materials or substances for war purposes.
2. The Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right
to add to this Article prohibitions of any weapons
which may be evolved as a result of scientific
development.
The Austrian Communist Party (KPOe)
The Soviets have not had tremendous success trans-
lating their close political and financial connections
with the KPOe into effective influence on Austrian
policies. Despite substantial Soviet financial backing
since the Soviet withdrawal from Austria in 1955, the
KPOe has consistently received less than 1 percent of
the nation's vote in elections. Moreover, the number
of KPOe member deaths reportedly continues to
exceed the number of recruits.
Volksstimme regularly features Soviet-line articles
and serves as a mouthpiece for Soviet views on
Austrian policies. However, Volksstimme does not
appear to have the circulation or the prominence to
effectively influence Austrian policies or even broader
public opinion.
The East Europeans as Surrogates
The most effective surrogate representatives of Soviet
security interests in Austria are Czechoslovakia and
Hungary. The two areas in which these two countries'
surrogate roles can most clearly be identified are in
intelligence (both political and military) and trade. By
using the connections of their East European allies to
the Austrians, the Soviets are better able to gain
access to people, information, and technology, as well
as to share the costs and risks of intelligence and
technology diversion activities
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Despite its lack of political success, the financially
secure KPOe maintains a large permanent staff in
Vienna and publishes a daily newspaper, Volks-
stimme, which runs at a habitual operational deficit.
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the Soviet Union
under Gorbachev has authorized an expanded Hun-
garian opening to the West to gain better access to
Western technology, both legally and through diver-
' The practice of providing Soviet economic relief in exchange for
Hungarian technology diversions predates Gorbachev, however.
6 The Soviets have encouraged the Hungarians to pursue joint
ventures with the West as a way to acquire restricted technology
and, have set up a confidential joint
' The election of Kurt Waldheim as President of Austria after
disclosure of his activities as an Austrian officer during World War
11, and the subsequent placement of Waldheim on the US Watch-
list, has strained US-Austrian relations during 1987 and 1988.
IIGV.1
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Soviet Active Measures in Austria: Two Case Studies
in Disinformation
In recent years, Soviet active measures activities in
Austria have not proved very helpful in courting
Western public opinion. Two rather clumsy incidents
in the 1980s, in fact, cast more suspicion on Soviet
than on American activities:
? The "Democratization in Communist States" Ca-
ble. In early 1983 a forged document was sent to
several West European missions as well as to the
Austrian Chancellery in Vienna by someone-sup-
posedly an American official in Austria-who
claimed to want to show that "not all Americans
accept the methods used by our government." The
document was represented as an official State
Department cable ordering the acceleration of a
secret American plan to undermine Communist
authority in the Bloc by infiltrating East European
governments, academic institutions, and church or-
ganizations. According to the estimates of the US
Embassy in Vienna, the document never came to the
attention of the Austrian public.
? The Von Damm Forgery. In February 1985, copies
of a letter ostensibly written by US Ambassador to
Austria Helene Von Damm to Austrian Defense
Minister Frischenschlager were sent anonymously
to several Austrian news publications. The publica-
tion of this "secret" document, printed on US
Embassy stationery, precipitated much discussion
in Austria because it asked the Defense Minister to
make the Austrian air defense radar system avail-
able to NATO in the event of an emergency-a
request that would run contrary to Austrian neu-
trality. An analysis of the Von Damm signature and
an examination of the circumstances of the docu-
ment's appearance-including the "coincidence" of
its timing a few days before the first official visit to
the United States by an Austrian president-led to
a general consensus, even among the Austrian
publications involved, that the letter was indeed a
forgery.
The Soviets over the years have displayed the greatest
sensitivity-and exerted the greatest pressure-in bi-
lateral relations with Austria on issues that affect
their calculation of the East-West balance in Europe.
Ever mindful of Austria's historical political, cultural,
and economic ties to the West, the Soviets attempt to
hold Austria to a high standard of neutrality. Apart
from their concern over Austria's neutrality obliga-
tions, however, the Soviets attempt to block any
Austrian policy that conflicts with their security
interests. The resulting Soviet approach to Austria
has been a mix of neutrality arguments and power
politics.
Since Gorbachev's accession to power, the Soviet
Union has noticeably modified its approach to Aus-
tria, seemingly to narrow its focus and soften its
approach to sensitive neutrality issues. This behavior
toward Austria is part of a larger Soviet effort to
demonstrate to Western Europe that the USSR is a
European partner to be trusted in regional affairs as
well as in broader security matters.
