THE SOVIETS IN MOZAMBIQUE: IS THE PAYOFF WORTH THE PRICE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP07C00121R001000690001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
The Soviets in Mozambique:
Is the Payoff Worth the Price.?
An Intelligence Assessment
SO v 88-10007X
February 1988/
Copy 330
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07C00121 R001000690001-3
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07C00121 R001000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
e?~rF L,II IUiaac "a 3ecrei
Intellh ence
The Soviets in Mozambique:
Is the Payoff Worth the Price?
This paper was prepared by ~ Office of
Soviet Analysis, with a contribution from the Office of
Leadership Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Regional
Policy Division, SOYA,
Secret
SOV 88-10007X
February 1988
9.5
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07C00121 R001000690001-3
The Soviets in Mozambique:
Is the Payoff Worth the Price? 25X1
Key Judgments The Soviets have been pessimistic for several years about Mozambique's
Information available ability to improve its economy and defeat the South African-backed
as of! February 1988 Mozambican National Resistance/RRNAM(11insur
ency 25X1
g
Moscow sees Mozambique as incapable of 25X11
making efficient use of economic or military aid. Soviet General Secretary
Gorbachev's speech during Mozambican President Chissano's visit to
Moscow in August 1987. made it clear that he holds the ruling party-the
Front for the Liberation of Mozambique FRELIMO responsible for
Mozambique's dismal performance. 25X1
Moscow is also concerned about Maputo's expanding ties to the West. The
Soviets apparently recognize that the only hope of revitalizing Mozam-
bique's moribund economy is Mozambique's continued access to substan-
tial Western aid. Maputo's extensive economic ties to the West, however,
are causing some strain in the relationship. Thus, although the Soviets have
not actively discouraged Mozambique, there are signs that they are
concerned about the potential political influence these links give to the
West. In addition, the Soviets take a dim view of Mozambique's small but
growing security relationships with Western nations,
Mozambique's security ties to the United Kingdom-
currently limited to London's promise in December 1987 of $900,000 in
nonlethal military aid and the training of 360 Mozambican Army person-
nel in Zimbabwe, which began in 1986, and a handful in the United
Kingdom-are the most significant military relationship Maputo has with
a Western nation.
Mozambique's military and economic weakness, Soviet pessimism about
the prospects for improvement in either situation, and Moscow's displea-
sure with some of Maputo's actions make Mozambique the African
Marxist client that the Soviets would most likely abandon were they to
abandon any of them. Nevertheless, despite the Soviets' misgivings about
the Maputo regime, they show no signs of giving up on their client. Instead,
the Soviets appear to be grappling with ways to keep Mozambique afloat
without having to throw too much more good money after bad. Although
military deliveries appear to have stabilized in 1987, they declined steadily'
from 1983 to 1986. In addition, Moscow supports the use of troops from
Tanzania and Zimbabwe as a means of improving the military situation at
minimum cost to the Soviets and their allies. The Soviets continue,
Secret
soy 88-10007X
February 1988
2tixI
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07C00121 R001000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
however, to be Mozambique's primary source of military assistance, and
military deliveries are Moscow's greatest source of influence. The Soviets
delivered $155 million worth of military equipment to Mozambique in
1986.
The broad range of Soviet interests in southern Africa provides the
motivation for Moscow to continue its aid to Mozambique. Moscow's
involvement serves to maintain an international perception of the USSR as
a key player in the region. the Soviets
in the mid-1980s viewed southern Africa as a region of significant strategic
importance because of its geographic position and richness in natural
resources. the Soviets hope, over the
longer term, to improve their position to take advantage of developments in
South Africa and eventually to promote a pro-Soviet regime there.
Mozambique's location in the region-bordering South Africa and Zimba-
bwe with a coastline on the Mozambique Channel giving access to the
Indian Ocean-helps make it an attractive client in support of these goals.
Moscow's goals in southern Africa also include consolidating the regime of
its primary Marxist client, Angola, bolstering the capability of the other
Frontline States-Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Botswana, and Zambia-to resist
South Africa, and improving its own credentials as an opponent of Pretoria
and its apartheid policy. The lion's share of Soviet support to the Frontline
States does go to Angola and Mozambique, but the Soviets are also the pri-
mary military supplier to Tanzania and Zambia, and have made offers of
military equipment to Zimbabwe and Botswana.
The negative consequences of cutting off support for Mozambique proba-
bly will also serve to maintain Moscow's commitment. A Soviet withdrawal
would raise doubts among some other Third World clients about Moscow's
reliability, and these doubts could lead them to look elsewhere for support.
A cutoff would certainly set back Soviet efforts to improve relations with
nonclient Frontline States, who would see such a move as a betrayal of
their struggle against apartheid in South Africa. In addition, the Soviets
would not gain much in the West by withdrawing their assistance from
Maputo because Moscow's role in Mozambique has not been a major point
of contention in East-West or Soviet-Third World relations.
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07C00121 R001000690001-3
secret
Maputo's dependence on Soviet military aid to stave off RENAMO, the
limited opportunities for Western military assistance, and Moscow's
reluctance to abandon Mozambique will ensure that the relationship
between them remains close and may even force Chissano toward closer
cooperation with the USSR. Nonetheless, we believe Mozambique's
inability to absorb major new weapon systems will discourage the Soviets
from making significant increases in military aid unless Maputo's security
situation deteriorates. Even in this event, deployment of Soviet combat
troops is highly unlikely but Moscow would probably encourage other
Frontline States and Cuba to increase their military support for Maputo.
