NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP05S02029R000300950001-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
64
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 18, 2012
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 14, 1987
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP05S02029R000300950001-9.pdf | 3.78 MB |
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP05502029R000300950001-9
Directorate of
Intelligence
Near East and
South Asia Review
14 August 1987
?`I
ecre
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NESA NESAR 87-019
14 August 1987
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP05502029R000300950001-9
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Near East and
South Asia Review
14 August 1987
Articles UAE-Iran: A Question of Business Over Politics
The United Arab Emirates pursues a policy of accommodation and
nonconfrontation with Iran to deter Iranian aggression. Despite its
pro-Iraqi stance in the Iran-Iraq war and its support for Gulf
Cooperation Council regional security initiatives, shared economic
interests will act as a strong deterrent to a deterioration in UAE
relations with Iran.
Iraq: Seeking To Improve Its Manpower Resources
Iraq's significant population disadvantage is a weak link in its
strategy of combating Iran's war of attrition. In the aftermath of
heavy casualties earlier this year, Iraq is taking steps to reallocate
its manpower to improve economic performance and keep up
military force levels.
Syria-Turkey: Kurds and Border Security
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The tenuous Syrian-Turkish reconciliation, which has been strained
by Kurdish attacks in southeast Turkey this year, was bolstered by
Turkish Prime Minister Ozal's visit to Damascus in mid-July. Syria
hoped to demonstrate good faith by promising to help secure the
border with Turkey from Kurdish insurgency.
Lebanese Forces Militia Gaining Momentum
Samir Ja Ja, leader of the Christian Lebanese Forces militia,
appears increasingly determined to achieve preeminence in
Lebanon's Christian community. Although Ja Ja is likely to seek to
limit the potential fallout of his initiatives, his actions could provoke
another major crisis in Beirut.
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NESA NESAR 87-019
14 August 1987
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Lebanon: Hizballah's Future and Its War on the West
the radical pro-Iranian Shia
Hizballah is facing the end of its "heroic age" of easy successes, and
a divisive debate on future strategy is under way within the group.
Although this thesis is well grounded, we believe it overstates the
differences within Hizballah and is premature in predicting a split.
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Israel: Gush Emunim Fights for Its Soul
Gush Emunim, Israel's leading prosettlement lobby, is split between
"moderates" who are staunchly prosettlement but opposed to
vigilante activity and more radical figures who sanction
confrontation with Palestinians in the occupied West Bank. The
growing split in the Gush will further the decline in its influence in
the National Unity government.
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Israeli Political Goals in Latin America
Israel's political aims in Central and South America are intrinsically
linked to its overall foreign policy goals of building international
acceptance and reducing its diplomatic isolation. Israel has provided
military and technical assistance in exchange for Latin American
political support, and it will make a maximum effort to preserve
these ties.
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Jordan: Undercurrent of Discontent
Latent antigovernment discontent exists in Jordan among a vocal
minority of the non-Palestinian segment of the population. The
Jordanians' unhappiness with government policies is not widely
shared despite their efforts to generate broader public support
among Palestinians and Muslim fundamentalists.
Jordanian Army Maintenance Problems Mounting
Jordan's Army maintenance program, long considered a model for
the Arab world, is experiencing severe problems that threaten to
undermine the operational readiness and effectiveness of the armed
forces. The deficiencies are serious and widespread and include poor
management, spare parts shortages, and funding limitations.
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Libya: Qadhafi's Fascist Friends
Tripoli's contacts with ultrarightists are much less extensive than its
ties to leftist groups and would seem to conflict with Qadhafi's
professed revolutionary ideology and "antifascism." Yet these
groups are willing to promote Libyan goals by various means,
including propaganda, political action, and, in some cases, violence.
Morocco: Hassan Calls for EC Membership
Despite King Hassan's announced intention to seek admission for
Morocco to the European Community, he almost certainly knows
that the EC will reject the application. He probably hopes to use the
bid to remind the Europeans of his country's importance and to prod
them to accept closer economic and political ties to Rabat.
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Arab States-Afghanistan: Resistance to Rapprochement
Kuwait probably will try to use its current position as chair of the
Islamic Conference Organization to soften the Conference stand on
Afghanistan, but a dramatic change is unlikely. Most members of
the organization are deeply suspicious of long-term Soviet motives in
Afghanistan and remain firmly opposed to the Soviet presence there.
