MILITARY THOUGHT: THE SUBMARINE OPERATION OF THE NAVE - THE NAVAL OPERATION OF THE FUTURE, BY ADMIRAL YU. PANTELEYEV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000403410001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 21, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Submarine Operation
of the Navy - the
Naval Operation of the Future
by
Admiral Yu. Panteleyev
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In the past war the principal enemy of the fleet at
sea was the aircraft armed with torpedoes and bombs. This
is attested to by the statistics on losses of combat vessels
by the nations involved. Whereas, in a number of instances,
a vessel could evade a submarine and then even pursue it,
the evasion of an aircraft by a vessel was very difficult,
and the overtaking and destruction of a departing aircraft
was completely impossible. It was hindered in this by its
significantly slower speed and by the limited ceiling of
its antiaircraft artillery. In other words, in comparison
with an aircraft, a vessel possessed neither the maneuver-
ability nor the requisite firepower.
The submarine has actually remained all-powerful ever
since World War I.
In our time the aircraft and the submarine have become
the major enemies of that leviathan of combat fleets,
"the king of the oceans" - the battleship. And this
leviathan, which costs billions, has departed from the seas
and oceans in ignominy; all naval powers have stopped build-
ing it. The same fate has also befallen other large combat
vessels. The missile/nuclear weapon has become the basic
means of destruction even at sea. Its development has led
to the division of naval power into two parts: one part,
consisting of nuclear/missile delivery vehicles immeasurably
smaller in size than the old battleships and cruisers,
has taken to the air (jet aircraft); the other has gone
under water, into the depths of the seas and oceans
(the submarine fleet). 50X1-HUM
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We visualize a future armed conflict primarily as a
battle in the air and underwater. Moreover, where air
operations have their own clear-Cut organization and
definite composition, the concept of "submarine operations"
is entirely new and not reflected in our literature, and
has not yet received the "rights of citizenship" in our
naval art. Is this right? It would seem not. This
conviction evolves from the following considerations.
The study of the history of military operations at
sea in past wars must be carried out neither exclusively
nor largely for the purpose of learning and defining the
course and results of the events themselves, but rather for
establishing the new trends in naval art which took place
? in a given war, what the prospects are for their development,
and what results they might produce.
It will be recalled that "submarine warfare" has been
mentioned more than once in naval art. The Germans
especially declaimed about this; nevertheless, neither
in the First nor Second World War, after having declared
merciless submarine warfare against the Allies, were they
able to bring the Allies to their knees. After carrying
out a series of bandit attacks against hospital vessels,
and after gaining, unquestionably, certain operational-
tactical successes, the German submarine fleet was still
unable to achieve any kind of strategic goals with
submarines alone. Although partly disrupted, the supplying
of England proper was not stopped. The failure of German
"submarine warfare" is explained by the fact that their
aubmarines,although able to sink enemy vessels at sea, were
not able to demolish his military economy entirely, to
destroy the basis for the construction of new vessels,
and to crush the antisubmarine defense. For each transport
sunk toward the end of the war, the Allies constructed two
which were more modern.
Thus, in past wars submarines primarily carried out
operational-tactical missions; strategic missions were not
within their power to accomplish, primarily because of the
status of equipment and the organization of the submarine
f ;t of those days. 50X1-HUM
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Is it correct at the present time to raise the
question of the organization of purely submarine operations
as naval operations of the immediate future? It seems to
us that it is. Moreover, a delay in deciding this question
can cause harm to the future increase of the defensive
power of our country.
First of all, let us attempt to define submarine
operations. The meaning of "operation" as a form and
method of achieving operational or strategic goals has
a very definite connotation in our military art; it is
known to the reader and there is no sense in citing it here.
Let us agree beforehand that we do not admit the possibility
of resolving all missions of a war, or the achievement of
its strategic goals, by any one type of armed force.
Victory in war can be achieved only through the combined
efforts of all types of armed forces in cooperation with one
another. Therefore, we view a submarine operation as an
integral part of battle by the armed forces in a naval
theater, carrying out the performance only of particular
operational or strategic tasks.
By a submarine operation we mean an operation of
submarine forces which is conducted in the depths of the
ocean or the sea without rising to the surface. The
term "underwater vessel" was not applied accidentally.
