CHINA REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001100010048-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: August 30, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO01100010048-5
China
ZONAL AND
TICAL ANALYSIS
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RP AC 77-021
30 August 1977
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CHINA
30 August 1977
CONTENTS
Composition of the New Politburo . . . 1
Eleventh Party Congress: Loose Ends . . . . . . . 6
Hua and Teng: Getting By With a Little Help
From Their Friend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The Eleventh Party Congress and Provincial
Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Military and the Eleventh Party Congress . . . . 14
The Eleventh Party Congress and Educational,
Cultural, and Scientific Policy. . . . . . . . . . 17
Reforming the Chinese Academy of Sciences. . . . . . 19
Party Constitution: Promoting Discipline
and Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Sino-Soviet Trade: No Big Deals . . . . . . . . . . 25
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by
the East Asia/Pacific Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence.
Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the
individual articles.
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30 August 1977
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Composition of the New Politburo
The new Politburo, elected on 19 August, is a veteran
group dominated by aged party bureaucrats and profes-
sional military men. As a group it favors moderate,
pragmatic solutions to China's problems. The leftist
ideologues of the 9th and 10th Politburos have been
purged; this Politburo does not appear to have an ideo-
logue. Although the new Poliburo is more united than
either the 9th or 10th, there is tension between those
members who supported Teng Hsiao-ping's rehabilitation
and those who opposed it, and potential tension between
civilians and military men.
The accompanying chart gives the approximate age,
top posts, and backgrounds of each member of the 11th
Politburo. New members are indicated by an asterisk.
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THE NEW POLITBURO
The Standing Committee (rank order)
Hua Kuo-fang 56 Chairman of Party; Chairman of the Party by chance. Rose
Premier; Chairman to top after Chou En-1a1 died and Politburo
Military Commission; too divided to agree on anyone else. Has no
Minister of Public real power base, but is attempting to
Security build one. Reportedly uneasy about Teng's
rehabilitation. Hua is an excellent admin-
istrator. Probably will surrender Premier
and Public Security posts at 5th National
People's Congress (NPC) this fall.
Yeh Chien-ying 79 Vice Chairman of
Party; Minister
of Defense; Vice
Chairman of Mil-
itary Commission
Teng Hsiao-ping 73 Vice Chairman of
Party; Vice Premier;
Chief of Staff of Army
Li Hsien-nien
70
Wang Tung.4sing
61
Vice Chairman of
Party; Vice Premier
Vice Chairman of
Party; Head of
Party's General
Office; Commander
of Security Forces
China's senior military man and- one
of its most respected leaders; strong
backer of Teng butalso giving consider.
able support to Hua. Seems to be holding
potential rivalries on Politburo in check.
In frail health.
Twice purged: once during Cultural Rev-
olution and once after Chou En-lai died.
Teng was heir apparent to Chou, but
Hua reaped the benefits after Teng's fall.
Tough, vindictive, hard to get along
with, but excellent administrator.
Very popular with masses and veteran
party, government, and military cadres.
Some Politburo members opposed Teng's re-
habilitation fearing he would eventually
monopolize all power. May be named Premier
at 5th NPC.
Economic expert. Former close associate
of late Chou En-lai. Supported Teng
when Teng ousted in 1976.
Long time Mao bodyguard. Big gainer
at Congress, perhaps because he played
large role in purging leftists. Was
suspected of leftist sympathies in
past. Reportedly opposed Teng's return.
Has become more visible since purge
of leftists.
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Full Members (stroke order)
Wei Kuo-ching 63 Kwangtung Party
boss
71 Head of Party's
United Front
Work Department
Fang 1*
Liu Po-cheng
Hsu Shih-yu
68 Vice President,
Chinese Academy
of Sciences
(CAS)
85 Vice Chairman,
National People's
Congress
71 Canton Military
Region Commander
Chi Teng-kuei 47 Vice Premier
68 Political Commissar
of Navy
Li Te-sheng
65 Shenyang Military
Region Commander
Strong supporter of Teng. Rarely ven-
tures to Peking, but rumors of trans-
fer to Peking occasionally surface in
Canton.
Purged during Cultural Revolution. Returned
at 10th Party Congress in 1973. Was
alternate member of 8th Politburo. May
have ties to Teng, but very independent
man before his purge during Cultural
Revolution.
