NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S02029R000300970001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 23, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Near East and
South Asia Review
NESA NESAR 87-024
23 October 1987
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Spurred by the debacle in Lebanon, Israel's political and military
leaders are reevaluating current defense concepts in formulating
future strategies. Whatever the outcome of the debate, Israeli
strategic thinking probably will continue to stress the offensive to
ensure a swift, decisive victory.
Jordan: In Search of a Modern Fighter Aircraft 11
King Hussein is deeply committed to modernizing Jordan's small
and increasingly obsolescent Air Force. The King prefers Western
aircraft, but without substantial financial assistance from the Gulf
states he will probably turn to the Soviet MIG-29 as Jordan's next
generation fighter.
The Syrian Army in Lebanon's Quagmire
The Syrian military is sinking deeper into the Lebanese quagmire as
it extends its presence into urban areas. The milit~y is coming under
increasing attack by various Lebanese groups, particularly as
tensions rise as the 1988 presidential election approaches
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NESA NESAR 87-024
23 October 1987
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Lebanon's Syrian-Supported Christian Renegades
The former leader of the Christian Lebanese forces militia Ili
Hubayqa continues to play a spoiler's role in Lebanese Christian
politics by virtue of his enduring relationship with Syria. Hubayqa's
role probably will increase in the coming months as he supports
Damascus's attempts to influence the outcome of Lebanon's
presidential election in 1988.
Lebanon: Sizing up the Militias
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As the central government's authority has declined, Lebanese
politics has become a patchwork of local power struggles. Militias
have become the major factor in this complicated welter of actors,
and to evaluate the militias we have devised a method of examining
them in terms of their military, social, and political environment.
Iraq-Libya: Modest Improvement in Relations
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Qadhafi's need to burnish his international and domestic image and
Saddam Husayn's desire to isolate Iran have induced Libya and
Iraq to improve their ties. Baghdad remains suspicious of Tripoli's
intentions, and relations could deteriorate if Libya sends Iran large
amounts of weapons to help in its pursuit of its war with Iraq.
Technology in Pakistan: Glitches and Glitter
Despite few resources allocated to research and development,
Pakistan has attained sophisticated technology, at least in defense-
related areas. Civilian technology has languished from a
combination of low education expenditures, high illiteracy rates, and
bureaucratic impediments to imported technology.
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South Asia-Japan: Growing Economic Relations
South Asian countries are increasingly looking to Japan for
financial and technical resources to assist in their economic
development. They want Japan to provide more concessionary
economic assistance, direct investment, and tariff relief for their
exports.
India-United States: Antinarcotics Cooperation
Prime Minister Gandhi has become more receptive to US
suggestions for increased cooperation on narcotics, but the Indian
Government will probably continue to be reluctant to involve US
private or governmental agencies in Indian domestic programs.
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India: Increase in Sikh Militancy
The Indian Government appears to be losing ground in its campaign
against Sikh extremists in Punjab, despite almost six months of
direct administration from New Delhi. The growing influence of the
militants underscores the ineffectiveness of New Delhi's policy and
its need to reevaluate its approach to Sikh grievances.
Recent public statements by Hizbi Islami faction leader Gulbuddin
and a conference of insurgent commanders in Ghowr Province
suggest the insurgents' military successes in 1987 have not made
them more tractable in seekingolitical settlement to the war.
Gulbuddin and the commanders offered Moscow terms that do not
allow a face-saving withdrawal.
The New Afghan Constitution: No Magna Carta
The new Afghan constitution unveiled by the Kabul regime on 15
July purports to guarantee human rights and provide for a transition
from the current one-party state to a multiparty system. In reality
the draft constitution perpetuates the dominance of the Afghan
Communists and is little more than a propaganda exercise.
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Afghan Paramilitary Forces: An Overview
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The Kabul regime deploys several paramilitary forces to help the
army maintain control in the countryside and to expand the
influence of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.
These units, however, have substantial problems and have not
achieved their political or military goals.
Some articles in the Near East and South Asia Review are
preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices
within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the view of a
single analyst; an item like this will be designated as a
noncoordinated view.
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Israeli Strategic Doctrine:
The Debate Continues
Spurred by the debacle in Lebanon, Israel's political
and military leaders are reevaluating current defense
concepts in formulating future strategies. The most
recent examination conducted by a Knesset
subcommittee, headed by Likud activist Dan
Meridor, provides insight into Israeli strategic
thinking and policy development. The Meridor
subcommittee focused on the military's wartime role,
debating how it would preserve its qualitative edge on
the modern battlefield and maintain its combat
effectiveness while reducing force size.
Whatever the outcome of the reassessment, Israeli
strategic thinking probably will continue to stress the
offensive to ensure a swift, decisive victory. A war of
attrition is viewed as unacceptable by Tel Aviv
because of the high human cost and the possibility
that it could lead to a widening of the conflict-either
by drawing in other Arab states or forcing superpower
intervention. The latest assessment comes during an
unprecedented period of stability and security for
Israel, despite the politically polarized electorate and
economic belt-tightening in every sphere including the
defense budget.
influence on the committee's outlook. Disillusionment
with the Lebanon war and the requirement for
increased efficiency made necessary by a reduced
defense budget have contributed to the need for a
fresh look at Israel's strategic doctrine. The focus of
the report is on a strategic concept for the future that
recommends stressing quality over quantity, while
reducing the size of the active and reserve forces. The
committee's recommendations reflect the new mood
in the military leadership that argues for a more
streamlined force, with less emphasis on the armor-
heavy doctrine prevalent since the 1973 Arab-Israeli
conflict.
Defining the Threat
Tel Aviv considers a unilateral Syrian attack as the
most likely threat to Israel's security in the next
decade. Key assumptions contained in the Meridor
report that reflect this view include:
? The peace treaty with Egypt will endure, allowing
military planners to concentrate the bulk of their
forces against the eastern front-principally Syria
and, to a lesser extent, Jordan, if necessary.
The Meridor Report
National media attention is focusing on a recently
completed Knesset report addressing the future of
Israel's defense. The 32-page document presents the
findings of a subcommittee chaired by Likud's Dan
Meridor-also a member of the Knesset's prestigious
Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee-which
during the past 13 months interviewed a host of
defense experts, both civilian and military, according
and Embassy reporting.
oug no revelations are expected to emerge from
this review, the report is notable in that it reflects the
views of the current generation of military leaders
who will influence the defense establishment's
development in the coming decade.
The study purports to be a comprehensive review of
Israeli security issues since the early 1950s, but the
invasion of Lebanon in 1982 has probably had a major
? The de facto peace between Israel and Jordan will
probably continue despite the recent diplomatic
rapprochement between Damascus and Amman.
? Iraq will remain bogged down in a costly war of
attrition with Iran. Moreover, Syrian support for
Iran and the intensity and duration of the conflict
have eliminated the likelihood of Iraqi participation
in a war against Israel in the near term.
Countering the Threat
Israeli planners define national security as assuring
the survival of the state, but within this context they
seek to determinine an acceptable margin of losses.
Foremost among their considerations is limiting the
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length of a future war, its political and economic
impact, and human costs. The underlying problem for
Israeli strategists is how to defend a state with a small
population-demonstrated by the extremely small
standing army dependent on rapid mobilization of a
much larger reserve force- limited territory lacking
strategic depth and sufficient economic resources, and
heavily reliant on US support. Faced with these
constraints, any Israeli government-whether led by
the Likud or the Labor Party-will be intent on
achieving a quick victory, minimizing Israeli
casualties, and carrying the war into the enemy's
territory.
A review of Israeli doctrine since 1948 reveals a
tendency to swing from offensive to defensive strategy
influenced by both political and military
circumstances
reporting. Before 1967, Israeli strategy emphasized
preemption. After the decisive victory in June 1967,
Israel altered this approach, believing that its newly
acquired territorial depth eliminated the threat to its
survival and enabled it to absorb a first blow.
Although Israel ultimately won the October 1973
war, the high Israeli casualties shattered Israel's
confidence. The policy of absorbing an Arab attack
was eventually abandoned, and preemption was
restored to Israeli doctrine.
Defensive Strategy. Current proponents of this
strategy-a small minority among strategic
planners-believe employing more sophisticated
weaponry would enable Israel to destroy the enemy
and decide the war's outcome without entering enemy
territory, thereby minimizing Israeli casualties and
reducing the chance of superpower intervention.
Improved weapon systems-such as precision-guided
munitions-have enhanced defensive capability,
making an invasion a much costlier enterprise. The
increasing effectiveness of firepower would cause
heavy enemy losses and slow their advance until
reserve forces arrive. The key to this approach,
according to its advocates, is to wear down the enemy
who will be conducting costly breakthrough tactics
and demonstrate that nothing can be won by
continuing the attack.
A fundamental flaw in this concept, critics argue, is
that it runs counter to the purpose of Israeli strategy
to deter Arab aggression and, failing that, to ensure
the indisputable military defeat of the Arab force. A
defensive strategy essentially prevents Israel from
achieving a decisive victory, and, without the ability
to decide the war's outcome, deterrence is lost.
Furthermore, critics contend, a defensive strategy
would allow the enemy to decide when and where to
fight and lead to a war of attrition. It also would not
permit Israel to capture territory it can hold for
negotiation. While strongly encouraging continued
development and procurement of advanced weaponry,
the military remains steadfast in its belief that Israel
must retain the battlefield initiative.
Offensive Strategy. Ever since the surprise Arab
attack in 1973, Israel has clearly geared itself toward
launching preemptive strikes should its national
security appear in jeopardy. This concept entails
striking Israel's enemies before they become too
strong. The ultimate goal of such a policy is to destroy
the warmaking capability of the enemy for several
years. Moreover, an offensive policy accords with
Israel's highly developed sense of independence,
allowing it to show both its enemies and allies that on
critical matters of national security Israel can act
autonomously.
This strategy advocates maintaining a smaller, but
highly efficient quick-reaction strike force to seize the
operational initiative, to concentrate military force at
critical junctures, and to conduct swift, highly mobile
offensive operations. This concept also necessitates
clearly establishing a set of "red lines," which, if
crossed, would force an immediate Israeli reaction. Its
supporters, particularly those in the military and
Likud hardliners led by Commerce Minister Ariel
Sharon, believe an offensive strategy compensates for
Israel's numerical inferiority. Speedy offensive
operations minimize the risk of a war of attrition and
forestall the entry of more Arab states and the
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superpowers. Furthermore, a smaller force is more
economical and ensures shorter offensive operations
less likely to result in high casualties.
Critics argue that this strategy risks involving Israeli
forces in preventive operations to further political
interests rather than as a last resort when diplomacy
or deterrence has failed. They cite Israel's invasion of
Lebanon as proof. The political, material, and human
costs of launching a preventive war without
provocation detract from its supporters' claims that it
is less expensive. Finally, adopting a doctrine based on
wars of choice and prevention reinforces the
international image of Israel as an aggressive,
militaristic state and arouses international reactions
against Israel, possibly leading to sanctions.
Outlook
The continuing debate among Israeli strategists is
unlikely to result in fundamental changes in doctrine,
although it underscores an evolutionary process under
way in Israel's strategic thinking. Israel's doctrine is
likely to remain offense-oriented and conventional.
Bitter lessons from the Lebanon war will lessen
somewhat the proclivity of Tel Aviv to choose
preemptive attack-short of an imminent threat to
national security.
The Meridor report essentially mirrors concepts
already under consideration or being implemented by
the defense establishment. The increasing technical
sophistication of Israel's adversaries threatens to
erode the qualitative edge deemed essential to ensure
Israel's conventional deterrence. The Meridor report
generally endorses the high-technology concept and
innovative application of state-of-the-art weaponry in
defense strategy to preserve Israel's lead.
Furthermore, the recent cancellation of the costly
Lavi aircraft project probably will ease the burden on
the defense budget, providing more funding for
procurement of additional modern equipment.
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Fighter Aircraft
King Hussein is deeply committed to modernizing
Jordan's small and increasingly obsolescent Air Force,
which is composed of three squadrons of US F-5E
interceptors and two squadrons of French F-Is. The
King prefers Western aircraft such as the French
Mirage 2000, the British Tornado, and particularly
the US F-16. The US F-16 is unavailable to him, and
he cannot secure financing for either of the West
European fighters. Lacking substantial financial
assistance from Saudi Arabia and the smaller Persian
Gulf states and because of a generous Soviet
financing offer, the MIG-29 will probably become
Jordan's next generation fighter
The King's Requirements
King Hussein realizes that he cannot begin to
compete with the impressive military buildups of his
potentially hostile neighbors, Israel and Syria, but he
wants to retain a credible force to deter attackers and
to defend Jordanian airspace. Moreover, we believe
Jordanian pilots, who are aware of Israel's purchase
of 75 advanced US F-16s and Syria's recent receipt of
a squadron of MIG-29s, will become increasingly
disgruntled with their aging planes and the King's
inability to redress this situation.
The King wants two squadrons of modern fighter
aircraft-about 30 to 40 planes-to replace some of
his aging F-5s that no longer compete with his
neighbors' more capable inventories. With his limited
resources, the King probably would prefer a multirole
aircraft to fulfill both air superiority and ground
attack missions. Although two squadrons of fighters
would not appreciably narrow Jordan's military
inferiority compared with Israel or Syria, they would
present a more credible obstacle to an attacking force.
Jordan's Limited Options
The first choice for both King Hussein and the
Jordanian Air Force is the US F-16. But the United
States has not concluded any agreements for the
Table 1
The Air Balance in the Levant
provision of major new weapon systems to Jordan in
more than four years, and the King has no illusions
that the Uunited States is about to reverse that trend.
Given the unavailability of the US F- 16, Jordan is left
with three alternatives-the French Mirage 2000, the
British Tornado, and the Soviet MIG-29.
The King views the US Congress's stipulation that he
begin negotiations with the Israelis before it
authorizes major arms sales to Amman as unrealistic
and unfair, and he is looking to alternating suppliers
to fulfill his needs. Increasingly, the king is turning to
the Soviet Union because of the few limitations on the
weapons it sells and lower Soviet prices than for
comparable Western equipment. The King would
prefer to purchase a major system such as a fighter
aircraft from a more politically compatible source.
Hussein has long distrusted the intentions of the
Soviets and recognizes their motives for selling him
the MIG-29 are self-serving-principally to gain
greater access to Jordan's military and to increase
their influence in the Middle East.
Despite clear political preferences, Jordan's options
are limited by its struggling economy. Jordan cannot
pay for the aircraft-at a cost of between $500
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NESA NESAR 87-024
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million to $1 billion per squadron-unless it is
granted generous repayment terms. Specifically, the
Jordanians require a lengthy grace period, about five
years, allowing them first to pay back their current
foreign military debt. The only supplier willing to
comply with Amman's need for lenient financing has
been the Soviet Union.
Without generous terms from France or the United
Kingdom, the Jordanians will require substantial
financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and the
smaller Gulf states to purchase a West European
fighter. Despite repeated requests, significant
assistance has not been forthcoming
As as ash
Hussein may take advantage of the Arab summit
meeting scheduled for early November to lobby the
Gulf states for additional aid
Hussein has delayed his decision
on purchasing MIG-29s until February to give the
Gulf states additional time to come up with funding
and to assess the various West European offers. King
Hussein had originally intended to decide before the
end of this year.
Assessing the Competition
We believe all three alternatives to the F-16-the
Mirage 2000, the Tornado, and the MIG-29-are
technically excellent aircraft. Although performance
criteria are important in choosing a modern fighter,
political and economic criteria are probably the
driving forces that will determine Jordan's decision.
