THE FUTURE OF COALITION GOVERNMENTS IN JAPAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000606180001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 30, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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t
Central Intelligence Agency
DATE 7 a j~Ee_
Washirpon. D. C 20505
DOC NO 64 M 96 20--o-es
OCR
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
P&PD I
30 June 1986
The Future of Coalition Governments in Japan
Summary
If Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) does
well in the general election on 6 July, it will be
able to end its three-year coalition with the tiny
centrist New Liberal Club (NLC). The coalition, the
first at a national level since the LDP was formed
in 1955, has not led to any alteration in the pro-US
or pro-business thrust of Japanese policies during
the postwar era. Although the very junior status of
the NLC is one factor in the limited impact it has
had on Japanese Government policies, the fact that
the two parties essentially share political values
is the primary reason the coalition has not affected
policy continuity. A community of views on
domestic and foreign issues also is evident between
the LDP and the other small centrist parties that
have become more popular with Japanese voters during
the last decade. The pattern suggests that even if
Division, OEA
This memorandum was produced under the auspices of the Office of
East Asian Analysis. Information available as of 30 June 1986
was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Japan Branch, Northeast Asia
EA M 86-20085
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the LDP fares poorly in this or subsequent
elections--as seems likely given long-term trends--
and once again enters into a coalition, there is
little likelihood of significant shifts on policies
important to the United States.
Development of Centrist Parties
Between 1955 and 1975, the conservative LDP so thoroughly
dominated the Japanese political scene with its perennially large
majority in the politically preeminent lower house of the Diet
that there was no need to include other parties in the
government. Until the mid-1960s, moreover, the ideologically
Marxist and assertively anti-US Japan Socialist Party (JSP)
dominated the opposition scene with about half as many Diet seats
as the LDP. Parties holding views between these two political
poles began to appear in the 1960s but were dwarfed--both
individually and collectively--by the LDP and JSP. Each of the
centrist parties is still relatively small, but together
hold over 20 percent of the Diet seats (see figure 1).
Although centrists have taken some support from the left,
their growing appeal has hurt the LDP the most and discussions
about coalitions are no longer moot. Indeed, a parliamentary
coalition has existed in Japan since 1983, when the Liberal
Democrats asked the tiny New Liberal Club--an LDP offshoot with
only eight of 511 lower house seats--to join the government. The
LDP move followed a poor showing in Diet elections, when it fell
six seats short of a majority in the lower house.
Leaders of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party hope the general
election scheduled for 6 July will allow the party to regain
enough Diet seats to dispense with the current coalition. Even
if the LDP accomplishes this goal, long-term political trends
suggest that any return to LDP majority rule may be only
temporary. In three of the last four general elections--1976,
1979, and 1983--the LDP was unable to secure a majority in the
lower house (see figure 2). Although the addition of the roughly
10 "independents" that normally join the LDP following an
election have in all these cases pushed the party over the
majority mark, it still did not have enough seats to control all
the key Diet committees. Court-mandated redistricting to correct
overrepresentation of rural districts also promises to make it
increasingly difficult for the LDP to convert a popular vote
share of less than 50 percent into a majority of lower house
seats (see figure 3).
Centrist Parties: Key to Future Coalitions
If rough parity between opposition parties and the LDP has
indeed become the norm, coalitions will probably not be as rare
in Japan in the future as they have been during the past three
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Figure 1
Japan: The Growing Appeal of Center Parties
1983
1980
1979
1976
1972
1969
1967
1963
1960
20
40
Parties
? Social Democratic Fed.
MI New Liberal Club
? Komeito
Ml Democratic Socialist
60 80 100 120
Seats
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Figure 2
Japan: Growing Parity Between LDP and
Opposition Parties
1976
1979 1980
Election Years
'Includes independents who joined
1983
Seats needed to control
atf major Diet Committees
Parties
M LDP*
- Leftist
Ml Centrist
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Figure 3
Japan's LDP: Benefiting From Rural Overrepresentation
65-,
LDP Share
Seats
Vote
40 ?1
1960 1963 1967 1969 1972 1976 1979 1980 1983
Election Years
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decades. Although coalition arrangements other than an LDP-
centrist party one are theoretically possible, we consider most
alternatives implausible under current circumstances. For
example, a coalition government including all of the opposition
parties appears out of the question. The two largest centrist
parties, the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP),
adamantly refuse to consider any coalition with the Japanese
Communist Party (JCP), which is now isolated on the extreme left
of the political spectrum and rarely cooperates with other
political parties.