Was Minister of Economic Relations with
Foreign Countries before transfer to
CAS after purge of leftists. Fang
running CAS and weeding out leftist
backers there.
III, inactive, seldom appears. A symbol.
One of top military leaders during
Chinese civil war.
A very strong supporter of Teng. Hsu
may be transferred to Peking to take over
Ministry of Defense from Yeh or Peking
Military Region from Chen Hsi-lien.
May oversee party's organization depart-
ment. His youth makes him a man to watch.
Speculation before the congress was he may
be promoted to Standing Committee. Has
functioned, as troubleshooter for party.
Promoted from alternate to full member
of Politburo at Congress. After leftists
fell, sent to Shanghai to clean house.
May be under a cloud; close associate
purged as leftist in Anhwei, Li's old
base. Li suspected of ties to left, and
reportedly has opposed Tong's return.
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67 Mayor of Peking;
Vice Chairman of
National People's
Congress
55 Minister of State
Planning Commission
Chang Ting-fa* 65 Air Force
Commander
Chen Yung-kuei 53 Vice. Premier
Chen Hsi-lien 64 Vice Premier;
Commander Peking
Military Region
Keng Piao*
68 Head of Party's
International
Liaison Depart-
ment
Nieh Jung-chien* 78 Vice Chairman
National People's
Congress; Vice
Chairman Military
Commission
44 Second Secretary
Peking Party
Committee; Second
Secretary Shanghai
Party Committee
Inactive. A symbol. Was on 9th Politburo.
Famous Military Commander during civil
war.
Promoted from alternate to full member. A
model worker originally but has greatly ex-
panded his role. Sent to Shanghai after fall
of leftists to help clean house. May be com-
mander of Peking worker-militia.
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Also may be under a cloud; Peking posters
have criticized Wu periodically; reportedly
opposed Teng's return.
Top economic planner. Associate of Li Hsien-
nien. Fell out of sight after Teng's ouster.
Professional military officer who assumed com-
mand of air force after leftist commander
purged. Purged during Cultural Revolution, but
returned in 1975 as political commissar of
air force.
A former model peasant who has assumed
other functions in recent years, including
travel abroad. Reportedly backed Teng's return
to power.
May be under a cloud. Career military man
who has flirted with leftists when it served
his interests. Often rumored to be transferred.
Was only Politburo member to miss Army Day
turnout in Peking, having been sent to Inner
Mongolia to attend minor celebration on behalf
of Politburo.
Apparently given job of cleaning house in
party's propaganda network which had long
been dominated by the leftists. Continues
to oversee China's relations with foreign
Communist Parties.
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Hsu Hsiang-chien* 75 Vice Chairman
National-People's
Congress; Vice
Chairman Military
Commission
Peng Chung 64 Third Secretary
Shanghai Party
Committee
Alternate Members (stroke order)
Inactive. A symbol. Was member of 9th Polit-
buro. Famous Military commander during
civil war.
Has day to day charge of Shanghai as Su
and Ni often in Peking. Sent to city
from Kiangsu after leftists fell to
help put Shanghai in order. Was purged
during Cultural Revolution. Criticized by
left in 1976 as a Teng supporter.
Chen Mu-hua*
55
Minister Economic
Relations with
Foreign Countries
A woman. Long-time Vice Minister of Eco-
nomic Relations with Foreign Countries. Pro-
moted to minister when Fang I went to CAS.
Chao Tzu-yang*
70
Szechwan Party
boss
Former boss of Kwangtung but purged during
Cultural Revolution. Returned to Kwangtung
in 1973 and restored order. Transferred to
Szechwan in 1975 to do the same there.
Reputed to be Teng supporter.
Saifudin
62
Sinkiang Party
boss
A member of Uigher minority. A symbol.
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Eleventh Party Congress: Loose Ends
Unlike its two predecessors, the 11th Party Congress
was not a stop along the way to further domestic political
turmoil, but seemed genuinely to mark a new stage in
China's development. The congress was pervaded with a
sense of general agreement on overall economic goals and
a desire to put a more orderly and predictable face on
political behavior. Nevertheless, Hua Kuo-feng's effort
to explain events of the recent past--especially his own
elevation and Mao's relationship with the "gang of four"--
left some questions unanswered and even raised new ones.
The personnel decisions of the congress, moreover, probably
caused some consternation among middle-aged and young
officials who found the door to upward mobility slammed
firmly in their faces.
