THE CHANGING SCENE IN SOUTH KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06C02121R000100020002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 2, 1970
• Content Type: NIE

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SECRET NIE 42-70
2 December 197(25X1
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 42-70
The Changing Scene in Sout
Submitted by
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
2 December 1970
SECRET
N? 314
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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State and Defense, and the NSA.
Concurring:
Lt. Gen. R. E. Cushman, Jr., USMC, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Dr. Ray S. Cline, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, the Director; National Security Agency
Abstaining: ?
Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, for the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Com-
mission and Mr. William 0. Cregar, for the Assistant to the Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
GROUP 1 ,
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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CONTENTS
Page
CONCLUSIONS ..................................................... 1
DISCUSSION ............... ........................................ 2
I. THE BALANCE SHEET . ........................................ 2
H. THE NORTHERN CHALLENGE: A NEW DIRECTION? ............ 6
III. THE SOUTHERN RESPONSE .................................... 8
A. Continuing Reliance on the United States ........................ 8
B. East Asian "Anticommunism" ................................... .9
C. Approaches to the Communist World ..............................9
D. The Korean Question ........... 10
IV. SOURCES OF INSTABILITY . ....................:.............:11
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THE CHANGING SCENE
IN SOUTH KOREA
CONCLUSIONS
A. South Korea's position on the Korean peninsula has improved
considerably in recent years. It has had a long period of political sta-
bility. The economy is booming. Its military strength poses a sub-
stantial deterrent to any North Korean invasion. And South Korea's
international position is notably stronger than that of the North. The
planned withdrawal of one US Army division from South Korea will
not of itself significantly alter this balance.
B. North Korea, probably in part responding to these changes and
to the evident failure of its military confrontation tactics, has changed
its line of attack. Terrorism and paramilitary action have been de-
emphasized. North Korean efforts to build a base for political sub-
version in South Korea, as well as diplomatic activity abroad, both
appear to be increasing. Pyongyang probably hopes by a more "peace-
ful" approach to weaken support for the vigorously anticommunist
Seoul regime in world (especially American) opinion, and to play on
the, natural desire of many South Koreans for closer North-South
relations.
C. South Korea is likely to respond to Pyongyang's more flexible
tactics by some very tentative approaches of its own toward East
Europeans and the USSR. But major direct moves to ease tensions
with North Korea still seem far distant in view of Seoul's enduring
hostility to and fear of the Korean communists. For some time, South
Korea will be most concerned to maintain firm US security commit-
ments, to retain some US troops on its territory, and to strengthen ties
with fellow non-communists in East Asia, especially Japan.
D. Only South Korea itself could give the North a significant open-
ing for its political subversion efforts. Pyongyang will be alert to ex-
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ploit suspicions or misunderstandings between Seoul and Washington-
especially Seoul's fear that the US might abandon it to its enemies.
Perhaps even more important, the strong Park regime has kept Korea's
old political ills under control but has not really cured them. Economic
troubles, Park's increasing authoritarianism, problems in finding a
successor to Park, or even an apparently diminished threat from the
North which reduced incentives for national unity, all might make the
South Korean political situation less stable. In such circumstances,
North Korean propaganda and subversion might begin to have more
impact than has been the case to date, and the North might be tempted
once again to reintensify paramilitary action and armed subversion
against the South.
DISCUSSION
1. During most of the time since World War II, South Korea has constituted
a serious problem of one kind or another for US policy. Simple economic
viability was long a worry-recovering from the ravages of wars, establishing
the basis of a modern industrial society in a traditionally agricultural and
resource-poor land, and much of the time fighting the twin handicaps of ruinous
inflation and pervasive official corruption. Political life has been no less troubled.
The shortcomings of Syngman Rhee's regime during the 1950s led to his over-
throw in 1960. Under the brief experiment with free political. activity which
followed, the perennial factionalism of Korean political life degenerated into
mounting public disorder. Major General Park Chung-hee and his military
colleagues who seized power in 1961 put a stop to that. But they were slow to
win genuine popular support, even after they converted themselves into a civilian
government in 1963. And throughout these years, South Korea has lived under
the shadow of the hostile North and its powerful Communist backers. In the
last few years, however, changes taking place throughout Park's reign have
culminated in a quite impressive position of strength.