Political Scorecard. Either West European fighter
would be preferable to the MIG-29 for political
reasons, and the British Tornado probably edges out
the French Mirage. The King has a long history of
dealing satisfactorily with the British, and, since the
US moratorium on arms sales, he has turned to them
increasingly for both hardware and training. The
French have less of a stake in Jordan, and the
Jordanian Air Force has been frustrated by
inadequate French support of an earlier purchase of
F-1 fighter aircraft. Furthermore, the Saudis-who
would be instrumental in funding a Jordanian
purchase of either plane, as unlikely as it appears-
purchased 72 Tornados and could press Jordan to buy
Economic Issues. Obtaining funding to purchase the
aircraft is the most important factor determining the
King's decision. Given the King's commitment to
modernizing Jordan's Air Force, we are convinced
that he will buy whichever aircraft he can most easily
afford, and, using domestic resources, his only option
is the MIG-29. The Soviets have offered generous
terms, including a grace period and interest rates well
below international norms,
Jordan believes it can afford the purchase without
outside funding. The French have made a
counteroffer. this does not
come close to matching the Soviet offer and would be
unaffordable without Saudi funding. The British also
have improved their original offer for Tornados, but
the plane is substantially more expensive than its
competition. The Jordanians probably would have to
settle for under 10 planes for the same money that
would buy an entire MIG-29 squadron.
Performance Criteria. The three planes are difficult
to compare-the MIG-29 and Mirage are basically
designed as agile fighters The Tornado-in the
currently available strike version-is much larger, less
maneuverable, and carries roughly twice the bomb
load of either of the other two. Nevertheless,
assuming similar weapon loads at constant weather
conditions and altitude, we can compare basic
performance levels:
? Maneuverability. The MIG-29 outperforms the
Mirage 2000 by a substantial margin, and the
Tornado trails even further behind. According to
available data, the MIG has superior thrust to
weight and has much higher specific excess power,
which measures an aircraft's inherent ability to
accelerate or decelerate quickly and is an excellent
guide to comparing overall maneuverability.
? Endurance. The MIG-29's extremely limited
combat radius is one of its most serious deficiencies.
Fitted with a centerline tank, the MIG-29's
maneuverablity advantage deteriorates
considerably. The Tornado has better endurance
than the Mirage, particularly important if Hussein
similar aircraft
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Table 2
Characteristics of the Competitors
Combat weight 10,100
(kilograms)
with two wing tanks
(kilometers)
Bomb load 5,000
(kilograms)
4 Skyflashes 6 AA-8, -10
2 Sidewinders
plans to base his new fighters some distance from
Israel and Syria to shield them from preemptive
attack in case of hostilities.
? Maintainability/Logistics. Again the Soviet plane
falls short. The MIG-29's engines need to be
replaced more than twice as often as the West
European fighters' engines and require return to the
Soviet Union for major overhaul after only 600 or
fewer hours of flight time. Although the Saudis
have had considerable problems with their Tornados
and have probably shared these experiences with the
Jordanians, the Jordanians probably expect British
support to be superior to that from the French.
Thus, we believe the Tornado leads in this category.
Overall Performance. Despite its limited endurance
and problematic maintenance record, the MIG-29
probably is a better performer-particularly in air-to-
air combat-than the two West European fighters. Its
substantial lead in maneuverability makes it well
suited to the Jordanian Air Force's desire for an agile
fighter and would place the Jordanians at a distinct
advantage over less capable Syrian pilots flying
similar aircraft. Jordanian pilots have flown the MIG-
29 at least once in Moscow and consider the plane a
close competitor of the F-16.
The Bottom Line
Hussein's commitment to his military-the linchpin
of his regime-will prevail over opposition to
expanding his military ties to the Soviet Union. If he
becomes convinced by early next year that the MIG-
29 is his only alternative then he will follow that
course. Given the advanced state of Jordan's
negotiations with Moscow, Saudi reluctance to fund a
West European alternative, and Jordan's economic
limitations, the MIG-29 sale is becoming increasingly
likely.
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Table 3
Performance of the Competition
Specific
Thrust to Sustained Sustained Combat
Excess
Power a
Weight
Turn
Rate a
G's
Radius b
Mirage
2
2
2
2
2
2000
3
3
3
3
1
MIG-29
1
I
1
1
3
a Calculated under similar air combat circumstances, 6,000-meter
altitude.
b Calculated using similar weapons and fuel loading and flight
profile.
Nevertheless, if the Saudis offer funding or the
French or British dramatically improve their
packages to equal Moscow's offer, we believe the King
would gladly forgo his negotiations with the Soviets
and accept the West European option.
Implications for the United States
Regardless of which fighter Hussein chooses-or is
forced to choose because of financial imperatives-it
will put further distance between Jordan's military
and its US mentor. Jordan's purchase of the MIG-29
would particularly damage its military ties to the
United States, as the Soviet stake in Jordan would
rise dramatically. A MIG-29 purchase would result in
at least doubling the number of Soviet advisers in
Jordan, from about 50 to over 100, substantially
increase Jordan's debt to Moscow; and deepen
Jordan's reliance on Soviet training and supply of
those involving Jordan's older aircraft.
spare parts and maintenance. US advisers probably
would be prohibited from bases at which the MIG-29s
were stationed, and joint exercises between the US
and Jordanian military probably would be limited to
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The Syrian Army in
Lebanon's Quagmire
The Syrian military is sinking deeper into the
Lebanese quagmire as it extends its presence into
urban areas. The military is coming under increasing
attack by various Lebanese groups, particularly as
tensions rise as the 1988 Lebanese presidential
election approaches. The attacks have been triggered
by the growing tensions among the Lebanese factions
and outside groups who operate in Lebanon. Any
move by the Syrians to counter the attacks will be
tempered by their desire to avoid sinking still further
into the quagmire and their desire to avoid a
confrontation with Israel.
The Syrian military presence in Lebanon numbers
about 25,000 troops and occupies approximately 65
percent of the country. Syrian motives for
maintaining a large presence in Lebanon are based on
the desire to place a government in power that is
favorable toward Syria-if not subservient-and the
need to protect the western approaches to Damascus
from the Israeli threat. The first motive stems from
the popular notion of "Greater Syria," which includes
Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan. The second stems from
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the
resulting battles in the Bekaa Valley.
Since their move into Lebanon's urban areas between
late 1985 and early 1987, the Syrians have come
under increasing attack. The attacks are usually
small-scale and aimed at small groups of Syrian
soldiers. The typical attack involves sniper fire, rocket
attacks, satchel charges, or car bombs against Syrian
positions. Civilians in the urban areas usually find
themselves in the middle of the violence. Syrian forces
in the cities of Beirut and Tripoli are more frequently
under attack, but the troops in the Bekaa Valley are
not immune from violence.
Background of Syria's Military Involvement in
Lebanon
Syria has maintained a military presence in Lebanon
since the 1975 civil war. It entered under the pretense
of trying to end the bloody civil war, and its
intervention helped elect Elias Sarkis, a pro-Syrian
Christian, to the presidency in 1976. With the Israeli
invasion in 1982 and the subsequent Syrian retreat 25X1
from Beirut and areas south of the Beirut-Damascus
highway, Damascus focused its military resources on
maintaining a presence in western Lebanon to protect
the approaches to Damascus. Syrian forces generally
stayed out of the country's large coastal cities
Syrian urban involvement resumed in Tripoli in 1985
when they crushed a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist
movement that was sheltering the remnants of Syria's
Muslim Brotherhood. In February 1987 the Syrians
intervened in Beirut with 10,000 troops, to shore up
their Lebanese Shia Amal ally in its fight against the
Palestinians. These urban deployments have brought
the Syrians in increasing contact with opposing
groups and further entangled them in Lebanese
politics.
Secret
NESA NESAR 87-024
23 October 1987
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The Partition of Lebanon, September 1987
Syrian
occupied
Druze
controlled
controlled
1 Heights
Israel (Israeli
\9 9 occupied)
Syria
*DAMASCUS
0 20 Mites
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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Where Are the Syrians?
Ground Forces. The Syrians maintain major elements
of one mechanized infantry division, one special forces
division, and at least six independent special forces
regiments throughout Lebanon. The forces are
concentrated in four areas-West Beirut, including
the Metn overlooking the capital and the coastal
highway south to Sidon; the Bekaa Valley; the
northern coastal region including Tripoli; and the
Syria-Lebanon border-giving Damascus control of
approximately 65 percent of Lebanon.
deployed major elements of the 14th Special Forces
Division, the 51st Armored Brigade of the 10th
Mechanized Infantry Division, and the 46th, 41st,
and 35th Independent Special Forces Regiments. The
51st Armored Brigade is located in the hills of
Khaldah, south of Beirut International Airport. The
36th Special Forces Regiment (mechanized) of the
14th Special Forces Division surrounds Beirut
International Airport. The 554th Special Forces
Regiment of the 14th Special Forces Division and the
46th, 41st, and 35th Independent Special Forces
Regiments man checkpoints throughout West Beirut,
along the supply routes through the Metn, and along
the coastal highway to the Awali River just north of
Sidon. The concentration of lightly armed special
forces units in and around Beirut provides the Syrians
with the urban warfare capability to cope with a
deteriorating situation in West Beirut.
With two brigades from the 10th Mechanized
Infantry Division, the Syrians occupy the Bekaa
Valley border to Lake Qirawn.
the 93rd Armored Brigade is
deployed in t e fort around the city of Ba'labakk, in
the Al Hirmil area northeast of Ba'labakk, and in the
Aynata-Schlifa area northwest of Ba'labakk
major units of the 85th Brigade
are deployed near the villages of Qabb Illyas and
Ghazzah in the central Bekaa. They occupy positions
along the valley's two major north-south routes and
are near the major east-west route through the valley,
the Beirut-Damascus Highway. The 122nd Field
he Syrians ave
Artillery Regiment of the 10th Mechanized Infantry
Division is also deployed throughout the Metn and the
Central Bekaa Valley.
three independent
special forces regiments-the 53rd, 54th, and 44th-
occupy the northern coastal area, which extends from
the Syria-Lebanon border along the coast to Kubba
and eastward to Mount Lebanon. The 53rd Brigade's
principal area of operation is around Kleiat Airfield,
near the Syrian border. The 54th operates in and
around the city of Tripoli. The 44th operates south of
Tripoli along the coast. The last area of Syrian control
in Lebanon is the border area or the "bulge," where
elements of the 554th and 556th Regiments of the
14th Special Forces Division are deployed. F_
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Other Forces. Syria maintains few air force and air
defense elements and no naval forces within Lebanon. 25X1
The major Lebanese airfields-Riyaq, Beirut 25X1
International Airport, and Kleiat-are in Syrian
control. No significant number of Syrian aircraft are
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maintained within Lebanon, other than 8 MI-8 (Hip)
helicopters which are based at Kleiat Airfield in
northern Lebanon, according to
[::::Jhe defense attache reports that Kie
Airfield can accommodate Syrian MIG-21 and MIG-
23 aircraft in an emergency.
Syria maintains a strong air
The Christian Lebanese Forces militia and the
Christian brigades of the Lebanese armed forces also
present obstacles to the Syrians and their policies. No
major clash has occurred between the Christians and
the Syrians since the Syrian arrival in Beirut. The
Christians are surrounded by the Syrians and fear a
Syrian intervention should Christian political
infighting in East Beirut deteriorate to that of West
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defense along the border with Lebanon, consisting
primarily of SA-2 and SA-6 missile systems. The
heaviest concentration of the surface-to-air missiles is
along the western approaches to Damascus where two
Syria's Principal Opponents in the Occupied Areas
The Syrians probably face their greatest opposition in
Beirut. The Syrians' desire to reshape Lebanese
politics places them in conflict with the Palestinians,
the Lebanese Shia Hizballah, the five Christian
brigades of the Lebanese armed forces, the Christian
Lebanese Forces militia and, to a lesser extent, the
Druze. It was the conflict between the Palestinians
and the Syrian-backed Amal militia, which Amal was
beginning to lose, that prompted the Syrians to enter
Beirut in February 1987. The Syrians-along with
Amal-want to contain the Palestinian presence and
keep it from regaining its strength in Lebanon.
Containment of the Palestinians is also a major reason
for Syrian attempts to control the coastal road south
to Sidon, Fatah's major base in Lebanon
Hizballah's growing strength conflicts with Syria's
plans for Lebanon. Hizballah's goal is to establish an
Islamic republic in Lebanon. Such a state would be in
conflict with, and present a threat to, the secular
Ba'athist regime in Damascus. Hizballah has
effectively resisted Syria's presence, refusing to lay
down its arms as requested by Damascus and in June
kidnaping a US journalist within several hundred feet
of a Syrian-manned checkpoint. The Syrians also
confront Hizballah in the Bekaa Valley, where its
stronghold at Ba'labakk provides the Syrians with an
easily accessible pressure voint
Beirut before the Syrian intervention.
Sunni fundamentalist groups, especially the Islamic
Unification Movement, are the major opponent of the
Syrian presence in the Tripoli area. It is one of the
most active groups in openly challenging the Syrian
presence. Several major clashes have occurred
between the Syrians and the Islamic Unification
Movement, with the most recent occurring in
December 1986. In previous Syrian-Islamic
Unification Movement clashes, especially in 1985,
Syrian forces used indiscriminate artillery
bombardments of populated areas to coerce the group
to accept Syrian control, demonstrating Syrian
ruthlessness when crushing resistance.
The Israeli military provides the major impetus
behind the Syrian desire to maintain a strong
presence in the Bekaa Valley and along the border.
Other motives besides defensive ones require their
presence in this area. The Syrians are trying to
contain Hizballah by maintaining their presence
along the main axis through the valley and around
Ba'labakk. The Syrians also are probably attempting
to limit the amount of smuggling that occurs between
Lebanon and Syria.
None of the Lebanese opposition groups are strong
enough militarily to confront the Syrians. Hizballah,
the Palestinians, and the Sunni fundamentalists at
most present a guerrilla threat to Syrian dominance.
By their adept use of bombs and sniper attacks, these
groups force the Syrians to be constantly vigilant.
Only the Lebanese Forces, the Lebanese armed
forces, and the Druze have any significant military
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capability, and they lack the numbers, the strength,
and, at the moment, the desire to take on the Syrian
Army.
Reporting to Damascus
No single military officer appears to be in overall
command of Syrian forces in Lebanon. Syria has
divided Lebanon into various sectors to aid in
command and control. Both the Syrian military and
Syrian Military Intelligence, each with their own
commander, maintain extensive operations in
Lebanon. The prominent Syrian commanders in
Lebanon are Maj. Gen. Sa'id Bayraqdar, commander
of the II Corps and all Syrian expeditionary forces in
Lebanon, ' and Brig. Gen. Ghazi Kanan, chief of
Syrian Military Intelligence in Lebanon. All
commanders have direct access to Damascus, with
differing degrees of influence. This decentralization of
power is to prevent any one commander from
controlling too much and threatening the regime.
Potential for Conflict With Israel
The geography of Lebanon limits large military
movement to the Bekaa Valley and the coastal plain. 25X1
The Bekaa Valley is the most likely area for a Syrian
confrontation with Israel, but its geography is more
conducive to a northward thrust by Israel than to a
southward thrust by Syria.