The designation "underwater boat" appears to us to be too
general, inexact, and not at all suitable for operational-
tactical language. At the present time there are missile-
carrying submarines with a displacement of several thousand
tons, submarines for antisubmarine defense, and submarines
of other designations. It is natural, therefore, that a
generic understanding be developed for all submarines,
whether the submarine fleet or submarine forces which
operate in their own peculiar element - in the depths of
the oceans and seas. 50X1-HUM
A purely submarine operation can take place only when
purely submarine missions are carried out in ocean depths
by a submarine fleet and where the possibilities exist for
their fulfilment by submarine forces. In the immediate
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future, just as at present, the submarine forces may
conduct operations primarily in conjunction with the
aviation and, in some instances, also with the surface
fleet. But such operations will not be designated sub-
marine operations; it would be more exact to call them
operations of submarines.
As is known,at present submarines operate in close
coordination with aircraft and surface vessels which are
suppw.ting their operations. We devote a great deal of
attention to this problem. Much is said about aerial
reconnaissance on behalf of submarines and about the
support afforded by surface vessels to the deployment of
submarines from their bases or to their return. Some of
these situations have become prescribed requirements.
During any naval exercise a thorough minesweep of the
channels of a naval base is instituted directly prior to
the departure of the submarines from the base. Also,
in order to support this departure of submarines, all
antisubmarine defense forces (protivolodochnaya oborona -
PLO) in the area of the naval base are deployed. (We have
in mind destroyer escorts and aircraft of PLO.) Finally,
a special direct escort is organized to support the departure
of submarines from the bases. This great number of ships
at sea and aircraft circling about, all engaged in driving
off enemy minelaying submarines and in "sweeping away"
mines, without even knowing if there are any at all, most
blatantly reveal that an operation is being prepared.
Even during the past war a number of measures for the
so-called suppolt of submarine deployment started to
become outmoded, while submarines more and more gained the
right for complete independence of action. Today this
trend is becoming evident with an even greater force. Of
course, the execution of all or part of the measures
indicated above is not excluded even now in certain cases.
However, it is entirely clear that such methods for
supporting the deployment of submarines or supporting
their combat activity are rapidly becoming outmoded and
it is necessary to seek new measures. 50X1-HUM
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One more example. In order to force the enemy
antisubmarine defense line with our submarines, it is
considered essential to carry out decisive strikes from
the air and sea against his PLO forces. But the execution
of this strike makes it patently clear that our submarines
are getting ready to force that particular line. In this
manner, our actions will serve as a distinct combat alert
for the enemy PLO. Is it not time for the submarine forces
themselves to secure the forcing of the PLO line covertly
underwater, without all the uproar on the surface of the
sea and in the air? It seems to us that such a time is here,
or practically here. Evidently, operations for forcing
the PLO line will constitute one of the first submarine
operations of the submarine forces.
What kind of operational and strategic missions can the
submarine fleet resolve independently because of this
developing situation?
As is well known, the military leadership of MATO
countries still attaches special significance to its
aircraft carrier large units, viewing them as mobile air-
fields from which aircraft can take off with nuclear
weapons. According to the plan of the NATO leaders, these
"airfields", being mobile, must be in their positions at
the right time in the Atlantic, in the Norwegian Sea, and
in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, from which they can
destroy designated targets on the territory of the USSR.
Aircraft carrier large units, the fleet's"Enemy No. 1",
are powerful but far from invulnerable. They can be
destroyed, first of all, by missile strikes of our aviation.
But the enemy may try to create strong counteractions
with his PV0 forces and weapons against these strikes.
At the present time it is extremely difficult to conceal
the deployment of large masses or of separate groups of
aviation and their approach to aircraft carriers, because
the eyes of the enemy have become very keen and his ears
sharp. ?The "sudden" appearance of strike aviation from
behind the clouds is also excluded, inasmuch as to bank
on the inadequacy of enemy equipment or on errors by his
leadership is worse than foolhardy. Aircraft al
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"hover" in one zone for a long time, awaiting the
arrival of the enemy. For the enemy can deploy his
aircraft carrier strike large unit (avianosnoye
udarnoye soyedineniye - AUS) prior to the beginning of
a war under the most plausible pretexts (cruises,training
exercises, etc.).
