POTENTIAL POLITBURO AND SECRETARIAT MEMBERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00591R000300410002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Potential Politburo and
Secretariat Members:
Implications for Soviet Policy
t
SOV 85-1015OX
September 1985
Copy '~ A 1 1
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Potential Politburo and
Secretariat Members:
Implications for Soviet Policy
Domestic Policy Division, SOYA,
This paper was prepared byl Ithe
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Secret
SOV 85-10150X
September 1985
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Secret
Potential Politburo and
Secretariat Members:
Implications for Soviet Policy
Summary An entire generation of Soviet leaders is leaving the scene at roughly the
Information available same time, prompting intense speculation in the West about the likely
as oft July 1985 impact of "generational change" on future Soviet decisionmaking. This
was used in this report.
speculation has been heightened by the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev, at
age 54 the youngest party chief since Stalin. The initial promotions under
Gorbachev indicate that new members of the Politburo and Secretariat,
like their predecessors, will be selected from a relatively small circle of
officials who combine full membership in the Central Committee with key
positions in the party apparatus or important government bodies, such as
the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs and the Presidiums of the
Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet.
An examination of a sample of 38 officials who meet these selection
criteria suggests that this turnover at the top will not lead to the rise of a
single new generation. Indeed, the ages of those promoted in the first round
of leadership changes under Gorbachev in April 1985 ranged from 55 to
73. Although most officials in the sample have suffered from the cadre
stability of the Brezhnev years, the effect of their long wait in the wings is
uncertain; it could lead them to adopt a more activist approach when they
achieve power, but may only have served to reinforce the traditional Soviet
bureaucratic bias toward conformity and compliance.
Our ability to assess the impact these potential leaders might have on
Soviet policy is limited by the narrow boundaries of permissible public
discussion in the USSR and our inability to predict how their current views
might be altered by political expediency or the broader perspective of a Po-
litburo or Secretariat post. Given these caveats, however, the public
statements of our sample of potential leaders suggest a number of policy
areas where a consensus or divergence of views could soon have an impact
at the highest level of Soviet decisionmaking.
The generally conservative attitudes expressed by these officials, together
with their emphasis on discipline and order as a means of improving
productivity, suggest that a return to some form of neo-Stalinist orthodoxy
would be easier for them to accept than any significant liberalization of the
system. Most members of the group, however, seem to favor an approach
that lies somewhere between these two extremes.
Secret
SOV 85-10150X
September 1985
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Judging from their statements, these officials would preserve the system's
basic features of state ownership and central planning but attempt to
introduce some much needed efficiencies. Most would support a package of
such measures that included:
? The devolution of some additional planning and management authority,
especially in the social welfare area, to the regional level.
? The merging of narrowly specialized ministries and state committees.
? The adoption of a more programmatic approach to planning and the
creation of interdepartmental organs to manage target programs.
? Greater emphasis on "self-financing" (requiring operating expenses to be
covered by revenues), contract brigades that operate on a profit-and-loss
basis, and similar measures designed to improve productivity.
There were wide variations in the severity of their criticism of current
planning and management policies, however, suggesting differences in the
priority they would attach to such reforms. Attitudes among this sample
group of potential leaders ranged from those of Kiev City party leader
Yuriy Yel'chenko, who appeared relatively sanguine about present prac-
tices, to those of Krasnoyarsk Kray party chief Petr Fedirko, who issued at
least 16 statements that were critical of central planning and management
during the period under review.
Because these officials are not currently involved in weighing the resource
needs of all sectors of the economy, the implications of their views on such
resource decisions must be highly tentative. Their statements suggest:
? Strong sentiment in favor of additional resources for social and consumer
programs, with proponents basing their arguments on the benefits that
would accrue to the economy as a whole.
? A disinclination, under present circumstances, to make a substantial
increase in the growth rate of defense spending, which most of these
officials appear to consider adequate for projected needs.
? An apparent belief, nonetheless, that current defense spending levels are
necessary and that any increase in allocations to meet social needs would
have to come from increased productivity and savings, rather than
diversions from defense.
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Less typical of this group were comments from officials such as Central
Committee department chief Vadim Zagladin, who expressed concern
about the need to develop "sensible" patterns of consumption and worried
that material well-being could lead to "money grubbing." Some members
of the defense establishment, such as Marshals Viktor Kulikov and Vasiliy
Petrov, also appear to have pressed for additional resources for defense
with little thought about the impact this would have on other sectors of the
economy.
Officials in the foreign affairs and national security establishments have
shown varying degrees of flexibility on East-West issues as well as differing
sensitivities to the domestic costs of the arms race-variables that suggest
US interests could be affected by the outcome of the selection process:
? In the Central Committee apparatus, Zagladin appears to be more
flexible and less inclined to see issues in strictly ideological terms than his
fellow department chief, Leonid Zamyatin.
? In the Foreign Ministry, Ambassador to the United States Anatoliy
Dobrynin is reported to have a personal commitment to improved Soviet-
US relations that seems lacking in First Deputy Foreign Minister
Georgiy Korniyenko, whose attitude has sometimes been criticized as
counterproductive by Soviet officials favoring an improvement of the
relationship.
All, however, seem to acknowledge the centrality of the United States in
Soviet foreign policy decisions and to agree on the desirability of pursuing
additional arms control agreements. For some, these agreements may be
desirable simply to facilitate Soviet planning and lessen the possibility of
technological surprise. For those who would devote additional resources to
other ends, however, the cost-avoidance benefits of such agreements appear
to give them a higher priority.
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These potential Politburo and Secretariat members are not inclined to be
any more tolerant of political and ideological diversity in Eastern Europe
and other socialist countries than the leaders they would be replacing.
Although they presumably would leave the door open to improved relations
with the Chinese, their statements suggest little optimism that a normaliza-
tion of relations will come soon. There also seems to be a lack of
enthusiasm among these officials about aid to most Third World countries,
possibly reflecting some concern about the economic burden of that
assistance. The Middle East, however, appears to be recognized as an area
of strategic geopolitical importance for which the cost of Soviet involve-
ment may be less subject to question.
In sum, the statements of these potential leaders provide no evidence that
the turnover at the top will create a readymade coalition for across-the-
board changes in Soviet policy. On many issues, the views of potential
Politburo and Secretariat members appear about the same as those of the
leaders they would succeed, arguing for policy continuity. On others, such
as the relationship with the United States, a divergence of attitudes among
these officials suggests that the policy impact will depend on which of them
is selected for promotion. On still other issues, such as economic manage-
ment reform, there appears to be a consensus for change, but varying
perceptions of the degree of urgency involved.
The Soviet Union's capacity for change will ultimately be determined by
the inclinations and abilities of its new party chief and the coalition he is
able to build of like-minded leaders. Gorbachev already has succeeded in
promoting Lev Zaykov and Boris Yel'tsin-two officials in the sample who
seem to share his policy orientation-to the Secretariat, and there is no
shortage of others in the sample whose views appear compatible with his:
? In the economic area, many seem to share his belief that management
has become overly centralized and that greater emphasis should be
placed on financial incentives.
? Among the foreign policy specialists, some also have deemphasized
ideological polemics when they thought it served Soviet interests-
demonstrating a compatibility with Gorbachev's more tactically flexible
approach.
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Secret
Not all of these potential leaders, however, appear to be as sympathetic to
the new party chief's views. Gorbachev's recent hints that some leaders feel
he is moving too fast in his efforts to revitalize the economy suggest that he
does not have carte blanche to pursue his policies as vigorously as he would
prefer and that others may attempt to slow his momentum. The kinds of of-
ficials selected for leadership positions, therefore, will continue to serve as
important indicators of his ability to effect significant policy changes.
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Future Leaders: Backgrounds and Careers
3
Wartime Experience
3
Apprenticeship in Party Work
5
Policy Views: A Look at the Record
5
Foreign Policy Views
5
Perceptions of International Environment
5
Eastern Europe
9
The Party's Role 16
Reform: How High on the Agenda? 16
Ideological Vigilance and Dissent 19
Prospects 20
Domestic Impact 20
Impact on International Behavior 21
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Potential Politburo and
Secretariat Members:
Implications for Soviet Policy
The Soviet Union is currently in the midst of a
significant leadership turnover. For the past two
decades, a policy of "cadre stability"-adopted in
reaction to Nikita Khrushchev's frequent and some-
times capricious personnel changes-has made death
and old age the principal causes of removal from high
office. As a result, an entire generation of leaders is
leaving the scene at roughly the same time. Death has
claimed eight members of the leadership-including
three General Secretaries-within the past three
years and is likely to remove at least five more, if they
have not "voluntarily" retired, by the end of the
decade.
Vacancies in the Politburo and Secretariat have been
and will continue to be filled by officials drawn from a
relatively small circle of party and government bu-
reaucrats. A basic prerequisite for such advancement
is full membership in the Central Committee-a
status held by about 320 officials and workers. How-
ever, given the pattern of previous selections, only
about 100 Central Committee members have any real
opportunity to advance to the Politburo and Secretari-
at. These officials hold key positions in the central and
regional party apparatus and a few important govern-
ment bodies-the Ministries of Defense and Foreign
Affairs, the Committee for State Security (KGB), and
the Presidiums of the Council of Ministers and Su-
preme Soviet.
Despite our ability to identify this circle of potential
leaders, we know little about their views or the impact
their advancement might have on Soviet policy. Com-
ments from those Soviets who have been willing to
discuss the issue have been conflicting. Some have
insisted that the West should negotiate with the
current group of Soviet leaders before a "less flexible"
group moves into place. Others, however, have de-
scribed these same future leaders as more reform
minded and pragmatic than their predecessors and
more likely to be influenced by the economic benefits
Figure 1. General Secretary Gorbachev, age 54,
with the two most influential representatives of
the Politburo's "Old Guard'-President Gromy-
ko, 75, and Premier Tikhonov, 80 (right to left)
This paper examines a group of 38 potential leaders
(see table 1) for clues to their likely policy orientation.
