INDICATIONS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN KEY COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000300450003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of
Intelligence
Indications of
Political Instability
in Key Countries
January 1985
sKm--
GI IPI 85-001
January 1985
Copy 673
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Secret
Erratum Notice to recipients of DI document Indications of Political Instability in Key
Countries, GI IPI 85-001 January 1985. F---]
The two graphics on page 17 are incorrect. The yellow and green indicators were
inadvertently reversed.
0673
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Directorate of
Intelligence
in Key Countries
Indications of
Political Instability
suggestions are welcome and may be directed to
This quarterly was produced by and coordinated
within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and
Secret
GI IN 85-001
January 1985
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Indications of
Political Instability
in Key Countries
This quarterly publication is designed to provide timely warning of
significant instability in countries of key importance to US interests. The
quarterly, which in this issue includes data from 1 October to 31 December
1984, examines events and processes that could lead to major regime or
policy changes. Although there are instances where the paper provides
short-term warnings of coups or collapse, it is primarily designed to address
the potential for instability during the next two years through the
consistent application of 94 indicators. Those countries for which indicators
have changed significantly or which are otherwise of special interest are
treated in detail in the text.
The quarterly includes three parts:
? Part 1 includes an overview of developments during the quarter, a chart
summarizing the status of key indicators, a brief narrative assessment of
each country, and country-specific tables tracing political and economic
changes during the past several years. We assess 30 countries that we
have identified as particularly salient to US interests because they are
strategic choke points, major oil producers or debtors, key US friends or
allies, geographically close to the United States, or especially influential
in the Third World.
? Part 2 presents a more detailed assessment of select countries in which
there have been developments of interest. Included in each assessment
are subsections listing indicators to be watched with reference to the
scenarios that we believe are most likely to unfold and alternative
scenarios.
? Part 3 provides a reference list of the 94 indicators.
Secret
GI IPI 85-001
January 1985
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Summary: Sudan and Nigeria again showed the highest level of instability, reflecting
Levels of Concern the odds for a coup in both countries. Analysts foresaw substantial
instability in eight other countries-in the Philippines because of the
expected succession crisis; in Peru, where the government is under fire for
ineffectiveness against insurgency and economic distress; in India, given
sharpened sectarian divisions; in Chile because President Pinochet's hard
line has antagonized many sectors, including the military; in Guatemala
because of continuing political polarization; in El Salvador, where the war
continues unaffected by dialogue between the government and the guerril-
las; and in Iran and Iraq, which are still at war.
Analysts expressed moderate concern about the outlook in 10 of the 30
countries covered. Honduras faces a potentially unsettling election this
year. Turkey will confront heightened terrorism as well as economic
troubles. Morocco and Egypt will also have to cope with discontent over
economic issues. The odds are lower regarding the threat of an Indian
attack on Pakistan, but President Zia's domestic opposition may become
more active. Growing alienation of the Kikuyus could lead to an assassina-
tion attempt on Kenya's President Moi, and in Zaire political discontent
may inspire increased dissident terrorism. Dissident leader Kim Dae Jung's
return to South Korea would substantially raise the level of instability
there. Because of hard economic times ahead, we expect increasing
problems for the governments in Argentina and Venezuela.
Analysts registered low concern about instability in Mexico, Brazil, Saudi
Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, and Indonesia. They saw no threat to
stability in Panama, Colombia, Spain, or Greece over the next two years.
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Part 1. Developments and Trends
Part 2. Countries in Which There Have Been Developments of Interest 21
29
Indicators of Political Instability 35
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Part 1. Developments and Trends
The six categories of indicators used in the following
charts are drawn from the 94 indicators presented in
Part 3. The social chang%ortflict indicators examine
developments such as labor or religious unrest that
could undermine the regime's legitimacy and ability
to rule effectively. The economicfactors link various
dimensions of economic performance to potential in-
stability. Opposition activities assess whether the
opposition can mobilize effective antiregime activity
or carry out acts that undermine public security. The
military attitudes/activities category addresses the
military's degree of dissatisfaction with regime poli-
cies, involvement in coup plotting, and behavior rele-
vant to the political process. Finally, the regime
capabilities/actions category focuses on what the gov-
ernment is doing that could lessen popular support,
otherwise undermine its authority, and affect its
ability to govern efficiently.
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 Developments in fou
rth quarter 1984
Judgme
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Status of Key Indicators
Not of concern
Low concern (last two columns)
Moderate concern
Substantial concern (last two colu
# Serious concern
A Concern has increased since
last quarter (color change)
V Concern has decreased
since last quarter (color change
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Selected Political and Economic Indicators/Developments and Trends
I II III IV
1 11 III IV
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
?
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Economic factors
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Opposition activities
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activities
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1 11 III IV
I 11 III IV
1 11 111 IV
Social change/conflict
?
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Economic factors
?
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Opposition activities
-
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Military attitudes/
activities
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External factors
to
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Regime actions/
capabilities
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+p
p
Antigovernment reaction to austerity measures and
political manipulation remains sporadic and localized,
reflecting the general success of President de la
Madrid's efforts to control discontent. Higher public-
sector spending, designed to ease social tensions and
cultivate voters before important state elections this
year, has set the stage for some economic recovery.
Unless the government deftly handles the aftermath
of the industrial accident near Mexico City, urban
unrest may rise.
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
During next six months
During next six months to two years
President Duarte's peace initiative won him national
and international acclaim, and his position appears
secure for the next six months, but political polariza-
tion bodes more instability over the longer term. The
military, leery of Duarte's plans for a cease-fire,
remains supportive of his overall policies. The guerril-
las, who expect little from the dialogue with the
government, may begin to operate in urban and other
areas thus far spared from the war
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
During next six months
During next six months to two years
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 I!II
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Selected Political and Economic Indicators/Developments and Trends
~
Social change/conflict
Economic factors
Opposition activities
Military attitudes
activities
Regime actions
capabilities
1 11
-
III
Iv
I
11
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I11 IvI
Le ?
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11
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ateg
ory
Social change'confli
Economic factors
Opposition activities
Military attitude,,
activities
Regime actions
capabilities
1
11
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11
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N
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?
Progress in returning Guatemala to civilian rule has
enhanced the standing of the Mejia government.
Despite some discontent within the military over his
economic policies, Mejia holds the support of key
commanders. Political divisiveness will continue to
endanger stability as the constitutional transition
proceeds.
Prospects %or major regime or policy change:
During next six months
During next six months to two years
President Suazo has strengthened his position in the
wake of an aborted coup plot, improving his chances
of remaining in office through the November 1985
national election. Factionalism continues to plague
the armed forces, but no military group appears
capable of challenging the current military leadership.
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
During next six months
During next six months to two years
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1982 1983 1984
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Selected Political and Economic Indicators/Developments and Trends
A] chainge/conflict
omic factors
)sition activities
Military attitudes/
activities
rnal factors
Regime actions/
capa
btlnics
1 u
u1
IV
Iv
I
II
III
1
111 IV
11
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I 11 111 IV
I 1I Ill IV
1 I1 1I1 IV
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Aternal factors
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Prospects for major regime or policy change:
? During next six months
? During next six months to two years
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1982 1983 1984
President Barletta, lacking an independent power
base and facing an uncooperative legislature, was
forced to repeal economic austerity measures because
of widespread opposition. Despite Barletta's bad start,
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
During next six months
? During next six months to two rears
Despite military concerns that guerrillas are using the
cease-fire to reorganize and rearm, we see no signs of
coup plotting or other threats to stability. Chronic
political violence has abated somewhat following the
truce, but government leaders and US officials face
an intensified threat from the drug mafia in the wake
of President Betancur's decision to extradite traffick-
ers to the United States
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Selected Political and Economic Indicators/Developments and Trends
1 11 Ill IV
1 11 111 IV
I II [I1 IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
?
Opposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
-
?
-
?
-
?
-
?
-
?
-
?
-
?
-
Military attitudes/
activities
-
-
-
N
-
ew c
ateg
ory
?
?
?
?
External factors
?
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MO
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Regime actions/
capabilities
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President Lusinchi is proving to be a skillful leader at
home, and his economic restraint has gained favor
with foreign lenders. Recent concessions to labor
aimed at cushioning the impact of austerity, however,
may provoke a backlash from the private sector and
hurt long-term economic prospects. Reports of terror-
ist activity along the border with Colombia have
raised government concern.
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
During next six months
During next six months to two years
1 11 111 IV
1 11 111 IV
1 11 III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
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Military attitudes/
activities
N
ew c
atego
ry
?
?
External factors
?
? ?
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Regime actions/
capabilities
?
?
?
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?
?
Peru's precipitous economic decline and continuing
insurgent activity continue to threaten stability. With
public attention shifting increasingly to the presiden-
tial election in April, however, Belaunde's prospects
for completing his term are strengthened. Center-left
candidate Alan Garcia remains the current favorite to
succeed Belaunde. A victory by the Marxist candi-
date, an unlikely development, would probably
prompt the military to intervene.
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
- During next six months
- During next six months to two years
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Secret
Selected Political and Economic Indicators/Developments and Trends
1 11 111 IV
I 11 111 IV! 1 11 Ill IV
change/conflict
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Social change/conflict
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Economic factors
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Opposition activities
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rt
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External factors ?
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Rccimc actions/
L
capabilities ?
?
Although some officers are concerned about a likely
opposition victory in the presidential election this
month, the military still firmly supports the process.
Social unrest remains low. Preoccupation with re-
scheduling the debt will make it difficult for the new
government to focus on urgent domestic matters,
including monetary and constitutional reform.
Prospects for motor regime or pulicr change:
During next six months
During next six months to two sears
President Alfonsin's standing is high following the
electorate's overwhelming approval of the Beagle
Channel treaty with Chile. Despite economic auster-
ity measures and continued triple-digit inflation, nei-
ther the Peronists nor the trade unions have been able
to mobilize significant opposition to the government.
Military disgruntlement with budget cuts and human
rights policies is growing, but the armed forces remain
discredited and internally divided.
Prospects for motor regime or policy change:
During next six months
During next six months to two Years
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1982
1982
1983 1984
1983 1984
o
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Secret
Selected Political and Economic Indicators/Developments and Trends
11
1 IV
1
11
I 11
11
1 IV
1 11 111 IV
cial change/ conflict
?
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)position activities
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ilitary attitudes/
N
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tivities
ew c
ateg
ory
ternal factors 1
6 ?
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gime actions/
?
?
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pahilities
1982
1983
1984
Stability is further endangered by President Pino-
chet's tough application of a new state of siege and by
his intent to abort the political transition. His actions
have antagonized the Church and led democratic
opposition leaders to work on occasion with the
radical left. Unless Pinochet holds out some promise
of political accommodation, we expect better coordi-
nated antigovernment activity after March, continu-
ing terrorism, and some erosion in military backing
M
ac
1 11 111 IV
1 11 111 IV
1 11 Ill IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
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?,
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/
activities
N
ew c
atego
ry
?
?
?
External factors
? 1
0
? ?
?
? ? ?
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?
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Regime actions/
capabilities
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_*
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?
?
1982 1983 1984
for the President.
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
During next six months
During next six months to two years
Prime Minister Gonzalez enjoys broad popular sup-
port despite the country's high unemployment. He
continues to outmaneuver the Communist-influenced
peace movement on the issue of NATO membership.
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
? During next six months
? During next six months to two years
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Selected Political and Economic Indicators/Developments and Trends
1 11 Ill IV
1 Il III IV
1 II Ill IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
?
Opposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/
activities
N
ew c
ateg
ory
?
?
?
?
External Iactors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Regime actions/
capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
1 11 111 IV
I 11 111 IV
1 11 Ill IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/
activities
acti
N
ew c
atego
ry
?
?
?
?
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Regime actions/
capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Polls indicate that Prime Minister Papandreou main-
tains a strong leadership image among the electorate.
The discouraging economic outlook and his controver-
sial foreign policies may make Papandreou politically
vulnerable with the approach of parliamentary elec-
tions later this year, but we see no threat to the
democratic system.
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
? During next six months
? During next six months to two years
We expect Kurdish guerrilla provocations and govern-
ment retaliation to lead to an increasingly serious
cycle of violence. The terrorist problem and economic
difficulties are likely to heighten tensions within the
ruling Motherland Party. These frictions could usher
in a new period of instability over the next year or
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
During next six months
During next six months to two rears
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1983
1984
 u i.
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Selected Political and Economic Indicators/Developments and Trends
1982 1983 1984
1 11 111 IV 1 11 111 IV 1 11 Ill IV Public discontent is likely to grow in coming months
social change/conflict ? ? ? ? ? as new austerity measures are implemented and as
? ?
prospects for early benefits from the union with Libya
Econo fade. We expect an upturn in student and labor
Itl lc f actors
unrest, but security forces probably will be quick to
oppt? quash protests.
loon activities ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Military attitudes/
activities
al factors
Regime actions/
t
capabilities
N
ew c
ateg
ory
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?'
change/conflict
mic factors
ition activities
Military attitudes,
i
l factors
Regime actions/
i
1
u
111
IV
1
u
III
IV
1
u
111
IV
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
N
ew c
atego
ry
?
?
?
?
a
?
?
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
I
~
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
During next six months
During next six months to two years
The Mubarak government remains in firm control
and is proceeding with economic reform and political
liberalization. The legal opposition is active but non-
confrontational, and, for at least the short term,
sectarian tensions have eased following concessions to
the Coptic community and the light sentences im-
posed on Islamic extremists.
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
During next six months
During next six months to two years
1982
1983
1 984
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Selected Political and Economic Indicators/Developments and Trends
I 11 III IV
1 11 III IV
III III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
Opposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/
activities
N
ew c
atego
ry
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
Regime actions/
capabilities
w
?
?
I II III IV
1 II III IV
1 II III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/
acti
activities
N
ew c
atego
ry
?
?
?
?
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Regime actions/
capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
President Nimeiri's moderation of his Islamization
program has temporarily weakened the opposition,
but the regime will be severely tested in coming
months. The increase in insurgent activity in the
south, which began in early December, is likely to
continue during the first part of this year. Economic
conditions are deteriorating, and unrest sparked by
food and energy shortages will make Nimeiri increas-
ingly vulnerable to a coup.
Prospects for major regime or policy change.'
During next six months
? During next six months to two years
Our concern about Iranian-backed subversion has
subsided following the relatively calm pilgrimage
(Half) last fall. The general decline in the economy is
provoking increasing criticism of the royal family's
extravagance, but the country remains basically sta-
ble.
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
During next six months
During next six months to two years
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Selected Political and Economic Indicators/Developments and Trends
1982 1983 1984
1 11 III IV 1 11 111 IV 1 11 111 IV The Ba'thist regime is firmly in control in the fifth
Social change/cont'lict ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? year of its war with Iran. Over the longer term,
however, increasing war casualties and continued
economic austerity may pose serious problems for the
s factors
i
ion activities
Military attitudes/
udes/
1 factors
action,/
Regime
capahilitics
g.
$
?
?
?
?
?
?
New c
ateg
ory
?
?
?
?
.v
,.
?
? ? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
---
Note: See page 3 for legend
Iran
Social changc/conflict
ctors
ctivities
Military attitudes,
Regime actions'
capabilities
1
11
111
IV
1
11
111
IV
I
11
111
IV
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
N
ew c
atego
ry
? ?
? ?
?
?
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
During next six months
During next six months to two years
The regime faces escalating discontent over official
corruption, economic stagnation, deteriorating public
services, and the human and financial cost of the long
war with Iraq. A post-Khomeini era looms with no
commanding figure capable of winning popular sup-
port or of containing the expected clerical infighting.
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
During next six months
During next six months to two years
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Selected Political and Economic Indicators/Developments and Trends
I II Ill IV
1 11 Ill IV
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
T
J
0
__
?
F
_
_
?
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/
activities
N
ew c
ateg
ory
?
?
?
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Regime actions/
capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
1 Il Ill IV
1 11 111 IV
1 11 Ill IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/
activities
N
ew c
atego
ry
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Regime actions/
i
-
capabilities
?
?
e
19
?
?
?
?
?
The danger of conflict with India has fallen with the
death of Indira Gandhi, and President Zia should
have little trouble managing legislative elections this
spring following the December referendum approving
his continuance in office through 1990. We expect,
however, some political backlash from Zia's high-
handed treatment of the opposition-and from his
own supporters if he welshes on preelection political
promises.
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
During next six months
During next six months to two years
Anti-Sikh violence following the assassination of In-
dira Gandhi claimed at least 2,000 lives, and sharp
Hindu-Sikh divisions will almost certainly mean fur-
ther turbulence over the next six months. Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi's leadership is yet to be tested,
but he may have a better chance than his confronta-
tional predecessor to work toward national reconcilia-
tion.
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
O During next six months
During next six months to two years
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1982 1983 1984
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Selected Political and Economic Indicators/Developments and Trends
1 II 111 IV
1 11 III IV
1 11 111 I V
?
?
---
-
---
-conomic factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
)pposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/
ctivities
N
ew c
ateg
ory
?
?
?
?
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? '
0
?
?
Regune actions/
S
i
.
.
?
.
.
?
?
?
ap abilities
.
factors
i activities
Military attitudes/
activities
actors
Regime actions
ctiom
capabilities
I 11 III IV
I 11 III IV
1 11 111 IV
-__~
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? 1
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
New c
atego
ry
?
li ? ?~
?
?
?I?
I?
?
?
?'
?
?
I?
?
?j
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
General Buhari endured in office through his first
anniversary on 31 December, but the threat of a coup
will remain high. The bleak financial outlook aggra-
vated by the weak oil market, regional and genera-
tional divisions in the armed forces, and labor and
student discontent will keep his regime or any succes-
sor regime under siege.
Prospects %ur ma/or regime or pulicr change:
? During next six months
? During next six months to two years
Increased insurgent activity in the north does not yet
threaten military control of the region, but the re-
gime's heavy security measures will further alienate
the population. Saudi assistance and a recently nego-
tiated IMF agreement should ease the economic
problems that had worsened last year, and, with the
opposition weak and fragmented, President Siad's
control is unchallenged.
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
? During next six months
During next six months to two years
1982 1983
1982 1983 1984
1984
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a
c
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Selected Political and Economic Indicators/Developments and Trends
1 II Ill IV
I II Ill IV
I II 111 IV
Social change/conflict
-
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
-
-
?
-
--
-
?
-
-
-
-
-
?
-
?
Opposition activities
?
Military attitudes/
activities
N
ew c
ateg
ory
?
?
External factors
Regime actions/
:apabilities
?
I 11 111 IV
I 11 111 Iv
1 II Ill IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities
?
-
?
-
-
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/
activities
N
-
ew c
-
atego
-
ry
-
-
-
-
-
-
External factors
Regime actions/
capabilities
- ---- -
-
?
-
-
-
-
-
J
--
-
i
l
-
-
l
-
President Moi's tactics of stifling dissent and cowing
opponents have kept his position secure. Discontent is
growing among the Kikuyu-Kenya's largest tribe,
whose political power Moi continues to whittle
away-and may spread to other sectors if food distri-
bution is perceived to be handled unfairly.F--- 25X1
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
Q During next six months
? During next six months to two years
The Mobutu regime is under no immediate threat,
although continued austerity measures probably will
lead to some expression of discontent from students
and labor. The international publicity given coup
rumors in Kinshasa and a minor rebel attack in
eastern Shaba may inspire dissidents to attempt ter-
1984
rorist activity.
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
Q During next six months
? During next six months to two years
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 I!II
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Selected Political and Economic Indicators/Developments and Trends
1 11 Ill IV
1 Il 111 IV
1 II 111 IV
)cial change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
onornic factors
?
?
pposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
ilitarv attitudes/
?
?
?
liv
ilies
N
ew c
ateg
ory
?
xtcrnal factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
egime actions/
?
IE
t
U
tE
?
?
?
?
tpahilities
L
L
L
c
M
ac
R
c:
I change/conflict
01111C faOOFS
)sition activities
ary attitudes
Milit
[ties
activ
1982 1983 1984
1 11 IV 1 11 111 IV
III IV 1 11 111
nal factors
me actions/
Regi
bilities
capa
The cycle of black unrest and government crackdowns
is expected to continue in coming months. Violence in
black townships may escalate but is unlikely to affect
white areas or threaten government stability.
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
? During next six months
During next six months to two years
Tensions in Manila were heightened by strikes and
antigovernment demonstrations, by the implication of
Armed Forces Chief of Staff Ver in the assassination
of opposition leader Benigno Aquino, and by Presi-
dent Marcos's health crisis in November. Widespread
anticipation of a succession crisis adds to the general
instability.
Prospects .for major regime or policy change:
During next six months
During next six months to two years
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
/
N
ew c
atego
ry
?
?
? '
t?
~?
? ?
?
L
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Selected Political and Economic Indicators/Developments and Trends
I II 111 IV
1 11 Ill IV
1 II III IV
octal change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
conomic factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
)pposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? .
?
?
?
ilitary attitudes/
ctivities
N
ew c
ateg
ory
?
xternal factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
egime actions/
apabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
M
a
1 11 111 IV
I II III IV
1 II 111 IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities
?
?
?
Military attitudes/
activities
N
ew c
atego
ry
?
?
?
?
External factors
?
?
Regime actions/
capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
a*
0
Although this fall's rash of bombings and antigovern-
ment violence has slowed, continuing antiregime ac-
tivity reflects chronic social tensions and rising resent-
ment of President Soeharto's suppression of Islamic
activity. Opposition groups pose no near-term threat
to the government, but the escalation in political
violence likely presages intensified anti-Soeharto ac-
tivity among Muslim radicals.
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
During next six months
During next six months to two years
President Chun's Democratic Justice Party will hold
its parliamentary majority in the February elections
but probably will fall short of a strong popular
mandate. The regime retains firm control, but we
expect an upswing in activity by student dissidents.
We are concerned that opposition leader Kim Dae
Jung's return will add to the political unrest.
Prospects for major regime or policy change:
During next six months
During next six months to two years
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 II II
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Secret
Part 2. Countries in Which There
Have Been Developments of Interest
Turkey
? Attacks by Kurdish guerrillas have increased, par-
ticularly against military installations in the south-
east.
? The government's counteroffensive has included the
destruction of Kurdish villages along the border
with Iran and Iraq and the relocation of the popula-
tion further inland.
? The government has been unable to make headway
against chronic economic problems, including a 20-
percent unemployment rate and inflation at 55
percent, and is facing increasing resistance to its
program for economic and bureaucratic reform.
? Factional bickering is growing in the ruling Mother-
land Party, and opposition parties are broadly criti-
cal of the government.