The submarine fleet possesses incomparably great
capabilities for combat rith the AUS. It may be deployed
in complete secrecy, during the period of exacerbation
of the military-political situation, to those very areas
of the ocean or sea, designated by the enemy as zones for
the deployment of his forces for a strike against our
installations. And it may very well be that the enemy air-
craft will not have time to take off for the delivery of
a strike, as they will go to the bottom together with
their "airfield" after being attacked by nuclear weapons
of the submarine forces which had been covertly deployed
beforehand in the appropriate areas of the ocean or sea.
For the execution of an independent submarine operation
to sink the enemy strike aircraft carriers, is it sufficient
to have only atomic submarines with nuclear weapons? No,
it is not sufficient! The resolution of this mission
requires an entirely new organization of Large units of the
submarine forces. In the interests of ammunition supply
and technical servicing, submarines are still grouped in
large units on the basis of class and type (submarines
with atomic engines, submarines with diesel engines,
submarines with torpedoes, submarines with missiles, etc.).
Such large units are not suitable for carrying out inde-
pendent submarine operations.
Upon receiving a combat mission to destroy an AUS,
a submarine (or a group of then) must, at the present time,
first of all be guided to the target either by aircraft
or by a reconnaissance screen of submarines. The commander
of an attacking submarine does not see or know who is
providing his tactical support or where it is and is forced
to operate independently; he watches nothing except the
target. Submarines beneath the surface do not yet 50X1-HUM
represent dependably controlled large units.
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It appears to us that it is now essential to create
separate submarine large units capable of independently
resolving tactical or operational missions. We have in
mind submarine squadrons of vessels with atomic propulsion.
Such a squadron must consist of strike submarines (with
missiles and torpedoes), reconnaissance submarines with
powerful hydroacoustical equipment, antisubmarine defense
submarines, minelaying submarines, and supply submarines.
Upon receiving its combat mission for operations in a
prescribed area of the ocean or sea, the submarine
squadron, independently, with its own submarine reconnaissance
forces, must find the assigned target and direct its strike
forces against it. On the basis of his intelligence data,
the commander of the operation must plan the main direction
of the strike and determine the forces to be used against
the main target, the operational makeup of these forces,
and the forces to be used in a strike along the auxiliary
axis. In a number of instances the covert laying of mines
(anchored or floating) may delay enemy deployment and
in this manner support the operations of the strike
submarine forces. It is doubtful that the existing hydro-
acoustical equipment of the enemy will be able to determine
accurately the entire depth of the operational makeup of
the submarine forces and the ).arge number of attacking
submarines deployed at various depths. In any event, the
ranges of this equipment are still much less than the
ranges of our modern long-range torpedoes, let alone missiles.
It is evident that an ocean-going atomic submarine,
carrying powerful nuclear armaments, must have its own
reliable defense under water from enemy submarines
(antisubmarine defense) and from mines (while moving at
corresponding depths), in order that the submarine commander
can devote all his attention to the major task - the attack
of the assigned target. With the development of the means
of underwater television, sonar, and communications, the
control of a submarine squadron becomes possible and
submarine battles and engagements with all their under-
water aspects - reconnaissance, deployment, strikes
against protective forces and against the main tart -
assume realistic forms. 50X1 -HUM
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Of course, an operation for the destruction of an
AUS may be conducted, as we have already indicated,
either by aircraft alone or in coordination with submarines.
We do not exclude such a variant, for it does not
contradict the basic views indicated above. But we
reiterate that even for joint operations with aircraft,
the submarine forces must be organized along a new principle.
This is primarily necessitated by the strengthened defense
of the AUS and by the rising cost of atomic missile sub-
marines, which require considerable support in all their
operations, (We have in mind reconnaissance, PLO, and
PVO, i.e., those types of defense which a battleship
required for itself on the surface of the seas in its
time.) It can be said that since "naval power" has
gone under water, all of its defense must also go under
water.
We have already spoken of the impossibility of aviation's
remaining a long time in waiting zones, of its significant-
ly lower capability than submarines for covert tactical
deployment, and of the great dependence of aviation upon
the condition and availability of an airfield network.
To this must also be added the dependence of aviation
capabilities upon the weather. Thus, by no means can
aviation always guarantee the complete success of its
operation against the MIS on all expanses of the world's
oceans.
