THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO INSTABILITY IN WEST AFRICA

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00591R000300440002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of See, et
Intelligence
The Soviet Response
to Instability
in West Africa
SOV 85-10164CX
SC 00445/85
September 1985
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mot` Directorate of
Intelligence
The Soviet Response
to Instability
in West Africa
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
Global Issues, and
Office of
Office of Central Reference. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Third World Activities Division, Regional Issues
Group, SOYA,
Secret
SOV R5-10164CX
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The Soviet Response
to Instability
in West Africa
Key Judgments Since the mid-1970s, the USSR's interests in West Africa have been
Information available overshadowed by the higher priority it has given to southern Africa and the
as Qf 15 July 1985 Horn of Africa. However, the Soviets do maintain access to air and naval
was used in this report.
facilities in the region, provide arms to several states, and enjoy political
and economic ties to almost all of the West African nations.
The chronic instability that has plagued West African politics has
presented Moscow with both opportunities and challenges. Moscow's
response so far to this turmoil indicates that through the 1990s it will:
? Cultivate radical regimes, especially where Western influence appears to
be on the rebound. Ghana and Burkina (formerly Upper Volta) are two of
the likely primary targets.
? Ensure that changes of regime do not harm relations with states, such as
Guinea and Nigeria, that now maintain military and economic ties to the
USSR.
? Continue to probe for entree in countries where it has little influence, as
in Liberia and Cameroon.
Moscow's long-term success in exploiting openings offered in future
accessions of radical regimes would closely depend on its willingness to give
timely security and economic aid. Although cautious about backing such
regimes, the Soviets might increase aid to obtain new rights of military
access or to displace the West in an important regional state, such as
Nigeria, should a leftist coup take place. The amount of aid that would
sway a shaky new government probably would be relatively small.
The Kremlin should be able to handle fairly easily the challenge that
instability will present to its existing positions in West Africa. Regimes
inclined to turn to the West for economic aid will still require a significant
amount of security aid that Western countries probably will be unable or
unwilling to provide. This reluctance will enable the Soviets to exploit the
most effective instrument of their Third World policy-arms transfers and
other military support-and ensure their continued presence and influence.
Secret
Sov 85-10164CX
September 1 85
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 The Soviets will continue to probe for opportunities that instability may
create in Western-oriented countries where they now have minimal
influence. Although they have gained little in such situations in recent
years, they are likely to persist with low-cost attempts to expand their
diplomatic presence, cultivate trade ties, develop intelligence assets, and
influence public opinion in a bid to improve their position to take advantage
of future developments.
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Key Judgments
Background
Cultivating the Radicals
Protecting Existing Relationships
11
Looking for Openings
14
The Soviet Bureaucracy's View of West Africa
19
1.
Soviet Relations With West African Countries: Econom
Military Deliveries and Personnel and Fishing Agreeme
ic and
nts
3
2.
Comparison of Soviet and Western Economic Disbursem
Selected West African States
ents to
5
3.
Comparison of Soviet and Western Military Disburseme
Selected West African States
nts to
5
4.
Arms Transfers From the Soviet Bloc to West African S
1956-84
tates,
6
5.
Students From Selected West African Countries Attend
Academic Institutions in the USSR
ing
7
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Figure 1
West Africa
/E) Aaiun
Algeria
lstern
Kara
Libya
Mali Niger
1 or 2 surface combatants
1 or 2 minesweepers
3 or 4 auxiliary ships
1 or 2 research ships
1 amphibious ship
Countries of special interest
to the Soviets
Central
African
Republic
Bangui
11
Cameroon
Douala
Yanundt
Libreville
Gabon
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Sierra
Leone
Soviet West Africa Patrol
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The Soviet Response
to Instability
in West Africa
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, West Africa was
the primary focus of Soviet attention in Sub-Saharan
Africa, while Washington and Moscow jockeyed for
position in newly independent African states. The
USSR appeared to have won major ideological and
political successes. Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah,
Guinea's Sekou Toure, and Mali's Modibu Keita
responded enthusiastically to Soviet offers of econom-
ic assistance and political support (see figure 2). These
leaders saw close relations with Moscow as a means
both of demonstrating their independence from the
colonial powers and of obtaining much-needed devel-
opment aid. They also viewed the Soviet model of
state-led industrialization and tight political control
as well suited to their needs.
The Soviets were relatively generous with economic
aid, and they provided credits and equipment for
numerous modernization and development projects.
Military and security ties also expanded, and Soviet
advisers played key roles in building the Ghanaian,
Guinean, and Malian armed forces. Moscow also used
its presence in these countries to maintain contact
with and, in some cases, funnel aid to leftist anticolon-
ial movements elsewhere in Africa, such as the Popu-
lar Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).
Some Soviet theoreticians argued that these countries'
experiences proved the possibility of successfully ne-
gotiating the path of socialist development in the
absence of the traditional "objective bases" for build-
ing socialism, a view embraced by Khrushchev. Even
the more cautious analysts recognized the value of
these states as supporters of Soviet foreign policy
positions on decolonization and Third World develop-
ment.
The close relations of the early 1960s proved short
lived. African leaders became disenchanted with what
they viewed as Soviet meddling in their internal
affairs. Moreover, Soviet aid often proved unsuited to
African needs and conditions, and the frequently
highhanded behavior of Soviet advisers and diplomats
offended local sensibilities. Sekou Toure, for example,
accused the Soviet Ambassador of interfering in local
labor politics. In December 1961 he expelled the
Ambassador and moved to scale down Soviet involve-
ment in Guinea. During the 1960s, Moscow's ties to
Mali stabilized at a comparatively low, but cordial,
level. Relations with Ghana continued to be good until
Kwame Nkrumah's fall in 1966 led to a sharp
reduction in Soviet presence and influence.