I.- THE BALANCE SHEET
2. President Park, although lacking the more flamboyant qualities of leadership,
has slowly achieved dominance of South Korean political life and the acceptance
of his- countrymen by virtue of solid accomplishment. He has skillfully maneu-
vered among rival power brokers to give South Korea a prolonged period of
political stability-authoritarian, to be sure, but more subtle in application
than during much of Korea's modern history. He also has overseen an economic
development program, centered on labor-intensive export industries, which has
made most South Koreans better off than ever before. Since 1964, South Korea's
real gross national product (GNP) has increased at the remarkably high rate
of 12 percent a year,. while industrial production has grown 19 percent and
exports 41 percent annually. The South Korean economic scene has drawn the
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high, if grudging, praise of one Japanese businessman that "they are. where we
were 15 years ago."
3. Under Park's supervision, South Korea has developed one of the most
competent and professional civil and military government structures in Asia.
Its army, the fourth largest in the world, is reasonably well equipped through
US aid programs, and its officer and non-commissioned officer corps has re-
ceived leadership and combat experience in Vietnam. Moreover the younger
officers now coming into leadership positions are better trained, and seem less
rent by regional and personal factionalism and more imbued with profession=
alism, than were their predecessors. The civil bureaucracy also has gained in
effectiveness. A large infusion of fresh blood following the military coup of
1961 has installed young men, well qualified by academic training and experi-
ence or by military service, in key positions.
4. Progress also has been made toward international acceptance. One of
the most difficult problems was resolved on at least a formal level with the
1965 treaty normalizing relations with Japan. Since then, Japanese capital has
played a vital role in South Korea's economic growth. Suspicion and outright
dislike of Korea's sometime conqueror persist; but there nevertheless is a grow-
ing recognition within the leadership in both countries of common regional
interests. An encouraging feature of the relationship has been quiet cooperation
in the exchange of intelligence. Other advances toward international status
have been South Korea's acceptance in regional groupings, such as the Asian
and Pacific Council (ASPAC) and the Asian Development Bank. Its partici-
pation as an American ally in the Vietnamese war has given it a sense of pride
and self-confidence which may prove as important as the more tangible military
and economic benefits that participation has brought.
5. These very successes have created potential problems. South Korea has
relied heavily on foreign loan capital to finance its economic boom, and in the
process has accrued massive foreign debts. In normal circumstances South Korea
should be able to handle these debts. But it is highly vulnerable to international
economic conditions. A serious world-wide recession, or the loss of US markets,
or anything which frightened off foreign investors, could undermine the whole
delicate structure of rapidly growing exports to earn the money to repay
the loans which make possible in the first place the industrial growth to pro-
duce the exports to earn the money.
6. There also are inequities in the distribution of South Korea's new prosperity.
The rural areas lag in educational opportunities, housing, and health and other
government services, as well as in actual income levels. Even in the booming
cities unskilled wages remain very low, and the pressures of rapid urbanization
could aggravate worker resentment at the prosperity of South Korea's growing
middle class. The "revolution of rising expectations" is not yet a serious political
problem in South Korea, but the ingredients are there.
7. Finally, South Korea's political stability rests too much on Park himself,
and on a feeling of threat from the North which makes Park's strong rule seem
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acceptable. Park's very success. in dominating South Korea's political life has
served to stunt the growth of democratic institutions, or the development of
independent political leaders. There is no effective political opposition. The New
Democratic Party (NDP), chief candidate for that role, is weak and divided.
Park's own Democratic Republican Party is allowed little role in policy making,
and even the implementation of policy is primarily in the hands of military
men, with whom Park still identifies far more than with civilian politicians.
Corruption still is an integral part of the governmental process, making the
possibility of new national scandals ever-present. Park's heavy-handed rigging
of elections he surely would win, even if they were free and fair, serves
further to discredit the democratic process. In sum, while Park is careful to pre-
serve the forms of parliamentary process, including a considerable degree of
free speech and a relatively independent press, there is little real sharing of
power or deep-felt public identification with the regime.
