MILITARY THOUGHT: INCREASING THE STABILITY OF CONTROL OF THE TROOPS OF A FRONT (ARMY), BY MAJOR-GENERAL M. IVANOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000403730001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 4, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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Incre in-: the Stability of Control of the Troors
of e Frcnt (Ara)
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by
Abjew-Goners" ). Ivanov
The first issues of the Special Collection of Articles of the
Jourrel "Waitary Thought" correctly state the prohlem concerning a
review of the postulates of the theory of strate&v, operrational art,
and tactics in light of the revolutionary changes vbinh have come
about in the realm of armament from the moment when nuclear weapons
arid missiles appeared on the scene. In the interests of the further
development of military theory, we mist decisively reject attempts to
adapt old forms and methods of conducting military operatic, to new
conditions, and we must work out comprehensively and profoundly the
problems of modern combat and operations and the structure of the
organizations pertaining tc them, including the control organs.
As is known, the organizational structure of staffs is directly
dependent upon methods of conducting combat operations and of equipping
troops with the means of combet. At the present time, significant
changes have taken place in armament, combet equipment, the natuze of
operations, and the methods of their ccmduct. Ccnsequently, there?
shnuld have been a corresponding change in the crganisation of staffs.
However, this baa not cetne about and in fact our operational organs
of control, from the arganizationel standpoint, still rein at the
level of the staffs of the World War n period.
In the interests of increasing the effectiveness of troop
direction, the or nizationat oerat1o1 staffs must, in our view,
at least correspond to the following requirements:
--to ensure a capability far constant control of the readiness
of missiles, aircraft, and nuclear warheads and of the location
and movement of all objectives of nuclear attack;
--to preclude any lack of ccxrdination in the action of
calm:enders of arum at troops and services; commanders of troops
of the front (army) must stork jointly with their iei
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sutcrainates in one place, controlling and coordinating their
actions; chiefs of directorates and services must decide all
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problems together, and not in isolation from one anorher;
--to eliminPte disunity in the prozessing of date concerning
a situation; all information must be concentrated in one place,
in one organ so that it can be immediately available to the
commander of troops of the front (army);
--to unify control of the weapons of destruction;
--to promote sufficient viability in the control organs.
At the present time, the organizational structure of operational
staffs is based on the same division of labor and distribution of
functions in the staff as existed meny years ago. In this connection,
now as in the past, a great number of elements takes pert in implementing
control of the troops of a front: combined-arms ..,taff with many
independent directorates (departments), the artillery staff, the air
army staff, the PVC staff, the engineer directorate and others. In
their work, all these elements depend upon one another and are
constantly forced to ccem.dimete their actions. If these organs are
located at separate control points, coordination of their actions,
even in accomplishing simple tasks, seriously hampers the work of the
front (army) staff and leads to an extremely greet loss of time.
Consider, for example, the planning of operations. As in known,
the staffs of all the arms of troops, special troops, and services
take part in this process together with the staff of the front (army),
and the planning is carried out on a broad scale. But despite this,
it still is a single, centralized process. Although they act on
behalf of the common goal of the operation, all services and arms of
troops work disconnectedly. As a consequence, planning breaks down:
the operational plan is worked out in one place by one organ, the plan
for the combat use of missiles and the artillery is worked out by
another organ in another place, the plan for the ccmbat use of
aviation is worked out by a third organ in a third place, etc. Because
all these plans are closely tied. in with one another and require
constant coordination during their working out, the planning of operations
extends over a long period of time.
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This principle of DiAnLini: WBS tolerable EL long as the factor
of tire did not play such a decisive role in the control Cf troops as
It does at the present time.
