GREAT BRITAIN AND THE PROBLEM OF THE TURKISH STRAITS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 24, 1945
• Content Type: REPORT

/ I 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
COtSIFIDENTIAL
onfidential T-517
January 24, 1945
pREAT ILIII5m AND THE PROBLEM OF.THE TURKISH
:TRAITS
I. BRI-ISH STRATEGIC INTERESTS
Since the opening of the Nineteenth Century,
especially, Great Etitain has had a significant strategic
interest in the problem of the Straits?as well as in
the Suez route to India. Great BritaiWs strategic
117
interests have been largely imperial in character and
have been concerned with the preservation of s stable
political situation along the routes to India. 1/
As long asi the Ottoman Empire seemed to serve such a
purpose,. the British attempted to preserve its territorial
integA.ty, and a similar situation obtains in present-
day Anglo-Turkish relations. 0
The Republic of Turkey, like the, former Ottoman
P11.?
Emare? occupies a key position in the Mediterranean,
which is of peculiar interest to Great Britain. Turkey
is the guardian of the Straits and, holds* therefore, ta
the keys to the Black Sea," A large section of the
Baghdad Railway, 'which is on the overland route to
India, lies in Anatolia, Turkey is also an important
state in the Mediterranean, important to the British
position in Palestine, Egypt, and the Suez Canal. In
addition to the port of Izmir (Smyrna), Turkey now has
an excellent harbor at Alexandrettav and Mersin has been
reconstructed.
II. BRITISH 'ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE STRAITS
British economic and commercial interests have
been equally significant, since, for decade's, British
shipping exceeded that of any other power. In the use of
the Stratts. British shipping predominated in the
Straits
X7 See especially Halford L. Hoskins, British Routes to
India (New York, 1928); Vaughn Cornish, Great
Capitals: an Historical 21a4Eaphy (London and
New York, 1923),
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
,
?2?
Straits following the last 'Awid War until 1927.
Italian tonnage exceeded that of Great Britain for the
first time in 1927, a condition which prevailed until
1936, when the British once more took the lead until
1939. In general, British tonnage in the Straits has
exceeded 2,500,000 tons annually, although in 1930 it
was more than 3,6000000 tons g 2/ The following is an
indication of British commercial use of the Turkish
Straits:
(Registered Net Tons)
1913
1924 1926
4
g 1932
1937
2
: 1938
valk?*????11.11...
1940
Ships ;
972: 848: t 101950 10235: 282
Tonnaget503700781aa9840783::09150053206470770:206010497:208900184:693,040
Percen?: 37.5 25.9
tage of: 37.5 25.9 20.7 15.1 20.0 : 26.8 : 21.7
Great Britain had been an important traderwith and an
important investor in the old Ottoman Eipire, and it remained
a significent importer of Turkish goods and a supplier of
materials to the Turkieh Republic. 3/ Nevertheless,
British Trade with Turkey fell well below that of Turco
German commerce in the inter?war period. While Germany,
for example, took about fifty percent of Turkish exports
and supplied about fifty percent of Turkish imports,
Great Britain supplied only 3.4 percent or Turkish
imports and received only 11.2 percent of Turkish exports.
British trade with Turkey was substantially equal to
that of Italy or the United States. The first clearing
agreement between the United Yingdom and the Turkilh
H.epublic was signed in 1935. Until recently Turkey
tended to purchase more from Great Britain than it sold,
and British exports tc; Turkey immediately prior to the
war
27?Yor tables see T-515. The Problem of the Straits.
3/ See especially P. B. Dartilis, Le robrYme de la
dette 21abil.s_iue., des ttate balkaniques Paris, 1936)0
ch. VI.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
war were were under the credits scheme, outside of clearing.
Toward the close of 1938, for instance, arrears reached
19700,000. In June 1938 Great Britain made a loan
of IC 6,000,000 for armaments, while the Germans extended
a credit of 150,000,000 Rm.
It is significant, too, that in its program of
industrialization, the Turkish Government entrusted
Great Britain with most of the work related especially
to military and naval security, such as the coalworks
of Zonguldak, the iron and steel works of Karabuk.,- the
power stations, harbor and port installations, the
naval base at Geleuk, the deep-water piers opposite the
island of Oyprus, the harbors at Mersin and Alexandretta,
and the shirbuilding works for the Turkish merchant
marine. 4/
III. BRITISH POLICY CONCERNING THE STRAITS
A, Backgrounds of British r_21.1....?.cy.