Terrorism, economic trouble, and political infight-
ing-the same set of problems that brought down or
crippled democratic governments and led to military
intervention in 1960, 1972, and 1980-once again
have surfaced. Unless an unexpected reversal of cur-
rent trends develops, we doubt that the Ozal govern-
ment will last through the next two years.
The most pressing concern for Ankara is the upsurge
in Kurdish guerrilla activity. Although Kurdish dissi-
dents have been a problem for all Turkish govern-
ments in recent decades, the scope and intensity of the
latest actions are unprecedented, and
Turkish military officers believe the
problem is worsening. We believe Kurdish provoca-
tions and government retaliation will produce a spiral
of violence that will become difficult to control. The
government's decision to eliminate Kurdish villages
Cypt
Mediterranean Sea
,ANKARA
Kury
Turkey 5'h
Soviet
Union
*NICOSIA 0 200Kifometer9k-
along parts of the border will almost certainly anger 25X1
and embolden the guerrillas, who are likely to target
not only military outposts, but also important symbols
of the state, such as government buildings and offi-
cials. Security problems may become further exacer- 25X1
bated if the guerrillas begin to collaborate with other
terrorist groups. Moreover, the ability of Kurdish
guerrillas to "disappear" across the border into Iran
and Iraq could lead to tensions between Turkey and
its neighbors, despite Ankara's efforts to maintain
good relations with Baghdad and Tehran.
The government, beset by economic and political
difficulties as well, is anxious not to appear weak or
divided on the Kurdish issue because Kurdish success-
es are likely to inspire the reactivation of other 25X1
extremist and terrorist groups. Besides creating a
cordon sanitaire along its border with Iran and Iraq,
Ankara will almost surely meet further Kurdish at-
tacks with more force of its own. 25X1
the government has decided to reinforce 25X1
local gendarmes with a new infantry division erma- 25X1
nently garrisoned in the Kurdish areas 25X1
25X1
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very important figure in contemporary Turkey, there
is sufficient commitment to the present constitutional
order-on the part of the major parties, President
Evren, and the military-to enhance its chances of
survival even if the Prime Minister is removed or the
government falls.
Key Indicators To Watch
Prospective Scenario: Support for Ozal Wanes, Lead-
ing to Increased Tension Between Evren and Ozal,
Greater Military Involvement in the Government, and
Eventual Ouster of Ozal
? Spiraling violence in southeastern Turkey requires
significantly more military resources to be diverted
to the area.
? Armenian and leftist terrorism increases, fed by
growing violence in the southeast and the perception
of the government's increasing vulnerability.
? The economy deteriorates further, with rising infla-
tion and unemployment; the institutional reforms
falter.
? Factional fighting worsens within the Motherland
Party, and members begin to defect to other parties.
? As tensions grow between Ozal and Evren, Evren
distances himself from Ozal's economic policy and
Ozal becomes disenchanted with the military's secu-
rity efforts in the southeast.
? Reports of high-ranking military authorities openly
criticizing the civilian government surface, includ-
Economic problems are even more critical to Prime
Minister Ozal's survival. Ozal came to power promis-
ing sweeping economic and administrative reforms to
make Turkey competitive in world markets. We think
his plan would produce beneficial results for the
country, but we doubt he will have time to attain his
goals. His restructuring efforts have produced many
enemies, partly because his policies clash with the
import-substitution state enterprise model that Ata-
turk espoused. Stubbornly high inflation and unem-
ployment and painfully slow progress in the reform
effort have led to some public disillusionment and
increasingly vigorous opposition, even among senior
military officers.
Ozal also is finding it hard to keep his Motherland
Party united. Unlike Turkey's other major parties,
Motherland is not heir to one of the country's princi-
pal philosophical strains, but rather is an eclectic
organization assembled primarily as an election vehi-
cle for Ozal and his colleagues. Commitment to the
party is tenuous, and other parties are encouraging
defections by Motherland Party members. We expect
tensions among the four factions in the party to grow,
creating yet another destabilizing pressure point on
the Ozal government.
Ozal's slide could be halted, particularly if the econo-
my unexpectedly perks up and terrorist problems do
not materialize as we anticipate. Without such a
reversal, however, we expect the odds against Ozal to
mount. At the same time, the eventual removal of
Ozal does not necessarily mean that the entire 1982
constitutional system will collapse. Although Ozal is a
ing rumors of coup plotting.
Indicators That Would Suggest the Prospective Sce-
nario Is Not Unfolding
? The economy stabilizes or rebounds, Ozal's policies
gain new support, and institutional reforms begin to
take hold.
? The military is able to control Kurdish guerrillas
and other manifestations of terrorism.
? Ozal is able to mitigate factional disputes within the
Motherland Party, winning a renewed sense of
loyalty and unity from the four factions of his party.
? President Evren demonstrates more support for
Ozal's policies, and the two men are seen cooperat-
ing on a broad range of issues.
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The architect of Turkey's economic stabilization
program, the 57-year-old Ozal is a highly intelligent
and skilled innovator with considerable self-confi-
dence. Despite growing political pressure and criti-
cism, Ozal has not wavered from his program. A
workaholic, he has maintained an exhausting pace in
personally managing both the government and his
is a pragmatic and judicious decisionmaker with a
broad international perspective and good negotiating
skills. Generally low-key and nonconfrontational, he
nevertheless demands accountability and is a tough
administrator. Although he usually seeks irforma-
tion from various sources, he can become singlemind-
ed when he sees his goals in jeopardy, ignoring
dissatisfaction and threats to his leadership, and
assuming even more of the burdens of decisionmak-
ing.
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? Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by
two Sikh members of her personal security guard on
? Post-assassination anti-Sikh violence, primarily in
northern cities, killed at least 2,000 persons.
? Hindu officers pulled some Sikhs from paramilitary
ranks and restricted others to quarters during the
violence, and a few Sikhs were removed from
sensitive military assignments.
? In elections held on 24 and 27 December, the
Congress Party held its majority in Parliament, and
Rajiv Gandhi was again selected Prime Minister.
Sharp political and social divisions will almost cer-
tainly keep turbulence at high levels in coming
months, and the many remaining questions about
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's leadership ability
make the long-term outlook highly uncertain. We are
particularly concerned about sectarian and separatist
threats to political stability. Nevertheless, we believe
there is a reasonably good chance that efforts at
political accommodation, national pride, and a possi-
ble reinvigoration of the ruling Congress Party will
keep Indian democracy alive over the next two years.
Despite the conventional wisdom before Indira Gan-
dhi's assassination that her son, Rajiv, was not ready
to follow in his mother's footsteps-and his own
assertions to that effect-he moved astutely to estab-
lish himself as an assertive leader representing stabil-
ity and continuity. Within hours after her death,
Rajiv took office as Prime Minister in a smooth and
constitutional transfer of power. He quickly deployed
troops to stop Hindu retaliation against Sikhs. His
rapid move to hold elections caught the opposition
offguard, won him a substantial sympathy vote, and
legitimized his authority. Favoring his political suc-
cess are the inherited magic of his name, his age and
modernist outlook, and his lack of personal enemies.
He probably will work to reverse the atrophy afflict-
ing the Congress Party that resulted from Indira's use
of the organization as an instrument of personal
power.
Although Gandhi has made an impressive start, we
are unsure whether he has the desire and dedication to
handle the challenges posed by communal separatists
and political rivals. Sikh extremists probably consti-
tute the biggest threat. Assassination attempts seem
highly likely, and in Punjab-where Sikhs are a
majority-radicals may try to embarrass Gandhi by
provoking communal violence, leading antigovern-
ment demonstrations, and disrupting the sale and
shipment of grain to the rest of India. Ethnic violence
may flare anew in Assam to test the new govern-
ment's willingness to address political demands and
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capacity to prevent civil disorder. Gandhi also will be
harassed by sniping from opposition leaders and dis-
gruntled Congress Party activists who resent the
Nehru dynasty or are shut out of the inner circle.