The sample includes top officials in important oblast
and kray party committees in the Russian Republic
(RSFSR) and Ukraine, selected departments of the
CPSU Central Committee, and the Ministries of
Defense and Foreign Affairs. Since the research for
the paper was completed, three officials in the sam-
ple-Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov and former
oblast first secretaries Boris Yel'tsin and Lev
Zaykov-have already moved into leadership posi-
tions, while two Foreign Ministry officials have proba-
bly been eliminated from immediate contention by the
appointment of former Georgian party leader Eduard
Shevardnadze as Minister of Foreign Affairs.' The
' The four officials elected to full Politburo membership since
Mikhail Gorbachev came to power-Viktor Chebrikov, Yegor
Ligachev, Nikolay Ryzhkov, and Eduard Shevardnadze-were not
included in the sample because they already were candidate
members of the Politburo (Chebrikov and Shevardnadze) or Central
of improved relations with the West.
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Table 1
Sample Group of Potential Leaders
Viktor Afanas'yev
62
Chief Editor, Pravda
Yevgeniy Murav'yev
55
First Secretary, Kuybyshev
Sergey Akhromeyev
62
Chief of General Staff
Oblast (RSFSR)
,
Ministry of Defense
Vladislav Mysnichenko 55
First Secretary, Khar'kov
Nikolay Aksenov a
56
First Secretary, Altay Kray
Oblast (Ukraine)
(RSFSR)
Nikolay Ogarkov c 67
Marshal of the Soviet Union;
Gennadiy Bogomyakov 55
First Secretary, Tyumen'
former Chief of General Staff
Oblast (RSFSR)
Vasiliy Petrov 68
First Deputy Minister of
Viktor Boyko
53
First Secretary
Defense
,
Dnepropetrovsk Oblast
(Ukraine)
Oleg Rakhmanin 60
First Deputy Chief,
Department of Liaison with
First Secretary, Khabarovsk
Kray (RSFSR)
Communist and Workers'
Parties of Socialist Countries,
Fi
L'
Obl
t S
t
t
CPSU Central Committee
rs
ecre
ary,
vov
as
(Ukraine)
Georgiy Razumovskiy d 48
First Secretary, Krasnodar
A
li
D
i
b
65
A
b
d
i
d S
t
U
Kray (RSFSR)
nato
y
ryn
n
o
m
assa
or to
n
te
ta
es
Nikolay Slyun'kov 56
Belorussian
First Secretary
Petr Fedirko
52
First Secretary, Krasnoyarsk
K
RSFSR
,
Party Central Committee
ray (
)
Dmitriy Gagarov
NA
First Secretary, Primorskiy
Kray (RSFSR)
Leonid Smirnov 69
Deputy Chairman, USSR
Council of Ministers;
Chairman, Military-Industrial
Leonid Gorshkov b
54
First Secretary, Kemerovo
Commission
Oblast (RSFSR)
Ser
ey Sokolov a 74
Minister of Defense
Vladimir Gusev b
52
First Secretary, Saratov Oblast
(RSFSR)
g
Inamdzhan 54
Usmankhodzhayev
First Secretary, Uzbek Party
Central Committee
Vadim Ignatov
54
First Secretary, Voronezh
Oblast (RSFSR)
Gennadiy Vedernikov 47
First Secretary, Chelyabinsk
Oblast (RSFSR)
Boris Kachura
54
Secretary, Ukrainian Party
Central Committee
First Secretary, Rostov Oblast
(RSFSR)
Vladimir Kalashnikov
56
First Secretary, Volgograd
Obl
t
RSFSR
Yuriy Yel'chenko 55
First Secretary, Kiev (Ukraine)
as
(
)
Boris Yel'tsin f 53
First Secretary
Sverdlovsk
Yuriy Khristoradnov
55
First Secretary, Gor'kiy Oblast
RSFSR
,
Oblast (RSFSR)
(
)
Vasiliy Konotop
68
First Secretary, Moscow Oblast
(RSFSR)
Vadim Zagladin 58
First Deputy Chief,
International Department,
CPSU Central Committee
Georgiy Korniyenko
60
First Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Leonid Zamyatin 63
Chief, International
Information Department,
Viktor Kulikov
64
First Deputy Minister of
CPSU Central Committee
Defense; Commander in Chief,
Warsaw Pact Forces
Lev Zaykov s 62
First Secretary, Leningrad
Oblast (RSFSR)
Vasiliy Mironov
60
First Secretary, Donetsk Oblast
(Ukraine)
Vsevolod Murakhovskiy 58
First Secretary, Stavropol'
Kray (RSFSR)
Aksenov died after research for this paper was completed; his
views appear to be representative of those held by others at this
level, however, and hence remain relevant for the purpose of this
paper.
b In March 1985, Gorshkov became a deputy chairman and Gusev
became first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers.
If Vorotnikov should succeed Premier Tikhonov,
Gusev is now well positioned to assume
Vorotnikov's post as chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers,
a position that normally warrants Politburo membership.
c Despite Ogarkov's removal from his post as Chief of the General
Staff in September 1984, his views were considered relevant to this
study of future Politburo leaders' views, given the possibility that
his setback may be only temporary,
wand that his views may be shared by others.
d Razumovskiy became chief of the Central Committee's
Organizational Party Work Department in June 1985.
e Sokolov became a candidate member of the Politburo in April
1985.
f Yel'tsin became chief of the Central Committee's Construction
Department in April 1985 and a CPSU Secretary in July 1985.
8 Zaykov became a CPSU Secretary in July 1985.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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chief purpose of the paper, however, is not to predict
which of these officials will be promoted to leadership
posts but to examine the range of policy views they
express and its likely implications for future Soviet
Table 2
Military Service of Current
and Potential Soviet Leaders
policy.
Future Leaders: Backgrounds and Careers
Formative Influences
The average age of officials in this sample of potential
leaders is 58-about nine years younger than the
average in the current Politburo (67.5) and Secretariat
(66.8). This younger group is not of one political
generation, however; it includes 10 officials who
entered the party during World War II, nine who
joined during the reconstruction period, and 17 who
joined after Stalin's death.'
Current
Leaders
Sample Group of
Potential Leaders
Military experience
37.5
29.7
Service during
World War II
20.8
24.3
and less likely to fear competition or comparison with
the West. Sergey Rogov, a young specialist in US
affairs at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, also has
argued that officials of the post-Stalin generation
consider Soviet-US "detente" to be the normal state
of affairs and view the current downturn in relations
with greater alarm than their elders, who regard
Although we cannot predict the Politburo's exact
generational makeup, it seems probable that by the
end of this decade one generation will have lost its
representation on that body and another will have
gained it for the first time. Leaving the scene will be
those officials who began their party careers during
Stalin's efforts to modernize industry and collectivize
agriculture in the late 1920s and early 1930s. These
leaders helped build the political and economic super-
structure that exists today and, in the judgment of
both Soviet and Western observers, tend to have a
stronger ideological and emotional commitment to the
past than subsequent generations. The passing of this
generation, it has been argued, could produce an
atmosphere somewhat more conducive to change.
Moving into the Politburo for the first time will be
representatives of the generation that entered the
party after Stalin's death. These officials began their
careers at a time when the party's doors were opened
more widely to new members and political discussion
became less ideological. They also enjoyed a higher
level of intellectual freedom and material well-being
than their elders. Because of this, it has been speculat-
ed that members of the post-Stalin generation may be
relatively more tolerant of dissent, more materialistic,
detente as an aberration.
Wartime Experience
Although the wartime generation (those who entered
the party during World War II) is more heavily
represented in the current leadership than among our
potential leaders, the percentage that saw military
service during the war is about the same in both
groups (see table 2). The average current leader was in
his early twenties when the war broke out, however,
while the average potential leader had just entered his
teens. Wartime memories, therefore, are generally
less vivid for these potential leaders than for their
predecessors. Although this could make future leaders
less sensitive to the danger and consequences of war,
some Soviet officials have worried that it might have
the opposite effect. Wrote one military official:
Two new generations of people have grown up
without any knowledge of war based on person-
al experience. They have the idea that peace is
the normal state of society. At the same time,
the ranks of those who participated in the Great
Patriotic War and can pass their experiences on
to younger generations are becoming thinner. As
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a result, questions of the struggle for peace are
sometimes interpreted not from class positions,
but somewhat simplistically; any kind of peace
Table 3
Educational Qualifications of
Current and Potential Leaders
is good, any kind of war is bad.
Slow Climb to the Top
A comparison of career profiles also reveals that the
advancement of our average potential leader has been
considerably slower than that of today's average
leader. The potential leader:
? Received his first important post about three years
later in his career than today's leader.
? Has held his current job five years longer than his
counterpart held his last post before entering the
Politburo or Secretariat.
? Is about a year older than his counterpart was at the
Current
Leaders
Sample Group of
Potential Leaders
Higher education
95.8
100.0
Graduate education a
16.6
13.5
Specialist education b
62.5
72.9
Party school education
12.5
5.4
a Graduate education is defined as either a candidate's or doctor's
degree.
b Educational training in the areas of agriculture, industry, trans-
portation, or science.
time he entered the leadership.
Younger officials in the sample, however, have less
room for complaint than some of their older col-
leagues. Those who joined the party after Stalin's
death (in 1953) received their first important posts
more than two years earlier, on the average, than
older officials in the sample, possibly because of a
better quality of education. They also have held their
current assignments for a shorter time than others in
the sample.
The generally slower rate of advancement of the
average potential leader, nonetheless, almost certainly
has been a cause of some personal frustration.' Al-
though we might infer that this frustration has also
made them more impatient with existing policies and
practices, it may simply have increased their eager-
ness to please their superiors-an impulse that could
lead to increased conformity with established views.
The latter tendency has been more obvious to analysts
at the US Embassy in Moscow, who once observed
that young officials who move up are "more likely to
share the characteristics of their predecessors than
those of their peers."
' One local party chief recently complained that "there are quite a
few leaders in the republic who have sat in their posts for more than
one decade and have gained the reputation of being irreplaceable.
Those who are getting ready to take over from them and who could
have done a better job have grown old and the original leaders are
still there. To justify this, people say: `They are experienced.' "
Educational Trends
A majority of both the current and potential leaders
have had a specialized technical education (in agricul-
ture, metallurgy, and so forth), and that trend appears
to be growing, judging from the high percentage of
potential leaders who have such a background. Ad-
vanced degrees in such specialties are slightly less
common among potential leaders (see table 3), but, for
those working in areas such as foreign affairs and
interparty relations, postgraduate training appears to
have become more important. Potential leaders in this
category hold degrees in such disciplines as history
and philosophy-a contrast with current leaders,
whose degrees are almost solely in engineering.
