MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): AIR DEFENSE OF AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100550001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 6, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT ?
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Air Defense of
Amphibious Landings
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6 Mhy 1974
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thot!ght". This
article proceeds from the premise that the success of an amphibious or
helicopter landing operation is dependent on air defense of the landing
forces by the coordinated resources of the navy, air defense, and ground
forces. Detailed descriptions of an amphibious operation and parallel air
defense actions are presented. The TALL KING radar extends warning to a
range of 900 kilometers, and a requirement for radar ships with a range of
450 kilometers is proposed. In addition to 130-mm antiaircraft guns,
Soviet naval vessels are said to have three types of surface-to-air
missiles. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (80) for 1967.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies.
David H, Blee
Acting Deputy Director for Operations
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The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE CW
INFO. Early 1967
Intelligence Information Special Report
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SUBJECT
DATE
6 May 1974
MILITARY TRUITT (USSR): The Organization of Air
Defense in Amphibious Landing Operations
SOURCE Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 1 (80) for 1967 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought ". The author of this article is Colonel V. Zemlyanushkin. This
article proceeds from the premise that the success of an amphibious or
helicopter landing operation is dependent on air defense of the landing
forces by the coordinated resources of the navy, air defense, and ground
forces. Detailed descriptions of an amphibious operation and parallel air
defense actions are presented. The TALL KING radar extends warning to a
range of 900 kilometers, and a requirement for radar ships with a range of
450 kilometers is proposed. In addition to 130-mm antiaircraft guns,
Soviet naval vessels are said to have three types of surface-to-air
missiles. A sketch is used to demonstrate the author's concept of the air
defense aspect of the operation.
End of Summary
Comment:
col. Lemlyanushkin co-authored another article in this series, "The
Cover of Naval Forces by Air Defense Troops of the Country in Operations on
a Maritime Axis, Issue No. 2 (84) for 1968, . The
SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and
was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly
ceased publication at the end of 1970.
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The Organization of Air Defense in Amphibious Landing Operations
by
Colonel V. Zemlyanushkin
In the World War II period, 114 different amphibious landings were
made, 92 of them in front offensive operations. Theoretical research of
the past years, operational and combat training experience of military
districts and fleets, as well as an analysis of the views of the probable
enemy on the nature of armed combat in theaters of military operations,
obviously indicate that amphibious landings may find wide application even
in a nuclear war. However, purely amphibious landings are applicable only
in the performance of certain tactical tasks or in special geographic
conditions. But in front offensive operations, combined airborne-
amphibious landing operations will be conducted as a rule.
In basic content these operations represent the sum total of the
integrated actions, combined in an overall concept and plan, of naval
forces, of large units and units of ground and airborne troops being
landed, of front rocket troops, of Air Defense Forces of the Country and
front air derale troops, of front aviation and, sometimes, of Long-Range
Aviation, directed toward the defeatof opposing enemy forces and means,
the rapid landing of amphibious and airborne forces, and their successful
fulfilment of combat tasks on shore.
Our probable enemies intend to combat these landings by various
methods and means: at landing points with air strikes, and on sea
crossings (in the air) by submarines, torpedo-gun vessels, and aircraft;
and, finally, they propose to complete the destruction of the landing force
right in the landing (drop) area with the combined efforts of ground
forces, aircraft, and the navy. Particular importance is attached to air
strikes.
For combat with an operational landing force (the approximate
composition of which is shown below), the enemy can assign up to 100 to 200
and more aircraft, including 50 to 120 nuclear weapons carriers; and for a
strike against the landing force in the landing area, he may also use a
certain number of ballistic missiles. Therefore, air defense of the
landing forces has acquired particular importance, since without it the
success of the amphibious landing operation cannot be counted upon.
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We shall examine briefly the organization of air defense in an
amphibious landing operation conducted by troops of a maritime front in the
main theater of military operations during a strategic operationt--The
composition of the landing force can vary depending on the targets, the
tasks of the operation, and a number of other factors. We shall take as
one of the possible variants that an amphibious landing force is composed
of a motorized rifle division and a separate naval infantry regiment, and
the airborne landing force is composed of an airborne regiment and a
helicopter-borne landing up to a battalion in strength.
The extent of the landing zone depends on several factors, the
principal of which is the proposed duration of independent actions of the
landing troops prior to the approach of the main forces. According to the
experience of landing training, this period lasts from two to five days.