Barring a dramatic change in Japanese politics, it also
appears unlikely that non-Communist opposition parties will be
able to capture enough lower house seats to rule by themselves.
In 1976, when they had their best performance to date, these
parties fell 32 seats short of the majority mark. Moreover, the
Komeito and DSP are reluctant to do more than give Iipservice to
a coalition with the JSP--which remains the largest opposition
party with 110 seats. Although the JSP's chairman has pushed the
party to adopt more pragmatic stands on a variety of issues, the
party's small but vocal left wing continues to insist that any
coalition be based on Marxist-Leninist principles. This attitude
led Komeito Chairman Takeiri to state in February 1985, "a
coalition centered around JSP force be difficult to realize
in the extremely near future."
Theoretically plausible, but in fact extremely unlikely, is
a coalition among several centrist parties and a part of the
LDP. The existence of intraparty factions in the LDP--with those
factions supporting the Prime Minister considered the mainstream
and the others labeled as antimainstream--raises the specter of a
split within the LDP, an obvious prerequisite for this coalition
scenario (see table 1). Enmity between faction leaders,
particularly former Prime Ministers Tanaka and Fukuda, dating
from the early 1970s, pushed the party toward a split on several
occasions. In May 1980, for example, LDP factions hostile to
Prime Minister Ohira permitted an opposition-sponsored no-
confidence motion to pass by absenting themselves from the
Diet. And in October 1984, DSP and Komeito leaders banded
together with the Tanaka faction's acting head, Susumu Nikaido~
in an abortive attempt to replace Prime Minister Nakasone. u
Notwithstanding the danger represented by past sparring,
outright confrontation within the LDP has been the exception.
Most threats and counterthreats have involved tactical
maneuvering by faction leaders and were carefully orchestrated to
avoid a rupture. And even if a faction leader bolted the party--
an unlikely event--a decision on the part of the followers to go
along would be difficult. The perceived costs of leaving the
LDP--inability to influence the selection of the Prime Minister
and Cabinet members--make it quite unattractive to LDP Dietmen.
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Table 1
Intra-LDP Factional Coalitions
Prime Minister Mainstream Antimainstream
Fukuda Fukuda, Ohira, Tanaka, Miki
(1976-1978) Nakasone
Ohira Tanaka, Ohira, Nakasone Fukuda, Miki
(1978-1980)
Suzuki Tanaka, Suzuki , Nakasone Fukuda, Komoto
(1980-1982)
Nakasone Tanaka, Nakasone Fukuda, Komoto,
(1982-Present) Suzuki (after 1984)
* Suzuki assumed leadership of the faction following Ohira's death in
1980.
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History suggests that Liberal Democratic Party politicians see it
to their advantage to stay with the party, both to maintain their
share of spoils and in the hope of improving their position in
the future.
Centrist Parties: Willing Junior Partners
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nearly certain to tap one of the centrist parties (see
appendix). Most are eager to play such a role.
-- NLC Diet members are generally positive about the
three-year stint as a minor coalition partner.
Moreover, three NLC members--Seiichi
Tagawa, Toshio Yamaguchi, and Yohei Kono--have each
gotten the opportunity to serve one year as a cabinet
minister. Nonetheless, NLC leaders reportedly are
worried the electorate will not view the party's
participation in the coalition positively, and that it
will do poorly in the next general elections. And,
unless it is needed for coalition purposes, the NLC is
likely to disband and most of its members return to the
LDP after the elections, according to Embassy Tokyo.