Cuba currently has 800 military advisers in Mozambique.
Mozambique's growing relationships with Western countries will continue
to be a cause for concern in Moscow. Economic commitments at home and
Maputo's ineffective use of Soviet economic aid, however, will undoubtedly
keep the Soviets from trying to compete with the West in providing aid to
Mozambique. Because Maputo's inability to pay for oil will probably
discourage Western suppliers, Moscow's willingness to supply Mozambique
with oil on credit will continue to give the Soviets significant economic
leverage. In 1985 the Soviets disbursed $55 million in economic aid, and
East European nations provided an additional $25 million. In addition,
although Maputo's inability to absorb or pay for Western arms will
continue to limit its military ties to Western nations, Mozambique will
probably continue its security relationship with the United Kingdom
despite Soviet objections.
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07C00121 R001000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07C00121 R001000690001-3
JOIa Vt
Moscow's Current Assessment of Mozambique
Soviet Military Presence
Encouraging Frontline States To Help 6
Concern About Western Military Involvement 7
Economic Involvement: Moscow's Weak Link 12
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07C00121 R001000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07C00121 R001000690001-3
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07C00121 R001000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
Secret
The Soviets in Mozambique:
Is the Payoff Worth the Price?
Moscow's Current Assessment of Mozambique
Moscow sees
Mozambique as a country that is unable to make
efficient use of economic or military aid and lacks a
strong commitment to socialism.
the Soviets have been pessimistic for
several years about the ability of the Mozambican
military to make progress against the Mozambican
National Resistance (RENAMO) and the prospects
for the economy to show any improvement. Other
Soviet officials reportedly have referred to the eco-
nomic situation as "catastrophic."
Soviet pessimism about Mozambique remains strong.
Soviet propaganda, which used to praise Maputo's
socialist orientation, now usually plays down Mozam-
bique's ideological status. During the visit of Mozam-
bican President Chissano to, Moscow in August 1987,
Gorbachev publicly criticized the performance of
FRELIMO, seeming to attribute Mozambique's poor
economic performance and failure to quell the
RENAMO insurgency to FRELIMO's incompetence.
Soviet diplomats have on occasion mentioned to their
US counterparts the possibility that FRELIMO will
have to negotiate with the RENAMO insurgents,
showing a lack of confidence in Maputo's chances of
defeating the rebels.
The lack of Soviet confidence in Mozambique's mili-
tary and economic stability and in its political com-
mitment makes Mozambique the African Marxist
client that the Soviets would most likely abandon
were they to abandon any of them. Why have the
Soviets not abandoned Mozambique?
Soviet relations with FRELIMO proceeded at a low
level until Mozambique became independent-under
a FRELIMO government-in 1975. Although Mos-
cow was one of the first nations to endorse
FRELIMO's struggle against the Portuguese, 25X1
FRELIMO looked to the Chinese as its main politi-
cal model and source of military and economic
support, receiving little aid from the USSR.
FRELIMO leaders saw the Chinese experience of
guerrilla warfare and collectivization in liberated
rural areas as more relevant to FRELIMO's needs
than the Soviet model.
Nonetheless, after independence the Soviets were
fairly successful in their attempts to win influence
with FRELIMO and encouraged its anti-Western
tendencies by providing arms and building political
ties. The USSR signed a treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation with Mozambique in March 1977 that
established a framework for close political, military,
and economic relations. At its third Congress in
February 1977, FRELIMO declared itself a Marxist-
Leninist "vanguard" party, reaffirming "scientific
socialist" principles as essential for the tasks facing
Mozambique. This ideological development was wel-
comed by Moscow, which maintains that the forma-
tion of such a party is necessary for the development
of genuine socialism.
25X1
25X1
The Soviets have a broad range of interests in south-
ern Africa that motivate them to continue their 25X1
support to Mozambique. We believe that Moscow's
short-term goals in southern Africa are to consolidate
pro-Soviet Marxist regimes, to bolster the capability
of the Frontline States-Angola, Mozambique, Tan-
zania, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana-to resist
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 R001000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
Secret
South Africa, and to improve its own credentials in
the Third World as an opponent of Pretoria's apart-
heid policy. The Soviets want to maintain their pres-
ence in the region and may want greater access to air
and naval facilities. They have some air and naval
access in Mozambique, and more extensive access in
Angola-their most important client in the region-
but have no exclusive basing rights in either country.
Mozambique's location-next to lucrative fishing ar-
eas in the Mozambique Channel and with a common
border with South Africa-remains a strong induce-
ment for continued Soviet involvement. Mozam-
bique's mineral resources include strategically impor-
tant tantalum and titanium-which are used in
submarine and aircraft construction-as well as
chrome, cobalt, and manganese. The Soviets are no
doubt also intrigued by the potential of exploitable oil,
natural gas, and coal deposits in Mozambique. A
major Soviet long-term goal in the region is to control
the region's natural resources,
Concern about the consequences of cutting off support
for Mozambique is also likely to maintain Moscow's
commitment. The Soviets most likely would lose
credibility in the Third World if they were to abandon
an ally in such dire need. Soviet efforts to improve
relations with the nonclient Frontline States would be
especially affected because these states would see
Soviet abandonment of Mozambique as a sign of
decreasing Soviet support for opposition to South
Africa. Tanzanian and Zambian officials recently
expressed concern that Moscow's commitment to
opposing Pretoria is weakening, according to
the US Embassy in London.