After coups in Ghana and Algeria sharply reversed 25X1
Soviet fortunes, the Soviets concluded that there was
no easy way to achieve socialism in Africa and that
major commitments to self-professed radicals could
backfire. The Kremlin began to base its military and
economic commitments on more narrow self-interest,
rather than ideological affinity, and sought to culti-
vate good relations with several regimes. The Soviets
continued to extend military aid to leftist-oriented
states in West Africa-such as Benin, Mali, and,
later, Guinea-Bissau-but they also cultivated diplo-
matic and trade ties to moderate states-such as
Senegal and Sierra Leone. In an attempt to cultivate
Africa's most populous state, Moscow sold MIG
fighters and tanks to Nigeria for use against Biafran
rebels. In the early 1970s, the Soviets established a
continuous naval presence off West Africa and gained
access in Guinea to facilities that would support
Soviet ships and aircraft. Since then, the Soviets have
turned their attention from West Africa to southern
Africa and the Horn; they have also limited the
resources allocated to West Africa.
Although their primary interests in Sub-Saharan
Africa are southern Africa and the Horn of Africa,
the Soviets have established a variety of political,
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Figure 2. Leaders meet with African counterparts in the 1960s
Keita and Khrushchev in Moscow (top), Nkrumah and Khrushchev
in Moscow (lower left), and Toure and Brezhnev in Moscow (lower
military, and economic ties to most West African foreign policy positions, including disarmament initia-
states (see figure 1). They are also actively seeking tives and the linkage of the policies of the Republic of
entree in countries where they have had little or no South Africa to those of the United States, and to
presence (see table 1). portray itself as the "natural ally" of African interests
against the "imperialist exploiters" of the West. Sovi-
The Soviet's political objective is to limit the West's et observers have generally been less than optimistic
influence, now dominant in West Africa, and to
encourage change to the left. Moscow also seeks to
gain the support of West African states for its various
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Table 1
Soviet Relations With West African Countries:
Economic and Military Deliveries and Personnel
and Fishing Agreements
Aid Deliveries, 1979-84
(million US $)
Fishing
Agreement
Cape Verde
8.1
1.4
10
20 20
Equatorial Guinea
0.6
9.0
85
15 0
Gambia, The
0.0
0
0 0
Ghana
16.0
5.0
135
10 0
Guinea-Bissau
15.5
20.0
Ivory Coast
0.0
0.0
Liberia
0.1
0.0
45
315
Senegal
0.0
40 0
Sierra Leone
1.5
10 0
Togo
0.3
5 0
about the prospects for the emergence of stable
socialist-and reliably pro-Soviet-regimes in West
Africa. Indeed, Soviet policy has concentrated on
developing ties to all West African governments,
including conservative pro-Western states, such as
Liberia and Cameroon. These ties establish Moscow
as a player in regional diplomacy and improve its
ability to monitor and exploit future developments. F
Militarily, Soviet interests in West Africa focus on
the preservation and, if possible, expansion of access
to air and naval facilities there. Existing access to
such facilities in Conakry, Guinea, supports long-
range transport flights to Angola and provisioning of
the Soviet West Africa naval patrol. These activities
in turn serve several purposes, including protecting
the Soviet fishing fleet, providing support for the
continuous flow of military assistance to Angola,
facilitating the transport of Soviet forces in a crisis,
collecting intelligence, and demonstrating Soviet in-
terest and involvement in a remote region. Expanded
access in West Africa could facilitate reconnaissance
and ASW operations in the mid-Atlantic.
Such access, while useful, is not of decisive impor-
tance to Soviet military operations, however, and
West Africa as a whole is presently of limited strate-
gic interest to the USSR. The Soviet Navy's primary
mission remains the deployment and defense of
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and the
defense of the USSR from enemy nuclear attacks.
The missions involving Soviet presence in West Afri-
ca-client state support, fisheries protection, and, in
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In 1969 and 1970 Moscow sent small naval task
groups to West Africa to support Soviet interests
during crises in Ghana and Guinea. Since then the
Soviets have maintained a continuous naval presence
in West African waters.
Generally, the West Africa patrol has consisted of
one or two surface combatants, an attack submarine,
an amphibious ship, one or two minesweepers, one or
two research vessels, and several auxiliaries. Logistic
support is provided at Luanda, Angola, and provi-
sioning at Conakry, Guinea. The patrol performs
various missions, including the demonstration of
Soviet interest in the region to both friendly and
unfriendly governments, protection of Soviet fishing
vessels, and the monitoring of local and Western
naval activity.
During a crisis, the patrol's most likely task would be
the evacuation of Soviet citizens and dependents from
danger areas.
They could also be used to back a friendly
regime under challenge with a show of Soviet pres-
ence and power. However, the patrol's small size and
its long supply lines suggest that its primary role
would be symbolic.
wartime, possibly sea lane interdiction-are of lesser
significance in Soviet doctrine, and Moscow has not
expended significant resources on expanding this pres-
ence in recent years.
Moscow's primary economic interests in West Africa
are its profitable involvement in coastal fishing and in
Guinea's bauxite industry. However, trade is minimal.
The development aid the Soviets have given West
Africa's faltering economies is also minimal, falling
far short of the economic needs of even those states
politically close to the USSR (see table 2). Much of
the aid that has been given has been poorly planned
and misdirected. For example, the Ajaokuta steel mill
in Nigeria-intended as a showpiece of Soviet eco-
nomic aid and industrialization assistance-has be-
come a white elephant due to poor planning and the
use of outmoded technology.
states over the long term.
Moscow's most effective policy instrument in West
Africa in recent years has been arms transfers. Be-
tween 1979 and 1984, Soviet military disbursements
to West Africa amounted to $383 million. (For mili-
tary disbursements to each country, see table 3.) Mali,
Guinea, Benin, and Guinea-Bissau depend on the
USSR for much of their modern military equipment
and technical support, items for which they have little
or no alternative source of supply. Nigeria also oper-
ates Soviet planes and tanks as part of its diversified
arsenal (see table 4). Arms transfers have enabled the
Soviets to establish a sizable long-term presence in
these countries through their control and manipula-
tion of training, advisory support, and spare parts
supply. Though the Soviets have not always enjoyed
great success in translating arms transfers into sub-
stantial political benefit, they have gained a measure
of influence in the military establishment of recipient
states and ensured their role as key players in these
Moscow has also sought to shape West African
opinion and lay the foundation for future influence
through various cultural, journalistic, and educational
programs. For example, most states have accepted
Soviet offers of scholarship assistance and cultural
exchanges, and many have local chapters of Soviet
front organizations and friendship societies (see table
5). In addition, local newspapers frequently publish
articles originated by the Soviets on themes designed
to embarrass Western states and promote Soviet
positions on issues such as arms control, South Africa,
and African debt. For example, a Nigerian newspaper
ran a story in July 1985 alleging South African
development of an "ethnic weapon" that only works
on blacks, a longstanding Soviet propaganda theme.
