CHINA REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001100010057-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 57
• Publication Date: September 27, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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27 September 1977
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CHINA
27 September 1977
CONTENTS
An Old Story: Teng and the Premiership . . . . . . . . 1
Hsu Hsiang-chien Attacks "Warlordism." . . . . . . . . . 4
The Rocky Road Ahead for Chinese Education. . . . . . . 10
Problems in Agricultural Mechanization. . . . . . . . . 15
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authoritative CPSU Journal Spells Out
Moscow's Case Against Peking . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by
the East Asia/Pacific Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence.
Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the
individual articles.
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An Old Story: Teng and the Premiership
Many Chinese officials have assumed that when the
Fifth National People's Congress (NPC) meets this fall,
senior Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping will be named Premier,
a post he has actively
At 73, Teng is not too old by Chinese standards.
Chou En--lai served as Premier until his death at 77, and
top Chinese leaders often hold key posts well into their
80s. To the Chinese mind, Teng's age and experience make
him preferable to a younger man.
emier in a but name since his return last July. He
meets and holds talks with the more important foreign
visitors. He is actively involved in all aspects of
science, education, and economic modernization policy,
s a stake is the tip e e power and prestige
that go with it), not additional duties.
Moreover, Teng's personality is such that it is very
unlikely he regards himself as too old. Teng is a hard-
driving, take-charge type who tends to grab as much power
as he possibly can. He has moved quickly to consolidate
his influence since his return.
when he returned, he said
he came back to work, not to be an adviser.
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Teng has been
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A number of Politburo members, including Party Chair-
man Hua Kuo-feng, who were uneasy about Teng's rehabilita-
tion and sought to delay it, may be opposing his appoint-
ment as Premier. Teng is a vindictive man who in the past
has not hesitated to punish his opponents. Hua, Party
Vice Chairman Wang Tung-hsing, Peking party boss Wu Te,
Shenyang Military Region (MR) commander Li Te-sheng, and
Peking MR boss Chen Hsi-lien, all of whom have had differ-
ences with Teng, may believe themselves threatened if
Teng acquires yet another top title. He already is vice
Chairman of the party, Vice Premier, Chief of Staff of
the Army, and Vice Chairman of the Military Commission,
the party body that oversees the political loyalty of the
military.
If not Teng, then who will be Premier? Hua currently
holds the title. but he has not been performing most of
Among the most frequently men i n -
dates for the job other than Teng are Kwangtung party boss
Wei Kuo-ching, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, and party
apparatchik Ch Tpna-kuei, but none of them seems entirely
Li is only
three years younger t an eng, w i would seem to dis-
qualify him if the excuse of age is valid. Chi is young
and able, but he is not on the Standing Committee of the
Politburo.
The easiest short-term solution may be to allow Hua
to keep the title while Teng continues to act as de facto
Premier. This may be more acceptable to Teng than ap-
pointing a younger man like Chi, who could devote his
full energy to the job.
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l
Some top
military men apparent
y are being transferred. A few
ministries still do not have heads, and there may be
some openings in the provinces as well.
If there are serious disagreements over who will
fill these vacancies, the NPC may be delayed. During
the summer, Chinese were speculating that it would meet
before 1 October, national day, but speculation about
this date has stopped. Now Chinese are saying it will
meet before 1 January.
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Iisu Hsiang-chien Attacks "Warlordism"
The Hua regime is evidently still having some serious
political problems with the military.
In a long and authoritative article on 19 September,
Politburo member and Military Commission Vice Chairman
Hsu Hsiang-chien scolds unnamed military leaders for try-
ing to parlay their control of forces into unwarranted
and independent political influence. This, in Chinese
Communist terms, is "Warlordism." Hsu implies that fric-
tion between party and military authorities is interfer-
ing with. the efficient execution of policy decisions.