The dynamic nature of operations and the striving of the opposing
sides to seize the initiative will lead to one form of combat operations
rapidly transforming into another without significant pauses. Those
prolonged periods of preparation of operations, which now take place
in our conduct of all types of training exercise, will vanish. Under
these conditions, it is natural that staffs will be required to coordinate
and execute an entire complex of complicated measures, which must be
planned in short periods of time. Decisions must be implemented on
a broad coordinated front, and very rapidly. Consequeatly, an urgent
need arises to speed up and improve the process of planning. It seems
to us, that in order to resolve thi problem, it is advisable to have
a singl. planning center in the composition of the field command of
a front (army).
We carry out the direction of troops and the control of weapons
of destruction in much the same manner as the planning of operations.
present, on the scale of a front: the combat operations of combined-
large units (tank and motorized rifle troops) are under the
ate direction of the staff of the front (army), while the
weapons of destruction are in the bands of the chief of the missile
troops and artillery and his staff, of the commander and staff of the
air army, of the chief of the PVO troops, and of the chief of the
chemical troops. This situation ala; leads to greet inconvenience in
the control of troops and does not promote increased effectiveness in
the work of the control organs.
We consider that unification of the functions of the direction
of trooEs and the control of the weapons of destruction may grave to
be not only beneficial but even extremely necessary.
In the mark of the staffs, the 7.ap1.d collection, processing and
transmission of information materials to command echelons and troops
become especially important. Today, it is extremely important to know
at all times the exact location of all forces and weapcma and their
condition and readiness to fulfil combat tasks. For this reason, it
is necessary that the staffs sharply reduce the time for processing
information.
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However, the existing system for the collection of data on s
situation is multi-staged. Information meteriall as formerly, is
transmitted successisely from one echelon to another: the reglmental
staff tranAmits information to the division staff, which trenseits it
to the army staff; it is only the army staff which informs the front
staff of the situation. All directorates (departments), services and
arms of troops engage in the collection of information at the scale
of the front (army). Therefore, information on the situation ia
scattered anong them. After reaching the front command poet, the data
on a situation are first studied and collated in the staffs of the
arum of troops and the services, then they are reported and re-reported
to various Chiefs, end only after this are they reported to the
commander. In order to have a complete picture of a situation, the
front (army) staff and particularly the operations directorate
(department), in addition to receiving inforeation directly from
tUbordinate staffs, is obliged to collect situation data from the
staffs of arms of trcope and from the services. Coming from various
sources, many of these data are incomplete and contradictory, do not
coincide in time, and require reherkrg and clarification.
111/All this creates excessive red tape within the staff and finally
ds to the fact that the collected and processed situation data do
not correspond to the true troop situation at any given moment. In the
army staff, the data lag behind by 1 or 2 hours, and in the front staff
by 2 or 3 hours. The commander is deprived of the capability to influence
the course of an operation in time, and often makes decisions according
to a situation which,--in reality, no longer exists.
In addition, the content of the information received by each
service aid arm of troops has much in common, and the requests for
these data by various consumers create an extremely heavy load on
subordinate staffs, upset then, and tear them ay from the solution
of other important and complex praises unnecessarily.
The necessity for all services and all staffs of erns of troops
to collect information, which stems directly from the orgenization of
the control organs, leads to the overloading of lines of communication,
necessitates supplementary channels, and involves an increase in the
expenditure of communications resources at control points; this in
turn emkes,the staffs more cumbersome and less mobile. It should also
be noted that all inquiries and reports on the situation and the
operations of the troops are still made by means of message and radio
signal codes, which greatly delays the collection and processing of
information.
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It is perfectly obvious ttt such an infornatiqc system has
cum,letely outlived its usefulness. In order to ensure rapid
reactors by the crrnrind echelon and the staffs to a situation, it is
necessary to ce:Itralize the 2ollection and processicg of information
data. All informatio0 sist be concentrated. in cce organ and be put
cc an overall nep or screen. Eowerer, this can be done only after an
appropriate reorganization of the control organs.