We think a significant threat to India's stability lies in
the weakening of the secular underpinnings of the
national polity. Congress Party governments histori-
cally have attracted votes from religious and social
minorities as well as from the Hindu majority. Today,
however, Sikhs and other minorities are seriously
alienated from the political process, and cultural
divisions have grown as the result of the government's
assault on the Sikh's Golden Temple, Indira Gandhi's
assassination by Sikhs, and the subsequent anti-Sikh
communal violence. Moreover, the list of Sikh griev-
ances has lengthened in recent months. In November,
Congress Party youths directed vengeful Hindu mobs
to Sikh homes and businesses; parliamentary elections
were not held in Army-occupied Punjab because of
the precarious security situation; and Sikh political
figures captured in the takeover of the Golden Temple
are still in jail.
Sikh alienation has already taken its toll on Indian
Army morale and threatens the secular tradition that
imbued the Army. Following the Army assault on the
Golden Temple in June, at least 2,000 Sikh soldiers
deserted in protest. The deserters have been impris-
oned, and the ringleaders are to be court-martialed. In
the wake of the assassination, clashes between Sikh
and non-Sikh troops occurred in some units. Hindu
officers restricted the movements of some Sikh per-
sonnel and removed a few from sensitive positions,
and Rajiv Gandhi dismissed Sikhs from his personal
Although discipline within the military remains gen-
erally good, the repeated use of troops to suppress
internal turmoil has raised concern within the Army
that such entanglements in domestic turmoil detract
from its defense mission. Local police and paramili-
tary units failed-as they had earlier in the year in
Punjab, Bombay, and Hyderabad-to halt communal
violence in New Delhi and other northern Indian
cities following the assassination. Gandhi had to call
out the Army to restore order.
Rajiv Gandhi's actions and the leadership style he
develops over the next year will play a major part in
determining whether these centrifugal forces will
strengthen. His ability to strike effective national
unity themes and particularly to dispel Sikh fears that
they are becoming disenfranchised remains uncertain.
We think his lack of appetite for personal power will
allow him to make good use of the talent around him,
however, and he may have a better opportunity than
his confrontational predecessor to begin healing In-
dia's wounds. Nonetheless, reconciliation will not
come quickly or easily, and we anticipate that politi-
cal tension will remain high over the next six months.
Key Indicators To Watch
Prospective Scenario: Gandhi Remains in Power, but
Tensions Remain High as He Finds his Initiatives To
Reconcile Sikhs Rebuffed
? In an independent inquiry into post-assassination
violence, Sikh clergy at the Golden Temple in
Amritsar accuse Gandhi of negligence.
? Army occupation of Punjab continues.
? A few Sikh Army officers resign to protest New
Delhi's decision to curtail recruiting in the Sikh
community.
? Sikh farm leaders in Punjab urge their followers to
block grain shipments to other parts of the country.
? Students stage antigovernment rallies.
? Protests against tax and price increases proposed in
New Delhi's February budget induce Rajiv to post-
pone economic reforms.
? NT Rama Rao, opposition Chief Minister in
Andhra Pradesh, soundly defeats Congress Party
challengers in state elections scheduled for March.
security guard.
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Gandhi entered politics reluctantly, following the
accidental death of his politically ambitious younger
brother whom his mother preferred as her political
heir. The 40-year-old Gandhi studied mechanical
engineering at Cambridge University, avoided poli-
tics, and worked as a pilot with Indian Airlines from
1967 until 1980. Rajiv, reputed to be less ruthless
and abrasive than his younger brother, was widely
regarded as too mild mannered and low-key to
survive in Indian politics. He has, however, proved to
be a quick study. Over the last two years, he has
worked hard to revitalize his mother's Congress
Party, eliminate corruption, and create a renewed
sense of commitment. Rajiv has emphasized the need
to bring India into the modern world. Like his
mother, who was widely regarded as ineffectual and
weak when she came to power, Rajiv could lead India
in new directions. His longtime avoidance of politics,
however, suggests a strong degree of ambivalence
toward power. Thus we believe he will turn to others
for counsel and may be susceptible to manipulation.
Indicators That Would Suggest the Prospective Sce-
nario Is Not Unfolding
? Gandhi retains Buta Singh as Minister for Parlia-
mentary Affairs, Works, Housing, and Sports and
names another Sikh to his Cabinet.
? Congress Party hooligans responsible for anti-Sikh
violence in New Delhi are tried, convicted, and
jailed.
? New Delhi widely publicizes the results of an
inquiry headed by a Supreme Court Justice denying
a broad Sikh conspiracy behind Indira Gandhi's
assassination.
? Rajiv Gandhi encourages the appointment of Sikh
military officers to senior positions and delays a
decision to disband Sikh Army units and reduce
recruiting from Sikh communities.
? Farmers in Punjab sell their rice and wheat to the
government in response to New Delhi's willingness
to discuss Punjabi demands on water-sharing issues.
? Gandhi is assassinated, setting off still higher levels
of communal violence.
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Indonesia
? On 4 October coordinated bomb attacks were made
against a Chinatown shopping center and two banks
owned by a prominent Chinese business associate of
President Soeharto.
? Since then, several major fires of unknown origin
and numerous bomb threats have occurred.
? Antigovernment pamphleteering and speeches as
well as anti-Chinese incidents have been on the rise.
elements, arresting scores of suspects, including
members of the dissident Group of 50-retired
military officers and former government officials.
Opposition groups pose no immediate threat to the
government, but the bombings and other incidents
represent a troublesome escalation of Indonesian po-
litical violence and portend continuing social unrest.
Muslim radicals have capitalized on popular resent-
ment of the ethnic Chinese, openly combining criti-
cism of the regime's anti-Islamic policies with its ties
to Chinese businessmen. Posters and speeches have
specifically linked President Soeharto with Chinese
financiers and criticized Armed Forces Commander
Murdani, a Christian, as anti-Islamic and a protector
of the Chinese.
Although reflecting longstanding social, racial, and
economic tensions, the latest rash of violence indicates
growing hostility to the Soeharto regime's determined
efforts to suppress any independent Islamic political
voice in the predominantly Muslim country. Although
officials have sought to downplay the political signifi-
cance of the recent incidents and to discredit radical
activists, we believe the unrest is also an expression of
increasing frustration among moderate Muslims over
the lack of legitimate avenues for their political views.
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Vietnam
Philippine
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The government's recent imposition of the secular
state ideology, Pancasila, on the opposition Muslim
political party and manipulation of the party's activi-
ties provided a focus for Muslim anger. Devout
Muslims regard the government's promotion of Pan-
casila as an effort to downgrade the role of Islam in
Indonesia.
Jakarta's reaction to the unrest has been swift and
decisive, underscoring Soeharto's hardline attitude to
challenges to civil authority and his determination to
neutralize Islam's potential as a political force. Hav-
ing quelled several Muslim rebellions in the past, 25X1
Soeharto and the military leadership remain firmly
committed to the elimination of separatist movements
and will not hesitate to use any means necessary to
combat future terrorist attacks. The sharp crackdown
on dissident groups and arrests of prominent members
of the Group of 50 who criticized the government's
handling of last fall's riots were followed by equally
tough reactions to the bombings. The regime is treat-
ing the incidents as a matter of national concern, not
as a simple police matter.