8. Of itself, this. may not matter too much. Democracy is a foreign plant in
South Korea, with shallow roots in the cultural traditions and emotions of the
people. Personal and family ties still rate higher than any concept of impersonal
law or broadly based political parties, and Confucian paternalism runs directly
contrary to ideas of shared or diffused power. Stability, order, economic progress,
and relative freedom from government harassment mean more to all but a very
few Koreans than parliamentary processes, and on these counts Park delivers
handsomely.
9. But Park (however understandably) has been unwilling to designate an heir
apparent, and his skill in playing even his own supporters off against one
another has kept any individual or group from emerging as an obvious potential
successor. The powerful South Korean Central Intelligence Agency and the
Army command are suspicious, even hostile, rivals. Kim Chong-p'il, the guiding
political genius of the regime's early years, is able and aggressive and has
something of a personal following. But this alone makes him suspect by many,
and he can no longer count on Park's support for the succession. When Park
chose to amend the Constitution last year, to enable himself to run for a third
term as President in 1971, he forfeited an early opportunity to oversee the first
orderly transfer of power in the Republic's history. Should that transfer take
place when Park is unable to supervise and control it-i.e., after his defeat
or death-continued stability probably would depend on whether the chance of
circumstances threw up another individual who could impose his will on the
congenitally feuding Koreans.
10. And Park's own dominance is based to an unhealthy extent on the wide-
spread sense of threat from the North, which the government has at least in part
purposely exaggerated. If this threat should recede-if national unity no longer
seemed quite so crucial-a wide range of destabilizing tendencies could emerge.
Relations with North Korea might become a controversial issue. Students-tradi-
tionally regarded by themselves and many others as the "conscience of the na-
tion"-might be less willing to tolerate government corruption and limits on
political freedoms. Trade unions might be more openly restive about government
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control. Ambitious individuals in the political parties or the military might hope
to use such sentiments to challenge Park's virtually total command of, South
Korean politics.
11. Indeed, very tentative signs of such political stirrings already are evident.
Kim Tae-chung, the young and aggressive NDP Presidential candidate for the
1971 elections, is mounting a surprisingly vigorous campaign by criticizing Park
for-among other things-"creating this atmosphere of tension and horror .. .
to prolong the life of [his] regime in the name of national security and anti-
communism." Kim does not now appear to be a serious danger to Park; many
among the large crowds who apparently relish hearing him attack the President
would not in fact want to substitute his untested abilities for the security Park
has demonstrated he can provide. But such criticism could intensify Park's ten-
dency under stress to withdraw into a distant authoritarianism, at times paralyzed
by indecisiveness and at times impulsively over-reacting. If Park should take re-
pressive measures against Kim or other critics which seemed out of proportion to
the threat, he could further fuel the incipient discontent with his authoritarianism.
12. On balance, however, we think that South Korea should be able to cope
with its problems and maintain a relatively strong position for the next few years
at least. South Korea's strengths are especially impressive when measured against
the apparent failings of the North. All our evidence indicates that North Korea's
economy is doing badly compared with the South, and its political and military
apparatus has been disrupted by a seemingly endless succession of high level
purges.
13. The planned withdrawal of one US division from South Korea-about
20,000 of the presently authorized total of 63,000 men- will not of itself signifi-
cantly alter the relative military balance between North and South. The South
Korean military has shown increasing skill in coping with North Korean guerrilla
infiltration efforts. With US air and logistic support, South Korea should be able
to successfully defend against an all-out North Korean attack.' In the hypotheti-
cal situation where North Korean troops were joined by Chinese, the South
(again with only US air and logistic support) is capable of holding off the com-
bined forces for about a month. In fact, South Korea's military position vis-a-vis
the North should be further strengthened by the $1.5 billion equipment moderni-
zation program which the US intends to provide over the next five years.