The three issues in Soviet-Austrian affairs that have
repeatedly elicited the strongest Soviet responses in
the post-1955 period all affect Soviet national security
interests: Austria's right to acquire guided missiles, its
relationship with the European Community, and its
cooperation with Western efforts to restrict sensitive
technology transfers to the Bloc. The interplay be-
tween Moscow and Vienna on these issues reflects the
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policies that conflict with their interests.
underlying Soviet concern over an Austrian drift
toward the West and illustrates how the Soviets seek
to use the constraints of neutrality to check Austrian
press the issue with the Soviets.
The Missile Acquisition Issue
The issue of Vienna's right to purchase tactical guided
missiles stands out in Soviet-Austrian relations as a
symbol of the Soviet Union's ability to influence
Austria on defense and security matters. The nominal
issue is whether the 1955 State Treaty permits the
Austrian Government to acquire defensive surface-to-
air missiles (SAMs) and antitank guided missiles,
given a treaty prohibition (article 13) against the
acquisition of "any self-propelled or guided missiles or
torpedoes, or apparatus connected with their dis-
charge or control." Although several other countries
(including Finland, Hungary, and Italy) with similar
postwar treaty clauses have set a precedent by acquir-
ing defensive missiles, Austrian purchase attempts
over the years-until this year-have largely foun-
dered because of a combination of budget constraints,
Soviet resistance, and a lack of political resolve to
The Soviet Union has three principal concerns about
an Austrian acquisition of defensive missiles:
? A stronger Austrian defense is not in the Soviet
interest. If Austria developed a force structure that
made credible its professed defensive strategy of
delaying an invader long enough to make it imprac-
tical to attack through Austrian territory, Pact
military operations in Austria in the event of a
NATO-Pact war would be more difficult.
? Austrian missile purchases could increase the pros-
pects of defense collaboration between Austria and
NATO. The Soviets have argued publicly that there
should be no theoretical possibility of integrating
Austria operationally into the NATO air defense
system and have railed against alleged US plans to
accomplish such an integration in violation of Aus-
trian neutrality. The Soviet rationale appears to be
that, if Austria improved its defenses with antitank
and antiaircraft missiles, it might also take steps to
secure its border areas through cooperation with
West Germany or Italy.
? Because Austria has previously felt obliged to con-
fer with the USSR on the possibility of acquiring
missiles, the Soviets want to ensure that future
defense decisions taken by the Austrian Govern-
ment show the same deference to Soviet sensibil-
ities.
The Soviets appear to have narrowed somewhat the
terms of their opposition to Austrian missile acquisi-
tions-from flat rejection in the past to some indica-
tions at present that they may, instead, insist on some
control over which missiles the Austrians purchase.'
The Soviet public response to the 1987 decision by the
Austrian Government to purchase a limited number
of defensive missiles in 1988 has been restrained
compared with past years, with less frequent Soviet
press invectives on the issue and, for the most part,
Soviet warnings restricted to the possible purchase of
US systems.10 During Austrian Defense Minister Li-
chal's April 1988 trip to the Soviet Union, Soviet
officials expressed skepticism about Austria's need for
SAMs but offered no firm answer to an Austrian bid
to purchase Soviet SAMs in 1988."
Economic Issues: The EC and Restrictions on
Technology Transfer
Moscow has demonstrated some degree of sensitivity
on two economic issues: Austria's relationship with
the European Community (EC) and the strictness of
Austria's enforcement of Western restrictions on tech-
nology transfer. The Soviet Union has lacked econom-
ic leverage with Austria (and with other neutrals) in
action that almost certainly was taken with Soviet approval.
10 The warning against the acquisition of US systems has a
precedent in the early 1980s, when the Soviets pressured the
Austrian Government not to purchase the F-16 fighter interceptor,
which which the claimed would represent an offensive threat.
US Embassy reporting, based on discussions with Austrian
officials who have met with Soviet officials on this issue, indicates
that the Austrians believe that the Soviets in the end will not object,
once consulted, to a small missile purchase from the Bloc, a neutral
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lop Secret
History ofAustrian Attempts To Acquire
Guided Missiles
In 1955 the Austrian Government, like several other
European postwar governments, signed a treaty con-
taining a clause prohibiting the possession of any
"self-propelled or guided missiles." Unlike these
other governments (including Finland, Hungary, Ita-
ly, and Romania), however, Austria has not been
forceful, until recently, in its willingness to reinter-
pret the clause to exclude defensive missiles and thus
has not acquired a credible antitank or antiaircraft
capability.