Intelligence should be considered separately. ivy demands
are also being made on it, particularly on the process of collecting
and processing dda on the enemy. Carefully organized and unceasing
intg011ecTioe work has become the guarantee of timely detection of
enme preparations for the use of welaixms of mass destruction. Today,
as never before, the calbet readiness of troops and their ability to
cone1Lct successfUlly combat operations depend on intelligence operations.
The fulfileent of all the tasks assigned to intelligence demands an
even greater centralization of its resources single control, and
firmer direction. Without this, intelligence organs will hardly be
able to play their part.
Even though this is Obvious, the intelligence organs and their
farces and means are still disconnected from the organizational
standpoint. On the scale of a front: not only the intelligence
directorate, but also the artillery staff, the air army staff, the
engineer directorate, the cherdcal staff and others are engaged in
intelligence. A siedlar situation exists in the staff of the army
and im the staffs of large units. All these intelligence organs frequently
work on their own, on behalf of only that arm of troops which they are
called upon to serve, end if some of the information obtained by them
&es become the property of all the troops, it reaches them only after
a ve77:, greet delay.
It is completely understandable that such an organization of
intelligence organs cannot, eerier modern conditions, ensure a high
degree of effectiveness in the receipt of intelligence data. The role
of this service has grown to such an extent that there is a direct
necessity to combine all these organs into a single independent
intelligence cent,e directly subordinate to the commander of troops
of the front and havingall the mama of intelligence at its disposal.
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Therefore, under the existiag organization of the field cornd
of a front (arry,, the efforts of ell its elements are disunited;
this gives rise tc frequent confusidc in the operations of vardcs
arms of troops, complicates coordination of tte efforts of the various
means of combat, ant creates gre,..t difficulty in the rapid assignment
of their conbat missions.
In order to ellrinate these shimt^omings,and to ensure stable
control of troops on the scale of a front (army), it is necessary to
centralize drastically the direction of troop combat operations. The
organizational structure of operational staffs nust be changed
correspondingly
It appears to us that from the standpoint of centralization of
the control of troops and weapons of destruction, the reorgenization
of control organs must proceed by way of unification of all the
directorates (departments) and staffs of the arms of troops and
services which are ccncerned with the direction of troops into single
control centers.
In accordance with this, it is advisable, in our opinion,, to have
within the composition of the field command of a front (army):
--a in command-planning center;
--a nuclear/missile center;
--an operbtionz center;
--an intelligence center;
--a PV0 control center.
The main commandvlanning center must be the basic working organ
of the commander of troops of the front. Here must be united all the
currently existing coutrol organs of the staffs of arms of troops and
the services which are concerned with the planning of operations and
the direction of troops. Al]. the planning of an operation must take
place in this center only. Centralized control of all means of
colhatoincInding ground troops, missile weapons, PVC, and aviation,
will also be carried out from here simultaneously. The complement of
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thls center .1.1.1 include generals and officers fru: all arms of troops
and specialties. locLted at the commnd post, the chi cf of staff
of the front and a:a chiefs who are directly responsible for the
direction of the operation rust be located ir this center together
wit; t,':e cxnnender. For rapid analysis of the situation and decision-
raki, a sinele rtip of the operational and radiation situation, the
aerial situation, and the situation of the FVO,and a sap of''-
grouPing and combat readiness of our missile weapons must be'-
constantly maintained here. These mops should be mounted in a
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vertical position for observation, in the manner of the PVC screen.
In relation to the remaining echelons of the field command
of the front (army), this center will be the directing organ. It
should direct their activity in order to ensure rapid reaction of the
command echelon to all changes in the situation.
The =clear missile center will be E united organ for control 14g
the weapons of destruction of t'?e, front. All the weapons of nuclear
attack must be concentrated in the hands of the chief of this center,
i.e. missiles of all types, bomber aircraft and others, which will
undoUbtedly improve and expedite their use.
Inasmuch as the over plan for the use of nuclear/missile
veappcs will be implemented by the main command-planning center, the
functions of the nuclear/Missile center in this reapect will consist
of making all the essential calculations' for the use of nuclear/Missile
weapons, calculations of the possibilities for neutralizing various
targets, of the safe removal of our tro-p from the ground zeros of
burEta, of the probable degree of destruction of the objectives, etc.