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Insurgent Supply Caravans to Northern Afghanistan: Trucking It
The Jamiat-i-Islami?one of the two largest insurgent groups and
the predominant group in northern Afghanistan?plans to increase
the share of its supplies delivered by truck to the area this year.
Although the availability of trucks is improving, they are still in
short supply, and the insurgents have only limited funds to obtain
them.
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Pakistan: New Shia Political Party Formed
The Movement for the Establishment of Shia Jurisprudence (TNFJ)
has become a political party to press Shia religious demands more
effectively. The TNFJ may resort to violence in its effort to
overcome Sunni resistance, but the small number of Shias in
Pakistan will prevent it from becoming a major threat to the
government.
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India: Dissidents and Drugs
India's border zones are a natural smuggling arena and a traditional
sanctuary for regional dissidents. New Delhi is growing more aware
that uncontrolled drug trafficking could disrupt regional relations by
providing funds to antiregime elements, disr-pting efforts to
increase border security, and encouraging official corruption.
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Erratum
71
Some articles in the Near East and South Asia Review are preliminary views of a
subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as
appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent
the view of a single analyst; an item like this will be designated as a
noncoordinated view.
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Articles
UAE-Iran: A Question of
Business Over Politics
The United Arab Emirates pursues a policy of
accommodation and nonconfrontation with Iran to
deter Iranian aggression. The UAE relies heavily on
its shared economic interests with Iran, particularly
its trade ties, to pacify Tehran's hostility. The UAE
calculates that Tehran would prefer not to jeopardize
the valuable commercial relationship and
psychological outlet the emirates provide for Iran's
foreign exchange- strapped and war-weary
population. In contrast to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,
the UAE's less visible support for Iraq has also
tempered Tehran's hostility.
UAE leaders are not naive about Iranian motives in
the region. As their country increasingly has become a
target of Iranian military attacks and subversion, the
UAE has toughened its military posture against Iran
and enhanced ties to like-minded neighboring states,
the United States, and the Soviet Union. UAE
officials, however, are especially cautious in dealing
with the United States to avoid provoking Iran.
Growing disagreement within the federation over how
to deal with an increasingly hostile Iran is straining
interemirate relations and could weaken the
federation and its support for initiatives undertaken
by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Economic Ties
The UAE benefits from an active economic
relationship with Iran and believes that trade and
joint commercial interests are major points of
leverage that can be used to mollify the Iranians.
Dubai and Sharjah are major transit points for a wide
range of Iranian imports and a major stopping point
for Iranian tourists. Dubai, for example, reexported to
Iran goods worth almost $600 million in 1986.
Official statistics obfuscate the extent of the close
1
commercial ties, however, and press reports indicate
that the unofficial trade far exceeds official
transactions.
The free market system and liberal export tax
regulations in Dubai and Sharjah allow Iran to earn
hard currency and meet the demand for goods not
available in Iran. Dhows shuttle between Dubai,
Sharjah, and Bandar-e Abbas every day loaded with
Iranian pistachios and carpets for the UAE and gas
stoves, refrigerators, and power generators for Iran.
According to press reports, Tehran has set up
companies in these two emirates specifically to tap the
foreign exchange holdings of expatriate Iranians.
Banks jointly owned by representatives from Tehran
and expatriate Iranians will allocate quotas for any
Gulf-based Iranian with mixed payment in foreign
exchange and Iranian rials.
Trade with Iran has experienced cyclical swings
linked to Iranian regulations as well as its tight
foreign exchange situation, sparking tension between
Iran and the various emirates. Periodically Tehran
raises import duties, temporarily inducing trade
recessions in Dubai and Sharjah. Press reports
indicate that protests from the UAE's Iranian
community to the Iranian Commerce Ministry have
influenced Tehran's decision to relax its restrictions.
Shared oil concessions between Iran and Abu Dhabi,
Dubai, and Sharjah also augur for a good working
relationship. Iran has signed cooperative agreements
with each except Dubai. According to the US
Embassy in Abu Dhabi, Iran's revenues from the
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NESA NESAR 87-019
14 August 1987
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Doha
U.A.E.?Iran Disputed Territory and Shared Oil Concessions
Iran
a'.andar?e
'Abb ? s
0 Tonb?e Bozorg_4. A
Tonb?e Kuchek A
(Islands disputed between
U.A.E. and Iran) 9.