The Austrians have broached the issue of missile
acquisitions with the Soviets several times in the
1980s. In 1981 the Soviet response was a strident
series of articles in the Soviet media and in Volks-
stimme, the Austrian Communist Party newspaper,
and a statement by Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov
that the terms of the State Treaty were "valid, plain,
and unalterable. " Again, in late 1985, Vienna tested
Soviet sensibilities by considering the purchase of
several hundred US Redeye short-range SAMs from
surplus US stocks. Soviet press reaction was initially
muted, a sign that some Austrian officials interpreted
as a new flexibility in Soviet policy toward Austria
under Gorbachev. By June 1986, however, after a
study of high-technology alternatives to guided mis-
siles (such as plasma and particle beam weapons) had
delayed a decision on the missiles, Austrian resolve
wavered amidst budgetary constraints and renewed
Soviet press criticism of a potential Austrian pur-
chase of SAMs as "an open attack" on the 1955
Treaty.
In 1987 the Austrian Government mounted its most
determined effort to date to acquire defensive mis-
siles. It touted strong, multiparty political support
for acquisition and couched the issue in practical
domestic and economic terms rather than as a legiti-
mate issue under the terms of the State Treaty. In
August 1987, Defense Minister Lichal publicly an-
nounced Austria's intention to purchase defensive
missiles in 1988 despite an anticipated defense cut-
back of 8 percent. During subsequent high-level Sovi-
et-Austrian exchanges, the Soviets have been re-
strained in their treatment of the Austrian
Government's stated plans, thus strengthening Austri-
an resolve and confidence in a purchase of defensive
missiles in 1988.a
Although an initial (probably small) purchase of
missiles would not enable Austria to slow a Pact
offensive, it would represent progress toward a-realis-
tic defense consensus in Austria. Vienna reportedly is
interested in the US Stinger missile but might opt to
make an initial purchase from the Soviet Union (or
other Bloc countries), from a neutral (possibly Swe-
den), or from multiple sources to lessen potential
Soviet objections.b With severe budget constraints
predicted for 1988 and the repeated record of the
Austrian Government moving toward-and then
away from-missile acquisitions, a militarily signifi-
cant purchase of missiles in the next couple of years
is unlikely.
a In April 1988 Austrian Defense Minister Lichal visited the Soviet
Union and specifically raised the issue of acquiring Soviet SAMs
with Soviet Defense Minister Yazov. According to subsequent
conversations that Lichal had with US officials in Vienna, the
Soviet reaction was uncertain, with officials indicating that a more
studied political response would be forthcoming later in 1988.
b Finland for years has had a policy of maintaining a mix in arms
purchases from both East and West
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contrast with its strong military leverage.'2 Austrian-
Bloc trade relations have not proved an attractive
alternative to greater Austrian cooperation with other
Western economies. Total Austrian exports to the
members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assis-
tance (CEMA) peaked at 17 percent of total Austrian
exports in 1975 and declined to 9.6 percent (32.9
billion Austrian shillings) of total Austrian exports in
1986. Austrian imports from CEMA, mostly fuel and
raw materials, also declined to 8.3 percent (33.9
billion Austrian shillings) of total Austrian imports in
Table 1
Decline in Austrian-
USSR/CEMA Trade Relations
Percent of total
(except where noted)
1986 (see table 1).
The Soviet approach to Austrian-EC flirtations over
the years has been to put the Austrians (as other
neutrals) on notice that the USSR would consider
membership in the EC or close cooperation with the
United States on COCOM export restrictions as a
breach of neutrality. The Soviets have publicly and
privately expressed concern over the specter of closer
Austrian economic ties to an organization they have
called "an essential basis for the Western military
alliance." At times the Soviets' expressions of disap-
proval have been emphatic: an Austrian official in late
1984 reported that the USSR had privately warned
Austria that close cooperation with US COCOM
restrictions would result in the doubling of the price of
Soviet natural gas for Austria and the cancellation of
two Austrian construction contracts for projects in
Eastern Europe.13
Nevertheless, Soviet economic pressure has not de-
terred Austria from pursuing an economic course that
increasingly parallels that of the EC and increasingly
cooperates with the West on technology-transfer re-
strictions. The Austrian Government in July 1987
publicly agreed to tighten its export licensing system
to encompass all exports of goods appearing on the
COCOM commodities list, including in-transit
12 Austria's stronger position in the economic sphere relative to the
security area is not suprising and, in fact, parallels the experience of
Bloc nations, which take advantage of better bargaining power with
the Soviets in economic matters while having less room to maneuver
in defense issues.