Such statistical comparisons, however, do not reveal
important qualitative differences in the education of
current and potential leaders. Members of the post-
Stalin generation, in particular, have benefited from
an education that has been less subject to significant
interruptions, a less repressive and ideological scholas-
tic environment, and significantly strengthened cur-
riculums.
Although emphasis on party training has been some-
what cyclical over the years (it declined under Khru-
shchev and increased under Leonid Brezhnev), our
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group of potential leaders contains a smaller percent-
age of party school graduates than the current Polit-
buro. Party training emphasizes ideological, histori-
cal, and party organizational themes and has been a
powerful tool for instilling appropriate modes of be-
havior and acceptable political viewpoints. An appar-
ent deemphasis on such training in our group of
potential leaders, therefore, has lessened the impact of
what traditionally has been a profoundly conservative
influence.
Apprenticeship in Party Work
These potential leaders, nonetheless, have spent most
of their lives in a political environment that would
tend to discourage nonconformity. Like current Soviet
leaders, they would be moving into the leadership
after devoting more than half of their careers, on the
average, to party work. Few have worked for any
significant amount of time in a nonpolitical institu-
tionalenvironment. (Members of this group of poten-
tial leaders have spent an average of 6.9 years in
economic production work, compared to an average of
8.6 years among current leaders.) Their working
environment, therefore, has been one that tends to
foster an "apparatus mentality" and discourage the
emergence of "noncompany" attitudes.
Policy Views: A Look at the Record
Such generalizations about the impact of background
and experience must, of course, be highly speculative.
To gain a better understanding of the policy orienta-
tion of these officials, therefore, we reviewed more
than 400 of their articles and speeches published
Such content analysis admittedly has its own limita-
tions. Our ability to assess the impact these potential
leaders might have on policy is limited by the narrow
boundaries of permissible public discussion in the
Soviet Union and our inability to predict how their
current views might be altered by political expediency
or the broader perspective of the Politburo or Secre-
tariat. (Because of this we have highlighted the views
of those officials, typified by Zagladin, who deviate,
however slightly, from the official line and define the
limits of discussion.) Given these caveats, however, the
public statements of these officials suggest a number
of policy areas where a consensus or divergence of
views could soon have an impact at the highest level of
Soviet decisionmaking.
Foreign Policy Views
Regional party chiefs-the largest category in our
sample of potential Soviet leaders-rarely address
foreign policy issues. Virtually the only time they do
so is at party congresses, which usually convene only
at five-year intervals.' The foreign policy views in this
sample, therefore, come largely from representatives
of the foreign affairs and national security establish-
ment-the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense
and the foreign relations departments of the CPSU
Central Committee. Although this imbalance skews
our findings, the officials who are now addressing
these issues are potential successors to posts that seem 25X1
likely to give them greater weight than others in the
sample in future foreign policy deliberations.'
Perceptions of International Environment
If these potential leaders have a unique world view, it
is not apparent in their statements, which seldom
' Although these speeches are infrequent, a study by Peter Haus-
lohner of Yale University found that regional party leaders have
devoted an increasing amount of attention to foreign policy.
Hauslohner found that, of the 65 speeches delivered by these
officials at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956 and the 22nd in 1961,
62 percent contained no separate passage on international relations.
By the 25th Congress in 1976, however, almost all of the regional
leaders who addressed the congress made some reference to foreign
policy issues. Moreover, those regional leaders who took part in the
discussion of the Central Committee's main report devoted an
average of 15 percent of their speeches to foreign affairs-roughly
twice as much as at either of the two previous congresses. One
possible impetus for this increase, Hauslohner suggests, is a grow-
ing awareness among these officials that an expanded Soviet
military and political involvement abroad, growing economic inter-
dependencies, and scientific and cultural ties also have an impact
on the domestic issues that dominate regional agenda. ("Prefects as
Senators: Soviet Regional Politicians Look to Foreign Policy," by
Peter Hauslohner, World Politics, vol. 33, No. 2, January 1981.)
' For example, Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the Central
Committee's International Department, has been rumored recently
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deviate from established guidelines. For example,
officials in this sample began referring to "heightened
international tensions" that have increased the "dan-
ger of war" in 1980, shortly after this theme was
officially sanctioned by a Central Committee decree.6
In the early 1980s, such negative assessments were
balanced by an almost equal number of references to
the continued viability of "detente" and the Soviet
"peace program." During 1984, however, these more
positive expressions were outnumbered (three to one)
by references to the deteriorating international situa-
tion and heightened danger of war-a shift that may
have reflected genuine concern about the INF deploy-
ments in Western Europe but that also was part of an
orchestrated campaign to alarm West Europeans
about the consequences of those deployments.
Although no generational or institutional differences
are apparent in these assessments of the international
situation, a few officials have taken positions that
depart somewhat from the norm. Warsaw Pact Com-
mander Viktor Kulikov, for example, has made more
frequent reference than others in the sample to the
increased danger of war-a position consistent with
his record as one of the more vigorous proponents of a
strengthened national defense.' On the other hand,
Vadim Zagladin, the first deputy chief of the Central
Committee's International Department, has criticized
those who contend that "only the worst can be
expected-that we are on the threshold of war."
Zagladin has been equally critical, however, of those
who say "there have been all kinds of crises, and this
one, too, will pass!" Rejecting both perspectives as
extreme, he has associated himself with a less sharply
defined approach that apparently favors greater Sovi-
et flexibility. While asserting that "without doubt we
are capable of defending ourselves," he has called it a
mistake to wait for the crisis in East-West relations to
pass of its own accord.
The Global Struggle. Rhetoric concerning the "global
struggle"-that is, reference to the ideological strug-
gle, the gains of socialism, and other terms referring
6 The decree, issued in June 1980, linked the increased danger of
war primarily to "adventurist actions of the US and its accompli-
ces."
' Kulikov nonetheless endorsed, more quickly than Marshal Niko-
lay Ogarkov, the line that "victory" is impossible in a nuclear war.
Figure 2. Propagandist Zamya-
tin has described US foreign
policy as a reflection of internal
contraditions and problems. F_
to the competition between socialism and capital-
ism-comes largely from representatives of the par-
ty's Central Committee apparatus. An exception to
this pattern is Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, whose
references to conflict between the two "systems" may
have been partially prescribed by his role as spokes-
man for party-approved strategic doctrine.
Both Zagladin and Leonid Zamyatin (head of the
International Information Department) have de-
scribed international developments in terms of a
global struggle between two competing social systems.
Their explanations of US policy motivations, however,
have been somewhat different. Zamyatin has de-
scribed US foreign policy as a reflection of internal
contradictions and problems in the United States and
the capitalist world in general. The US "internal
political task," Zamyatin wrote in 1983, "is to try to
restore the political stability of American society by
creating an atmosphere of a beleaguered camp and
thereby controlling manifestations of the social dis-
content that is inevitable under present conditions-
the most acute economic crisis in the postwar period."
In another article elaborating on this theme, he
concluded: "The truth is plain to see: The [US]
domestic situation is dictating foreign policy."
Zagladin, on the other hand, has emphasized the US
perception of a change in the "correlation of forces"
that resulted from Soviet achievement of military-
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Figure 3. Zagladin (on left, next to his boss,
Ponomarev) says it is premature to claim that
strategic parity. In a possible reference to Zamyatin
and like-minded propagandists, Zagladin wrote that,
unlike "some Marxist scientists," he found it "prema-
ture" to say that the "crisis of capitalism has entered
a qualitatively new stage." Moreover, he continued,
"the socialist world has problems and difficulties of its
East-West Relations
References to East-West relations in this sample are
strongly dominated by statements on arms control or
the arms race. Political relations receive only half as
much attention, while economic aspects of the rela-
tionship are seldom mentioned. For example, Marshal
Ogarkov was the only official in this sample who
publicly complained about US economic sanctions
and the curtailment of scientific and technical ties
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 25X1
The frequency of comments on arms control presum-
ably is an accurate reflection of the priority these
officials assign to the strategic aspects of the relation-
ship. Their relative inattention to economic relations,
however, may reflect their sensitivity to implicitly 25X1
unfavorable comparisons of Soviet and Western econ-
Depictions of United States. Public references to the
United States and US policy have been predictably
and consistently negative during this period of review,
which coincided with a downturn in Soviet-US rela-
tions. In fact, of all the officials in this sample, only
Zagladin has been somewhat selective in his criticism,
coupling condemnation of present US policies with a
who exaggerate the danger of war.
belief that more "reasonable circles" exist and a hope
that these circles eventually will prevail. His use of
this formulation has made him appear more optimistic 25X1
than others in the sample about the long-term pros-
pects for improved relations. In 1983 he wrote: "By all
indications, a considerable number of people in the
United States hold realistic positions and, as life
shows, their numbers are growing." There are "cir-
cles," he wrote, that are "sufficiently influential and
that are protesting against the confrontation policy.
And they still have not had their last word." Zagla-
din's relative optimism on this score has continued to
Privately, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, Chief of the
General Staff, also has appeared more optimistic
about the prospects for improving relations than his
public stance, which has been highly critical of the
United States. would sueeest. In a conversation with a
he dismissed 25X1
the rhetoric of Soviet-US polemics ("propaganda is
propaganda"); referred to biases in the perspectives of
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 Figure 4. Marshal Akhromeyev
privately has acknowledged bi-
ases in the perspective of Soviet
both nations' leaders; recalled the military coopera-
tion of the two countries during World War II; and
emphasized his personal desire for improved relations.
Although Akhromeyev may have been posturing, his
remarks contrast sharply with those of most other
Soviet officials, which at that time were generally as
negative in a one-on-one setting as in their public
pronouncements.
The Foreign Ministry officials in the sample-Anato-
liy Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the United
States, and Georgiy Korniyenko, the First Deputy
Foreign Minister-appear to have somewhat differing
attitudes regarding Soviet-US relations.
Dobrynin has a genuine
personal commitment to improving Soviet-US rela-
tions and has done what he could to support those
Politburo members who share his view. By contrast,
Korniyenko, whom Shevchenko found to be more
skeptical of US motives, has sometimes been so harsh
Nature of the Threat. These officials see the threat
posed by the United States chiefly in a military
context. Criticism consists primarily of allegations
that the United States has escalated the arms race,
adopted a military strategy based upon a preemptive
strike against the Soviet Union, and embraced the
concept of limited nuclear war. Predictably, given the
period of analysis, it is the alleged US effort to alter
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the military balance of power by deploying intermedi-
ate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe that
receives the strongest condemnation. US "adventur-
ism"-chiefly in Latin America, Africa, and the
Middle East-also is depicted as destabilizing and
threatening to world peace but receives far less em-
phasis than the strategic threat.