In the near term we believe any Syrian-Israeli conflict
in Lebanon will be triggered accidentally by a clash
between their respective surrogates or by an
unplanned clash between Syrian and Israeli forces in
the southern Bekaa. Israeli and Syrian units patrol
only a few kilometers apart in that contested area. We
believe neither sees an advantage in deliberately
provoking a confrontation at this time, but Syrian
forces have contingency plans for both defensive and
offensive war in the Bekaa.
three of their nine armored and mechanized infantry
divisions in a confrontation with Israel in Lebanon.
Syria would use two to
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the 10th Division, II Corps would 225X1
form the first Syrian echelon in the Bekaa Valley, and
the 1st Armored Division, II Corps garrisoned at
Kisweh would make up the second echelon. The 1st
Armored Division is responsible for the Bekaa Valley 25X1
south of the Beirut-Damascus highway,)
expects this unit to move west and then south in the
early stages of a crisis. The 10th Division already
maintains two brigades in the Bekaa Valley, and a
third, the 62nd Mechanized Infantry Brigade, is
within striking distance from its garrison at Qatana,
Syria. The US defense attache in Damascus reports
that Syria has arrayed its forces in the valley
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major air defense warning sites within Lebanon, one
at Dayr al Baydar in the mountains east of Beirut and
the other near Riyaq airfield in the Bekaa Valley,
providing a link between the forces in Beirut and the
headquarters on the border.
maintain
headquarters within Lebanon for II Corps Lebanese
operations at Judaydat Yabus on the border,
Intelligence at Anjar, Intelligence in Beirut at the
Beau Rivage hotel, and Syrian forces in West Beirut
at the Bain Militaire.
' The Syrian Army is organized into two corps, each with its own
area of responsibility. The I Corps, also known as the Golan Corps,
is composed of the 5th and 7th Infantry Divisions, the 9th Armored
Division, and the independent 61st and 90th Infantry Brigades. The
11 Corps, also known as the Lebanon Corps, is composed of the 1st
and 11th Armored Divisions and the 10th Mechanized Division.
primarily for defense.
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A Syrian offensive thrust against Israeli units in
southern Lebanon would be made as a diversion in
conjunction with an effort to retake the Golan. The 25X1
move through the Bekaa Valley would involve at least
two armored divisions, one mechanized infantry
division, a commando division, and at least two
additional commando regiments. Two commando
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regiments would move from the vicinity of Sidon to
the area around An Nabatiyah, confronting at least
one Israeli infantry brigade. One mechanized infantry
brigade would move down the eastern side of the
Bekaa Valley through Kafr Mishki and be joined by a
commando regiment moving out from the Rashayya
area. An Israeli infantry and a mechanized brigade
would move up to block their progress through the
southern part of the valley toward the Israeli security
zone. Once inside the security zone, one Syrian
armored division would proceed toward Metulla and
the finger of Israel, while the remaining Syrian
elements would proceed toward the western Israel-
Lebanon border.
Outlook
The Syrians will continue to maintain troops in Beirut
in hopes of influencing the Lebanese presidential
election next year. No major withdrawal of Syrian
troops is likely in the near term. Between now and the
election, Syria will try to achieve a national
conciliation agreement between the various factions
that is to Damascus's favor.
In the immediate future, the most likely repositioning
of Syrian troops, if any occurs, will be toward Sidon,
Lebanon's third largest city, to shore up Amal in its
struggle with the Palestinians. Damascus would move
only reluctantly, probably after a significant
deterioration in Amal's position such as occurred in
Beirut in February. The Israelis, by their silence, have
acquiesced to Syrian deployments in Lebanon, but Tel
Aviv would be seriously concerned about a sizable
Syrian troop movement southward.
Syria would be wary of possible Israeli or US
responses to a move against Christian elements in
Lebanon. The Syrians probably would enter East
Beirut only if fighting erupted between Christian
forces loyal to Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'Ja
and Phalange forces loyal to President Amine
Gemayel. This situation could provide the Syrians an
opportunity to extend their "Pax Syriana" into East
Beirut.
The likelihood of the Syrians withdrawing troops from
the Bekaa Valley is slim, even in the long run. The
valley has become a critical part of Damascus's plan
for protecting Syria from the Israelis. Only if a stable
agreement were reached between Syria and Israel
would Syrian troops withdraw. Even then the added
pressure of not allowing any other power, that is, Iran,
to gain a foothold in Lebanon would provide Syria
with an additional motive for maintaining its hold on
eastern Lebanon. With the growing strength of
Hizballah and the presence of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps in Lebanon, the potential
is strong for Iran to gain a level of influence that
rivals Damascus. A strong, uncontrolled pro-Iranian
presence in Lebanon would present a threat to
Damascus.
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Lebanon's Syrian-Supported
Christian Renegades
The former leader of the Christian Lebanese Forces
militia Ili Hubayqa continues to play a spoiler's role
in Lebanese Christian politics by virtue of his
enduring relationship with Syria and growing tensions
within Lebanon's Christian community. An
assassination attempt against Hubayqa last month
illustrates continuing Christian opposition to his plans
to establish a stronghold in northern Lebanon as a
base for taking control of the Christian community.
Trained by the Israelis in the late 1970s, Ili Hubayqa
became Lebanese Forces chairman in May 1985. He
aroused fierce opposition within the Christian
community and alienated his core supporters when he
cooperated with Syria and signed the Tripartite
Accord in December 1985. By January 1986,
Hubayqa had been violently ousted from the
Lebanese Forces and forced to flee to Damascus.
Since that time Damascus has pressed him to plot a
return to power.
Consummate Opportunist
Involved in Christian militia politics since he was 14,
Hubayqa's allegiance has shifted drastically over the
years. A principal adviser to Bashir Gemayel,
Hubayqa, as chief of intelligence for the Lebanese
Forces, was responsible for liaison with the Israelis.
Forces' officials and President Gemayel in East
Beirut, intended to force Christian acceptance of the
Tripartite Accord. Cementing his ties to Damascus,
Hubayqa, with Syrian assistance, launched an attack
on East Beirut in late September 1986 to regain
control of the Christian community. Unsuccessful,
Hubayqa retreated to Damascus to regroup his
followers.
Northern Foothold
Since his ouster from East Beirut, Hubayqa's
principal stronghold has been the Syrian-occupied city
of Zahlah in the Bekaa Valley. Zahlah, the largest
Christian town in eastern Lebanon, has long been a
center of Lebanese Christian political activity.
Hubayqa has about 300 armed fighters in Zahlah and
could mobilize up to 800 in a showdown.
In recent months, Hubayqa has begun an effort to
reassert Christian Lebanese primacy in northern
Lebanon, with Syrian backing.
ubayga recently
announced plans to open an office in Akkar, near the
Syrian border. In addition, he plans to form a security
committee in the northern cities of Andaqat and
Qubayyat to deal with internal security matters,
independent of Damascus.
chief of intelligence, press reports accused Hubayqa
of leading the massacre in the Sabra and Shatila
Palestinian refugee camps in September 1982. In
March 1985, Hubayqa led a series of revolts against
the leadership of the Lebanese Forces and senior
Phalange politicians to gain independence for the
militia from Lebanese President Amine Gemayel and
the Phalange party. At the time, Hubayqa was
angered by Phalange cooperation with Syria.
After his forced departure from East Beirut, Hubayqa
took refuge in Syria. We believe Hubayqa and
Damascus were behind car bombs targeting Lebanese
Syria appears to be backing this venture to extend its control in the region
believe the primary motive behind the
intention to tighten control on the Lebanese Armed
Revolutionary Faction, another dissident Christian
group with ties to Syria.
the reason is to counter the presence of the Abu Nidal
organization in the region. Regardless of the
motivation, given Hubayqa's financial and logistic
Secret
NESA NESAR 87-024
23 Ormher 1987
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Ili Hubayqa (right) after the
signing of the Tripartite Accord
indebtedness to Damascus, his presence in North
Lebanon could strengthen Syria's hold on the region
and on Lebanon's Christians.
Adverse Reaction
Hubayqa's renewed activity, although limited,
brought quick and harsh reaction from his
adversaries. Before a rumored intense recruiting drive
in Akkar-a move that could hurt both the Lebanese
Forces and the Lebanese Army-Hubayqa became
the target of an assassination attempt. On 15
September, during a meeting in Hubayqa's stronghold
of Zahlah, an explosion occurred, trapping Hubayqa
under the rubble for several hours. Hubayqa was
wounded, but not seriously, according to press and
Embassy reports. The press reports at least 30 others
Haddad's apparent devotion to both Hubayqa and his
archbishop makes his sole responsibility for the
assassination attempt suspect. Although the Lebanese
Forces have the most to gain from Hubayqa's death-
the removal of a divisive force-other groups appear
eager to thwart Hubayqa's potential political power
and Syria's tightened grip in the north. The
confessionally split Lebanese Army would be further
weakened by the emergence of another strong
Christian militia should Hubayqa regain popularity,
as would President Gemayel's troubled Phalange
Party.
were injured as a result of the explosion.
Samih Haddad, a Greek Orthodox priest and member
of Hubayqa's forces, has been saddled with
responsibility for the assassination attempt. Haddad,
a former member of the Lebanese Forces, followed
Hubayqa when he split with the militia.
Haddad detonated the
remote-controlled bomb shortly after verifying
Hubayqa's attendance at the meeting with his
archbishop. Haddad confessed to Syrian military
intelligence and committed suicide after wresting a
(With Haddad's death, it is
unlikely that a reliable link will be made to implicate
any group.
Outlook
As the Christian community in Lebanon becomes
increasingly divided between militant supporters of
the Lebanese Forces and followers of President
Gemayel, Hubayqa will probably continue to reassert
rifle from his guards.
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his presence in Lebanon. Since the assassination
attempt Hubayqa has remained uncharacteristically
quiet, but it is unlikely that he will be daunted by the
recent attempt on his life.
Hubayqa's ties to Syria remain strong despite reports
that Damascus has been disappointed in his ability to
quickly gain significant support and recruits. It is the
Syrian link alone that maintains Hubayqa as a viable
alternative among Lebanese Christians. Thus,
Hubayqa's role probably will increase in the coming
months as he supports Damascus' attempts to broker
the formation of a multiconfessional front before
Lebanon's presidential elections in 1988.
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Lebanon: Sizing up
the Militias
As the central government's authority has declined,
Lebanese politics has become a patchwork of local
power struggles, particularly in Beirut. Because they
play the dominant role in grassroots politics and can
mobilize supporters along sectarian lines, militias
have become the major factor in this complicated
welter of actors. Over the last five years, West Beirut
has become a patchwork of small areas loosely
controlled by confessional or ideologically based
militias and plain gangsters.
Militias are nothing new in Lebanon. The history of
most Lebanese sects, particularly the Druze and the
Maronites, is interwoven with episodes of a private
military force supporting the religious community.
The flight of minority communities to refuge in
Lebanon was often accompanied by quasimilitary
resistance from inhabitants already there. The militia
system is characterized by several features-foreign
patronage, economic self-sufficiency, and intense
alliance politics.
We have devised a method for rating the militias. Our
rating of Lebanon's militias allows readers to keep
track of the groups and to assess the fluctuations in
their fortunes. Because we have examined the major
militias in terms of military, social, and political
factors, this rating can help illustrate why some
communities prosper under militia rule and others do
not and why Lebanese politics grows increasingly
violent.
Characteristics of Militia Politics
Lebanese militia politics involves a malevolent
dialogue. Its trademarks are amorality and violence.
Car bombings and political assassinations occur so
often that they are regarded as commonplace. These
acts are sometimes a crude, but effective, form of
communication between militias in which
unreasonable warlords are confronted with the limits
of their power and induced to behave more
circumspectly. In some cases, the car bombs and
killings are the attempts of underlings to seize power
in their militias. In others, the goal is to eliminate
recalcitrant opponents from other militias.
The hallmark of Lebanese militia politics is the
interplay of weak groups that are forced to make
alliances with domestic rivals and foreign powers to
survive in an anarchic system. Its daunting
complexity reveals that its leading characteristic is the
absence of a central authority. Not even the
government can impose consensus on the system, nor
can two or three groups working together bring about
a working national political order.
The continuing power struggle among Lebanon's
militias has transformed Beirut-once a major
commercial, intellectual, and tourist center of the
Arab world-into a lawless militarized zone contested
by confessional and ideological factions. Turf battles,
terrorism, rampant street crime, and the lack of
centralized authority make the area, especially the
Muslim western sector, uniquely dangerous. Beirut's
lawlessness has markedly curtailed the social and
economic activities of government institutions and
provided sanctuary for extremists of various
affiliations.
Foreign Patrons
Virtually all militias have foreign patrons who supply
them with weapons and attempt to use them to
maintain political influence in Lebanon. On the basis
of US Embassy reporting over a period of years, we
judge that Syria supports the Shia Amal organization
as well as the Druze and several small militias
according to the dictates of Syrian policy. Iran backs
Hizballah. Libya has provided financial backing to
the Druze, some Nasirist groups, and the Lebanese
Communist Party. The Saudis give money to
Christians, Druze, and Sunni groups. Israel has had
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NESA NESAR 87-024
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Militia Groups in Lebanon: A Lexicon for the
Perplexed
LF-Lebanese Forces ... Christian ... aims to
establish independent Christian political entity
outside framework of 1943 National Charter ...
leadership repudiates political compromise with
Muslims ... may be best armed militia.
PSP-Progressive Socialist Party ... Druze militia
in Shuf area, but an amalgam of Druze and leftists in
West Beirut ... aims to guard independence of Druze,
particularly in Shuf stronghold ... famed for
expedient, sometimes short-lived political
alliances ... may be best fighters in country.
PLO-Palestine Liberation Organization ...
umbrella term for mainly pro-Arafat Palestinians ...
covers diverse groups in refugee camps such as
Democratic and Popular Fronts for the Liberation of
Palestine as well as Abu Nidal's Revolutionary
Council ... Palestinians generally cooperate against
attacks by hostile Lebanese militias ... probably best
disciplined group in Lebanon.
Amal-Afwaj al-Mugawamah al-Lubnaniyah Shia
militia ... established by revered, charismatic, and
martyred cleric Imam Musa al-Sadr ... pro-
Syrian ... popular among Lebanese Shias, but appeal
slipping ... leadership weakened by division between
pro-Syrian and pro-Iranian wings.
Hizballah-Party of God ... Shia militia ... pro-
Iranian ... rose to prominence following Israeli
invasion of Lebanon ... seeks to establish Iranian-
style Islamic republic in Lebanon ... may be most
pragmatic political actor on scene ... effectively
exploits ties to Palestinians and Iran ... winning
struggle with Amal for loyalty of Lebanese Shias.
Murabitun-Small Sunni militia ... attempts to fill
power vacuum created when PLO retreated in
1982... periodically bashed by pro-Syrian
groups ... marginal influence militarily, but
important as representative of Lebanese Sunnis.
contacts with both the Christian and Druze militias.
The Christian Lebanese Forces militia does not hide
its ties to the United States from other Lebanese
actors. The Soviet Union has provided military aid to
the Druze militia and the Lebanese Communist Party
militia.
Plunder and Profit
Just below the surface of Lebanon's traditional
economy lies another layer of services and trade that
sustains the economy. Militias have established a civil
arm that imposes taxes and provides public services.
According to the US Embassy, all the major
militias-for example, the Lebanese Forces, the PSP,
Amal, and Hizballah-aggressively solicit funds from
local and foreign sources. Increasing competition
between rival militias for funds intensifies the
factional struggle and further undermines the state's
authority. According to our analysis, militia sources
of revenue include:
? Fees from unofficial ports operated by the militias.
? Support from foreign patrons.
? Contributions from coreligionists at home and
abroad.
? Fees collected at checkpoints throughout the
country.