"Austria, however, has also used the excuse of Soviet pressure to
avoid policies that it found inconvenient for budgetary reasons.
1983
10.5
4.3
1984
11.6
5.0
1985
10.6
4.5
1986
8.3
3.0
Holdings of East European Debt
(Percent of debt owed to West that Austria holds)
1986 10.9
a During 1975-86 an average of 75 to 80 percent of Austrian
imports from CEMA countries were fuel and raw materials.
goods." Moreover, several Austrian officials have
publicly acknowledged Austria's deliberate move to
"participate in the substance of the EC," although the
decision to apply for formal membership will be taken
in 1989.15
14 This system is intended to address longstanding US complaints
about technology diversion through Austria in hopes of bringing it
to its goal, as articulated by Chancellor Vranitzky of "quasi-
COCOM" membership status. The new amendment attaches the
COCOM Dual-Use Technology List to the 1984 Foreign Trade
law, requires export licenses for all goods on the list, and replaces
the previous exemption for in-transit goods with an authorization
for Austrian Customs to control these items. Its success in slowing
restricted technology diversions through Austria may be limited by
Austria's ability to direct adequate resources to enforcement and by
COCOM members' willingness to request controls on goods being
reexported through Austria.
"One indicator of the visibi rty ot~ th E membership issue in
Austria is reporting by the US Embassy in Vienna that, during the
November 1987-February 1988 period, only six issues of Austria's
most respected daily newspaper, Die Presse, did not contain an
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lop secret
The Soviet Union under Gorbachev appears to have
reassessed its approach to Austria on these issues as
part of a larger attempt to demonstrate a cooperative
"new" spirit to West European governments. Mos-
cow's realization of the inevitability of at least some
Austrian trade and technology-transfer arrangements
with other Western democracies, combined with a
broader Soviet undertaking to engage those same
West European governments and multilateral institu-
tions (including the EC), appears to have contributed
to some modification of the Soviet stance with Aus-
tria. Thus, whereas in previous years Austrian discus-
sions of cooperation with COCOM restrictions have
elicited a swift and predictable Soviet rebuke, the
Soviets' rather muted reaction to Austria's 1987
tightening of export restrictions may reflect both a
judgment in Moscow that this legislation would have
only a marginal affect on its security interests and a
realization of the limits of its leverage with Vienna on
this issue.
The Soviets appear to regard the EC issue as more
central to their interests, and thus the tension between
Moscow's desire to appear flexible and its need to
maintain influence with Vienna on this issue has been
more apparent. On one hand, the Soviets have tried to
demonstrate flexibility in their statements on Austri-
an-EC ties by distinguishing between economic links,
which they indicate are acceptable, and political-
military links, which they still emphasize are forbid-
den by Austrian- neutrality. In that spirit, during a
July 1987 visit to Austria, Soviet Premier Ryzhkov
reportedly emphasized "understanding" of Austria's
expanded economic and scientific-technological ties to
its Western neighbors and completely omitted any
direct-reference to its policy toward the EC or to
COCOM restrictions (see figure 2).
.Nevertheless, as momentum has built in Austria in
-1987-88 toward an EC application, Soviet officials
have restated in rather strong terms their objections to
full membership and have increased pressure on the
Austrian Government to find an alternative solution
that will avoid the political-military obligations of
membership to which Moscow objects.16
"16 Soviet Ambassador to Austria Gennadiy Shikin, Foreign Ministry
Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov, and the Director of the Soviet
Institute of World Economics and International Relations Yevgeniy
President Waldheim, July 1987
Soviet Acquiescence on the Current Austrian Path:
How Much Leeway?
Despite Moscow's more moderate response to recent-
Austrian assertions of independence on several'impor-
tant issues, the Soviets' positions clearly are note -
infinitely elastic. Although it appears that over the
years the gray area in Soviet thinking between accept-
able and unacceptable Austrian behavior has grown,
certain criteria have remained unchanged: Austria's
accession to the NATO alliance would be viewed by'
Moscow as an intolerable shift both in the correlation
of forces and in NATO's attitude toward the status
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I up JCCICI
quo in Europe. Moreover, the Soviets will continue to
oppose any Austrian actions that, in their view, call
The Soviets also face constraints in their ability to
work through East European surrogates in Austria:
the benefits of increased Austrian-East European
contacts must be weighed against the risks that
into question the East-West balance in Europe
Regarding the ongoing Austria-EC issue, the Soviets
probably are skeptical about the likelihood of a
satisfactory (from their view) bilateral Austrian-EC
solution, given what they see as the increasing orien-
tation of the Community toward political-military
issues and given statements by EC officials that no
"special" individual memberships will be considered.
