THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PROBLEM OF THE TURKISH STRAITS

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• Publication Date: January 24, 1945
• Content Type: REPORT

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/_.
CCINEtitiTIAL
T-516
January 248 1945
TTTE ,g9,211ILiL2iJ.Ai:D THE PROBLE: OF THE
TURKISH STRAITS
1. STRATEGIC DITE}ZZSTS iJL 0VI'l]T ION-
Second only to the Re-)ublic of Turkey itself-and
more'tha any other Great 'Power, Soviet Russia is
directly interested in the problem of the Turkish ?
Straits, since these waters represent a strategic key
of the greatest importance to the Black Sea shores of
the Soviet Union. Traditionally, consideration of the
strategic factors in the region of the Turkish Straits
has centered around the interrelation of land and sea
power. The new factor of air power may, however, funda-
mentally alter the setting of the problem for the
Soviet Union as for other Powei's. A non-riparian fleet
could hardly challenge Soviet air Dower, by entering
the nlack Seal while Soviet air power, based on the
region of the Straits, could dominate Turkey and the
Balkan States, as well as other states in the Near
East. On the other hand, air ?power based on Aegean or
Greek bases could control passage of ,the Straits in ?
time of war.
Strategically, the Soviet Union is interested in
limiting or closing the Turkish Straits to the entry
rt?foreign war vessel:: or aircrft and )reventing
their entry into the. Black Sea, where the Soviet Black
Sea fleet, though the largest in that sea, might be
at the mercy of a.non-riverain fleet or combination offleets. If the Straits are opened freely to foreign
war vessels, the Soviet Union is threatened in the Black
Sea;. if the Straits are closed, the Black.Sea may become
a Soviet lake and Turkey may be subject to the dom-
ination of the Soviet Union. In sum, the strategic
problem which the Straits 'resent to the Soviet UnionIs that of the security of the Blc,eh Sea shores. of
Southern Russia.
II. EC01102:IC IIITERSTS 017 THE SOVIET UNION
The economic interest of the Soviet Union in the
region of the Turkish Straits is as direct as the.
strategic
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stratecic interest.. RuSsian commerce in the, Straits
has been of growing importance especially dulling the
past one hundred years. -By 1913 Russian shipoin
patsing the Straits reched a total of about 1,428,435
tons- (10 percent )0 ranking fourth after Great Britain,
Greece and Austria-Hungary. f By 1914 approximately .
forty percent of Im*erial -Rucia9s total export Commercer?
or about fifty-four percent of its total maritime
exports--went cxo.t through the Turkish Straits, while
seventy-four percent of Russian cereals, eighty-eight
percent of its oil, ninety-three-2ercent of its manganese,
and sixty-one yereent of its iron were ex2orted through
the Straits. 21
In the years im7leaiate1y- following the revolution
of November 1917 the economic interest was somewhat
lessened, though the statistics .of Soviet shipping in
the years after 1024, especially, showed a growing
Soviet trade, until the coming of the 'war in 1939.
In 1924, .for example) the Soviet tonnage was only
17291030 though by 1930 it passed 300,000_ and five years
later was more than 1,60000-00, surpassing the. 1913
Russian tonnage of 1,428,000 and being exceeded only
by the Italian, British and Greek tonnage. V In
the years 19S7-1928, over, eighty percent Of Soviet
%ports and imeorts .)assed over the European frontiers
of the U.S.S.R., including the Straits. The years
after 1935 witnessed a decline in Soviet tonnage in
the Straits, although in 1937 it once more exceeded
10000,000 tons. The war years naturally witnessed a
decline
DrI777517-table in Coln Phillipson and Noel Buxton,
eaulausass..=.13,....u.aaa2arkaeis-
(London, 1917), 232-33 and the tables in T-515.
2) Russian Political Conference. LeagraneWailjellizata
C2Arqr,:Ma .511: 12.2LSOI,
July 5, 1919 (Paris, 1919).
? W In 1908, 368 Russian vessels 2assed the Straits;
in 1028 the figure was 275 and the tonnage about
470,000; in i38 there were 333 vessels of 740,000
- tons.
COZIFIDgi1711111,
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decline. 1/ Under normal 'commercial conditions,
however, Soviet experts from Black Sea .ports, clearing
through Istanbul, fried a considerable proportion
a total Soviet exports. In 1936, they were only about
eight -)ercent by value of the larger total,, but in the
two irevious years, 136 and 1037,? they ran thirty
percent or more. Grain, coal, manganese ore, petroleum
and letroleum products, and licorice root were ohipped
almost entirely from the lac!: Sea region ana were
recorded as they. passed throu:h the Dardanelles. lil
As the Soviet Union recovers from the ravages of
the -resent war and becomes a great industrial as well as
agricultural nation the economic 'illnortance of the.
Straits to the .Soviet Union should materially increase. ?