So far as Great T4ritain is concerned, the campaign
of Napoleon in Egypt (1798-99) may be said to have
opened the Todern phase of the Eastern .Question, although
Russia had reached the tilack Sea permanently in 1774
and by the Treaty of'Kuchuk ral.nardji had won the right
for its commercial ships to pass through the Straits.
Similar rights were extended to the commercial vessels
of other powers, but the Straits were closed to warships
according to the "ancient rule" of the Ottoman Empire,
which Great Britain agreed to reapect in the-Treaty of-
the'Dardanelles of 1809,
The Nineteenth Century witnessed a struggle over
the problem of the Straits, in which the primary contest-
ants were Imperial Russia and Great Britain. Though
other elements and other nations were involved, 5/
the
Jackh, Thellisin Crescent (New York,
Farrar and Rinehart, 1944 241-42. Warships were
also ordered from British shipyards in 1939 and a
contract for the Dardanelles fortifications was awarded
to a British firm and British engineers served as
advisers.
ji/ For the American position see T-390. The United
States, and the 2,mill...on of the Turkish Straits. 9 pp.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
the history history of successive conventions may, perhaps, be
summed ur in the Anglo-Russian rivalry. Russia desired
that the passage of the Straits be open to its warships
and closed to OtheM. while Great Britain desired that
the Straits.be closed to warships and opened only to
commercial vessels. If the Straits were orened to
warships, the British desired that British ships have
access to the Black Sea. The Russians, on the other
hand, 1,:ou1d have made the Black Sea a Russian lake safe
from the menace of the British fleet. Russia, for a
brief period, by the secret provisions of the Treaty
of Unkiar Eskelessi in 18330 received the right of its
war vessels to pass through the Straits, which were to
remain closed to the war vessels Of other rowers. That
position, however, had to be given up, because of the
pressure of Great Britain, in the conventions of 1840
and 18419 which once more closed the Straits to foreign
vessels of war. The legal rule. of closure. remained a
part of the public law of Europe from that time until
1914 despite the vicissitudes of international politics
and intervening wars. The Treaty of Paris (1856)9
following the Crimean War, did not change the rule,
though it demilitarized the Black .Sea. Neither the
Convention of London (1871), nor the Treaty of Berlin
(1878)0 made essential changes in this respect, though
the penetration of Germany into the Ottoman Empire
before 1914 altered the rolitical situation fundamentally. 6/
From the beginning to he end of the Nineteenth
Century, Great Britain remained a firm supporter of the
territorial integeity of ;he Ottoman Empire and opposed
Russia in the question of the Straits. With Germany
playing a basic economic and political ?Ole in the Otto-
man Empire, Great Beitain ceased to hold to the policy
of supporting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as a
necessary
6/ In general see Latex la. la (laza). Treaties aaa
Other Documents Relatiatg,totje Blagk ggab the
Dardanelles and the gsaphprus, 1535-1878. (Trans7-
1ations), Cmd. 1953, See also V. J. Puryear9
England, Russia, and the Straits Question, 1844-1856
(Berkely, University of California* 1931).
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
-5=
necessary position and sought to gain advantages in
case of a partition. 7/ Moreover,, partly in view of
a possible German threat in the ,Eastern Mediterranean
after the beginning of the Twentieth Century, the
British position with respect to the passage of Russian
warships through the Straits began to change. On
February llb 1903 the Committee of Imperial Defense
went on record "that the exclusion of Russia from the
Straits as not for Great Britain a primary naval or
military interest." The Director of Naval Intelligence
reported:
It may be stated generally that a Russian
occupation of the Dardanelles, or an arrangement
for enabling Russia to freely use the waterway
between the Black Sea and he Mediterranean 4 such
as her dominating influence can extract from
Turkey at her pleasure, eould not make any Marked
difference in our strategic dispositions as com-
pared with present conditions.
Although conceded.in principle at this early date, it
eas hoped that a concession to riussia in the matter
of the Straits need not be made, and if made,, only for
other concessions on the part of Russia. Britain
did not
pSee Howard, Partition of Turkey, 4? ff.
See the decision of the Committee on Imperial Defense
regarding the Straits, February lls 1903. Memorandum
by Sir Charles Hardinge. Memorandum respecting the
passage of Russian warships through the Dardanelles.