Western nations would almost certainly be able to
expand their influence in Mozambique, and the Sovi-
ets would lose Third World support for their positions
on East-West and regional issues. In addition, the
Soviets would stand to gain little politically in the
West by withdrawing their assistance from Maputo
because Moscow's role has not been a point of major
contention in East-West or Soviet-Third World rela-
tions.
Beyond Mozambique, the Soviets have a wide range
of other interests in southern Africa. Although Soviet
influence in Mozambique will not directly aid many
of these goals, Moscow's involvement there serves to
maintain its visibility in the region and the interna-
tional perception of Moscow as a key player in the
region. the
Soviets in the mid-1980s viewed southern Africa as a
region of significant strategic importance because of
its geographic position and richness in natural re-
sources. over the
longer term, the Soviets want to improve their position
to take advantage of developments in South Africa
and eventually to promote a pro-Soviet regime there.
Soviet interest in southern Africa is also demonstrated
by Moscow's attempts to strengthen relations with all
the Frontline States that are not now Soviet clients-
Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia, and Botswana-to
expand its presence and influence in southern Africa.
It uses military relationships as the primary means of
gaining additional entree into southern Africa and in
the last year has supplied or offered arms to all the
Frontline States. In addition to their important mili-
tary relationship with Mozambique and Angola, the
Soviets are negotiating a major arms deal with Zim-
babwe, signed an arms deal with Tanzania in Decem-
ber 1986 that includes arms to be used in Mozam-
bique, offered helicopters to Botswana in the spring of
1987, and
Given Moscow's stated unhappiness with Mozam-
bique's performance and the bleak assessments of its
prospects on the one hand, and the clear opportunities
that close ties to Mozambique present on the other,
the Soviets appear to be grappling with ways to keep
Mozambique afloat without having to throw too much
more good money after bad. Under Gorbachev, the
Soviets seem to be reassessing more generally their
25X1
25X1
2bAl
25X1
25X1
25X1
L0A]
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
secret
methods of handling their economically burdensome
Third World clients
are pressing Vietnam and Cuba to
adopt economic reforms similar in some cases to those
being tried in the Soviet Union. Although Moscow
has never abandoned any of its Marxist allies, no
matter how economically incompetent, it now seems
more reluctant to sharply step up economic aid to
them or take on any new poor Third World clients and
apparently accepts the need for some of its Third
World allies to expand their economic ties to the
West.
The Soviets appear to be trying to stabilize Maputo's
military and economic situation by continuing aid but
are limiting the amounts where possible. Despite
Mozambique's repeated requests, for example, they
have not significantly increased military assistance or
economic aid for the past four years,
probably because of their
doubts about the ability of the Mozambican military
to absorb and use additional equipment. Nonetheless,
we believe Moscow remains committed to helping
Mozambique, and in fact the level of arms deliveries
may even rise slightly in the next two to three years
because Mozambique will probably need to replace
trucks, small arms, artillery, and other supplies cur-
rently in its arsenal.
Military Involvement: The Ties That Bind
Moscow's first priority has been to provide sufficient
aid to keep FRELIMO in power and to keep the
20,000 RENAMO insurgents from making major
gains. This assistance has been the cornerstone of the
Soviet-Mozambican relationship and the primary
source of Soviet leverage in the country. Even so, the
Soviet assistance has not been able to turn the
Mozambican military into an effective fighting force
against RENAMO. One major reason for this is the
military',s poor discipline and morale. The US Embas-
sy reports many soldiers are remaining in garrison to
avoid combat, and defections and desertions are wide-
spread. In addition, inadequate training, inappropri-
ate equipment, and chronic resupply problems have
compounded Maputo's military problems. As a result,
RENAMO operates freely in many areas of the
country and is able to mount numerous and effective
hit-and-run attacks.
Soviet Military Presence. The Soviets began to pro-
vide arms to Mozambique immediately after it be- 25X1
came independent in 1975. In 1978, Soviet military 25X1
aid increased sharply and the Soviets established a
military advisory group (MAG), which grew to 800
men by 1984 and has remained almost constant over
the last three years. Maputo has repeatedly requested
increased Soviet arms in response to stepped-up activ-
ity by the RENAMO insurgents, but Moscow actual-
ly shipped fewer arms to Mozambique over the past
few years than it had in the early 1980s. Although
Maputo has tried to diversify its sources of military 25X1
aid since 1981, when then President Machel first
requested Tanzanian military aid, Mozambique has
remained largely dependent on Soviet military hard-
ware and advisory assistance (see figure 1).
Soviet advisers are present at the national and region-
al command, division, and brigade levels, closely Orly l
monitoring combat operations and suggesting courses '25X1
of action. There are also as many as 800 Cuban
military personnel and several hundred East Europe-
ans. Most of the advisers assist the Army. 25X1
The Soviet role in Mozambican military planning and
logistics for operations against RENAMO is signifi-
cant. Military reporting indicates that Soviet advisers
supervised Mozambican planning in January 1987 for 25X1
an offensive against RENAMO. In addition, the
USSR in late 1986 doubled-from two to four-its
contingent of Soviet-piloted and -operated AN-12
transport aircraft in Mozambique, possibly to trans-
port Mozambican troops for offensive operations in
1987.