Consequently, if the troops advance at an average rate of 60 to 80
kilometers per day, the depth of the landing operation can be 300 to 400
kilometers.
It is more convenient to examine the organization of air defense in
three periods of an operation: 1) the concentration and embarkation of the
landing troops onto transport means; 2) the crossing by sea (flight); 3)
the battle for the landing and the development of the offensive into the
depth (see diagram).
In the period of concentration and embarkation of troops on transport
means the amphibious landing force can occupy a coastal area up to 300
kilometers along the front and up to 30 to 45 kilometers and more into the
depth, and within this area there will be 7 to 8 regimental sections of the
landing force. This area may be located within the limits of responsi-
bility of either the Air Defense Forces of the Country or the front air
defense system, and sometimes within the limits of responsibility of both
of these systems. Their forces and means can form the basis of air defense
in this area. Of course, some changes in the disposition and organization
of air defense in a given area will be unavoidable in a number of cases.
The system of observing the air enemy, created by the forces and means
of air defense formations and front air defense troops prior to conducting
an amphibious landing operation, EaSically supports the combat actions of
surface-to-air missile troops and fighter aviation covering shore installa-
tions. However, the timely commitment to action of fighter aviation and
long-range surface-to-air missile units to repel an enemy strike on ships
and the coastal area requires expanding the radar coverage over the water
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area by 140 to 150 kilometers at low altitudes and 200 to 400 kilometers at
high altitudes.
The best way to deal with this task may be radar patrol ships and
aircraft. Their combined use will bring the target detection perimeter at
low altitudes to 400 to 450 kilometers, and at medium altitudes to 750 to
900 kilometers from shore. Before the embarkation front it is sufficient
to create an observation zone about 300 to 400 kilometers in length, i.e.,
to simultaneously have 2 or 3 radar patrol aircraft in the air at low
altitude and the same number at medium and high altitudes.
Fighter aviation cover of the debarkation ship force and landing
troops in the areas of concentration and embarkation can be carried out
from the status of duty on the airfield, in Readiness No. 1. In this case,
air targets must be spotted by the observation system at medium and high
altitudes at a range of 450 to 475 kilometers, and at low altitudes at 400
to 450 kilometers. In the low altitude band this can be achieved by means
of radar patrol ships and aircraft, and at high altitudes only by shore,
based radar stations. This means that the debarkation ship force can be
protected from air strikes in the majority of cases in the overall system
of fighter aviation cover of fleet basing or installations in the
prefrontal zone (without assigning special fighter aviation forces to duty
in the air).
Surface-to-air missile troops of the Air Defense of the Country and of
front large units which are deployed on the coast covering naval ship
EiTing areas and other installations, have the capability also of
simultaneously covering the landing forces in the concentration areas and
at the embarkation points. A certain number of surface-to-air missile
units of the Air Defense Forces of the Country or the front obviously have
to redeploy to cover the departure zone of the airborne landingforce in
order that a grouping of surface-to-air missile troops can satisfy the
requirements of the amphibious landing operation as well.
It is desirable to include the shipboard fire means of the debarkation
ship force in the overall system of antiaircraft and artillery fire in the
coastal area; however, it should be kept in mind that using missile systems
to repel an attack in the embarkation zone is permitted in exceptional
cases and only by decision of the commander of the debarkation ship force,
since the limited sppyof missiles available to them is intended mainly
for repelling attacks during the sea crossing.
The departure area of the airborne landing force is located deep in
the territory of the country, 500 to 700 kilometers from the front line
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and, as a rule, is covered in the overall system of Air Defense of the
Country. In individual cases, the low altitude cover of certain Military
Transport Aviation airfields is reinforced by detailing one low altitude
surface-to-air missile regiment to the airfield.
The departure area of the helicopter-borne landing force is located in
the front air defense area, much closer to the line of contact with the
enemy. However, the embarkation on helicopters takes comparatively little
time (up to one hour), therefore reinforcement of its cover may not be
required. But if the departure area must be covered more reliably during
the period of landing force embarkation, it is sufficient to assign one or
two law altitude surface-to-air missile battalions for this.
Duriathe sea crossing the debarkation ship force with landing troops
(of accepted composition) on board may comprise 4 to 7 landing detachments
and, having two echelons, follow two routes with a speed of 8 to 16 knots.
The main part of each echelon (landing detachments with local protection),
positioned in an area of about 50 by 60 kilometers, comprises an isolated
grouping requiring close air cover, especially from low altitude strikes.