? Informal "taxes" imposed on local business.
Machiavellian Alliances
In Lebanon, the principle that the enemy of an enemy
is a friend can bridge even the widest ideological
differences. Still, militia alliances are often temporary
and are limited by the militias' changing regional
interests. There is abundant evidence that Hizballah
has an important tactical alliance with PLO leader
Arafat and his supporters in West Beirut. In South
Lebanon the US Embassy in Beirut and the
at least on one occasion
fought the Palestinians near t o town of
Maghdushah. Elements of the Amal militia, which
opposed the Palestinians in West Beirut and South
Lebanon, participated in attacks with Hizballah and
some Palestinians against Israeli forces and pro-
Israeli militias, according to Embassy and press
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reports. The Christian Lebanese Forces militia aided
the Palestinians return to Beirut, according to
Embassy and press reports.
Where Is Square One?
Several important factors must be considered before
rating the militias: quality of data, measurement
schemes, objectivity of measurement criteria, and the
validity of the exercise as an analytical tool:
? Because the militia situation is so fluid and much of
our data concerning military factors is estimative in
nature, this study rates the militias against each
other rather than against an objective standard.
? We know of no standard---other than combat
performance-by which militia fighting proficiency
can be gauged, but the outcome of fighting against
one militia is only a crude indicator of how a militia
will perform against another. Our strategy is to rank
Lebanon's militias as if they were baseball teams,
averaging the evaluations of a panel of experts on
the militia analogues of pitching, fielding, and
hitting.
? The goal of the exercise is to produce a scorecard of
militia actors that illustrates the major factors
affecting the political and military strength of major
Lebanese militias.
The Evaluation Process
We rated the militias on three clusters of issues:
military, geographic, and political. The rating scheme
used the integers from 1 to 9, with 9 representing the
"best," "largest," or "richest" and 1 representing the
"worst," "smallest," or "poorest." Additional criteria
to be considered or instructions to the evaluators are
included as necessary.
Military Factors
Manpower. Military Effectiveness. Rank each militia
using three criteria-weaponry, training, and
presence of advisers. The militia with the "best"
weapons should be ranked 9; the one with the "worst,"
1. Use the same scheme for training and advisers.
(The score for military effectiveness was determined
by dividing the composite score by 3.)
Leadership Effectiveness. Cohesiveness and command
and control. (Composite score divided by 2.)
Motivational Factors. Morale, pay, and degree of
ideological indoctrination. (Composite score divided
by 3.)
Social Factors
Geographic Factors. Concentration (geographic) and
potential for self- sufficiency. The militia that has its
forces dispersed over several noncontiguous areas
would receive a 1-it is the most dispersed. The one
that has its forces concentrated most in one area
should get a 9. The militia's potential defensability
from attack is a factor to be considered. The militia
with the highest potential to defend an economicallly
self-sufficient canton should be ranked 9. (Composite
score divided by 2)
Financial Resources. Ability to generate funds from
activities inside Lebanon or from supporters abroad
(this is one subcategory) and to obtain financial
support from foreign governments. The militia that
can get the most money from foreign patrons should
be ranked 9. The militia that has the best fund-raising
from Lebanese sources (both domestic and expatriate)
should be ranked 9. (Composite score divided by 2.)
Political Factors
Popular Support. Imagine every Lebanese could vote
for his or her favored militia. The militia that would
get the most votes should be ranked 9.
Foreign Support. Rank each militia in terms of the
reliability of its foreign patron, the effectiveness of the
patron's support, and the degree to which the interests
of the militia converge with those of its patron. The
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militia with the most reliable foreign patron should be
ranked 9. The militia with the most effective foreign
supporter should be ranked 9. Since militia politics in
Lebanon is fluid, gauging the durability of the militia-
patron relationship is important. We believe that the
most durable relationship will be one in which the
militia and the patron have shared long-term political
interests. The least durable one will be when the
militia and the patron have divergent interests-a
tactical alliance. Therefore, the militia with the best
fit of interests with its patron should be ranked 9; the
one with the worst fit 1. (Composite score divided by
3.)
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Iraq-Libya: Modest Improvement
in Relations
Qadhafi's need to burnish his international and
domestic image and Saddam Husayn's desire to
isolate Iran have induced Libya and Iraq to improve
their ties. Baghdad remains suspicious of Tripoli's
intentions because Qadhafi still sides with Tehran in
the Iran-Iraq conflict. Relations could deteriorate
again if Libya sends Iran large amounts of weapons to
help in its pursuit of the war.
From Friendship to Enmity
After Qadhafi came to power in 1969, Iraq and Libya
enjoyed a brief period of good relations based on their
shared anti-Western views. In 1970, Iraq became the
first state to recognize Qadhafi, but relations declined
after Iraq and the USSR signed a Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation in 1972. Qadhafi recalled
his ambassador temporarily from Baghdad on the
grounds that Iraq had aligned itself too closely with a
non-Muslim power
Relations deteriorated further after Libya sided with
Iran following the fall of the Shah. Since then,
satellite imagery indicates that Tripoli has transferred
to Iran Scud surface-to-surface missiles, T-55 tanks,
130-mm artillery, and AT-3 antitank missiles from its
inventory of Soviet equipment. The Scuds have caused
several hundred civilian casualties in Baghdad and
contributed to a break in Libyan-Iraqi diplomatic ties
in 1985. Libya also has provided heavy machineguns,
mortars, SA-7 surface-to-air hand-held missiles, and
financial assistance to Mas'ud Barzani and Jalal
Talabani, leaders of the two largest Kurdish dissident
groups in Ira
Iraq has retaliated against Libya by supporting
Libyan exiles and the Chadian Government. Baghdad
set up a Libyan exile radio station broadcasting from
Iraq and was host in 1985 to the annual meeting of
the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, the
largest Libyan exile organization,
31
Baghdad has also provided
commando training to the Libyan National Struggle
Front, an exile group that occasionally conducts
terrorist attacks against Libyan diplomats and
government offices outside Libya. According to the
US Embassy, Baghdad sent Chad armored vehicles,
heavy machineguns, RPG-7s, and SA-7 surface-to-air
missiles in early 1987.
Recent Improvement in Ties
Since the beginning of the year, Libya and Iraq have
taken a series of steps to smooth over their
differences. Iraq shut down the Libyan dissident radio
station and promised Libyan officials that it had
stopped its aid to Chad, according to the US
Embassy. Libya reduced its military aid to Iran and
Iraqi dissidents and called for an end to the war
without retention of captured territory by either side.
These steps culminated in an agreement to restore
diplomatic ties in September.
Reasons for the Rapprochement
Qadhafi has several reasons to improve ties to Iraq. In
addition to hoping that better relations will lead to an
end to Iraqi support for Libyan dissidents and Chad,
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Qadhafi probably wants to reduce his international
isolation and improve his badly tarnished image in the
Arab world. Qadhafi may also be responding to Soviet
entreaties to modify his hostility toward Iraq. Moscow
has expressed concern to Libya in the past about the
transfer of Soviet weaponry to Iran, particularly the
Scud missiles. Finally, Libya almost certainly wants a
diplomatic presence in Baghdad to monitor Libyan
exiles and possibly to subvert Saddam's regime
Iraq's opening toward Libya is part of its diplomatic
campaign against Iran. In addition to seeking an end
to Libyan military support for Tehran, Baghdad
hopes that better relations with Libya will isolate
Syria in the Arab world. Syria is now the only Arab
country that fully supports Iran.
Outlook
Despite the recent rapprochement, relations between
Libya and Iraq will remain tense and limited. Libya
still values its ties to the region's most anti-Western
country, Iran, and admires Tehran's willingness to
confront the United States in the Persian Gulf and
Israel in southern Lebanon through support for
Muhammad Yusif Maqaryaf
Secretary General of the
National Front for the
Hizballah. Moreover, Libya probably will draw closer
to Tehran if the Iranian-US confrontation continues
over an extended period. Libya has already vigorously
defended Iran's actions in the Gulf and has sent it
mine
Baghdad will remain sceptical about Qadhafi's
intentions. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz told US
officials after the resumption of diplomatic ties was
announced that Iraq believes that Libya's recent
moderation is a ploy. Should Qadhafi resume sending
large quantities of military. equipment to Iran,
Baghdad is likely to again support Libyan dissidents
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Technology in Pakistan: Glitches
and Glitter
Despite few resources allocated to research and
development, Pakistan has attained sophisticated
technology, at least in defense-related areas.
Islamabad's longstanding priority to acquire and
develop unsafeguarded nuclear technology has
hindered other technological development. Civilian
technology has languished from a combination of low
education expenditures, high illiteracy rates, and
bureaucratic impediments to imported technology.
Pakistan probably will need to acquire equipment and
training from Western nations in view of its inability
to fully develop a technological base. Nevertheless,
Pakistani leaders have never hidden their desire to
acquire nuclear technology first and have only
recently discussed a need for "appropriate"
technologies.
Technology in Pakistan
Pakistan probably is the most technologically
advanced country in the Middle East and South Asia,
with the exception of Israel and India. Pakistan's rush
to procure modern technology began in the 1960s
when the acquisition of agricultural technology was a
national priority, according to press reporting. The
perceived threat from India's explosion of a nuclear
device in 1974 and its superiority in military forces,
however, moved Pakistani leaders to shift most of
their resources from agriculture to nuclear
development. Prime Minister Bhutto's statement that
Pakistan would eat grass to build a nuclear bomb is
indicative of the direction of technology since the
early 1970s. Diversifying Pakistan's technological
base to assist the country's development needs in the
1980s and 1990s is a major endeavor of Prime
Minister Junejo's Five-Point Program.
Priority Areas of Technological Development
Nuclear Program. Islamabad places top priority on
nuclear research and development-it has become a
matter of national pride and security. High pay,
national prestige, and other incentives have attracted
a concentration of scientists and technicians in this
field. Pakistan's only Nobel Prize winner earned his
award in physics in 1979. Pakistan is the first Third
World nation to enrich uranium by the centrifuge
process. Pakistan's nuclear power reactor provides
little electricity. The purpose of Islamabad's nuclear
program-producing nuclear weapons-grade
uranium-is a major stumblingblock in the country's
foreign relations, principally with India and the
United States.
The nuclear program, while technologically
sophisticated, impedes the development of a broader
technological base. We believe nuclear development
in Pakistan absorbs large sums and large numbers of
trained personnel that otherwise could have assisted
the civilian sector. Pakistan has difficulty obtaining
advanced Western computers and equipment that
could advance civilian projects. The West has
restricted exports of such equipment to countries like
Pakistan that possess unsafeguarded nuclear facilities,
including a uranium enrichment plant; refuse to sign
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; or are
suspected of having a nuclear weapons program.
Therefore, Pakistan must develop the technology itself
or obtain it covertly at a considerable increase in cost.
Because of sanctions on Pakistan's nuclear program,
its ability to procure equipment for nuclear-generated
electricity has been hampered at a time when the
country's economy suffers from periodic power
outages.
Space. After nuclear research, space development has
the highest priority. Suparco (Space and Upper
Atmosphere Research Committee) has made
formidable progress in space science and technology.
Suparco may launch its first communications satellite
using its own rocket in 1988-nearly 25 years after
launching its first rocket. Much of Suparco's work is
defense related-it was previously run by the
Ministry of Defense-and Suparco probably
maintains close ties to the military. We believe
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Suparco's civilian space program is closely linked to
Pakistan's efforts to develop ballistic missile
technology. Suparco is in the process of setting up an
Aerospace Institute at Karachi that will offer
postgraduate degrees in space technology and space
science. As is the case with nuclear technology,
Pakistan has made strides in space as a result of an
intensive, focused effort despite the small number of
scientists available.
Ballistic Missile Program. Suparco not only has the
task of space exploration, it also runs Pakistan's only
missile test range. Probably in conjunction with the
Precision Engineering Complex, Suparco has
undertaken a long-term program to develop a ballistic
missile capable of carrying a nuclear weapon. The
Precision Engineering Complex has built a facility to
manufacture solid rocket motors, probably for use in a
ballistic missile. We believe missile guidance
technology will be the most difficult technology for
Pakistan to obtain, hindering development of a
ballistic delivery system for at least the next 10 years.
Defense-Related Industry. Islamabad's third priority
is the development of defense industries that typically
have higher technology and better management
expertise than civilian industries.
in a survey of manufacturing
industries, those dedicated to defense production were
more concerned with quality control than were those
dedicated to civilian manufacturing, which
concentrated on output.
one Pakistani engineering facility-primarily
geared toward military production-has state-of-the-
art printed circuit board manufacturing, automated
plating, precision computer- controlled drilling
machines, and equipment for advanced optics
manufacture.
Civilian Technology
Because Islamabad continues to place a high priority
on defense-related technology, civilian sectors are
characterized by a lack of advanced equipment, low
quality control, and inadequately trained personnel.
Foreign competition, high capital outlays, low profit
margins, and technical inefficiency for the initial
years of production have prevented many private
entrepreneurs from investing in Pakistan's civilian
industrial sector. To soften the impact of the
inordinate investment of national resources in the
nuclear program, a few officials are beginning to
encourage private investment in industry and public
investment in education and training to promote
technologies appropriate to civilian sectors.
Computers. Computing is a vital part of any
technological base, but Pakistan is notably short on
computing power. Minister of Commerce and
Planning Mehbub-ul Haq has called for the country
to develop national computerization over the next 10
to 15 years. By 1995, Haq expects to train 2,000
information analysts, 20,000 systems analysts and
programmers, and 100,000 data entry people,
computer operators, and direct users. According to a
professional journal, an acute shortage of experienced
computer operators, programmers, and systems
analysts exists because of the large number of these
specialists who emigrate to the Middle East, the
United States, and the United Kingdom. Until
recently, the unavailability of computer systems and
programs in the national language, Urdu, also
hindered the growth of computer technology
Telecommunications. Pakistan is particularly
advanced in television and radiobroadcasting, as well
as telephonic and data communications. According to
the World Bank, Islamabad recognizes the link
between telecommunications and economic
development and has planned in the Sixth
Development Plan (FY 1984 to FY 1988 `) to expand
these services 15 percent annually versus the
historical average of 7 to 8 percent. The National
Communications Satellite System, Paksat, recently
called for the operation of two spacecraft-one in
orbit and one spare-with a ground station in Karachi
to replace the ground-based system for telephone,
telex, and computer links. The ground station will
provide alternative systems for air traffic control and
radio networks. We believe Pakistan's first satellite
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will be launched sometime in 1988. The satellite
would greatly enhance communications to remote
areas and, in this manner, may be used to transmit
government policy to typically antigovernment areas.
Agriculture. Significant strides in scientific research
and agricultural education in the 1960s brought
improved productivity and economic gains to
Pakistanis. Agriculture is the mainstay of Pakistan's
economy. Some 60 percent of Pakistanis earn their
living from farming, accounting for 30 percent of the
nation's gross national product. Pakistan has evolved
from a net importer of food to a major exporter of rice
and is nearly self-sufficient in wheat. Although wheat
and rice output per hectare has more than doubled
since the early 1970s, most of the recent increase in
agricultural production has come from increased
acreage. Average yields remain low by world
standards, according to World Bank reports.
Research in plant pathology, genetics, and agronomy
has produced many new, improved varieties of grains,
according to press reporting. These technological
innovations probably will improve agricultural
production, but many of these improvements can only
be used by farmers who have the financial means to
implement the new technology.