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The intelligence apparatus has already stepped up its
monitoring of Muslim, youth, and dissident organiza-
tions. Although most students remain apolitical,=
increasing numbers of
youths are becoming active in radical Muslim activi-
ties and in politicized mosque services. The Iranian
Embassy is known to cultivate ties with a number of
fundamentalist and youth groups in Java, provide
funding for underground religious publications, and
sponsor unspecified training in Iran for youth leaders.
Radical foreign elements will probably explore oppor-
tunities offered by the current unrest, but we do not
believe Iranian or other foreign groups played a
significant role in recent events.
The underlying political and economic causes of
discontent-poverty, anti-Chinese racial hostility, and
the lack of effective political outlets for opposition
views-will almost surely lead to continuing out-
breaks of violence. We do not believe, however, that
the unrest signals a breakdown in the regime's author-
ity. Soeharto retains the loyalty of the military,
control of the bureaucracy, and the respect of the
majority of the population; we expect no effective
organized opposition to emerge in the next year or
two. Over the longer term, however, the government's
heavyhanded retaliation against its opponents is likely
to intensify anti-Soeharto sentiment among Muslim
activists and other disaffected groups.
Key Indicators To Watch
Prospective Scenario: Despite Continuing Antigov-
ernment Activities, the Authorities Crack Down and
the Regime Is Not Threatened
? Government successfully contains anti-Chinese and
antigovernment demonstrations.
? Fires and bomb threats keep tensions high in major
cities.
? An increase in antigovernment pamphleteering,
speeches, and organizing by radical Islamic groups
results in stronger security measures.
? Rumors circulate suggesting a substantial flight of
capital by Chinese and native businessmen.
? Large numbers of suspects linked to incidents of
unrest and radical organizations are detained.
? The government pushes compliance with the state
ideology.
? Authorities continue to reassure mainstream Mus-
lims that recent unrest is the work of radical
elements.
? To appease public criticism, the government publi-
cizes trials for some blatantly corrupt-but politi-
cally inconsequential-businessmen and govern-
ment officials.
or pest-stricken rice harvest.
Indicators That Would Suggest the Prospective Sce-
nario Is Not Unfolding
? Government harshness leads to new efforts by the
opposition to unite against Soeharto.
? Widening cycles of violence rapidly erode confi-
dence in the government, and antigovernment senti-
ment grows among students and the unemployed.
? Prominent government, parliamentary, religious,
and business leaders begin to criticize publicly
Soeharto's ties to Chinese businessmen.
? Terrorist activities, including kidnapings and assas-
sinations, become rampant, and the authorities have
increasing difficulty coping with the security threat.
? Growing disarray appears within the military
leadership.
? Growing isolation of President Soeharto from his
Cabinet advisers becomes evident.
? Severe economic hardship is caused by develop-
ments such as a collapse of oil prices or a drought-
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? President Chun's restoration of political rights to
influential opposition figures has sparked divisive
jockeying for the leadership of anti-Chun forces,
accompanied by shriller attacks on government poli-
cies.
? Confrontations between students and the govern-
ment have escalated as a result of Seoul's return last
fall to a tougher policy toward student dissidents.
? Dissident leader Kim Dae Jung has announced
plans to return to Korea around late January.
The military-backed government of President Chun
Doo Hwan remains firmly in control, but parliamen-
tary elections scheduled for mid-February could occa-
sion some unrest. The balloting will be a major test of
the ruling Democratic Justice Party's ability to mobi-
lize public support, despite Chun's continuing unpop-
ularity. For the public, the conduct of the elections
will shape perceptions of Chun's sincerity in promis-
ing political reform and willingness to step down when
his term ends in 1988.
Although the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP)
is virtually guaranteed a continuing 55-percent major-
ity because of the method of allocating seats, it has
worked assiduously to enlarge the 36 percent of the
popular vote it received in 1981. The party is anxious
to demonstrate broad support for the President and,
through an aggressive recruitment drive, has in-
creased dues-paying party membership to over
1 million. To further enhance its appeal as well as
tighten party discipline under Chun's lieutenants, the
DJP is fielding many fresh new candidates.
Despite these efforts and the government's success-
es-for example, sustaining economic growth, raising
South Korea's international stature, and smoothing
relations with the United States and Japan-the
/ /~ Boundary rep,sentat ion s
regime faces a skeptical electorate. Many Koreans
view national achievements as the product of their
own hard work and look cynically at government
attempts to solidify foreign backing for Chun's leader-
ship. The ruling party itself invites disdain by its
regular obstruction of parliamentary discussion of
sensitive issues and by its rubberstamp role. Similarly,
the public tends to judge recent government conces- 25X1
sions on such issues as local self-rule and labor law
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Chun's credibility will be further strained if opposi-
tion activity provokes a tough government response.
Chun's lifting of the political ban on most of his
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opponents was intended in part to spark infighting
within the opposition camp among contenders for
leadership. This strategy will probably succeed, but
we see some chance for it to backfire. The leadership
battle may spur the various opposition groups to adopt
highly confrontational campaign tactics that Chun
may not be able to tolerate. This might lead the
government to directly interfere with campaign activi-
ties, which in turn would risk a sharp public reaction.
We are particularly concerned that political stability
will be undermined should dissident leader Kim Dae
Jung return home from the United States. Kim
remains an important symbol for Chun's opponents
and probably hopes his presence will trigger serious
problems for the government. The strong possibility
that radical students will take up Kim's cause raises
questions about the government's ability to tamp
down unrest quickly, particularly if Kim appears
during the election campaign. Seoul has already
indicated that Kim will be imprisoned if he returns,
and this move will be sure to revive the domestic and
international pressures over human rights.
Dealing with regime critics during this coming tense
period is likely to strain Chun's patience and may
incline him toward his hardline advisers' preference
for reinstating harsh political controls. Heavyhanded
government actions probably would prompt massive
street demonstrations when the colleges reopen in
March. Seoul's decision in November to return riot
police to the campuses and to prosecute protest lead-
ers-a long retreat from the "campus autonomy"
introduced early last year-dims prospects that the
government can avoid the traditional reactive cycle of
campus violence and police crackdown.
Prospective Scenario: Chun Takes a Tougher Ap-
proach Against Dissidents but Mollifies the Public
With Modest Reform Measures and an Orderly
Election.
? The government selectively applies sanctions against
student radicals, but deals tolerantly with nonvio-
lent protestors and makes some concessions on
elected student government.
balloting.
? The government announces definitive plans for eco-
nomic and labor law reform, removing these issues
from the opposition parties.
? Kim Dae Jung's intransigence undermines efforts
by various dissident groups to unite behind a new
opposition party.
? Infighting splits the opposition into hostile factions,
diluting the effectiveness of their campaign.
? Chun directs his party and the security services to
avoid election irregularities that could discredit the
Indicators That Would Suggest the Prospective
Scenario Is Not Unfolding
? Chun orders security services to deal harshly with
all dissident student activities.
? Preelection Cabinet shuffle results in a loss of
influence for Chun's moderate advisers.
? Kim Dae Jung returns and is imprisoned, galvaniz-
ing the dissident movement under a confrontational
leadership.
? A new opposition alliance emerges around formerly
banned politicians and begins to gain grassroots
support.
? Chun announces emergency measures that restrict
political expression, claiming national security
needs, as Seoul moves into delicate negotiations
with North Korea.
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 Chun Doo Hwan:
A Tough Tactician Seeking National Unity
President since 1980, the 53-year-old Chun is dis-
liked by many South Koreans but enjoys the support
of the security and military establishments. Viewing
vigorous economic growth as the key to stability and
security, Chun generally leaves economic manage-
ment in the hands of experienced technocrats. His
foreign policy has raised Seoul's international pres-
tige and instilled national pride. Less skilled at
managing domestic political crises, Chun tends to
respond with quick fixes that fail to address underly-
ing problems. Despite his promises for political devel-
opment and a peaceful transfer of power in 1988,
Chun does not appear to have a plan for doing so. We
believe he views liberalizing gestures as means to
achieve "national harmony, " rather than ends in
themselves. Chun's ability to deal with instability
most likely would be hampered by his habit, when
challenged, to isolate himself behind a protective
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Part 3. Indicators of
Political Instability
The following indicators were used in our examination
of each of the countries treated in this publication.