14. Nor will South Korea's economy be markedly damaged by the planned US
troop withdrawals. US military spending, which includes Vietnam-related items
as well as money brought in because of troops actually in South Korea, has con-
tributed on the average only about 15 percent of the real increase in South Korea's
GNP during the 1965-1969 period. This share has been steadily declining with the
expansion of South Korea's economy. The loss of about 20,000 US troops will at
most slow down South Korea's (conservatively) estimated 10 percent annual
growth during the next several years to a still highly impressive 9 percent, and
'See Annex for a discussion of North and South Korean military capabilities.
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will cost Seoul roughly $50 million a year in dollar earnings. This loss is relatively
small when compared with South Korea's export earnings of nearly $1 billion in
1970, and its $400 million annually in foreign capital inflows. It will not have much
balance of payments effect so long as exports continue to climb rapidly.
II. THE NORTHERN CHALLENGE: A NEW DIRECTION?
15. The North Koreans seem to have read the balance sheet in much this way,
and have revised their tactics against the South accordingly. The immediate cause
of this tactical adjustment seems to have been the failure of their experiment with
paramilitary tactics and terrorism from 1966 through 1968. Such large scale
disasters as the Blue House raid and the mass landings at Ulchin on the east
coast, far from encouraging the people of the South to rise in "people's war", only
stiffened the South's resistance, while justifying the presence of US troops in the
eyes of the world. Since early 1969, the rate of incidents along the Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ) has dropped by over 80 percent. Meanwhile, the emphasis of Pyong-
yang's efforts has shifted to the infiltration of agents for political subversion-i.e.,
to recruit agents, organize cells, and to develop the political base for revolution in
the South. Kim 11-song has recently signaled the continuation of this policy by
warning that the people of the South must take the responsibility for their own
revolution; the road ahead, he said, will not be an easy one.
16. While shifting its emphasis from armed to political subversion against the
South, North Korea has also resumed its earlier campaign for international status
and influence. An extensive effort is under way, particularly in Africa, to open
trade and diplomatic ties. Denunciations of the UN's role in the Korean Question
have again become somewhat more ambiguous. Attempts also have been made at
least to seem more flexible on relations with the South. North Korea has revived
earlier suggestions ranging from such limited steps as mail exchanges and visits
between members of divided families, to a non-aggression pact, mutual troop
reductions, and even a confederation of the two Koreas, each keeping its differ-
ent social and political system. Pyongyang's constant demands remain the with-
drawal of all foreign (i.e, American) troops from the peninsula and the ouster
of the Park government by the South Korean people.
17. All in all, North Korea seems to be showing its peaceful face at the mo-
ment, both to the South and to international opinion. Kim doubtless hopes to
exploit the natural desire of many South Koreans for better relations with the
North. These shifts in military and diplomatic activity are reflected in new
propaganda emphasis from the North. "Peaceful reunification" is once more the
key phrase, with nation-wide elections possible if only (again) the foreign troops
would leave. While it is granted that military means may eventually have to be
used to achieve reunification, Pyongyang now claims to foresee this as a re-
sponse it will make only when the South Koreans themselves rise up in revolt
against their foreign oppressors and the native puppet government.
18. We have very little evidence as to why this change in tactics has come
about, and still less about how long it might obtain. But speculation about the
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"why" does give some indication of "how long." For a start, Pyongyang's openly
aggressive tactics were obviously not working. Far from weakening the South
Korean regime, the evident threat was serving to solidify support for Park and
acceptance of his strong rule. Nor was North Korean brinkmanship generating
international pressure on the US to withdraw from Korea. Quite the contrary:
it demonstrated the need for continued US military presence in the peninsula,
while both Peking and Moscow were clearly reluctant to back up North Korean
adventurism. With Pyongyang's two potential' backers feuding between them-
selves, the North Koreans could not count on receiving the level of support nec-
essary to further pursuit of the high-risk policy.