In an apparent effort to disassociate Mao from Teng
Hsiao-ping's former political difficulties, Hua Kuo-feng
addressed himself to each quotation from Mao that the
leftists had used last year against Teng. He attempted
to put these statements in a larger political perspective
that left the clear impression that the statements were
not directed at Teng. This served the dual purpose of
trying to restore Mao's good name to Teng's supporters--
a move vital to Hua who owes his position to Mao's good
judgment in choosing him--and of clearing away, for the
public record at least, any lingering suspicions that the
case against Teng was legitimate.
The problem--one that is likely to dog Hua for the
duration of Teng's political life--is to explain the
apparent contradiction between Mao's selection of Teng
in 1975 to head the day-to-day work of the party and his
selection of Hua for the same job the following year. If
Mao in fact was at odds with the "gang of four" and dis-
agreed with their efforts to unseat Teng, why did he
choose Hua as first vice chairman of the party in 1976
rather than Teng? Hua cannot explain this and made no
effort to. Instead, he slid over the events of early
1976, indicating Mao's choice of someone to take over
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the work of the party in January 1976 without actually
naming himself. The January date remains troublesome
because Hua was not named first vice chairman of the
party until April. In January, leaving Teng out of the
equation, Hua was outranked in the party by such officials
as Yeh Chien-ying, Li Hsien-nien, and Chi Teng-kuei, all
of whom seemed at least as likely as Hua to assume that
role. Nevertheless, even Yeh Chien-ying in his speech
to the congress claimed that Mao picked Hua in January,
an interesting point for Yeh to make since he had already
left Peking by that time in a rage over Teng's failure
to be named premier.
The current leaders may have glanced knowingly at
one another when Hua announced that the Cultural Revolu-
tion was over after 11 years, but this will raise prob-
lems for future generations. The 11-year period includes
two purges of Teng Hsiao-ping and two rehabilitations of
him; it encompasses the rise of Lin Piao and his fall and
the rise of the gang and their fall. It was not, as the
Chinese seek to portray it, a straight line leading pro-
gressively toward current policies, but a circle that
has left China essentially back where it was before the
Cultural Revolution started. The current leadership, of
Mao's generation and having lived through the Cultural
Revolution, needs to maintain a fiction about that period
so as not to discredit Mao or ignore the past entirely.
Future generations that did not live through that period
and will not have experienced Mao's leadership may not
feel the same need to put a gloss on the Cultural Revolu-
tion and, in any case, will have difficulty reconciling
the earlier stages of the Cultural Revolution with the
later stages that overturned it. Consequently, it seems
almost inevitable that a more realistic assessment of the
Cultural Revolution and Mao's role in it will emerge in
the future. That reassessment in turn will reflect poorly
on the pronouncements of the 11th Party Congress and on
Hua Kuo-feng himself, who perpetrated the fictionalized
version of the Cultural Revolution in the first place.
Another reason for future generations to look back
on this congress with some dismay is its treatment of
young and middle-aged officials. After years of dominat-
ing the leadership, much of the old guard has at last died
off, a process that in theory should have created some
head-room for the younger officials who have been waiting
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so long in the wings. Instead, what is left of the old
guard got the empty seats on the Politburo and were named
to the party central committee. The only allowance the
congress made for grooming the next crop of leaders was
a rather brief statement by Hua Kuo-feng on the need for
younger officials to learn from the veterans and for the
veterans to help younger officials to correct their mis-
takes. Implicit in this statement was the view that
veterans do not make mistakes, but that younger officials
inevitably do.
This position, as distasteful as it may be for younger
officials, is probably a wise tactical move by Hua. As
a middle-aged official himself and one without a strong
independent base of support, Hua needs to keep the veteran
.officials in his camp and seems to have gone out of his
way to pay homage to them.
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Hua and Teng: Getting By With a Little Help From Their
Friend
The 11th Party Congress, which dwelt at length on
the need for greater party unity, discussed not only the
factionalism that split the party from 1966 to 1976, but
also tried to assuage fears that Party Chairman Hua
Kuo-feng and Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping, the dominant
figures on the new Politburo, have become rivals.
