NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP05S02029R000300950001-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
64
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 18, 2012
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 14, 1987
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP05S02029R000300950001-9.pdf3.78 MB
Body: 
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP05502029R000300950001-9 Directorate of Intelligence Near East and South Asia Review 14 August 1987 ?`I ecre -Secret? NESA NESAR 87-019 14 August 1987 Copy 3 1 8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP05502029R000300950001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP05502029R000300950001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP05502029R000300950001-9 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP05502029R000300950001-9 Secret 25X1 Near East and South Asia Review 14 August 1987 Articles UAE-Iran: A Question of Business Over Politics The United Arab Emirates pursues a policy of accommodation and nonconfrontation with Iran to deter Iranian aggression. Despite its pro-Iraqi stance in the Iran-Iraq war and its support for Gulf Cooperation Council regional security initiatives, shared economic interests will act as a strong deterrent to a deterioration in UAE relations with Iran. Iraq: Seeking To Improve Its Manpower Resources Iraq's significant population disadvantage is a weak link in its strategy of combating Iran's war of attrition. In the aftermath of heavy casualties earlier this year, Iraq is taking steps to reallocate its manpower to improve economic performance and keep up military force levels. Syria-Turkey: Kurds and Border Security Page 1 7 The tenuous Syrian-Turkish reconciliation, which has been strained by Kurdish attacks in southeast Turkey this year, was bolstered by Turkish Prime Minister Ozal's visit to Damascus in mid-July. Syria hoped to demonstrate good faith by promising to help secure the border with Turkey from Kurdish insurgency. Lebanese Forces Militia Gaining Momentum Samir Ja Ja, leader of the Christian Lebanese Forces militia, appears increasingly determined to achieve preeminence in Lebanon's Christian community. Although Ja Ja is likely to seek to limit the potential fallout of his initiatives, his actions could provoke another major crisis in Beirut. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 11 25X1 25X1 25X1 15 25X1 Secret NESA NESAR 87-019 14 August 1987 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP05502029R000300950001-9 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP05502029R000300950001-9 Secret Lebanon: Hizballah's Future and Its War on the West the radical pro-Iranian Shia Hizballah is facing the end of its "heroic age" of easy successes, and a divisive debate on future strategy is under way within the group. Although this thesis is well grounded, we believe it overstates the differences within Hizballah and is premature in predicting a split. 19 Israel: Gush Emunim Fights for Its Soul Gush Emunim, Israel's leading prosettlement lobby, is split between "moderates" who are staunchly prosettlement but opposed to vigilante activity and more radical figures who sanction confrontation with Palestinians in the occupied West Bank. The growing split in the Gush will further the decline in its influence in the National Unity government. 23 Israeli Political Goals in Latin America Israel's political aims in Central and South America are intrinsically linked to its overall foreign policy goals of building international acceptance and reducing its diplomatic isolation. Israel has provided military and technical assistance in exchange for Latin American political support, and it will make a maximum effort to preserve these ties. 27 Jordan: Undercurrent of Discontent Latent antigovernment discontent exists in Jordan among a vocal minority of the non-Palestinian segment of the population. The Jordanians' unhappiness with government policies is not widely shared despite their efforts to generate broader public support among Palestinians and Muslim fundamentalists. Jordanian Army Maintenance Problems Mounting Jordan's Army maintenance program, long considered a model for the Arab world, is experiencing severe problems that threaten to undermine the operational readiness and effectiveness of the armed forces. The deficiencies are serious and widespread and include poor management, spare parts shortages, and funding limitations. Secret ii 31 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 35 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP05502029R000300950001-9 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP05502029R000300950001-9 Secret Libya: Qadhafi's Fascist Friends Tripoli's contacts with ultrarightists are much less extensive than its ties to leftist groups and would seem to conflict with Qadhafi's professed revolutionary ideology and "antifascism." Yet these groups are willing to promote Libyan goals by various means, including propaganda, political action, and, in some cases, violence. Morocco: Hassan Calls for EC Membership Despite King Hassan's announced intention to seek admission for Morocco to the European Community, he almost certainly knows that the EC will reject the application. He probably hopes to use the bid to remind the Europeans of his country's importance and to prod them to accept closer economic and political ties to Rabat. 