III. TH OLICY Q TTI OVIET UNION WITH RESPECT TO.
TIE STRAITS
A.Ilbg, HistoricalAgallexawc=.91Q3Lit, policv
In general, the bAstoric olicy,of Russia in the
Turkish utraits has centered around the problem of .
attaining
7?.F.T7o7E-1,Ax-fior7-7EriE-ATnerioan adios:say, Istanbul, Turkey,
January 23, 1941, declared: "Exports from Russian
Plack Sea -ports )assing Istanbul during the calendar
year 1940 showed a heavy decline compared with the
previous year. The only exports made in any consider-
able quantity were cereals to Greece and manganese
,to the United.Stttes. 'Exce,pt for these two products
ether exports fell to an almost nefaigible quantity.
he total volume of merchandise exported during 1940
? amounted to 311,925 tons as against 1,713,405 tons.
durinF the )revieus year. This represents a decline
of 1,401,581 tons."
1,5/ .See E.C. Ro.;)es, "Foreign Trade of Soviet Russia in
1927-1028", ft-? 9 (Maroll- 1029),
318.22; "Soviet .Transit Shipments Through
Commerce Ilgamla March 9, 1940, p. 231, For statistical
data, 1932-1935, concerning Soviet maritime commerce, -
see Centralnoe Ranulezala lkornagg-Koziaistvenam
Uchota Stroit
ma. Tschi3chvglotpplana 333R Legjsmap 1):30 glak.
.1.0iLehtgliu.zz,? Table 43*
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attaining freedom freedom of passage for commerce through the
Straits and of assuring the security of Southern Russia
from hostile attack by foreign fleets passing through
the Strsits into the Black Sea. Although desirous
of barring access to the Black Sea to non-riverain
warships, Russiallae sought to secure the right of
passnge through the Straits to its own fleet. These
desiderata may be secured either through war and outright
seizure of the Straits from the Ottoman Emoire (or Turkey)
or by means of close alliance and understanding between
Russia and the Ottoman Empire.
The modern history of the problem of the Straits
may be said to begin with the arrival of Imperial Russia
on the Black Sea and the conclueion of the Russo-Turkish
Treaty of Kuehl* Kainarji (I774)i which gave Russia
commercial access to the Strsits, though these waters
remained closed to warships, in accordance with "the
ancient rule of the Sultan's Empire." By the Treaty
of the Dardanelles (1809), the British Government agreed
to respect the Principle of cloaure. The Russo-Turkieh
Treaty of Adrianople (1829) confirmed eommercAal freedom
in the Straits, but in 1833 the Russians were able,
through close alliance with the Sublime Porte, to impose
closure of the Straits to foreign warships at Ruseiaas
command, thereby converting the Black Sea into a
Russian lake and subjecting Turkey to Russian domination.
Under British pressure, however, Russia had to
abandon its position, and in the conventions of 1840
and 1841 the Straits were open to the commerce of all
nations
7.-----77?G?ori6SeeS.1.73-357c7i, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles
(Paris, 19/0), 25-81; V. J. Puryear, .Kaglawl, Russia,
and_tbl Straits Elmestion, 1844-1856 (Berkeley,
University of California9:l71)7717.7 E. Mosely, Russian
Diplomacy and the Openiny- of the Eastern Question in and
1C38 (Cambridge, Halyard, 71347 R:77-0-7Fr-iriF7Triesta?e
TO-Policy in the Hear at After the Peace of
Adrianonle; including the Text of the Protocol of
16 September 1829." V Cambridge Historical Journal 3
(1937), 280-90; P. H. Miechef, I...Amer noire et les
Detrolts de Constantinople (Paris, Roussenu, 18n79
694 pp
-
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nations and closed, under established international mile,
to foreign war vessels. The legal rule of closure remained
a nart of the public law of Eurone from that time until
1914 despite the vicissitudes of international politics
and. intervening wars. The Treaty of Paris (1856).
following the CrimeanWar, did not alter the fundamental
rule, though it demilitarized the Black Sea. Neither
the Convention of London (1871); by which Russia regained
the right to arm on the Black Sea, nor the Treaty of
Berlin (1878), made essential changes in this respect;
though the penetration of Germany into the Ottoman
Empire before 1914 altered the political situation in
the Near East fundamentally.
By the early !art of the Twentieth Century Russian
Policy concerning the Straits could be seen in clear
pepspecitve. The negative aim was to nrevent the
installation of a foreign power in the region of the
Straits, for the obvious reason that this would endanger
the security of Russia. The alleged positive aim of
conquest of the Straits by Russia apoeared as a veritable
mirage. Imperial Russia, however, pursued a nositive -
subsidiary aim of close alliance and understanding with
the Ottoman Empire, by which seoarity of passage through
the Straits would be obtained in a manner similar to
that established in the Treaty of Unkiar-Eekeiessi of
1833. Thia Was attemoted both in 1911 and in August 1914,
on the very eve of the World War. If unable to achieve
a nrivileged position, however, Imperial Russia nreferred
the ststus nuo--1.e., closure of the Straits, to the
o'-ening of the Straits to all foreign fleets. 2/
Tsarist
57 See Andre H. Marldelstam, Laolit1aue rusf,e 41gaagb,
11-Mdditerranee la XXe Siecle. Hague. Academie de
droit international. Recueil des course, 1934.