Similar cover is required by groups of long-range guard ships and by
groupings of naval forces supporting the landing force and maintaining an
operational schedule in a given naval theater in the area of the landing
operation. Besides this, it is necessary to protect the entire zone of the
landing operation as a whole from medium and high altitude strikes. The
duration of coverage of the debarkation ship force will depend on their
speed and on the length of the route, and may total 15 to 25 hours and
more.
Shipboard air defense means could comprise the basis of air defense in
this naval zone. But at the current level of their technical development,
and due to the limited number of ships which have the appropriate armament,
they cannot yet fulfil all tasks independently.
Observation of the air enemy on the sea crossing must ensure the
timely commitment to battle of fighter aviation, the bringing of shipboard
fire means to full readiness, the centralized control of them, and the
execution of evasive moves. For this purpose a complete field of
observation is created around the cruising disposition. As estimates show,
its depth in relation to the forces being covered must be: for fighter
aviation in actions from duty in the air at law altitudes, 120 to 140
kilometers, and, at high altitudes, 200 to 260 kilometers; for assurance of
centralized control of antiair fire means when they are in readiness forsoxl-Hum
immediate firing, 80 to 180 kilometers, and at Readiness No. 2, up to 250
kilometers. The average depth of observation for the air enemy is 120 to
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140 kilometers at low altitudes and 250 to 260 kilometers at high
altitudes.
If the ships of the debarkation ship force have three-dimensional
radar sets with an operating range on the order of 300 kilometers, this
zone of observation may be created by shipboard means during the sea
crossing. If there are none, radar patrol has to be organized.
The majority of radar sets in our armament still cannot assure timely
opening of fire by shipboard antiair means when they are in 2 to 3 minute
readiness. They are able to a still lesser degree to assure the timely
commitment to battle of fighter aviation. It seems desirable during the
sea crossing to create two radar fields: a mobile one, to support the fire
means of ships which are at a high degree of readiness (owing to ship radar
sets); and another one for the distant approaches, for fighter aviation
providing local cover, and for the fire means at a lower degree of
readiness (awing to the cruising ship radar patrol). The desirable
distance of the latter from the ships being protected is about 100
kilometers or more. But in this case also, the radar patrol ships can
ensure fighter interception only of those air targets which attack the
landing detachments directly. Of course this is not enough: fighters must
have a capability for the timely interception of an air enemy operating
against other groups of ships in the area of operations, as well as against
antisubmarine aircraft.
This task may be carried out more successfully by radar patrol
aircraft. By using them jointly with P-14 radar stations located on shore,
the limits of complete radar cover at sea can be extended to 750 to 900
kilometers, which is entirely sufficient for observation of the air
situation throughout the area of operations. Even in the zone of battle
for the landing (when the depth of the operation is up to 350 to 400
kilometers), the radar range perimeter in relation to the ships of the
debarkation ship force will be located at a range of 400 to 500 kilometers.
However, such an extension of the field of observation will be possible
only when the safety of patrol of the radar patrol aircraft is ensured.
Otherwise they will supply warning data within the limits of the technical
specifications of their radar sets (100 to 300 kilometers). To best solve
the problem of reconnoitering an air enemy and controlling fighter aircraft
at sea to the entire depth of the landing operation requires constructing
special radar patrol ships equipped with three-dimensional radar sets with
a range of operation of 400 to 450 kilometers.
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Fighter aviation cover of the debarkation ship force during the sea
crossing may be carried out from "duty on the airfield" and "duty in the
air". Long-range fighters also are capable of conducting semiautonomous
search and destruction of air targets throughout the area in which the
operation is being conducted.
The choice of the method of fighter aviation combat actions depends on
the assigned task, the conditions of its fulfilment, and on the
availability of forces and means. It is calculated that the limits of
fighter cover of ships from "duty on the airfield" extend 80 kilometers
from shore at low altitudes and 120 kilometers at medium and high
altitudes. Consequently, fighters can provide cover for ships at greater
ranges only from "duty in the air".
It is desirable to designate zones of duty in the air in such a way
that a fighter reaches the line of commitment to battle just as it begins
to accelerate. This requirement is satisfied if the zones of duty are 80
kilometers away from the guard ships at low altitudes and 160 kilometers
away at medium and high altitudes. However, even with this distance it
does not appear possible for the groups of fighters standing patrol to move
from one axis to another to repel an air attack from any axis in time,
especially at low altitudes in the course of battle. Therefore, all of the
most dangerous air axes must have zones of duty in the air.
