SYRIA: ASSAD`S GRIP ON POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00927R000100040005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
Directorate of
Intelligence
Syria:
Assad's Grip on Power
An Intelligence Assessment
NESA 83-10199
August 1983
Copy 3 2 4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
Syria:
Assad's Grip on Power
This paper was prepared by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis.
It was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 83-10199
August 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
aecreu
Syria:
Assad's Grip on Power 25X1
Key Judgments Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad's grip on power remains firm after 13
Information available years in office. We believe his security and intelligence forces, including
as of 11 August 1983 several elite units under the command of relatives or trusted confidants,
was used in this report.
constitute a formidable obstacle to any challenge. In our view, Assad has
shown both the determination and the capability to crush any threat to his
rule. Just as he uses brutal force to quell domestic dissent, he takes
uncompromising positions on foreign policy issues that he perceives could
threaten Alawite rule in Syria.
Assad's hardline position on Lebanon reflects, at least in part, a determina-
tion to maintain sufficient leverage with Beirut to prevent that neighboring
state from becoming closely linked to Israel or otherwise become a base for
his opponents. At least one of Assad's advisers has argued that continuing
Syrian intransigence risks a costly and destructive war with Israel, but we
believe Assad calculates he can accept the risks of conflict and control any
serious dissension in the regime.
There are recurring rivalries among Assad's senior advisers, but we believe
his inner circle remains loyal, and there is no obvious contender for power.
In our view, differences of view between the President and his brother,
Rifaat al-Assad, are largely calculated for domestic political purposes and
to achieve room to maneuver between the United States and the Soviet
Union. We know of no contender for power in Syria who would abandon
ties to the Soviets or enter the peace process without prior assurances that
Syrian interests, including the return of the Golan Heights, would be
served.
In our view, Assad's repressive style of rule, the loss of dynamism by the
Ba'th Party, widespread corruption, economic woes, and setbacks in
foreign policy head a growing list of regime liabilities that have sent its
popularity to an alltime low. Nevertheless, we believe Assad's centralized
control and his comparatively successful efforts to create a large group of
party and government workers dependent on the regime is an effective
substitute for a popular constituency.
The regime's continuing arrests of key opposition leaders and its harsh
suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood and other fundamentalist organi-
zations, in our view, have reduced most potential opponents to sullen
acquiescence. The diverse coalition of Assad's opponents based in Europe is
unlikely to attract widespread popular support inside Syria. Assad has
largely co-opted the Syrian political left.
iii Secret
NESA 83-10199
August 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
We believe Assad would be most vulnerable to a coup from within his own
Alawite community, disrupting his hold on the key instruments of power.
Assad, however, relies on Alawite fears of retribution from the majority
Sunni Muslims. In our judgment, the Alawite elite continues to regard
Assad as its best hope for retaining preeminence in Syria, and the wider
Alawite community still supports him for the measurable benefits of
having one of its own in power.
Foreign support for Syrian dissidents has little impact on Assad's pros-
pects, in our view. Iraq and Jordan have provided safehaven and limited
support for Syrian opposition groups, but, in our judgment, Iraq's preoccu-
pation with the war with Iran and Jordanian fears of Syrian retaliation
make it less likely that either state would now attempt to provoke a
challenge to the regime. Moscow currently is deeply committed to Assad's
survival in power. We believe, however, that Moscow-through its training
program for Syrian officers-has gained some influence among potential
replacements for Assad, should he be ousted.
'Assad frequently adopts policies that run counter to US interests, but his
long tenure in office has proved him to be a calculating pragmatist. We be-
lieve many of his foreign policy decisions are determined by domestic and
international concerns that would confront any successor government. The
increasingly repressive character of his regime and Assad's numerous
liabilities reinforce his current inclination to look at most issues in terms of
regime survival and reduce his willingness to take a more flexible approach
to present US policy initiatives.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84S00927R000100040005-5
occ1 c a
Syria:
Assad's Grip on Power
President Assad's minority Alawite regime maintains
a firm grip on power in Syria, but the government's
popularity continues at a low ebb. Over the past five
years the sectarian character of the regime has
emerged as a key issue, and Assad's liabilities have
mounted. Academic observers note that the country's
majority Sunnis deeply resent being ruled by what
many of them regard as ill-bred Alawite peasants who
rely on indiscriminate repression to remain in power.