In addition, it must keep track of the movement and readiness of the
adseile weapons of the front, maintain an operational record of the
svsilability and receipt of missiles and the special charges for them,
and maintain a graphic chart of their readiness.
The nuclear/missile center must have direct communications with
all the weapons of nuclear attack and must cocmdAmate all its work
sources of information.
closely with the operations and intelligence centers which are the
The tions center should engage in the collection and
Processing of data on the operational and radiation situation, decide
questions of combat support, implement the transmIssicm of combat
tasks to the troops and control their fulfilment.
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All information on the locetiot and pperations of our troot.s ar50X1-HUM
on the resalts of the uae of nucier weapons by both sides will be
concentrated,sum:eel-feed, and thonoaaaa analysed in this center.
This will permit the creatice of the conditions for the uninterrupted
precessima of ell data on the grcund arid aerial situations and wall
brang about completeness and a high degree of effectiveness in the
collection and preperatiot of data, permitting decisions to be made
rapidly by the commander of troops of the front (army). In order
to achieve rapid processing of inforuation, the operations center must
have direct cummunicatione with all the formatioms of the front.
The activinaes of this center will be conducted through the
chiefs of axes; who must process the data oe the position of their
troops oe the appropriate pperational axes and transmit commands
received from the nein command-planning center to the staffs of the
apprppriate formations (large units) for implementation.
Since our proposed organization of field comeand of a front (army)
assumes the abolition of a number of currently existing services and
directorates (engineer, chemical, and others) and the transfer of
decisions on their problems to the operations center, the functione
of this organ will be much broader than those carried out by the
operations directorete. In connection with this, the operations center,
as well as the nein cemmanr,-planning center, must have a complement
of highly trained generals and officers from the appropriate arms of
troops and specialties.
The intelli ence center is assigned the collection and processing
of all intelligence information. All the intelligence resources of
the front are concentrated in the hands. of this single organ; it must
conduct intelligence work or behalf of all arum of troops and
disseminate informetion concerning the enemy to all centers. For
the nuclear/missile center, the intelligence center must keep an
account of targets (Objectives for nuclear attack), make an evaluation
and general description or them, keep track of the movement of
primary targets, calculate the most advantageous time and place for
the delivery of nuclear strikes, pinpoint the coordinates of the
targets and prepare the initial topogrephic and geodetic data. The
chief of intelligence of the front should be the head of the 50X1-HUM
intelligence center.
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This certer-rust have direct comrunications with reconnaissance
aircraft aloft, with radio reconnaissance means and with other
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Tbe PV,;D control center is designated fo: control of the FVO
weapon:, includin,7 the fighter aircraft of the front. Its mission
will- include directing the 2pulse of mssed enesv aircraft and
rLssile strikes. This center must have direct communications with
all pvo weapons, with the staffs of aviation large units and with the
intelligence center. It should be headed by the chief of PVC of the -
front.
We shall not stop to consider materiel, technical and other
support. It appears to us that their organization Rust also be set
Up in accordance with the same principle.
This organizational structure of the field command of a front
(army), will undoubtedly permit all its echelons to decide more
effectively all the complex problem of troop control which are
concerned with a cern= goal and a single concept . In addition,
such an organizational structure of the operational staffs will
correspond to a greater degree to modern methods of controlling troops,
which are based on the use of the latest control equipment.
In our opinion, the organization of all subordinate staffs must
also be built in accordance with this sere prinCiple.
In order to increase the flexibility of control, along with the
proposed changes in the orgsnizationel structure of the field command
of a front (army), it is necessary to retiev the means and methods of
work of the staffs in the area of collection, annlysi4 and transmission
of inforration data.