The Congress and the meetings preceding it took every
opportunity to portray Hua and Teng as partners and to
dispel any notion that they may be at odds. In his widely
circulated speech to the third Plenum of the 10th Party
Congress in July, Teng praised Hua at length and promised
to serve as his "good assistant." Teng also said that
he, the late Premier Chou En-lai, and Party Vice Chairman
Yeh Chien--ying first tapped Hua for the succession in
1975--as if to imply that Hua's rise to the top was
accomplished with Teng's blessing and not at his expense.
In his speech to the 11th Party Congress, Hua cast Teng
and himself as allies in the fight against the leftists.
Completing the picture of unity, Teng made the official
announcement at the congress that Hua had been elected
chairman of the party--a nice touch because, but for an
odd series of events, Teng himself might have been elected
chairman. Hua's speech went to great lengths to repudiate
leftist claims that veteran officials like Teng were
"capitalist roaders." Although Hua undoubtedly was re-
ferring to the many veterans who have been newly elected
to the Central Committee and Politburo, his constant re-
futation of the capitalist roader charge in particular
seemed aimed at clearing Teng, since only a year ago he
was called the biggest unrepentant capitalist roader in
the party.
The Teng and Hua accounts of their earlier relation-
ship are creatively rewritten versions of the actual situa-
tion. Hua reached the top only because Teng fell, and
it is doubtful that Teng ever seriously promoted Hua's
career.
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Articles appeared in the Peking press
that seemed to oppose Teng's return, while others suggested
Hua was being pressured by Teng's supporters.
Hua and Teng see eye to eye on most issues, but ap-
parently differ on how to proceed against the remaining
supporters of the purged leftists. Teng,
apparently favors a much tougher approach
than Hua. In his speech to the Third Plenum, Teng called
for vigorous prosecution of the campaign, and intimated
that the basic reason for his fall in 1976 was that he
was too soft on his leftist opponents. In his speech to
the congress, Hua called for a quick end to the campaign,
set strict limits on permissible targets, and counseled
leniency. Hua's position was endorsed by the new Central
Committee.
Teng's conception of his proper role in the leader-
ship is more likely to cause friction between the two
men than policy differences. Teng clearly sees himself
as playing a very large role, and Hua may feel threatened.
Teng has already dee 1 involved himself in the economy
and foreign polic
and it seems unlikely that a man of Teng's
assertive nature and long experience would readil accept
a role secondary to the younger Hua.
Yeh Chien-ying, who is 79 and frail, seems to be the
key to holding the potential rivalries on the Politburo
in check. The 11th Party Congress was made possible
largely through Yeh's efforts. Yeh, who has been one of
Teng's most ardent backers, reportedly put together a
compromise that allowed Teng to return and assured the
anti-Teng people that they would not suffer at the congress
for their earlier opposition. Yeh, who has consistently
lent his prestige to Hua of late, appears to be seeing
to it that all parties abide by the agreement. As long
as Yeh is around to rein in Teng and bolster Hua's prestige,
the chance of a serifl?G falling out between the two men
is greatly reduced.
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The Eleventh Party Congress and Provincial Leadership
The recent 11th Party Congress apparently marks
the beginning of the reconstruction of the provincial
party organizations and the end of the purges and major
reshuffling at that level which have characterized the
period since the ouster of the "gang of four" last
October. The election of all 29 provincial party first
secretaries to full membership in the Central Committee
reinforces the status of the 13 newly appointed lead-
ers and confirms the political health of the 16 holdovers.
The ouster of "gang" supporters from the provin-
cial committees over the last 10 months has left many
provincial party units understaffed, but the integrity
of this remaining core group is attested to by the high
percentage of remaining officials chosen for Central
Committee membership. Provincial broadcasts and, most
recently, Chairman Hua's opening address at the Party
Congress have made it clear that much investigation,
education, and rebuilding remain to be done at the
local levels. The composition of the new Central Com-
mittee indicates that the slate has been wiped clean
and the leaders have been selected to begin this work
of recreating a stable, correct, and responsive party
organization in the provinces.
The election of all 29 first secretaries to full
membership in the new Central Committee suggests both
the organizational importance of that group to party
affairs and, on a personal level, the resolution of a
number of outstanding cases. Individuals such as Tseng
Shao-shan from Liaoning and Wu Te from Peking, whose
involvement in the anti - Teng Hsiao-ping campaign in
1976 had left their political fortunes in doubt, ap-
parently have made satisfactory amends. The same seems
to be true of their corresponding Military Region Com-
manders, Li Te-sheng and Chen Hsi-lien. It appears
that for now the central authorities value a consoli-
dated leadership in the provinces over a potentially
troublesome, if somewhat more thorough, continuation
of the housecleaning of provincial leaders.