Foreign Offices November 15s 1906; British Documents
on the S211.girns. of the War, IV, 59-60. Sir James
Headlam-Morley, Studies in Apismatic History (New
Yorks King, 1930TTraorical Adviser to the Foreign
Offices notes, however, that "the answer is very
carefully restricted and only deals with the naval
position as it was In the very unusual collocation
of the time, and naturally does not imply that the
oeening of the Straits would not have serious- strategical
Importance in the future. So far as it goes, however,,
this clearly gave freedom to the political handling
of the Question." [242]. Headlam-Morley also
declared that there was "little analogy between the
Suez Canal and the Straits", because the Straits
gave access to Constantinople, where as the Suez
Canal was "far removed from all the vital parts of
Egypt"
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
did not have to make any concession in the matter of
Straits to Russia either in 1907 on the occasion of the
conclusion of the iWglo-Russian Agreement of August 300
1907 or during the period of the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-
1909 because of the relative weakness of Russia following
the Russo-Japanese War and the ReTolution of 1905.
Nor did Great Britain cope to the surport of Russia
in the problem of Turkey and the Straits on the eve ,
of the World War of 1914-19180 when that problem was
raised In acute form with the sending of the Liman von
Sanders military mission to Turkey by Germany.
During the World War of 1914-191R: however: Great
Britain was forced to accede to the Russian demands with
respect to Constantin4p1e and the Straits, although
it wa's not until after the British campaign In the
region of the Dardanelles had begun that Russia made a
definite and formal reouest. On March 12, 19150
Great Britain acknowledged the Russian claim to Constanti-
nople.and the Straits, in return for which Russia was
to revect British and French commercial rights in
these waters, and Great Britain ,as tr have the neutral
zone in Persia on the basis of the 1907 agreement.
France gave its reluctant con@ent to the Russian demands
on April 10, 1915. 9/
B. British E2112y. in the.Inter-War Period
The end of the World War brought about an entirely
new status to the Straits. The Russian Revolution of
1917 forced Russia out of the war and forced its surrender
of the rill,hts to Constantinonle and the Straits according
to the secret treaties of 1915-1917& The Armistice of
Mudros (1918) gave Great Britain a controlling influence
over
W-H. N. Howard The Partition of lulu, Ch. IV. The
agreement with respect to Constantinople and the
Straits laid the ground for the treaties partitioning
the Ottoman Empire In the pariod of 1915-1917: in
which Great Britain took a leading rO1e0 obtaining
Mesopotamia (Irao) and later on, ralestinz, both
of which were ultimately assigned to Great Britain
as mandates.
. CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
over the the destinies of the late Ottoman territories,
including the Straits, and the Treaty of Sevres (1920)
was to seal British dominance. 10/ The Sevres Treaty
not only partitioned the Ottoman Empireand subjected
the Turkieh portions to drastic. controls, but set up
a rigid "international" control over the Straits.
Though theoretically Constantinople remained Turkish,
the Straits were "to be open, both in peace and war
to every vessel of commerce or of war and. to military
and commercial.aireraft, without distinction as to
flag." But the Treaty. of Sevres, because of the revolt
of the Turks under Mustafa Kemal Atathrk, and the success-
ful war against the Greeks between 1919 and' l22,
proved abortive. Under Atathrk's leadership a national
government was established at Ankara, which in its
National Pact of April 23, 1920, declared that the
security of Constantinople being guaranteed, freedom
of the Straits for commerce would be assured.
The Conference of Lausanne (1922-1P23) 11/ ended
the Greco-Turkish struggle, recognized the complete
independence of Turkey, and provided a new Convention
of the Straits. At the 'very beginning of the discussion
of the problem of the Straits, Lord Curzon, the Eritish
Foreign Minister, described his conception of the
permanent factors in the problem of the Straits: igi
1. The
10/ TreatySeries No. U. (1920). Treaty of Peace with
Turkey. Signed at Sevres, August, 10, 1920. Gmd. 964.
11/ Turkey. Ira- 1 (122a) LAILearine g.gallEtrIlt on Elg
Eastern Affairs 192?,12u. Cmd. 1814. Mini stere
des affaires etrangeres. Republieue francaise.
ulLt _pc _Tits. r) 0 Ilk,. Loa ta Conference desan
lee affaires du Proehe-Orient (1922-1923
Recueil des aotes de la conference. Paris, Imprimerie
nationale, 1923. PremieFW-WETW7-Tomes I-IV;
Deuxi'eme aerie, Tomes I-II.