Hsu focuses on two kinds of problems that evidently
are troubling the army-party relationship. First, he
attacks certain political misbehavior which has been
pervasive for at least the past decade: "one-man rule,"
factionalism, and creation of "strongholds." He also
criticizes leaders who manipulate the party committees
within their military units by organizing "small groups"
who "discuss things behind the scenes." Second, Hsu
focuses on lapses of political discipline that were ap-
parently used by the military to good effect against the
"Gang of Four." These include "haggling" or negotiating
over orders, selective compliance with orders or willful
distortion of insturctions, and plain refusal to obey--
either through "duplicity" ("saying yes and meaning no")
or "sophistry" (disobedience rationalized on the pretext
of "resisting erroneous leadership").
The remedy Hsu prescribes is to revive strict party
discipline and enforce honesty and candor within the
party structure in the armed forces. He also repeats
Teng Hsiao-ping's call at last month's 11th Party Con-
gress for strict honesty in party life. Hsu notes that
an investigation of the "gang's" activities in the armed
forces is still going on and that "the individuals and
incidents" connected with the "gang" will be dealt with.
He warns that those who persist in the indiscipline of
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the past decade will be admonished, and if they continue
to be disobedient, "must be disciplined and must not be
tolerated."
Clearly, the Politburo would like to eliminate this
vestige of the Cultural Revolution. The techniques that
military leaders used to thwart the Leftists' efforts to
expand their influence in the armed forces now are avail-
able for other purposes. Although Hsu does not even hint
at who is using these tactics or for what purpose, there
may be some factional maneuvering around the question of
who should succeed Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying or
whether any successor should be chosen at this time. It
is also easy to imagine how military factionalism could
complicate and delay the military modernization program.
It is doubtful that Hua and his aging military "as-
sistants" on the Politburo will be able to force some
military men to become less political. Events of the
past decade, especially the circumstances that brought
Hua to power, have thrust Chinese generals into politics
to a degree unprecedented since the founding of the PRC.
The Chinese Army is the single most powerful interest
group, and the plea to follow party direction by the
aging and respected Hsu Hsiang-chien raises the inevitable
question of who in the next generation will have suffi-
cient stature in the eyes of the military to hold its
political activity in check.
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The Rocky Road Ahead for Chinese Education
Since the arrest of the "Gang of Four" in October
1976, there have been numerous indications pointing to-
ward major educational reforms. It is generally as-
sumed that these reforms, pragmatic steps to depoliti-
cize education and upgrade its academic content, will
undo the damage done by the leftist educational poli-
cies pursued since the Cultural Revolution. In the
long run, this assumption may be correct. But in the
short run, over the next five or 10 years, it may be
far too optimistic. It can be argued that the problems
facing Chinese education are so numerous and so great
that they will defy easy and fast solutions.
Among the most nagging of these problems are the
small number and poor ability of students. According
to the Ministry of Education, there are currently
584,000 students in Chinese universities. Although
this figure is probably higher than in any year since
the Cultural Revolution, it is far lower than the
820,000 university students before the Cultural Revolu-
tion and falls far short of meeting China's needs for
trained personnel, especially in the sciences. The
shortage, moreover, is even more severe than these
figures suggest. Between 1966 and 1970, all universi-
ties were closed, no students entered or graduated, and
the education of those in the midst of their college
careers was stopped. China thus lost at least four
years of university graduates.
Those students who have attended universities since
1970 have often had little aptitude for higher educa-
tion. Since university entrance exams were abolished,
students have been chosen on the basis of their politi-
cal reliability and work records rather than their
academic qualifications. In addition, because the
quality of education in primary and secondary schools
deteriorated after 1966, even capable students often
have been poorly trained and poorly prepared for col-
lege. Since all students, regardless of ability, are
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-equ:ired to spend at least two years working in the
countryside after graduating from middle school, most
require remedial work and refresher courses once they
return to school.
A second set of problems involves the inadequate
number and quality of teachers. During the Cultural
Revolution, many teachers were persecuted as members
of the intellectual class. Others were purged and
sent to work in the countryside. Still others left
their posts to escape the pressures placed on them.