Since a "regular" application with attached Austrian
avowals of neutrality is unlikely to mollify Soviet
objections, Moscow's preferred solution may be a
larger "special" accord between the EC and the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), an organi-
zation that includes several European neutrals, in-
cluding Austria."
As the Soviets reevaluate the tone and, to some
extent, the substance of their relations with the West,
they must manage the tension between trying to
establish a political and economic climate that will
allow the Soviet Union to improve its ability to
develop and compete as a world power while main-
taining the Soviet system and Soviet security. Because
the Soviets have viewed Austria's balance between
East and West as one indicator of their security
position in Europe, they tend to view movement by
Austria toward closer cooperation with the West and
toward a stronger defense posture as an unwelcome
ability to use a heavy hand in pursuit of security
interests in Austria is increasingly constrained, how-
ever, by their limited leverage on Austrian domestic
policy and by their own desire to project an image of
moderation and flexibility in the West.
sufficient confidence at present in the ability of the
Hungarians to maintain this balance. Nevertheless,
Budapest's interests differ from Moscow's agenda in
certain respects, and thus there are limits to the
extent that the Soviets can achieve their goals work-
ing through the Hungarian relationship with Austria.
Because Austrian-Czechoslovak relations have tradi-
tionally been cooler than Austrian-Hungarian ties,
the Soviets also face constraints in their ability to
work through Prague.
The Soviet perception of what role Austrian territory
might play in a NATO-Pact war appears to have
remained fairly consistent over the years, in large part
because Soviet considerations are so strongly based on
the strategic location of Austria in Central Europe.
An improvement of Soviet-Austrian peacetime rela-
tions would probably not affect the Pact conviction
that Austrian neutrality would have to be violated in
the event of a war.
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It is unlikely that an Austrian purchase of defensive 25X1
tactical missiles would alter the Pact calculation that
operations in Austria would be necessary in the event
of war. Although Vienna's acquisition of a militarily
significant number of missiles-something that is far
from assured at this point-would indicate a stronger
domestic will to defend Austria and maintain territo-
rial neutrality in a war, the Austrians would have to
make major, sustained improvements in their ability
to deny the Danube Valley to either side in a conflict
before the Soviets would be likely to see Austrian
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'lop Secret
territory as less inviting for either NATO or Pact
forces. Moreover, the continuing Soviet mistrust of
Austria's will or ability to maintain neutrality in a
major European war would prevent prudent Pact
military planners from discounting this strategic terri-
tory.
As the USSR continues to engage Western Europe on
political, economic, and security matters, the Soviets
will promote relations with the European neutrals to
show other Western countries how cooperative rela-
tions could develop under Gorbachev's concept of a
"European house." Certain Soviet initiatives toward
Austria and other European neutrals can be
anticipated:
? Moscow will continue to challenge the Western view
that neutrality obligations extend only to security
affairs, and it will work to encourage the neutrals'
active support for Soviet-sponsored "zones of peace"
that would limit Western influence and promote
Soviet interests in various world regions.
? Moscow will continue to explore the benefits, as well
as the drawbacks, of Vienna's Western-leaning
tendencies.
? By seeking to establish a common "peace" interest
with the neutrals, Moscow will attempt to maintain
and improve the positive tone of its relations with
these countries as a more effective way to influence
their policies than the negative approach of past
years.
? Correspondingly, Moscow will try to avoid a nega-
tive campaign against any of Vienna's policies that
do not clearly threaten Soviet security interests.
Instead, the Soviets will work to increase Austria's
political and economic ties to the East so that
Vienna will consider greater cooperation with the
Soviets in its own interests.
? In public diplomacy, Moscow will continue to em-
phasize the role that small European states-specif-
ically neutrals-can play to promote East-West
cooperation.
? To some extent, the Soviets will try to use Austria as
a way to gain better access to other Western
countries, particularly in the economic area."
? Moscow will continue to hold up the Austrian
example as a possible behavioral model for other
nations, stressing its cooperative, rather than heavily
armed, approach to security.
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