12/ Cmd. 1814 n 141-42
t? 0
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
1. The primary interest in 'these waters, from the
point of view both of economic life and security
ateainst attack, of the littoral States of the
,Black Sea, both great and small, and the
necessity of giving equal consideration to
the interest of all those States.
2. The eharacter of the Dardanelles, the Sea of
Marmora and the Bosphorus, as an international
highleay for the commerce of the world between
two internatiOnal seas, and the necessity,
thereforep-of treating it, as far as possible,
in the same manner as other international
waterways, whether, rivers, straits or canals,
With a view to assure the freedom of peaceful
commerce.
3. The existence of the capital of Turkey and
the seat of the Caliphate on the shores of this
waterway.
Three theses with respect to the Straits were
presented at Lausznne, and there was no real intention
on the part of Lord Curzon to treat the Straits like
.other international waterways, -such 'as, for example,
the Suez Canal.- The old struggle between Russia and .
Great Britain Was now resumed with the Soviet Government
playing the rble of the Tsarist regime. The British
thesis concerning the Straits, intended to preserve the
"freedom" of the Straits, under a kind of international
control, would actually give a position of dominance
to the Britiels.flect. The Turkish r)roject, preserving. -
Tureish sovereignty, gave a eestrieted rreedoT in the
.
Straits. The Soviet plan rise reecerved Turkieh sovereignty
but closed the Straits to T:arsnips, - th the Black - ?
Sea remaining virtually a Russian mare clausum.
In the end, the Convention of Lausanne guaranteed,
essentially, commercial freedom ofAhe Straits, with
pertain restrictions in war tire. War vessels, which
any one Power, in time of peace, might send through the
-
Straits, were not to exceed the strength of the most
-powerful Black Sea fleet--the Soviet. However, the
Powers
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
?
Powers reserved reserved the right at all times and under all
circumstances to. send not more than three warships
into the Black Sea, none to exceed 10,000 tons each.
Hostile acts in the Straits wera forbidden, but even
if Turkey were at war, neutral vessels were alloved
freedom Of passage. The sone of the Straits was de
militarized, though there .were certain excertions,
Constantinople,- for instance, being allowed a garrison
of 12,000, a naval base and an arsenal. To enforce
these provisions an International Commission of the
Straits, under the League of Nationsand composed of one
rerresentative each of Turkey- (President), France,
Great Britain, Italy, Jananr Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia,
Rumania and the Soviet Union, was established. While
Turkey had desired an individual and eeillective.guarantee
if the Straits were demilitarized, the Powers refused.
Instead they merely' offered, in case the security of
the Straits were menaced, to get together by all the
means which the 'Council of the League of Nations might
suggest. Turkish security was not guaranteed. More-
over, the Russians looked upon .the Straits provisions
as a possible threat to the shores of the Black-Sea.
The Turkish Government accepted the Lausanne -
Convention, and, although it desired revision, the ,
question was not pressed until the meeting .of the Con-
ference for the, Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.
On May 2,, 1933, Tevfik Mast& Aras, the Turkish Foreign
Minister, after analyzing the problem, and after private
discussiene with Sir John Simon, the British Foreign
Minister, proposed that "a CoAaittee should be set up
consisting of all the riparian States of the Black
Sea and the Mediterranean and of the United States of
America and Japan." He, therefore, submitted the
following resolution: 1Z/
The General Commission
special committee, composed
Mediterranean and Blick Sea
.with representatives of the
decides to set up a
of representatives of
riparian States, together
United States of America
and Japan
13/ Lagueof Nations. Records of the Conference for
- the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Series B.
Minutes of the General Commission. II. December 140
1932--June 29, 1933. IX. Disarmament. 1933,
IX. 10. pp. 486-87. '
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
-e10 -
and Japan, to consider the situation of the Straits
[Dardanelles and Bosphorus] as put forward by the
Turkish delegation.
The British delegation,, however, thoUght that onnsidera-
tien of this problem should be deferred, although it
'appeared to be not unsympathetic with the Turkish
position.