While these factors-especially if taken individual-
ly-may not be predictive of instability for any single,
Social Change/
Conflict Indicators
Demonstrations and Riots
1. Are demonstrations/riots increasing in frequency
and intensity? If so, what rates of increase have there
been in:
? The numbers of demonstrations or riots?
? The numbers of people taking part?
? The numbers of cities/places in which the events are
occurring?
? The number of days on which demonstrations or
riots take place?
2. Is the government taking a more permissive view of
the demonstrations/riots? If so, does this account in
part for the increase?
3. Are government repression and opposition violence
escalating?
4. Are demonstrations/ riots becoming status quo or
"normal" events? Are there indications that those
participating believe they will not suffer by
demonstrating/rioting?
given country, they have been associated with political
instability in the past. We will continue refining these
indicators to make them more specific to each country
and more predictive.
5. Is the violence in demonstrations/ riots increasing
in intensity? If so, is the violence indiscriminate, or is
it being directed against the government, a scapegoat
minority or religious community, or other group?
6. Are demonstrations starting to assume a general
antiregime tone, or do they focus on one specific issue,
such as an increase in food prices?
7. Does a demonstration attract a larger crowd than
originally predicted? Does a demonstration called by
one opposition group attract the genuine-not manip-
ulated-support of other groups not previously in-
volved, such as labor groups in support of student
marchers, etc.?
8. Are the media:
? Becoming more critical of the government or sup-
portive of the demonstrators/rioters?
? Devoting more time or space to the events?
? From the government's perspective, starting to give
a gloomier picture of events?
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9. Are there indications that elements of the political
elite or the security forces are beginning to sympa-
thize with the demonstrators/rioters?
10. Is the government making concessions to the
demonstrators/ rioters for the first time? If so, are
these having a calming effect, or are they seen as a
sign of weakness?
11. Are the demonstrators/rioters disrupting any
area of the economy? If so, does the concerned sector
blame the government or the demonstrators/rioters?
Are the disruptions affecting the government's ability
to provide goods and services, patronage, etc.?
Strikes and Other Job Action
12. Are strikes, slowdowns, sit-ins, etc., increasing in
number and frequency? If so, what rates of increase
have there been in:
? The number of incidents?
? The number of workers involved?
? The number of cities/places where the incidents are
occurring?
? Extralegal actions, such as sabotage?
? The number of man-hours lost?
13. Do the strikers have political objectives apart
from economic motivations? If so, are these directed
against the government?
14. Are labor groups that oppose the government
forging links with nonlabor opposition groups?
15. Are the strikes and other job actions drawing
increasing support from the general public?
16. Is the government starting to meet the workers'
demands despite sound economic reasons that it not
do so? If so, have the concessions persuaded workers
to return to work?
17. Are the strikes, etc., starting to hurt the economy:
? Is production declining in key areas such as energy?
? Is the decline in production diminishing the govern-
ment's ability to provide goods, services, and
patronage?
? Is labor disruption beginning to affect foreign in-
vestment flows?
? Do those adversely affected blame the government
or the labor movement for their losses?
Maintenance of National Unity
18. Do increasingly large numbers of the general
public reject the regime's legitimacy, as indicated in
casual conversation, opinion polls, newspaper articles
and editorials, books, etc.?
19. Is effective government control over some areas
outside of the capital being eroded? If so:
? Is the government losing its ability to protect its
officials and the general public in these areas?
? Are local officials increasingly unwilling or unable
to implement directives from or to perform services,
such as tax collection, for the central government?
? Is the opposition increasingly able to mobilize and
organize the local populace?
20. Is the government starting to carry out policies
that change the political or social status of any group;
for example, is it increasing religious intolerance,
suppressing the use of a minority language or culture,
etc.? If so, are the policies compelling those affected
to oppose the government actively in any way?
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21. Is the middle class starting to withdraw its
support for the government? For example:
? Is any part of the middle class actively participating
in new or radical opposition parties or violent
activities?
? Are there indications that the middle class is start-
ing to believe the government can no longer protect
its interests?
? Are there signs that the middle class increasingly
sees its values under assault and its economic
position deteriorating?
? Are there indications that members of the middle
class believe they can tolerate the coming to power
of the opposition as a viable alternative?
Economic Stability
Indicators
23. Is the government losing its ability to raise tax
revenues? If so, is it finding difficulty in providing:
? Essential public services?
? Food, energy, and other popular subsidies?
? Patronage to keep its supporters in line?
? New equipment, pay increases, etc., for the military
and police?
24. Is the government increasingly turning to money
creation to finance its operations?
25. Is the general public blaming the government for
the deteriorating economy?
22. Are religious leaders increasingly critical of the
government? If so:
? Is alienation of religious figures from the govern-
ment growing?
? Are more religious figures-priests, nuns, or other
clerics-becoming active in antigovernment
activities?
? Is the general public beginning to support these
activities and agree with the criticisms?
26. Are sudden price rises or drops in food or energy
supplies likely or increasing?
27. Is the international economic situation starting to
depress the local economy? If so:
? To what extent is it affecting commodity prices?
? Is only one sector affected, or is the populace
hurting across the board?
? Do popular perceptions tend to blame pernicious
international forces or countries?
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28. Is the government's ability to obtain foreign aid
and investment starting to decline? If so, what impact
is this having on the economy?
29. Does the economy include a traditional sector,
such as subsistence agriculture and barter, that re-
mains isolated from the modern economic sector and
that could provide a safety valve in times of crisis? If
so, is this being eroded by overpopulation, landless-
ness, crop specialization, etc?
30. Do the country's reserves or the free market
exchange rate reflect capital flight? If so, is the
capital flight the result of economic reasons, such as
lack of return on investments, or because of political
fears?
31. Is the government unlikely to meet its debt
service repayment obligations? If so, are the govern-
ment's creditors willing to reschedule all or part of the
debts?
Opposition Groups
Indicators
35. Are opposition groups coalescing against the gov-
ernment? If so, is the basis for this a shared ideology
or shared opposition to the government?
36. Are opposition groups increasingly able to mobi-
lize large numbers of people for antiregime activities?
If so, are the reasons:
? Growing organizational capabilities?
? Better finances?
? Increased membership?
? External aid, etc.?
32. Is the government starting to implement its own
or IMF-imposed austerity measures? If so, can it
withstand pressures from opposing domestic interests?
33. Are the government's economic policies benefit-
ing only a small segment of the population, such as
the elite and associated groups? If so:
? Is the government trying to redress the effects of the
policies? If so, is it likely to succeed?
? Are the poor becoming aware that the gap between
themselves and the rich is widening? If so, are they
attributing this to the government?
34. Conversely, are attempts to redress inequality
through taxation, land reform, anticorruption drives,
or other economic measures alienating important
elements of the elite, such as the military or clergy?
38. Is any opposition group representing itself as the
embodiment of the national identity?
39. Are symbols of popular nationalism changing; for
example, is the picture of the ruler in houses, shops,
etc., being replaced by that of the leading political or
religious oppositionist?
40. Is a polarization of forces taking place, that is, are
centrists and moderates increasingly compelled to
make a choice between the left and the right?
37. If opposition groups are organized along class,
ethnic, religious, or regional lines, are these factional
forces and their attraction growing?