US embassies throughout West Africa report that the
cumulative effect of such programs is not substantial,
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Table 2
Comparison of Soviet and Western Economic
Disbursements to Selected West African States a
West USSR West USSR West
Burkina 241 232 236
Cameroon 394 373 348
Ghana 200 211 174
a Includes official development assistance and other official flows.
b Estimate.
USSR West USSR West b USSR USSR
223 0.0
307 250 0.0
NEGL 174 NEGL 190 1 11.9
Table 3
Comparison of Soviet and Western Military Disbursements
to Selected West African States
0.6
0
3.7
0
Ghana
47.8
0
0.8
0
1.6
0
8.1
0
11.6
0
Guinea
2.0
20
0.2
6
NA
0
2.0
0
0
Liberia
1.6
0
0.7
0
10.5
0
Nigeria
because moderate and leftist regimes alike generally
resist what they perceive as attempts to meddle in
their domestic affairs. The opportunities these activi-
ties afford the Soviets to enhance their image and
cultivate key individuals and constituencies over the
long run, however, may have more serious conse-
quences for Western interests in West Africa's unsta-
ble political climate.
The chronic instability that has plagued West African
politics has presented Moscow with both opportunities
and challenges. Moscow's response so far to this
turmoil indicates that through the 1990s it will:
? Cultivate radical regimes, especially where Western
influence appears to be on the rebound. Ghana and
Burkina (fomerly Upper Volta) are the likely prima-
ry targets.
? Ensure that changes of regime do not harm Soviet
relations with states, such as Guinea and Nigeria,
that presently maintain military and economic ties
to the USSR.
? Continue to probe for entree in countries where
Moscow presently has little influence, as in Liberia
and Cameroon.
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Table 4
Arms Transfers From the Soviet Bloc
to West African States, 1956-84
Value Key Systems
of Deliveries
(million US $)
AN-26 transport aircraft 3
KA-26 helicopter 1
T-54 tank 20
PT-76 tank 4
BDRM scout car 6
ZHUK patrol boat 4
AN-26 transport aircraft
Patrol boat
Torpedo boat
Armored personnel carrier
BDRM scout car
AN-12 transport aircraft
MI-4 helicopter
Poluchat patrol boat
Armored personnel carrier
MIG-21 fighter 6
MIG-17 fighter 12
MIG-15 fighter 6
AN-12 transport aircraft 2
AN-24 transport aircraft 1
Torpedo boat 9
Patrol boat 8
T-62 tank 10
T-54 tank 10
T-34 tank 31
PT-76 tank 24
Armored personnel carrier 50
BDRM scout car 20
Radar (various) 22
MIG-21 fighter 6
MIG-17 fighter 3
MIG-15 fighter 3
MI-8 helicopter 1
MI-4 helicopter 3
T-34 tank 8
Armored personnel carrier 25
MIG-21 fighter 6
MIG-17 fighter 21
MIG-15 fighter 5
AN-26 transport 3
MI-8 helicopter 6
MI-4 helicopter 1
T-34 tank 59
PT-76 tank 50
Armored personnel carrier 237
BMP armored fighting vehicle 41
BDRM-2 scout car 128
Radar (various) 24
SA-3 AA missile system 6
Soviet military aid peaked in 1981
and has since declined.
Almost all Bloc assistance to Gha-
na was extended between 1961 and
1965.
Although Guinea has recently
sought to diversify its arms
acquisitions, it remains
heavily dependent on the
USSR for spare parts and
advisory support.
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Table 4 (continued)
Value
of Deliveries
(million US $)
Key Systems
Quantity
Nigeria
259
MIG-21 fighter
MIG-17 fighter
MIG-15 fighter
T-55 tank
SA-7 AA missile system
Radar (various)
31
36
5
65
100
22
Sao Tome and Principe
4
AN-2 transport aircraft
Zhuk patrol boat
2
1
Auxiliary ship
Radar
Small arms/ammunition
Comments
Nigeria has frequently cited the
relatively attractive prices of Soviet
equipment as a key reason for its
purchases.
Table 5
Students From Selected West African Countries
Attending Academic Institutions in the USSR a
Ghana
500
650
650 800 875 960
Guinea
575
605
455 420 350 340
Liberia
45
65
65 65 90 90
Nigeria
1,030
1,180
1,000 1,100 1,110 1,250
One form of political change in West Africa has been
the emergence of regimes headed by leaders who had
been disaffected junior military officers when they
toppled previous governments. These leaders have
often struck radical notes in their policy statements,
arguing that socialist restructuring at home and an
"anti-imperialist" orientation abroad are the way out
of serious economic and political troubles. The Sovi-
ets, however, have been cautious toward such regimes
in recent years, and they have offered rhetorical
support, but only token economic and military aid.
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Figure 3. Ghana's Head of
State, Jerry John Rawlings
Their caution probably reflects their previous setbacks
in dealings with African leaders who profess radical-
ism and a desire to limit commitment until the new
governments have established their viability.
In Ghana and Burkina, junior military officers led
coups that brought leftist regimes to power in previ-
ously pro-Western states. In 1984 Moscow-which
had maintained a wait-and-see attitude-moved to
improve relations with Accra and Ouagadougou, pos-
sibly to counter overtures they had made to Western
countries. Moscow may also have concluded it could
improve relations, with less chance of their sudden
reversal, because the prospects for the survival of both
heads of state-Ghana's Jerry John Rawlings and
Burkina's Thomas Sankara-appear to be fairly good
(see figures 3 and 4).
Ghana
Following Nkrumah's overthrow in 1966, Soviet-
Ghanaian relations were generally cool, and the Sovi-
ets had little more than a diplomatic presence in
Accra. Bilateral trade was minimal and military ties
nonexistent, even though the Soviets had been Ghan-
a's major benefactor during the early 1960s.