When Italy began its march into Ethiopia in 1935,
Turkey, considering itself threatened at least by
implication,, followed by-the British lead in applying
economic sanctions against Italy and in suppert of the
League of Nations. In the fall or 1935 Turkey, along
With Greece and Yugoslavia, in anser to a British
reouest to place their ports at the disposal of a
Great Power acting under the authority of the Lee.gue of
Nations, relied that it would ?fulfil the obligations'
under the ,Covenant." 14/ Subsecnently Turkey asked
the British Government fo furnish it with reciprocal
assurances,- "which were duly convened."
Perhaps the Turkish Government felt that. Great -
Britain's attitude towarl revisinn of the Straits r4g1me
would be altered?in.TurKey's tzvolet (n April 10, 1936
Turkey made a formal recuest.for revision 'of the
Lausanne Con7eeono with a genuine possibility of
succesi. 15/ There were indications that the Turkish
Government, :in the interest of its own security, was
prepared to act alone, In case its request did not
receive favorable consideration. Both the British and
Soviet Governments hastened to accede to the calling
of a conference to consider the problem of reyision.
The conference met at Montreux, Switzerland, on
June 22,.1936 and lasted until July 20. ? 16/ All the
Lausanne signatories were represented except Italy,
which.
14/ ALthA2pla No. .2.(T936). Dis-ute between litlaula&Ar
Italy. CorresPondence in connection with the
AEplication of Article 16 of the Covenant of the
LeEigne of Natfons. Cmd 72.
13/ Stephen Heald and J.W.Wheeler-Bennett, Documents on
International Affairs (London, Oxford, 1937), 645-48Ak
16/ Actes de la Co3F3TqFCe de Montreux concernant le
Eame dei-Detroits. 22 19147-20 12i11et 19366
germIl-rendu d;;-i-G.nces plenieres et pnrsai=verbta
desHdibat.s du co477?technlaue7ti4F:0 Belgium, 1936)0
310 pp.
CONFIDENTIAL,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
which refused to send a delegation as long as sanctions
prevailed and Great Britain kept its mutual ascistance
agreements in the eastern Mediterranean. It was under-
stood from the beginning that there would be a new
:convention, that commercial freedom would be guaranteed9
and that Turkey would have the right to remilitarize
the Straits; but there was fundamental disagreement,
particularly between Great Britain and the continental
Powers, concerning the Turkish right to close the
Straits. When the conference began, Tevfik Raptd Aras,
the Turkish Foreign Minister, presented a draft which
abolished the Commission of the Straits and placed the
zone definitely under complete Turkish sovereignty,
with the right of closure. The project guaranteed
freed= of commerce, but remilitarized the Straits
Non-riverain Powers were limited to 14,000 tons of
warships in the Straits and 28,000 tons in t e Black
Sea. Submarines and civil and military aircraft were
completely excluded from the Straits. The other Powers
challenged the Turkish project though they agreed that
a change was necessary. The Soviet Union attacked those
features limiting the right' of Soviet warships to pass
to and from the Mediterranean, and insisted on a
privileged position for the Black Sea Powers. The
British conter-project, presented on July 6, raised the
tonnage limitations in the Straits and in the Black
Sea and nrovided that in case of war belligerents could
pursue their enemies through .he Straits into the
Black Sea--an obvious threat both to Turkey and the
Soviet Union. The British project also provided that
the Turkish right to close the Straits was to be decided
by a two-thirds vote of the Council of the League of
Nations. It also provided for an Interng1onal Commission
of the Straits. Naturally the British draft aroused the
opposition of the Turkish and Russian delegations, as
well as the members of the Balkan Entente. The Soviet
delegation was so incensed that it was rrepared to
leave the conference. Rumania, now in close alliance
with Turkey in the Balkan Entente, had revised its
Straits policy and came out strongly against
Great Britain. M. Titulescu, the Rumanian Foreign
Minister, accused the British delegation of duplicity--of
supporting collective security and regional pacts at
Geneva lnd then sabotaging them at Montreux0
n the
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
4e.