Based on the probable nature of the tactical procedures of the air
enemy, fighters are echeloned by altitude in the zones. This requires
creating a minimum of two echelons (layers): one for low and the other for
high altitudes.
According to the experience of NATO exercises and the Vietnam war, the
composition of simultaneously attacking groups of carrier aircraft may be
from 12 to 18 aircraft in the daytime and 6 to 9 aircraft at night, but
groups of tactical aircraft will have from 15 to 50 in the daytime and 12
to 25 at night. Since part of the crossing is made at night, and both
deck-landing and tactical aircraft can operate, according to rough
calculations, an average of about 15 to 20 aircraft can participate in one
strike. If we assume that fighters must destroy but half of them (7 to 10
aircraft), calculations show that three or four regiments of fighters, 50
percent of them low-altitude, are required to participate in the air
defense of the debarkation ship force during the crossing period.* It is
* The sector of cover by duty in the air is 270 to 280 kilometers (for 10
hours). With an average time of duty for one shift of 30 minutes, 20
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to 10 enemy aircraft. Therefore, at 2 to 3 sorties per fighter, a total or
115 to 165 aircraft are required.
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desirable to effect fighter cover of the entire area of the landing
operation from medium and high altitude enemy strikes by using long-range
aviation systems.
The remaining part of the attacking aircraft obviously must be
destroyed by shipboard air defense fire means. What are their capabilities
for covering the landing?
In analyzing the special characteristics of modern shipboard antiair
means, it may be noted that: ships armed with self-defense surface-to-air
missile systems and antiaircraft artillery cannot be used to cover the
landing detachments; ships equipped with short-range surface-to-air missile
systems and 76 to 130mm caliber antiaircraft artillery are capable of
effecting local all-round cover of the debarkation ship force only within
the bounds of the landing detachments; ships having medium-range surface-
to-air missile systems may be used, in addition, to reinforce the air
defense disposition by positioning them in the center of the landing
detachments. And, finally, ships armed with long-range surface-to-air
missile systems can create a zone covering the entire cruise disposition or
echelon of the debarkation ship force. Consequently, the composition of
the guard forces must contain ships equipped with all classes of antiair
missile weapons, or at least short and medium-range surface-to-air missile
systems.
The basis of organization of fire cover of the landing detachments on
the sea crossing is forming the guard ships in an air defense disposition;
the main task of the air defense disposition is not to permit the
destruction of ships by the air enemy, but to destroy him before he carries
out that task. The most valuable from the air defense point of view are
all-round dispositions, the basic parameters of which are: the distance
between the ships being protected, their distance from the line of
protection, and the distance between them on that line.
Considering the characteristics of enemy air weapons and the methods
of using them in combat, it can be estimated that the optimum distances
between protected ships must be: 10 to 12 cable lengths when the enemy
uses conventional weapons and a minimum of 25 to 30 cable lengths when he
uses nuclear weapons.
The desirable distances of the guard line from the protected ships,
based on air defense requirements are: 25 to 40 cable lengths for ships
with artillery armament; 25 to 35 cable lengths for ships armed with 50X1-HUM
surface-to-air missile systems of 15 kilometer range of fire; and from 25
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to 55 cable lengths for ships with 25 kilometer range surface-to-air
missile systems.
The fire coordination of ships on the guard line is more fully ensured
if the distances between them are as follows: for Project 56 destroyers,
up to 35 to 45 cable lengths; ships armed with surface-to-air missile
systems with a 15 kilometer range of fire, up to 40 to 50 cable lengths;
and ships with surface-to-air missile systems having a 25 kilometer range
of fire, up to 45 to 55 cable lengths. Organizing the cover of one landing
detachment with these parameters requires 7 to 12 ships armed with short
and medium-range surface-to-air missile systems. Ships with long-range
surface-to-air missile systems may be placed in the center of the landing
detachment or may create a zone over the whole echelon. The expenditure of
ships in that case will be 3 to 4 times smaller.
Antiaircraft artillery cover of the landing detachments during the sea
crossing may be reinforced from the antiaircraft means of the landing
troops (primarily small caliber systems), which should be positioned and
secured on the decks of the landing ships. The use of ground fire control
devices on the decks of the ships, in our opinion, is impossible, since
they are not stabilized and require considerable space in which to set them
up. An exception may be the self-propelled ZSU-23-4 (Shilka) antiaircraft
mount; its radio-instrumentation system is stabilized by line of sight,
which provides a choice of angles up to 10 degrees. Self-defense missile
systems also may be used successfully. As the sea crossing is concluded
troop antiair systems must be ready to fulfil their main task--providing
cover for the landing troops after disembarkation.