The Soviets initially viewed Rawlings's return in
December 1981 (he had ruled briefly in mid-1979)
favorably. They portrayed the coup with a leftist cast,
and they proclaimed it a setback for the West. They
were not equally accommodating, however, when
Rawlings looked to them for economic aid; they
offered only $10.6 million in credits, mainly for
rehabilitating projects of the Nkrumah era. Their
willingness to commit resources there appears to have
been limited by suspicion of the mercurial Flight
Lieutenant Rawlings and by previous political rever-
sals in Ghana. Libya and Cuba emerged as the
primary non-Western suppliers of military and eco-
nomic assistance to Ghana; however, overall aid levels
were relatively low.
By mid-1983, Rawlings was disenchanted with the
limited level of aid provided by Libya, Cuba, and the
USSR. He began to moderate his radical rhetoric and
turned to the West for economic help. This shift may
have led the Soviets to reassess their approach in
Ghana. In early 1984, the Kremlin launched a cam-
paign to improve its standing there:
? In March, Vyacheslav Semenov, a diplomat with
extensive experience in Africa, was appointed Am-
bassador to Ghana.
? A Soviet merchant ship landed a shipment of small
arms and ammunition, probably for Ghanaian secu-
rity forces,
? The destroyer Obraztsovyy visited the port of Tema
for a week, showing the flag and probing Ghanaian
interest in improved security ties (see figure 5).
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? A cultural and scientific agreement was signed, and
the Soviets reportedly relaxed their terms for renew-
ing previous aid projects.
? Bulgarian Prime Minister Filipov visited Accra,
possibly to discuss intelligence cooperation
arrangements.
little more than an update of earlier Soviet commit-
ments to aid in the renewal of several projects initiat-
ed during Nkrumah's regime. Since August 1984, at
least 121 Ghanaian students have begun scholarship
study programs in the USSR.
promoted Capt. Kojo Tsikata, head
of security and intelligence, to the Provisional Nation-
al Defense Council (PNDC). Rawlings and other
PNDC members, however, are said to suspect the
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Soviets' motives and to believe they are more interest-
ed in their own ends than in aiding Ghana. Moreover, 25X1
the Ghanaians have not been impressed with Soviet
assistance. They reportedly considered the guns and 25X1
ammunition delivered last year to be useless.
Rawlings wants to
? To build pro-Soviet opinion and influence govern-
ment policy, the Soviets stepped up press place-
ments, educational exchanges, and front activities.
Moscow seemed to believe it could prevent Ghana
from moving too far toward the West by providing
small amounts of economic aid and boosting military
support, and that efforts to improve ties in the short
term could lead to more substantial long-run gains.
For example, if relations with Guinea deteriorate and
the military access it gives them is threatened, the
Soviets could use Ghanaian facilities much as they
now use those at Conakry to support the West Africa
naval patrol and long-range transport flights to Ango-
la. Accra would also be a useful staging point for
South Atlantic aerial reconnaissance, were Ghana to
grant permission for such flights.
17
The Soviets' campaign has had mixed results.
Accra accepted Soviet offers of
training for Ghanaian security officers, 24 of whom
have reportedly completed a six-month course in the
USSR. An economic cooperation agreement was an-
nounced in August 1984, though this appears to be
avoid alienating Western governments that provide
almost all of Accra's outside economic assistance.
Before the recent spy scandal, Rawlings had removed
several other leftist members of his cabinet from
positions of responsibility and promoted several mod-
erates. The US Embassy in Accra reports that in
November 1984 a US Navy ship-the first to visit
Ghana since the 1981 coup-was warmly received.
Foreign Affairs Secretary Asamoah announced that
Ghana has not adopted socialism and seeks beneficial
cooperation with both East and West.
The Soviets may continue to offer expanded military,
security, and, possibly, economic aid in the hope that
the unpredictable Rawlings will adopt a more radical
posture if he is unsuccessful in obtaining it from the
West. They probably will try to cultivate leftist
officials, like Tsikata, to improve their ability to
exploit future developments (see figure 6).' They will
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also undoubtedly continue their persistent efforts to
build a pro-Soviet constituency by promoting scholar-
ships and cultural exchange programs and by placing
Soviet-originated articles in the press. The Soviets
might also be inclined to intensify diplomatic efforts
and increase its economic aid should their air and
naval access to Guinea be threatened. However, they
are probably more likely to try to build influence
slowly and avoid major commitment in a potentially
unstable environment.
Burkina
After it attained independence in 1960, Burkina
(formerly Upper Volta) followed a generally pro-
Western foreign policy course, and it relied heavily on
France for economic and military support. Soviet ties
to Burkina were minimal during the period of coups
and upheavals that preceded the establishment of
Sankara's government. By 1983 these ties were only a
small cultural and educational program, an airline
service agreement, and provision of financial aid to
Backed by key military personnel, leftist unionists,
students, and intellectuals, Capt. Thomas Sankara,
former Prime Minister, seized power in August 1983.
A self-styled revolutionary, Sankara proclaimed a
"revolutionary government" and advocated strong
"progressive" foreign policy positions. At the same
time, he avoided the initiation of radical programs,
restrained extreme leftists at home, and maintained
links to Western governments that donated aid.
Cuba, Libya, and North Korea quickly moved to
cultivate Sankara, but Moscow was cautious. While
the Soviet media highlighted Sankara's radical rheto-
ric, officials of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
expressed doubts about his reliability. The Soviets
donated some school supplies and urged Ouagadou-
gou to accept their scholarship offers, but they did not
extend any financial aid. Sankara publicly berated the
Kremlin for not providing substantive assistance to a
fellow revolutionary government.
During the spring and summer of 1984, Moscow
appeared interested in improving bilateral relations,
probably because Sankara's prospects for survival
made it likely that Soviet influence would not be
subject to sudden reversal. In April, Moscow sent a
TASS official to Ouagadougou to ease tensions raised
by Sankara's criticism,
In May Burkinan Defense Minister Lingani
visited the USSR. Although no agreements were
announced,
Moscow probably was trying to reassure San-
kara of its support for his revolution and to limit the
influence of Western suppliers of aid.