The sectarian split between Assad's ruling Alawite
minority and the Sunni Muslim majority has emerged
as a key issue dividing Syrian society. Assad's ap-
pointment of Alawites to most of the sensitive posi-
tions in his regime has fostered an only slightly
exaggerated perception in Syria that the nation is
exclusively ruled by Alawites,
The Alawites-Syria's Ruling Minority
Syria's ruling Alawites are sharply differentiated
from the Sunni majority by their religious doctrines,
low social status, and the geographic concentration of
their home areas.
Most Sunni Muslims regard Alawites as heretics
because the Alawites view Ali, the nephew and son-in-
law of Muhammad, as the incarnation of God. Assad
has made a concerted effort to minimize Sunni-
Alawite differences, but, in our view, critics of the
regime continue to focus on the sectarian issue.
Historically, limited educational opportunity and
exclusion from avenues of social mobility fueled a
vicious cycle of Sunni prejudice and discrimination
against the Alawite minority. French rule in Syria
provided Alawites with access to military careers,
however, and the rise of the secular-based Bath
Party afforded a means for political advancement.F
although some prominent
regime figures are Sunnis-including Defense Minis-
ter Mustafa Talas, Chief of Staff Hikmat Shihabi,
and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
Abd al-Halim Khaddam-the key military and secu-
rity advisers to the President are Alawites.
Longstanding social cleavages between urban and
rural sectors of the Syrian population aggravate Sunni
opposition to Alawite rule. Academic observers note
that Sunni urban merchants vehemently object to the
policies of Assad's rural-based regime. Long accus-
tomed to political and economic domination, the
Sunni urbanites have witnessed the funneling of de-
velopment funds to the provinces and a high rate of
migration from rural areas into the cities, where
Alawites crowd the job market and the universities
and dominate the top positions in government.
The Alawites, who constitute 10 to 13 percent of
Syria's 9.6 million people, have lived primarily in the
mountains of northwest Syria, a traditional refuge
from Sunni persecution.
With the rise to power in 1966 of Alawite strongman
Salah Jadid, the Alawites gained a prominence in
Syria far beyond their small number. Appointments
of Alawites to numerous government and Bath Party
positions, together with development policies targeted
at the regime's rural base of support, have enabled
the Alawite community to turn the tables on the
Sunni Muslim majority who once dominated Syrian
political and economic life.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84S00927R000100040005-5
25X1
25X1
,25X1
LOA I
25X1
25X1
LDAI
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Turkey
Aleppo
rt
Latakia . (firda ah, Jabal an Nusayriyah
Nuwayriyah Mountains)
Hamah' 'S y r i a
Mediterranean
Sea
Lkban n~
BEIRUT*~
*DAMASCUS UNDOF zone
~G N HflGHrS
(ls a6 occupied)
IsrTo
WfBRJordan
occupied-
o be determined)
Iraq?
0 75
Kilometers
34938 8-83
Over Assad's 13 years in office, the regime has lost
the dynamism of its first years, sapping its popularity.
Academic observers note that Assad's bureaucracy
has too many people telling other people how, when,
and where to do their jobs. Assad's closest advisers
remain in office year after year. We believe those who
advance owe their rise to loyalty to Assad rather than
to initiative or promise. According to US Embassy
reports, Assad's system of control without public
accountability has allowed corruption to become
widespread.
In our view, the oppressive hand of Assad's security
services and the absence of significant political free-
doms further weaken the regime's legitimacy. Europe-
an diplomats in Damascus report that the visibility of
armed security agents of the regime, together with
widespread awareness of the regime's brutal tactics in
dealing with the opposition, reinforce the popular
perception that the basis of the regime's power is its
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
13V%;1 CI
Academic observers note that Assad has failed to
achieve the goals set out by Damascus to justify its
intervention in Lebanon in 1976-the prevention of
the partition of Lebanon, the establishment of a
government favorable to Syria, and the creation of a
buffer against the Israeli threat to Syria from the
west. Syrian relations with Iraq and Jordan remain
hostile, while Damascus has put distance between
itself and the Arab majority by strengthening ties to
Khomeini's Iran. Despite pretensions to Arab leader-
monopoly on force. The rubberstamp role of the
Syrian legislature, the People's Assembly, government
domination of the press, and bureaucratic regulations,
such as the requirement of exit visas for anyone
wishing to leave the country, further limit the average
Syrian's limited political rights.