Without going into a detailed description of this prObler, we
believe that the information system must ensure that all interested
elements receive the nata on a situation as the events occur. In
order to achieve this, it is necessary to make some changes in the
procedure for sending reports at the level of the division, army and trout.
Along with a periodic presentation, say 1. or 2 tines a day, of the
more substantial reports with a description of the positions and
operations of the two sides which are now presented, it is essential
to organize the transmission of short signals to indicate only the
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lines ottained by the units of the first echelon and the nature of
thsfr combat operations ("1 an adv.ancing",11 ar defending", "I an
withdrawing", etc.). These signals rust be transmitted by the staffs
of lorge units evers.,:3(.; to 40 minutes according to a strictly
es-t--;'zlished schedule.. In order tc send these signals, the division
staffs could take data from the battalions which core in'automatically
through the use of course-plotters 0-rarscirokl...dc.lik) und determine
for every given mOment only se location c: Lhe battalion command
post (the center of the combat formation).
It rust be supposed that this simplification of reporting and
elimination of intermediate elements will permit the staff of the
front to have precise data on the position of the first echelon troops
30 mdnutes after the units reach any line. EXperience from wars and
exercises indicates that these dkita, especially under complex
situational conditions, are sufficient to enable the commander to
react instantaneously to the course of:events.
Ii this connection, reali4y requires the establishment of a
procedure for transmitting informetion by which each command echelon
can relay informstion on the position of its troops and the enemy
directly to the next higher staff: the regimental staff to the army
staff, the division staff to the front staff0'and simultaneously to
relay this information correspondingly to the division and army
' staffs also.
have examined above only one of the questions of incongruity in
ornizational structure of operational staffs due to the changed
nature of combat operations. A second problem, which is directly related
tot nization of control organs and which, in our opinion, is
as ir need of review, is the problem of control points.
The increased ipportance of minterrupted control of .troops
provides a basis for assuming that in future operations staffs will
be one of the primary targets of enemy action. The combatants will
adopt every measure to disorganize the work of control organs and to
diaI:upt the direction of troops. For this purpose, strikes by
missiles or aircraft may be delivered, diversionary groups may be
sent out, and jamming may be conducted against the means of
coarunication. The capability of using nuclear weapons creates a real
threat of instantaneous removal from action of entire control echelons
and large bodies of troops. Therefore; the organization of operational
staffs at be subordinated first of all to guaranteeing their vitality
and ability to retain control in the most complex situation.
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Under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons, this mey be
achieved by creating dispersed, more ramified, and constont1;; opez.stiNe
networks of control points to ensure rapid replacement of points which
have been put out of action, and broad continuity in the Contr61 nf
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In an operational element, the solution to this problem is
reflected by the creation in formations of control points, commend
and forward commend posts, and also rear control points. In this
connection, it is believed that the existence of these points
permits successful control of a large nuxber of troops and weapons
of destruction.
In cur opinion, such an organization and echeloting of control
points in the front (army) ca mot sufficiently ensure their vitality
under new conditions and, consequently, does not promote increased
stability of control.
The creation of several points for the control of front (army)
troops is justified only when each of them functions constantly, is
:Cully independent and is capable of assumIng troop control in the event
that another point is destroyed by an enemy nuclear -trike. Unfortunately,
front (army) command and forward coamend posts, as they are at present
constituted, do not meet these requirements. The basic reasons for
this consist of the following.
In the first place, despite its numerical strength, the T/0 of
the field control of a front (army) does not in fact provide for the
creation of two full-fledged control points. For this reason, oalz,
one independent control element, the command poet, is actually
created in a front (argy). The forward command post is organised by
using the forces and means of the commend poet. In its make-up it is
usually a temporary and poorly organized control organ and, naturally,
cannot fully provide the commander with firm direction of troops in
the event that the command poet is put out of action.
Secondly, the forward command poet is not a constantly functioning
control organ, because it is usually created only for the period of the
conduct of combat operations. During the preparation for an operation,
the generals and officers and the transportation and communications
means designated for the command and forward command poets are usually
located together at the command post.
