CUBA: REASSESSING THE CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00589R000300350013-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of t-
Intelligence
Cuba: Reassessing the
Central American Wars
Secret-
ALA 85-10079
July 1985
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Cuba: Reassessing the
Central American Wars
An Intelligence Assessment
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. F-]
This paper was prepared by
Division, ALA, on
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Secret
ALA 85-10079
July 1985
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Cuba: Reassessing the
Central American Wars 25X1
Key Judgments We believe that Cuba's ultimate goal of replacing governments in Central
Information available America with radical revolutionary regimes hostile to the United States
as of 28 June 1985 remains unchanged. Cuba's shrinking policy options in the region, however,
was used in this report.
have caused President Castro to look for negotiated settlements to the wars
in Nicaragua and El Salvador to preserve the Sandinista regime and
prevent a defeat of revolutionary groups in El Salvador. In our judgment,
Castro's desire to negotiate is a tactical response that would dissipate
quickly if the pressures that drove him to seek an accommodation are
reduced.
to be drawn into a superpower confrontation over Central America,
Havana appears to us genuinely concerned over the possibility of a US
military intervention in Central America or even an attack on Cuba itself.
The US intervention in Grenada showed Cuban leaders that Washington is
willing to use force to protect its interests in the area. Soviet unwillingness
probably persuaded him that caution must be the mainstay of his policies
to avoid a showdown with the United States. The shift in the political and
military balance favoring US allies in El Salvador and Guatemala, Costa
Rica's adherence to democracy, and the weakness of leftist forces in
Honduras also have caused Cuba to change the focus of its tactics, in our
view.
further reduced Castro's options and
ing, the likelihood of a US military intervention.
? Limiting US military assistance to the government of El Salvador-
In the past, Castro has sought talks only to gain a propaganda advantage.
Now, however, he seems to realize that negotiations are necessary if he is
to halt current trends in Central America, which he believes, according to
the US Interests Section in Havana, favor the United States. Castro, in our
opinion, has concluded that a pact under Contadora sponsorship-the only
negotiations initiative with any serious chance of success at this time-
offers him the best opportunities for achieving two minimum goals:
? Preserving the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua by ending all foreign
support for the anti-Sandinista guerrillas and reducing, if not eliminat-
Secret
ALA 85-10079
July 1985
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We believe Cuba's desire for a negotiated settlement to protect Nicaragua
will diminish if the regime in Managua succeeds in reducing the anti-
Sandinista insurgency and Havana believes that Washington will not take
other military measures against Managua. On the other hand, as long as
Havana is uncertain about the United States' next moves against the
Sandinistas, including the possibility of a direct US military attack, and
the heavy fighting continues in Nicaragua, Cuba will push for a negotiated
solution under Contadora auspices. To that end, Castro will probably
encourage the Sandinistas to accept verification provisions in the Conta-
dora draft treaty. F__1
Even without a Contadora settlement, however, we believe that Havana
will refrain from committing major Cuban combat forces to Nicaragua
under most circumstances for fear of provoking Washington. Havana
probably would limit its direct role in Nicaragua to strengthening the
Sandinistas' military capabilities with Cuban advisers and Soviet-made
weapons.
In our judgment, Castro's tactics toward El Salvador will continue to focus
on a negotiated settlement that preserves the integrity of the guerrilla
movement. If the guerrillas' position continues to deteriorate, however, we
believe Havana will probably urge the rebels to temper further their
demands for power sharing to induce the government of President Duarte
to negotiate.F_~
We have no evidence, however, that Cuba is ready to retreat on the
fundamental issue of its "right" to support revolutions in Central Ameri-
ca-at least as long as Castro and his coterie of guerrilla veterans and "old
guard" Communist Party functionaries rule in Havana. For these individ-
uals, promotion of revolution is at the core of their ideological beliefs, and
any restraints they might agree to in the context of negotiations would be
temporary. F_~
Secret iv
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Adjusting to Setbacks and Pressures
The Push for Negotiations 6
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Cuba: Reassessing the
Central American Wars
Military and political pressures from the United
States and Moscow's reluctance to be drawn into a
major confrontation with Washington over Central
America have, over the past few years, reduced
President Castro's policy options in the region. The
same factors also have limited Havana's ability to
help duplicate the Sandinista revolution elsewhere.