Syria's continuing economic woes compound the re-
gime's political problems, according to academic ob-
servers.
Syria's commercial sector is stagnant due to
the government's rigid control of trade and chronic
foreign exchange shortages.
few private individuals are
willing to invest in the country for fear the govern-
ment will take over a successful enterprise once it is
established. The industrial sector lacks effective mid-
dle management and shop floor supervision, and most
factories use outmoded East European technology.
Syrian Government statistics indicate that the agri-
cultural sector has expanded, but not rapidly enough
to keep pace with rapid population growth, and
Syria's imports of grain have escalated since 1975.
Inflation has put basic amenities, such as housing, out
of reach for many wage earners.
We believe foreign policy mishaps since the mid-
1970s have also contributed to mounting popular
dissatisfaction and the regime's isolation in the region.
ship, Syria, in our view, can count among its Arab
allies only Libya and South Yemen
The Syrian system of government is highly central-
ized. Under the 1973 constitution, Assad has author-
ity over the government machinery, the Cabinet, the
legislature, and the armed forces. He also has a strong
voice in the judicial process.I
Assad's control over Syrian decisionmaking is
strengthened by the informal mechanisms, hidden
from public view, through which he exercises power,
ssad governs
primarily through the unofficial group of trusted
advisers who are Alawites or confidants who have
proved themselves through long association with the
Rifaat Assad commands the heavily armed, predomi-
nantly Alawite force known as the Defense Compa-
nies, which has primary responsibility for ensuring
regime survival. In conjunction with a special antitank
unit known as the Struggle Companies commanded
25X1
L~DA"I
25X1
25X1
2 A11
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
Gen. Muhammad al-Khuli, head of Air Force
Intelligence and security adviser to President
by Adnan Assad, the President's nephew, the Rifaat
force assures the defense of the capital against the
frequent military coups that plagued Syrian politics in
the years prior to Assad's takeover in 1970. According
to US Embassy officials in Damascus, these elite units
are trained to protect key points in the city, such as
radio and communications stations, military and intel-
ligence headquarters, Ba'th Party institutions, and
key political and military figures in the event of
political rebellion, mob violence, or military coup
efforts.
Mobilizing Popular Support
property abroad
Assad's success in making a large sector of the
population dependent on the regime has been a substi-
tute for a strong popular constituency, according to
academic observers. Through maximizing government
employment, Assad has created a constituency of the
salaried middle class, workers, and peasants depend-
ent on the regime for work and benefits. Moreover,
according to US Embassy officers in Damascus, the
presence of a vigorous "second economy" has amelio-
rated the impact of the poor state of Syria's Govern-
ment-controlled economy, diminishing popular disaf-
fection with the regime. Individual middle class
Syrians, as well as entire villages, are thriving on
undeclared remittances from migrants to the Gulf or
investments in commercial, residential, or agricultural
Assad has pursued a more pragmatic course than his
Alawite predecessor, Salah Jadid, and his policies
have resulted in tangible gains for minorities, women,
peasants, and the urban poor, according to academic
observers. Living standards have been raised. Road,
telephone, water, sewage, and electric networks have
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
aecrer
been developed and improved throughout the country.
A recent academic study noted that education has
become widely available and illiteracy cut to less than
25 percent for adult men and to 55 percent for
observers note that Assad enjoyed a honeymoon with
the conservative Sunni community throughout the
first half of the decade. His moderate economic and
foreign policies were generally acceptable to the class
of urban traders who lead the Muslim community. 25X1
After 1975, however, the regime's mounting liabil-
ities, including its decision to intervene in Lebanon,
together with the emergence of more militant groups
within the Islamic opposition, sparked a resort to
women.