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It rust r..:t be overlool:ef ti-IA the ener:-:- will seek out and
destroy control points, not only durinE: the course of combet
operations, but alsc durinE the period of preparation for 6r offensive
an.:; during the oreF,nizatioL of defense. For tLit reason, it is quite
obvious that with the personnel and the mac:as cf control of the
command and forward commani posts all located in one place, even for
a short interval of time, there is serious danger of their simaltaneous
destruction and the actuAl remcrilsl froc action of the entire control
of the front (arm which can undoubtedly cause ccup1ete44c,"P-44on
of the control of a large number of troos. 50X1 -HUM
Thireily, the very fact of the creation of a forward comand post
predetermines its place and role in an operation. As is known, it
moves forward on one of the axes, as close as possible to the front,
so that the commander can feel the "pulse" of the combat and observe
it to the extent possible. Almost all the chiefs of directorates
(departments), services, and the commanders of an of troops arrive
at this post together with the commender all commuuicatimA choinnels
are switched here, and in this .manner the center of gravity in the
control of tro,,ps is tremsferred entirely to the forward cnd post.
Thus, because of this, the commend poet, with all the means of control,
becomes an unnecessary attribute arid actually pazticipetes only
indirectly in the direction of troop combat operations.
We consider this to be nothing more than a vestige of the past.
The tendency to rxrre the command and his observation post forward
to the troop combat formations was justified in the years of World War n,
when operations developed relativelzy- methodically? when front
5 foctations and armies had a comieratively shallow operatic formation
or 5 words laissine wens of control permitting direct influence
on the course of operations from coextend posts far removed from the
troops.
Now, however, wi-ieL the nature and conditicms of conducting
operations have changed sharply, such a situation cannot be acknowledged
as correct. In the future, the basic method of condu.eting combat
operations will be mesh nuclear/missile strikes, carried out with the
aim Lf simultaneous mass destruction,nort so much of troops located on
the line of combat contact of the opposing sides, as of objectives
located in the rear area. The center of gravity of combat operations
under these conditions can shift from the zone of combat contact to
the depth of the disposition of front (army) troops. The former
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....Lnear formations and operations of troops will also disappear,
engagements will le conducted on axes and in separate areas, and
operations in the rear area will frequently begin before the
of ground troops frac the front.
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It is perfectly obvious that in making decisions in such a
situation it is ineufficiert to be guided by the picture of combat
on one axis. It order to react, both correctly and quickly to the
course of cachet operations, the commander must constantly be
awre of the entire situation. But this is only possible if, during
the course of the entire operation, he is supported by the basic
personnel of the front staff who are located at the cammerid post in
the area of the in grouping of troops. If, however, during the
course of an operation,the commander is located primarily at a forward
command post on only one of -:-.hs axes, he will be unavoidably detached
from the overall situation and will be unable to influence not only
the development of the operation as a whole but even the moat important
changes which may arise at any moment away from the forward commend
post. Under these conditions it is difficult to ray where the
presence of the commandez will be required first?forward, on one of
the flanks or in the rear of the front's troops.
Deep disposition of front (army) troops, particularly of reserves,
missile units, airborne troops, and the possibility of committing
large units to battle in a hurry frthe depth also make the forward
move of the commander and the forward command post senseless,bacause
ill eseince it causes him to be detached from the main forces. In the
control of troops, emphasis must hOit be placed not CC per80011
Observation of the field of combat and on personal contact of the
front troop commander with the commanders of large units, but on
control frog a distance. Of course, even under modern conditions, the
commander mnst visit certain axes for the immediate direction of --
battle, particularly during the critical moments of the development
Or a,.-.. operation. But this will take place only incidentally and will
not be the system to which we adhere today.
It is also essential to consider the fact tht the evolution of
means of control is prxeeding in the direction of complex automation
of the processes of direction of troop contactivity, and it must be
assUmed that staffs will soon be equipped with automated systems.