After the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, many
teachers were still required to spend a large part of
their time away from the classroom, either working in
factories or on communes or attending political reedu-
cation classes. The result has been a shortage of
qualified teachers, particularly at the primary and
secondary levels. Moreover, since standards at teachers'
colleges also deteriorated after 1966, many younger
teachers are poorly trained and often ignorant of basic
knowledge in their fields. In some areas, junior mid-
dle school graduates have been assigned as teachers in
middle schools because teachers with higher qualifications
were unavailable. The problem has become so severe
that Chungshan University in Kwangtung Province was re-
cently obliged to set up a teacher training office to
teach young teachers basic theory in their fields.
A third problem is the weak and highly politicized
curriculum. For the most part, it is too short and
pays too little attention to academics to produce first-
rate graduates. After the universities reopened in
1970, courses of study were cut from 4 to 3 years in the
humanities and social sciences, from 5 to 4 years in the
sciences, and from 7 to 3 years in medicine. Graduate
programs were completely abolished. In undergraduate
courses, political courses were favored over academic
ones. Many important aspects of education--in particu-
lar, training in basic theory in the sciences--were
neglected in favor of subjects which had "practical"
value. In addition, students were required to spend
large portions of their academic careers working in
communes or factories. Exams were abolished, and stu-
dents were passed routinely from one level to the next
regardless of their performance or ability. All this
produced a graduate ill-suited to the country's needs:
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one who often lacked ability, was unable to reason, and
was ignorant of basic theory and often even basic knowl-
edge in his field.
There are also severe problems with discipline and
morale. Since the Cultural Revolution began, students
have been encouraged to stand up to and even rebel
against their teachers. Teachers and intellectuals in
general have been intimidated, not only by the conduct
of their students but by government persecution. Some
like the late Minister of Education, Chou Jung-hsin,
have even been driven to illness and death by the tre-
mendous pressures placed on them. As a result, many
intellectuals and educators have become timid and apa-
thetic, unwilling to take risks for fear that they
might be attacked or criticized. With such attitudes,
they are unlikely to move forcefully to carry out pro-
posed educational reforms.
The demoralization extends to students as well.
Middle school students wanting to attend college are
faced with the prospect of spending at least two years,
and sometimes a lifetime, working in the countryside.
Because selection for university education has been
based heavily on political and work records rather
than academic qualifications, few have any incentive to
work hard in school. The problem is compounded by the
shortage of prestigious jobs for middle school and uni-
versity graduates. Although China needs more highly
trained scientists, it also needs a large number of
low-level technicians to work in rural areas. Such
jobs--the majority of the positions available--are far
less attractive to young people than jobs in the cities.
Although problems with poor students, teachers,
and educational facilities are nationwide, they are
especially acute outside the major cities. The best
universities in China--Peking University, Tsinghua
University, and Futan University--are located in Peking
and Shanghai. So are the best research institutions,
to which students are often attached for training and
research experience. In order to upgrade education,
it will be necessary to develop first-rate research and
educational facilities in other parts of the country as
well.
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In order to solve all of these problems--to improve
the quality of students, teachers, and educational fa-
cilities--the Chinese Government will have to tackle at
least two more problems. One is economic: the shortage
of funds. China's modernization program demands huge
outlays of money for a number of purposes--modernizing
the military, modernizing and mechanizing agriculture,
raising industrial production and modernizing industry,
and upgrading science and technology.. Because there
will be so much competition for China's scarce resources,
education may well receive less support than it needs
to adequately carry out all of the reforms essential to
its improvement. The second problem is political. It
is likely that there is still some leftist influence in
universities and in educational circles, both long bas-
tions of the "Gang of Four." Until people with leftist
views are removed or purged, they are likely to resist
any moves to depoliticize the educational system and to
stress study rather than work and politics.
The problems afflicting Chinese education have had
a disastrous effect on an area closely connected with
education: science and technology. Because of the
poor quality of Chinese education, too few scientists
have been trained to meet the needs of scientific re-
search,. During the Cultural Revolution, many older
scientists were persecuted, harassed, or purged. Others
left their jobs to escape the pressures placed on them.
Since graduate programs were abolished, few young people
were trained to take their places, and those who were
often lacked solid grounding in scientific theory.