Assad's political vehicle, the Ba'th Party, has only
limited influence on government decisionmaking, but
we believe it buttresses the regime by controlling
popular participation in the discussion of government
policy. Academic observers note that the party appa-
ratus is composed of a series of assemblies to allow
expression of popular views to decisionmakers and
executive and specialized bureaus that explain and
implement government policies. These are linked to a
series of auxiliary organizations for peasants, workers,
youth, women, and professionals. A recent scholarly
study of the Ba'th Party estimated that the party has
about 100,000 members, but that, through its auxilia-
ries, it has organized about one-third of the popula-
tion. In the countryside, where the party's base is
widest, the typical Ba'th organization is made up of
educated village youth and peasants with small- or
medium-sized landholdings, according to the study.
We believe that in response to concern that the Ba'th
Party's utility in mobilizing popular support is declin-
ing, Assad has sanctioned efforts to explore possible
alternatives to the party. European diplomats in Da-
mascus report that the average Syrian's attitude
toward the Ba'th is disdainful acquiescence and that
the party has lost its dynamism to the point of
resembling a large government ministry.
violence
Beginning in 1976 Assad's opponents scored some
initial successes against the regime. According to the
dissident leaders' public claims, a militant faction of
the Muslim Brotherhood and other fundamentalist
organizations began a wave of bombings and assassi-
nations of prominent Alawites that continued through
1978. In June 1979 several dozen Alawite and Chris-
tian officer cadets were murdered in Aleppo. In June
1980 Assad himself was the target of a grenade attack
that killed one of his guards. By early 1981 govern-
ment spokesmen admitted to over 300 assassinations
of persons connected with the regime, and in August
1981 an explosion at the Prime Minister's office killed
a further score of people.
Opposition in Disarray
Longstanding opposition among the majority Sunni
Muslims to Alawite dominance and the avowed secu-
lar character of the regime has prompted periodic
outbreaks of violence since the mid-1970s. Academic
inhabitants into sullen submission]
Mass civil disorder has erupted twice since the late
1970s in major cities, although the disturbances did
not spread to Damascus, the key to power in Syria.
Throughout late 1979 and early 1980 various opposi-
tion groups coalesced in Aleppo to stage a series of
strikes and demonstrations that paralyzed the city,
according to diplomatic reports. Aleppo merchants
protesting price controls declared a general strike in 25X1
March 1980 that spread to other major provincial 25X1
towns. Various professional associations issued mani-
festos demanding an end to the regime's use of special
security courts, the release of political prisoners, and
basic civil liberties. The regime responded by using
troops to seal off Aleppo and gradually forcing the
We believe the watershed of Syrian opposition activity
occurred in February 1982, when an even bloodier
uprising began in Hamah, a city of 200,000 and a
stronghold of religious orthodoxy and opposition to
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
Destruction in the provincial
city of Hamah during the re-
gime's harsh suppression of the
popular uprising in February'
the regime. According to US Embassy reports, orga-
nized opposition attacks on government installations,
led by.a militant wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, led
to numerous deaths of security and Ba'th Party
officials. The regime used brutal tactics to suppress
the revolt, bringing up artillery to flatten opposition-
held quarters of the city, before launching a several
weeklong mopping up operation of shootings and
arrests. Estimates vary, but we believe as many as
10,000 civilians were killed
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
secret
Several groups opposing the Assad regime have at-
tempted a merger to overcome their losses at Hamah,
according to press and diplomatic reports, but we
believe the diversity of the organizations and individ-
uals involved sharply diminishes any threat they pose
to the regime. Exile leaders of the "National Alliance
for the Liberation of Syria"-including Adrian Saad
al-Din of the Muslim Brotherhood, Muhammad
Bayanuni of the Islamic Front, and formerly promi-
nent Syrian political leaders Amin al-Hafez and
Akram Hawrani-have held press conferences in
Europe denouncing the regime and outlining a liberal
platform for a new regime. In our judgment, the
Alliance is unlikely to attract widespread support
inside Syria.
Assad faces little threat from the Syrian left, accord-
ing to US diplomats in Damascus. Much of the
traditional left has been incorporated into the Ba'th
Party and its coalition-the National Progressive
Front-with the Communist Party, Ba'th socialist
offshoots, and remnants of Nasirist groups. The coali-
tion remains firmly under the control of Assad and his
Ba'th Party appointees.