Despite occasional rumors of Soviet participation in
combat, largely from 75X1
we have no confirmation that this 25X1
has occurred in the last several years. 25X1
Embassy report- 25X1
ing indicate Moscow's unwillingness to allow Soviet
advisers to participate in Mozambican combat opera-
tions. The preparations in January for an offensive
included replacing the MI-25 helicopters at Queli-
mane Airfield-often associated with combat against
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 R001000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
secret
Figure 1
Soviet Military Deliveries to Mozambique
Million 1986 US $
500 MI-8 helicopter
NA
I I I I I I I I I I I I
0 1975 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86
APC and
75-mm field gun
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
Figure 2
Selected Airfields and Ports in Mozambique
Airfield
Port
-?- Province boundary
0 150 Kilometers
0 150 Miles
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
RENAMO-with MIG-17 fighters (see figure 2). A
reliable source of the US defense attache reports.that
only Mozambican pilots fly the MIG-17 and MIG-21
fighters in combat missions. Mozambique's Air Force
Chief of Staff reportedly opposes having Soviets
undertake such sorties. There does not appear to be a
direct Soviet or Cuban role in ground combat.
Largely because of the Mozambican Armed Forces'
lack of success against RENAMO and inefficient use
of Soviet equipment, the Soviets have recently been
more restrained in their military support for Mozam-
bique. In the past they provided Mozambique with a
wide range of military hardware, including aircraft
and tanks, as well as other arms, transport vehicles,
and ammunition. In the last two years, however,
Soviet arms deliveries to Mozambique have been
relatively low, dropping from $330 million in 1985 to
$155 million in 1986. We believe arms shipments
remained at a low level in 1987. A Soviet official in
Maputo told his US counterpart in mid-1987 that
Moscow was not stepping up its military support
because Maputo's primary need is to make better use
of what it already has.
The Mozambican Air Force is reportedly unhappy
with the poor quality of Soviet aircraft, tactics, and
training, which undoubtedly limits Moscow's ability
to make the Mozambican military a more effective
fighting force. For example, Mozambican displeasure
with the low proficiency of pilots returning from pilot
training in the USSR and with the standoffish atti-
tude of Soviet advisers has contributed to Soviet
unpopularity in the Mozambican Air Force, according
Many Mozambican Air Force officers probably would
like to become more independent of the USSR, but
rumored attempts to purchase aircraft from the Unit-
ed Kingdom have not yet materialized, probably
because of Mozambique's lack of hard currency.
Mozambican Army personnel
Force's displeasure. For example, during an April
1987 visit by a Soviet military delegation, according
to the US Embassy in Maputo, Mozambican military
officials complained about the nature and quality of
Soviet training of Mozambican troops-which con-
sists largely of assistance to ground forces-and the
lack of Soviet supplies such as ammunition and boots.
Encouraging Frontline States To Help. As a way to
limit its own military assistance burden, Moscow has
encouraged Tanzania and Zimbabwe to send troops to
Mozambique by providing logistic and advisory sup-
port. Moscow's support to this effort has included
transporting Tanzanian forces to Mozambique, per-
mitting Tanzanian troops to use Soviet arms delivered
to Mozambique, and providing financial assistance,
In addition, the Soviets
have agreed to provide some $30 million worth of
arms to Tanzania for use in Mozambique. Bulgaria
and Cuba have provided small arms and supplies to
Tanzanian troops in Mozambique,
The Zimbabwean and Tanzanian presence has thus
far allowed the Soviets to avoid the difficult choices of
significantly increasing their military support to Ma-
puto, seeking the assistance of Cuban troops, or
abandoning the Mozambican Government if faced
with a significant deterioration in the security situa-
tion. (Moscow evacuated Soviet dependents from the
central provinces in March 1986 because of its con-
cern over the security situation, according to the US
Embassy in Maputo.)
Soviet relations with Tanzanian forces in Mozam-
bique have been somewhat strained. Although Tanza-
nian troops are allowed to use Soviet arms and
ammunition, the amounts of Soviet equipment made
Soviet advisers have voiced disapproval of Tanzanian
tactics, Zimbabwean
officials, on the other hand, have praised Soviet
planning of military actions against RENAMO, and
we see no signs of serious problems between Zimbab-
wean forces and Soviet advisers in Mozambique.
25X1
25X1
25X11
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
Secret
Concern About Western Military Involvement. Mo-
zambique's increasing security ties to the West-a
trend we expect to continue over the next few years-
are causing deep concern in Moscow. In December
1987, London promised Maputo $900,000 in non-
lethal military aid. The British began training Mo-
zambican troops in Zimbabwe in 1986-the are now
training 360 troops a year, according to the
The British also train a
handful of officers in the United Kingdom. Moscow
regards British involvement in training the Mozam-
bican Armed Forces-the most significant Western
security link to Mozambique-as a threat to its
position, They are
trying to nip these ties in the bud. During Chissano's
visit to the USSR in August 1987, the Soviets warned
him against military cooperation with the West,
according to the US Embassy in Maputo.
Political Ties
Relations With Senior Leaders. Moscow has fairly
smooth relations with most Mozambican leaders and
almost certainly has direct influence over some of
their actions. This seems to be achieved through its
role as the primary source of material aid rather than
ideological or personal influence, although many lead-
ers have traveled and studied in the Soviet Union and
claim some allegiance to Marxist-Leninist principles.
Although Mozambican officials are willing to work
with Moscow, some
leaders have repeatedly found fault with the amount
and quality of Soviet aid and are willing to act
independently of Moscow on major issues. Soviet
influence, moreover, is not strong enough to allow
Moscow to dictate policy to Maputo in most instances,
as shown by Mozambique's signing of the Nkomati
accord (see inset), its continued search for Western
military aid over strong Soviet objections, and its
refusal to fully support the Soviet position on the
causes of the late President Machel's fatal plane
Moscow continues to be resigned to the Nkomati
accord. The Soviets did not protest Maputo's January
1987 expulsion of six ANC leaders at Pretoria's
insistence, and a Soviet official in Maputo told his US
Embassy counterpart that same month that Moscow
The Soviets have exploited Maputo's heavy military
dependence on them by gaining air and naval access
in Mozambique. They use this access largely for
maintenance, refueling, and crew rest. Foreign bases
are prohibited by Mozambique's constitution, and 25X1
Maputo has never granted the Soviets exclusive
access to the port of Nacala, which they have asked
for occasionally.