25X1 39 25X1 45 Arab States-Afghanistan: Resistance to Rapprochement Kuwait probably will try to use its current position as chair of the Islamic Conference Organization to soften the Conference stand on Afghanistan, but a dramatic change is unlikely. Most members of the organization are deeply suspicious of long-term Soviet motives in Afghanistan and remain firmly opposed to the Soviet presence there. 47 Insurgent Supply Caravans to Northern Afghanistan: Trucking It The Jamiat-i-Islami?one of the two largest insurgent groups and the predominant group in northern Afghanistan?plans to increase the share of its supplies delivered by truck to the area this year. Although the availability of trucks is improving, they are still in short supply, and the insurgents have only limited funds to obtain them. 51 Pakistan: New Shia Political Party Formed The Movement for the Establishment of Shia Jurisprudence (TNFJ) has become a political party to press Shia religious demands more effectively. The TNFJ may resort to violence in its effort to overcome Sunni resistance, but the small number of Shias in Pakistan will prevent it from becoming a major threat to the government. 111 53 Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP05502029R000300950001-9 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP05502029R000300950001-9 Secret India: Dissidents and Drugs India's border zones are a natural smuggling arena and a traditional sanctuary for regional dissidents. New Delhi is growing more aware that uncontrolled drug trafficking could disrupt regional relations by providing funds to antiregime elements, disr-pting efforts to increase border security, and encouraging official corruption. 25X1 25X6 65 25X1 Erratum 71 Some articles in the Near East and South Asia Review are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the view of a single analyst; an item like this will be designated as a noncoordinated view. Secret iv Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP05502029R000300950001-9 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP05502029R000300950001-9 Secret 25X1 Near East and South Asia Review Articles UAE-Iran: A Question of Business Over Politics The United Arab Emirates pursues a policy of accommodation and nonconfrontation with Iran to deter Iranian aggression. The UAE relies heavily on its shared economic interests with Iran, particularly its trade ties, to pacify Tehran's hostility. The UAE calculates that Tehran would prefer not to jeopardize the valuable commercial relationship and psychological outlet the emirates provide for Iran's foreign exchange- strapped and war-weary population. In contrast to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the UAE's less visible support for Iraq has also tempered Tehran's hostility. UAE leaders are not naive about Iranian motives in the region. As their country increasingly has become a target of Iranian military attacks and subversion, the UAE has toughened its military posture against Iran and enhanced ties to like-minded neighboring states, the United States, and the Soviet Union. UAE officials, however, are especially cautious in dealing with the United States to avoid provoking Iran. Growing disagreement within the federation over how to deal with an increasingly hostile Iran is straining interemirate relations and could weaken the federation and its support for initiatives undertaken by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Economic Ties The UAE benefits from an active economic relationship with Iran and believes that trade and joint commercial interests are major points of leverage that can be used to mollify the Iranians. Dubai and Sharjah are major transit points for a wide range of Iranian imports and a major stopping point for Iranian tourists. Dubai, for example, reexported to Iran goods worth almost $600 million in 1986. Official statistics obfuscate the extent of the close 1 commercial ties, however, and press reports indicate that the unofficial trade far exceeds official transactions. The free market system and liberal export tax regulations in Dubai and Sharjah allow Iran to earn hard currency and meet the demand for goods not available in Iran. Dhows shuttle between Dubai, Sharjah, and Bandar-e Abbas every day loaded with Iranian pistachios and carpets for the UAE and gas stoves, refrigerators, and power generators for Iran. According to press reports, Tehran has set up companies in these two emirates specifically to tap the foreign exchange holdings of expatriate Iranians. Banks jointly owned by representatives from Tehran and expatriate Iranians will allocate quotas for any Gulf-based Iranian with mixed payment in foreign exchange and Iranian rials. Trade with Iran has experienced cyclical swings linked to Iranian regulations as well as its tight foreign exchange situation, sparking tension between Iran and the various emirates. Periodically Tehran raises import duties, temporarily inducing trade recessions in Dubai and Sharjah. Press reports indicate that protests from the UAE's Iranian community to the Iranian Commerce Ministry have influenced Tehran's decision to relax its restrictions. Shared oil concessions between Iran and Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah also augur for a good working relationship. Iran has signed cooperative agreements with each except Dubai. According to the US Embassy in Abu Dhabi, Iran's revenues from the Secret NESA NESAR 87-019 14 August 1987 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP05502029R000300950001-9 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP05502029R000300950001-9 Secret Doha U.A.E.?Iran Disputed Territory and Shared Oil Concessions Iran a'.andar?e 'Abb ? s 0 Tonb?e Bozorg_4. A Tonb?e Kuchek A (Islands disputed between U.A.E. and Iran) 9.