Moscow, however, appears to have overplayed its
hand in its attempts to interfere in Burkinan internal
politics. According to a report from the US Embassy
in Ouagadougou, in August 1984, Sankara fired five
cabinet ministers who were members of a civilian
Marxist party that favors improved relations with the
Socialist world. Although apparently not the immedi-
ate cause of their firing, links between these figures
and the Soviet Embassy had angered Sankara and led
to a cooling of bilateral relations.
The Soviets reportedly said
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they found Sankara's firing of the leftist ministers
Burkina responded by publicly cri
Special Ties To Guinea
cizing the USSR's aid policy and, according to diplo-
matic sources, expelled the Soviet deputy chief of
mission in Ouagadougou.
Sankara is highly sensitive to perceived slights to
Burkinan sovereignty and probably will continue to be
cool toward the Soviets. Although likely to accept
small amounts of economic or military aid, he is also
likely to limit the Soviets' presence and influence.
The Soviets, meanwhile, will almost certainly contin-
ue to probe for Burkinan interest in military and
economic cooperation, but wariness of the unpredict-
able Sankara and the still questionable prospects for
his regime will lead them to assume a low profile.
They probably will also rely on Havana, which enjoys
fairly good relations with Ouagadougou, to advance
the Soviet Bloc interests. The Cubans opened their
Embassy in Ouagadougou in 1984, and in July Cuba
and Burkina signed a cooperation agreement.
Recent coups in Nigeria and Guinea overthrew gov-
ernments that had maintained correct, if not particu-
larly close, relations with the USSR. The Soviets
responded by trying to preserve the economic and
military ties already developed.
While political ties have cooled in recent years, the
Soviet position in Guinea is still substantial, due to
Moscow's extensive involvement in key economic and
military sectors. This involvement does not always
guarantee direct political influence, but it does under-
pin the Soviet position in Guinea and makes its
sudden reversal unlikely.
Moscow has been Conakry's primary source of mili-
tary equipment and training since independence. The
Guinean armed forces operate various Soviet equip-
ment, including MIG-21 fighters, T-62 tanks, and
MI-8 helicopters, and they are aided by about 50
Soviet advisers. Many Guinean officers have received
training in the USSR. While Conakry may seek to
diversify its arms inventory somewhat, Guinea's need
for Soviet spare parts and maintenance support and
its poor prospects for obtaining favorable credit terms
in the West should ensure continued military depen-
dence on the USSR.
The Soviet Union plays a key role in the Guinean
economy through its involvement in the Guinean
bauxite and fishing industries. Moscow has invested
over $116 million in the Kindia bauxite project and
receives some 2.5 million metric tons of bauxite a
year-about 14 percent of total Guinean exports-in
repayment. The Soviets have provided almost $12
million in credits for Guinea's fishing sector. These
credits are to finance the construction of cold storage
plants and dock facilities, and the acquisition of
trawlers and a hydrographic research vessel. Mili-
tarily, Conakry has no realistic alternative to the
Soviets' continued aid. Past attempts to reduce Sovi-
et involvement have failed, serving to underscore
Guinea's economic dependence on the USSR.
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Guinea
Moscow's once close relations with Guinea have de-
clined since 1977, when Sekou Toure suspended Sovi-
et reconnaissance flights from Conakry. The Soviets
continue to make periodic naval visits to Conakry,
however, and Soviet transport flights regularly refuel
there en route to Angola and Cuba (see figure 7). In
addition, Moscow benefits from its participation in
Guinea's bauxite and fishing industries.
Uncertainty resulting from President Toure's death in
1984 and the subsequent military coup increased the
Soviets' concern over their position in Guinea.
The Soviet press, meanwhile, reported the
coup in straightforward fashion and emphasized the
importance of continuity with Toure's policies. F_
In the following months, as Guinea actively sought
increased Western aid and investment, Moscow
moved to protect its interests. Presumably to sound
out Conakry's intentions and stress the benefits of
cooperation, Moscow received a delegation led by
Defense Minister Keita. Although no agreements
As reported by the US Embassy in Conakry, the
USSR and Guinea signed a loan accord for $115
million in September. Terms of the loan-which was
to finance various agricultural and industrial pro-
jects-stipulated that 25 percent was to be used to
purchase Soviet merchandise and that repayment was
to be in bauxite or hard currency. An agreement on
continued Soviet assistance to Guinea's fishing indus-
try was signed in November. Finally, the Guinean
press reported that existing defense assistance agree-
ments were also renewed in November.
market economic policies.
Once implemented, these measures would expand the
Soviets' presence in Guinea and sustain their influ-
ence with the new regime. But Moscow as yet has not
shown any willingness to provide the large amounts of
economic aid Conakry requires. The $115 million loan
is apparently not an increase over previous levels of
aid. Moreover, the
Guineans are unhappy with the Soviets' implementa-
tion of previous agreements and their emphasis on
ideological and cultural programs rather than devel-
opment aid. As a result, the Kremlin probably will not
be able to dissuade the Guineans from their overtures
to the West or discourage them from pursuing free-
to their requests for aid.
Moscow's primary interest in Guinea is the preserva-
tion and, if possible, expansion of its air and naval
access. Soviet naval ships now call at Conakry, and
Soviet transport planes stop there en route to Angola.
The Soviets probably can maintain this access
through the 1980s at relatively low cost, because of
Guinea's dependence on and present lack of alterna-
tives to Soviet military and economic aid. Conakry
probably will take care not to alienate the Soviets
even as it opens its economy to Western aid and trade.
The Guineans, however, probably will not allow a
significant expansion of the Soviet military presence
unless they become displeased with Western responses
Nigeria
Until its civil war in 1967, Nigeria's relations with the
USSR were limited. Lagos had remained close to the
West after independence, and the country's few "pro-
gressive forces" were primarily in the province that
was trying to break away-Biafra. However, the civil
war gave Moscow an entree, and the Soviets, calculat-
ing that the Lagos government would win, abandoned
the left-a pragmatic approach typical of their Afri-
can policies in the late 1960s. Moscow gave its first
military support to the Nigerians during their war
with Biafran rebels and expanded trade and cultural
ties as well.
