MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE QUESTION OF SELECTING THE AXIS OF THE MAIN ATTACK IN AN OPERATON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302160001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 14, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
NtENORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
SUBJECT
William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Question
of Selecting the Axis of the Main Attack
in an Operation
14 July 1976
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This
article is a comment on a previous article concerning the selection of the
axis for the main attack in an operation. It expresses disagreement with
the employment of nuclear strikes on one axis while troop actions are being
carried out against weak points or breaches in adjacent axes, pointing out
that this method will slow down an offensive. The author emphasizes the
need for proper planning to the entire depth of an offensive against the
enemy's main grouping. This article ameared in TSSUP Nn 2 (60 cnr 1963.
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2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference rennrtq frnm rhic i.,Ith14,-ation have been
assigned
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William W. Wells
Page 1 of 6 Pages
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
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Page 2 of 6 Pages
l'OP?SE-GRFa-
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TOP SECRET
COUNTRYussR
DATE OF
INFO. Mid-1963
SOURCE
Intelligence Information Special Report
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SUBJECT
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DATE 14 July 1976
MILITARY THOUGHT MTO: The Question of Selecting the Axis of
the Main Attack in an Operation
Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 2 (69) for 1963 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militapr
Thought". The author of this article is Colonel I. Vbrobyev. This article
is a comment on a previous article concerning the selection of the axis for
the main attack in an operation. It expresses disagreement with the
employment of nuclear strikes on one axis while troop actions are being
carried out against weak points or breaches in adjacent axes, pointing out
that this method will slow down an offensive. The author emphasizes the
need for proper planning to the entire depth of an offensive against the
enemy's main grouping. End of Summary
Comment:
The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times
annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It
reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970. The Russian-language
version of this article was disseminated as
TOP SECRET
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TOFECRET
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The Question of Selecting the Axis of the
Main Attack in an Operation
by
Colonel I. Vbrobyev
This question, which is important to the theory and practice of the
combat training of troops, has already been discussed in the military
press, although Colonel V. Solovyev resolves it in a different manner.* The
author puts forward a new principle -- "the spatial separation of nuclear
weapons strikes and attacks of the ground forces" (p. 35). He attempts, as
it were, to bring together two divergent points of view and concludes that
it is advantageous to deliver massed nuclear strikes against the main
grouping, but to target troop actions against weak points, gaps in the
enemy's combat disposition, as a rule away from areas which had been
subject to a massed nuclear attack. This ensures the high speed of an
offensive.
We agree with the author's initial premise that the defender's main
grouping usually is dispersed on a broad front and to a great depth.
However, in our opinion, one should not conclude from this premise that it
is advantageous for the attacker to deliver a massed nuclear strike on one
axis, while at the same time concentrating the efforts of the ground forces
groupings on another axis adjacent to it, because the goal of the
employment of nuclear weapons and the goal of the troop actions in the
offensive are identical. They are directed toward the total destruction of
the main enemy grouping. It is possible to rapidly and effectively carry
out the tasks of the operation only as a result of the combined employment
of the means of destruction and the application of troop combat efforts
which are united according to goal, place, and time.
The unity and close correlation between the employment of nuclear
combat means and troop actions, of course, stem not from their equivalent
roles in destroying the enemy, but, above all, from the fact that troop
actions depend directly and immediately upon the reliability and
completeness of the fire destruction of the defense. It is natural that
the rate of advance of troops exploiting breaches formed as a result of the
delivery of nuclear strikes, as well as ruptures and gaps in the defense,
will be greatest namely on those axes where powerful nuclear strikes are
* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 4 (63)563K2-wmp
1962.
TOP
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,
TO
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being delivered, and where the enemy is more disorganized, and his system
of fire and his control and cooperation are disrupted.
Under these circumstances one of the most important tasks of the
attacking troops is to shorten the time gaps as much as possible between
the moment the nuclear strikes are delivered and the time the troops move
out toward the targets for destruction. But this is achieved with a
movement along the shortest axes, deviations from which are possible only
in order to bypass zones having high levels of radioactive contamination.
Consequently, the combat efforts should not be separated in space but, on
the contrary, they should be combined in location and time. It is namely
with this goal in mind that airborne landing forces are dropped into areas
destroyed by fire, and forward detachments and advance guards are sent out,
while the tank large units operate on the axis of the main attack where
they are capable of delivering swift and powerful attacks to a great depth
in the enemy's defense.
If the nuclear strikes are delivered on one axis, and only the
airborne landing forces are sent after them, but the attack grouping is
operating on a different axis where the defense has not been sufficiently
destroyed by fire, then, obviously, the rate at which the attack grouping
advances will be slow. The enemy, having a certain amount of time, will be
able to eliminate the aftereffects of the nuclear strike, will carry out a
maneuver and put up organized resistance. As a result, the disjointedness
of the efforts of the attacker plays into the hands of the defender and
only impedes the achievement of high speeds in the offensive.
The author's apprehension that massive barriers and destruction will
be created and vast zones of radioactive contamination will be formed in
areas subjected to massed nuclear strikes on the axes of the troop
offensive, is unfounded. The density of nuclear strikes cited on page 34
is not practically possible, inasmuch as such a great number of targets
will not be found in an area of limited dimensions. But this is not the
main thing. The selection of targets and methods for the delivery of
nuclear strikes, the yields of the warheads and types of bursts, and in
accordance with this, the nature of the expected destruction and
contamination in the zone of the offensive -- all this is meticulously
planned beforehand by the command. There is no doubt that in correctly
selecting the targets of actions for the large units and units exploiting
the results of nuclear strikes against the enemy's most important targets
and the routes of their movement, the troops will be able to bypass zones
of mass destruction. 50X2-WMD
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In our opinion, in the article, the concept concerning the weak and
strong points in the enemy's defense, upon which, in the author's opinion,
the selection of the axis for the main attack should depend, has not been
clearly and convincingly delimited. The axis of the main attack in a
modern Operation is planned to its entire depth; the author, though,
discusses mainly the primary place for applying the troops' efforts.
Analyzing the experience of troop exercises, it is readily noticed
that the main attack is always targeted against the enemy's main grouping.
In all instances, the attacker will strive to select the crucial link in
the enemy's defense and, having destroyed it, will achieve the goal of the
operation in the shortest possible time and with the fewest losses. It was
also like this in the past. In this respect the selection of the axes for
the concentration of the main efforts, in our opinion, will not undergo
substantial changes. The principal difference consists only in the fact
that in the past the troops most often exploited the weak points in the
enemy's defense which already existed at the beginning of the offensive.
Under modern conditions weak points can be created in any sector of the
defense and, above all, on the most heavily reinforced sector, by
delivering nuclear strikes. This makes it possible to confront the enemy's
main grouping which has been subjected to the massed action of nuclear
weapons, with the goal of totally destroying it along the shortest axes,
without losing time on long bypasses and envelopments.
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