In the end a compromise was effected between the
British position and those of Turkey and the Soviet
Union, and a new. Convention was drafted by July 20,
1936. 17/ In general, the Montreux Convention
affirmed Commercial freedom of the Straits in time of
peace an war, even if Turkey were a belligerent,
provided the commercial vessels committed no hostile
acts. In war, belligerents were forbidden to use the
Straits, except when acting under the League of Nations,
or under the terms of a regienal pact to which Turkey
was a signatory and which was registered under the
Cevenant of the League of Nations. If Turkey considered
itself threatened by imminent danger of war, it had a
right to close the Straits, subject to a. twoethirds
vote of the Council of the League of Nations. Navfal
vessels of the Black Sea states?primarily the Soviet
Union?were subject to some restriction, but non-riverain
states were limited to a maximum of 45,000 tons of
light vessels.
The new Convention was a diseinct victory for
Turkey, for the members of the Balkan Entante and for
the Soviet Union. But it also added further complication
to Turkey's foreign policy. Since 1921 Turkey and the
Soviet Union had worked in close political association
Great Britain, reluctant though it had been in its
final approval of the Turkish position at Montreux, now
became one of the mainstays of Turkish security, and
within three years entered into an alliance with Turkey.
CO ft=ert. Zarsaia, layeeseu, the Straits and the War
The Montreux Convention remained in formal Operation
in the years following 1936, but as th-T war clouds
gathered, Turkey continued-to move, .however cautiously,
in the orbit of Great Britain and France. Following
the destruction of Czechoslovakia by Germany in March 1939
and the subsequent British guarantee to Poland, the
British Government offered to support Greece and Rumania
(April 13, 1939), and communicated this declaration to
Turkey. On June 23, 1939, Turkey signed a declaration
?of
17177STeY-737-171936). Convention J..ssarding the
lifia;ILLof the straits,WEE?UFFFes ondence
thereto. Montreux, July 20, 1 36. Cmd. 524S Also
T-5150 The Montreux Convention of the Straits, L
(1936)a
C ONFI DENT' AL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
-1
of mutual mutual assistance with Great 'Britain and France
which ultimately develored into the treaty of Oct-
ober 1939,
There is no doubt that the Turlash Government was
somewhat alarmed at the seeming shift in the rosition
of the Soviet Union in the signing of the socalled
non-aggression pact with Germany on August 239 1939
as well as at the aggressive and expansionist attitude
shown in the direction of the Baltic States. When the
Soviet Government suggested "the ecnelusion of a bilateral
pact of mutual assistance limited to the regions of the
Black Sea and the Straits" to Turkey in the fall of
1939, the Turkish Government turned down the project,
and immediately thereafter:concluded the Anglo-Franco-
Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance of October 199 1939. 18/
This pact pledged Turkey to "collaborate effectively
with France and the United Kingdom" and to "lend them
all aid and assistance in its rover." This would seem
to have implied use of the Straits, though Protocol
No. 2 declared specifically that Turkey's obligations
could not compel Turkey to engage in armed conflict
with the Soviet Union.
Throughout the war, Turkey, despite some wavering,
partly on account of the ebb and flow of the var on
Turkish national interests, has remained a non-belligerent
ally of Great Britain. Turkey's Primary concern was
the maintenance of its territorial integrity, independence,
and the opportunity. 1.0 build up a new country free from
outside interference or economic domination. On Italy's
entry into the war on June 109 19409 Great Britain
and France asked Turtey to implement the Treaty of Mutual
Assistance of 1939, but on June 26, Dr. Saydam9 the
Prime Minister, announced in the Grand National Assembly
the decision not to take any such action, which might
involve Turkey in possible hostilities with the Soviet
Union (Protocol 2). The Turkish Government was of
necessity reassessing the political and military situation
following the defeat of France in the summer of 1940.
It was believed in Ankara that the Soviet Union desired
joint control of the Straits with Turkey and possibly
One or
18/ Tti-ii73-77,77707Tf939). Treaty of Mutual Assistance
between His la...,Lts12 in respect to the United
ungq2a, the President of the French haublic and
the President of the Turkish anyjall.a. Angora,
October 10, 1939. Cmd. 6123.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
-14-
one or more bases in the vicinity. Announcement of
the conclusion at Berlin on September 270 1940 of
the German-Italian-Japanese alliance was received with
some relief in Turkey, partly because it was felt that
the pact -would prepare the ground for an improvement
of Soviet-Turkish relations and even of Anglo-Soviet
relations, possibly with Turkey serving as an inter-
mediary.