19. And North Korea had mounting problems at home. We already have men-
tioned its economic failings, and the purge in late 1968 of key military and intelli-
gence leaders.2 We are not sure whether these men were eliminated because their
policies toward the South had failed or whether Kim 11-song got rid of them for
quite other reasons (most likely because he feared they were or might become
a threat to his total control of the military) and then used them as scapegoats
for an unsuccessful policy. Whatever the true reason for the purge, it seems likely
that a need to regroup and rebuild at home would further diminish Kim's en-
thusiasm for an aggressive policy toward the South which was not working
anyway.
20. Kim furthermore can reason that his newer "peaceful" approach is having
some success. His diplomatic offensive has thus far won recognition from a few
more African and Middle Eastern states. More important, the Japanese have been
encouraged to hope that North Korea may be ripe for their "bridge building"
efforts, and are likely to increase economic and even political contacts. Most of
all, Kim's present course is in keeping with the current fashion of detente. He can
hope that in the absence of a clear military threat, international and even South
Korean support for Park's fiercely anticommunist government will weaken.
Indeed, he may see the planned reduction of US troop strength in the South as
consistent with his present policy, if not an actual consequence of it.
21. What we cannot estimate with much confidence is Kim's own volatile
personality. His desire for the international limelight and his apparent tendency
to act hastily and emotionally when he feels his position threatened, together
with a real need to buck up the spirits of the North Korean populace and recon-
cile them to continued economic and political hardships, all may make it difficult
for him to hold steady on a "peaceful" course. At any time he thought it oppor-
tune, and with very little warning, Kim could revert to a paramilitary approach
toward the South. But insofar as evidence and logic are useful guides in such
a situation, it seems to us likely that for some time to come North Korea should
calculate that it has little to gain from aggressive military tactics on any signifi-
cant scale against South Korean forces.
2 Those purged in 1968 included three of North Korea's five Army Group Commanders, the
Minister of Defense, the Army Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the Army's Reconnaissance
Bureau.
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22. Pyongyang probably will indulge in military spectaculars from time to time.
These. might be directed at US targets in and around the peninsula if the oppor-
tunity arises-something like the Pueblo or EC-121 incidents-rather than at
South Korea itself. Kim would hope to erode American interest in defending
South Korea and to shake South Korean confidence in our willingness to react
sufficiently vigorously, as well as to demonstrate that his quarrel is not with
South Korea as such but with the "foreign oppressors" whose presence prevents
better North-South relations. There might also be attempts at political assassina-
tion in the South. These probably would be designed to appear to be the work
of South Korean "freedom fighters", rather than North Korean military actions.
Ill. THE SOUTHERN RESPONSE
23. North Korea's more flexible tactics present a more complex and possibly
confusing challenge to the South. It is a competition South Korea is eminently
qualified to win, provided it has confidence in its considerable strengths vis-a-vis
the North. We think it increasingly has. South Korean estimates of the impact
of the' proposed US troop withdrawals on the actual military balance largely
parallel our own. But their frequently expressed concern that North Korea might
miscalculate the withdrawals, as a sign of diminished US commitment, reflects
their own fears that indeed this may be just the beginning of a general disengage-
ment policy. While gaining in self-confidence, the southerners are not yet con-
vince,d..of the permanence of their "economic miracle." Moreover, they still see
themselves confronted by an implacably hostile North Korea and surrounded by
three neighboring giants-the Soviet Union, China, and Japan-who are un-
friendly or at best untrustworthy. And they worry about the Americans who,
they feel, once before withdrew troops from Korea too soon.
A. Continuing Reliance on the United States
24. Thus a continuing attempt to elicit further American assurances of military
support-in writing if possible-will remain the cornerstone of South Korea's
foreign policy for the foreseeable future. The South Koreans feel strongly that
they are and ought to be an exception to the Nixon Doctrine. Seoul will continue
seizing any opportunity to press for a bilateral guarantee of "automatic" US
response to an attack or, failing that, for a regional security alliance. In the
past it has tried such approaches as a "PATO" modeled on NATO (which some
South Koreans seem to believe commits the. US to automatic response in West
Europe's defense), an ABM system with the US providing the weaponry and
the countries within range of Chinese missiles the real estate, a security system
among the countries contributing troops to the allied side in Vietnam, or expan-
sion of ASPAC into a military alliance. Most recently, the Nixon-Sato commu-
nique of-Noveinber 1969 raised South Korean hopes of a security system with the
US, Japan, and Taiwan. The common theme in all these regional efforts-we
believe the central South Korean aim-is not so much to improve cooperation
with Asian neighbors as to get the US ever more securely bound to South Korea's
defense.