However, the relatively large size of these systems and the complexity
Or their apparatus limit their maneuverability and pensit their
effective use 0124 at the command post. i
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Fourthly, the necessity for an auxiliary control point will
often arise in the course of an offensive operatics as well as in
defense, especially when we succeed in breaking up the enemy's
operational formation and in cutting off part of his troops from the
main grouping, and when the operation therefore disintegrates into a
nunber of engagements. However, at present it is impossible to do
this because of the limited capabilities in fcrces and means of the
operational staffs, which are capable of creating only command and
forward command posts from their complement.
And, fifthly, as has already been mentioned, as a result of
changes in the situation,critioal moments may arise on individual
axes in an operationprequiring the personal presence of the commander
and his involvement in the direction of troop combat operations.
But the existing organization of control points and the means of
communications and movement available to the staffs do not permit the
commander to move rapidly to these sectors of the front. The forward
command post is Obviously not suited to accomplishing such tasks since
it is too cumbersome, insufficiently mobile, and it is impossible to
conceal its location in the vicinity or the enemy. However, there is
no other organ for this purpose in a front or army.
Another important condition in increasing the viability of
control points is their reliable security (ckhrana), defense-, and
combat support. The constant threat of the use of nuclear weapons
against control points and the increased possibilities of an attack
on them by maile units of enemy ground troops, diversionary groups,
and airborne-troops,indicate the necessity for havtng sufficiently
strong special organic security and support units for the protection
Of staffs.
Daring World War II subunits and units from the troops were
usually used for the preparation, support, and, frequently, also for
the defense of control points. This led to disengaging combat subunits
from the accomplishment of important tasks at the immediate front and
was not justified. As a rule, temporarily detached subunits and units
were not suitable in their orgatiewGion, equipment, training, and
experience for accomplishing the tasks of preparing end supporting
control points. The productivity and quality of their work was low,
despite the fact that a large quantity or personnel and equipment
was detached, pert of the equipment was not used because of the
impossibility of using it in the preparation of control points, and
work was performed separately and was not united under a single command.
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The situation concerning the security, defense, and support of
control points is also in npproxinately this sane state, even at the
present time. The security and service regiment provided for by the
T/06.I. and attached to the front etaff,and the battalion attached to
the army staff do not have organic, engineer, cnemical, and other
special subunits at their disposal. This situation, as in the years
of the last war, again leads to the fact that it will be necessary to
use temporary and untreined special line units and subunits for the
preperetion, support, and servicing of control points.
Entirely different results can be achieved if these subunits
are united and if on the basis of them, special units are created,
equipped with the necessary weapons, equipment and the other standard
items required for the combat support, servicing, and preparation of
control points. The personnel of these units who are trained in
advance will also acquire experience. Ox the Whole, significantly
greater effectiveness in the use of these &ewe forces and means will
be achieved and the organization and conduct of the security, defense,
servicing, and support of control points will be greatly improved.
The pralem of the direction of the entire security service for
control points and of the maintenance of the required order in them
is still decided by us in the old manner. Up to the present time,
apart from the staff commandants, many staff officers who are
insufficiently trained and inexperienced in this respect engage in
this vork,while having more than one function.
The growing volume of activities and the broadening functions ar-
the commandant's service (komendantskaya sluxhba), as well as the
necessity of carrying it out constantly, have drastically elevated the
role of this service; it has nov acquired the importance of one of the
maim ea.ments in troop control. This circuestance requires
centralization of the direction of the commandant's service, the
placing of a strong independent organ at its head, and the subordination
to it of all the forces and means assigned for the security and
preparation of control points. In our opinion, only with this
condition if: it possible to resoOve more purposefully and effectively
the important pr,jblems of security and defense, of antiatomic
protection, engineer preparation, and the concealed placement and
transfer of control points and tonstantly to maintain the strictest
order in their disposition areas, all of which will directly affect
the viability of control organs.