The US "ideological threat" has a still lower priority
in the statements of these officials, drawing fire
primarily from propagandist Zamyatin and a few
local party officials whose regions have been particu-
larly vulnerable to "contamination" by Western ideas.
Zamyatin has complained that the US "ideological
war" is aimed at "weakening and splitting" socialist
countries and is trying to "isolate states in Africa and
Latin America from the Soviet Union, from socia-
lism." A few officials, however, such as Leningrad
Oblast party chief Lev Zaykov (now a CPSU Secre-
tary) and L'vov Oblast first secretary Viktor Dobrik,
have been more concerned about the impact US
propaganda might have on Soviet citizens. Zaykov,
for example, has warned that "ideological subversion
by the class enemy" requires a constant increase in
the political vigilance of Leningrad party organiza-
tions, which were instructed to suppress the "malevo-
lent fabrications planted by Western propaganda
centers."
my through their escalation of the arms race.
US economic power is seldom depicted by these
officials as posing a threat to Soviet interests. The
exceptions have been Ogarkov's outcries against US
sanctions imposed after the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan and complaints from Ogarkov, Zamyatin,
and Marshal Akhromeyev that US strategists are
trying, without success, to exhaust the USSR's econo-
Other Western Countries. Officials in this sample
have focused most of their criticism on the United
States (see figure 5) and have seldom differentiated
between US actions and intentions and those of other
Western powers. The exceptions have been the Cen-
tral Committee's foreign affairs specialists, Zagladin
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Figure 5
Foreign Policy Focus of
Potential Soviet Leaders
United States
Western Europe
Imperialism
NATO
Total references to
Western countries
135
Eastern Europe
31
China
15
Third World
13
and Zamyatin, who usually place greater emphasis on
the divergent interests of Western nations. Zamyatin,
for example, has written that US efforts to discourage
Soviet-West European trade-"an area of immense
contradiction between the United States and its
NATO allies"-causes serious damage to local mar-
kets in Western Europe. Expressing a similar view,
Zagladin told an interviewer: "Western Europe and
Japan have become very impressive political and
economic quantities that are by no means willing to
yield to Washington's pressure on everything."
This more sophisticated perspective appears to be
largely institutional. Both Zamyatin and Zagladin
have Central Committee jobs that give them impor-
tant roles in exploiting Western differences, both as
propagandists and as participants in the coordination
and formulation of Soviet covert action (so-called
active measures). Zagladin's role is so important, in
fact, that KGB defector Stanislav Levchenko has
credited him personally with whatever recent success
Soviet propaganda and active measures have had in
Western Europe.
In sum, these officials, as a group, do not appear to
have a unique world view. Their publicly expressed
views, not unexpectedly, differ little from those of the
leaders they would replace (see appendix A). All, for
example, place the blame for increased international
tensions on the West, and primarily on the United
States. Within this group, nonetheless, there are some
notable differences of perception about how close the
world has come to the brink of war, how this has come
about, and the prospects for improved East-West
relations.
Other International Issues
No such differences are apparent, however, in their
discussions of other international issues. All who have
addressed the topics have taken a fairly hard line on
East European political reform and the failure of
other Communist or socialist parties-whether in
Eastern Europe, Western Europe, or China-to align
themselves with official Soviet positions. More sur-
prising is the virtual silence from these officials on
most Third World issues, which may reflect a lack of
enthusiasm about the economic burden of aid to Third
World countries. The Middle East, by contrast, ap-
pears to be recognized as an area of strategic geopolit-
ical importance for which the cost of Soviet involve-
ment may be less subject to question.
Eastern Europe
Officials in this sample have given no hints of being
any more tolerant of East European political reform
or nonalignment with Soviet positions than their
Politburo counterparts. Oleg Rakhmanin, the first
deputy chief of the Central Committee's Bloc Liaison
Department, has condemned both "rightwingers and
leftwingers" who believe a country should have its
own model of socialism, "disregarding the experience
of the Soviet Union and other fraternal states."
Warsaw Pact Commander Kulikov has taken an
equally hard line on such deviations-most notably
during the Polish crisis, when his remarks seemed to
convey a more alarmist assessment of the situation
than those of most other Soviet officials. Kulikov's
remarks also have reflected the push for a more
"integrated," that is, Soviet-dominated, military com-
mand system in Eastern Europe.
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The only regional leaders in the sample who have
referred to the Polish issue are the Ukrainians, whose
proximity to Poland has made them especially sensi-
tive to developments there. The first secretaries of
both the L'vov Oblast and Kiev City party committees
placed the blame for the crisis almost solely on
Western "imperialism" and cited the Polish example
as justification for their campaigns to increase local
vigilance against foreign propaganda.
In the Central Committee apparatus, Zamyatin and
Zagladin have, as on other issues, taken somewhat
divergent positions on Poland. Zamyatin, like the
Ukrainians, has portrayed the situation chiefly as a
consequence of "Washington's ideological war,"
which was designed to push the Polish people into
"fratricidal conflict." Zagladin, by contrast, has said
that Western pressures only "played a role" in the
crisis but that it was precipitated by "serious prob-
lems in the political, economic, and social fields."
Figure 6. Aleksey Chernyy,
First Secretary of the Khaba-
rovsk Kray Party Committee
The Foreign Ministry officials in our sample have not
publicly addressed Soviet-East European relations,
probably because this issue is within the province of
the Central Committee.
China
Of the few officials in this sample who have addressed
the issue of Sino-Soviet relations, most have appeared
generally pessimistic about the prospects for normal-
ization. Shortly after the renewed Soviet effort to
improve the relationship in 1982, Zagladin empha-
sized the signs of positive change in Chinese domestic
policy and relations with the USSR while cautioning
that China "always moves slowly." Rakhmanin-the
Central Committee's chief Sinologist-remained as
pessimistic as ever, however, complaining that China's
"common cause" with Western "imperialists" was
continuing to encourage its "rightist tendencies."
Zamyatin, too, has found little positive to say about
Chinese policy. In January 1984, during a televised
discussion of the Chinese Premier's trip to the United
States, he was unwilling even to praise the Premier's
condemnation of US policy in the Near East and
Grenada, dismissing those remarks as primarily de-
signed to impress the Third World.
Of the regional leaders in the sample, only Khaba-
rovsk Kray First Secretary Aleksey Chernyy, whose
kray (territory) sits on the Chinese border, has public-
ly addressed the subject. In 1981 he said that the
"people of the Far East" condemned Chinese "adven-
turist policy" and that his party committee was doing
everything necessary "to ensure the impregnability of
our socialist homeland's Far Eastern borders." A few
years earlier, Chernyy had startled a visiting Western
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interviewer by brandishing an old French newspaper
article he kept in his desk and praising the prescience
of the article's title, which read: "Sooner or Later All
Whites Must Unite Against the Yellow Peril."
Eurocommunism
Only two officials in the sample-Afanas'yev and
Zagladin-have dealt with the issue of Western
Europe's more independent-minded Communist par-
ties. Of the two, Afanas'yev has been the more
consistently inflexible on the subject.
when relations were tense between the Soviet and
Spanish parties, Afanas'yev reportedly described the
Spanish Party Congress as
more of a "happening" than a party congress.
Zagladin's record on this issue has been less consistent
than that of Afanas'yev. Although he had an early
history of taking a more flexible stance, his position
seems to have become increasingly rigid. In recent
years he has been harshly critical of West European
Communist parties for their "unevenness" in support-
ing the peace movement and for accepting the notion
that Moscow bore some responsibility for increased
international tensions. In 1984 Zagladin warned his
West European comrades that imperialist "power
centers" were devoting increasing attention to influ-
encing the Communist movement and cited as evi-
dence a remark by Zbigniew Brzezinski that the
United States favored "the greatest possible pluraliza-
tion of Marxism."
Third World
Soviet relations with Third World countries receive
much less public attention from these officials than
relations with the West or the socialist Bloc. Their
frequent failure to mention that area of the world may
reflect a lack of enthusiasm among these officials
about the economic burden of aid to Third World
countries. The few who address the issue, however,
depict such aid in terms of a socialist obligation to
assist "democratic national liberation movements"
against imperialist efforts to "export counterrevolu-
tion." Zagladin, for example, has written of the
necessity to strengthen "peace-loving" states of the
developing world, noting that to do otherwise is to aid
those who are attacking "young revolutionary demo-
cratic regimes."
Such ideological rhetoric is rarely used to describe the
Middle East, however, suggesting that these officials
share the long held Soviet view that the area's geopo-
litical strategic importance outweighs its role as bat-
tleground for the national liberation movement.F_
Economic Planning and Management
Domestic economic issues dominate the public agenda
of most officials in this sample group. For the most
part, however, these officials deal with economic
problems at the microlevel and do not directly address
such larger issues as planning and management re-
form. Even the word "reform" is virtually taboo,in
such pronouncements, presumably for fear it might
raise the specter of changes that could challenge
powerful bureaucratic interests or even endanger po-
litical stability.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the officials in our
sample who deal most openly with the reform issue
are not those directly involved in the process of
economic management but "outsiders" whose relative
candor on the subject presumably is less threatening
to their careers. Even the boldest of these officials,
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however, have treated the issue gingerly. For example,
Zagladin, one of the party's key foreign policy special-
ists, once told a foreign journalist that what the Soviet
Union needed was a management reform that placed
greater emphasis on incentives and less on administra-
tive controls. Upon reflection, however, he tried to
have his use of the word "reform" deleted from the
interview.
Similarly, Afanas'yev, the editor of Pravda, once
openly argued for an increase in the power of the
consumer relative to that of the producer and for an
extension of "direct ties" between enterprises and
sales outlets! (The "direct ties" system was intro-
duced as part of the economic reform of 1965, but an
intended extension of the system beyond the initial
enterprises was never carried out.) Afanas'yev later
appeared to be covering his tracks, however, by urging
that any management changes be considered "ex-
tremely carefully" before being introduced. Anyone
could sit down and describe a system of management
in 10 minutes, he wrote, but Lenin had warned that
"one must suppress such desires because it would be
harmful and a political mistake."