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From another angle, the importance of the provincial
leaders can be seen in the inclusion of five first sec-
retaries, as well as Shanghai's second and third sec-
retaries, on the Politburo. It should be noted, how-
ever, that a number of these men serve primarily in
Peking. In the case of Shanghai, Su Chen-hua and Ni
Chih-fu appear to have left the day-to-day management
of the city to Peng Chung, also a Politburo member.
Sinkiang's Saifudin has appeared only sporadically in
his home province since the central work conference in
March. This, coupled with the recent appointment of
new second and third secretaries in Sinkiang, suggests
that Saifudin may leave many of his secretarial duties
to others in order to free himself for other work in
Peking.
The representation of provincial party committees
in the Central Committee makes it clear that Peking has
paid a great deal of attention not only to the first
secretaries, but to the provincial party organization
as a whole. More than 43 percent of the full Central
Committee members and 25 percent of the alternates hold
a position on a provincial party committee, for a total
membership of over 36 percent. More important, however,
is the fact that of the total number of persons of
deputy secretary rank or higher known to be active in
provincial party committees, more than 57 percent are
members of the new Central Committee. That is to say,
every second person of secretary rank in the provinces
belongs to the Central Committee. The net effect is
the existence of a newly endorsed core group of polit-
ical leaders at the helm in the various provinces as
restaffing at the lower levels begins.
The Party Congress paid a great deal of attention
to the problems of maintaining a stable and responsive
provincial apparatus. The interference of the "gang
of four" in the provinces, most importantly in operat-
ing outside the party's chain of command, may still
concern the central leadership. Hua's call for further
education and work style rectification of cadres in the
provinces is only the most recent example of central
concern. A number of provinces have already announced
plans for widespread investigations and rectification
during the last half of this year. This same concern
is also expressed in new provisions of the party con-
stitution which call for the establishment of
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investigative units within each party organization.
These units may function in a way similar to the con-
trol commissions set up in the party following the Kao-
Jao affair in the mid-1950s, thus providing Peking with
a theoretically independent check on the lower levels.
In summary, Peking has cleaned house in the pro-
vincial leadership, given its seal of approval to a
nucleus of trusted officials, set up further controls
on the functioning of lower level party organizations,
and called for a thorough reeducation and change in
work style throughout the country.
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The Military and the Eleventh Party Congress
A preliminary accounting of the number of military
men elected to Chinese Communist Party leadership bodies
suggests that the percentage of career military men on
the Politburo has risen to about 39 percent (10 of 26
members), while the military proportion of the Central
Committee has dropped from 32 percent at the 10th Congress
to. about 29 percent at the 11th.
While such figures are useful in terms of assessing
the overall position of the PLA vis-a-vis the party, there
are certain qualifications which must be taken into
account. The most troublesome is the problem of dual
responsibilities. Nearly all the provincial first party
secretaries (mostly civilians) have concurrent military
responsibilities as first political commissars of the
relevant military regions or districts. These are not
simply honorary positions, particularly given the in-
creasing emphasis within the PLA itself on decision-mak-
ing by the entire party committee, not just the commander.
Thus, these individuals hold very important positions
within the military chain of command. For example, An
Ping-sheng, first secretary of Yunnan Province, is ordi-
narily considered a civilian, even though he holds the
positions of first political commissar, Kunming Military
Region (MR), first political commissar, Yunnan Military
District (MD), and most importantly, first secretary of
the MR party committee. He is clearly one of the key
military officials in the area.
The reverse, that is when an individual who has
primarily held military responsibilities is given a civil-
ian position, is also important. Yu Tai-chung, for ex-
ample, is the commander of the Inner Mongolian Military
District. He is also first secretary of the Inner Mon-
golian Autonomous Region party committee and makes the
vast majority of his public appearances in that capacity.
Yet he is usually considered a military representative
on the new Central Committee.
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There is a certain artificiality in making fine
distinctions about the new Central Committee on the basis
of military affiliations. If all those who hold military
positions of any kind are included in the military cate-
gory the proportion of the PLA on the Politburo becomes
69 percent and 45 percent for full members of the Central
Committee.
A more useful categorization would be to separate
those individuals holding concurrent military and civilian
responsibilities from those holding purely military posts.