These constraints have forced Cuba for now to stress
caution and negotiation rather than promote an ever-
expanding guerrilla struggle. Nevertheless, according
to public L
statements by Cuban leaders, Castro remains
committed to consolidating the regime in Managua
and to preserving the political and military integrity
of the insurgency in El Salvador.F - - - ]
This paper
assesses Cuba's tactics in support
of its main regional allies, the Sandinistas in Nicara-
gua and the Salvadoran insurgents, in the light of
developments since 1982. It examines Havana's ad-
justments to subsequent setbacks and pressures-such
as the US military intervention in Grenada-and
explores the motives behind Cuba's professed willing-
ness to negotiate a political solution to the Central
American problem. Finally, it speculates on likely
future actions by Havana in both Nicaragua and El
Salvador, and assesses the implications for the United
States.F---]
In our judgment, Castro has been forced temporarily
to set aside his goals of revolutionary upheaval in
Central America as the political, military, and eco-
nomic climate has turned against him. The US inva-
sion of Grenada, the strong public support in the
United States for that operation, and the lack of a
firm Soviet response to the US action underscored to
Cuban leaders Washington's willingness and unchal-
lenged capability to use force successfully to protect
its interests in the area. Moreover, the growth of the
anti-Sandinista insurgency in Nicaragua and the
shifts in the political and military balance in El
Salvador and Guatemala in favor of US allies since
1982 have made it more risky for Castro to push
revolution in Central America. In weighing his policy
options, moreover, Castro has appeared increasingly
concerned about the possibility of US military inter-
vention in the region and even an attack on Cuba
itself.)
The Impact of Grenada
In our opinion, the US intervention in Grenada and
the large US military exercises held in the region over
the past three years, more than any other factors,
have convinced Castro that caution must be the
mainstay of his policy in Central America if he is to
avoid a showdown with the United States.
After the invasion, senior Cuban officials
publicly a mitted that Grer
their interests in the region.
Since the Grenada intervention, Cuban officials have
expressed publicly particular concern about Washing-
ton's ability to act forcefully against a Cuban ally
without significant domestic opposition in the United
States. Support in the United States for the Grenada
action, in our view, caused Castro temporarily to lose
confidence in his ability to use his propaganda appa-
ratus and public relations skills to manipulate public
sentiment in the United States against Washington's
policies. For example, his public declarations immedi-
ately after the events in Grenada were marked by
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The Castro regime is clearly on record that its long-
term goal in Central America is the replacement of
pro-US governments with radical revolutionary re-
gimes hostile to Washington and dependent on Cuba
for ideological guidance and inspiration.
far more sophisticated and selective approach that,
since the late 1970s, has made Central America the
Indeed,
throughout the 26-year history of the Cuban revolu-
tion, its leaders have made no secret of their convic-
tion that Latin American countries will eventually
follow Cuba's revolutionary example. Moreover, the
historical record shows that Havana has actively
supported radical leftist efforts to overthrow regimes
in such disparate countries as Argentina, Nicaragua,
Bolivia, El Salvador, and Venezuela. Cuba's almost
indiscriminate meddling in its neighbors' internal
affairs during the 1960s, however, has given way to a
fulcrum of Cuban revolutionary activism.
Cuba has
Central America.
concentrated its efforts on uniting, training, and
supplying regional leftist movements to:
? Support the new regime in Nicaragua.
? Intensify the armed struggle, especially in El
Salvador.
? Prepare the way for violent change elsewhere in
Consolidating Sandinista Rule in Nicaragua
the survival of the Sandi-
25X1 nista regime in Nicaragua is Cuba's highest priority
in Central America. The two countries are linked by
a mutual defense treaty,
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as well as by strong political and
radical revolutionaries in Latin America.
fields. Havana remains the predominant foreign in-
fluence on Nicaragua and has acted as broker be-
tween Managua and the Soviet Bloc to ensure the
flow of Communist economic and military assistance
to the Sandinista regime. Furthermore, the Sandinis-
ta revolution represents Cuba's most successful
achievement in more than two decades of support to
ideological ties. Thousands of Cuban technicians and
advisory personnel have served in Nicaragua since
1979, and several thousand Nicaraguans have been
trained in Cuba in a variety of civilian and military
25X1 Havana's main goal in Nicaragua, in our judgment,
is to help the Sandinistas develop the institutional
bases for a politically stable and militarily strong
Marxist-Leninist state. Cuban assistance thus far has
focused on the development of the Sandinista mili-
tary and security services, the militia, and other mass
organizations as instruments of social control and
regimentation typical of a totalitarian regime. Cuba's
actions also show that, as a related goal, it wants to
use Nicaraguan territory as a secure base for sup-
porting other Central American revolutionaries.
The presence in Nicaragua,
]of two highly regar a senior
Cuban military officers-Generals Ochoa and Esca-
lante-to coordinate Havana's assistance to the San-
dinista armed forces and the Salvadoran guerrillas
demonstrates the depth of Castro's commitment to
strengthen the regime in Managua and to use Nicara-
gua as a springboard for regional revolution. Ochoa
played a major role in Havana's military interven-
tions in Angola and Ethiopia and is one of only two
men in Cuba-the other being General Abelardo
Colome-to be declared a "national hero. "
Promoting Violent Revolution Elsewhere
In our judgment, Havana regards its main efforts in
Central America-consolidation of the Sandinista
regime and export of the revolution-as complemen-
tary. Cuban and Nicaraguan leaders share the belief
that, in a region dominated by the United States, the
ability of revolutionary governments to resist foreign
pressures is linked to the fortunes of revolutionary
movements in neighboring countries. From their point
of view, therefore, the defeat of the Salvadoran-or
Guatemalan-insurgents would threaten Managua
by increasing its ideological isolation and encourage
its more conservative neighbors and the United States
to destroy the Nicaraguan revolution. This siege
mentality is underscored by the Sandinistas' private
description of the Salvadoran insurgents as "our
shield, " and by Havana's doctrine of "internationa-
lism'-the right and duty to render aid to wars of
national liberation-which is enshrined in the Cuban
Constitution.