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The Ajaokuta Project
The integrated steel manufacturing complex at Ajao-
kuta, Nigeria, was to be the showpiece of Soviet
development aid in Sub-Saharan Africa. Joint plan-
ning began in 1967, and in 1979 Moscow extended a
$1.2 billion credit for construction. The Soviets de-
signed the facility and provided technical support,
training, and equipment for construction of the plant
and associated facilities.
Since its inception, however, the project has been
plagued by problems. Although one of the four
projected mills began operation in July 1983, rising
costs, delays in payments, and a lack of equipment
have seriously delayed completion of the entire pro-
ject. construc-
tion came to a halt in November 1984. Moreover, the
US Embassy in Lagos reports that the plant's obso-
lete design and remote location make it unlikely that
steel will ever be economically produced at Ajaokuta.
The Federal Military Government is undoubtedly
unhappy with Soviet performance on the project, in
spite of the generally optimistic public pronounce-
ments of both sides. Other West African leaders are
presumably aware of the difficulties with the project
and they, along with Nigeria, are likely to take
Moscow's record at Ajaokuta into account when
assessing the prospects of economic cooperation with
the USSR.
Relations cooled gradually after the war. Although
nominally nonaligned, Lagos was considerably closer
to the West because of its extensive economic (it is a
major oil supplier), military, political, and cultural
links. Moscow's persistent interest in Nigeria, none-
theless, reflected its appreciation of the country's size,
economic potential, and regional importance.
Since the late 1970s, the cornerstone of the Soviet-
Nigerian relationship has been trade. It amounted to
over $500 million in 1983, for example, but it was
only a small fraction of total Nigerian trade. Overall,
bilateral trade levels have fallen in recent years,
because of Nigeria's economic problems and reluc-
tance to engage in barter. Moscow also provided $1.2
billion in credits for the Ajaokuta steel mill project,
but its poor design, rising costs, and construction
delays contributed to Nigeria's growing disenchant-
ment with the Soviets' economic aid.
The Nigerian armed forces operate various equipment
purchased from the Soviets, including MIG-21 fight-
ers, T-55 tanks, and ZSU-23 antiaircraft guns. How-
ever, purchases of equipment and acceptance of Soviet
advisers declined in the early 1980s, because Nigerian
officers apparently were not impressed by either. The
number of Soviet military advisers in Nigeria declined
from 50 in 1980 to 10 in 1983.
Moscow has conducted numerous social, cultural, and
educational programs in Nigeria. It has offered schol-
arships to Nigerian students and sponsored artistic
and cultural exchanges. It has also supported so-
called peace committees, placed numerous articles in
Nigeria's relatively open and lively press, and-along
with the Bulgarians-funneled funds to leftist trade
unionists. According to the US Embassy, these efforts
have not had a significant impact on Nigerian public
opinion.
In response to the military takeover, the Soviet press
stressed the desirability of honoring existing commit-
ments to "friendly countries" and blamed Nigeria's
troubles on the West. The Kremlin also encouraged
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Lagos to follow a "truly nonaligned" foreign policy,
defined, in this case, in economic terms that include
limiting foreign investment, resisting International
Monetary Fund conditions, and increasing trade with
the Soviet Bloc. In a bid to improve relations with the
new Federal Military Government (FMG), the Soviets
extended a warm reception to an FMG delegation
sent to Moscow after the coup.
The FMG expressed rhetorical interest in cooperation
with the USSR on the South African and Namibian
issues-probably to reinforce its claims to nonalign-
ment-but did nothing else to improve bilateral rela-
tions. The FMG, like the preceding government, has
suspected Soviet intentions; counting against Moscow
are a trade balance in its favor and problems with the
Soviet-built steelmaking project in Ajaokuta.
In 1984 the FMG apparently authorized the purchase
of 12 new MIG-21 fighters, but it reportedly saw
these as a low-cost stopgap measure until it could
afford Western interceptors.
deal for the MIGs in October.
serious snags arose in the
negotiations and that Lagos was inclined to forgo the
purchase of new aircraft in favor of a far more limited
repair and maintenance agreement for its existing
MIG fleet. These difficulties were apparently over-
come by the end of 1984, though, when
delivery of the MIG-21s had begun.
Nigeria's need for Western aid and investment, FMG
suspicions of Soviet motives, and Moscow's poor track
record on economic projects make significant im-
provement in Soviet-Nigerian relations unlikely-
despite the aircraft sales. Lagos probably will contin-
ue its policy of spreading its weapons purchases
among Eastern, Western, and Third World suppliers.
unionists and students.
Moscow is no doubt aware of the limits to the
relationship and probably will concentrate on trying
to revitalize the Ajaokuta project and on continuing
military supply arrangements. At the same time, the
Soviets will seek to influence Nigerian public opinion
and improve their position to affect future events by
supporting front activities, promoting press place-
ments, and expanding contacts with leftist trade
Should the FMG prove unable to consolidate its hold
on power, the fluid, potentially chaotic situation that
probably would follow could offer Moscow attractive
opportunities to increase its influence in Nigeria. To
improve relations, Moscow might well offer diplomat-
ic support and security aid to a successor regime. F_
assets, and influence public opinion.
Political turmoil in some pro-Western governments
has given Moscow the opportunity to improve its
position at the expense of the West. Despite having
made no major gains in West African situations of
this type in the past, the Soviets are likely to persist
with low-cost attempts to expand their diplomatic
presence, cultivate trade ties, develop intelligence
Liberia
Following the coup in Liberia in April 1980, Mos-
cow-in an effort to court the pro-Western nation-
offered political, economic, and military cooperation
to then Master Sergeant Doe (see figure 8). Liberia
accepted scholarships for study in the USSR, signed
an air service agreement, and allowed the Soviets to
expand their diplomatic presence in Monrovia. F_
However, Doe soon cut off this expansion in bilateral
relations because of his mistrust of Soviet intentions
and his perception of Soviet links with his leftist
opposition. Doe limited the Soviet mission in Monro-
via to six officials, and he removed cabinet officials
who favored improved ties to Moscow. His suspicions
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of Kremlin involvement in alleged leftist plotting of
coups finally led him to expel the Soviet Ambassador
Figure 8. Liberia's Head of
State, Samuel K. Doe
from the Soviets. Alternatively, Doe may have initiat-
ed the proposal merely to attract US attention. F_
down.