Problems and Solutions
Although careful to avoid such "political mistakes,"
regional party leaders in this sample are rarely hesi-
tant about criticizing Moscow's government planners
and administrators (see appendix B). These complaints
appear to serve both as a diversion from any short-
comings closer to home and as an indirect and
politically acceptable way of criticizing policies ap-
proved by party superiors. Nor are these officials shy
about extolling local economic "experiments" they
believe to have proved successful. Although these
experiments are always carefully circumscribed, polit-
ical careers like that of former senior secretary
' Afanas'yev has taken somewhat unorthodox positions on other
issues as well. he tried to, run an expose in
Pravda on Sergey Medunov-a corrupt local party official with
reputed ties to the Brezhnev family-before Medunov succeeded in
using his influence to quash the story. (During Brezhnev's waning
days, the corruption scandal caught up with Medunov, and he was
removed from office.) Afanas'yev also was openly critical of the
military for its handling of information on the shootdown of the
Korean airliner in 1983. During Chernenko's tenure, Afanas'yev
was reported to have been rebuked for describing senior party
secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to Westerners as the "second General
Secretary"-an upgrading of Gorbachev's status that Chernenko,
Grigoriy Romanov profited greatly from an associa-
tion with such "innovations." An examination of the
complaints and initiatives of these officials reveals a
number of management-related problems that are of
common concern to them as well as the kinds of
"solutions" they have proposed at the local level.
The Need To Modernize. Although the specifics vary,
complaints abound about the failure to modernize and
retool existing plants and about the continued produc-
tion of obsolete equipment. A typical remark came
from Altay Kray First Secretary Nikolay Aksenov
(recently deceased), who warned that if his kray (the
most important agricultural area in Siberia) was to be
developed as an "agro-industrial complex," as envi-
sioned in the Food Program, the Ministry of Tractor
and Agricultural Machine Building would first have
to modernize the local tractor plant. Reflecting more
urban concerns, Moscow Oblast First Secretary Vasi-
liy Konotop complained that a local bus plant, al-
though recently modernized, had been told to contin-
ue producing an obsolete model that failed to meet the
demands of city transportation. New models of equip-
ment, wrote Belorussian party chief Nikolay Slyun-
kov, "often become obsolete even before their series
production begins."
This obsolescence, although partly a consequence of
resource allocation decisions, has been exacerbated by
a system of planning and management whose vertical
lines of authority create bureaucratic barriers be-
tween science and industry. Recognizing this, local
party leaders in the sample have experimented with a
variety of schemes designed to break through those
barriers and speed up the acquisition of new technol-
ogy. Some, for example, have set up coordinating
councils-composed of party officials, production spe-
cialists, scientists, and educators-under the kray or
oblast party committees. Others have developed "tar-
get programs" for technological progress in their
areas or set up associations or complexes designed to
bring scientific institutes into closer contact with
production enterprises.
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Figure 8. Moscow Oblast First
Secretary Konotop has com-
plained about obsolete equip-
Figure 9. Former Leningrad
party chief Zaykov has been
critical of the wage-leveling
trend that prevailed under
The proponents of several of these schemes have
claimed significant local results. For example, former
Sverdlovsk Oblast First Secretary Boris Yel'tsin (now
a CPSU Secretary) said that, after adopting a target
program for technological progress, his oblast intro-
duced new technology and inventions that resulted in
a considerable savings during the 10th Five-Year
Plan. According to L'vov Oblast party chief Dobrik,
the development of such a program in L'vov and the
establishment of "academic-scientific production as-
sociations" nearly tripled the number of applications
of new technology and cut the time to introduce them
in half.
"Departmental Barriers." These potential leaders also
complain about so-called departmentalism within the
economy. The Soviet bureaucracy, organized on a
branch-of-industry basis, has long had difficulty cop-
ing with projects that cut across sectoral lines. The
need to alleviate that problem has become more acute
for regional party leaders, however, with the increased
adoption of national programs focusing on particular
regions (such as the West Siberian oil and gas com-
plex) and the creation of territorial production com-
plexes (TPKs) of functionally related, but administra-
tively distinct, enterprises. The more outspoken
officials in this area include Tyumen' Oblast First
Secretary Gennadiy Bogomyakov, who has criticized
the poor coordination among departments involved in
the West Siberian complex, and Krasnoyarsk Kray
party chief Petr Fedirko, who has complained about
similar problems in the TPKs. The "bureaucratic
interests" of TPK enterprises, noted Fedirko in some-
thing of an understatement, "do not always coincide."
To overcome departmental barriers in large-scale
projects and TPKs, several regional party leaders in
this sample have tried to circumvent problems in
Moscow by setting up councils under the krays or
oblasts to coordinate the actions of all the organiza-
tions involved. Efforts also have been made to coordi-
nate the activities of a project's primary party organi-
zations, either by setting up a single party committee
for all project workers in a given area or by establish-
ing a council of secretaries of primary party organiza-
tions in related enterprises. One local official, Fe-
dirko, even went so far as to call for the replication of
his coordinating efforts at the national level.
Labor Shortages and Turnover. As competition for
scarce labor resources has risen, complaints about
Moscow's failure to alleviate the situation have
grown. In addition to grumbling about the slow
introduction of laborsaving equipment, officials in this
sample have been especially critical of central author-
ities' failure to develop the "social infrastructure"
necessary to attract and retain an adequate number of
workers-particularly in rural and remote areas.
Except for experiments designed to speed up the
adoption of laborsaving equipment, local officials in
this sample have proposed few solutions to the labor
problem. Hoping to improve productivity, a few offi-
cials, such as Leningrad Oblast First Secretary Lev
Zaykov (now a CPSU Secretary) and Belorussian
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party chief Nikolay Slyun'kov, have been critical of
the wage-leveling trend that prevailed under Brezhnev
and, like General Secretary Gorbachev, have called
for more and better financial incentives. Others, such
as former Kemerovo Oblast First Secretary Leonid
Gorshkov (now RSFSR Deputy Premier), have relied
primarily on exhortation.
For the most part, however, local efforts to produce
more with less have been only marginally successful
(see inset on "The Leningrad Experiment"). As a
result, most efforts have been focused on improving
the labor supply by creating commissions to "moni-
tor" the improvement of living and working conditions
in remote areas; holding periodic conferences to
"study" the problem of retaining workers on the
farms; and increasing the propaganda designed to
make farm work more appealing to young workers.
Inadequate Regional Control. In their attempts to
solve these problems, local officials clearly have been
frustrated by the limits of their influence on the
planning and management process. Expressing the
problem in Marxist-Leninist terms, Khabarovsk Kray
First Secretary Chernyy has complained about an
"incorrect correlation between centralism and the
democratic principle." Other officials have offered
concrete examples to underline their irritation with
Moscow's heavyhandedness. L'vov Oblast First Secre-
tary Dobrik, for example, once complained that agri-
cultural targets were set in Moscow without the
slightest consideration of regional variations in grow-
ing conditions. "In a word," he concluded, "the
distribution of a single memorandum applicable to all
is inadmissible"-a statement that captures the es-
sence of the complaints from these officials about
overcentralized planning and management. This view
is apparently shared by former regional leader Gorba-
chev, who recently criticized "the ambition to regu-
late everything from the center."
The social dimensions of economic planning are
strongly emphasized by these regional officials, who
regard the development of local plans for social
In July 1983 Leningrad began an experiment at five
production complexes that was designed to decrease
the number of technical personnel while simulta-
neously maintaining or increasing productivity. These
goals were to be achieved by giving more money-
obtained by freezing wage funds and then releasing
"superfluous " personnel-to participating workers.
Although the two main goals of the experiment
reportedly are being met, there apparently is no
standard method for determining which workers are
superfluous, which of them qualify for supplemental
wages, and what amount they should be paid-issues
that seem to have generated considerable worker
discontent. Managers and foremen interviewed in the
Soviet press also have expressed concern about ineq-
uities in the system and a belief that modernization
would accomplish the goals of the experiment more
effectively than wage incentives. The experiment,
however, continues.
development (in areas such as housing, education, and
medical services) as one way of increasing regional
influence in the planning process. The concept of
"comprehensive economic and social planning" was
born in Leningrad and has been pushed especially
hard in Moscow and Western Siberia, where one of
the potential leaders, Fedirko, was the first to win the
authority to develop a 10-year plan along these lines.'
' In what may be a significant concession to such regional pressures,
the Politburo in September 1983 granted the cities of Leningrad
and Moscow an expansion of their previous planning rights-a
move that could presage some eventual widening of discretionary
authority in other localities. The extent of this devolution of central
functions to local planners remains unclear; according to former
Leningrad Oblast First Secretary Zaykov, however, central plans-
starting with the next five-year plan (1986-90-will carry no
detailed breakdowns for Leningrad, and the city will have more
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Regional party leaders also have initiated local man-
agement experiments, such as those previously de-
scribed, that have been designed to expand their
authority, but these have been carefully circum-
scribed and closely monitored by Moscow. L'vov
Oblast First Secretary Dobrik once denied that he
was under such close supervision, telling a Western
reporter that Moscow gave him complete freedom to
act and experiment. "In fact, Moscow is sometimes
surprised at what we do," he said. The interviewer
then asked who decided that the local television
factory should switch to color only. "The ministry in
Moscow," Dobrik conceded. Then he indicated one of
the ways Moscow can make its decisions more palat-
able: "But we're getting the biggest color TV institute
in the country."
Selective Endorsements
Officials in this sample also have been fairly selective
in their endorsements of existing management forms
and practices. Those ideas that enjoy the strongest
support-and the reasons given for that support-also
may be indicative of perspectives these officials would
bring to the Politburo and Secretariat.