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personal invectives against US leaders and reflected,
in our opinion, his profound bitterness over the set-
back he had suffered and frustration over his inability
to retaliate with anything more than words.F__1
Although showing verbal defiance, Castro reacted
with considerable caution and defensiveness to Grena-
da. at the time of the
intervention m rena a that Havana and Managua
genuinely expected an imminent invasion of Nicara-
gua by US or proxy forces.
Despite the atmosphere of panic in Nicara-
gua, Castro publicly warned the Sandinistas that he
would be unable to send reinforcements if the United
States attacked. Castro's warning under such circum-
stances was remarkable in that it undercut Cuba's
commitment to fulfill its obligations under the mutual
defense pact that, links
the two countries, and risked being perceived by
Washington as a sign of weakness.
25X1 Castro's concern about a possible US attack also was
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reflected, we believe, in his decision to change the
composition of the Cuban "internationalist" corps in
Nicaragua. Shortly after Grenada, Havana withdrew
most Cuban women and all children from Nicaragua,
and gradually replaced older Cuban males there with
younger men with prior mi
Castro,
ful US response.
litary training,
direct orders to these younger Cubans to defend
themselves if attacked by hostile forces. This appar-
ently was as far as Castro felt he could go in
reassuring the Sandinistas without provoking a force-
Soviet Caution
We believe the Soviet Union's unwillingness to be
drawn into a major confrontation with Washington
over Central America and the Caribbean is a key
factor limiting Cuba's policy options in the area. For
Castro, Moscow's inaction during the demise of the
Grenadian revolution and Cuba's inability to rein-
force militarily its personnel already on Grenada
underscored the geopolitical realities behind the lack
of a firm Soviet commitment to defend Cuba. The
episode almost certainly reinforced his sense of vul-
nerability to a US attack. In public statements after
the invasion,
Castro has touched repeatedly
on Havana's understanding that it cannot count on
direct Soviet military support in the event of Cuban-
US hostilities.
25X1
The Soviets, in fact, have directly warned the Cubans
to move cautiously in Central America
Soviet pressure on Cuba to
avoid a showdown with the United States has worried
Castro and forced him to moderate his revolutionary
activities in Central America.
Moreover, recent Soviet pressure on Cuba to improve
its economic performance apparently has led to a
resurgence of the influence of those individuals in the
Cuban leadership who traditionally have argued for
pragmatic policies on both the domestic and interna-
tional fronts.' Although these pragmatists-such as
Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez-are known
to share the same revolutionary goals and deep antip-
athy toward the United States as the ideologues in the
leadership, they have shown themselves to be more
attuned to Moscow's interests and to have a prefer-
ence for nonconfrontational tactics. Because they are
responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the
Cuban economy, we believe their growing influence
may precipitate a reordering of priorities toward
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better economic relations with the West, and thus to
reduce temporarily Cuba's support for violent revolu-
tion abroad.)
25X1 The Insurgency in Nicaragua
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The anti-Sandinista insurgency has continued to grow
since 1982 despite Managua's increased efforts-with
Cuban support-to suppress it. As a result, we believe
that Havana's concern about the stability of the
Nicaraguan regime and Washington's intentions to-
ward it has risen accordingly. Since 1981, the rebels
have grown from a ragtag band of some 500 men,
largely former members of President Somoza's Na-
tional Guard, to a guerrilla army of about 18,000,
comprising mostly peasants, Indians, and ex-
Sandinista supporters. Over the last three years, the
guerrillas have made substantial military progress,
inflicting thousands of casualties on the regime's
troops and significant economic damage,
teams play an active advisory role in the counterinsur-
gency effort. Cubans pilot some of Nicaragua's MI-8
helicopters in combat areas and accompany MI-24
helicopter gunship crews on training missions, for
We estimate,
based on the number of active Sandinista counterin-
surgency battalions, that as many as 100 advisers are
located in zones of substantial fighting.
Shifts in El Salvador
In our judgment, the declining fortunes of Cuban-
supported rebels in El Salvador have also caused
Castro to moderate his Central American policies.
Even before the Grenada setback, Havana apparently
had realized that the struggle in El Salvador would be
a long-term affair.
Although the largest of the
rebel groups apparently has had to scale back objec-
tives and adopt new tactics to conserve resources, we
believe it has adapted relatively well to the US
military aid cutoff; it apparently has raised substan-
tial funds from private sources, and has received
greater cooperation from Honduras and Guatemala.