Turkish fears of Soviet designs on the Straits were
renewed, following the invasion of the Soviet Union
by Hitler, June 220 19410 four days after the Turco-
German non-aggression pact of June 18, 1941. The
Germans alleged that Great Britain had agreed to
Soviet ambitions in the region of the Straits. On
August 10, 19410 however, Great Britain joined with the
Soviet Union in declaring that 12/
in view of anti-Russian propaganda by the Germans,
His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government
have considered it right to reaffirm categorically
their attitude towards Turkey in order that the
Turkish Government may be under no delusion in the
formation of their own policies towards Great
Britain and the Soviet Union. ?
So far as Great Britain was concerned, the declaration
was "intended to be a simple reiteration" of the engage-
ments involved in the Anglo-Turkish alliance of October 19,
1939. Like the Soviet Union0 Great Britain af-irmed
that it had "no aggressive intentions or claims whatever
with regard to the Straits" and declared that it was prepared
"scrupulously to observe tLe territorial integrity of
the Turkish Republic".
As a result of the decisions taken at the Casablanca
meeting between Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, on
January 14, 1943, some apprehension existed in Turkey
lest the war might extend to regions close to Turkey,
whereby Germany would exert pressure on Turkey, either
to establish a defensive line whi3h might include the
Straits or to permit passage of troops under the pretext
of meeting an Allied offensive through Turkish territory.
Mr. Churchill
19/ Goodrich-Jones-Myres, Documents on American foreign
relations, 1941-19420 V, 686-87.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
-15-
Mr. Churchill, therefore, telegraphed President Inftet
on January 26, expressing a desire to meet him, with
the primary object of going further into the auestion
of strengthening Turkey's position through the supply
Of eruipment, Prime Minister Churchill, at the conclusion
of the meeting at Adana* January 309 1943, declared it
Was the wish of Great Britain to see Turkeys "territories,
rights and interests effectively preserved",- and its
particular desire to have "wart and friendly relations
established between Turkey and our great Russian ally
to the northwards to whom we are bound by a twenty-year
Anglo-Russian treaty." 20/
Notwithstanding pressure on Turkey to grant bases
and to stop shipments of vital raw materials, particularly
chrome, to Germany, the Republic of Turkey* without
concrete assurances from the Allies and without possession
of the promised war material, continued to stress its
policy of neutrality, with preservation of its alliance
with Great Britain.
In such a policy the Allies found much to criticize.
Early in June 1944, Great Britain officially protested
against the use of the Straits by German warships which
had been employed in the Black Sea. a/ When Mr. Eden
announced in the House of Commons on June 14, that
Great Britain was profoundly distrubed by the fact that
the Turkish Government, by allowing German vessels
to pass through the Straits from the Black Sea into the
Aegean, had helped to increase German naval strength
in that region, Numan Menemencioglu, the Turkish
Foreign
20/ For text III United Nations Review 3 (March 15* 1943)*
106110. AWress to the House of Commons, February 11,
1943. Present at the meeting were President In8nik*
Premier Saracoglu, Foreign Minister Menemencioglu,
and Marshal Fevzi gakmak? among others.
. 21/ New York Times, June 6, 1944
C0NFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
Foreign Minister, who was directly responsible for the
policy, vas forced to resign. 22/
The resignation of Numan Menemencioglu accelerated
the development 'ofTurkish rolicy toward a break with
Germany, which took place on August 20 1944. 23/
Although the Soviet Government was distinctly reserved
in its attitude toward the Turkish break with Germany,
Prime Minister Churchill announced the break in relations
with Germany, with apparent satisfaction in hie address
to the House of Commons on August 2. 24/ This act, in
Mr. Churchill's
227 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons. Official
itsamt. Volume 400, No. 90. -Vednesday, 14th June,
19440 cols. 1986-88. The vessels which were passing
through the Straits-were of two types. The first
were known as Y. T. vessels, of about. BOO tons,
with a normal armament of two 3.7 inch guns and
machine guns. The second were E. V. S. craft, of
about 40 or 50 tone, with a normal armament of one
three pounder, machine guns and depth charges.
The former could be used for transport of troops
and supplies, the latter for various purposes,
ineluding submarina chasing. To obtain passage,
the Germans dismmaeld their armament, which was
reinstalled on reaching the Aegean Sea. Mr. Eden
said: "Both classes of vessel must. ..be regarded
as either men-of-war or auxiliary vessels of
war, the passage of which by a belligerent through
the Straits in time of war is prohibited under
Article 19 of the Montreux Convention."