-- Komeito has decided it wants to be a governing party at
the national level as it has been at the prefectural
and city levels for years. At the party convention in
December 1985, the party's chairman called upon the LDP
to form a policy coalition with the Komeito that would
involve close consultations on key issues and thus pave
the way for an eventual parliamentary coalition.
-- The 1985 "action policy" of the Democratic Socialist
Party indicated a strong desire to join the LDP in a
coalition as soon as possible. One reason for this
haste is the advancing age of many senior DSP party
leaders, such as Ikko Kasuga and Ryosaku Sasaki, who
would like to be cabinet members before they retire.
This sense of urgency has, however, been criticized by
other party members--including Vice Chairman Nagasue.
Moreover, some DSP Dietmen may still be upset with the
LDP's lukewarm reaction to the party's 1984 offer to
set up a policy consultation body.
Policy Congruence: A Sine Qua Nor
In our view, the basis for coalition cabinets in
contemporary Japan must be a substantial policy congruence
between the partners. Most centrist parties meet this
criterion. Their policy differences with the LDP have
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historically been in the defense and foreign policy areas. In
the last decade, many of these differences have disappeared as
centrist parties have adopted increasingly conservative stances
on defense issues.
Further narrowing policy disagreements, the LDP has moved
closer over the last decade to centrist policy positions on many
domestic social issues, such as education and the environment.
Although domestic agenda items usually are not a source of
contention, the center parties--especially those, such as the
DSP, that have strong links to organized labor--have frequently
been at odds with the LDP over tax policy. In particular,
centrist parties have been strong advocates of income tax cuts
that many LDP members believe would endanger the government's
budget-balancing efforts.
The NLC's attractiveness in 1983 as a partner for the LDP,
in fact, stemmed from its de facto agreement with the ruling
party on almost every major issue except defense spending. An
indication of their accord was the policy agreement written when
the coalition was formed. It was fairly innocuous, calling only
for the government to:
-- Take steps to improve political ethics.
-- Reform the education system.
-- Carry out administrative reform by, among other things,
transferring the national railroads to private control.
- Uphold the three nonnuclear principles--not possessing,
not manufacturing, and not introducing nuclear weapons
into Japan--promulgated by the government in 1967. C
In terms of policy congruence, the DSP looks as acceptable
as the NLC. Despite its socialist name, the DSP is in many ways
as conservative as the LDP or the NLC. DSP Vice-Chairman Nagasue
has noted that 25 years ago there were many differences between
the LDP and DSP, but today there are almost none. The party has
modified its defense position in recent years to such an extent
that breaking the cap of 1 percent of GNP on defense expenditures
appears to be more of a problem for the LDP than for the DSP.
The DSP fully supports the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and
the continuation of US bases in Japan, and in general agrees with
Tokyo's commitment to defend sealanes 1,000 miles from the
Japanese coast. On domestic matters, the picture is similar.
Particularly in the areas of administrative reform and education
reform, the DSP supports the policies of the LDP. Small
disagreements still exist, however, in the areas of nuclear power
and tax policy.
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The policy congruence between the Komeito and LDP is
certainly less close than that between the L4P and DSP, making
Komeito a less attractive coalition partner. Although Komeito's
security and foreign policies have been moving toward the
positions held by the LDP, there are still major differences.
For example, the Komeito publicly insists the Self-Defense Forces
should have no overseas role in sealane defense and opposes big
increases in defense spending. Komeito leaders argue the party's
domestic policy stands are almost identical to those of the LDP,
but many in Japan perceive that the Komeito wants more sweeping
reforms of basic institutions--such as the education system--than
does the LDP.
The Social Democratic Federation (SDF) has no illusions
about being invited to join a coalition because of many policy
differences with the LDP. The party is much more pacifist than
any of the other center parties. It supports the existence of
the Self-Defense Forces but wants no expansion of its role or of
defense spending. The party also opposes the 1,000-mile sealane
defense policy, because it believes such defense would require
offensive weapons. In most policies, both domestic and foreign,
the SDF position is closer to that of the Komeito than those of
the DSP or LDP.
SDI Participation: A Litmus Test?