The struggle for securing the possibility of the first
strike in the initial period of war will be an important
problem for both sides; therefore, in a number of instances,
the operational deployment of forces even during peacetime
will be unavoidable. Even today submarine forces can
occupy necessary waiting positions and from them conduct
covert and prolonged observation of the enemy. Aircraft
cannot do this. Sonar is incapable of determining either
the hull number or the designation of a submarine;
for this reason, during an intermittent sonar sounding
for submarines it is difficult to determine immediately
the number of submarines operating in a given area,
the same submarine may be detected several times.
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We are correct in asserting that "underwater danger"
is more serious than aerial danger, for it is more difficult
to gain rapidly the particulars of an underwater situation
than of an aerial one. After intercepting the enemy,
the submarine forces are capable of delivering strikes
against him repeatedly and of organizing a pursuit while
reloading their torpedo nuclear weapons underwater. All
these considerations speak for the advantages and the
reality of submarine operations.
Although recognizing the vulnerability of aircraft
carriers from the sea, as well as from the air, foreign
authors for the time being are still timid but, nonethe-
less, are expressing views on the growing obsolescence
of aircraft carriers as floating, maneuverable "airfields".
The attention of these authors is turning to missile-carry-
ing submarines which can use their missiles from the depths
of seas and oceans and, especially, from the areas of
the Arctic (through the many unfrozen patches of water
in the midst of ice) where an aircraft carrier cannot
operate at all. It is natural, that in contrast to the
AUS, with its numerous support vessels and aircraft,
the appearance of our missile-carrying submarines in the
ocean and their tactical deployment at great depths can,
as we have indicated, be carried out covertly without the
knowledge of the surface fleet of the enemy, his aviation,
and, even more so, the shore facilities for the detection
of submarines. Neither aircraft carriers nor the most
powerful aircraft can counteract the arrival of submarines
in the Arctic area. The sinking of one or two submarines
during their passage into the Arctic by surface vessels
or aircraft will not have a decisive effect. In the near
future only enemy submarines will be able to counteract
the deployment of our submarines. And only our submarine
forces, organized into submarine squadrons and carrying
out submarine operations, can counteract this formidable
force of the enemy. 50X1-HUM
We shall discuss briefly the plan of operations for
the destruction of enemy missile-carrying submarines in
the Arctic area, i.e., under the ice in the depths of the
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Arctic Basin. Here, neither an aircraft nor a surface
vessel can aid a submarine in the usual manner in any
way. Our submarine squadron (a large unit of submarine
forces in a given theater) must first of all have its own
underwater reconnaissance, consisting not only of reconnais-
sance submarines but also of technical equipment for
submarine detection, installed by special minelaying
submarines under the ice buoys for detecting enemy sub-
marines, mine obstacles, and nets). The creation of such
means is not an insoluble problem. In addition, our
strike missile-carrying and torpedo submarines for combat
against enemy missile-carrying submarines in the ocean
depths under the ice must have a mobile underwater patrol
and a direct underwater defense donsisting of PLO submarines
and submarines for detecting mine obstacles (submarine
mine detectors, a type of submarine mine-sweeper). A
squadron commander must command such an operation from one
of the submarines. Control of the forces must be based
on reliable means of underwater communication and
television. The validity of such an operation has already
become apparent; however, the materiel base for its
resolution is still more theoretical than practical. Let
us recall that this is not the first year that American
atomic submarines have studied the under-ice Arctic area.
During the conduct of submarine operations it is
absolutely necessary that each submarine know its place in
the formation and its place in relation to the bottom of
the ocean or sea and to the nearest banks and islands,
first of all for security of navigation, as well as for
the tasks of tactical deployment and placement of technical
means of combat (buoys, mines, nets). One of the most
important navigational aids for helping submarines determine
their position must be a well-made naval chart showing
depths of the Arctic basin and a series of other important
data (underwater currents, the steepness and unevenness of
the bottom, as well as its characteristics). Such a
"submarine" chart should be in the making now and should
be periodically updated with new data (areas of sound
channels and other hydrological elements) for the most
detailed portrayal of the entire underwater environment.