Despite the ban on permanent basing, Soviet ships
and planes are permitted access to Mozambican
facilities. In 1985 two antisubmarine warfare aircraft
flew to Maputo, the first and only such deployment to
Mozambique. The aircraft did not fly any missions
during their two-week visit. Also, a wide variety of
Soviet naval warships often make port calls at the
Mozambican ports of Maputo and Nacala when
transferring between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.
In addition,
for supply flights to and
from Antarctica. Although these flights are of limited
strategic value, they highlight the importance of the
availability of Maputo airfield for Soviet transport
operations throughout the Southern Hemisphere.
25X1
25X1
25X1
believes Mozambique has no choice but to continue to
adhere to the Nkomati accord. Although the Soviets
oppose rapprochement between Maputo and Pretoria,
Moscow fears South African military intervention in
Mozambique and probably will try to minimize this 25X1
risk. Over the longer term, however, we expect Mos-
cow to continue attempts to minimize South African
influence in the region by encouraging Maputo to
eventually renege on the Nkomati commitment not to
aid the ANC.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
Secret
Under the terms of the Nkomati agreement, signed in
March 1984 between Mozambique and South Africa,
Pretoria agreed to stop supporting RENAMO in
return for Maputo's pledge to prevent African Na-
tional Congress (ANC) attacks against South Africa
from Mozambican territory. The accord also provid-
edfor a variety of forms of expanded economic
cooperation. South Africa and Mozambique continue
to publicly support the accord and generally adhere
to the security agreements, although Pretoria has
probably continued to channel small amounts of
covert aid to RENAMO and Maputo has probably
likewise helped the ANC.
The Soviets initially criticized the agreement and
played down its prospects for success, arguing that
South Africa could not be trusted to abide by the
agreement. Since then, however, Moscow appears to
have accepted the necessity for Maputo of an agree-
ment that held out the prospect of lessening the
security threat to the regime. Moreover, Maputo's
economic dependence on South Africa-for some
fuel, electric power, and hard currency earnings from
transport and labor services provides Pretoria with
a degree of access and influence in Mozambique.
Mozambique's willingness to reach agreement with
South Africa probably convinced the Soviets of the
limits of their influence, particularly over Mozam-
bique's relations with third countries.
Moscow is displeased with President Chissano's mod-
erate line on South African issues, particularly his
continued adherence to the Nkomati accord and his
contacts with the South African leadership.
President Chissano, who is considered less pro-Soviet
than some other FRELIMO leaders, probably was not
Moscow's preferred choice to succeed former Mozam-
bican President Machel. The Soviets, in the view of
many foreign observers, favored Politburo member
Ever since the death of Mozambican President Ma-
chel-when his Soviet-built and -piloted plane
crashed in October 1986-Moscow has attempted to
deflect criticism in southern Africa by maintaining
that a false radio beacon lured the plane off course.
Although the Soviet media made some accusations of
South African involvement in Machel's death and
harshly criticized South African actions before the
crash and during the investigation, probably to score
propaganda points in the region, official statements
by senior Soviet civil aviation officials placed no
blame for the 'false beacon." We expect the Soviets
to continue a public campaign to counter the conclu-
sions of investigators and of other African leaders
that pilot error and shoddy equipment led to the
crash. For its part, Maputo has walked the middle
ground on this issue, publicly stating that the evi-
dence has so far been inconclusive-it has criticized
the South African inquiry on the one hand but has
also mentioned errors on the part of the Soviet crew.
failed.
Immediate Soviet reaction to Machel's death in a
Soviet-piloted airplane crash was designed to stabilize
the situation and retain unity within FRELIMO.
Moscow's first statements after the crash urged unity
and stability, and the Soviets made no apparent
attempts to influence the succession process. Moscow
may have preferred to use its limited influence on
FRELIMO to ensure party unity rather than to try to
handpick a president, a move that easily could have
The Soviets continue to show strong interest in party
unity by supporting Chissano publicly even though
their endorsement is mixed with some criticism. After
he assumed the presidency, the Soviet press was quick
25X1
25X1
25X1,
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
to praise his leadership ability. In private
Moscow has been disappointed
with Chissano's acceptance of Western military aid,
his foreign policy opening to the West, and his
moderate line on South Africa. Nevertheless, during
Chissano's August 1987 visit to Moscow, even as the
Soviets publicly lectured him about FRELIMO's
shortcomings, the Soviet press reported that the atmo-
sphere of the talks was "warm and friendly," and
Gorbachev mentioned Chissano's previous visits to the
Other senior Mozambican leaders are generally con-
sidered more hardline Marxists than Chissano and
may be more susceptible to Soviet influence, although
all factions within FRELIMO are backing Chissano:
25X1
25X1
Soviet Union.
We believe Chissano will continue to work closely
with the Soviets-at least on the military front-but
his views of the USSR are more negative than those
of his predecessor. According to the US Embassy in
Maputo, he is suspicious of both the United States
and the USSR, once defining nonalignment as "a pox
on both the superpowers." Moreover,
Chissano is frustrated with the quality
and quantity of Soviet economic and military aid, and
supports a more active role for Maputo in the Non-
aligned Movement. In addition, according to the US
Embassy in Maputo, Chissano's public statements
have been much more evenhanded in their treatment
of the United States and USSR than those of Machel.