Chang Wen-yu, Director of the Institute of High Energy
Physics of the Chinese Academy of Science, recently
stated that over half of his staff were poorly trained,
were unable to understand the principles of quantum
mechanics, and hence were unable to do research. Out-
side of the main research centers, tie situation is
even more abysmal. The Chengtu Geology College in
Szechuan Province, for instance, recently reported that
of 234 research projects it completed since 1973, only
six have reached international standards, and only 10
have reached progressive national standards.
The greatest dilemma facing Chinese education, how-
ever, is not any single problem, but the combination of
a large number of problems. The Chinese Government has
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to tackle many jobs at once--increasing the number of
students, recruiting good teachers, improving educa-
tional facilities, writing good textbooks, raising
morale, rooting out leftist influence, and finding
enough money. All of these, moreover, are intercon-
nected. The solution of one demands the solution of
another. The task of solving the problems facing Chi-
nese education will therefore demand both time and ef-
fort. It is highly unlikely that it can be accomplished
by the end of the century, when Peking wants to have
developed China into a "powerful socialist state." And
until substantial educational reform and improvement is
carried out, the modernization of agriculture, industry,
not
i
s
national defense, and science and technology
likely to be fully achieved.
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Problems in Agricultural Mechanization
A recent broadcast from Kwangsi Province in South
China and an editorial published recently in the People's
Daily illustrate the important practical problems China
is having mechanizing its agricultural production. In-
creased[ mechanization of agriculture has been a long-
standing goal of Chinese economic policy, but has been
especially stressed since 1975 when then Vice Premier
Hua Kuo-feng announced China's intention to basically
complete the process by 1980. China's mechanized farm
implement industry, however, has been more successful
in producing the machinery than the Chinese peasant has
been in assimilating it.
Kwangsi, according to the provincial broadcast, had
increased by 12 times the number of tractors in the prov-
ince since 1970, but had only trebled the number-of
trained tractor operators during the same period. One
county, for example, had added 300-400 new machines
per year since 1974 but only 200 operators per year
during the same period. As a consequence, the county
is now 1,000 operators short, and machines remain idle.
In addition to being in short supply, many supposedly
trained workers are not adequately prepared to either
operate or maintain the machinery. The broadcast cites
the following examples:
-- A production brigade youth sent to the county
seat to learn to operate and bring back a new
hand-guided tractor was to return to a triumphant
and noisy hero's welcome. The youth failed to
arrive at the appointed hour because he and his
tractor had fallen into a ditch on the way back
to his village.
-- A production team had painstakingly carried a
tractor into a mountainous region of the province
only to have the machine fail after a few days'
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use. Unable to diagnose the problem, the team
disassembled the tractor and carried it down the
mountain to the county seat for inspection. The
problem: the machine had run out of fuel.
Having pressed tractor production since 1975, Peking
is now paying more attention to getting the best use out
of the machines. Peking plans a conference on agriculture
mechanization in late October and has established a high-
level State Council office to oversee the program. Over-
coming the training problems, however, will be the prov-
inces' responsibility, according to the People's Daily
which calls for training programs to be established in
all provinces and at all levels of authority from the
production brigade up.
The editorial and Kwangsi broadcast both suggest
another and perhaps more fundamental weakness in the
mechanization program: tractors are often not being used
for farming. Both professional tractor drivers and peas-
ants have apparently found that using tractors to haul
goods on roadways is more profitable than using them to
pull plows in the fields where traditional labor intensive
methods still prevail.
The editorial, in particular, reflects concern that
the growing class of professional "agricultural workers"
is becoming divorced from the peasants it is trained to
serve. The editorial criticizes the practice of "small
production," presumably rental of machines and services
to the highest bidder, and directs that machine operators
remain skilled at farming and be paid according to the
same standards as the peasants. To correct the "capital-
ist tendency," the editorial urges stepped-up political
training.
Neither political nor technical training, however,
is likely to promote substantially wider use of the equip-
ment in agricultural production until the machines rep-
resent a clear advantage in economic terms over the
traditional methods or become less profitable when used
for other purposes.
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FOR THE RECORD
Nepal: The appointment of new Nepalese Prime Min-
ister Bista on 12 September undoubtedly cheered Peking.
The Chinese have assiduously courted Bista's favor and
will now expect him to strengthen relations between the
two countries.