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in November 1983.
Liberia appears to have moved to repair relations with
the USSR in the spring of 1984, when its close ties to
the United States cooled somewhat.
April speech, Doe stated that Liberia wanted good
relations with all states, hinted that greater coopera-
tion with Moscow would be welcome, and sharply
criticized the United States.
Doe was interested in
buying three MI-17 transport helicopters. Moscow
reportedly agreed to sell the helicopters on commer-
cial terms, but the Liberians ultimately backed away
from the deal, possi-
bly because they could not obtain concessionary terms
The Kremlin probably will have difficulty improving
its position in Monrovia as long as Doe is in charge.
His intense suspicion of Soviet meddling and close
surveillance of opposition parties led him to break
diplomatic relations with the USSR in July. Doe
reportedly said he would not consider reestablishing
relations until after the transition from military to
civilian rule promised by January 1986. In the mean-
time, Moscow probably will seek to cultivate assets-
by building contacts with Doe's opponents-that
could be exploited should the transition process break
Cameroon
Soviet relations with Cameroon, both before and after
the attempted coup in 1984 against the government of
President Paul Biya, have been correct but cool.
Trade levels have been limited and declining; security
arrangements, nonexistent. Soviet freighters call at
the port of Douala, but Cameroon has resisted Soviet
pressure for additional diplomatic facilities. Heavily
dependent on the West for economic and security aid,
Cameroon's ties with Moscow merely reinforce its
claims to nonalignment.
Cameroonian forestry technicians.
The Soviet press has said almost nothing about the
opposition military officers' attempted overthrow of
Biya. Moreover, Soviet activity in Cameroon has
remained at its usually low levels, including the
freighter calls at Douala, occasional placements in the
local press, and a few social and cultural exchanges,
such as an agreement in September on training of
The prospects for any meaningful increase in Soviet
influence in Cameroon are limited, even should the
political situation deteriorate. Cameroon is a low
priority for Moscow, which has few local assets-
there are no Communist parties or affiliates of inter-
national front groups-and opposition within the mili-
tary has not appeared to be inclined to seek help from
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the Soviet Bloc. Yaounde's suspicions are also fueled
by memories of Soviet support for antigovernment
insurgents in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Howev-
er, the Soviets will take advantage of any opportunity
to increase their presence in Cameroon so they can
watch events and build relationships with people who
might lead the opposition. However, no significant
change in the bilateral relationship is likely soon.
Instability in West African political life will present
Moscow with many opportunities for improving its
position there. Economic distress, the fragility of
political structures, and lack of accepted succession
mechanisms almost ensure frequent plots and changes
of government. Moreover, the Libyans' persistent
efforts to expand their presence and influence in the
region add to the potential for instability. The Soviets,
however, have not been able to manipulate events
because they lack meaningful influence with West
African opposition movements and parties. The
Kremlin consequently will probably continue to be
fairly cautious in dealing with governments following
coups and will take time to assess new leaders and
avoid substantive commitment even to those regimes
professing the most vehement radicalism. Moscow
probably will try, nevertheless, to exploit the opportu-
nities presented by regional political instability and to
limit damage to political, economic, and military ties
that it views as beneficial.
If a new radical regime seizes power in West Africa,
Moscow will initially assess its stability and orienta-
tion. Then the Soviets will almost certainly try to take
advantage of its insecurity and pretensions by offering
arms, military and security training, and, possibly, a
limited amount of highly visible development aid.
They are unlikely, however, to be willing to pay the
high price necessary to supplant Western providers of
aid.
Any expansion of influence would be gradual, but
Moscow would be patient and persistent. The pay-
offs-expanded Soviet presence, influence over a
regime's decisionmaking, potential access to military
facilities-are attractive enough and the risks and
costs low enough to justify Moscow's long-term atten-
tion.
In instances where instability threatens Soviet influ-
ence derived from existing political, military, and
economic links, Moscow will point up the importance
of fulfilling past agreements. It might also extend new
military and economic aid as an incentive for new
rulers to continue these relationships. Alternatively,
Moscow could try to stress the military and economic
vulnerability of a state dependent on the USSR by
threatening to stop such aid. Even pro-Western suc-
cessor regimes are unlikely to entirely cut ties to the
USSR, if only to demonstrate their nonaligned stand-
ing.
Moscow will continue to try to build relationships in
West African states where it has a minimal presence
and little contact with either government or opposition
forces. It will try to enhance its position by offering
cultural and educational aid and military training and
support for various Third World and Pan-African
issues, such as opposition to South Africa (see tables 3
and 4). It may also use low-profile active measures,
such as press placements and clandestine funding of
leftist political groups. Once again, however, Moscow
almost certainly will not expend significant resources.
Limitations-Often Self-Imposed
The Soviets' ability to fully exploit opportunities in
West Africa will be constrained until or unless they
are willing to allocate substantial economic aid to the
region. Higher priority objectives in southern Africa
and the Horn probably will continue to receive the
larger share of their attention, and West African
leaders inclined to look to Moscow for significant
military and economic aid are likely to be disappoint-
ed by its lack of generosity (see tables). Given these
conditions, the West, notably France and the United
States, will continue to be economically dominant in
the region.
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Moscow's policy in West Africa is also limited by the
perceptions that West African leaders have of its past
record. Its showpiece industrial project, the steel mill
in Ajaokuta, Nigeria, is experiencing serious difficul-
ty. Several West African countries have complained
that the USSR takes unfair advantage of bilateral
fishing agreements. Even Ghana's leftist Chairman
Jerry Rawlings has expressed his doubts about Soviet
ability to deliver promised aid.