Moscow apparently wants to retain good relations
with Chissano-as it did when he was Foreign Minis-
ter-despite displeasure with some of his recent ac-
tions. Soviet press coverage of Chissano's visits to the
Soviet Union, for example, has generally been posi-
tive. Coverage of his trip to Moscow in November
1985 was generally upbeat, although the US Embassy
in Maputo reported angry disagreements with the
Soviets over Mozambique's UN votes on Afghanistan
and its continuation of the Nkomati accord with
South Africa. Press coverage of Chissano's trip to
Moscow in August 1987 was similarly positive despite
Soviet criticism of FRELIMO's performance in han-
dling economic problems and the RENAMO insur-
gency. The US Embassy in Moscow reports that a
Soviet Foreign Ministry official recently spoke favor-
ably of Chissano's attempts to improve the perfor-
? According to press reports, Politburo member dos
Santos has traveled frequently to the Soviet Union
and Bloc countries and maintains close ties to Soviet
and Bloc representatives in Maputo. As Economics
Minister in the early 1980s, dos Santos successfully
negotiated a number of trade agreements and other
economic treaties with the Bloc.
? Lieutenant General Guebuza, supported by radicals
in the military, strongly opposed the Nkomati ac-
cord with South Africa. Nonetheless, we believe he
is a Chissano loyalist whose possible Marxist lean-
ings are tempered by a strong sense of nationalism.
Although some Mozambican leaders-such as Polit-
buro member Veloso, Major General Gruveta, Chis-
sano confidant and Minister of Culture Honwana,
and Foreign Minister Mocumbi-are less positive
about the Soviets, these leaders are currently much
less influential than the pro-Soviet leaders. Veloso,
has had wide-
ranging differences of opinion with Soviet military
advisers. Gruveta in
February 1986 said he was dissatisfied with Machel's
relationship with Moscow and blamed-the Soviets for
Mozambique's economic problems and prolonged civil
war. Gruveta reportedly criticized Soviet personnel
for the privileged status they enjoy in Mozambique
and said other military officers shared his discontent.
mance of Mozambique's Armed Forces.
25X1
2bAl
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
VGL.I VL
Selected Senior Leaders
of Mozambique
Joaquim Chissano
President
(since November 1986)
Has consolidated control during past year by strengthening ties to
senior military and party officials ... popular, particularly in
southern Mozambique, stronghold of his own Shangan ethnic
group ... nationalist with strong socialist leanings ... a growing
"anti-Marxist" insurgency and a lackluster economy are his
primary concerns ... is pursuing two-track policy of reaffirming
ties to "socialist states" while simultaneously furthering relations
with the West ... cautious consensus builder, say US diplo-
mats ... long service as Foreign Minister (1975-86) has given him
considerable negotiating skills ... habitually tailors his remarks
to his audience, according to Embassy reporting... is head of
FRELIMO and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces ...
educated in Portugal and France ... talented linguist ... 48 years
Gen. Alberto Chipande
Minister of National
Defense
(since 1975)
Key Chissano ally ... popular in military ... FRELIMO Politburo
member ... favors strong political and military relationship with
Moscow, but for economic reasons also supports Chissano's efforts
to improve ties to West, according to Embassy reporting.. .
military training in USSR (1978-80) ... belon s to small, northern
Maconde ethnic group ... 48 years old.
Lt. Gen. Armando Guebuza
Minister of Transport and
Telecommunications
(since January 1987)
Second most powerful official in Mozambique ... FRELIMO
Politburo member ... extremely popular in party and military ...
long identified with FRELIMO's pro-Soviet faction, but now
appears to be aligning himself with nationalist element, according
to Embassy reports ... has good relationship with Chissano and
supports his efforts to improve relations with West, say US
diplomats ... current Cabinet post gives him responsibility for
revitalizing transportation routes, including economically and psy-
chologically important Beira Corridor ... formerly Interior Minis-
ter (1976-87) and Minister of State to the Presidency (1984-87) ...
was prominent guerrilla commander in independence war against
Portugal ... belongs to Macua, country's largest ethnic group ...
Marcelino dos Santos
Chairman, People's Assembly
(since January 1987)
Pro-Soviet ideologue and defacto head of FRELIMO's radical
faction ... senior member of Politburo ... garners considerable
respect as one of FRELIMO'sfoundingfathers, but his racially
mixed background has always limited his influence, according to
Embassy reporting... does not appear to be close to Chissano.. .
political importance is declining, according to US Embassy ... has
consistently opposed good relations with West ... married to white
9 X1
25X1
25X1
2bAl
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
secret
Party-to-Party Ties. The Soviets and East Europeans
have developed extensive party-to-party ties to
FRELIMO-formalized by the 1977 Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and
Mozambique and similar agreements with Bulgaria,
East Germany, and Cuba. Dozens of delegations from
the Soviet Union and Bloc countries visit Mozam-
bique each year. The program of interparty contacts
includes visits from CPSU representatives at the
Politburo, Central Committee, and provincial levels.
Although we have little information on their activi-
ties, Soviet Embassy personnel in Maputo almost
certainly have extensive contacts with FRELIMO
officials.
Moscow uses its influence at various levels of
FRELIMO to offer advice on how to deal with
Mozambique's problems and to organize the political
structure along Soviet-approved lines. Moscow also
uses these contacts to influence Maputo's position on
East-West and other issues.