Production Associations. Officials in this sample have
been enthusiastic about the creation of production
associations-organizations designed to coordinate
the activities of related enterprises under a single
management organ. Production associations have
been officially designated as the economy's "basic
self-financing units," and it is the self-financing as-
pect (requiring associations to cover operating ex-
penses out of revenues) that often is praised by these
officials, as well as by Gorbachev, for its beneficial
effects on productivity. Regional party officials also
believe these associations strengthen the local level of
economic management, where the influence of local
party organizations can more easily be brought to
bear. In sum, they consider the formation of produc-
tion associations to be-in the words of Gor'kiy
Oblast First Secretary Yuriy Khristoradnov-a step
toward "sensibly combining local and national inter-
ests" and surmounting "still visible departmental
barriers." (These officials remain critical, however, of
the "mechanical" formation of production associa-
tions and of their frequent failure to be organized on
an interdepartmental basis as was originally intend-
Agro-Industrial Associations. Although agro-
industrial associations are not self-financing, the other
virtues these officials ascribe to them are similar to
those attributed to production associations. Officially
sanctioned in May 1982, agro-industrial associations
were created to bring the various components of the
agro-industrial complex together under a single ad-
ministrative hierarchy that could coordinate the entire
food-production process. Because the rayon (district)
associations are organized on a territorial basis and
empowered to distribute some resources within that
territory, they have the support of most local officials,
who generally favor any moves that increase local
discretionary authority. Agro-industrial associations,
wrote Kuybyshev Oblast First Secretary Yevgeniy
Murav'yev, are a "practical solution to one of the
most important problems in contemporary economic
policy-a rational combination of sectoral and territo-
rial management principles."
Contract Brigades. Most oblast and kray leaders in
this group also seem enthusiastic about the use of
"contract brigades"-a form of labor organization
that links the income of individual workers to the
output of their work teams (brigades)-in construction
and industry. They believe that by tying individual
income to group output, laggards are less likely to be
tolerated by their peers and labor discipline and
productivity will increase. Officials in this group
seldom refer to the use of brigades in agriculture,
however, suggesting little enthusiasm about their ap-
plication in that sector, where the nature of the work
gives these organizations a wider degree of decision-
making latitude and makes them less subject to local
party control. Despite these misgivings, the contract
brigades have been approved for nationwide adoption
in agriculture and have Gorbachev's strong backing.
Target Programing. The so-called program-goal ap-
proach to planning-focusing attention and resources
on national or regional problems that cut across
sectoral lines-is seen by officials in this group as one
of the more effective means of coping with depart-
mental barriers. ("Life has proven" the efficiency of
ed.)
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this method, wrote former Sverdlovsk Oblast First
Secretary Yel'tsin.) Although the program-goal ap-
proach is helping to eliminate such barriers from the
planning phase, it also appears to be heightening these
officials' awareness of the need for commensurate
changes in the management structure, which contin-
ues to be organized along sectoral lines.
The Party's Role
Despite their desire for increased regional control,
officials in this sample do not seem to favor a more
strongly interventionist role for the party in economic
management. For example, Voronezh Oblast First
Secretary Vadim Ignatov has complained that certain
of his section chiefs and even oblast secretaries "per-
sonally attend to minor day-to-day economic ques-
tions." According to Ignatov, this stifles the initiative
of economic managers, who "get used to the idea that
they can work without effort, without rolling up their
sleeves." Former Kemerovo Oblast First Secretary
Gorshkov cited what he described as a typical daily
schedule of the manager of the Stroymekhanizatsiya
Trust:
0830 Meeting of a "holiday commission"
of the city party committee
1100 Meeting of the party staff for con-
struction of a city sewage system
1330 Meeting of the party staff for con-
struction of the Azot Production
Association
1500 Meeting of the party staff for con-
struction of a wood paneling factory
1600 Meeting of the Leningrad Rayon
Party Committee
This example illustrates, wrote Gorshkov, how party
committees place unfair demands on economic man-
agers and "waste their time" with unnecessary meet-
ings. In short, the message conveyed by these officials
is similar to the one that both Chernenko and Gorba-
chev seem to have pushed-that the party must
oversee and control, but never substitute for, econom-
ic managers.
Reform: How High on the Agenda?
In sum, these statements suggest general agreement
on the need for planning and management reforms
that would include the devolution of additional au-
thority to the regional level and a consolidation of
narrowly specialized central organs, accompanied by
greater utilization of the program-goal approach and
a number of self-financing schemes designed to im-
prove productivity. There appear to be wide varia-
tions, however, in the priority these officials attach to
such reforms.
This was the only issue, moreover, on which we found
statistically significant generational differences
among potential leaders. Those officials who joined
the party after Stalin's death were more likely than
older officials in the sample to be critical of existing
planning and management practices and to propose
their own local "solutions" to national problems (see
figure 10). George Breslauer's study of 24 oblast first
secretaries in the RSFSR also found that complaints
from younger officials were likely to be qualitatively
different from those of their elders-ranking higher
on his scale of "demandingness" and "impatience"
with central policies.10 Even among representatives of
the post-Stalin generation, however, our study found
significant individual differences, ranging from those
who appeared relatively unconcerned about the issue,
such as Kiev city party leader Yuriy Yel'chenko, to
Krasnoyarsk Kray party chief Fedirko, who made at
least 16 statements that were critical of central
planning and management policies during the period
under review."
Whatever their priority, the modest measures these
officials are advocating seem unlikely to have a
liberalizing influence on the Soviet system. To judge
10 Policy Orientations of Provincial Party First Secretaries in the
Russian Republic of the USSR, by George Breslauer, National
Council for Soviet and East European Research, 1983.
11 Breslauer also found the post-Stalin generation to be highly
polarized in terms of its demandingness and impatience with
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Figure 10
Complaints by Potential Leaders
About Soviet Central Planners and Managers,
1978-84
Average numbers of complaints by age
10 , ,,-I ,r
from their statements, for example, their attraction to
the notion of contract brigades, which link individual
income to group output, is not based upon a wish to
foster an entrepreneurial spirit at the workplace but,
rather, on a desire to exploit the more oppressive
effect of the scheme-namely, an increase in peer
pressure, which is said to improve labor discipline and,
hence, productivity.
Most officials in this sample, in fact, have consistently
stressed the importance of improving labor discipline
as a means of increasing production capacity-a
theme they emphasized even before it became de
rigueur under former party chief Andropov. Pravda
editor Afans'yev, for example, observed that "raising
individual responsibility and consolidating order and
discipline produce a substantial economic, political,
and moral effect-without increased material expen-
ditures." Many regional officials also have boasted
about the efficiencies achieved through increased
labor discipline. L'vov Oblast First Secretary Dobrik
went even further than most officials in this sample,
proposing that labor discipline be stiffened by intro-
ducing "specific penalties" for "irresponsible work"-
"negative incentives" of the type Gorbachev has since
endorsed.
Figure 11. Krasnoyarsk Kray
First Secretary Fedirko-one
of the more vocal critics of cen-
tral planning and management
Resource Allocations
On resource allocation issues, there are some striking
differences of emphasis among these officials-ex-
plainable for the most part by their differing constitu-
encies and responsibilities. For example, local party
leaders, unlike members of the defense establishment,
seldom have occasion to comment on the country's
defense needs. This study also showed, however, that
the position an official takes on this issue cannot be
predicted solely on the basis of his institutional affili-
ation, lending support to our assumption that such
public pronouncements do, in fact, reflect a degree of
personal policy preference. The statements of these
officials also suggest strong support for increased
resource allocations for social and consumer pro-
grams. A minority, however, have expressed concern
about the excesses of "consumerism" or stressed the
need to build a stronger defense with apparent disre-
gard for the impact this would have on other sectors
of the economy.
Consumer Needs. With the exception of defense
officials, members of this sample group-including
those from areas where heavy industry predomi-
nates-have given particular emphasis to the impor-
tance of consumer and social needs. This holds true
throughout the last half of the 10th Five-Year Plan
(1976-80), when heavy industry was assigned a priori-
ty growth rate, as well as the first half of the 11th
(1981-85), when the consumer sector was so favored.
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On this issue, therefore, the rhetoric of these officials
has sometimes been out of step with national policy.
Moreover, the explicit linkage that many of these
officials make between the satisfaction of consumer
needs and improvements in labor productivity sug-
gests that this is not merely an effort to identify
themselves with popular concerns. Several officials in
this sample took the position of L'vov Oblast's Dobrik,
who said that every industrial enterprise, "regardless
of its departmental jurisdiction," should be involved in
the production of goods for the people.
Similarly, the strong concern these officials express
about the need to improve the quality of life and
"social infrastructure" (schools, medical facilities,
cultural and recreational amenities, and so on) seems
to be motivated less by their commitment to consumer
welfare than their efforts to improve productivity and
attract and retain an adequate work force. "In the
difficult conditions of Siberia," said Krasnoyarsk
Kray party chief Fedirko, "it is especially important
to have good housing, kindergartens, polyclinics, hos-
pitals, theaters, concert halls, and sports facilities.
The mood of the people and the creation of stable
work collectives depends on this."
Although these officials seldom acknowledge a com-
petition for resources between the consumer sector
and defense, most of those who have done so have
hinted that consumer interests should not be sacri-
ficed. Moscow Oblast First Secretary Konotop said
that workers within his jurisdiction were especially
grateful that "under conditions of a complicated and
strained international situation, there has been a firm,
consistent implementation of the program to improve
Soviet citizens' material and cultural standard of
living." Central Committee official Zagladin, who has
expressed concern about socialism's inability to match
capitalism's production of consumer goods, acknowl-
edged in 1983 "that new efforts in the defense sphere
do not make it easier to fulfill the peaceful and
creative tasks facing socialism." Zagladin went on,
however, to indicate that the Soviet economy was
sufficiently strong to produce both guns and butter.
Despite the consumer orientation of a majority of
officials in our sample, a minority have voiced con-
cerns similar to those that have been raised by
Politburo members Aliyev and Solomentsev about the
excesses of "consumerism." A few officials, for exam-
ple, talked about the need to develop "sensible"
patterns of consumption, and Altay Kray's Aksenov
worried that material well-being could lead to selfish-
ness, "money grubbing," and neglect of the responsi-
bilities of Soviet citizenship.
Defense. Members of the defense establishment in
this sample have been unanimous in calling for an
improvement in the country's defense capability, but
they generally have described this as a longstanding
concern-not one that requires any new diversion of
resources. For example, Marshal Akhromeyev, who
was later to become chief of the General Staff, wrote
in January 1984: "The party and the Soviet Govern-
ment have never overlooked the question of strength-
ening the nation's defense might." The armed forces,
he wrote, "are receiving a sufficient amount of mod-
ern combat equipment" and only need better training
in the use of that equipment. Like Akhromeyev, these
officials generally have defined "increased defense
capabilities" in terms of increased combat readiness,
better training, and more efficiency-not increased
resources. Most of them have acknowledged the legiti-
macy of other sectors' claims on the resource pie by
conceding that a strong defense depends, first and
foremost, upon a strong economy. For example, De-
fense Minister Sergey Sokolov has written that "the
Soviet people are strengthening and developing the
country's economic and, consequently, defense might"
(emphasis added).