Air defense during the battle for the landing. This primarily
requires that guard ships occupy positions ensuring reliable cover for the
landing of the force. Guard ships with antiaircraft artillery must move to
the immediate proximity of the landing ships. Ships with surface-to-air
missile systems may be placed in the center of the landing ship waves. The
overall system of coverage must also include the ships belonging to the
fire support detachment; therefore, the choice of maneuver areas of the
fire groups should be approached with consideration for air defense
requirements.
During the battle for the landing the significance of covered
objectives changes, which requires certain changes in the air defense.
During the deployment of the landing detachments and the breakthrough of
the enemy protection on the water, it is necessary to more reliably cover
the landing craft, amphibious tanks, and armored personnel carriers wit
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landing troops in them; and as the landing force lands on the shore and
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seizes the beachhead, to cover the combat dispositions of troops on shore
and the landing means of subsequent echelons. The surface-to-air missile
and antiaircraft systems of the landing force will not yet have been able
to deploy on shore at this time, so the fire means of the ships will
protect it from air attack. Particular attention should be paid to
covering the landing troops meeting with success on shore: it is desirable
to move ships with surface-to-air missiles up to this sector. It is
necessary also to reinforce fighter aviation cover since the fire means
have limited range, while ships, prevented from maneuvering by shoreline
features and sometimes by the shallow depth at the coastline, cannot
approach the shore at all.
Air defense of airborne and helicopter-borne landins in flight.
Cover for units and large units of Military Transport Aviation in the
airborne landing force departure area and while flying within the limits of
responsibility of the Air Defense Forces of the Country can be provided by
the latter; to cover them on a more distant flight route requires assigning
fighter aviation forces from the front air army or from the Air Defense -te
Forces of the Country.
Cover for a Military Transport Aviation division carrying an airborne
landing force can be provided by fighters using the following methods: by
flying to intercept the air enemy from "duty on the airfield"; actions from
"duty in the air (in zones)"; by patrol escort; and by clearing the air
space of enemy fighters.
Actions from "duty on the airfield" may be used in those cases when
the radar detection and control system and the technical specifications of
our fighters ensure intercepting enemy fighters before they approach the
start line of our transport aircraft. These conditions can occur only
within the limits of the combat actions zone of the Air Defense Forces of
the Country and partially of the air defense troops of the front. At the
moment the head of the Military Transport Aviation division column
approaches the shoreline (front line), fighter cover by the "duty in the
air" method must begin.
Patrol escort actually is a variation of duty in the air. However,
these methods are not equivalent from the tactical point of view. From
zones of duty in the air it is convenient to intercept the air enemy
operating from a definite axis, regardless of the target he has chosen for
his attack. But fighters standing patrol cannot always render timely scal-Hum
assistance to an adjacent group repelling an attack from another axis.
Fighters on patrol escort can attack targets breaking through to the
covered objective from any direction, but they lack depth of engagement and
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therefore can destroy in good time only those enemy aircraft which are
attacking the group being covered by the fighters.
Groups of fighters fulfilling the task of clearing the air space of
enemy fighter aircraft operate in support of air defense of the whole
Military Transport Aviation division by destroying enemy aircraft before
the air transport column approaches the battle zone or by the method of
forcing the enemy out of the flight path.
It is most desirable to use all three of the latter methods
simultaneously.
The timely_commitment of covering lighters _to battle_ requires means
for the detection_of the sir enemy and for controlling fighter aircraft.
RadAr_patrol aircraft can be used in these capacities. Following in the
combat, dispoait5ih of the Military Transport Aviation division, they can
conduct radar surveillance and control their own fighters, i.e., -Wind the
role of flying fighter aviation command posts. It is necessary to include
in the Military Transport Aviaton column_no-less than two radar patrol
aircraft: one at the head of the first two regiments, and the second at
the head of the two following regiments.
It is desirable to keep groups of patrol escort fighters somewhat
above and behind the radar patrol aircraft to ensure, first, their direct
cover and, secondly, the successful destruction of enemy aircraft breaking
through the fighter duty zone on the approaches.