China had been suspicious of former Prime Minister
Giri's links to India, fearing that he might cause the
Himalayan kingdom to lean too far toward New Delhi and
away from Peking. The Chinese fear was heightened by
the memory of India's annexation of Sikkim, which re-
moved an important buffer from the border with India.
With Bista's appointment, the Chinese will want to
collect on their investment last year in his political
future. Bista visited Peking in may 1976 for what he
expected to be a private visit with relatives serving
in the embassy there. The Chinese surprised him by
according him high-level treatment, including a meeting
with Hua Kuo-feng and a banquet given by the Chinese
Foreign Minister. In return for this well-publicized
support, Peking may well be looking for a payoff in
Nepal's foreign policy.
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Chronology
9 September Huang Ming-ta, new Chinese Ambas-
sador to Afghanistan, leaves Peking
for his post.
Ting Hao, new Chinese Ambassador to
Kuwait, leaves Peking for his post.
Secretary of State Vance receives
the first time in three years.
Taiwan Ambassador James Shen forr
tradictions.
Joint editorial warns against using
selected use of Mao quotations and
implies Mao's thought contains con-
tiger.
Chinese media republish 1958 Mao
speech on imperialism as paper
leader is Ulanfu, vice chairman
of the NPC Standing Committee.
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping meets
with a delegation of the Japanese
Dietmen's League for Japan-China
Friendship. He severely criticize:
US policy toward China, saying that
the US is playing wit7h "two cards"
(China and Taiwan). ul
A delegation of the National
People's Congress of China leaves
Peking for a visit to Australia
and New Zealand. The delegation
A Chinese military delegation led
by Yang Cheng-wu, deputy chief of
General Staff of the PLA, leaves
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12 September Peking for a visit to France and
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Japanese good will mission of the
New Liberal Club headed by its
chairman, Yohei Kono, arrives in
Peking. The delegation is greeted
at the airport by Liao Cheng-chih
and other members of the China -
Japan Friendship Association.
Somalia for a friendly visit.
ident, Wang Ping-nan arrives in
A delegation of the Chinese People's
Association for Friendship with
Foreign Countries led by its pres-
Miao Chiu-jui, new Chinese Ambas-
sador to the Republic of Chad
leaves Peking for his post.
ends its visit to China.
The delegation of the QUOTIDIEN
DU PEUPLE, central organ of the
Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary
Communist Party of France, led by
Robert Emery and Gabriel Ferreol,
for his post.
Sun Sheng-wei, new Chinese Ambas-
sador to Sri Lanka, leaves Peking
post.
Yueh Liang, new Chinese Ambassador
of Rwanda, leaves Peking for his
man.
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping meets
with the delegation of the New
Liberal Club of Japan. Teng in-
dicates to the Japanese that China
would give Japan favorable treat-
ment if China declared a 200-mile
fishing zone. During these dis-
cussions Teng states that the pre-
miership is a job for a younger
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14 September Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien meets
with Louis Alexandrenne, Minister
of Industrial Developm?nt and En-
vironment of Senegal.
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Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien meets
with American columnist Carl T.
Rowan and his party in Peking.
Jensen.
Tan Chen-lin, vice chairman of the
Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress, meets with a
delegation of the National Con-
ference of State Legislatures of
the United States led by Tom
H. Salih.
Ho Ying, vice minister of foreign
affairs, meets with a Palestinian
"Fatah" visiting group led by M.
Chairman Hua Kuo-feng meets with
Marcelino dos Santos, Minister of
Development and Economic Planning
of Mozambique, and the dele ation
accompanying him.
Hsiao-ping.
U Ne Win, President of Burma, in
China for a visit. Welcoming him
at the airport are Chairman Hua
Kuo-feng and Vice Premier Teng
U Ne Win.
Hua and Teng
Peking.
separately with
Tan Chen-lin meets with Lord
Killanin, chairman of the Inter-
national Olympic Committee, in
Fang I, member of the Politburo
and vice president of the Chinese
Academy of Sciences, meets with
Chinese-American physicists
RP AC 77-023
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1 SECRET
17 September Dr. Chien-shiung Wu and Dr. Chia-
liu Yuan.