As a result of the 11th Party Congress, these "double-
dippers" constitute roughly 45 percent of the Politburo
and 17 percent of the Central Committee. Those who have
only military titles, on the other hand, represent 23
percent of the Politburo and 21 percent of the Central
Committee.
Perhaps a more important characteristic of the PLA
representation on the party's ruling body is the increased
equation between Central Committee membership and command
influence. Whereas the 10th Central Committee contained
a number of model soldiers or politically active (leftist)
cadres at the military district level, the 11th Central
Committee military contingent constitutes the most senior
level of the PLA high command.
For example, there are now 11 members of the General
Staff Department who hold positions on the new Central
Committee, as opposed to only six on the previous commit-
tee. There were a total of 38 members of the central
military hierarchy elected to the new committee, a gain
of 11. (Thirteen members of the 10th Central Committee
who held central military positions were dropped and 24
new central military officeholders were added.)
At the MR level, the total number of Central Commit-
tee members remained roughly the same, 51 on the 11th
Central Committee and 49 on the 10th. All 11 MR commanders
(including Yang Yung, who has not yet formally received
a new appointment) are full members, as are 25 of 27 of
the known MR political commissars.
Military district representation on the new Central
Committee, however, was cut back somewhat. Only six MD
or major municipal garrison commanders made the new
committee, while all of the MD and garrison first polit-
ical commissars, most of whom are civilian provincial
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first secretaries, were elected full members. Those PLA
officers who hold secretary positions in the provinces
were largely slighted, compared to their civilian counter-
parts, in gaining Central Committee membership. Thus,
the slight loss in total PLA representation on the 11th
Central Committee was largely absorbed at the MD level
and below.
RP AC 77-021
30 August 1977
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The Eleventh Part y Congress and Educational, Cultural,
and Scientific Policy
There were no surprises in the statements made about
science and technology, education, and culture at the
11th Party Congress. As expected, the Congress reaffirmed
recent policies designed to upgrade science and technology,
improve the quality of education, and relax some of the
constraints on cultural life.
The most visible sign of the party's commitment to
these policies was the appointment of Fang I, vice pres-
ident and acting head of the Chinese Academy of Sciences,
to the Politburo. Fang, who was appointed to his post
at the Academy of Sciences in January, has many years
of experience in managing economic, scientific, and tech-
nological programs. Since taking charge of the Academy,
he appears to have spearheaded efforts to reorganize the
Academy, to upgrade its research programs, and to permit
more freedom of debate in the sciences. His presence on
the Politburo is certain to strengthen his hand, and in-
deed documents from the Congress made repeated calls for
more open discussion of scientific issues.
In his political report to the Congress, Party Chair-
man Hua Kuo-feng committed himself--and the party--to the
new policies. He called for efforts to upgrade basic
research, to draw up long-range research plans, and to
reward scientists who make significant contributions.
He noted that a national conference on science and tech-
nology would be held "at an appropriate time," presumably
in early 1978, to expedite these efforts.
In his comments on education, Hua noted that students
should be not only politically reliable, but also pro-
fessionally competent. To this end, educational facili-
ties should be expanded at all levels and the quality of
the education they offer upgraded. He called for more
diversity in cultural life and more freedom of thought--
"letting a hundred flowers bloom"--in literature and the
arts, but he stressed that it was still imperative for
the party to retain strict control and maintain discipline.
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Hua condemned the gang of four for attacking intel-
lectuals as "the stinking ninth category." Although he
conceded that many intellectuals lacked complete commit-
ment to Maoist ideology, he pointed out that China needed
their talents and ability. Rather than attacking them,
he said, the party should put their knowledge to use while
trying to reeducate them.
Hua implied that there might be a review of one of
the most unpopular policies related to intellectuals--
the policy of sending large numbers of middle school
graduates to the countryside to work. He asserted that
this policy was necessary and should continue, but added
that problems caused by the practice must be dealt with
effectively.
Although Hua reaffirmed the general tone of recent
policies, he failed to spell out how they would be im-
plemented. Perhaps this is because of some resistance
to the new ideas. Particularly vulnerable to criticism
are plans to modify the policy of sending young people
to work in the countryside by allowing a few to go directly
to universities without first doing an obligatory stint
of labor. Recent reports suggests that there is some
debate about certain other educational reforms as well.