Moreover, we estimate that its ranks have been
increased over the past year by several thousand
recruits.)
progress to-
ward a more open political system in El Salvador
following the 1982 and 1984 elections and the grow-
ing capabilities of the Salvadoran armed forces-
largely through US assistance-have further reduced
Cuban expectations for the near term.
We believe that the insurgency's persistence and
growth have been key factors in shaping Cuban and
Sandinista objectives and strategy in the Contadora
negotiations, as well as in forcing Havana to devote
greater resources to Nicaragua. The Cubans almost
certainly view the insurgency as the clearest expres-
sion of US determination to undermine the Sandinis-
tas and prevent the consolidation of a Marxist-
Leninist regime in Nicaragua.F_~
with the anti-Sandinistas,
Havana's concern was underscored in early 1983 with
the assignment of a prestigious Cuban army officer
with extensive experience in Angola and Ethiopia,
Division General Arnaldo Ochoa, as chief of the
approximately 2,500 to 3,500 Cuban military person-
nel in Nicaragua. In addition, although no Cuban
military units appear to be directly engaged in combat
military advisers and training
armed forces' increasingly successful use of US-
supplied airpower to hit the rebels in recent months
has dashed Cuban hopes that the insurgents would be
able to improve significantly their military position in
the short term.
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How Far Would Castro Go To Protect
the Sandinistas?
We believe the Cubans would be unwilling to rein-
force the Sandinistas with combat troops in the event
of a US military attack on Nicaragua. Castro recog-
nizes that the United States has an overwhelming
advantage on the sea and in the air, and is unlikely to
waste Cuban resources challenging such superiority
once a US attack on Nicaragua has begun.
Cuba would be unable to protect its supply lines to
Nicaragua in the face of US'military intervention.
Castro openly admitted as much shortly after the
invasion of Grenada, when he warned the Sandinistas
that Cuba would be just as helpless to assist them
militarily if the US intervenes in Nicaragua as it was
in the Grenada intervention. In our opinion, Castro
has written off any plans to introduce a large Cuban
military contingent into Nicaragua in the event of a
US intervention.
This, however, does not preclude a military role for
Cuba in Nicaragua's defense during a US attack. We
believe Castro has every intention of using the Cuban
military personnel and civilian advisers now in Nica-
ragua to make any US intervention as costly as
possible. He probably calculates that such a conflict
would be bloody enough to discourage Washington
from ordering an assault on Cuba itself There are
enough Cuban military personnel and civilian advis-
ers capable of immediate military mobilization al-
ready present in Nicaragua to stiffen Sandinista
d enses sign ificantly.
anesi-
mated 2,500 to 3,500 Cuban mi itary personnel are
attached to the Nicaraguan armed forces and securi-
ty services, and some 3,500 to 4,000 Cuban civilians
are involved in construction, health, and other activi-
ties. The civilians have been armed, and most have
undergone military training,
Nicaragua already have been assigned to Sandinista
Army units in the event of major hostilities. Havana
probably considers these personnel an expendable
force, and they are likely to receive only token
reinforcements, if any.
We do not believe the Cubans would commit a large
number of troops to help the Sandinistas crush
genuine and widespread popular resistance in Nicara-
gua. We believe, however, that they might undertake
the more limited objective of protecting key cities and
installations with some combat units while Sandinis-
ta armed forces bear the burden of combat against
large insurgent forces. Havana, in our opinion, would
accept such a role only if there were a cowed popula-
tion and no widespread civilian resistance such as
street demonstrations and labor strikes.
We believe that Castro would adopt a more aggres-
sive course of action if, for example, he were con-
vinced beyond all doubt that US intervention in
Nicaragua was merely a prelude to an attack on
Cuba itself. In this scenario, Castro might be willing
to make a major commitment of Cuban military
forces to Nicaragua before US attacks began in hopes
that the decisive battles would be fought there rather
than on Cuban soil, and that he would have time to
generate international pressure on Washington from
Latin America and Europe.
Longer Term Prospects in Guatemala
In Guatemala as well, Havana has few reasons to be
optimistic about the pace of Cuban-supported insur-
gency. After a period of growth and increased effec-
tiveness between 1979 and 1982, the insurgents were
dealt a series of political and military setbacks by
government forces from which they have not been
able to recover. Since 1982, the government has
forced the rebels into a reactive and defensive posture
by expanding the deployment of small military units,
forming large civilian militia forces, and emphasizing
psychological operations. We estimate,
that fighting and amnesty programs
have cut insurgent strength from over 3,000 to be-
tween 1,500 to 2,000 in the past three years.
or,
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uban
officials believe the Guatemalan Army's tactics are
isolating the rebels from the rural population and
thereby complicating their ability to obtain recruits,
Since 1982, it has become clear that Cuba has shifted
toward less openly confrontational policies in Central
America, in hopes of forestalling US military activi-
ties in the region and reducing the risk of an armed
confrontation with Washington. These new tactics
include:
? A propaganda campaign aimed at projecting an
image of flexibility and moderation in contrast to
Washington's alleged intransigence. A favorite ploy,
for example, is Castro's use of personal diplomacy to
impress Western visitors with his sincerity, states-
manship, and reasonableness.