However, the availability of even the most detailed charts
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cannot guarantee that there will be an exact pinpointing
of the submarine's position. A question arises concerning
the creation of underwater hydroacoustic beacons for
submarines, concealed from the enemy and operating when
triggered by our submarines. Theoretically, the creation
of such a beacon, operating on the basis of a coded format,
also presents no problem.
We do not deny, of course, the possibility of
submarine forces' detecting enemy submarines through the
use of technical equipment installed on the ice surface or
in the water through holes cut into the ice. But in view
of the great mobility and hummocking of Arctic ice and of
the vulnerability of these technical means from the air,
it should be taken into consideration that these technical
means will be used only occasionally. Therefore, they
should not be the principal basis on which the reliability
of an entire submarine operation is planned.
Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that combat against
missile-car ying submarines under the ice in the Arctic
is exclusively a submarine operation, in which the
participation of other types of armed forces is completely
insignificant. On the basis of all that has been stated,
it is now time to consider the creation of submarine sailing
directions for the seas and oceans.
Combat with enemy missile-carrying submarines outside
the Arctic basin must be planned on the same principles as
those in the Arctic. To escape aerial and surface
pursuit, modern enemy atomic submarines more and more are
increasing the depth of their dives, which are now measured
in hundreds of meters. In our time, it is not the structure
of the submarine itself, but the depth of the sea or ocean,
that will soon limit the diving depth. Combat by our
submarine forces against enemy missile carriers at great
depths will also be a purely submarine operation56611doMl
its inherent characteristics.
The significance of the potential enemy's communication
routes from America to Europe, across the Atlantic Ocean
and, to a lesser extent, the Pacific Ocean, is well known.
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It is necessary to understand correctly the composition
and role of ocean shipments in order to assign a mission
to the fleet skilfully and to select appropriate forces
for the resolution of that mission without expecting more from
them than they can accomplish and, at the same time, not
assigning them missions which are impossible for them to
carry out. Strikes against a convoy on the communications
routes, carried out by a group of submarines or by aircraft,
can destroy part of the guard vessels and part of the
transports. However, this will have no perceptible influence
on the situation on the ground front or on the course of
the war as a whole, for in a given instant only tactical
success is achieved at a time when all ocean communications
routes as a whole will have strategic significance. The
results of a strike against a convoy must not -be judged_
by individual transport sinkings out of an entire convoy,
but by the sinking of the entire convoy, or at least three-
fourths of it.
It should be remembered that in a number of instances
even the destruction of a convoy in its entirety will not
by any means immediately influence the situation at the
front, in a campaign, or in the war as a whole. This is
all the more reason why it is necessary to destroy a convoy
and not to settle for partial tactical successes in the
battle againzt communications routes.
How, then, and by what means, can the destruction of an
entire convoy be achieved, a convoy which in a number of
instances will proceed in separate groups (large units) which
do not fall into the zone of one nuclear bomb? In addition,
it should be taken into consideration that some of the
vessels will proceed without cargoes for purposes of
camouflage.
In the immediate future the resolution of an assigned
mission only by missile forces from our own territory is not
yet very realistic, since an enormous number of missiles will
be required even for one convoy of 100 transports with its
escort if a high rate of probability for its destruction is
desired. In resolving this same mission aviation will
require reliable, uninterrupted reconnaissance of the50X1-HUM
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and, since it is capablP of only a single attack, will not
be able to reload in the air, but will be forced to return
to the airfields. We are by no means deprecating the
significance of strikes against convoys by aircraft,
but we must also note all the weak spots of this type of
force.
The matter is different insofar as the capabilities
of submarine forces are concerned. Even now, unlike
aircraft which can only search for hours, submarine forces
can search for convoys independently underwater for tens
of days; they can wait until the convoy approaches, overtake
It and, without surfacing, take up advantageous positions;
then they carry out strikes against the escort forces,
break through them for strikes against the transports, and
moreover, deliver these strikes repeatedly with the use of
underwater nuclear explosions. Naturally, the strike of
one submarine squadron will serve as reconnaissance and
guidance for another, which can, in several hours, deploy
for the completion of the first squadron's strikes against
the convoy.