Tomo 47. (Paris, Siroy, 194), 595-802. Also Harry,N.
Howard, The EgEtition of laau (Norman, University
of Oklahoma Press, 193l), Ch sc 1-2.
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Tsarist Russia had no clearly defined policy as
to the attainent of its desiderata with respect to
Constantinople and the Straits until the inception of
the Dardanelles Campaign in February 1913. In the
midst of that campaign, however--the Ottoman Empire
having come into the war in ectober 1914 by means of.
an attack on !?ussia in the Black Sea--the Potrograd
Government, finally demanded and obtained consent te the
annexation of Constantinople and the region of the
Straits, including the Dardanelles the Sea of Marmara
and the Bosphorus, Great Britain gave its consent on
March 12, 1913 and Irance on April 10t 1q15. In returns
Beitish and French commercial interests were recognized,
the British were to have thein-called "neutral zone"
In Iran as. defined in the Anglo-RuSsian Agreement of
August 1907, and the position of France in Syeia Teas_ -
acknoeledged. R/
.B. Soviet EaLee.icet Towards, the .Problem of. the Straits
The policy of the Soviet Union toward the Straits,
since-the Russian lievolutionat 1917 did not alter the
geography of Southern Russia, has not differed funda-
mentally from that pursued by the government of Tsarist
Russia. 9/
The policy of the Tearist Government concerning
the Straits was reaffirmed by Peofesser Paul Miliukov
as Foreign Minster of the 'Previsional Government.
in, April and May 1917. But with the forced resignation
of MiliukoV on May 13, 1917, the Provisional Government
declared for a peace without annexations, without indemni-
ties, and on the basis of the self-determination of
peoples. When the.Bolshevileg seized power on November 6,
? 191, they immediately abrograted "absolutely and
Ct=.111P.Carar.??????.,...
immediately ,
8/ See Howard, Partitim of Turkffe Ch. IV. For the
Anrtuments see: E,A. PeeTe-.47-7e2pcieztle derzhavi I
Gretcis v epokhy mirovoi voini-[The European Powers
and Greece During thrrirni-iif the World War]
(Moscow, 1922). Konstantinopol 1 rolivii (Constantinople -
and the Gt:cal43 OOT96, , volumes);
Razdel Aziatskoi Turtsli [The Partition of Asiatic
10-417-
9/. Paul MIliukov, La .%litioue ext6r1eure des Soviets
(Paris, Librairie gee7irale de Droit et de,Jurisprudence,
1936), 330 pp., passe.
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immediately all the provisions of these secret treaties".
On nublication of the Inter-Allied secret agreements by
the Bolsheviks on November 22, 1917, they declared them
"not -binding for the Russian peonle."
Strictly speaking, the Conference of Paris did not
arrive at a solution of the Turkish nroblem in general
o':0 of the question of the Straits in particular. No
Russian delegation was present, though a group of
Russians associated both with the Tsarist Government and
with the Provisional Government did "resent memoranda
unofficially to the Pence Conference outlining the
Russian asniretions to a mandate for Constantinonle end
the region of the Straits. A new regime of the Straits
was achieved at Sevres, on August 10, 1920, 12/
placing the region of the Straits under the naval
dominance of Great Britain, and designed not only to
keen Turkey in subjugation but to threaten the position
of Soviet Russia in the Black Sea through the'eccess
which it would have given to the British rind other
Allied fleets, ?The Treaty of Sevres, however, coved
abortive thanks to the resistence of the Turkish nation
under the lendershin of Muth a Kamk. The Soviet
Government vas, of course, bitterly opposed to the
Sevres Straits Convention.
Soviet RUSPAP abandoned the so-called imperialism
of the Tsarist regime and attempted to solve the problem
of the Straits through A nolicy of close co-operation
with Turkey, based on the somewhat common interests which
the two countries had in the region ofthe Straits.
This eolicy found expression in the Soviet-Turkish
Treaty of arch 16, 1921, 11/ signed Turkey was
fighttng for its life against the Greeks, who were
supported by the British. For the purpose of guaranteeing
the freedom of the Straits -"and their free easeage for
commercial purposes to all countries", the agreement
-nrovided for the calling of a special conference of the
riverain states, to draft a new convention of the Straits
and the
WlfreatTh?iWgCj.. 11 (1920), Treaty of Peace with
Turkey. Signed at yes,, Ausan 10_, 1920. Cmd, 964.