The Communist Party of Syria, under Khalid Bak-
dash, supports Assad in exchange for limited freedom
of action and a share in the government's rewards for
loyalty.
powerless to challenge the regime
we believe
pressure from Assad's security services and the ab-
sence of coordination in their activities have left them
Foreign Involvement
In our view, foreign involvement is unlikely to affect
significantly the opposition's capability to challenge
the regime over the next several years. Iraq and
Jordan have long provided a haven and limited sup-
port for the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition
groups, but we believe Iraq's preoccupation with the
war with Iran and Jordanian fears of Syrian retalia-
tion diminish the current extent of their involvement
in Syrian internal affairs.
in our
judgment, Tel Aviv would be unlikely to seek an
overthrow of the Assad regime. Assad has prevented
terrorist operations against Israel across the Golan
Heights, and, despite Syria's inflexible position on
withdrawal from Lebanon, bamascus has not pursued
risky, confrontational tactics in the Bekaa Valley. In
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
addition, Syria's currently strained relations with Iraq
and Jordan diminish the potential threat to Israel of
the emergence of an eastern front.
Moscow's close relations with Assad, in our view,
virtually preclude Soviet involvement in support of
dissidents actively opposing the regime. In the event
of a coup that removes Assad from the scene, Soviet
training of Syrian military officers probably has
provided Moscow with some influence among poten-
tial replacements for Assad
In our judgment,
Soviet links to the Communist factions in Syria are
currently of little value but could be called into play
should Assad or a successor regime attempt to
strengthen Syrian ties to the West at the expense of
the USSR.
Threats to the Regime
The regime's intelligence and security apparatus poses
a deterrent to would-be coup plotters, but we believe it
cannot entirely eliminate the threat. Control of key
security points in Damascus by Assad's praetorian
guard means that a coup by a single brigade from
outside the city-a common occurrence in the
1950s-is no longer possible.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Assad's leadership of the Alawite community is po-
tentially open to challenge, in our view. Assad was
born into one of the smaller and less prestigious
Alawite tribal confederations-the Kalbiyah-and
must invest considerable resources in courting support
among powerful Alawite families.
We believe factions among the Alawites in the mili-
tary pose the principal potential threat to the regime.
At least two identifiable military factions have op-
posed Assad in the past. Supporters of his predecessor
Salah Jadid, currently in prison, and supporters of a
now deceased former Defense Minister, Muhammad
Umran, have been forced into quiescence by Assad's
repressive measures, but we believe there are continu-
ing rivalries in the military based on allegiances
formed during the power struggle among Assad,
Umran, and( Jadid during the 1960s.
Given Assad's ultimate authority over the decision-
making process, we believe factions in his inner circle
opposed to one of his policy decisions may decide their
only recourse is to remove Assad himself.
We cannot discount the possibility that Assad may be
removed by assassination or a palace coup, but in our
view, he has demonstrated both the ability and the
willingness to crush any open challenge to Alawite
rule in Syria. According to diplomatic observers,
brutal repression has neutralized the organized oppo-
sition and forced potential opponents into a morose
acquiescence to his rule. In our judgment, sporadic
bombings or assassination attempts on Alawite offi-
cials are likely to recur, but, over at least the next
few years, there is little likelihood of a successful,
organized popular movement to remove Assad from
power.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
OFMML
Despite the recurring rivalries among Assad's Alawite
advisers, we believe his inner circle remains loyal. We
also believe the Alawite elite currently regards Assad
as the best hope for maintaining Alawite preemi-
nence. Assad probably relies on Alawite fears of
retribution if the majority Sunni community returns
to power in Syria, and, in our view, key Alawite
leaders would have to believe Assad was seriously
endangering their future before they would move
against him.
US Embassy officers report that Assad continues to
enjoy popular support among the broader Alawite
community in northwest Syria. Local satisfaction with
having an Alawite in power and the measurable
benefits to the area from public expenditures give
Assad a strong base of support there.
Alawite community believe the Assad regime must
continue to demonstrate to Sunnis that the Alawites
will retain power at any cost.