At the present time, and for the immediate future, it
is difficult to assume that the enemy convoy escort will
quickly and easily detect all the submarine squadrons
(2 to 3) deployed in a given zone of the ocean at various
depths and be able to determine where, how many, and what
type of submarines are deployed. Atomic submarines will
always have superiority over a convoy in speed with all
the benefits ensuing from this, including the guarantee
of concealment of actions.
The place of departure of convoys and their place of
assembly at sea can be established not only by aviation,
but by reconnaissance submarines; and in the future the
entire mission for the destruction of a convoy can be
resolved completely within the framework of a submarine
operation. It should be kept in mind that the development
of PVO means makes aerial reconnaissance very complex and
less reliable than reconnaissance with the aid ofUM
--`---"Ies
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The parameters of a submarine operation for the
destruction of a convoy are already indicated. In its
battle against communications routes the German-Fascist
fleet adopted "wolfpack" methods with the use of
reconnaissance submarines. And only the weakness of
technical means during the period of World War II - the
lack of underwater television and means of reliable covert
communication, prevented the Fascists from resolving the
problem of submarine operations completely. Allied
communications routes were not disrupted. At the present
time the means and methods of radiocountermeasures in our
country and abroad have improved significantly. The
achievements in this field are not to the advantage of
guided missiles and aircraft but do not at all affect the
ocean depths, where the means of hydroacoustic concealment
and counteraction by submarines are still a long way from
results capable of decisively breaking up a maneuver and
strike by submarine forces.
Thus, a submarine operation during operations against
enemy communications routes becomes plausible in all respects.
In a given case we also do not exclude the coordinated
operation of submarines with aircraft when this is possible,
we say, that a purely "submarine operation" is more effective
when it is conducted with decisive goals in mind against
communications routes where not a single, but a prolonged
and methodical, action is required.
To the extent that the threat to sea communications
routes from missile strikes increases, a future war could,
unquestionably, see the appearance of submarine tankers,
submarine vessels for transporting troops and cargo, and,
finally, special submarine amphibious-force-landing vessels.
During the past war there were attempts in our country and
abroad to create submarine transports. Thus, we delivered
ammunition and supplies by submarines to the besieged naval
bases of Hanko and Sevastopol. True, these were not special
submarines,but combat vessels with limited capabilities for
taking on various cargoes, but the idea of creating submarine
transports and underwater communications routes receivi
its first practical application. 50X1 -HUM
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Thus, in a future war there will undoubtedly be missions
for the destruction of enemy underwater communications
routes and for the protection of our underwater communications
routes. It is apparent that missiles and aircraft will
not be able to destroy submarine transports in the ocean
and sea depths. Of course, it is possible that they could
achieve partial tactical successes as a result of an under-
water atomic explosion capable of destroying one or two
submarine transports. However, these successes will not
lead to the breakdown of communications routes or to the
disruption of deliveries over them.
Underwater communications communications routes will be at various
depths and along different courses, and the submarine
transports will proceed in a dispersed manner. Under these
conditions, who will be able to find quickly and destroy
such a submarine convoy? It is apparent that only properly
organized subwarine squadrons of the submarine forces are
in a position to resolve this important operational and,
in a number of instances, even strategic, mission. Aircraft
and, even more so, surface vessels, certainly cannot do it.
It is necessary to mention certain special missions
which, though not tied in with strategic tasks, have come
up in the past and apparently will face the fleet in the
future. We are referring to diversionary operations of
different magnitudes, carried out for the purpose of
destroying radar stations and radio stations of communications
of special designation, and also to resolve other missions
of the most varied nature, especially on islands or on
a sparsely populated and poorly protected shore. These
missions cannot by any means always be resolved by a missile,
no matter how it may be delivered. Modern technical means
permit an installation to be reliably protected-even from
a ground nuclear burst. Very frequently it will be necessary
not only to knock this or that installation out of commission,
but, what is much more important, to obtain documents and
seize the "tongue". Neither an airborne landing nor a
missile can accomplish this mission.
For the resolution of a number of missions of a
diversionary nature the temporary presence of subunits of
our armed forces at an enemy installation will be required.
a
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Only submarine forces can suddenly and covertly land such
a force and also quickly and covertly remove it. In past
wars there were many examples of such use of sukiii"Fuli,
but the scale of these operations was limited.