One issue of high current interest where the LDP and
centrist parties hold similar views is Japanese participation in
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research. Like LDP elders,
the leaders of key centrist parties are generally positive about
the idea but are wary of having the Japanese Government play a
large role in the program. Moreover, some of the opposition
parties feel it is inadvisable--given the fact that nearly half
of all Japanese oppose participation--to stress publicly their
basic agreement with the LDP on this issue:
1 The unpopularity of the Soka Gakkai, a lay organization
associated with a Buddhist sect and the Komeito, is another
factor arguing against a future LDP-Komeito coalition
government. The Soka Gakkai receives bad press for the
aggressive recruitment tactics and because of its founder's
involvement in numerous scandals.
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In a meeting with US officials in April 1986, Komeito
Chairman Takeiri explained that he supports
unrestricted participation in SDI research by Japan's
private sector but opposes official government
participation.
The DDP's public position is that Japan should study
SDI carefully until it can be confirmed that it is a
purely defensive weapons system.
Embassy Tokyo
reporting indicates that defense contractors employ
numerous members of the Domei Confederation of Labor,
which is the party's main support organization.
Numbers and Personal Ties: Among the Deciding Factors
The LDP's decision about a coalition partner obviously will
be made, in the first instance, on the basis of numbers--the
seats each party holds in the lower house. The LDP is likely to
approach the party (or parties) with the minimum number of seats
necessary for a workable coalition. If the LDP invited a party
with more than the minimum to join a coalition, the LDP
leadership might have to promise more than one highly sought-
after Cabinet post, a move that would clearly antagonize LDP
Dietmen.
Personal ties would also be considered in such a decision.
In Japan, perhaps more than in other Westernized democracies,
friendships count in politics. Thus, the coalition partner
selected by the LDP will be influenced heavily by who is Prime
Minister when the need to form a coalition develops. Close ties
between Nakasone and NLC member Toshio Yamaguchi made the
coalition decision in 1983 easier. Less probable as long as
Nakasone remains Prime Minister is a coalition with Komeito,
because many Dietmen from thi~ party consider Nakasone's defense
and foreign policies hawkish. On the other hand, if a Tanaka
faction prime minister is chosen by the LDP, the likelihood of a
coalition with the Komeito would increase given the personal ties
between the two groups. Fukuda faction leaders would tend to
2 On a personal basis, however, ties between Nakasone and the
Komeito leadership appear relatively good. Nakasone's good
offices were reportedly used to get a job for the son of Komeito
Secretary General Yano, and Komeito is supporting the upper house
candidacy of Hirofuni Nakasone, the Prime Minister's son.
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prefer working with the DSP for similar reasons.
Coalition Governments: Little Danger to Stability
Stability has long been a hallmark of Japanese governments
and is widely credited with much of Japan's postwar economic
success. Continuity in macroeconomic policies--as well as the
conservative bias of these policies--during 31 years of unbroken
LDP rule has provided businessmen with enough certainty to
encourage robust plant and equipment investment, a key ingredient
in Japan's manufacturing competitiveness. Japan's ability to be
a supportive ally for the United States has also generally been
aided by this stability, although at times security policy issues
have been manipulated at the margins by LDP faction leaders
maneuvering for political advantage.
The LDP-NLC coalition experience to date suggests that
coalitions with center parties pose little danger to Japanese
policy stability. In its three years as a coalition partner, the
NLC has never tried to force the LDP to reverse its stand on a
key policy issue. Admittedly, the NLC is a very junior coalition
partner and the situation might be different if a more powerful
party had to be courted. But it is doubtful. Reflecting public
opinion, the policies of the Japanese Government are likely for
the indefinite future to retain their distinctly probusiness,
pro-US thrust regardless of the nature of coalition
arrangements.
Indeed, as long as centrist parties continue to vie for a
spot in a coalition government, the ability of LDP prime
ministers to govern effectively is likely to be enhanced. We
believe that a desire to gain acceptability as a coalition
partner is one of many factors that has prompted the smaller
parties to adopt increasingly conservative defense and foreign
policy stands. This new moderation big plus for the
stability of Japanese policies.