East Germany advises FRELIMO on party organiza-
tion, according to the US Embassy in Maputo. An
East German delegation led by Politburo member
Kleiber-who is responsible for economic issues-
visited Maputo in March 1987. According to the US
Embassy, the delegation discussed governmental and
party cooperation told a US
official that the East Germans will soon send advisers
to work with the FRELIMO Central Committee and
Secretariat on organizational matters.
The Soviets maintain a close intelligence relationship
with Mozambique that includes KGB officials sitting
in Mozambican security service offices.
These links add marginally
d
to Mozambican depen
ency on Moscow, but give
Soviet intelligence officers additional opportunities to
influence Mozambican officials by providing misin-
formation and increasing Soviet access to Mozambi-
Cultural Links. Moscow uses its extensive cultural
ties to Mozambique to bolster the political relation-
ship by promoting positive Mozambican perceptions 25X1
of the USSR and its worldwide activities. Media
influence is one prominent method. There are 11
Soviet media personnel in Mozambique. The Soviet
news agency Novosti maintains offices in Maputo,
and another Soviet news agency, TASS, provides
articles to Mozambique's news agency, the Mozambi-
can Information Agency. In addition, the Soviets
place numerous articles directly in the Mozambican
press on international affairs-largely concerning dis-
armament and regional conflicts-highlighting the
positive role of the Soviet Union, according to US
Information Agency (USIA) reporting. The articles
also highlight Soviet aid to Mozambique.
Moscow, with its East European and Cuban allies, 25X1
sponsors an extensive scholarship program for Mo-
zambicans as a means of providing visible aid and
attempting to gain influence among future elites at 25X1
relatively low cost. Thousands of Mozambican under-
graduates and hundreds of graduate students have
studied in the Soviet Bloc, almost all on scholarships.
The programs appear to be proceeding vigorously,
with over 7,000 students currently studying in the
USSR, Eastern Europe, and Cuba, according to
USIA Approximately 850 students
departed Mozambique for training in the USSR and
Eastern Europe in 1986. Most students in the USSR
study technical and scientific subjects. Nonetheless,
the experience has not always had the desired effect,
and some returning students have expressed disillu-
sionment with Soviet-style Communism and the rac-
ism in the USSR, according to the US Embassy in
Maputo.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
CJCCI CL
Table 1
Soviet Bloc and Cuban
Presence in Mozambique
Diplomatic, Media, Military
and Cultural
Economic
Soviet
65 800
900
East European
30 500
1,175
Cuban
15 800
900
The extensive Bloc scholarship program adds to Mos-
cow's influence by increasing Maputo's dependence
on the Soviets for needed technical training.
Economic Involvement: Moscow's Weak Link
Moscow's economic program in Mozambique, while a
secondary factor in Soviet-Mozambican ties, is de-
signed to help keep the regime afloat, particularly in
terms of energy needs, while providing another avenue
for Bloc penetration. There are 900 Soviet economic
technicians-along with some 900 Cubans and 1,175
East Europeans-in Mozambique. The technicians
play a particularly important role in Mozambique's
fishing and mining sectors.
Although Moscow has long been one of Maputo's
largest donors of economic aid, Soviet Bloc aid ac-
counts for only about 20 percent of Maputo's total
aid, with the West-primarily France, Italy, and the
United States-supplying almost all of the rest. The
Soviets have not been willing to compete with the
West in the scale of their economic aid to Mozam-
bique, preferring to rely primarily on military aid to
sustain its influence. The Soviets probably are also
reluctant to sink resources-that they could put to
better use at home-into Mozambique's dismal econ-
omy. We believe Moscow will remain unwilling to
provide enough aid to significantly improve Mozam-
bique's economy or lessen Maputo's dependence on
Western donors (see tables 2 and 3).
Secret
Table 2
Aid Disbursements to
Mozambique in 1985 a
a Mozambique also receives $88 million in multilateral assistance.
b Mostly emergency food assistance.
Table 3
Economic Aid Deliveries
to Mozambique
Nonetheless, the Soviets seem determined to remain a
significant economic player in Mozambique. They
offered limited amounts of additional aid immediately
after Chissano's visit to the United Kingdom in May
1987, and signed three economic protocols that pro-
vided for $60 million in loans during Chissano's visit
to the USSR in August.
25X1
25X1
2bAl
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
Secret
70 percent of Mozambique's catch.
The Soviets supply a wide variety of goods and
technical assistance, including credit for. a large por-
tion of Mozambique's petroleum needs. In addition, in
1987 Moscow supplied $30 million worth of consumer
goods on concessional terms, and Mozambique and
the USSR in March 1987 signed an economic cooper-
ation accord including plans for new and continued
Soviet involvement in mining, oil refining and trans-
portation, and training for economic technicians. Mo-
zambique's fishing industry is particularly dependent
on Soviet assistance, and a joint Soviet-Mozambican
company-which depends on the Soviets for acquisi-
tion and maintenance of its ships-accounts for about
mineral sector.
Minerals are an important reason for Soviet economic
interest in Mozambique. In March 1987 Moscow
offered to buy Mozambican tantalum ore at twice the
world market price in return for continued mineral
rights in Zambezia Province, according to the US
Embassy in Maputo. The Embassy also has reported
that the Soviets may be using Mozambique's $1
billion debt to the Bloc as leverage for obtaining
greater involvement in more profitable projects in the
Clumsy Interference. Moscow's clumsy and tightfist-
ed economic approach toward Mozambique was a
major cause of Maputo's turn to the West for trade
and aid:
Moscow supported Mozambique's nationalization of
industry and service sectors after independence,
probably hoping it would increase Bloc influence.