We have reviewed a number of operations, the aims of
which, in our opinion, can most effectively be achieved
even today by submarine forces and even more so in the
Immediate future. We have discussed the destruction of
aircraft carriers and missile-carrying submarines, the
disruption of surface and underwater communications routes
in oceans and seas, and certain diversionary actions of
submarine forces.
This is, of course, far from a complete list of all
of the missions which could be assigned to the navy and,
especially, to its submarine forces. To this should be
added the contribution-of missiles fired by submarines
against naval bases, shipbuilding yards, and other enemy
military installations located on shore and in the zone
of interior of the enemy country; also, missions involving
coordinated action with troops of our maritime front by
landing forces in the enemy's rear. However, it appears to
us that while these missions can be assigned to our
submarine forces today, in the future they can be accomplished
with equal success by missile units and long-range aviation.
In the resolution of the3e missions, strategic missiles will
completely replace submarine forces, but nothing can replace
submarine forces in their battle under the ice and in the
depths of the oceans and seas against enemy missile-carry-
ing submarines, his submarine transports, and his aircraft
carrier str1Xe large units. Therefore, the question arises
as to whether it would not be better to orient our
submarine forces in the future chiefly toward those types
of operations, the execution of which depends entirely upon
them, and in which a missile (ballistic or from an aircraft)
cannot at present replace a submarine? Without exception,
every type and arm of the armed forces must first of all
execute those missions which it has been designated
to accomplish and which no one else can accomplish.
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It was not just for sport that our naval reconnaissance
seaplanes (MBR-2) bombed troop concentrations on the ground
front at Leningrad during tae first months of World War II.
Of course, during this period no one conducted aerial
reconnaissance at sea, since it was impossible in those
days to replace a naval reconnaissance plane with any
other aircraft - all aviation operated on the ground front.
Many seaplanes were lost, but the grave situation at the
front at that time necessitated such sacrifices. Such
use of naval aviatiorcannotserve as an example for the
future, for this was a unique and atypical case *F--
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methods of conducting military operations at sesP
The approach of our missile submarines to the enemy
shore to carry out a missile salvo will always entail
their entry into the enemy antisubmarine defense (PLO)
zone; therefore, if the salvo is carried out from a
distance, outside the PLO zone, from an area of complete
security (more than 500 to 600 miles from shore), then
is it not better in such a case to use the ballistic
missiles of the missile troops or to use long-range
aviation? For the ocean-going atomic missile submarine is
a very expensive weapon; it not only carries expensive
equipment, but large groups of highly qualified specialists
are on board. There is no one on a strategic missile and
the results will be the same, and perhaps even greater,
than from missiles fired from a submarine. Why risk an
expensive submarine weapon and its entire crew in such a
poor cause? We might be asked - why then is the NATO
fleet preparing to fire missiles at USSR installations
specifically from their submarines? It appears to us that
this is explained by the fact that neither the USA nor
England at the present time has strategic missiles with
the range and, mainly, the accuracy of flight, to justify
their being fired from USA bases against all5axi -HUM
important installations.
If, nevertheless, our submarine fleet will be assigned
the mission of destroying enemy shore and rear area
installations, in this case the submarine forces must be
organized in a new manner. Individual submarine operations
off enemy shores must be dropped, because the enemy anti-
submarine defense has become very effective. The strike
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submarine, or a group of them, must have their own
direct underwater protection from enemy submarines; and
their own reconnaissance submarines to clear the approach
routes and the firing area, which is covered not only by
the enemy PLO submarines but also by his mine obstacles
and other technical means. Thus, even in this case there
is a need for a special large unit of submarines, which we
have already mentioned.
In no way by our discussions are we preparing to
deprecate the significance of missile strikes from submarines
against enemy naval bases or other of his installations.
We are discussing only the selection of the most effective,
economical, and reliable weapon for the accomplishment of
a given mission. It appears to us that with the develop-
ment and perfection of strategic missiles, missions for
the destruction of shore installations by submarines will
be eliminated.
The role and significance of first strikes in the
initial period of a war have been sufficiently delineated
in our military literature. The effectiveness of the
first strike depends, first of all, upon the secrecy and
timeliness of the deployment of the forces during a
threatening period. In a number of military-political
circumstances, it will be necessary to carry out such a
deployment even during peacetime for, so to speak,
protective purposes, without the least violation of
existing international practices. Which type of weapon
can do this with the most secrecy? Who can covertly
occupy positions in the area of probable deployment
against us by enemy aircraft carriers and missile submarines,
or in the area of appearance of a large convoy with troops?