A number of schools, for example, have been unable to
agree on the proper way to reintroduce exams--whether to
have traditional written examinations or group discussion
examinations and pzactical tests of knowledge. While
some of this uncertainty may be a result of the tradi-
tional reluctance of educators to respond to policy shifts
for fear that they are not permanent, there is some evi-
dence that leftist influence in the universities has not
been totally eradicated.
RP AC 77-021
30 August 1977
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Reforming the Chinese Academy of Sciences
One of the focal points of China's efforts to upgrade
its science and technology has been the Chinese Academy of
Sciences, the country's leading center for scientific re-
search. Since the Cultural Revolution, the work of the
Academy has been hamstrung by leftist policies in science
and education. In order to revitalize the Academy, the
Chinese. Government appointed a new acting head, Fang I,
in January 1977 and apparently gave him a mandate to over-
haul the Academy and step up its research programs.
Fang I's efforts
have begun to bear fruit. Research programs have been re-
stored, and in a number of the Academy's institutes, theo-
retical research programs, neglected since the Cultural
Revolution, have been introduced. Under a new policy,
five days of the week must be spent exclusively on scien-
tific research, something unthinkable in the heyday of
leftist influence, when political meetings or practical
work were considered of great importance. In addition,
a number of scientists dismissed during the Cultural
Revolution have been reinstated to their jobs. Libraries
have been reopened, new journals and publications have
been issued, and academic seminars have been held regu-
larly.
The Academy is also trying to meet its need for
young, well-trained scientists. To this end, it has
emphasized the importance of upgrading the China Scien-
tific and Technical University, once the main center for
training physicists and engineers. The university was
once located in Peking, where its students could work
at the Academy of Sciences, but was moved to Anhwei Prov-
ince during the Cultural Revolution. There it became a
provincial technical university.
T e Aca emy eci e
university s,ou o er new, more specialized courses,
institute new enrollment procedures for students, and
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stress academic performance as well as political reli-
ability. In addition, it declared that the university
should become primarily a center for scientific re-
search and that its main job should be the training of
research scientists.
Many of these reforms are badly needed. Since the
Cultural Revolution, the Academy of Sciences and the
China Scientific and Technical University have been
fraught with problems. Research programs have been dis-
rupted and, in some cases, halted. Some of the Academy's
institutes were disbanded, and others were moved to the.
provinces or subordinated to other agencies. Many of its
scientists were dismissed or sent to work in factories or
communes. In one of the research offices of the Peking
Astronomical Observatory, for instance, 33 out o_f 38
scientists and technicians were forced to leave their jobs.
New scientists recruited by the academy were often poorly
trained and incapable of doing sophisticated research.
The recent reforms, although helpful, solve only a
few of the problems facing Chinese science and technology
and often skirt the most basic difficulties. Unless, for
instance, the China Scientific and Technical University
is returned to Peking where its students will have access
to the facilities and resources of the Academy of Sciences,
many of the reforms there are likely to be short-lived.
The dilemma facing the Academy of Sciences and China's
science and technology in general is that a large number
of intractable problems have to be solved before the sit-
uation can be substantially improved. Not only do re-
search programs have to be restored, but incompetent
people hired since the Cultural Revolution need to be
weeded out, competent scientists need to be trained,
communications between scientists throughout the country
need to be improved, and blurred lines of authority in the
scientific establishment need to be clarified. Because of
the neglect that education and science and technology have
suffered over the past decade, solution of these problems
is likely to require a number of years.
RP AC 77-021
30 August 1977
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ORPA
Party Constitution: Promoting Discipline and Stability
The constitution adopted by the 11th Chinese Party
Congress contains specific measures that seem calculated
to promote discipline and stability in the party. Most
of the measures restore procedures that were part of the
constitution adopted during the eighth Party Congress,
the last one before the Cultural Revolution. That con-
stitution did not prevent the excesses of the Cultural
Revolution, and the factionalism that followed, largely
because the constitution was ignored. The reintroduction
of some of the provisions of the earlier constitution
indicates that the current leadership is committed to re-
storing some aspects of pre - Cultural Revolution politi-
cal norms. The principal changes in the constitution
involve procedures by which new party members are re-
cruited and some adjustments to party organization.
Membership
The new constitution reintroduces:
-- A one-year probationary period for candi-
date party members, during which they can-
not vote or hold party office.
-- An interview with candidate members by a
representative of a party committee an
echelon above the one that recruited
him.