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25. The same motive is present- in South Korean thinking :about Vietnam.
reports that some influential South Koreans have tried to think of
ways to prolong or expand the war may not at all reflect Park's official policy.
But he almost certainly takes comfort from a situation in which US and South
Korean soldiers are allied in common anticommunist cause, and he has real appre-
hensions about anything that diminishes this active and lucrative cooperation.
B. East Asian "Anticommunism"
26. So long as they are reasonably confident of the American commitment,
the South Koreans are likely to play their strong hand quite skillfully in diplo-
matic and economic competition with the North. They have more money for
investment and for purchase of raw materials, and South Korean diplomats are
not feared as a subversive element in the countries with which both Koreas
would like relations. Seoul naturally will give first priority to strengthening ties
with fellow non-communists in East Asia. Taiwan, and at least for the 'present
Thailand, see Asian security problems in much the same light as does South
Korea. Some ROK officials have even talked of offering South Korean troops to
Thailand, especially if it became necessary to withdraw them from South Vietnam.
Such an offer no doubt would be contingent on US bases and personnel remaining
in Thailand; Seoul is not interested in taking on purely Asian entanglements.
27. Relations with Japan are likely to grow especially close, if not. warm and
friendly. Japan's economic stake in South Korea is high and growing, and with
it inevitably comes some political influence. A whole network of political, intelli-
gence, economic, and military exchanges is developing between the two at various
levels of government and commercial life which may lead to a sort of big-and=
little-brother relationship over the years. The South Koreans find their relation=
ship with Japan galling, but useful, and expect the US to protect them from
Japanese economic and potential military aggressiveness. If. the US, shield were
removed, the South Koreans might be confronted with a choice between accept-
ing a Japanese "protectorship" and coming to terms ::with the North. We think
they probably would choose the .Japanese alternative; but the process of making
a decision would provoke strong emotions and divisions within South Korea.
C. Approaches to the Communist World
28. South Korea also is edging cautiously toward a different relationship with
neutralist and even communist states. This is still very much in the talking stage
in Seoul, and is in large part a defensive reaction. Seoul clearly is worried about
US efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union, even alleging that this
restricts the US from moving to check North Korean aggressiveness.. Now the
West Germans, with whom Seoul has believed it had psychological affinities
and similar interests, seem prepared .to compromise on their divided-nation prob-
lem. At the same time, South Korean officials talk of a need to block North
Korean diplomatic efforts throughout the world. Park appears responsive to the
argument of some of his advisors that South Korea will be "isolated" in inter-
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national opinion if it continues to seem so intransigent toward the communist
world.
29. But South Korea's evaluation of its own strengths and needs also appears
to be slowly changing. Seoul's protests about Japan's economic and other dealings
with the North have an increasingly formal sound, as though South Koreans-
while still not liking Japanese-North Korean exchanges-no longer see them as
such a serious threat to their own interests. Superficially at least, Korean develop-
ments might follow the German model (albeit a decade or so behind) of both
sides working for a lessening of tensions and specific improvements in relations
while reunification remains impossible. But so long as Kim 11-song is in power
in the North, and the Korean War generation in the South, a fundamental hos-
tility. to and fear of North Korea will persist. A crucial difference from the
German situation is that the South Koreans have been through a bitter war with
the North and still feel physically threatened.
30. The South Korean version of detente is therefore likely to remain a matter
of very small steps, far behind those of most other non-communist states. Diplo-
matic relations may be established with countries which also recognize Pyong-
yang. Sporting and cultural delegations will be exchanged with East European
states. And South Korea's stringent anticommunist law may be amended to permit
trade with some communist countries.