The Soviet Angle
We believe the Soviets are strongly committed to
Assad's survival in power. Moscow probably fears
that Assad's demise could, in the worst case, lead to
the kind of protracted instability that characterized
Syrian politics before Assad's rise to power and
eventually to a strongly anti-Soviet regime based on
the Sunni Muslim opposition. This case would reduce
Damascus's ability to oppose US policies in the
Middle East and leave the USSR isolated with the
more radical Arab states. The Soviets probably are
also concerned that a successor to Assad might under-
take more risky policies in Lebanon and on the Golan
Heights
Soviet assistance to Syria provides Assad with limited
insurance against another military debacle that could
threaten his hold on power, as well as direct support to
his security forces. Soviet military deliveries over the
past year have replaced Syria's battlefield losses in
the conflict with Israel over Lebanon in 1982, and, in
our view, the SA-5s and related systems have substan-
tially upgraded Syrian air defense capabilities. In
addition to the Soviet combat forces manning the
SA-5s, Soviet advisers serve throughout the armed
forces-at the Ministry of Defense, major headquar-
ters and staffs, training facilities, and with many
operational units. Soviet weapons, including tanks, are
provided to the Rifaat force, the mainstay of Assad's
defense against a coup
In our view, Syria's ties to the Soviet Union neverthe-
less increase Assad's domestic liabilities. The in-
creased Soviet military presence risks inciting Assad's
conservative Islamic opponents at home and could
prompt a surge in antiregime terrorist activity, in part
directed at Soviet personnel and installations. In-
creased Soviet involvement in Syrian military opera-
tions decisionmaking also would be likely to lead to
frictions in the military and disputes with Moscow,
such as occurred between the Soviets and Egypt in the
In our judgment, domestic security concerns that
result from the extensive liabilities of the regime are a
key factor in Assad's foreign policy decisions affecting
US interests. We believe his determination to prevent
Israeli gains in Lebanon reflects in part a concern that
a government in Beirut less responsive to Syrian
interests would tolerate political activities by the
regime's opponents and make Lebanon a base for
operations threatening Assad's hold on power.
Similarly, in our view, Assad's determination to
establish Syria as the key to any progress in the
peace process bolsters Assad's claim to legitimacy as
an Arab leader, holds open the possibility of an
eventual foreign policy victory by regaining Syrian
lands-the Golan Heights-occupied by Israel, and
provides some assurance that Arab subsidies to ame-
liorate Syria's foreign exchange shortage will be
forthcoming
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
Assad has frequently taken a course that runs counter
to US interests, but his 13-year rule has shown him to
be a calculating pragmatist. Summing up Assad's
tenure in 1979, US diplomats in Damascus noted that
many of his policies had worked to US advantage and
in favor of stability in the area. Assad engaged the
leftist Palestinians, and then rightist Christians, in
Lebanon to suppress the civil war, he recognized
Resolution 338, which incorporated UN Resolution
242 and served as the basis for the Golan disengage-
ment agreement, and he opened Syria to the West and
the United States. Despite his hardline position on
withdrawal from Lebanon, Assad continues to demon-
strate a willingness to maintain a dialogue with
Washington.
We know of no contenders for power in Syria pre-
pared to abandon Syria's military ties with the Soviets
or willing to participate in the peace process without
greater assurances that Syrian interests would be
served. In our judgment, Rifaat Assad's occasional
differences of view with President Assad and his
allegedly pro-Western outlook are largely calculated.
Rifaat's reported differences with the President ap-
pear designed to broaden the regime's appeal to both
the right and left wings of the political spectrum and
to give the Assads some room for maneuver between
the United States and the Soviet Union. The reality is
that, in our view, Assad's rigid control over the
decisionmaking process provides an effective check
against any effort by either superpower to gain lever-
age by exploiting policy differences within the Presi=
dent's inner circle.
members of the regime-{
have privately expressed opposi-
tion to some of Assad's policies, including the Syrian
position on Lebanon. We believe Assad tolerates such
divergences of view but moves against dissidents if
they appear to threaten his primacy in decisionmak-
ing. In our view, unhappiness within the leadership
over Syria's involvement in Lebanon is not yet serious
enough to threaten Assad's hold on power or to
prompt alteration of that policy.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
It
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/03: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100040005-5