-Obviously, only submarine forces can accomplish this,
because as we have already indicated, it is a very
complicated matter to detect their deployment, to say
nothing of determining their exact position and the exact
number of submarines in the depths of the ocean and sea.
A few words concerning the supply of submarine forces.
Submarine vessels are designated for a long stay under
water, which their equipment already guarantees. It is
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also necessary to provide for the replenishment under-
water of certain types of supplies for submarines. Not
too long ago the possibility of refueling a jet aircraft
traveling at an enormous speed and height seemed un-
realistic, yet today this problem has been resolved.
Surface vessels already take on fuel from other vessels
while underway, as well as while in anchorage, from
storage containers hidden in the depths of the sea.
Submarines, however, still come to the surface to take on
supplies, and in so doing deprive themselves of all their
submarine qualities. It is time to create special supply
submarines for supplying submarine squadrons underwater
and underwater depots from which a submarine could take
on supplies while lying on the bottom.
It should be kept in mind that the possibility of
counting on stationary surface floating bases is becoming
more and more problematical. There is an urgent need for
underwater submarine supply bases in bays near our shores
or for special submarines to furnish supplies away from
bases. The technical solution of this problem is entirely
possible.
What kind of deductions can be made from all that has
been discussed?
First of all, it appears to us that the appearance of
independent submarine operations in naval art is completely
natural. The object and goal of these operations will be
such that no other types or arms of the armed forces except
submarine forces will be uble to engage in or achieve them.
We have in mind combat with enemy missile-carrying submarines
in the Arctic, under the ice, or in the depths- of non-
freezing oceans and seas, and also, the destruction of
underwater and surface communications routes. In the
future, submarine operations will be able to achi 50X1-HUM
operational, as well as strategic, goals.
Submarine operations will also be conducted in those
Instances when the accomplishment of a mission jointly with
aviation, or by aviation alone, is difficult or, for many
reasons, temporarily impossible. We are referring to the
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conduct of submarine operations involving the destruction
of the carrier strike large unit (Ails) and the destruction
of naval bases and the forces stationed there, as well as
a number of diversionary operations, including the landing
of tactical amphibious forces.
During the conduct of submarine operations with any
type of goals, in a number of instances, when it is
possible, a joint operation of submarines with various types
and arms of the armed forces is not excluded, first of
all with the missile troops and aviation; but at the same
time it should be remembered thatforms of coordinated
operations besides strategic ones, are becoming more and
more complex.
In order to support the conduct of submarine operations,
it appears to us that it is necessary now to resolve a
number of organizational and technical problems:
-first of all, to work out the organization of strike
submarine large units (squadrons);
-to organize a system of covert underwater communications
and television in order to ensure navigational security
of movement in the depths and to maintain position in an
underwater formation, as well as to control the large unit
during the delivery of strikes against the enemy underwater;
-to create navigational charts especially for the
operation of submarine forces at all depths attainable
by them (with an indication on the charts of the temperature,
density, and transparency of the water, and the relief of
the bottom, currents, and other data);
-to work out and create materiel-technical means for
underwater navigation (underwater beacons with coded
format) in our own as well as in neutral waters; and also,
means of obstruction, placed covertly from submarines50D(1-HUM
(light nets in combination with mines);
-to work out a system for all types of underwater supply,
for submarines lying on the bottom at points of dispe.csal
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and at definite depths and not moving;
-to create a class of special submarine tankers and
submarine transports for the shipment of combat supplies,
equipment, and contingents of personnel.
None of these proposals is fantastic, for a number
of them already are coming into being. The task now
consists of creating an orderly system of theoretical
postulates and to give clear-cut "orders" to our
technology on the basis of these, lest the realities
of combat operations of submarines catch us unawares.
In this article we have attempted to present and, wherever
possible, to substantiate, certain problematical questions
of submarine operations which are subject to detailed
elaboration, because submarine forces must, above all,
prepare themselves for the conduct of submarine operations
as the naval operations of the future.
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