31. Progress in this direction will be very slow indeed. Seoul will have trouble
finding suitable goods to trade with communist states, and reconciling the tradi-
tional communist preference for barter trade and long-term deferred payments
with its own desire for immediate foreign exchange profits. It certainly will not
want to seem to lessen whatever obstacles other nations still feel to dealing with
North Korea. Furthermore, it will want to be very careful about undermining
the solid anticommunist front of the South Korean populace.
D. The Korean Question
32. The relationship with North Korea is a more important and much more
difficult problem than approaches to other communist states. On 15 August-
the 25th anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japanese rule-Park's surprise
reunification proposal brought at least some propaganda advantage. He de-
parted from previous official statements dismissing unification as a problem
for the distant future. Instead, he challenged the North Koreans to help lay
the groundwork by ceasing military provocations and publicly renouncing the
forceful overthrow of the South Korean Government. The proposal, however,
was hedged about with conditions clearly unacceptable to Pyongyang, which
promptly denounced it. Thus, its main value probably lay in its impact on world
and domestic opinion, with an eye toward both the UN vote on the Korean
Question and the upcoming Presidential election in South Korea.
33. Park's formal airing of the subject did have one unavoidable side-effect-
reunification will be discussed with increasing openness in the South. In an
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effort to control the pace of the blossoming debate, and to assert government
control over it, spokesmen have described plans to allow discussion of North-
South relations by stages: first among "experts", then scholars, then journalists,
then students, ending with general public debate in 1972. Such control will not
be entirely possible, particularly in the later stages. The government's own
statements and actions will make it more difficult to accuse others of having
violated the anticommunist law by merely discussing relations with the North.
34. If North Korean military activity remains at a low level, there is likely
to be some increase of public pressure for more initiatives toward the North.
Even very modest steps, e.g., family visits or mail exchanges, would imply a
tacit recognition of the North quite dramatic in South Korean eyes. But there
will be at least as many important South Koreans uneasy about the whole
venture as there are pressing for greater flexibility. We expect Seoul's detente
efforts to continue to be a matter of one step back for every two forward. And
the issue of US troops on the peninsula will remain of crucial importance to
both North and South, effectively limiting progress toward major rapproche-
ment between them for a long time. to come.
35. Even Seoul's desire to make more friends among more kinds of states
must be seen in context of the priority it gives to relations with the US. Certainly
South Korea would like as many nations as possible in its corner if the US
protectorship were ever weakened or removed. But there really is no palatable
alternative to that protection. Hence any gestures Seoul makes toward North
Korea. will be as much an attempt to demonstrate to Washington that it is not
the South Koreans who are responsible for continuing tensions on the peninsula,
as to prepare for a possible American withdrawal.
IV. SOURCES OF INSTABILITY
36. South Koreans suspect that while Washington may still consider their
defense a necessary burden, it is one for which American enthusiasm is dimin-
ishing. They further worry that the US might want to share its Korean load
with-perhaps even turn it over to-Korea's traditional enemies, the Japanese.
Their suspicions about US constancy should ease as Seoul gains confidence
in its own strengths vis-a-vis the North. For a very long time to come, however,
there will be ample opportunity for misunderstanding. A compromise settle-
ment in South Vietnam, further US troop withdrawals from South Korea or
Japan, efforts to improve US-Chinese relations (including what might be seen
as US weakness in opposing Peking's entry into the UN), all would arouse
South Korean apprehensions that Washington's dedication to the anticommunist
cause in Asia was weakening.
37. There is very little the South Koreans could do about any of these devel-
opments. We cannot rule out a South Korean military provocation in the
DMZ, designed to show Washington that American troops still were needed
in Korea. Moreover, some in Seoul may genuinely believe that they have
much more leverage with Washington than is the case. If President Park,
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who has staked everything on the US tie, feels "abandoned" and exposed, it
might aggravate his tendency to become more authoritarian in his rule and
less accessible to the reasoned advice of subordinates in times of stress. Public
pronouncements as to what the US "must" or "must not" do can expose him
to embarrassment before his own populace, and exacerbate tensions between
the two governments. Any break in harmonious US-ROK relations-e.g., in-
temperate statements by Park which alienated segments of American public
opinion-would aid North Korean efforts to sow distrust and discord.