Technology Transfer Via Foreign Investment
Pakistani officials have stated that the ultimate
purpose of foreign investment is the transfer of new
technologies to Pakistan as well as the development of
industries to replace imported goods. In practice, the
Pakistani bureaucracy places so much emphasis on
developing industries to replace imports that it
discourages foreign investment. Foreign investment in
high-technology industries is hampered by excessive
government control, cumbersome review procedures,
unrealistic indigenization policies, and infrastructural
shortages, according to US Embassy reporting.
Investors-foreign or domestic-who want to set up a
plant that uses significant quantities of imported
goods are typically required to promise to "delete" the
imported goods over time and to obtain them from
local manufacturers. In the case of a joint Pakistani-
Suzuki automobile plant in Karachi, the deletion
policy requires that 80 percent of the components be
manufactured locally within five years, according to
Pakistan's Memorandum of Understanding on
Technology With the United States
A fully implemented Memorandum of Understanding
with the United States would probably increase
Pakistan's expectation of greater access to US
technology. The Memorandum of Understanding
would allow Pakistan to import commodities and
technical data on the US Commodity Control and US
Munitions lists, given government assurances that
sensitive technology will not be transferred to hostile
governments and that end user guarantees are
submitted. Complications in implementing
procedures for the import certificate and delivery
verification have delayed high-technology transfer.
Many of the goals of transferring technology to
Pakistani industries via import substitution are not
achieved. Local industries often import needed
components because local manufacturers cannot
supply components of the needed quality at
competitive prices. The deletion program has largely
failed because imported parts are often cheaper than
those purchased locally. International suppliers can
ship large quantities of components to accompany
their goods, according to press reporting. Another
problem associated with deletion programs is that
local component manufacturers cannot quickly adapt
production to match improvements or innovations in
imported goods. Private industrialists are quick to
blame foreign manufacturers for not readily
transferring technology to local industries, according
to press reports. One possible solution suggested by
Pakistani businessmen is to standardize imports as
well as local assembly procedures so that sufficient
quantities would be produced locally, thus reducing
the cost for each unit.
Obstacles to Technological Advancement in Pakistan
Pakistan spends only a small amount of its GNP on
research and development, hindering its ability to
create a technology base. In the Sixth Development
press reports.
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Pakistan's Ministry of Science and Technology
The Ministry of Science and Technology was
established in the mid-1970s to adapt advanced
technology to local needs and to develop technology.
The Ministry also supervises administrative and
research organizations, including the Pakistan
Science Foundation, which supports research,
primarily at universities, and establishes museums.
The Ministry's budget increased more than sixfold
from the Fifth Development Plan (FY 1979 to FY
1983) to the Sixth Development Plan (FY 1984 to FY
1988). Three strategies to promote nationwide
development of technology have been developed:
? The first calls for a three-tier technology transfer
network-a National Center for Technology
Transfer, provincial technical centers, and
technology extension units in each administrative
division. The National Center would provide advice
on negotiating technology agreements and assign
priorities to a list of imported technologies.
? The second encourages and sponsors programs to
bring appropriate technology to small-scale
mantffacturers. Appropriate Technology and
Research Development Corporations are to be
established.
? The last is the creation of a "risk fund"for
commercial development of Pakistani technologies.
The fund would be allocated to support projects
based on new inventions and innovative
entrepreneurs with limited resources wishing to
expand local technology.
We believe the Ministry of Science and Technology
will fall short of achieving its objectives. Because of
the rapid change of technology, Pakistani firms
involved in supplying parts for imported goods cannot
keep up with improvements that are made overseas.
The limited size of local markets and the variety of
modern products-automobiles, tractors, televisions,
and air conditioners-make local production of
components uneconomical.
Plan, Pakistan budgeted a mere 0.5 percent of its
GNP for research and development. On the basis of
recent spending patterns, we believe the figure is
closer to 0.2 percent annually. Other countries in the
Middle East and South Asia typically spend about 0.3
to 0.4 percent of GNP on research and development,
according to UNESCO statistics. Pakistan falls far
behind the Third World average of 0.4 percent and
even further behind India, which spends 1.2 percent of
its GNP for this purpose.
The lack of resources allocated to education has
strained Pakistan's technological development and
perpetuated Pakistan's literacy rate of only 25
percent, according to official statistics. Public
expenditure on education has hovered around 2
percent of GNP annually for the past 20 years,
according to press reporting, causing research and
development innovation to languish. Although
Pakistani universities specializing in science are the
premier institutions in the country, most universities
are geared to teaching. They cannot afford to have the
low teacher-to-student ratio that is typical of Western
schools with effective research and development
programs, according to press reporting. Prime
Minister Junejo has recognized the problems in
education, staking much of his political future on his
Five-Point Program, which calls for a literacy rate of
50 percent by the 1990 election and construction of an
additional 10,000 primary and mosque schools,
according to the US Embassy in Islamabad. Because
of the lack of spending on education, we believe these
goals will not be met.
Outlook
Several major constraints will probably prevent
widespread development of technology in Pakistan.
Expenditures on research and development as well as
education-areas crucial to developing a technology
base-probably will fall short of the goals of the Sixth
Development Plan. On the other hand, a technology
embargo prompted by Pakistan's nuclear program
will severely limit its ability to import sophisticated
Western technology. Islamabad's weak foreign
exchange position also hinders its ability to import
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high technology. Limited domestic markets for
modern consumer items prevent efficient local
production of these goods. Pakistan's deteriorating
communications networks and unreliable power
supplies will minimize some of the advantages of any
new technology Pakistan does acquire. Lastly, the
absence of software skills will limit the adaptability of
new programs to needs peculiar to Pakistan.
Islamabad will continue to make progress in its high-
priority areas-nuclear weapons development and
short-range rockets. These efforts probably command
large chunks of the resources at Islamabad's disposal.
Rocket capabilities probably will be greatly expanded
in the 1990s, with a Pakistani-produced satellite and
rocket and possibly a fully operational ballistic
missile. Civilian technology will limp along, mainly to
support defense-related projects. Countrywide
communications and computerization probably will
not make many breakthroughs in the next decade as
infrastructural deficiencies will limit their
development.
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South Asia-Japan: Growing
Economic Relations
South Asian countries are increasingly looking to
Japan for financial and technical resources to assist in
their economic development.' They want Japan to
provide more concessionary economic assistance,
direct investment, and tariff relief for their exports.
During a five-day visit to the subcontinent in August,
Japanese Foreign Minister Kuranari affirmed Japan's
intent to promote political dialogue and increase
economic cooperation with the region. The countries
of South Asia will remain wary of new promises
without more action on Tokyo's part. Many South
Asians believe that Japan is still primarily interested
in quick sales of manufactured goods and will
continue to require lengthy negotiations before buying
more South Asian goods or concluding major aid
agreements.
Regional Issues
Relations between South Asia and Japan before the
late 1970s focused on bilateral trade that was nearly
balanced. Japan purchased mostly raw materials and
agricultural and marine products and sold
manufactured goods. By the early 1980s the South
Asian trade balance with Japan moved into a serious
deficit, reaching $2 billion in 1986. The value of
Japanese imports of raw materials has grown only
slowly, while the value of Japanese exports of
manufactured items, particularly capital goods, has
grown rapidly. Japan, subsequently, has become the
largest commercial exporter to South Asia and the
second largest trading partner, slightly behind the
United States.
Some of the growing trade imbalance has been offset
by increasing Japanese aid to the region. By 1986,
Japanese official development disbursements
exceeded $800 million. Except for Pakistan, Japan is
the largest Western bilateral donor in each of the
countries. Only a small portion of the Japanese aid is
explicitly tied to imports from Japan. Most purchases
financed by the aid, nonetheless, generally are made
in Japan because of other conditions. One frequent
requirement is that the aid is untied only if the
purchases are made from another less developed
country. Most of the equipment that fills
requirements for Japanese aid projects, however, is
not available from less developed countries. F_
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South Asian countries are eager to acquire a large
share of any additional foreign aid that might be
offered, especially since Japanese aid payments
generally are not tied to political and economic
reforms.' Tokyo appears unsure of how to respond to
all the aid requests from the area. According to the
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for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) if the
organization develops a serious role in the region.
Japan appears to be encouraging the countries in the
region to delegate additional powers to the
organization. During his trip to the subcontinent,
Foreign Minister Kuranari announced that Tokyo
would convene a Japan-SAARC symposium
sometime before next April.
A major expansion of economic relations between
Japan and the South Asian countries faces important
obstacles. South Asians remain wary of becoming a
dumping ground for Japanese manufactured goods.
Tokyo, on the other hand, has found it difficult
dealing with South Asian bureaucracies on issues
such as trade laws and aid projects. Aid
appropriations have sometimes gone unused because
of delays and inefficiencies in the programs designed
to receive the assistance, and the South Asian
countries sometimes have problems coming up with
change the geographical proportions of its aid allotments, but the
absolute amount going to South Asia is likely to grow as available
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
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SOUTH ASIAN TRADE WITH JAPAN
2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
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200
0
1980 1986
Exports
1980 1986
Imports
JAPANESE AND UNITED STATES TRADE WITH THE REGION
EXPORTS TO SOUTH ASIA
1IMPORTS FROM SOUTH ASIA
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Millions US$
1980
$1,950 $435
South Asia--22%
Africa--19%
i986
$3. 850
JAPANESE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE*
*Includes only bilateral disbursements
$820
Nepal
Sri Lanka
Pakistan
India
Other
Nepal
Sri Lanka
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the large-scale projects Tokyo requires for most loans.
We believe it will be several years, if ever, before
SAARC can play the regional role the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations plays in coordinating
economic relations with Japan.
India
Prime Minister Gandhi has personnally encouraged
greater Japanese participation in his drive to
modernize India's economy. He has sought Indian
access to Japanese high technology, greater direct
Japanese investments, and exposure to Japanese
entrepreneurial expertise. Gandhi would like the
Japanese to compete more actively with the United
States and Western Europe in selling high-technology
items to India. New Delhi
will look more to Tokyo over the coming years as a
neutral and reliable high-technology supplier.
Foreign diplomats in New Delhi predict that Japan
will become India's largest trading partner in a few
years. The value of trade between the two countries
grew by more than 20 percent in 1986 to almost $3.4
billion. Last year Japan passed the Soviet Union as
India's second largest commercial trading partner
after the United States. In volume terms, Japanese
exports to India in 1986 increased by 100 percent
from the level of 1980, and imports from India were up
by almost 75 percent.
Direct Japanese investment and industrial
collaboration also show signs of growth. Indo-
Japanese joint ventures have increased from 34 in
1980 with $1.4 million in Japanese investment to 108
in 1986 with $12.6 million in investment. Although
Japanese investment in India remains small-less
than $100 million over the last 30 years-Japan has
become the second largest foreign investor in India
after the United States. Japanese direct investment
has been oriented toward the Indian domestic market,
especially the automobile industry. India has been
pushing for more Japanese investment in export-
oriented industries and joint ventures that would help
India sell goods to third countries.
We believe Tokyo's increased bilateral assistance will
facilitate even greater trade and investment. Japan
has become India's largest Western bilateral aid
donor and provided almost $230 million in loans,
grants, and technical assistance in fiscal year
1986-87.' During his visit to India, Kuranari pledged
a loan of $470 million for the fiscal year that ends in
March 1988 to finance nine industrial projects,
including construction of a fertilizer factory, a
telecommunications facility, and an electric power
plant. Tokyo also offered a $200 million long-term,
low-interest loan to purchase edible oils as a drought
relief measure during Gandhi's stopover on his way to
the Commonwealth Conference in Vancouver.
Opening the economy to more Japanese high
technology is a mixed blessing for New Delhi. India's
trade balance with Japan has gone from a $100
million trade surplus as recently as 1980 to an $800
million deficit in 1986 as a result of the surge in the
volume and cost of imports. New Delhi's imports from
Japan, including major purchases of capital goods for
industrial modernization, have more than doubled in
value since 1980. Another major component is
consumer goods, including parts used in assembling
automobiles in India and consumer electronics
equipment. Indian exports to Japan, which are
primarily raw materials (iron ore) and food (marine
products), have grown by less than 30 percent in
value.
We believe several areas of tension persist between
the two countries that are likely to hamper growth in
economic relations. Tokyo has shown little interest in
opening its markets to a wider variety of Indian goods
despite frequent requests from New Delhi. Japanese
businesses continue to drag their feet on the
indigenization of the supply line for Indo-Japanese
joint ventures, thus worsening India's foreign
payments. New Delhi continues to stew over Japanese
conditions that require lengthy negotiations for sales
and aid agreements, leaving some doubt that all the
aid promised this year will be disbursed.
' Japan might be India's largest overall bilateral aid donor. Moscow
has offered India about $3.4 billion in economic assistance since
1985, but some of the funding is scheduled for long-term projects
that have not been started. We have no reliable information on the
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Pakistan
Commercial and international pressures underscore
Japan's interest in Pakistan's economic development.
Pakistan offers a large consumer market, low wages,
and a relatively advanced industrial base, as
compared with many less developed countries. Partly
in response to the US designation of Pakistan as a
strategically important aid recipient, Japan provides
generous economic assistance and technical
cooperation. It is a leader in food donations for
Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Japan will raise its
profile in Pakistan this fall when it holds a "Japan
Week" in Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi.
Japan's assistance package in Pakistan not only
fulfills some of Pakistan's development needs but
benefits the commercial interests of Japanese
manufacturers and engineering firms. In many cases
bids by Japanese firms on major projects have been
backed by government aid credits of 30 to 40 years,
with interest rates of less than 3 percent. Tokyo
concentrates on commercial sectors that other major
donors ignore, according to US Embassy reporting.
The Japanese have been active in
telecommunications, energy, transportation, industrial
machinery, agriculture, water resources, health, and
education. Islamabad's satellite earth station was
financed almost entirely by Japanese aid, according to
US Embassy reporting.
We believe that Islamabad hopes Japan will become
an even larger aid donor in the future, in part because
Tokyo does not tie its funding to internal policy
reforms, according to US Embassy reporting. The
most recent Japanese aid agreement-signed in July
of this year-totals $230 million in long-term, low-
interest, and untied loans covering four projects and
one commodity loan.
Bilateral trade and foreign investment have increased
steadily over the past 10 years. Japan now accounts
for 13 percent of Pakistan's trade, passing the US
11-percent share. Japanese companies are expanding
manufacturing plants in Pakistan, Suzuki recently
announced that it intends to build a new plant near
Karachi, doubling its production of cars and pickup
trucks. Two truck companies-Hino and Nissan-
plan on building manufacturing plants.
Pakistan's mounting trade deficit with Japan and
Islamabad's delays in submitting aid requests could
adversely affect the pace of improved economic ties.
Last year Pakistan had a $530 million trade deficit
with Japan, the largest deficit of any trading partner.
As Islamabad and Tokyo negotiate new trade
protocols, Pakistani officials will be aware of the
domestic backlash to such a large deficit and will
emphasize the need to link Japanese exports to
Pakistani exports. Pakistan is likely to miss out on
some of the aid requested because of its inability to
define economically sound projects and Tokyo's
inability to process all project proposals.
Bangladesh
Japanese assistance of $250 million in 1986 was the
largest among bilateral donors and one of the few
programs in Bangladesh that do not emphasize
economic and political reforms. Most of the project
plans are generated by Japanese trading companies in
Dhaka that collaborate with the Bangladeshi
Government to draft proposals. The passive role that
Japan plays in policy discussions is viewed by other
Western donors as undermining their efforts to
encourage political and economic reforms.