Chen Chih-fang, new Chinese Ambas-
sador to Vietnam, leaves for his
post.
eight-day visit to Yugoslavia. I 25X1
estry, leaves Belgrade after an
The Chinese Government agriculture
delegation, led by Sha Feng,
minister of agriculture and for-
Central Committee circular announced
plans to hold e conference
next spring. sCl 25X1
in Peking.
Hua Kuo-feng and Li Hsien-nien greet
Lieutenant-Colonel Seyni Kountche,
President of the Supreme Military
Council and head of state of the
Republic of Niger on his arrival
The Chinese Government delegation
led by Vice Foreign Minister Ma
Wen-po returns to Peking from
Romania after attending the inau-
guration of the new Chinese embassy
building there. F__1 25X1
in Peking.
Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and Vice
Premier Li Hsien-nien meet Macias
Bojogo Negue Ndong, President of
Equatorial Guinea on his arrival
21 Meeting with Li Hsien-nien.
The government-industry delegation
from Senecra1 endG its visit to
China.
and his party.
Chairman Hua Kuo-feng meets with
Lieutenant-Colonel Seyni Kountche
RP AC 77-023
27 September 1977
21
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SECRET
23 September Huang Hua, chairman of the Chinese
delegation to the 32d session of the
General Assembly of the UN, leaves
Peking for New York.
eral Political Department.
Politburo member Wei Kuo-ching is
publicly identified for the first
time as Director of the PLA's Gen-
RP AC 77-023
27 September 1977
22
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RPA 25X1
25X1
Authoritative CPSU Journal Spells Out Moscow's Case
Against Peking
The full text of the extensive anti-Chinese polemic
in the August issue of the CPSU Central Committee's
theoretical journal Kommunist is now available. It is
a forceful, sharply-focused indictment of Peking's sins
as Moscow sees them, and clearly reflects Soviet exasper-
ation at the unwillingness of the post-Mao leadership
to moderate Mao's strident anti-Soviet policies. Many
of the charges made in the Kommunist article have been
made elsewhere in Soviet propaganda and in private state-
ments,by Soviet officials. Nevertheless, as the most
extensive and authoritative official Soviet pronounce-
ment on China since Mao's death, it contributes greatly
to an understanding of Soviet charges, fears, and resent-
ment of Chinese policies. The article, which went to
press during the Chinese Communist Party's 11th Party
Congress, assumed, correctly, that the decisions taken
at the CCP plenum in July were an authoritative state-
ment of Chinese policy programs under the new leadership
and would be reflected in the results of the party con-
gress. Kommunist was clearly at pains to vilify these
policies in the strongest possible language.
The New Leaders Are As Bad--Or Worse--Than Mao
The Kommunist article clearly articulates Moscow's
distress over the fact that Mao Tse-tung's successors
have failed to change the direction of Mao's hostile
policies toward the USSR. It hammers away at the theme
that the essentials of Maoism are being faithfully fol-
lowed by the new Chinese leaders both internally and
externally. In fact, in their negative policies toward
the USSR and world socialism, they are being intensified.
Moscow's negative assessment of the July plenum's results
and of the new Chinese leaders is pointed and harsh. The
following, and all the excerpts cited later, are direct
quotes:
RP AC 77-023
27 September 1977
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-- So far no positive changes have become
apparent in the policy of the Chinese
leadership compared with the course
pursued by Peking during Mao's life.
It is rather the opposite that has
happened--a line of further intensifica-
tion of anti-Soviet attacks, militariza-
tion of the country, and closeness with
the most reactionary imperialist forces
has been charted.
-- Implementing the Maoist foreign political
course as a whole without corrections,
the Peking leaders go beyond it, re-
jecting the former revolutionary camou-
flage, displaying an even greater desire
to come closer to the imperialists.
-- The leaders of the CCP, as is clear, do
not intend to reject the Maoist ways,
critically assess faulty concepts, and
put the country back on the track of
socialist building. The events of
September-October 1976 did not go beyond
a type of leadership coup which was
limited to the removal of one of the
rival groups without, however, bringing
about radical political changes.