11/ For text see XVII Current DIA/arm 2 (November 192277
277-79.
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and the the .Black Seas, "on condition that its decisions
shall not prejudice the absolute sovereignty and the
safety of Turkey and of her capital, Constantinople."
That conference res never held, however. Nevertheless,
the Treaty of March 160, 1921 marked the beginning of
Soviet-Turkish collaboretion and .as renewed in 19250
1929 and 1941. A treaty of friendship rather than .of
alliance, it still remains technically in .force.
Soviet Russia vies invited to send representatives
to the Conference of Lausanne, which was to bring the
Greco-Turkish War to an end, only for discussion of the
problem of the Straits. While the British delegation
called for preservation of "freedom" of. the Straits for
both war end commercial vessels under an interntytional
regime which would have given supremecy to the British
fleet, and the Turkish delegation desired to preserve,
Turkish sovereignty over the region of the Straits,
the Russian delegation insisted on Turkish sovereignty,
but called for closing the. Straits to all warships,
thereby converting the, Black Sea into a Russian mare
clausum. Igi The Lausanne Convention of the Straits
TUUT7-740 1923)0 was unsatisfactory to the Soviet
Government, although the Soviet Representative .signed
on August 14, 1923. The Soviet Government looked upon
the provisions of the Lausanne Convention as a constant
threat to Soviet Aecurity in the Black Sea. The Soviet
Delegation at Lausanne held that the new Convention
threatened
12/ In general see Howard0 Partition of Turkey, 285.97.
It is noteworthy that the General Board of the United
States Navy, on November 100 1922, just on the eve
of the Lausanne Conference, declared: "No solution
that imposes. en artificial barrier between so great
a Power Las Ruseig and the sea can contain within
it the elements Of permenency,--of stability."_ See
U.S. Foreign Relations, II (1936), 893-970 for text.
IV For text of the Lausanne Convention see Treaty
Series No. 16 (1923). aeaix at, Elaal with Zuararc
EA other Instruments agagg at Lausanne on ,July 240
1923,0 Cmd. 1929.
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threatened "the "the seoUrity and vital interests" of Soviet
Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia; that it made impossible
the establishment of a stsble and peaceful situation in
the Near East and the Black Sea; and that it would impose
the burden of additional naval armaments on Soviet
Russia and other riverain states and would not,, therefore,
serve the interests of pence. -
Both Soviet Russia, which did not ratify the
Convention, and Turkey were dieeatiefied with the
Lausanne Convention and when Turkey took the first real
opportunity to modify the statua of the Straits, it had
the full suoport of the Soviet Government. This op-ortunity
did not come until the rise of Adolf Hitler threatened
the peace of Europe, and did not take concrete form until
the Montreux Conference of June-July 1936. The Turkish
note of Arril 10, 19369 urging modification of the regime
of the Straits, was especially well received by the
Soviet Union, The Soviet note of April 16 declared that
its views of the Lausanne Convention had not changed, Pnd
In view of the threatening situation the Soviet Govern-
ment considered "quite well-founded the Turkish Government's
apprehension of the dangers to general peace at the
Present moment and the serious menace of var." Therefore,
the desire of the Turkish Government' to assume sovereign
control over the region of the Straits was ouite natural.
In general the Soviet Government supported the Turlrish
demsnd at the Montreux Conference, June 22 to July 20,
19369 1A/ for complete control over the Straits, a
position which Great Britain was reluctant to concede.
The Montreux Convention lp./ affirmed commercial freedom
of the Straits In time of peace end war, even if Turkey
were a belligerent, prol!ided the commercial vessels
committed no hostile acts. In ,-ar, belligerents were
forbidden
ETATE-ST-T7E7Confe'rence de Montreux concemaat le
regime_ des Detroits. 22 124n7-20 luillet 1936.
gomple'rendiides seances plenibres et roc -verbal
des elg_ie.ti du comTITEEEEEE7Er4ge, Belgium, 1936)9
310 pp.
Turkey No. 1 (19361. Convention rigmglag.the RegIme
of Vie atrsaits with Corresponslence rel_atUu Stime_ta.
Montreux, &Tula. 209 1936. Cmd. bgia. See alsoT-539. -
The Montreux Convention of the Straits (1936). .
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.400.
forbidden to use the Straits, excent When acting under
the League of Nations, or under the terms of a regional
pact to which Turkey was a eignatCry and -which was registered
under the Covenant (If the League of Nations. Subject
to a two?thirds vote of the Council of the League of
Nations, Turkey had a right to close the Straits. Naval
vessels of the Black Sea states--primarily the Soviet
Union--were subject to some restriction, but non?rivernin
states were limited to a MPYIMUM of 450000 tons of
light vessels.