Finally, activity in West Africa may be constrained
by the widespread perception of Russians as outsiders
meddling in African affairs. According to many diplo-
matic and academic sources, the good will Moscow
built up in previous decades as the champion of
anticolonialism has largely dissipated, in part due to
the often highhanded behavior of Soviet nationals in
Africa and openly racist treatment of Africans in the
USSR. Moreover, ideology usually plays a limited
role in the ultimate policy calculations of most Afri-
can leaders. Even the most radical West African
heads of state are inclined to assess relations with the
USSR by strictly weighing cost against benefits.zF_
Alternative Outcomes
There are, nonetheless, circumstances in which the
Soviets might sharply upgrade military and economic
support for certain West African states. For example,
marked deterioration of Moscow's position in south-
ern Africa might lead it to intensify its efforts in West
Africa to regain a measure of dynamism in its Africa
policy. In this case, Gorbachev might focus on West
African opportunities as a means of reestablishing
foreign policy momentum in the Third World. Con-
versely, successful consolidation of the Soviet position
in southern Africa might incline the Kremlin to begin
new ventures in West Africa.
Local situations might trigger a Soviet resurgence in
the region. For example, if Guinea moved to cut off
Soviet air and naval access, Moscow might offer
large-scale security and economic aid to other West
African nations to try to regain access. The Soviets
probably would turn to Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, and
Cape Verde. If Nigeria became unstable, the Soviets
might commit diplomatic backing and security and
economic aid to the vulnerable successor regime.
Expanded access to West African air and naval
facilities could improve the Soviets' capacity to moni-
tor naval activity in the South Atlantic. Such access,
in and of itself, however, would not result in substan-
tial improvement in Soviet military capabilities in the
region. It would be likely to influence area perceptions
of the local balance of superpower capabilities and
intentions, especially if Moscow were buying that
access with arms transfers. At the very least, pro-
Western states would look to France and the United
States for increased military aid, potentially trigger-
ing a regional arms race.
Moscow's success in establishing influence in a radi-
cal successor regime in Nigeria could pose more
serious challenges to Western interests. Although
such a regime probably would be too dependent on oil
sales to the West to sharply change sales patterns,
Moscow probably would exploit the regime's propen-
sity to blame Nigeria's economic woes on the West
and to resist existing debt and trade arrangements.
The Soviets would also gain a useful ally in interna-
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pro-Western states such as Cameroon, Niger, and
Ivory Coast.
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Appendix
The Soviet Bureaucracy's
View of West Africa
Both the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
International Department (ID) of the CPSU's Central
Committee have departments or sectors that deal with
Africa. However, the responsibilities of the two insti-
tutions and the types of officials in those departments
are different.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for
state-to-state diplomatic relations. Within the minis-
try, the bureaucratic structure for Africa is roughly
similar to that for most other regions. Three regional
departments cover Africa: the First African Depart-
ment, which is responsible for Northern Africa; the
Second African Department, which is responsible for
the western coastal countries; and the Third African
Department, which is responsible for East and south-
ern Africa. Only the Third Department, which in-
cludes coverage of both Angola and Ethiopia, is
represented in the ministry's Collegium (policymaking
body), which indicates importance, especially relative
to the other departments.
The ambassadorial posts to the West African coun-
tries are filled either by government and party offi-
cials who have been essentially "exiled" because their
political careers have been cut short or by career
diplomats who are African specialists.
The Soviet Ambassador to Guinea, Vladimir Kitayev,
is a failed politician. An assistant to Presidium Chair-
man Nikolay Podgornyy until his political defeat by
Leonid Brezhnev and subsequent forced retirement in
1977, Kitayev was sent to Algiers to serve as Minis-
ter-Counselor, and in 1982 he was sent to Guinea. F_
Generally, the career Africanists predominate: four of
the five ambassadors to the countries considered in
this study have spent most of their careers working on
Africa. (Liberia is excluded because the Soviet Union
does not have an ambassador stationed there.) Typical
of these specialists is the Ambassador to Ghana,
Vyacheslav Semenov, who has worked in African
affairs for almost 20 years. The prejudice in the
ministry against Africanists is evident in the comment
He stated
that Semenov "has spent his entire career in Africa,
and, as a result, does not have a brilliant future and
again reflects the relatively low priority our ministry
apparently assigns West Africa."
The CPSU Central Committee's
International Department
The International Department maintains CPSU's re-
lations with nonruling Communist parties and other
political organizations abroad. ID officials who work
on Africa are usually former academics, members of
research institutes, or journalists who have specialized
in Third World affairs or Africa.
Although we cannot determine the priority the ID has
given it, West Africa is a region where the ID
attempts to curry favor. For example, West African
officials-like other Third World leaders-who be-
long to nonruling Communist parties or pro-Soviet
socialist parties/ organizations are among the dele-
gates brought to the USSR on all-expense-paid trips.
The visiting Africans usually meet Boris Ponomarev,
head of the ID and a candidate member of the CPSU
Politburo. Soviet delegations to West African coun-
tries are usually accompanied by ID personnel.
Two of the six ID deputy chiefs share responsibility
for West African affairs: Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy and
Petr Manchkha. Ul'yanovskiy has been deputy chief
for Asia and Africa since at least 1966 and is one of
the senior Soviet authorities on the Third World. He
served as deputy chief of the Institute for Asian and
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African Affairs during the early 1960s. Many of the
numerous articles he has written are on African
liberation movements. He is the ID deputy chief who
usually accompanies Ponomarev when he meets with
visiting delegations from West Africa. He is also
involved with the Soviet Committee for Solidarity
with Asian and African Countries-a front organiza-
tion that works closely with the ID.
Petr Manchkha, a former journalist, also covers Afri-
can affairs in the ID. Manchkha came to the ID
around 1970 and served as chief of the Africa sector.
In 1978 he became a deputy chief of the ID. He has
traveled in West Africa and has written numerous
articles on the region. We have had very little infor-
mation on Manchkha's activities in the past few years;
he is rarely mentioned in the press and has not
published much recently. There has been some specu-
lation that his absence indicates that he is either
involved in clandestine activity or not influential.
Viktor Sidenko also appears to be responsible for
African affairs in the ID. He has been an ID consul-
tant since at least 1979, and he probably covers at
least the Congo, Ghana, and Nigeria. He was the New
Times correspondent for Africa during the late 1960s
and early 1970s. In 1974 he was identified as the
director of Novosti Press Agency.
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300440002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300440002-2
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300440002-2