? Support for the Contadora initiative, despite indica-
tions of continuing Cuban misgivings regarding
some limitations it imposes on Nicaragua's domestic
affairs, such as proposals for democratization and
national reconciliation, and its failure to address El
Salvador's internal situation.
negotiated settlement.
? Advising the Salvadoran insurgents to support a
the hemisphere.
? Courting South American nations, and inducing
them to upgrade political, commercial, and cultural
relations with Cuba to reduce Havana's isolation in
25X1 The Push for Negotiations
We believe that Cuba's shrinking policy options in
Central America as a result of US military muscle
flexing, Soviet caution, and setbacks in El Salvador
and Guatemala have caused Castro to refocus his
policies from the battlefield to the political arena. In
our view, Castro is looking to a negotiated settlement
as a way of reducing pressures on the Sandinistas and
preventing a complete reversal of revolutionary gains
in El Salvador. In the past, Castro has viewed talks
only as a means of gaining a propaganda advantage.
Now, however, he seems to realize that a negotiated
agreement is necessary if he is to attempt to halt
current trends in the region, which, according to the
US Interests Section in Havana, he believes favor the
United States.
On several occasions during the past few months,
Cuban officials have expressed pessimism about de-
velopments in Central America. These officials have
stated in private that Washington holds the initiative
in the region and that events "are going the Ameri-
cans' way," according to the US Interests Section in
Havana. Consequently, Havana now appears more
willing to support the Contadora initiative, despite
some misgivings over the proposed treaty provisions
calling for democratization. This support indicates, in
our view, that Cuba is seeking more than propaganda
points and would like to see a settlement reached that
would eliminate all foreign support for the anti-
Sandinista rebels and reduce US military aid to El
Salvador.
Castro, in our opinion, has concluded that the Conta-
dora pact offers him the best short-term defense
against US activities in the region and one that would
require him to offer few significant concessions. Al-
though Castro has given verbal backing to the region-
al peace process since its inception in 1982, he
previously insisted that, before Cuba would honor a
Contadora pact, it had to be supported not only by
Nicaragua but also by the Salvadoran and Guatema-
lan insurgents, as well as the Communist parties and
leftist groups of both Honduras and Costa Rica. Such
a broad formula gave Havana latitude to renege on its
pledge of support and avoid any serious commitment
to abide by a possible treaty. In what seems to be a
major departure from supporting the negotiating pro-
cess for propaganda purposes while simultaneously
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obstructing the possibility of an actual agreement, the
Cubans and Nicaraguans have accepted the draft
submitted by the Contadora sponsors last September.
In our judgment, a negotiated settlement under Con-
tadora-the only initiative with any serious chance of
agreement at this time-would give the Cubans a
considerable advantage. It probably would allow Ha-
vana to make some progress toward achieving two
minimum goals:
To preserve the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The
settlement would end all significant foreign support
for the anti-Sandinista guerrillas and, from Havana's
perspective, reduce or eliminate the likelihood of a US
military intervention in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas
would then be able to roll back the insurgents and
proceed at their own pace to consolidate the institu-
tional bases for a Marxist-Leninist state.' The Cubans
almost certainly are concerned that in the absence of
a negotiated settlement the Reagan administration
will resort to other measures to maintain or increase
military pressure on Managua, even direct US mili-
tary action. Moreover, Havana's uncertainty about
US moves is compounded by the US administration's
recent success in obtaining Congressional approval for
nonmilitary funds for the rebels and by press reports
about increasing disillusionment with the Sandinista
regime among US legislators. Castro publicly admit-
ted such concerns earlier this year, when he termed
Washington's future policy "an enigma."F--]
To reduce US military assistance to the Salvadoran
Government. The Cubans believe,
that US military aid is the main
reason the rebels have lost momentum in the battle-
field. Although a reduction of US support probably
would not take place immediately upon signing of the
Contadora formula-the treaty draft calls for a 90-
day arms freeze beginning 30 days after signing-the
pact includes provisions that would limit the size,
composition, and weaponry of the region's military
establishments; end the involvement of foreign mili-
tary advisers; and put a cap on foreign military
assistance. Such limitations, at a minimum, probably
lor" 1 - -- - - L-
Fidel Castro looks on at Daniel Ortega's presi-
dential inauguration in Managua, 10 January
would slow the growth of the Salvadoran armed
forces' capabilities and give the insurgents a chance to
recover gradually the initiative on the battlefield.