There is some evidence, however, that others, such as
First Deputy Defense Minister Vasiliy Petrov and
Warsaw Pact Commander Kulikov, have approached
the issue from a somewhat narrower perspective.
Petrov, for example, once used the analogy of the
limited resources of the post-World War II period to
praise the party's efforts to strengthen national de-
fense. "In this situation," he wrote, "despite the
difficulties of postwar reconstruction, the Communist
Party took the necessary measures to further
strengthen the country's defense capability and in-
crease its armed forces' combat might."
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Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov also has been an advocate
of programs that could be interpreted as an implicit
call for additional resources. For example, he has
stressed the need to be at the forefront of military
technology development to meet the challenge of
NATO's advanced conventional weapons and the US
Strategic Defense Initiative. Ogarkov also has called
for measures to speed up the mobilization deployment
of the armed forces and the transfer of the Soviet
economy to a wartime footing-an issue that appears
to bear on the overall question of resource allocation
at a time of economic strain.
Investment. Although officials in this sample have
dropped hints about how they believe the resource pie
should be sliced (by emphasizing the importance of
one or another sector of the economy), they have
seldom made even veiled calls for increases in capital
investment. Despite their concern about obsolescence,
for example, only L'vov Oblast's Dobrik has talked
about the need to "invest resources" in the updating
of equipment and manufacturing processes-Gorba-
chev's proposed solution to the problem. This reti-
cence on the issue of investment may reflect a recog-
nition by these officials of their limited ability to
influence Moscow's policies as well as their under-
standing of prevailing economic realities. If more
resources are to be devoted to consumer and social
needs, as most of these officials seem to be advocat-
ing, and defense spending is to be maintained at an
"adequate" level, which most seem to equate with its
current growth rate, then any increase in investment
probably would have to come from increased produc-
tivity and savings.
Ideological Vigilance and Dissent
In comparison with economic issues, officials in this
sample have devoted little attention to ideological
work and propaganda. The chief exceptions have been
officials from border and port areas, such as former
Leningrad party chief Zaykov and L'vov Oblast first 25X1
secretary Dobrik, who have emphasized the need for
vigilance against the contamination of foreign ideas.
For example, Dobrik, whose oblast borders Poland,
wrote that "our ideological enemy is trying to awaken
vestiges of the past in the consciousness of some
people"-their private-property inclinations, religious
dealings, and "manifestations of national narrowness"
(that is, Ukrainian nationalism). Dobrik has decried
the activities of "subversive organizations," such as
Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, and called for
the party to play a more active role in combating
"bourgeois" propaganda.
Pravda editor Afanas'yev also has written on the
issue, proposing that officials involved in countering
such propaganda revise their tactics. "There are still
some in our midst," he wrote, "who think that the
stronger the language they use in reviling our foe, the
more resounding their victory in the ideological battle.
It appears that some find it difficult to discard the
sloganeering, noisiness, and misplaced emotions that
still prevail in some materials. Emotions are no substi-
tute for truth, nor is noisiness a method of attack."
None of these statements contains any hint of lenien-
cy toward "alien ideas" or the Soviet dissidents who
might espouse them. Even Central Committee official
Zagladin, who has taken somewhat unorthodox posi-
tions on other issues, has defended the Soviet Union's
denial of rights to a "tiny, insignificant group of
people," claiming this "enables us to guarantee the
rights of society as a whole and of each member
individually."
Nationalities Issues. Statements on this issue also
contain little evidence of concern about nationalist
dissent, in part because most officials in the sample
come from areas without sizable ethnic minorities. An
exception is L'vov's Dobrik, whose oblast has a popu-
lation that is less than 8 percent Russian and that was
not integrated into the USSR until after World War
II. To combat Ukrainian nationalism in his oblast,
Dobrik has organized public meetings to discuss its
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Self-Image
When these potential Politburo members describe the
qualities of a `good leader"-a designation they
presumably would apply to themselves-they paint
the following composite portrait.
The good leader is politically mature, well educated,
and selfless'in his devotion to the party and the
people. He has strong organizational skills and
knows how to set priorities and concentrate on his
main goals. He also knows how to mobilize people to
fulfill those goals. This is a man who doesn't sit
around in his office but keeps in close contact with
the workers and listens carefully to their problems
and suggestions. He does everything he can to im-
prove their working conditions and the quality of
their everyday lives. He serves as an example to his
subordinates. Although he has exacting expectations
of them, he considers dismissal to be an extreme
measure that generally can be avoided. He is con-
stantly mastering new skills and progressive methods
of management. He is able to foresee the long-term
consequences of decisions and to predict future needs.
Despite these superior personal qualities, he is always
careful to observe the principle of collectivity in the
formulation of decisions. He is, in short, a leader "of
the Leninist type."
"bloody" history, complete with presentations by rela-
tives of the victims of past atrocities." Marshal Ogar-
kov also has alluded to a resistance to the Russian
language among ethnic minorities that has created
problems in training draftees." Ogarkov was the only
national-level figure in the sample, however, to com-
ment on such issues-a fact that presumably reflects
the current absence of any widespread, politically
disruptive protest or dissent by ethnic minorities.
" Dobrik has special reason to be concerned with this issue. His
predecessor, Vasiliy Kutsevol, was removed from his post in 1973
following disturbances among L'vov University students protesting
tcussincation eftorts.l
" As of 1980, non-Slavs represented about one-third of the draft-
To judge from this sample of Soviet officials eligible
for promotion to the Politburo and Secretariat, turn-
over in the top-level leadership will not mean the rise
of a single political generation. Instead, as was true in
the first round of promotions under Gorbachev, new
Soviet leaders are likely to be drawn from several
different age groups. Those promoted to the Politburo
at the April 1985 plenum, for example, ranged in age
from 55 (CPSU Secretary Nikolay Ryzhkov, who
became a full member) to 73 (Defense Minister
Sokolov, who became a candidate member).
Domestic Impact
On the issue of economic reform, these officials may
all be described as "conservative" in the sense that
any changes they seem to favor would preserve the
system's basic features of state ownership and central
planning. An analysis of their complaints, initiatives,
and endorsements, however, suggests that as national
leaders most of them would support a package of
modest "reform" measures that included:
? The devolution of some additional planning and
management authority, especially in the "social
welfare" area, to the regional level.
? The merging of narrowly specialized ministries and
state committees.
? Greater utilization of the program-goal approach to
planning and the creation of interdepartmental or-
gans to manage target programs.
? Increased operational authority for agro-industrial
and production associations.
? Greater emphasis on self-financing contract bri-
gades and similar measures designed to improve
productivity.
There appear to be wide variations, however, in the
priority these officials would attach to such reforms.
Attitudes among this sample group of potential lead-
ers ranged from those of Kiev city party leader Yuriy
Yel'chenko, who appeared relatively complacent
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about present practices, to those of Krasnoyarsk Kray
party chief Petr Fedirko, who issued at least 16
statements that were critical of central planning and
management during the period under review.
As Politburo members, these officials would be weigh-
ing the relative merits of resource claims from all
regions and sectors of the economy-a task none of
them has faced to date. The current statements of
these officials, nevertheless, suggest:
? Strong sentiment in favor of additional resources for
social and consumer programs, with proponents
basing their case on the benefits that would accrue
to the economy as a whole.
? A disinclination, under present circumstances, to
make a substantial increase in the growth rate of
defense spending, which most appear to consider
adequate to meet projected needs.
? An apparent belief that current defense spending
levels are realistic, however, and that any increase
in allocations to meet social needs would have to be
made at the expense of capital investment, rather
than defense.
These statements also suggest, however, that such
resource allocations issues will be contentious. A
minority group among these officials has expressed
concern about the potential excesses of "consumer-
ism" and stressed the need to build a stronger defense
with apparent disregard for the impact this would
have on other sectors of the economy.
The comments of these officials also suggest that their
entry into the Politburo or Secretariat probably would
have little effect on the plight of Soviet dissidents. The
silence of most officials on this issue may simply
reflect their indifference to an issue that is not of
major concern to them in their current posts. Those
who have spoken out on the subject and those most
likely to assume positions as cultural and ideological
"watchdogs" have taken a predictably orthodox and
unyielding line.
Impact on International Behavior
Foreign policy issues are rarely addressed by most of
these potential leaders and are of secondary concern
to them in their current positions. As Politburo mem-
bers, therefore, the domestic repercussions of foreign
policy decisions probably would weigh heavily in their
consideration of policy options, at least at the outset of
their tenures. The dismay so many of these officials
have expressed over the country's technological back-
wardness-coupled with their apparent belief that the
investment required to solve that problem should
await fulfillment of more urgent social and consumer
needs-suggests a strong appreciation of the techno-
logical benefits of improved East-West relations.
Judging from their statements, such potential benefits
now seem to outweigh their concerns about the ideo-
logical "contamination" that would result from in-
creased contacts with the West. Although sensitive to
their technological inferiority to the West, they have
voiced little sentiment for an autarkic approach simi-
lar to that pursued under Stalin and advocated by
such leading contemporary figures as Academy of
Sciences President Anatoliy Aleksandrov.
The expertise of leaders who would be drawn from the
foreign affairs and national security establishments
probably would give them a disproportionate influ-
ence in resolving such issues. There have been indica-
tions of sufficient differences among these officials,
however, to suggest that US interests could be affect-
ed by the outcome of the selection process:
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pears to be more flexible and less inclined to see
issues in strictly ideological terms than his col-
league, Zamyatin.
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Regardless of who is selected, however, the statements
of these officials leave no doubt about the continued
centrality of the United States in any future Soviet
foreign policy considerations. They also suggest the
existence of a consensus about the value of pursuing
additional arms-control agreements with the United
States. For some, these agreements may be desirable
simply to facilitate Soviet planning and lessen the
possibility of technological surprise. For those who
would devote additional resources to nondefense pro-
grams, however, the cost-avoidance benefits of such
agreements appear to give them a high priority.
Judging from their statements, these potential Polit-
buro members are not inclined to be any more lenient
in their dealings with their East European allies or
with Eurocommunists than the leaders they would be
replacing. Although they presumably would leave the
door open to improved relations with the Chinese,
there appears to be little optimism that a normaliza-
tion of relations will come soon. There also seems to
be a lack of enthusiasm among these officials about
aid to Third World countries, possibly reflecting some
concern about the burden such assistance places on
the Soviet economy. The Middle East, by contrast,
appears to be recognized as an area of strategic
geopolitical importance for which the cost of Soviet
involvement may be less subject to question.