According to the US Embassy in Dhaka, grants-
which account for nearly one-third of Japan's aid
program-are tied to purchases of Japanese
equipment and raw materials, raising the
procurement costs of development projects by 15 to 20
percent. Moreover, most of the projects focus on
capital-intensive sectors that serve Japan's
commercial interests and generate spare parts orders
for its equipment. The US Embassy in Dhaka projects
Japanese assistance to double by the end of the
decade and the composition of aid-funded activities to
continue to benefit Japanese companies.
The Bangladeshi Government presented several
proposals to expand economic cooperation to the
Japanese Foreign Minister during his trip to
Bangladesh in August, according to Embassy
reporting. These proposals include the establishment
of a Bangladesh-Japan joint economic commission
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and expansion of joint and private ventures in
Bangladesh. As a gesture of good faith, Japan
donated 100,000 metric tons of rice and wheat to
alleviate the problems associated with the devastating
floods last month. Japan was the first contributor to
the relief and rehabilitation effort.
The trade imbalance remains a major area of
contention between Dhaka and Tokyo. Bangladesh's
exports to Japan have failed to exceed $100 million,
and imports from Japan now exceed $400 million.
Bangladesh has urged Japan to lower tariffs on jute
products and expand imports of garments. Dhaka has
been unable to maintain sufficiently high-quality
control to compete with garment imports from Korea,
Hong Kong, and Taiwan, according to US Embassy
reporting.
Sri Lanka
Japan emerged as Colombo's largest bilateral foreign
assistance donor in 1986, with disbursements
amounting to $127 million. Loans make up slightly
more than 45 percent of Japan's assistance, and
grants and technical assistance account for the
remainder. Japan recently pledged additional
financial assistance this year for reconstruction in the
Northern and Eastern Provinces.
Over half of Tokyo's assistance is used to finance
development programs. Most of these funds are used
to construct large, highly visible projects, such as
hospitals, telecommunications and transportation
networks, and improvement of port and power
generating facilities. Unlike multilateral lending
organizations and most Western bilateral donors,
Japan does not tie its assistance to the government's
economic philosophy, such as increased privatization
schemes
Japan is Sri Lanka's second largest trading partner,
closely trailing the United States. Tokyo accounts for
about 20 percent of Colombo's imports, which include
consumer goods, such as calculators, electronics, and
manufacturing inputs. In contrast, 4 percent of Sri
Lanka's exports are destined for Japan.
Outlook and Implications for the United States
We believe Japan will continue to make major
economic inroads in South Asia. The prospect of a
large new market opening as a result of liberalization
efforts undertaken by countries in the region has
prompted a major influx of Japanese seeking new
business ventures and markets for exports. Growing
aid disbursements, even though not directly tied to
sales of Japanese products, will facilitate Tokyo's
activities, possibly at the expense of the United States.
Japanese businessmen, however, will not relinquish
their autonomy in favor of an equitable partnership
with a foreign partner. Many of their business
ventures will serve primarily as markets for Japanese
exports.
We expect Japanese companies to remain aggressive
in sales of high-technology items, particularly to
India. The one exception is likely to be
supercomputers. Japanese companies probably will
wait until the first US supercomputer is delivered
before launching their marketing efforts. Recent
reports that Japanese high technology has reached the
Soviet Union through India may lead to licensing
delays for some of this equipment in the future.
South Asian countries are wary of Japanese business
and trade practices but will seek a closer economic
relationship with Japan. They will continue to accept
reluctantly a large trade deficit with Japan because
much of it can be balanced by inflows of capital from
Tokyo. Japan is also a politically acceptable supplier
of economic assistance and high-technology
equipment. Some Indians express concern that their
country has become too dependent on the United
States for high-technology equipment.
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India-United States:
Antinarcotics
Cooperation
Prime Minister Gandhi has become more receptive to
US suggestions for increased cooperation on narcotics
and has identified two areas in which he would
welcome bilateral efforts-drug interdiction and
treatment of drug abuse. New Delhi is increasingly
concerned that India is rapidly becoming a major
conduit for Asian heroin, a development that is
feeding India's fast-growing domestic appetite for
heroin. New Delhi is seeking US technical training to
improve India's drug interdiction efforts and support
for appropriate drug abuse prevention and treatment
programs. Technological enhancement of India's
existing port of entry security programs, training in
drug treatment techniques for public health care
providers, and drug education materials are likely to
be especially welcome. The Indian Government,
however, will probably continue to be reluctant to
involve US private or governmental agencies in Indian
domestic programs.
India-Conduit for International Drug Trafficking
Because of it's long, porous borders, its location
between the world's two largest heroin-producing
regions, and its relatively sophisticated
communication and transportation networks, India is
becoming a major conduit for Southwest and
Southeast Asian heroin. Since the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, drug traffickers have altered their
routes to move increasing amounts of heroin through
Pakistan and India. Although reliable data do not
exist, we judge that half the approximately 12 tons of
Southwest Asian heroin that reaches the West each
year transits India. In 1986 the Indian Government
seized 2,500 kilograms of heroin-almost all captured
near the Pakistani border-including the world's
largest single heroin seizure of 604 kilograms.
Furthermore, the India route appears increasingly
attractive to Southeast Asian heroin traffickers
seeking to avoid greater enforcement efforts and
rising competition along traditional routes through
Thailand and Burma.
New Delhi recognizes that some domestically
produced opium is entering the domestic black market
but doubts that large quantities of Indian opium are
flowing into the international drug trade. India is the
world's largest legal producer of opium-some 600
metric tons annually. About 200 metric tons of this
production is sold to US pharmaceutical companies.
We believe Indian domestic production is a
significantly expanding source of illicit opiates.
Licensed poppy farmers obtain yields two to three
times the government-imposed maximum of 32
kilograms per hectare and sell the excess to
traffickers,
In addition, illicit poppy cultivation-from licensed
farmers increasing their fields after government
inspection or unlicensed farmers cultivating poppy
outside legal areas-feeds the black market. Using
this opium and readily available domestic precursor
chemicals, Indian traffickers are refining heroin to
sell on the local market and, in a few cases, to the
international trade. The improving quality of the
Indian product will soon make it competitive with
other Asian heroin in international markets. F_
Moving Slowly With Pakistan
New Delhi and Islamabad have responded to long-
term encouragement from Washington to cooperate in
combating illicit drug flows and have explored ways to
reduce cross-border drug trafficking. Since early
1986, New Delhi and Islamabad have publicized
antinarcotics programs as a key area for increased
bilateral cooperation, and several exploratory sessions
have been held. Senior Indian and Pakistani officials
have agreed that cooperation between antinarcotics
officials and border security forces are the necessary
first steps toward increased border interdiction. Both
governments have also encouraged the South Asia
Association for Regional Cooperation to make
regional antidrug cooperation a priority issue.
Secret
NESA NESAR 87-024
2? (Lett)her 10R7
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Mutual suspicion and a reluctance to share sensitive
information limit effective antinarcotics cooperation
between India and Pakistan. Gandhi faces strong
domestic pressure from powerful anti-Pakistani
elements in his administration who seek to prevent
accommodation with Islamabad on issues affecting
Indian national security.
A Growing US Role?
The rise in drug trafficking through India has led to
an explosion of domestic heroin addiction since 1980.
We estimate India has some 500,000 heroin addicts
primarily in New Delhi and Bombay, and drug abuse
is spreading to smaller cities and towns. New Delhi
has attempted to step up narcotics control, passing a
comprehensive national drug bill in 1985 that
mandated tougher sentences for convicted drug
pushers and created an antinarcotics squad to improve
drug interdiction efforts
Although New Delhi has sought to increase Indian
antinarcotics effectiveness, the central government
cannot-or, in several instances, will not-institute
the far-reaching bureaucratic changes necessary to
significantly reduce drug activity in the country.
Indian drug enforcement is largely in the hands of
state police, security, customs, and finance officials
who are unresponsive to central government direction
and have limited access to foreign assistance. The
much publicized national Narcotics Control Board
established over a year ago has yet to demonstrate its
institutional independence or its ability to spearhead
antinarcotics efforts in key drug-trafficking regions,
such as the northeast and Tamil Nadu.
Moreover, New Delhi's drug reform efforts are
opposed by powerful participants in the Indian drug
trade. Low- and middle-level government officials
routinely receive large payoffs from drug producers
and traffickers and have little incentive to reduce the
traffic,
Many drug traffickers use legitimate Indian business
concerns to cover their activities, effectively
concealing drug profits and connections within legal
international business transactions. Sikhs and Sri
Lankan Tamil insurgents are active in smuggling-
including drugs-in key areas and resist New Delhi's
efforts to disrupt their access to this source of funds.
Corruption involving payoffs and kickbacks for
government services-expediting state paperwork,
securing licenses, guaranteeing favors-is endemic in
Indian society. Drug production and trafficking are
an additional source of high financial return for
relatively little risk for some politicians and officials.
Outlook
New Delhi probably welcomes increased US support
in developing drug treatment programs that do not
involve US officials or private agencies working
directly in India. India probably seeks increased
access to US expertise in developing television and
film spots or other educational materials to improve
public awareness of the risks of drug use similar to the
US-sponsored programs used in Pakistan, Burma, and
Thailand. New Delhi may also be interested in
training in detoxification techniques appropriate for
Indian health care systems.
We believe Gandhi's administration will face
bureaucratic opposition and official footdragging
when it tries to introduce improved domestic antidrug
programs. Corrupt government officials will obstruct
New Delhi's efforts and denounce US involvement in
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Secret
the effort. Gandhi's administration is still reeling
from corruption scandals that rocked the ruling
Congress Party during early and mid-1987. In our
judgment, Gandhi will not take on an issue as
contentious as the role of corrupt administrators in
drug trafficking, given the greater potential for
embarrassment than political reward.
In our judgment, New Delhi's and Islamabad's
suspicions and conflicting national interests in areas
unrelated to the antidrug effort will continue to
obstruct effective antinarcotics cooperation. Neither
country appears willing to share the sensitive
intelligence regarding troop placements, border
security tactics, and the involvement of high-level
officials in drug trafficking that is crucial to the long-
term success of bilateral drug interdiction efforts.
Islamabad and New Delhi probably will be content to
seek maximum public relations value from only
minimal compliance with any bilateral drug
interdiction agreements for the foreseeable future to
appease international pressure for movement on these
issues.
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Militancy
The Indian Government appears to be losing ground
in its campaign against Sikh extremists in Punjab,
despite almost six months of direct administration, or
President's Rule, from New Delhi. Violence in the
state instigated by the militants is up sharply from
1986. The militants are taking advantage of the
vacuum created by the resignation of several
moderate political and religious leaders to consolidate
their hold on key religious positions. In our judgment,
the militants lack widespread credibility among the
Sikh population, but they are strong enough to
undermine the influence of moderates who had
mediated for New Delhi. The growing influence of the
militants underscores the ineffectiveness of New
Delhi's Punjab policy and its need to reevaluate its
approach to Sikh grievances.
The Rise in Violence
New Delhi took over the state administration in
Punjab last May ostensibly to curb terrorism, but
most statistics cited by the press show an increase in
Sikh extremist violence. According to press accounts,
terrorist-related deaths in 1987 already number at
least 200 more than the approximately 650 in 1986,'
and reports of six to 10 dead per day are routine.
Press and Embassy reporting suggests part of the
problem in Punjab is New Delhi's ineffective use of
the large number of military, paramilitary, and police
forces in the state to contain the extremists. The
security forces continue to rely on curfews, searches of
alleged militant hideouts in residential areas of the
Golden Temple, roadblocks, and heavy patrolling of
Punjab's border with Pakistan to root out the
extremists. These efforts have had little effect on the
militants' ability to plan more numerous and lethal
operations against Hindus and moderate Sikhs.
New Delhi claims to be making progress in combating
the militants despite the apparent rise in violence.
Julio Ribeiro, chief of the Punjab police force, says his
security forces during the past year have jailed or
killed over half the state's extremist Sikh leaders,
which he numbers at about 45. Some press accounts
discount Ribeiro's claims, but the recent arrest of a
prominent leader and the killing of another suggest
the police are getting good intelligence on militant
membership, tactics, and operations from captured
militants. Police in New Delhi gained front page
headlines in early September with their arrest of one
of the most notorious Sikh militants, Harjinder
"Jinda" Singh, who was wanted for bank robberies
and the assassination of a prominent Indian Army
general. Indian police scored another victory by
killing Gurdev Singh Usmanwalla, one of several
militants who last April issued a controversial and
highly publicized call for Punjab's secession from
India.
The Alienation of Sikh Moderates
The imposition last May of President's Rule, which
involves suspension of the state legislature and
administration of the state by the central government,
has undermined New Delhi's and the moderates'
credibility in the state. Several moderate political
leaders in Punjab, including Chief Minister Barnala,
lost their positions as a result of President's Rule.
During the past several years New Delhi looked to
these leaders to serve as intermediaries with the
militants.
New Delhi's ineffective political and security
measures have discouraged moderate religious leaders
in Punjab from retaining key religious and political
posts. For example, Darshan Singh Ragi, Punjab's
head high priest and the main spokesman for the
moderates, resigned in September. He announced he
was frustrated with trying to bridge the gap between
militants and moderates and was leaving to "pave the
way for militants to run the affairs of the Sikhs."
Ragi's retreat was, in our view, as big a loss for New
' Some of the killings classified by the police as terrorist-related
probably are criminal acts or the settling of old scores. Punjab
historically has had a high incidence of violent crime.
Secret
NESA NESAR 87-024
23 October 1987
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Delhi as it was a gain for the militants because he was
the most prominent Sikh leader with credibility
among militants and government officials.
New Delhi's failure to address Sikh grievances is
discouraging moderate Sikhs throughout India.
According to US Embassy reports, most moderates
reject the call for an independent Sikh state-
Khalistan-but they argue the government ignores
their legitimate grievances-such as demands for
control over the state capital, Chandigarh, which
Punjab shares with neighboring Haryana State.
Moderate Sikhs believe the government and Hindus
indiscriminately lump all Sikhs together and blame
the whole community for the actions of a relatively
few militants. According to the US Consulate in
Calcutta, some Sikhs outside Punjab are concerned
that harassment by security services is rising. Other
Sikhs claim that roadblocks set by security forces
discriminate against Sikhs and that some Hindus
avoid Sikh business and will not serve Sikh customers,
according to the US Embassy in New Delhi.
Sikhs and Indian Government officials trade
accusations over which side has failed to address Sikh
demands. The Sikhs believe New Delhi reneged in
implementing the Punjab accord and regard it as
defunct. Indian officials counter with claims that Sikh
leaders have obstructed efforts to find a solution for
Sikh demands. They say, for example, that state
government officials in Punjab never decided on the
territory they would offer Haryana in exchange for
control of Chandigarh. That indecision led in part to
the failure of the Punjab accord, which hinged on the
Chandigarh transfer. Central government officials
administering Punjab are trying to placate the
frustrated Sikh mainstream by offering job training
programs for unemployed Sikh youth, according to
press reports. Unemployment is rising in the state
because of the worsening business climate and
agricultural setbacks Punjabi farmers suffered as a
result of India's failed monsoon this season. About
one-third of Sikhs are landowning farmers of the Jat
caste, which is also the most important political group
in Punjab.
from moderates. Priests affiliated with the militants
are assuming control over these posts by issuing Sikh
policy pronouncements traditionally under the
purview of legitimate religious organizations. Militant
priests sitting on a key religious policy making council
are working to install a militant as the Sikhs' head
high priest-the post vacated by Ragi. They are also
trying to dominate this year's election for the Sikhs'
temple management committee, which serves as a
Sikh religious parliament.