-- A requirement that high-level party offi-
cials review and approve disciplinary ac-
tions taken against party members.
The reintroduction of the probationary period and
the interview seems intended to prevent the easy packing
of the party with members of a particular political per-
suasion, a tactic the purged leftists are accused of
having used in 1976. The leftists recruited many who
normally might not have survived a screening by higher
authorities.
RP AC 77-021
30 August 1977
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While the new constitution makes admission to the
party more difficult, it also makes it more difficult to
discipline party members. The requirement to obtain the
approval of higher authorities to discipline party members
appears to be inconsistent with efforts to tighten party
discipline. It should, in fact, improve party stability
by preventing wholesale traumatic leadership changes at
local levels that have followed political shifts in Peking
in the past. The disciplinary provision may have some
bearing on the forthcoming rectification campaign, which
Peking hopes to keep tightly controlled in order to pre-
vent major disruptions in production and social order.
In particular, the measure may reassure cadre who fear
indiscriminate retaliation because of unavoidable past
association with leftists.
Organization
The chief organizational measure introduced by the
new constitution to improve party discipline at all levels
is the creation of inspection commissions. The commis-
sions will be responsible for "strengthening party mem-
bers' education or discipline, checking on discipline,
and struggling against all breaches of discipline." The
new commissions may be similar to the control commissions
that existed prior to the Cultural Revolution. At that
time, the control commissions had the authority to re-
ceive and investigate complaints against party cadre, a
function which the new inspection commissions may also
assume.
The new constitution also calls for the formation
of "leading party groups" within state and mass organi-
zations. Although the function of the groups is not de-
fined in the constitution, they may serve as party com-
mittees in organizations where such committees do not
currently exist. The groups may be roughly analogous
to the commissar system in the military, which is intended
to temper the independent authority of military commanders
by giving the party another direct line of control over
military units.
Formation of the "leading party groups" may also
presage the re-creation of Central Committee departments
with functional responsibilities for some government and
mass organization affairs. Central Committee departments
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for agriculture and forestry, industry and communication,
and finance and trade were disbanded during the Cultura
Revolution and have never been formally reestablished.
The Other side of the Coin: Combating Commandism
and Bureaucra ism
While the speeches at the Congress and the revisions
in the constitution clearly emphasize discipline, the
constitution nevertheless reaffirms Maoist concerns over
bureaucratic 'work styles, dictatorial leadership prac-
tices, and abuse of power at the lower levels. The con-
stitution, like all those before it, affirms the principle
of collective leadership in which all members of party
committees participate in decisions. It also retains
the right of party members to criticize and bypass su-
periors, although it requires that cadre obey orders even
though they may disagree with party committee decisions.
The inspection commissions and "leading party groups"
attached to government organs, while serving as checks
from above, should provide disaffected party members with
additional outlets for their points of view.
Neither the constitution nor the rhetoric of the
party congress will change the Chinese or their politics.
The stresses of modernization are likely to rekindle the
kind of tension that helped fuel the Cultural Revolution
11 years ago. The way in which that tension is controlled
or relieved will-depend largely on the character of the
leadership in Peking. The new constitution seems to pro-
vide channels through which grievances can be expressed,
and the new leadership is likely to adhere to the provi-
sions of the constitution.
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RP AC 77-021
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Sino-Soviet Trade
Million US$
500 r I I
RP AC 77-021
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Sino-Soviet Trade: No Big Deals
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Overall, the value of Sino-Soviet trade increased
about 50 percent from 1975 to 1976. With Chinese im-
ports totaling $238 million against exports of $178 mil-
lion, the balance shifted sharply to Moscow'
higher prices were largely responsible for the in-
crease. The real value of trade, that is, the volume
of goods exchanged measured in constant 1970 US dollars,
increased only an estimated 15 percent over 1975--a re-
covery from the 30-percent decline in 1975, but still
below the levels of 1972-74 (see figure 1). Average
prices for selected commodities ran about 90 percent
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30 August 1977
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higher in 1976 than in 1974, both for Chinese imports
and exports. The entire increase in trade volume last
year, therefore, was probably due to increased Soviet
deliveries. The volume of Chinese exports may have de-
clined because the Tangshan earthquake tied up transpor-
tation in northeast China in the last half of the year.
RP AC 77-021
30 August 1977
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Secret
Secret
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