-- Maoist concepts are the essential founda-
tions of the domestic political program
of the new Chinese leadership headed by
Hua Kuo-feng.
Most striking is the blanket condemnation of the
entire leadership group and the admission that Moscow
sees no succor from any member of the reconstituted
Chinese leadership. Specifically, the article claims
that "a struggle is taking place within the Chinese leader-
ship less about a 'line,' as its participants claim,
than among individuals who support the same Maoist plat-
form and are different only in terms of shades and
emphasis." In short, Kommunist writes off any signifi-
cance to the elevation or demotion of any leaders, in-
cluding Teng Hsiao-ping or the "Gang of Four."
RP AC 77-023
27 September 1977
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Peking Is Beyond The Role Of Marxism-Leninism
One purpose of the article is to depict Chinese
policies as being completely beyond the pale of Marxism-
Leninism or having any "progressive" content whatever.
Specifically, the journal alleges that:
-- Under the new Peking leadership Maoism
remains a variety of anti-Communism.
-- The Peking leadership is in the ranks of
the enemies of peace and socialism.
-- The policy of the Peking leadership is
openly directed against the majority
of socialist countries.
-- It openly approaches the position of
the most extreme reaction and is not
only alien to the principles and ideals
of socialism but, essentially, has be-
come an important reserve of imperialism.
The Maoist stipulations on the most impor-
tant social and economic problems are of
an anti-Marxist and subjective nature.
Peking As A Military Threat And Source of War
The article pays close attention throughout to
China's military potential and sounds an alarmist note
about Peking's alleged preparations for war. It clearly
reflects Moscow's growing concern that the West and Japan
will contribute to China's military buildup and therefore
vilifies Peking's military investment policies as being
a source of severe deprivation to the Chinese people
and a threat to world peace. These charges, in addition
to their obvious propaganda intent and their attempt to
discourage Western military-related assistance to Peking,
also convey a note of genuine concern about the long
range threat to the USSR of a populous, hostile China
with a growing nuclear capability. The following points
are made:
The Chinese leaders are actively pursuing
the course set by Mao Tse-tung of prep-
arations for war, ignoring the fact
RP AC 77-023
27 September 1977
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that this is harming the development
of the country's national economy,
exhausting its already limited resources,
and creating a serious threat both to
the amine .late neighbors of the PRC as
well as to the cause of peace through-
out the world (emphasis added).
-- The course of preparations for war was
entered in the PRC Constitution adopted
in January 1975, and in the documents
of the Ninth and Tenth CCP Congresses.
-- China's military potential is growing at
an accelerated pace. Basic attention
is being paid to improving nuclear
missile weapons. In the first months
following Mao's death China had three
nuclear blasts. Last year a total of
four nuclear tests were conducted.
-- In 1976 direct military outlays accounted
for over 40 percent of state budget
expenditure, about 50 percent of them
being in nuclear missile weapons.
-- Lately the Chinese leadership has been
adamantly asking the West for military
aid in terms of procurement of modern
armaments and combat materiel as well
as assistance in the development of
military industry sectors.
In this connection the trips which Japanese
military leaders and specialists have
made to the PRC, at Peking's invitation,
deserve serious attention. As the
Japanese themselves state they had to
listen to the "complaints" of the
Chinese military concerning the limited
combat possibilities of their army.
RP AC 77-023
27 September 1977
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I JLl,fl L I
Peking Muddies The Waters Of Soviet-US Relations And
Sabotages Detente
Clearly most rankling to the Soviet Union is Peking's
courting and encouragement of any country or organization
which maintains an essentially adversary relationship
with Moscow. Particularly, Peking's tilt toward the US,
its contacts with West Germany? and its encouragement of
NATO draw the strongest fire in the Kommunist article.
All are cited as evidence of Peking's casting its lot
with imperialism (that is, anyone anti-Soviet). The
statement draws particular attention to China's attacks
against the basis of the present Soviet leadership's
foreign policy--detente and productive relations with
the US. Particularly, it claims that:
-- Peking's foreign policy is entering a
new stage which is even more hostile
and dangerous to the forces of peace,
democracy, and socialism.