The security crackdown is prompting Sikh youths to
join the militant ranks, according to Embassy
reporting. Many Punjabi Sikhs believe security forces
in the state routinely murder innocent youths in
staged "encounters" with alleged Sikh militants.
Some Sikhs estimate that five youths join the
militants for each encounter" death, which they
number at about 200 this year. Older Sikhs say the
government's intransigence toward Sikh grievances
spurs deeply embedded desires for revenge among
younger Sikhs.
The militants have not consolidated their hold on
power, in part because their leadership is fragmented.
In early September, for example, four key high priests
announced the unification of 16 militant groups in a
Sikh "war of liberation." The following day, the
temple management committee disavowed the high
priests' remarks. At least two major militant factions
later backed the temple management committee.
Moreover, the militants do not have the support of
most Sikhs. US Embassy officials say the moderates
fear expressing opposition to militant tactics and goals
because of militant intimidation.
Outlook
The Indian Goverment does not plan in the near term
to end President's Rule by reinstating the state's
legislative assembly. New Delhi probably calculates
that the restoration of the assembly now-when
security conditions in Punjab are deteriorating-
would highlight its inability to curb terrorism in the
state. Moreover, Indian officials refuse to acquiesce to
militant demands and probably will delay further
talks until new moderate leaders emerge.
Militants Supplanting Moderates
Militant Sikhs are capitalizing on the unstable
security situation and trying to gain legitimacy and
support in Punjab by taking over leadership posts
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Indian officials will be hard pressed to enlist the
support of moderate Sikhs against the militants
without offering concessions on some Sikh grievances,
such as the release of some Sikh detainees. Indian
officials probably will have an even harder time
hammering out an agreement than they did
fashioning the Punjab accord in 1985. The new
negotiations will have to overcome the legacy of the
failed accord and the loss of the Congress Party
government in the Haryana State election last spring.
Haryana's cooperation will be crucial for New Delhi
to answer some Sikh grievances, such as water
sharing.
Gandhi will face increasing domestic criticism of his
handling of the Sikhs as President's Rule proves
ineffective. State political and security officials are
running out of excuses for why Sikh violence is
increasing six months after New Delhi took over the
state administration. Criticism of Gandhi probably
will crystallize when Parliament convenes in early
November to debate, and probably pass, a six-month
renewal of President's Rule. New Delhi probably will
look to new tactics in the next few months to stem the
rising tide of killings and keep government critics at
bay. Indian officials may revive talk of a political
settlement to try to highlight conciliatory tactics and
prevent militants from further undermining the
moderates.
For their part, the militants will try to use their new
religious positions to legitimize their goals and tactics.
Militant domination of these posts, coupled with
intimidation by younger extremists, will help the
hardcore religious leaders ensure that the moderates
resist either open rapprochement with New Delhi or
efforts to rally moderate opinion against militant
plans. The extremists probably also judge that they
can press their case for greater autonomy by using
violence to press Hindus to move out of Punjab.
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Afghanistan: Insurgent
Peace Terms
Recent public statements by Hizbi Islami faction
leader Gulbuddin and a conference of insurgent
commanders in Ghowr Province suggest the
insurgents' military successes in 1987 have not made
them more tractable in seeking a political settlement
to the war. Gulbuddin and the commanders offered
Moscow terms ruling out a post-Soviet role for the
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)
and providing for a Soviet departure from
Afghanistan that could mirror the US departure from
South Vietnam in 1975. In our view, the insurgents'
military successes this year have set back the limited
inclination they had to discuss a political solution that
would allow the Soviets to save face.
Gulbuddin's Draconian Peace
In late August, Hizbi Islami faction leader Gulbuddin
told a press conference in Rawalpindi that the
resistance would continue to insist on a short,
logistically based timetable for the withdrawal of
Soviet troops. He said that an interim government
acceptable to the insurgents must replace the PDPA
regime. Gulbuddin argued that the guerrillas military
successes in 1987 had placed Soviet and Afghan
regime forces on the defensive and outlined a four-
stage peace plan that he said was being studied by the
seven-party resistance alliance:
? Soviet authorities would withdraw their forces from
the current war zones and concentrate them at the
Bagram, Shindand, Dehdadi, Dashti Abddan, and
Kolagia airfields. The USSR's departure from
Afghanistan would be conducted from those bases.
? The PDPA regime would be replaced by an interim
government acceptable to the resistance. There is no
role in this government for former King Zahir Shah.
? The interim government would disband all regime
army units created since 1978 and assign the
remaining forces to their prewar garrisons. The
Soviet withdrawal would be supervised by the
purged Afghan army under the command of officers
who had defected from Kabul to the resistance
after the PDPA coup in 1978. All of the interim
government's officer appointments would have to be
approved by the insurgents.
? After the Soviet withdrawal is complete, the interim
regime would be replaced by a temporary
resistance-led government that would conduct an
election for a representative assembly. The assembly
would then choose a national leader and shape
Afghanistan's future political system.
Gulbuddin's peace plan is notable for its specificity
and its almost complete lack of flexibility. The plan
offers the Soviets nothing that would allow them to
conduct a face-saving withdrawal. It also guarantees
the elimination of the PDPA. We believe,
Gulbuddin's peace plan provides no basis for
negotiations with Kabul and Moscow but accurately
reflects the greater political and diplomatic
intractability instilled in the fundamentalist party
leaders-probably including Jamiat-i-Islami leader
Rabbani-and the field commanders by the
improving military performance of the resistance.
The Commanders' Conference: Hardline Attitudes
Dominate
Jamiat-i-Islami commander Ismail Khan held a
conference in late June and early July of several
hundred insurgent commanders of all parties in
Ghowr Province. A similar but smaller conference
was held in April in Quetta. According to reporting of
varying reliability, up to 500 commanders
representing insurgent groups from Ghowr, Herat,
Badghis, Faryab, Farah, Helmand, Qandahar,
Oruzgan, Wardak, Lowgar, and Kabol Provinces
attended the meeting. Ismail Khan apparently
organized the gathering to promote insurgent unity
and cooperation in western Afghanistan. Although
Jamiat-i-Islami officials in Peshawar claim that the
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Secret
meeting was conducted under the party's auspices,
US officials report that Ismail Khan deliberately
minimized the party's role during the meeting as a
means of promoting harmony among the attendees.
Ismail Khan dominated the proceedings and played a
significant role in drafting the final communique,
which-like Gulbuddin's peace plan-gave no
indication of flexibility regarding the manner in
which the resistance would "require" the Soviets to
withdraw. The most important points of the
communique are:
? Only those Afghans who have fought against the
PDPA regime will be allowed to participate in
shaping the country's political future.
? The commanders' rejection of all peace proposals
made by Kabul since last January is reaffirmed.
? The Soviets must withdraw unconditionally and pay
a war indemnity to avoid being attacked during the
withdrawal.
? A "Supreme Revolutionary Council" of
commanders would be formed in early 1988 to
formulate and coordinate the military and political
activities of the resistance inside Afghanistan.
In our view, the outcome of the Ghowr conference
displayed what Jamiat leader Rabbani has described
as the increasing self-confidence and assertiveness
among commanders as a consequence of their growing
military prowess. The commanders ruled out a face-
saving Soviet withdrawal, an interim role for Zahir
Shah, and the survival of the PDPA-all of which the
moderate resistance party leaders, the Pakistanis, and
most Western observers believe are essential to
achieve a Soviet withdrawal. The commanders'
attitudes toward a negotiated peace are unlikely to
become more flexible as long as insurgent military
effectiveness continues at its currently high level.
The Upshot
The harshness of the peace terms presented by
Gulbuddin and the commanders indicates that the
resistance has for the present no plans to propose a
moderate response to the Soviet-Afghan regime peace
initiative. Insurgent military successes since late 1986
probably have hardened the resolve of the
fundamentalist party leaders and most field
commanders to rely on intensifying combat as the
principal vehicle for effecting a Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan. There is little reason to expect that
the resistance would respond positively to genuine
concessions from Moscow or Kabul on a withdrawal
timetable or a coalition regime. Islamabad almost
certainly anticipates having to exert strong pressure
on the alliance, and through the alliance on the field
commanders, should Kabul offer significant
concessions at the next round of UN-sponsored peace
talks in Geneva.
We believe there are at least two reasons why the
alliance and the Pakistanis cannot control the
commanders simply because they administer the
insurgents' supply line. First, the significant amount
of stockpiling occurring inside Afghanistan will soon
lessen the dependence of many major commanders on
supplies from Pakistan. Second, and more important,
the major regional commanders who are working to
forge insurgent unity and durable political and
military insitutions inside Afghanistan-Ismail Khan
in the west, Ahmad Shah Masood in the north, and
Mullah Malang in the south - have historically been
able to fend for themselves with materials captured
from Soviet and Afghan regime forces.
We regard the Ghowr conference as the strongest
manifestation yet of the insurgent commanders'
growing dissatisfaction with the endless bickering and
disunity of the seven party leaders. Although
nominally held under the banner of the Jamiat-i-
Islami, the Ghowr meeting involved commanders
from all seven insurgent parties and focused on
outlining political and military activities that could be
undertaken by the commanders without external
assistance. Although a break between the
commanders and the party leaders is unlikely in the
near term, the rift between the commanders and their
Peshawar-based political chiefs will grow unless the
alliance begins to show signs of internal unity and
promotes a policy that approximates the attitudes
displayed by the Ghowr conference.
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The New Afghan Constitution:
No Magna Carta
On 15 July, Kabul unveiled the draft of a new Afghan
constitution that it claimed would serve as the basis
for peace and reconciliation" within Afghanistan.
According to Kabul media reports, the regime intends
the draft constitution to be the subject of a national
debate among all segments of society-including
resistance groups. Articles in the constitution
purportedly ensure human rights and provide the
mechanisms for turning the current one-party state
into a multiparty political system. In our judgment,
however, the draft constitution is intended to
perpetuate the dominance of the People's Democratic
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)-the Afghan
Communists-and is little more than a propaganda
exercise.
The seven chapters of the new constitution include
sections on the rights of citizens; foreign and domestic
policy; and the organization and powers of the
legislative, judicial, and executive branches of
government. The draft constitution is intended to
replace the 1980 "Fundamental Principles of the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan," which called
for "all-out cooperation with the Soviet Union" and
established the current system of one-party
government.
the regime claimed the Fundamental
Principles were only an interim measure until a new
constitution could be drawn up and a national election
held.
Party Politics-The Usual Suspects
A major feature of the draft constitution is its
provision for the creation of a multiparty political
system. We believe this represents an attempt to win
non-Communist collaborators, rather than genuine
Soviet and regime willingness to share power. The
regime's "Law on Political Parties," released along
with the constitution, requires all new parties to apply
to the government for their charters. According to this
law, the new parties are to affiliate with the National
Front (formerly the National Fatherland Front), a
grouping of proregime nonparty figures reported by
sources of varying reliability to be controlled and
directed by the PDPA. According to speeches by
Najib, new parties must support the regime's national
reconciliation program and the "consolidation of
traditional and historic friendship with the Soviet
Union." A party that fails to obey these rules may,
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The regime may already be taking steps to create
"independent" parties under these provisions.
the PDPA set
Hizbi Islami would represent
proregime religious leaders; Hizbi Dehqanan would
be organized from existing farmers' unions to
represent the peasantry, and Hizbi Boozwa would
represent small businessmen. We believe existing
regime front groups such as the National Front have
failed in their efforts to broaden the regime's popular
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front groups are ineffective outside Kabul, are widely
perceived as "Communist puppets," and suffer from
the same divisions as the Kabul regime. We believe
the new parties will not expand their membership
beyond the same small pool of party members,
government bureaucrats, and previously co-opted
tribal leaders.
The Legislative and Executive Branches
All nonparty policy and legislation is in theory
handled by the Revolutionary Council-a group of
about 146 senior party members and "independent"
figures chosen for their proregime views. Najib, the
President of the Revolutionary Council, is both head
of state and Secretary General of the PDPA.
According to official regime statements, the
Revolutionary Council is to regularly convene loya
jirgas, or popular councils of tribal and religious
leaders, to appoint Council members and set overall
regime policy. According to media and US diplomatic
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Selected Articles of the Draft Constitution of the
Kabul Regime
In the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, political
parties are allowed to be formed provided the
platform, charter, and activity of the party are not
opposed to the values embodied in the constitution
and laws of the Democratic Republic.
The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan is the
organizer and guardian of the implementation of
national reconciliation policy in Afghanistan. The
PDPA shall struggle for justice and social progress.
In the Democratic Republic of Afganistan, freedom of
religious rites is guaranteed to all Muslims.
Followers of other religions are fully entitled to
perform their religious rites provided they do not
disturb public peace and order.
No citizen has the right to use religion for
antinational and antipeople propaganda purposes,
creation of enmity, and commission of other deeds
contrary to the interests of the Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan.
Punishment incompatible with human dignity,
torture, and harassment are prohibited.
Citizens of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
enjoy the right of freedom of thought and expression.
No one has the right to exercise the rights and
liberties enshrined in the law against public interest.
The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan supports
the struggle of the peoples and nations for peace,
national independence, democracy, social progress,
and the right of nations to self-determination and
fights against colonialism, neocolonialism,
imperialism, Zionism, racism, apartheid, and
fascism.
Whenever the preservation of independence, national
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and internal security
become impossible through the channels provided for
in this constitution due to war, danger of war,
disturbances, or similar conditions, a state of
emergency may be proclaimed by the
President ... (who may) suspend or renew provisions
of this constitution.
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Secret
PARTY AND STATE STRUCTURE, 1980-PRESENT
PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY
OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA)
[_Politburo
Lralcom:ttJrlee
Commissioners:
Districts
PDPA
Subdistrict level
Commissioners:
Subdistricts
L District level
Jirga
Subdistrict level
jirga
reporting, however, the regime has limited this while ensuring continued PDPA domination. The new
popular participation to show jirgas that have legislative system described in the draft constitution
unanimously praised regime policy and the Soviet would replace the Revolutionary Council with a
presence. bicameral National Assembly-made up of a House 25X1
of Representatives and a Senate-and a loya Jirga of
The draft constitution's planned reorganization of the government ministers. A president elected by this
Kabul regime's apparatus, in our view, presents the
image of wider public participation in government
PDPA
Province Level
f!
STATE
INSTITUTIONS
Prime Minister
Revolutionary Council
President
Revolutionary Council1
Revolutionary Council - - - .4
L
Selection
Supervision/control
-------Loys Jirps is
convened by the
Revolutionary Council
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Secret
PROPOSED STATE STRUCTURE
STATE INSTITUTIONS
President
i/3/ \,1/3
House of
Representatives
2/3 2/3
Governors;
Provinces
Loya Jirga
Provincial level
jirga
District level
jirga
Subdistrict level
jirga
Commissioners;
Districts
loya Jirga would retain veto power and the right to
dissolve the legislature or suspend the constitution.
The position of Prime Minister-frequently
mentioned as a possible post for a nonparty figure-
will be given little real power. The constitution does
not specify that the president must be a party
member. According to the US Embassy in Kabul,
Najib has hinted that nonparty members such as
former King Zahir Shah might be eligible. We believe
*President chooses one-third of the
Senate and House; the other two-thirds
are chooses by the district level jirga.
the mechanisms for choosing members of the loya
Jirga will ensure continued party domination. In our
view, Najib's appointment as President of the
Revolutionary Council and head of state on 30
September 1987 was meant to strengthen his position
during the transition to a new government
organization.