Negative voter reaction among the traditional constituencies
of the centrist parties poses a potential--but probably remote--
threat to this new moderation. If loyalists from the smaller
parties begin to feel that their groups have become
indistinguishable from, or have "sold out" to, the LDP, the
centrist parties' appeal might fade. Under such circumstances,
leaders of these parties might be`tempted to distance themselves
from the LDP, particularly on bread-and-butter issues important
to their supporters. But other forces would probably counteract
the willingness of centrist parties--especially those in a
coalition with the LDP--to use obstructionist tactics to thwrt
LDP policies and to create a more distinctive image for
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themselves. In particular, such behavior might alienate voters,
who could construe these actions as indications that the parties
were not "responsible."
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A Thumbnail Sketch of Centrist Parties in Japan
Komeito: What is now Japan's second-largest opposition party
began as the political wing of Soka Gakkai, the lay organization
of a Buddhist sect. In 1964, Komeito became a full-fledged
political party. The party's official policy plank is
"humanitarian socialism," which calls for maintenance of the free
enterprise system but with greater corporate social
responsibility and a more even wealth distribution.
Democratic Socialist Party: Formed in 1960 as a splinter group
from the Japan Socialist Party. Ideological differences over
defense and foreign policy issues and a lack of opportunity for
advancement within the JSP were the primary reasons for the
split. With a support base among the conservative elements of
the labor movement and in small business, the DSP advocates
welfare state policies. At the same time, the DSP is very
conservative on defense issues.
New Liberal Club: Founded in June 1976 by six Dietmen, who left
the LDP in the wake of revelations about the Lockheed kickback
scandal. As a result, the party has always emphasized political
ethics issues. Political scientists view the NLC--with its
stress on individualism and the quality of life--as typifying
Japan's new right.
Social Democratic Federation: The newest and smallest centrist
party, the SDF was formed in 1978 by a group of pragmatic right-
wing Socialists who bolted from the JSP. It advocates citizen
participation in politics, worker self-management, and other
forms of decentralized authority.
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SUBJECT: The Future of Coalition Governments in Japan
Distribution:
Original - OEA/NA/Japan
1 - Donald Gregg, Assistant to the Vice President
1 - Thomas Hubbard, Director, Office of Japanese
Affairs/State
1 - Charles Kartman, Deputy Director, Officer of
Japanese Affairs/State
1 - William Brooks, INR/EAP/Japan
1 - John Malott, State
1 - James Kelly, Staff Member NSC
1 - Cdr_ (Ret.) James Auer, DOD/ISA/EAP
1 - Bryon L. Jackson, Office of the ntelligence
Liaison/Dept. of Commerce
1 - Joe Massey, Assistant USTR
1 - Bob Park, Intelligence Liaison, USTR
1 - Doug Mulholland, Office of the Special
Assistant, Treasury
1 - Dan Morris, INR/EAP/Japan
1 - NIO/EA 7E-62
1 - NIO/Economics
1 - C/PPS/DO (DO1)
1 - C/EAQ (5E18)
1 - OGI/IIC/PI
1 - OEA/NEA/Korea Branch
1 - OEA/NEA/Japan Branch
1 - OEA/NEA/STI Branch
1 - OEA/NEA Division
1 - OEA/China Division
1 - OEA/SEA Division
1 - D/OEA (4F18)
1 - C/Research/OEA
1 - FBIS Analysis Group
1-- DD I
1 - D/DCI/DDCI Executive Staff
1 - Senior Review Panel
1 - PDB Staff (7F30)
5 - CPAS/IMC/CG (7GO7)
1 - CPAS/ILS (7F50)
1 - C/PES (7F24)
1 - NIC/AG (7E47)
1 - DDO/EA Division
1 - DDO/ EA/^ (5E22 )
1 - DDI/Seoul
1 - DDI/Tokyo (Info Kobe)
1 - DDI/Honolulu
1 - OLA/EAD/AB (1H18)
DDI/OEA/NEA/Japan Branch/
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