The new Convention WPS a distinct victory for
Turkey, for the Members of the Balkan Entente and for
the Soviet Union, and nt the time it altered the Med?
iterranean balance to the disadvantage of Italy. .But
it also added further complication to Turkey's foreign
polioy. No longer was the Soviet Union the only Great
Power on which Turkey would place reliance--for Great
Britain, reluctant though it had been in its final
approval of the Turkish nosition at Montreux, now became
one of the mainstays of Turkish security. Relations
with the Soviet Union, however, continued substantially
unaltered until the outbreak of the .war in September
1939.
C. The Straits, The Soviet Union_ acLy.te and the ',ter
The Montreux Convention remained in formal operation
in the years following 19360 but as the war clouds
gathered, Turkey continued to move, however cautiously,
in the orbit of Gre!:t Britain and France. Following the
destruction of Czechoslovakia by Germany in March 1909
and the subsequent British guarantee to Poland, the
British Government offered to support Greece and RnMania
on Anril 13, and communicated this declaration to
Turkey. At the same time, Soviet Russia, while Maxim Litvinov
still remained at the head of the ComthiesariFt of Foreign
Affairs, aopeered to be trying to organize a Turco? .
Balkan group for the nreeervation of the security of the
Straits and. the Black Sea. 1?.../ On June 23); 1939,
Turkey
UrSuch a solution has 1-een suggested many times--as ?
late as 1911-1912 and 1914 in Imperial Russia. It
was proposed at the Lausanne Conference on December 8,
19220 and in February 1939 by M. Litvinov, as well.
as
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Turkey signed a declaration of mutual assistance with
Great Britain and France which ultimately developed into
the treaty of October 1939.
There is no doubt that the Turkish Government was
somewhat shocked at the seeming shift in the roeition of
the Soviet Union in the signing of the so-called non-
aggression pact with Germany on August 239 1979 on the
eve ofGermany's attack on Poland- The Turks were
further alarmed at the aggressive and expansionist
attitude shown by the Soviet Union in the direction of
the Baltic States, especially in the case of the war
with Finiand,. Moreover, the treatment accorded tIle
Turkish Foreign Minister, M. SaracOglu, on the occasion
of his four-weak visit to MOECOW in September end October
1939, was considered a Studied insult. V. M. Molotov,
the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, explained the
Soviet position with respect to the Straits in his
address bofore the Supreme Soviet on November 1, 1939. 12/
Molotov denied any suggestion of altering the Montreux
Convention for the purpose of establishing "a privileged
position as regards the Straits", but he did declare
that "the subject at issue was the conclusion of a
bilateral nact of mutual assistance limited to the regions
of the Black Sea and the Straits." The U.S.S.R. considered
that the conclusion of such a mutual assistance pact
would
16/ Continued0 as by N. Molotov in the.fell of 1939.
See es-ecially Gabriel Hanotaux, La Guerre des
Balkans et l'Eurone, 1919-1913 (Paris, Plon-Nourrit,
1914), 19?-200; Cmd. 1014 EMI, 159-65; New York
Times, February 80 1939; D. J. Dallin, Soviet
Russia's FLmeLga Policx, 1979-1942 (Neu Haven, Yale,
1942), 105-111; N.-Dascovici, jflon du Boshhore
at des Dardanelles (Geneva, 1915), 299-300.
Without specific guarantees to Turkey, Bulgaria
and Rumania, these powers would run the risk of
complete domination by the Soviet Union and the Black
Sea would become a Russian lake.
12/ For text of Molotov's address see the New York Times,
November 1, 1949, See also Ernest Jackh, The Risin
Crescent (New York, 1944)0 228 ff.
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would help to prevent armed conflict with Germany,
end thought that the U.S.S.R. "should have a guarantee
that in view of a war danger Turkey would not allow
warships of non-Black Sea powers through the
Bosphorus to the Black Sea." Turkey had rejected
these nroposales doubtless because of the understanding
with Great Britain and France and because of its.
fears concerningSoviet policy. Turkeys according
to Molotov, had drifted into the Anglo-French camp
and warned rather directly'that Turkey might come to
regret its pro-British attitude
A few days after his return from Moscov, Saracoglu
signed the Anglo-Franco-Turkiah Treaty of Mutual
Assistance of October 190 19350 la/ pledging that
Turkey would "collaborate effectively with France
and the United Kingdom, and would"lend them all
aid and assistance in its power." This would seem
to have implied use of the Straits, though Protocol
No. 2 declared specifically that Turkeys obligations
,could not compel Turkey to engage in armed conflict
with the Soviet Union. Despite some.va.verings
partly motivated by the ebb and flow of the fortunes
of wars Turkey remained a non-belligerent ally of
Great Britain.