38. A more serious source of potential instability is the political situation
in South Korea itself. Should the sense of threat from the North recede, the
main justification- for the repression of political life in South Korea would no
longer appear acceptable to important elements in the population. We do not
know what would happen in such a situation, but it could lead to confusion
and struggle and some unraveling of political stability. In such circumstances,
North Korean propaganda and subversion might begin to have more impact
than has been the case to date, and the North might be tempted once again
to reintensify paramilitary action and armed subversion against the South.
39. In sum, the dimension of the threat to South Korea is expanding beyond
the military confrontation we are used to thinking of, into a more complex political
competition at home and abroad. South Korea clearly has the advantage on the
international front. But friction between South Korea and the US, or between
the South Korean Government and its own people, could give North Korea
an opening for more successful political or even paramilitary action in the
South than has heretofore been the case.
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MILITARY ANNEX
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1. Neither the North nor the South Korean military forces could conduct sus-
tained independent offensive operations against the other. Each has the capabil-
ity to launch an attack, but would require considerable outside assistance to con-
tinue operations. Both must import POL, as well as replacements for major items
of equipment such as aircraft, missiles and rockets, tanks, artillery, most vehicles,
and heavy ammunition. Without advance assurances of Soviet and/or Chinese
logistic support, North Korea could not count on sustaining offensive operations
in the South beyond a month or two.
2. The South Korean Army is larger than that of the North-about 548,000
men as opposed to the North's 360,000. The South's numerical superiority may be
offset to a degree, however, by the North's greater number of maneuver battalions.
In addition, individual. North Korean soldiers are armed with the domestically
produced AK-47 assault rifle which is superior to individual weapons in general
use by the South. The North has a larger inventory of anti-aircraft- artillery, large
mortars, truck mounted rocket launchers, and tactical free rocket over ground
(FROG) missiles. The South has a greater number of tanks; the North, however,
has increased its armor assets over the last several years and its tank inventory
includes the T-54 which is superior to any tank of the ROK Army. Both sides are
about equal in number of field artillery pieces with the South having a pre-
ponderance of those of a heavier calibre. Major items of combat equipment in
both armies have been obtained from outside sources and much of it is dated.
There appear to be some changes under way in the organizational structure of
the North Korean Army, which seem to have the effect of reducing the amount
of heavy equipment in some individual regiments while upgrading former
brigade-size units. This may reflect a shift in combat tactics to greater reliance
on light infantry units, but it is not clear how this might affect overall capabilities
in combat against the South Korean Army.
3. The naval forces of each are small and primarily oriented toward coastal
defense. North Korea does have four W-class submarines and 14 Komar and Osa
guided missile boats which provide it with a potential offensive capability. South
Korean navy ships and their equipment are of World War II vintage and their
obsolescence seriously erodes the navy's general combat effectiveness. The South
Korean Navy would be at a tactical disadvantage in operations against North
Korean submarines and missile boats.
4. North Korea still has a great advantage over the South in air power, although
the gap is decreasing with the introduction of F-5s and F-4Ds into the South
Korean Air Force.,' In addition, South Korea has an inadequate Airborne Early
Warning system and insufficient air facilities for effective dispersal of
units and equipment. The ROK Air Force is capable of providing tactical support
to ground and naval forces under visual flight conditions only. South Korea could
not cope with a substantial North Korean air attack without significant US air
augmentation.
'While there are remaining differences within the Intelligence Community with respect to
the North Korean air order of battle, there is agreement as to the general proposition in this
sentence.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This document was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on a
need-to-know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the follow-
ing officials within their respective departments:
a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, for the
Department of the Army
d. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Department of the
Navy
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Force
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
i. Director of Central Reference Service, CIA, for any other Department or
Agency
2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with
applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by
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3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may
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IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
4. The title of this document when used separately from the text should be clas-
sified: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DISTRIBUTION:
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