In sum, these statements provide no evidence that the
turnover in the leadership will by itself bring a
readymade coalition for across-the-board changes in
Soviet policy. On many issues, the views of potential
Politburo and Secretariat members appear about the
same as those of the leaders they would succeed,
arguing for policy continuity. On others, the diver-
gence of views among these officials suggests that the
policy impact will be dependent on the outcome of the
selection process. On still other issues, there appears
to be a consensus for change, but with varying
perceptions of the urgency involved0 Most
members of the group seem to favor a course that lies
somewhere between Stalinist orthodoxy and a signifi-
cant liberalization of the system, coupling a continua-
tion of many present policies with a modest degree of
change, particularly in the area of economic manage-
ment.
Even such modest changes may be difficult to imple-
ment, given the constraints of a collective leadership
and traditional bureaucratic resistance. Unlike An-
dropov and Chernenko, however, Gorbachev is rela-
tively young and healthy and appears to be trying to
build a coalition for change. If so, the range of views
among these officials suggests that the turnover in the
Politburo will not automatically provide the kind of
leaders he needs and that his success will be depen-
dent on his ability to maintain control of the selection
process.
On the other hand, a number of these officials appear
to hold views similar to Gorbachev's-especially in
the economic area, where many (such as Fedirko and
Zaykov) seem to share his belief that management has
become overly centralized and that greater emphasis
should be placed on financial incentives. Among the
foreign policy specialists, some (such as Zagladin)
have also deemphasized ideological polemics when
they thought it served Soviet interests, demonstrating
a compatibility with Gorbachev's more tactically flex-
ible approach. If Gorbachev can gain control of the
cadre selection process-and the recent pattern of
promotions indicates that he is doing so-he should be
able to ensure that he has the policy support he needs
to push his domestic and foreign policy agenda.
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Appendix A
At the beginning of the eighties, with the coming to power of the new US
administration, the leading circles of imperialism, setting a course of confrontation
and outright antagonism, have openly launched a global offensive on socialism,
based on a carefully elaborated, large-scale program covering all aspects of the
struggle up to and including brinkmanship.
The reactionary forces are making foolish plans to dominate the world, pushing
mankind to the brink of nuclear disaster, and directly interfering in peoples'
affairs. This crazy policy is first of all apparent in the efforts by the United States,
its allies, and NATO to disturb the military balance and to deploy nuclear missiles
in the West.
We counter the imperialists' hostile intrigues and the new US administration's
adventurist statements with our boundless devotion to Communist ideals, the
Soviet people's monolithic cohesion around the party, and new successes in
building the economy and culture.
Yuriy Khristoradnov
The United States has adopted a policy of a large-scale, total arms race, which
harbors a serious new threat to peace and the people's security.... Mankind is
threatened with war on land and from space, which aggressive US forces also wish
to turn into an arena of the lethal arms race.
Reagan seems to have forgotten with whom he is dealing. We are not El Salvador
or Panama. We are a superpower, with the self-respect of a superpower.
Sergey Afanas'yev
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The American strategists' hopes of weakening and exhausting us economically
through the arms race and then dictating their will to socialism are unrealizable;
they are refuted by the entire history of the Soviet state.
Leonid Zamyatin
We are convinced of the possibility of an improvement, or at least a normalization,
of Soviet-US relations, and we hope for that.
Vadim Zagladin
The course of the present US administration, which thinks in terms of war and
acts in accordance with its militarist plans, is very dangerous. It is aimed at
gaining military superiority, and is convincingly apparent in the White House
approach to nuclear arms limitation and reduction talks. The Soviet-US Geneva
talks were wrecked through the fault of Washington.
In conditions of the international situation, which has been aggravated through the
fault of aggressive imperialist circles, the strict realization of established economic
plans is not merely an obligation, but also the patriotic duty, of every Communist
and every Soviet person.
The US leadership is openly pursuing a policy that undermines detente and
aggravates the international situation. It is trying to dictate its will to the socialist
states and other countries. By expatiating on the defense of their "vital interests"
and on the so-called Soviet military threat, and exploiting events in Afghanistan,
the US ruling circles are concealing their own militarist plans.
Marshal Sergey Sokolov
If realism and a realistic appraisal of the actual situation in the world arena were
to gain the upper hand in the United States over the narcotic of the "power of
America," and if a realization of real US interests were to gain the upper hand
over a policy founded on illusory interests, then confrontation would be rejected
and a new turn would take place in US policy-a turn toward coexistence and
peaceful cooperation. This turn is vitally necessary-necessary for everyone,
including the United States itself.
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A further intensification of the general crisis of capitalism and the weakening of
its positions in the international arena have occurred in recent years. The
imperialist circles are attempting to change the course of events in their favor and
to halt the process of progressive historical changes by force.... The US
militarists have embarked on the path of undermining detente, stepping up the
arms race, constantly creating crisis situations, and grossly interfering in the
domestic affairs of other states.
Yuriy Yel'chenko
Every Soviet person is profoundly conscious that there is no greater happiness than
the happiness of working under peaceful skies.... The flywheel of the arms race,
however, is being cranked up once again. The imperialists are covering up their ag-
gressive aspirations with propaganda forgeries about the supposedly increased
"Soviet military threat" and about our country's complicity in "international
terrorism." In the Altay stands a memorial to stewardess Nadya Kurchenko. In
the prime of her youth and beauty, her life was cut short by a bandit's bullet fired
by the Brazinskas terrorists. These criminals have found shelter in the United
States, from where absurd charges are made against the peace-loving, humane
Soviet people.
It is difficult to give assurance that the Reagan administration will change its
policies. This is because the regime is serving the interests of a specific class,
particularly the military-industrial complex.
In a conversation with a Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev 25X1
emphasized his personal a ire or impr ve relations between the United States
and the USSR. between the two countries 25X1
during World War II "against a common enemy" and stated had 25X1
formed a lasting impression on the Soviet people of his generation. Akhromeyev
fondly recalled the period of "detente, " which he characterized as a period of
comparatively substantive discussions between and the Soviet 25X1
military. He dismissed the rhetoric of Soviet an polemics by stating that
while propaganda serves its purpose on both sides, 'propaganda is pro a anda."
He emphasized the important responsibility of both Soviet and 25X1
to forward information accurately and objectively to facilitate correct 25X1
analysis. This was especially important, he said, because of biases inherent in
each nation's leadership perspective.
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Appendix B
Criticism of Central Planners
and Managers: A Sampler
Densely populated regions like Moscow Oblast urgently need comprehensive
planning of future socioeconomic development, taking into account nature conser-
vation, the fuel and energy balance, water supply, and other utilities. The solution
of these problems currently depends largely on the mood of the ministries and
sector departments of Gosplan, and we are constantly forced to beg money from
them for numerous acute needs in the municipal services sphere.
Considerable amounts of cement could be saved by the oblast's industrial
construction enterprises by using the coal ash of the thermoelectric power plant.
Every year more than 1 million tons of ash are produced by the Kuzbas power
plants. However, the reason insignificant amounts of the ash are being used is that
the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification has not resolved the problem of
dry ash separation at operating power plants. This, however, would enable us to
save 100,000 tons of cement every year.
I believe that the problem of "departmentalism" is our greatest sore point. A
ministry has its plans and interests and wishes to carry out its price policy, but
what is done in the neighboring ministry is none of the former ministry's concern
or only to a very limited extent.
We fully approve measures taken by the CPSU Central Committee ... to
restructure the work of the USSR Gosplan.... At the same time the system of
management in a number of sectors remains split among many departments and
remains extremely complex and inefficient.... Thus, there are today in our oblast
387 construction organizations subordinate to 36 ministries and departments.
Many of them operate in parallel.
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We have serious claims against the work style of the ministries.... In the activities
of many of them we continue to see the predominance of bureaucratic, red-tape
methods ... the system that frequently predominates is the "play it safe" method.
Our oblast produces 90 percent of the country's natural sulfur, but there is not
enough of it to insure that operating enterprises work at full capacity, not to
mention those now being built. The reason is that in the 10th Five-Year Plan, the
USSR Gosplan channeled resources mainly into the development of production
capacity and neglected development of the mineral mining base. There has been no
change in the picture in 1981.
The growth rate of production is steadily increasing and, although the program for
social development laid out in the Five-Year Plan was fulfilled, there is still a
shortage of housing, institutions for children, and other domestic and cultural
facilities.... We can understand this, but we cannot accept it, particularly
because the lag in development of the social-domestic infrastructure is also the
result of mistakes in planning and organizing work by the ministries participating
in shaping the complex.
Gennadiy Bogomyakov
The USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources does not in
practice participate in solving problems of water usage in the complex's zone. The
question of the storage and utilization of industrial waste has not been solved. The
Ministry of Power and Electrification, Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, and
Ministry of Construction Materials Industry are not helping to work out a unified
approach to the solution of this problem.
Considerable timber resources remain unused, 45 percent of them because of the
insufficient attention that the USSR Ministry of the Timber, Pulp and Paper, and
Wood Processing Industry pays to the reconstruction and technical improvement
of timber procurement and processing enterprises.
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It would be desirable for construction ministries and planning organs to show
greater concern for developing the industrial base, stabilizing cadres, and improv-
ing construction planning and administration.
Most unfortunately, the leaders of a number of ministries are seeking to increase
production not on the basis of improved labor productivity but mainly by means of
expanding production areas and employing more people.
I would like to note that the ministries and departments still have not tackled the
job of quality control as they should; we are not aware of their energetic help.
Back in 1974 we drew up a plan for the protection of air and water from pollution
by local enterprises. But it has never been realized-the Ministry of Ferrous
Metallurgy has refused to supply the necessary resources.
Viktor Boyko
It is essential to increase the ministries' responsibility for accelerating the rate of
retooling, the timely creation of new production capacities, and ensuring the
fulfillment of the plans adopted.... Unfortunately, when compiling the plans for
this year and the five-year plan, the USSR Ministry of Coal Industry is not
providing for many of these measures.... At the oblast's ferrous metallurgy
enterprises there is an urgent need to resolve more rapidly questions of the
retooling and modernization of metallurgical plants. The obkom has made specific
proposals on this matter to the USSR Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy.
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