The treaty also might affect the external arms flow to
the guerrillas. The Cubans probably hope, however,
that the rebels would be able to capture more of their
weapons and ammunition from government forces,
and reduce their munitions expenditures by avoiding
major clashes with the Army, concentrating instead
on small ambushes, sabotage, kidnaping, and political
penetration of parties and labor unions.
In any case, Havana has acknowledged that current
interdiction efforts by the United States and its allies
already have made rebel logistic operations increas-
ingly difficult, and
resupply difficulties have forced
Cuba and Nicaragua to reduce the arms flow to the
Salvadoran insurgents.
25X1
25X1
We believe that under the present conditions-that is,
fluctuating prospects for the insurgents in Nicaragua,
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Would Cuba Sacrifice the Salvadoran Insurgents for
the Sake of Nicaragua?
concession.
We believe that from the Castro regime's point of
view the rebels in El Salvador would become expend-
able if this were necessary to preserve Sandinista rule
in Nicaragua. in October
1983 that Havana had informed the Salvadoran
guerrillas that its assistance would be curtailed
because increasing problems in Nicaragua had com-
pelled the Cubans to allocate greater resources to the
Sandinistas. Although we realize that Havana may
have intended its warning primarily to encourage the
rebels to conserve their resources or as an incentive
for greater unity among the various guerrilla fac-
tions, its position clearly shows the order of Cuban
priorities. If conditions were such that Havana had to
make a clear-cut choice, and if such a sacrifice would
guarantee the consolidation of Sandinista rule in
Nicaragua, we believe Cuba would view the fate of
the insurgency in El Salvador as a necessary tactical
25X1 It seems to us, however, that Cuba views its aid to the
insurgents as complementary to its support of the
regime in Managua. From their perspective, the
defeat of the Salvadoran rebels would be detrimental
to the security of the Sandinistas and increase their
isolation in the region. In addition, Castro probably
would calculate that his suspension of support for the
Salvadorans need only be temporary until the danger
to Nicaragua dissipated.F--]
declining fortunes for the rebels in El Salvador, and
uncertainty about Washington's next moves against
the Sandinistas-Cuba will continue to focus on
achieving a negotiated settlement under Contadora
auspices. To that end, Havana probably will go along
with the objectives of the Core Four countries-Costa
Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala-for
strict verification of treaty provisions. Havana almost
certainly realizes that any verification mechanism,
while able to monitor the activities of the United
States and its allies, would encounter considerable
difficulties in detecting Cuba's and Nicaragua's non-
compliance with treaty provisions because of the
Presidents Castro and Ortega at ceremony inau-
gurating Csugar mill in Nicara-
gua, 11 January 1985. Cuban-financed
clandestine nature of many of their actions, particu-
larly support for insurgents, and the ease with which
Castro and the Sandinistas can conceal the presence
of Cuban military advisers in Nicaragua.
Moreover, the verification proposals submitted by the
Core Four countries do not include a mechanism to
inspect the dismantling of guerrilla training camps in
Cuba. Furthermore, we believe it would be practically
impossible to verify that Cuba and other Communist
countries have ended financial support to leftist rebel
forces in the region. Although verification almost
certainly would require the withdrawal of at least a
substantial number of Cuban military advisers from
Nicaragua, Havana probably calculates that any con-
sequent deterioration in Sandinista military capabili-
ties would be balanced by a decline in the Nicaraguan
insurgents' ability to sustain themselves without for-
eign support. Consequently, the Cubans are likely to
urge the Sandinistas to moderate their opposition to
verification provisions in the treaty, but we expect
them to try to ensure that restrictions on US military
aid to El Salvador are not diluted.
In our judgment, Havana will press the Contadora
sponsors and other Western countries to support
negotiations between the government and the insur-
gents in El Salvador. The Cubans probably expect
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Preparing the Ground for Revolution in Honduras
and Costa Rica
We believe the Cubans have also earmarked Hondu-
ras and Costa Rica for violent revolution. Havana,
however, probably realizes that present conditions in
these two countries-a weak and factionalized radi-
cal left in Honduras and strong democratic traditions
in Costa Rica-do not favor armed struggle. The
thrust of Cuba's strategy, therefore, has been to
weaken Honduran and Costa Rican support for US
policies against Managua and the Salvadoran insur-
gents while laying the long-term-groundwork for
eventual guerrilla warfare.
Nicaragua
With Cuban support, several hundred Costa Rican
and Honduran leftists are fighting alongside the
Sandinista Army against the antiregime guerrillas in
Salvador and complicate US efforts to continue pro-
viding military and economic assistance to the govern-
ment.
however, the Cubans
believe that the Salvadoran rebels must regain some
military and political momentum before sufficient
international pressure for negotiations can be mobi-
lized. Cuba, therefore, probably will urge the guerril-
las to enhance their credibility and enter new rounds
of talks from a position of strength by increasing
attacks against low-risk, high-visibilit tar ets and
bringing the war closer to the capital.