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According to the draft constitution, two-thirds of the
members of the House and Senate will be chosen in a
national election, while the remaining third will be
appointed by the government leadership.' This
election will almost certainly be limited to areas
controlled by the regime and be subject to massive
fraud. According to reporting from the US Embassy
in Kabul, previous elections held by the Kabul regime
have been run by the Afghan intelligence service
KHAD, which used threats of jail and beatings to
discourage dissenting votes.
Proposed changes in the loya jirga also appear
intended to further regime control. Loya jirgas are
traditionally gatherings of tribal and ethnic leaders
who, according to academic reporting, used their
personal power to win concessions from the central
government in return for their support. The new
constitution, however, calls for a loya jirga made up
of government officials and leading citizens chosen by
the National Front. In our view, this attempt to use
traditional Afghan institutions to further the Kabul
regime's claim to legitimacy will backfire. We do not
believe tribal or regional groups are likely to view a
loya jirga so completely dominated by regime figures
as legitimate.
Human Rights-Legislating Loopholes
In our view, the articles describing the basic rights of
Afghan citizens are designed to answer foreign
criticism of the regime's human rights abuses and do
not offer genuine protection. The articles forbid
torture and unwarranted search and seizure and call
for freedom of religion, thought, and expression. Later
articles, however, state that these rights may not be
exercised "against the public interest." Provisions are
also made within the constitution for the President to
suspend civil rights in case of "war, danger of war,
disturbances, or similar conditions"-all of which, in
our view, could be used by the regime to justify
continued human rights abuses. According to the US
Mission to the United Nations in Vienna, UN Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights Ermacora has also
criticized article 117's provision for the creation of
' The appointment of one-third of the legislature is similar to the
arrangement during the parliamentary period in the 1960s when,
according to academic sources, the King appointed one-thrid of the
"specialized courts." According to Ermacora, the
article would permit the regime's continued use of
revolutionary courts and show trials for political
dissidents.
No Fresh Start
We believe the many loopholes in the draft
constitution and its premise of continued PDPA
domination indicate that the regime's current offers
are little more than propaganda ploys. Soviet and
regime leaders have already tried to use the
constitution in their campaign for wider international
recognition. According to the US Embassy in Kabul,
Foreign Minister Wakil used the constitution's pro-
Islam statements as the basis for his claims that
Afghanistan should be readmitted to the Islamic
Conference Organization. In early September the
Soviet representative to the UN Human Rights
Commission tried to introduce a resolution praising
the new constitution and the national reconciliation
campaign, according to the US Mission to the United
Nations in Geneva. We believe the new constitution
has also played a central role in the Soviet and
Afghan regime lobbying before the UN General
Assembly vote on Pakistan's Afghanistan Resolution.
In our view, the new constitution will only marginally
affect the Kabul regime's lack of domestic and
international legitimacy. We believe promises of
human rights will not win much support when the
regime's large-scale abuses are so well documented.
Similarly, the offer to share power with any resistance
group willing to endorse the Soviet presence seems
disingenuous. The most likely result of an attempt to
implement the draft constitution will be increased
regime factionalism as the proposed organizational
changes increase governmental disarray and threaten
established power bases within the regime.
Soviet and regime leadership had expected their
national reconciliation program to split the resistance
and win over many Afghan refugees. We believe the
release of the new constitution shows an intention to
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continue the program-despite its apparent failure-
for at least the near term.
the Khalqi and Babrak Karmal
factions in the PDPA opposed national reconciliation
from the beginning. In our view, Najib believes these
factions would use an admission of the program's
failure to oust him from power. Najib and the Soviets
are likely to use the draft constitution as part of their
continuing effort to win some form of visible success.
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Afghan Paramilitary Forces
An Overview
The Afghan regime deploys several paramilitary
forces to help the army maintain control in the
countryside and to expand the influence of the ruling
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).
These groups are designed to combat the insurgency,
extend regime control to outlying areas, and help
integrate the rural population into the PDPA. In our
view, these units have substantial problems and have
not achieved their political or military goals.
Background
Kabul has been using paramilitary forces-especially
police-type units and tribal militias-since the
Marxist coup of April 1978 installed the PDPA in
power. Cuban officials assisted in establishing the
first Defense of the Revolution militia units in late
1979. In addition to their military functions, these
forces allow the regime to establish a minimal
presence in some regions.
regime officials believe the militias
enable Kabul to integrate traditional elements of
Afghan society into structures controlled by the
PDPA. Most groups are designed to force the local
population into accepting the Kabul regime as part of
their lives. The deployment of these units away from
their homes also works to Kabul's advantage because
these previously uncommitted militia forces are
exposed to insurgent attacks, which usually creates a
permanent vendetta between the two groups.
The army's growing inability to prosecute the war has
led the Kabul regime to become more dependent upon
paramilitary forces, in our view. Recent indications
suggest that the Afghan sarandoy (police), Defense of
the Revolution units, and various tribal groups are
seeing more combat. The army, handicapped by high
casualty and desertion rates, inadequate training, and
low morale, cannot shoulder the burden of the
counterinsurgency. We believe, however, that these
paramilitary groups have proved to be little better
than the regular army in dealing with the insurgents.
Evolution and Role
In our view, paramilitary forces are primarily
intended to maintain a measure of self-defense,
support the PDPA's presence in areas where regular
army units are unavailable, and integrate traditional
society into the Marxist structures of the current
regime. These units have been a major factor in the
regime's counterinsurgency efforts since the PDPA
assumed power in 1978. For example, sarandoy units,
responsible for securing regime installations in Kabul
and in the provincial capitals, were established shortly
after the regime came to power. Defense of the
Revolution forces and tribal militias were formed in
outlying regions to frustrate insurgent infiltration at
about the same time,
Defense
of the Revolution forces consisted mostly of local
citizens who were trained and equipped to secure
provincial outposts. By 1980 additional units were
established in other villages. Since 1978 the Kabul
regime has armed and supplied tribes along the
border with Pakistan in the hope that they would
block insurgent passage.
Paramilitary groups took on a more active role in the
early 1980s, when the regime realized that its regular
forces could not quickly eliminate the insurgency,
even with Soviet aid. In 1980, Kabul gradually
increased the offensive capabilities of some groups,
For
example, the regime authorized uniforms and
increased supplies to Defense of the Revolution units,
Some of these forces
began participating in combat operations with regular
army forces later in 1980. Kabul evidently transferred
Defense of the Revolution units from the party's
control to the Ministry of Interior to centralize
management of its paramilitary forces by 1982.
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Sarandoy. This combined police-light infantry force
under the Ministry of Interior is the largest and most
capable regime paramilitary unit. In late 1984, the
sarandoy sforce was expanded, given new weaponry,
and assigned more tasks. We estimate total sarandoy
manpower at 15,000 to 20,000, about 35 to 40 percent
of the authorized level,
We believe that the sarandoy is responsible
for maintaining the regime's presence in provincial
capitals and supporting the regular army in combat
operations.
Defense of the Revolution. These forces consist of two
paramilitary organizations under the control of the
Interior Ministry. These units are primarily
responsible for carrying the regime's Marxist
message to outlying regions and providing military
support to regular army units. We do not know the
size of these forces. The two subunits are:
? Revolution Defender units, which consist of poorly
armed tribal militias in each province. They are
responsible for securing their villages against
insurgent attacks.
Recent Developments
By the mid-1980s paramilitary forces were beginning
to assume more combat responsibilities. In late 1984,
Kabul, for example, expanded the sarandoy by giving
it new weaponry and assigning it more tasks,
By late
1986 sarandoy units were conducting their own
independent reconnaissance operations. According to
sources of the US Embassy, sarandoy units were
deployed on the frontline, manning artillery positions
during large-scale operations in Paghman this past
June.
For most of 1987 the sarandoy has been ineffective
despite its larger role in the counterinsurgency,
according to the US Embassy. In late March
sarandoy forces suffered serious casualties in
Qandahar. In May, Embassy sources reported that
? Soldiers of the Revolution units-first seen in
1985-consisting of party members or candidate
members who act as armed propagandists for
Kabul in rural areas. We believe their function is
almost entirely propaganda, although there has
been recent reporting suggesting they also support
military operations.
Tribal Militias. The Ministry of State Security and
the Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs have
supported and armed various tribes and former
insurgents to limit guerrilla infiltration from
Pakistan
in late 1986, the Kabul regime has attached
these tribal forces to army divisions to participate in
operations on their territory. The regime's one major
recruitment, Ismatullah Muslim Achakzai and his
force of almost 1,000 men, hampered insurgent
resupply into Qandahar during the first half of 1986
before guerrilla successes and Ismatullah's feuding
with Kabul diminished his effectiveness.
sarandoy forces suffered additional losses in
Laghman. A month later, in Paktia, large numbers of
sarandoy-recently transferred from Kabul-
the regime
has been bolstering its Defense of the Revolution
forces. In 1985, Kabul established Soldiers of the
Revolution units, an elite militia organization
consisting solely of members or candidates from the
PDPA or its youth wing. These units, primarily
responsible for publicizing the regime's ideology, were
generally well armed, mobile, and active as of a year
ago In our view, Kabul
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Secret
has also reestablished several Revolution Defender
groups on a smaller scale. We judge that these groups
are little more than an armed and untrained citizenry.
We believe Kabul's efforts to win military support
from various tribes have failed, except for the
recruitment of former insurgent commander
Ismatullah Muslim Achakzai and his tribal adherents
from Qandahar in April 1985. Achakzai's men
curtailed guerrilla resupply along the 120-kilometer-
long Chaman-Qandahar road in early 1986,
according to sources of varying reliability. Tribal
differences, increasing insurgent attacks, and
problems with Kabul ultimately weakened his force's
grip on the area in late 1986. Other attempts to gain
tribal support have been unsuccessful. Many tribal
chiefs have accepted weapons, money, and other
inducements from the regime but refused to support
Kabul's initiatives.
the regime has established several tribal
regiments" in eastern Afghanistan. Although we
know little about these groups, they have had almost
no impact, in our view.
Chronic Problems
The effectiveness of the Afghan paramilitary forces
has been hampered by the same problems that have
hurt the regular army - limited manpower, a lack of
equipment and training, low morale, and collusion
with the resistance.
Manpower. In our view, the Afghan army has priority
for the limited manpower available to the regime. As
most regime units are seriously under strength, we
judge that the number of forcibly conscripted males
available to the paramilitary forces is extremely
limited. This shortage is compounded by high
casualties. In late 1986 the Soviet press reported that
the sarandoy had suffered 6,500 killed during the
war, a significant number given their limited size.
These constraints have forced Kabul to adopt
desperate measures to staff these forces. For example,
in April and May 1987 the regime released prisoners
into the custody of the sarandoy,
Defense of the Revolution forces have resorted to
recruiting women to fill the ranks of some units.
comparatively well equipped,
Weapons and Training. Most paramilitary units are
handicapped by a lack of weapons and inadequate
training. Sarandoy units are an exception and are
Several sarandoy units deploy a mix of
Soviet armored vehicles in addition to 82-mm
mortars. Given the poor performance of the sarandoy
during engagements with the insurgents earlier this
year, we judge that the sarandoy cannot take
advantage of this equipment.
Most Defense of the Revolution units are poorly
equipped, in our view, and are often armed with
antiquated weapons. For example, a photo appearing
in the government-controlled press earlier this year
showed a Nangarhar-based defender group armed
with British single-shot rifles and World War II
Soviet submachineguns. Ammunition for these
weapons is probably in short supply. Soldiers of the
Revolution units are better armed,
till lack modern
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Morale. Morale within the regime's paramilitary 25X1
units has been chronically poor, and recent events
have worsened the situation, in our view. In mid-
February Soviet advisers, dissatisfied with the
sarandoy's performance in Kabul, ordered army and
state security forces to replace some sarandoy units in
the capital, according to Embassy reporting. The
redeployment of as many as 2,500 sarandoy forces to 25X1
less secure provincial cities prompted a riot at Kabul
Airport that required the personal intervention of
Interior Minister Gulabzoi. By March, according to
an Embassy source, sarandoy personnel were paying
bribes to prevent reassignment from Kabul. In an
unrelated development, two sarandoy battalions
based in Baghlan defected with their weapons to the
insurgents earlier this year after killing their Soviet
advisers
Other paramilitary groups have suffered similar
morale problems.
female members belonging to northern-based Defense
of the Revolution units have been abused by fellow 25X1
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militiamen or party members with whom they are
supposed to work. In February a tribal militia
battalion and 20 army officers attached to the 18th
Infantry Division in Mazar-e Sharif defected to the
insurgency with all their weaponry,
Insurgent Collusion. We believe that many sarandoy
units have been penetrated by insurgent forces, and
some outposts manned by the sarandoy have reached
an accommodation with the guerrillas. There have
been cases of active complicity between sarandoy
officials and the resistance. In October 1985 the chief
of the Lowgar Province sarandoy was arrested for
actively working for the guerrillas
colluded extensively with the insurgency.
Defense of the Revolution
units often have tacit agreements with local guerrillas
to leave each other alone
the Kabul regime has been
assigning out-of-area militiamen to different Defense
of the Revolution posts to hinder collaboration with
local insurgents. In other instances, some Defense of
the Revolution forces request extra ammunition based
on exaggerated expenditure reports in order to pass
the excess to the resistance,
Weakened Cooperation
The effectiveness of the paramilitary forces has been
handicapped by bureacratic infighting in the regime,
in our view. Friction regarding overall provincial
authority between the local sarandoy commander, the
regular army, and provincial officials has reduced the
effectiveness of the sarandoy,
In Qandahar the sarandoy and the military
maintained only minimal cooperation during
operations last year, a result of personal animosities
between the commander of the II Corps and the
provincial sarandoy chief
OThe lack of cooperation,
prevented the
government from exerting greater control in
Qandahar city. Government counterinsurgency efforts
in Herat were hindered last September when the
sarandoy commander refused to obey the order of the
army commander,
The regime's relative success with Ismatullah's tribal
militia ended largely because of Kabul's interference
in the group's operations. The turning point occurred
in October 1986 when the regime replaced a post
commander without consulting Ismatullah,
Ismatullah killed the
office in Qandahar, killing 27 officials.
appointee, prompting the regime to retaliate by killing
an undetermined number of militiamen. Ismatullah's
forces countered by opening fire on a Kabul regime
Marginal Political Success
The continued existence of paramilitary groups
suggests that Kabul has made marginal gains in
winning tribal support and expanding its influence to
the countryside. In some cases, the regime has been
able to recruit new party members from the ranks of
the paramilitary organizations. Most of these militias
lack enthusiasm, political motivation, and
organization
Several of these ostensibly proregime groups are
probably cooperating with the insurgency.
Outlook
Kabul will probably continue to develop its
paramilitary forces because they are an inexpensive
means of maintaining a limited regime presence in the
outer regions and they free army troops from static
defensive positions. In our view, these units will
continue to be only marginally effective because of
manpower, equipment, and morale problems.
In our view, an expansion in militia personnel or their
outposts would be an indicator that the regime can
expand its influence. Success for Kabul's proposed
national reconciliation campaign, which ensures
continued PDPA control, would probably be best
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demonstrated in a proliferation of outposts in areas
that were considered to be proresistance or neutral.
Such activity is unlikely in the near term.
We judge that most of the regime's paramilitary
groups will quickly disintegrate in the event of a
Soviet troop withdrawal. Most guerrilla groups will
attempt to increase their control of the countryside to
bolster their party's influence during the withdrawal
by attacking vulnerable militia posts. Regular army
support is unlikely as they probably will be deployed
to key cities to protect regime personnel and
installations.
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