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41. Is there an opposition leader whose charisma is
increasingly recognized even by those who oppose
him? If so:
? Is this person getting equal billing with major
government leaders in the media and casual
conversation?
? Are those not yet committed to the opposition
making excuses for the charismatic leader by por-
traying him as a "moderate at heart" or a "social
reformer" and saying that he can control the "cra-
zies" or the Communists once in power?
42. Are opposition parties increasingly claiming that
the violent overthrow of the government is the only
way to bring about change?
43. Are people not yet committed to the opposition
starting to speak of when rather than if the opposition
comes to power?
44. Are the intellectuals becoming alienated from the
system? If so, does this lend strength to the
opposition?
Terrorism and Sabotage
45. Are incidents increasing in frequency and intensi-
ty? If so, what has been the rate of increase in:
? The number of incidents?
Military Attitudes/
Activities Indicators
50. Are there any signs of antiregime or coup
plotting?
51. Are there indications that elements in the mili-
tary and security services, particularly senior person-
nel, are becoming discontented over government ac-
tions or policies?
46. Are the terrorists or saboteurs being indiscrimi-
nate or selective in their targets? If selective, who are
the targets-government supporters, the opposition,
perceived traitors to one or another side, or others?
47. Is terrorism or sabotage starting to deter any part
of the general public from supporting the
government?
48. Are there indications that the public is beginning
to view terrorism or sabotage as a necessary evil to be
acquiesced in or even supported?
49. Is terrorism or sabotage starting to hurt the
economy? If so:
? Is production declining in key areas such as energy?
? Is the government's ability to provide goods, serv-
ices, and patronage being reduced?
52. Are there indications that military and security
service leaders consider the civilian leadership unable
to cope with events?
53. Are the corporate interests or dignity of the
military being assaulted or threatened?
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54. Are there elements in the military that are dis-
contented over career loss, pay, or other benefits?
55. Are there signs of a split within or between
military or police leaders?
56. Are military or police leaders or groups becoming
identified with opposition groups?
57. Are the military or security services becoming
less disciplined; are desertions and acts of disobedi-
ence, and so forth, increasing?
58. Are the security services becoming less able to
penetrate opposition groups and predict events?
-59. Are the security services being reorganized fre-
quently or to an extent that affects their efficiency
and morale?
External Factors
Indicators
62. Is the government or the opposition receiving
increased aid from the Soviet Union, other Commu-
nist countries, Libya, etc.? If so:
? In what form and in what amounts?
? Is the increased aid improving the recipients' capa-
bilities, or is it evoking negative responses from any
groups, indicating that they feel their interests are
threatened?
60. Are expenditures for the military and security
services beginning to strain the budget?
61. Is the government trying to upgrade the efficiency
and morale of the military and police through such
measures as:
? Better recruitment, pay, leave, and promotion
policies?
? Increased training in dealing with civil
disobedience?
? Better equipment?
64. Is Western influence and aid-particularly from
the United States-being viewed negatively by the
public and by influential power groups? If so, is this
starting to hurt the regime?
65. Are other countries starting to pose a military
threat? If so, does this enable the government to
"wrap itself in the flag" and rally support it might
otherwise have lost?
63. Are neighboring countries or other external influ-
ences beginning to affect sectarian groups-for exam-
ple, Islamic fundamentalists, Shiites, Roman Catho-
lics influenced by liberation theology, etc.-in a way
that is eroding loyalty to the government?
66. Is the public's mind being taken off deteriorating
domestic conditions by the government's overseas
adventures?
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Regime Capabilities and
Actions Indicators
Repression of the Opposition
67. Does the general public increasingly see the gov-
ernment as more responsible than opposition groups
for perpetrating domestic violence?
68. Is the government increasing the use of force to
counter opposition activities? If so, what are the rates
of increase in:
? Political assassination?
? Cases of firing on crowds?
? Summary executions?
? Cases of torture?
69. Is the government stepping up nonviolent repres-
sion? If so, what are the rates of increase in:
? Imprisonment without trial?
? Exile?
? Banning of political parties and activities?
? Press censorship?
? School and university closings?
? Other suspensions of civil liberties?
70. Are the regular police having difficulty putting
down demonstrations or riots? If so, is the government
increasingly using:
? Paramilitary police units?
? Military forces?
? Government-controlled "mass organizations" such
as revolutionary guards or village scouts?
? Hired thugs or goon squads?
71. Are government officials talking about the possi-
bility of declaring martial law or a state of siege?
72. If the government uses massive force, does this
disrupt opposition groups and make them less effec-
tive? What is its effect on the general public: is it seen
as a necessary sign of firmness, or is it seen as brutal
and repressive?
73. Are there indications that the public sees the
government as inconsistent: for example, does the
average citizen complain that he has "no way of
knowing what he can or cannot do to stay out of
trouble"?
Government Leadership and the Ruling Elite
74. Is conflict breaking out or increasing among
groups that make up the ruling elite or between the
ruling and supporting elites? If so, what is the cause?
75. Are there indications that government leaders are
doubting their major policies or their ability to rule?
76. Are there any indications that the ruler may be
considering stepping down because of age, ill health, a
shift in public opinion, personal tragedy, etc.? If so, is
the political elite gearing up for an obvious successor
crisis?
77. Is the ruler's style changing in such a way that
lessens his ability to rule? Is he:
? Increasingly isolated in the "palace"?
? Increasingly dependent on advice from "yes-men"?
? Generally unaware of realities?
? Becoming erratic-such as changing domestic al-
lies, neglecting his duties, falling under the influ-
ence of persons outside the government (spouse,
astrologer or other fortune teller, lover, financial
cronies, etc.), drinking, taking drugs, etc.?
78. Are changes taking place in the relations between
government leadership and opposition groups?
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79. Is the ruler or other government leader starting to
make trips to Communist countries to seek assistance
or prestige?
80. Has the ruler shown that he is prepared to use the
security forces to suppress demonstrations, riots,
strikes, etc.? If so, is he prepared to take extremely
tough measures before the situation gets out of hand?
81. Is the government introducing reforms? If so, is it
doing so under pressure or at its own initiative, and is
it prepared to enforce them?
82. When the ruler makes his final decision on a
policy, do other government leaders who oppose this
policy continue to argue against it publicly?
83. Are senior officials and/or progovernment politi-
cians becoming factionalized, paralyzed, or fatalis-
tic-signs that they feel the success of the opposition
is inevitable?
84. Are media criticism of and jokes about the ruler
and the government becoming more direct and open?
Government Bureaucracy
85. Is the bureaucracy becoming less loyal to the
government leadership because of divergent political
views, distaste for the government's policies, etc?
86. Is the bureaucracy becoming so large, corrupt,
intimidated, and/or underpaid that its ability to im-
plement policy and respond to policy shifts is becom-
ing overwhelmed?
87. Is effectiveness being eroded because the leader-
ship is firing competent officials as scapegoats?
88. Has the government shown ineptness in coping
with natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods,
crop failures, etc.?
The Education System
89. Is the education system turning out too many
qualified graduates in relation to employment
opportunities?
90. Is the government starting to implement policies
that might enrage students, for example, an increase
in fees, interference with faculty, closing down of
student newspapers, etc.?
91. Are fundamentalists or other religious groups
starting to set up schools in opposition to the public
school system, or is enrollment increasing at such
schools already in existence?
The Business Sector
92. Is the business sector starting to be hurt by
specific government policies? If so, are losses suffi-
ciently serious to make businessmen increasingly criti-
cal of these policies?
93. Are conditions in the country generally deterio-
rating to such an extent that the business sector is
expressing doubt about the government's ability to
rule?
94. Is a substantial segment of the business sector
starting to support the opposition? If so, is this
support political, financial, or both?
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