A trend toward further rapprochement
and expanding the area of "common"
or "parallel" international interests
of Peking and Washington remains.
The position of the Chinese leadership
is reduced to inducing the United
States to fight the Soviet Union "edge
to edge" on the basis of "common
interests" and doing everything
possible to provoke a worsening of
relations between the United States and
the USSR.
-?- In the scale of priorities of Peking's
foreign policy, relations with the
West have taken the foreground.
--- Li Hsien-nien noted that he had "much
in common" with [British Conservative
leader Thatcher] on a number of impor-
tant international problems and the
joint desire to counter the policy of
detente, "of which there could be no
question."
RP AC 77-023
27 September 1977
27
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-- Using the advance of the enemies of
peace in the West and giving them all-
round support, the Maoists are trying
to turn back the process of detente.
-- Peking is adamantly resisting any measure
in the field of disarmament. It has
still not assumed any obligations
banning or limiting the development
and use of weapons of mass destruction.
-- Acting under the false banner of "struggle
against superpower hegemony," Peking is
trying to counter the general course
followed by the socialist states toward
detente and disarmament.
And Worst Of All--Tampering In Eastern Europe
The polemic includes an uncommon expression of con-
cern about alleged Chinese efforts to tamper with Moscow's
sensitive relationship with Eastern Europe. The degree
of sensitivity on this issue seems surprising, but it
is stated in forceful terms:
-- The Chinese leadership is continuing its
devisive policy of "differentiated
approach" to the socialist states,
acting in this case in an even more
subtle manner than in the past.
-- Peking sees as its task the breaking
of the unity of the fraternal countries
and undermining their coordinated
course. It is trying to convince
individual socialist countries of an
alleged "real possibility to develop
all-round cooperation" to continue
a hostile course toward the socialist
community as a whole and the USSR in
particular.
-- The escalation of Peking's subversive
efforts against the members of the
socialist community represents a real
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1 )runC I
threat both to their unity and to
the national interests of each of the
fraternal states (emphasis added).
Finally, the Kommunist article provides a clear
warning to its allies:
-- Maoist ideology and politics are directed
against the very essence of socialism
and against the foundations of the
international communist movement. Any
conciliation with them could turn into
a form of opportunism. With this in
mind we cannot fail to see the topicality
of the struggle against Maoist attempts
to assist in the manifestation and
proliferation of all types of nationalist
distortions (emphasis added).
Conclusion
A lengthy portion of the 7,000-word statement attacks
in detail Peking's domestic political and economic pol-
icies, particularly singling out the Taching and Tachai
production models. A few optimistic lines are scattered
throughout the piece to the effect that the policies of
the new Maoists will fail and China will some day take
the path of scientific socialism. The final, five-line
paragraph also provides a proforma statement of the
Soviet desire for normalized relations between the two
countries. The true spirit of the article, however, is
best reflected in the concluding paragraph of the penul-
timate section which states that:
"'The words and actions of the Chinese leadership
that replaced Mao Tse-tung confirmed the correctness
and topical nature of the principled assessments of
the theory and practice of Maoism made at fraternal
party congresses. Peking's feverish attempts to wreck
detente, prevent disarmament, implant mistrust and hos-
tility among countries, and its aspirations to provoke
a world war and warm its hands on the flames of this
conflagration represent a great danger to all peace-loving
nations. Peking's provocative policy is profoundly con-
tradictory to the interests of all nations and must be
rebuffed."
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A striking aspect of the article is the pessimistic
conclusion, which closes off the possibility that some
members of the present Chinese Politburo might desire
an amelioration of Peking's hostility toward the USSR.
In contrast to Soviet media articles in the early 1970s,
there is no reference to "healthy forces" (that is, pro-
Soviet leaders) in the Chinese Party or Army who might
be willing at some future date to try to improve Sino-
Soviet relations. On the contrary, the article becomes
polemical in denying that conditions in China could be
conducive to the development of such forces, inasmuch
as Mao's death, "neither did, nor could, automatically
bring about the surmounting of Maoism."
RP AC 77-023
27 September 1977
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Secret
Secret
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