Relations with the Soviet Union percertibly
cooled0 and for a time thn-e were indications of a
possible bargain between Germany and Russia with
respect to the Strnits. Indeed0 in his rroclamation
,of war against the Soviet Union on June 220 19410 12/
Adolf Hitler charged that when Molotov visited Berlin
from
-1?/ See Turkey No ...1 (1939). Treaty_or Mutual
AgalaIgue between His Maleety in resrect of the
United Kingdom, sresident of the French
Republic and the President of the Turkish
Rerublic. Angora, October 19, 1939. Cmd. 6123.
-19,/ For text see ? Adolf Hitler, New Order. Edited
with Commentary by Raoul de-Roi7574-TE-Sales.
New York, Reynal-and Hitohcock, 1941)0 984.
It should be recalled that a German-Turkish
Treaty of Non-Aggression was concluded on June 180
19410 just four days before the German attack
on Rupsia.
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from No ember 11 to l40 1940. the Soviet Cownisser
demanded, among other things, not only a.fundamental
alteration of the Montreux Convention of 19360
but German agreement to "Russia's taking rossession
of the Straits." This, however, was immediately
and explicitly denied by Molotov on June 22i 1941
and by the Soviet foreign office on many Occasion
thereafter. .22/
A few weeks after the German attack on the
Soviet 'Union? the British Foreign Minister, Mr. Anthony
Edene noting the German .propaganda concerning an
alleged arrangement "at the. expense of Turkey",,
told the House of Commons on August 6 that "we would
never agree to anything of the kindt nor had any
suggestions of the kind ever been made to us by any
Party." LI/ Four days later,, on August 10, 22/
the British Ambassador in Ankara, Sir HughblCaatchbull-
Hugessen, and the Soviet. Ambsssndort M. Vinogra(ove
in joint declarations, confirmed- "their fidelity to
the Montreux Convention" and assured the Turkish
Government that they-had"ho aggressive intentions, or
claims whatever with regard to the Straits." Both
governments were "prernred scrupulously to observe
the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic",,
and, moreover, were ready to "rnder Turkey every
hel- and assistance in the event of her being atkacked
by a Eurocenn Power."
Follcwing
gg/ Note especially the statements in the Moscow
Pravda on June 27t 29, October 5, 19410 denouncing
the statement as a baseless lie. But see John Scotto
Duel for Europe (Boston,, Houghton Mifflin, 1942)0
150, 1-ho indicates that Hitler did mention to -
Molotov possible acquisitions in Iran. Iraq, India,
a navel base on the Bosphorus, and a free hand
in Finland.
21/ The London Times; August 70 1941.
gg/ Goodrich-Jonee-Myriest Documents on American
fArglgn Relations,. IV, 666-87. ?
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Following his his return from MOPCOWF in an address of
January 8, 1942, 23/ before the House of Commons, Mr. Eden
reaffirmed the Anglo-Soviet position with respect to Turkey.
"The references to Turkey," he declared, "were In all
resects friendly, end such as the. Turkish Government
themeelves would. have been glad to hear." Turkey had
nothing to fear from an Allied victory. Turkish territ-
orial integrity was in no way meneced by either Great-
Britain or Soviet Russia, ."And the Anglo-Soviet nledges
thet we gave to Turkey last autumn will be fully honoured."
Both eoviet Ressin -nd GrerA Britain telshed'"te sco
Terkey strong and prosperous." Finally, in his reeort
te the Supreme Soviet on June 19, 1942, on the occesion
the ratification of the Anglo-Soviet Trenty of Alliance
ol! May 26, 1942, Molotov specifically dented any desire
for territorial aggrandizement. gii
Desnite
W?Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, No. 377,
Ncx Pb, P.--313.-7VEYToosition wap -confirmed to the .
British and American press representatives in Ankara
on January 13, 1942 by the British Ambassador to
Turkey, who had been with Mr. Eden in MoscoW. For
another aspect of the development of policy toward
the. problem of Turkey and the question of the Straits,
see T-517. Great Britain and the Problem of the
Turkish Straits. -
24/Rausey of the U.S.S.R., Information
Bulletin No. 74, June 2,0, 1942. moica37-Enia?
niTIRTI'statement of November 6, 1941g "We have
not and cannot 11,,.ve ny.fv.?7h wt-zr alm3 ,1 the eeizure
of foreign territories !lid? the subjugation of foreign
peoples, whether it peoples and territories of
Asia, inclndtre Teee.. In the Anglo-Soviet-Iran Treaty
of Alliance of January 29, 1942, Great Britain and the
.Soviet Union we pledged 'tto tho territorial in-
tegrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Iran",
and to withdraw ? their forces from Iranwithin
months after thc,ceznation of hostilities between
them and. Germany. See Louise Holborn, War and Peace.