Paralleling Cuba's efforts to support Contadora-
which, from Castro's point of view, must remain
relatively low-key so as not to give the appearance of
undue anxiety and weakness-Havana probably will
continue a broad range of propaganda activities to
enhance its international image. In our view, Castro's
personal diplomacy will play a major role in this
effort, including more invitations for leading foreign
figures to visit Cuba and possibly trips by Castro to
Western Europe and Latin America. Castro probably
hopes to influence lawmakers, journalists, and reli-
gious leaders in the United States and some allied
countries, in hopes of inducing the United States to
moderate its Central American policies.
The Cubans and the Sandinistas also will continue
efforts to exploit doubts among Central American
countries-especially Honduras, Costa Rica, and to a
lesser extent Guatemala-about the reliability of the
United States as an ally. In doing so, Havana and
Managua hope that Honduras, Costa Rica, and Gua-
temala will adopt a neutral position regarding the
Castro probably calculates that these combatants
25X1 will form the nucleus of an insurgent movement when
conditions are more favorable in their own countries.
internal conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador. On
that Contadora and other international pressure may
help move the Salvadoran Government to make some
concessions to the left that could either provoke a
rightwing reaction against President Duarte or, less
likely, result in a power-sharing arrangement that
would eventually lead to leftist domination of the
government. A rightwing reaction in the form of a
coup or a resurgence of death squad activities would
be likely to turn international opinion against San
several occasions during the past few years, Havana
has requested private meetings of Cuban and Hondu-
ran officials to sow dissension and reinforce fears in
Tegucigalpa that Washington's attention to Central
American developments would eventually fade. Hon-
duras would then be left alone to face a powerful
Marxist-Leninist Nicaragua and a victorious revolu-
tionary movement in El Salvador, according to Cuban
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Cuban tactics in Central America, in our judgment,
are largely determined by the volatile security situa-
tions in Nicaragua and El Salvador, as well as by
Havana's perception of likely US responses to such
changing situations and Havana's own moves. We
have selected three alternative security scenarios in
the absence of a regional settlement, and speculate on
Cuba's likely responses to them. We are assuming in
these scenarios that Havana's perception of US will-
ingness to use military force to prevent a rebel
takeover in El Salvador and increase pressure on the
Sandinistas-a key factor in determining Cuba's
choice of tactics-remains high. If that perception
diminishes, in our opinion, Cuban responses to the
following scenarios would, in our view, be generally
more aggressiveF_-]
Insurgents Make Gains in Both Nicaragua and El
Salvador. In such a scenario, Castro probably would
increase-covertly and modestly-the number of Cu-
ban military advisers in Nicaragua to help the Sandi-
nistas deal with the insurgents. We believe he would
be particularly concerned, however, that rebel ad-
vances in El Salvador not provoke a US military
intervention in that country. Consequently, he would
take advantage of the Salvadoran situation to mobi-
lize international opinion for a negotiated settlement
in El Salvador that would give the rebels a role in the
government, while trying to deflect pressure for paral-
lel negotiations between the Sandinistas and their
armed opposition. He would claim that negotiations
in El Salvador are necessary to avert both a collapse
of the Salvadoran armed forces and consequent US
intervention. Castro might counsel the Sandinistas to
negotiate with their opponents as a last resort if the
regime was unable to stem insurgent advances, and if
such a move appeared likely to improve the chances
for a settlement in El Salvador favorable to the
rebels.F__1
propaganda efforts aimed at Tegucigalpa. We believe
that Costa Rica's official stand of neutrality toward
regional conflicts is partly intended as a hedge against
possible US failure to prevent the consolidation of a
Communist regime in Nicaragua, and that Castro is
Uhe failed to get negotiations going in El Salvador
and Salvadoran rebel operations threatened to rout
government forces and provoke a US intervention,
Castro could be faced with the dilemma of trying to
restrain the insurgents at a time when their increasing
strength made them less susceptible to his influence.
If Castro became convinced that the situation in El
Salvador was leading to US intervention there, he
might send a small number of Cuban combat units to
Nicaragua in hopes of reassuring the Sandinistas and
making a US attack on Nicaragua as costly as
possible for Washington. He might calculate that
high US casualties in Nicaragua would cause Wash-
ington to think twice before following with an attack
on Cuba.
Prospects for the Nicaraguan Insurgents Decline
While the Salvadoran Rebels Make Gains. This
scenario, although representing a significant advance
in the achievement of Cuba's goals in Central
America, is one in which Castro probably would
likely perceive the danger of direct US military
intervention to be the greatest-in El Salvador be-
cause of rebel advances and in Nicaragua because US
options to press the Sandinistas would narrow with
the insurgents' waning prospects. Castro probably
would use all the resources at his disposal to mount a
major public relations and diplomatic campaign in
favor of a negotiated regional settlement to stabilize
a situation favorable to the Sandinistas and the
Salvadoran guerrillas. If he thought that the likeli-
hood of US intervention were high, he might privately
call on the rebels in El Salvador to declare a cease-
fire to enhance the chances for negotiations.