EA/ New York Tlinek August 3, 6, 1944.
24/ For text see New York Times, August 3, 1944. The
United States welcomed "as a step toward full
cooperation with the United Nations in their struggle
against Nazi aggression today's decision of the
Turkish Grand National Assembly to sever diplomatic
and economic' relations with Germany". For the
Soviet comment see Pravda, August 7, 1944.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
-17-
Mr. Churchillas opinion, had infused "new life into the
alliance we made with Turkey before the war," and if
Turkey were attacked by Germany or Bulgaria, Britain
would mace common cause with Turkey. Mr. Churchill Also
hoped that the Turkish break with Germany would
contribute to the continuity of friendship of Turkey
and Russia"..
In the months following the break in diplomatic
and economic relations between Turkey and Germany, the
United States and Great Britain opened negotiations
with the Turkish Government concerning the right of
merchant ships to pass through the Straits into the
Black Sea carrying surplies for the Soviet Union, in
accordance with the terms of the Montreux Convention.
The United States Government took the position that
since the Montreux Convention provided for passage
of merchant vessels under any flag and with any cargo,
there was little cuestion as to the light of merchant
vesaele to paae theeen tin! Strifp and no special
agreement would be necessary even though they carried a
defensive armament. 25/ even though they carried
assuranee 02 aee eiaae of T)aecaze- encl_ the sending of
suppliee via the straits would eerve as an element in
the :ehabiliation of Turkish polit;Ical relationships
wleni the Soviet Union, in particular, and with the
United Nations as a whole. 26/ By the middle of
January 1945 it was publicly announced that supplies
to the Soviet Union were passing through the Turkish
Straits. 27/ ?
IV. SUMMARY
British strategic and economic interests in the
Turkish Straits have been of great significance since
the period of Napoleon. Throughout the Nineteenth
Century Great Britain was engaged in a Secular struggle
with Imperial Russia over the problem of the Cttoman
Empire and the regime of the Straits. While Imperial
Russian
-137?Fe77:5717-1297;gTh of Merchant Vessels Through
the Turkish Straits. See Press Release No. 6,
January 10, 1945.
26/ It should also be noted that the break in diplomatic
relations between Turkey and Japan might serve a
similar purpose.
27/ See New York Herald-Tribune, January 101 13, 1945.
,CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7
'
-18-
Russian policy centered about the problem of attaining
freedom of passage for commerce through the Straits and
of assuring the security of Russia from hostile attack
by foreign fleets passing through the Straits into the
Black Sea, Great Britain sought to preserve commercial
freedom and at the same time to bar the Russian fleet
from access to the Straits, unless other fleets had
eoual access through the Straits to the Black Sea.
Although the British Government came to the conclusion
in 1903 that passage of a Russian fleet through the
Straits into the Mediterranean would not affect the
strategic disposition of the British Mediterranean
fleet, the British Government did not have to concede
to the Russian ambition until March 1915. The Soviet
Government renounced the agreements whereby Russia
had obtained control over Constantinople and the
Straits, ald in the postwar years Britain and the Soviet
Government, in slightly different form, resumed the
ancient struggle over Turkey and the Straits. Great
Britain was able to assert its principles in the abortive
Sevres Convention of 19200 and In the Convention of
Lausanne of 1923 both of which rreserved commercial
freedom in the Straits and both of which theoretically
enabled Great Britain to dominate the Straits. Great
Britain reluctantly accepted the Convention of Montreux
(1936), which preserved cothmercial freedom, but established
a basic Turkish control over the .Straits. However,
while during the early years of the inter-war period
Turkey and the Soviet Unionwere in close understanding,
'following the Montreux Convention, Turkey and Great
Britain drew more closely together, and in 1939 entered
into an alliance, Great Britain aupears satisfied
,Ath the Montreux Convention, and together with the
Soviet Union, guaranteed to respect it, in August 1941.
Although British interests in the Straits are probably
somewhat less than they were in the Nineteenth and the
early part of the Twentieth 'century, mutual interests
still bind Turkey and Great Britain, and it is 'probable
that Great Britain will continue to be satisfied with
the regime of the Straits established at Montreux.
Prepared by:
TS: HNHoward
CONFIDENTIAL
Reviewed by:
TS; PWIreland
GLJones? Jr.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/13: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500030009-7