Aims of the United Nations (Boston, 194-1-)7
The United" States, Great Britain and the Soviet
Union reeeated this ?ledge as to "their desire for .
the riaintenance of the independence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity- of Iran", on December 1,
1943, at Teheran. In part this pledge was intended,
no
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Deipite these assurances ?there was continued
apprehension on the part of Turkey as to Soviet intentior
concerning the Streits. While the -Soviet Union appeared '
reasonably satisfied with the Montreux Convention and
had-guaranteed It,, the Turkish Government feared that at
the end of the war, the Soviet Union might demand additional'
gurantees, which, together with oossile territorial
acquisitions in the Balkan,, would constitute a substantial
Soviet dominance in the Straits. Until the latter part
of 1943 it apnears that Great Britain and the United
States were not urging Turkish entry into the War lest
'its involvement result in. extending German lines into
the Near East and drain United Nations supplies when they
were seriously 'limited. When Ir. Churchill flew to
Adana,,. Turkey for a, conference with President Inona, in
February 1943, after his meetine: with President 'Roosevelt
.at Casablanca, he did not. press Turkey for early entry_
Into the war, but expressed his wish to see "Turkish
territoriek rights and interests effectively preserved"
The British Prime Minister also desired to see "warm 'and
friendly relations" between Turkey and the Soviet
Union. gy
The problem of the Straits does not appear to have
been. discussed, at the Vosco* Conference in October 1943.
Differences in Anglo-American and. Soviet policies toward
Turkey were ironed out at the Teheran Conference in
conversations between Prime kA.nister _Churchill,. President
Roosevelt and 'Premier Stalin, in November 1943, following_
'which President Roosevelt and Prime VAnister -Churchill
held discussions with President Inemt on December 4, 5,
and 6, 1943 in Cairo. 261 Pressure ?wan now annlied to
Antara
no doubt, to 'calm Turkish fears as to the intentions
of 'the Powers, and especially the Soviet Union, in
the -riddle .Easto
25/ For the British position nee Prime Minister Churchill?s
statement to the House of Commons on February 11, 1943,
In III United Nations Review 3 (March 15, 1943)
106-110?.-
26/ See-IV United Nations Review I (January 15, 1944)r
1-3. See.- ai7o New-WiR-Times December 7 12,
1943.
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16
Ankara in order to secure the use of airfields for,
attacks on Rumanian oil centers and to stop the exports
of vital raw materials eseecially chrome, to Germany.
As long as Turkey feared German retaliation for any -
assistance to the United Nations, it refused to accede
to British and American requests.' Ey_i By June 1944,
when military successes of the United Nations reduced,
the German menace, Turkey agreed to suspend chrome
exports to. Germany and to prevent the passage of partly
dismantled German warehios through the Straits." 28/
On August 2, 1944 Turkey broke off relations with
Germany. 29/- By this action Turkey, no deubt, hoped
to secure a voice in the oeace settlement, especially
with respect to thefrontiers of Turkey in Europe, the
balance of power In the Balkan peninsula, and particularly
in the question of the Straits? It le with respect to
the latter two eroblema, in ?articular, that Turkey
is apprehensive concerning the policy of the ? Soviet
Union. If the problem of the Straits should be raised
In the
07--W5M?Eic Churchill An his speech of Eay 24, 1944
severely criticised. Turkish policy, Soviet sources
declared that "Turkey eueplied Germany with ?valuable
strategical raw materials and especially with chrome
ore. Out of 100,000 tons of chrome ore mined .in
Turkey in 1943, 47,000 .tone went to Germany? These
consignments increased in 1944, 'totaling 25,000
tone in the first three months. Consignments to.
Germany of cotton, coeper, oilseed, wool, leather,
etc., likewise reecteed large proportions. The
gConomiste doOrient-in its issue of January 10
stWra?trigt "Germany acquire 90 percent of Turkeys
exports." Pravda, Adgust 7e 1944, cited in
Embassy 'of the ?USSR, Information Bulletin IT.
No. 92 (August 120.191V.
.28/ Numan Monomencloglu,-the Turkish ForeIgn.Minister,
who had pursued a very cautious policy, resigned
on June 15, 1944.following a British. protest over
the passage of German armed. vessels between the
Black and Aegean POiS. See the New York Times,
June 15,? 16, 1944.
- 29/ See the New York Times, August 3, 1944,
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in the future by the Soviet Union, the Turkish Government
no doubt, believes that its chances of retaining the -
control of the Straits, established at Vontreux in 1936
may be enhanced by its, overtures to the United iiatleaan,
While Turkeys,ection was received as another stroke
against Nazi Germany, Pravda (August 7, 1944) struck a
reserved note in assee'SingTurkey's action, stressing
that as late as June ?instances were revealed of Turkish'
authorities permitting German war veseels to pass into
the Aegean sea through the Dardanelles ."? Vic5reover
Thus for auite a long oeriod Turkeys rulers
pursued a policy which in practice was tantamount
to aiding Hitler Germany in the war. And even when
the three?Allied powers?Great Britain, the United
States and the USSR?at the end of last year made
Insistent representations. to Turkey on the necessity
of putting an end to such a foreign Policy, which
was of benefit only to Germany, the Turks refused
to do so This refusal could only make for the
protraction of the war. It Is scarcely necessary
to point out that this policy was to the detriment
of her political and economic relationswith the
democretic countriee. Apparently, this line of
Turkish foreign policy WRS to a large measure due,
on the one hand, to the influence exercised on
Turkieh leaders by the thesis of German propaganda
. that a split In the Allied Camp was inevitab19;
and on the other, by an overestimation of Germany's
chances in this war.