In Nicaragua, we believe the Cubans would urge
moderation and even some temporary unilateral con-
cessions-such as restoring press freedom and closing
likely to try to exploit such sentiments in San Jose. In
our view, Havana's flaunting of its immigration
agreement with the United States reached last De-
cember was in part an effort to strengthen the
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the Salvadoran communications command facility in
Managua-to preempt a US attack. Havana proba-
bly would refrain from sending more advisers, com-
bat troops, or offensive weapons systems for fear of
further provoking Washington.0
Insurgents Make Gains in Nicaragua While Pros-
pects for the Salvadoran Rebels Decline. Under this
scenario, Havana probably would pursue the negotia-
tions route forcefully and might urge its allies in the
region to offer substantial concessions if their posi-
tions deteriorated drastically. For example, Cuba
might urge the Sandinistas to negotiate with their
armed opponents and offer them a role in the govern-
ment and the armed forces. The Cubans might press
the Salvadoran insurgents to declare a cease-fire and
temper their demands for power sharing. F-1
If concessions failed to bring about a negotiated
settlement, Castro probably would conclude that the
United States was not serious about negotiating,
short of a total surrender by Cuba and its revolution-
ary allies. Moreover, he might calculate that the
trends so favored the United States that a military
intervention by Washington was highly unlikely. Con-
sequently, he might resort to more aggressive tactics
to protect his interests in the region. He might ask
Salvadoran rebel leaders to transfer a substantial
number of their combatants to Nicaragua to assist
the Sandinistas while the remaining guerrillas in El
Salvador avoid direct combat and increase political
penetration and low-risk, highly visible terrorist ac-
tions to sustain the leftist cause until more favorable
conditions develop. Castro probably would intensify
efforts to mobilize Latin American leftists to join the
fighting in Nicaragua. He might also send a few
Cuban combat units to help the Sandinistas if he
thought they would make a difference in the battle-
field situation.=
Despite Havana's apparent desire to reach a negotiat-
ed settlement, we have no evidence that Castro is
ready to retreat on the fundamental issue of his
"right" to support revolutionaries in Central America.
Indeed, in view of Castro's continuing support for his
allies in the region, we judge that Cuba's push for a
negotiated agreement is a tactic aimed at preventing
the defeat of the Salvadoran insurgents, relieving
pressure on Nicaragua, and avoiding an armed con-
frontation with the United States that Havana and its
revolutionary allies cannot hope to win. We believe,
moreover, that any restraint the Cubans might agree
to in the context of negotiations would be temporary.
Castro's behavior over the years has demonstrated
that he is personally and ideologically committed to
the support of revolutions abroad as a matter of
general policy, and, in our judgment, he is highly
unlikely to give up what he regards as his moral duty.
Castro publicly rejected the possibility of Cuban
concessions across the board on this key issue in an
interview with editors of The Washington Post earlier
this year. l
Implications for the United States
We believe that the United States will continue to
face formidable Cuban competition for power and
influence in Central America at least as long as
Castro and his coterie of guerrilla veterans and "old
guard" Communist Party functionaries remain in
power. These individuals share a deep ideological and
emotional antipathy toward the United States, which
they justify even in geopolitical terms. Castro, for
example, stated in a recent public speech that, even if
the United States became "socialist," Cuban military
preparedness would remain high simply because of
the disparity of power between the two nations.
Moreover, the promotion of armed revolution is at the
core of Cuban Communist philosophy. This virtually
guarantees, in our judgment, that Havana's ultimate
goal of replacing pro-US governments in Central
America with revolutionary regimes hostile to the
United States will remain unchanged for the foresee-
able future.F__1
impression Castro is trying to create that Washington
would negotiate with Cuba behind the backs of US
allies.
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Nevertheless, Cuba's pursuit of its goals in the region
probably will continue to fluctuate in intensity, as US
policies and Castro's perception of US intentions
change. In our view, any relaxation of US pressure-
especially military-on Cuba and its regional allies
probably would make Castro more reluctant to mod-
erate his policies. Maintaining or increasing pressure
while leaving him a way out through mutual conces-
sions in negotiations, on the other hand, would add to
his sense of urgency, prompt him to be more judicious
in pursuing his goals, and make him more accommo-
dating in negotiations.F_~
Castro's position would undoubtedly harden if he
thought that inaction or concessions by him in the
face of mounting US pressures were being perceived
at home and abroad as an abandonment of his
revolutionary commitment. Above all, he does not
want to appear to be buckling under to US pressure.
If he believed there were no graceful way out, he
might dare the United States to intervene militarily in
Central America by increasing substantially his activ-
ities there in the expectation that US intervention
would poison relations between Washington and Latin
America for a long time to come and improve the
fortunes of leftist groups in the area. F_~
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