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Therefore, all these arguments permit a restatement of the
conclusion that the existing organiultioneastrature of operationU
staffs does not provide for the creation in a front (arry) of a rarified
network of control points which in turn does not pracote an increase in
the flexibility and stability of troop control. The argenization of
operational staffs, it appears to vs, must be such as to ensure the
creation of not less than two permanently operative full-fledged control
points in a front (army) for all for of conbet operations and to
provide the opportunity for the commander, in certain cases, to
personally and directly participate in the direction of troops in the
most important sectors.
For this purpose, it is essential, in our opinion, to have two
independent ccotrolcatiaLs in the composition of the field command of
a front and army.
The first is the staff of the front (army), including the basic
I complement of the field command and all the above-mentioned centers.
On the basis of it, it is necessary to develop the command poet of the
front (army) as the primary control point, head-A-directly by the
front(army troop commander.
second is the staff operations group (organic). This
control organ must be somewbat smaller in its composition than the
staff but must have an organisation similar to that of the staff.
As an independent control organ, the group muEt have its own organic
means of communications and transportation in such quantity as to make
1-1t capable of assuming complete control of all the troops of the front
in the event that the command poet is put out of action. Op the basis
of the staff operations group, regardless of the situation, a second
Ierrenent control port of the front (army) Bust be created and headed
by the deputy front am/7 troop commander. Its title and designation
will be determined each time by the specific conditions of the
situation. Therefore, during the preparation for an offensive operation
and in defense, this will usually be an alternate command poet, but
during the course of the operation it can become an auxiliary control
point or can carry out the functions characteristic of the forward
command poet.
In peacetime, the personnel of the staff operations group should
be located aad worked in the appropriate control centers, in order to
facilitate the work and perfect the skills of the officers. During
Ilk
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the training of staffs, this operations group must be prepared and
knii;latitogether as an independent control organ.
For the transportation of the commander and hi E deputy to any
particular axis where thefr personal intervention in the direction
of troop combat operations nay be required, it is essential to have
specially allotted,control vehicles in the T/0106gE of the staff of
the front and the staff operatic group.
For the security and coMbet support of control points it is
advlsableto create apecial units and subunits and to include them
in the T/O of the field control Cf the front (army). In our ppinion,
they should be called EkEtionsy.lpt's units (komendatskaya chest). It
appears to be advisable to Uii?OrgaRT7--c-ommandant's regiments and
separate commandant'S bettalions as the organizational basis. For
servicing the command posts and rear control point of the front, it
is essential to bare a commandant's regiment for each of them; for
servicing the staff operations group of the front and the command post
of the army, to have separate commandant's bettaliona.
For direction of the commandant's service and of the security,
defense preparation, and support of control points, it is essential
to creat e in the staffs comnandaturas (commandant's gnas) with a
complement of 5 to 8 offraTrigatTarby the commandant to Whom the
commandant's units and subunits must be subordinated. These will be
organic, independent, and influential organs which possess the necessary
forces and Means and are capable of maintaining order at control
any conditions.
points and of directing their relocctint, security, and defense under
The daily activity of the commandaturas must be carried out through
permanent duty commandants. In this connection, and also tin the basis
of the proposed changea in the structure of staffs, we consider it
advisable to abolish the operational duty officer in the staffs, particularly
since he is no longer in a position to fUlfil functions concerned with
present time.
the collection of situation data which be has been charged with to the
The presence of organic commandaturas will permit the concentration
of the direction of all measures of security of control pants in one
element and in one place, will bring order to the commandant's service,
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and will significantly elevate its authority. In addition, this will
release many chiefs an officere of staffs fre their involvement
in the orri=nization end direction of the cancandants a service and will
give then the opportunf.ty to spend more time on their immediate duties.
We propose a broad study of the questions which have been raised
and a more rapid realization of the necessary changes in the structure
and methods of work of control organs.
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