. Although the conferences at Voscow and -Teheran 'bad
"brilliantly demonstrated" the unity and strength of
the "Anglo-Spviet-American coalition, Turkey continued
to adhere to her rormer foreign policy." It was perfectly
obvious to Pravda that the Turkish decision to break
diplomatic Tia?eeonomic relations with Germany "was
dictated first and foremost by the fear that Turkey
would be politically isolated after the -war." It was
al*. "undeniable that the ruptureof diplomatic and
economic relations" with Germany would "cause additional
concern and dieappointmeree to the Hitler Government" and
that this was its "advantageous side for the Allied
countries" Nevertheless, the change in policy was
"extremely .belated and should not be overrated",, .
since the issue of the'war had been predetermined against
Nazi Germany--"tbanke to the heroic efforts of the Red
Army and the Allies, and without any pai-t having been
taken in these efforts by Turkey."- Finally, Pravda
concluded:
In
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In assessing assessing Turkey's decIsion to break off
diplomatic and trade relations with Germany, it should
be borne in mind that even this decision does not
mean that Turkey is joining the states which are
waging a grim fight against Hitler Germany. Nor
should it be forgotten that Turkey is preserving
intact her close relations with Germany's satellites,
especially with Hungary and Rumania, which in alliance
with Hitler Germany are at war with the Soviet
Union and other democratic countries.
In the months following the break in diplomatic
-
and economic relations between Turkey and Germany, the
United States and Great Britain onened negotiations.
with the Turkish Government with respect to the right of
merchant Shins to 'ass ? through the Straits into the
Black Sea rarrying supplies for the Soviet Union, in
accordance with the terms of the Montreux Convention.
The United States Government took the noeition that
since the Montreux Convention -rovided for passage of
merchant vessels under any flag and ,A_th any cergo, -
there was little question as to the right of merchant
vessels to pass through the Straits, even though they
carried a defensiysi armament. 30j It was also thought_
that assurance of the right er Passage and the sending
of supplies VIP the Straits would serve as an element. in
the rehabilitation of Turkish nolitical relationships
with the Soviet Union, in particular, ?and with the
United Nations as a whole. al/ By the middle of
January '945 it was publicly announced that sunnlies to
the Soviet Union were nassing through the Turkish
.Straits. a2/
IV. SUMMARY
Soviet strategic and economic interests in the
Turkish Straits are more direct than those of any other
Great Power
aQ/ See T-537. LazgazateL Merchant Vessels through the
Turirgirgtralte.
El/ it should aleo be noted that the break in diplomatic
relations between Turkey and Japan would serve a
similar purpose.
ag/ See New York Herald-Tribune, January 10, B, 1945.
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Great Power. Soviet policy with respect to the Turkish
Straits re ire fundamentally similar to the policy
Pursued by the government of Xmperial Russia.. The
storic boll c.y of -Depe,rial Russia centered around, the
problem of attnining freedom of nassage for commerce
through the Straits end of assuring the security of
RUESM from ha stile attack by foreign fleets 'clasping
through the Straits into the Black Sea. These desiderata
could be secured either through war end out-right
seizure of the Straits from the Ottoman Empire?or by
means of close alliance and understanding between
Imperial Russia and the Ottoman Emeire. Imperial
Russian tolicy was not necessarily motivated by a desirie
to seize Constantinople and the Straits in order to
attain its ends.
Traditionally the police of the Soviet Union toward
Turkey has rested on the Treaty of Moecow of Yerch 16,
1921, which was renewed ? as late as the enrinfe of 1941.
The aims of the Soviet Union with reepect to the ,
Straits arreer to he.ve been attained in the Convention
of 14o.ntreux of 1936, which both the Soviet Union and
Great Britain aveed to. reseect in August 1941. Doubt-
less the Turkish Government still fears that the Soviet
Union might seek to dominate the Straits either through
some be sic change in the I4ontreux Con7ention to the
detriment of Turkish control or theeough territorial
acquisitions or influence in the Balkan nenins.ula. There
is rt. rresento however, no decisive indication of s
basic change in Soviet noney toward the Straits. 3_1/
3V Note the various rumors 9F to Soviet demands con-
cerning the Straits New York Her.old-Tribune,
November 7, 1944; New York Times., November 7, 1944.
Prepared by:
TS: HNHoward
CONrIDEN TI AL
Reviewed by:
TS: Pnreland
GLionesi, Jr,,
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