Nationalization, however, contributed to a disas-
trous economic performance in the late 1970s,
which, along with effective RENAMO exploitation
of rural economic grievances, led FRELIMO to
allow limited privatization of agriculture and indus-
try and improve price and market incentives.
zambique's 1979 request for membership and still ern countries.
has not accepted Mozambique.
? Soviet and East European economic aid since 1975
has been small scale compared to Western aid or to
Mozambique's needs. In addition, before 1982 most
of the assistance required repayment in hard
currency.
? Mozambique has been dissatisfied not only with the
amount of economic aid but also with the overall
low quality of Soviet Bloc goods and advisers.
Moscow probably has exacerbated the latter prob-
lem by charging Maputo high prices for the services
of Soviet technicians. In addition, a Soviet-spon-
sored mining project was costly and provided few
economic benefits for Mozambique. Maputo has 25X1
also protested Soviet violations of bilateral fishing
agreements. Soviet physicians, moreover, have
earned poor reputations.
The Soviets appear to be acquiescing in Mozam-
bique's desire to seek expanded economic ties and
continued aid from the West.
Moscow accepts the fact that the Soviet
Bloc cannot provide the bulk of the economic aid
Mozambique requires and wants the West to assist
25X1
25X1
Mozambique. The Soviets, moreover, have apparently 25X1
learned from their mistakes in advising Maputo on
economic policy. They no longer seem to be pushing
Maputo to nationalize its economy further, and a
Soviet commentator last year referred to Mozam-
bique as a case where there were incentives to "use
private and foreign capital and encourage the mixed
sector in the interests of national development."
However, the Soviets' offer of limited additional aid
just after Chissano's visit in May 1987 to the United
Kingdom indicates their concern about the possible
political gains for the West resulting from closer
Mozambican economic ties to Western nations. Mos-
cow apparently prefers taking that risk, however, to
sharply stepping up its own support to Maputo. Soviet
Partly because of Mozambique's poor economic influence is probably weakest in the economic sector,
performance, the Soviet-dominated Council for Mu- and we do not believe Maputo would heed any advice
tual Economic Assistance (CEMA) rejected Mo- from Moscow to limit economic relations with West-
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
Secret
Bloc Assistance. Cuba and East Germany also make
significant economic contributions to Mozambique.
East Germany provides about $10 million per year in
aid, which supports a variety of economic projects,
including training for the fishing industry. Approxi-
mately 250 Mozambicans departed for Eastern Eu-
rope, mostly to East Germany, for technical training
in 1986, and over 2,000 Mozambicans-mostly sec-
ondary students-are studying in Cuba. In addition,
Cuba conducts projects in health care, education,
construction, agriculture, and fishing and mining,
according to the US Embassy in Maputo.
Mozambican dissatisfaction with the Soviets' heavy-
handedness, racism, costly military program, and
failure to provide adequate economic assistance has
probably kept their influence somewhat below what
might be expected, given the extensive military assis-
tance program and cultural, political, and economic
ties. Partially as a result of this dissatisfaction, the
Soviets have not had enough influence to dictate
policy to Maputo. For example, Mozambique believes
it must limit its ties to the ANC to avoid South
African retaliation and will probably continue to
proceed along these lines regardless of Soviet advice
or pressure.
The Soviets will probably continue to make some
effort to remain a significant economic player in
Mozambique, but their economic influence may wane
as Mozambique's desperate need for aid beyond what
the Soviets are willing or able to provide continues to
encourage a turn to the West. Economic aid to
Mozambique will remain a far lower priority for the
Soviets than military aid. A Foreign Ministry official
told a US official in Moscow early last year that,
without progress in Mozambique's war against REN-
AMO, economic aid would be superfluous. Moscow's
willingness to supply Mozambique with oil on credit,
however, will continue to give the Soviets significant
economic leverage in Mozambique since Maputo's
inability to pay will probably discourage Western
suppliers.
If, as we expect, the status quo holds over the next two
years, with the military initiative shifting from time to
time but neither the insurgents nor the regime gaining
a decisive edge, we believe the Soviets will continue to
help FRELIMO to hang on but will continue to look
for ways to limit their burden. Mozambique's continu-
ing need for military aid to stave off RENAMO and
the limited opportunities for Western military assis-
tance will, in our view, force Chissano toward closer
cooperation with the USSR-possibly including al-
lowing expanded Soviet military access rights. Chis-
sano probably will continue to look to both East and
West for economic and military aid but will be
cautious in pursuing initiatives to the West to avoid
alarming Moscow and pro-Soviet FRELIMO offi-
cials.
If Maputo's security situation worsens the next two
years, we believe Moscow is likely to respond by
increasing military aid and encouraging other Front-
line States-and Cuba-to step up their own military
support to Maputo rather than by direct Soviet
military intervention. The USSR's reluctance to get
involved in combat so far and its basic dissatisfaction
with Mozambique's performance and loyalty as a
"socialist" ally would, in our view, make the deploy-
ment of Soviet combat troops highly unlikely. Al-
though the Soviets have a substantial commitment to
Mozambique, this commitment does not appear suffi-
cient for Moscow to take on the risks and expense of
the extensive military campaign that would be neces-
sary to blunt a direct military threat to the regime's
survival-which could only come with extensive direct
South African support.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07000121 ROO1000690001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07C00121 R001000690001-3
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP07C00121 R001000690001-3