The duty zones on the approaches should be located on the most
probable attack axis of the enemy fighters at a distance of 70 to 80
kilometers from the covered aircraft. In this case the fighters on duty in
the zones, based on radar patrol aircraft data, can intercept the air enemy
before he reaches the line of attack on the transport aircraft.
Groups to clear the air space must proceed ahead of the Military
Transport Aviation column, and be echeloned by altitude and moving along a
course within the limits of the flight path of the covered aviation large
unit (30 to 40 kilometers).
The number of fighters required to cover a landing force on its flight
over the sea will depend on the anticipated enemy forces, the duration of
cover, and on the tactical-technical capabilities of our fighters. Based
on the prediction time, on an estimate of enemy forces, and on the
composition of his fighter aviation, and considering that by the morninksoxi-Hum
the second day of the strategic operation he will have extremely difficult
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conditions for air combat, it should be expected that up to 30 or 40
fighters (from 3 or 4 airfields) can participate in a simultaneous strike
on a transport column. To oppose them in a one-to-one ratio, the
composition of the covering forces must have no less than a regiment of
fighters.
Fighter aviation cover of a helicopter-borne landing force in
principle may be carried out by the same methods as for an airborne landing
force; however, the possibilit of fi hter icopter
columas_is_ruled---out-y--since the ifference in their flight speeds is very
great (550 to 650 kilometers per hour). In the area of concentration and
embarkation, as well as in the initial segment of the route to the
shoreline, fighter aviation cover of helicopters may be carried out from
"duty on the airfield"; on the flight over the sea--from "duty in the
zone", constantly exchanging air space with the combat disposition of
helicopters. Covering fighters thus fly in a closed line encircling the
helicopter combat disposition at a distance which permits repelling the
attacks of enemy aircraft and constantly having the helicopter group in
visual contact.
To destroy a helicopter-borne landing force the enemy can detail one
fighter for 3 or 4 helicopters. Consequently, up to 10 to 17 enemy
fighters can operate simultaneously against a column of 40 to 50
helicopters. To repel their attack will require no less than a squadron of
fighters. This number of fighters is required, in addition, to build up
the forces and clear the air space. The total direct cover time does not
exceed 1.5 hours, therefore a repeated flight is out of the question.
Consequently, to cover a helicopter-borne landing force, it is necessary to
detail from a front air army a minimum of a fighter aviation regiment (with
a resource of 1-7-1.5 regiment-sorties).
Air defense of landin troops pressing the offensive into the depth.
When a motorized rifle division operates in the landing troops composition,
the following tasks are, as a rule, designated for it: the immediate task
consists of seizing the beaches and destroying the opposing enemy, and it
extends to a depth of 25 to 30 kilometers; the task of the day as a rule
consists of seizing a line at a depth of 50 to 60 kilometers; and the final
task usually is the goal of the landing operation.
Thus, the first position of the air defense means must ensure air
defense of troops at a depth of up to 30 kilometers from the landing zorm, -HUM
particularly direct protection of each regiment from low altitude air
strikes; and the whole front of the landing from enemy medium and high
altitude strikes. The length of the front, then, is 30 to 35 kilometers.
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The second position of air defense means, with the advance of the landing
troops to a depth of up to 50 to 60 kilometers and with the forming of a
single front, must permit creating a unified air defense zone, within which
all objectives would be reliably covered from enemy strikes from all
altitudes. However, the air defense forces and means organic to a
motorized rifle division and regiments are not able to cope fully with
these tasks.
What minimum necessary air defense means must the landing troops have
available?
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In order to ensure direct cover of the first drops of the first-
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echelon regiments, it is necessary for the motorized rifle battalions and
the battalions of naval infantry to have self-defense surface-to-air
issue weapons with a range of operation of about 3 kilometers and an
altitude of 1.5 to 2 kilometers. These means also Can be in the
composition of the airborne landing force. The ZSU-23-4 subunits will have
to be landed right after them. By locating one battery of six ZSU-23-4 by
latoons at intervals of 1.5 kilometers it is possible to cover the whole
first echelon of the regiment. Therefore, each motorized rifle regiment
must have no less than one ZSU-23-4 battery.
In the coastal zone surface-to-air missile cover at medium altitudes
may be reinforced by the air defense means of the ships of the debarkat:50x1-Hum
ship force and throughout the area as a whole by fighter aviation.
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After capturing the beachhead, the unloading of division air defense
means may be begun to create a unified zone of antiaircraft cover over the
whole beachhead. Our 57mm systems, due to the limited zone of fire, cannot
perform this task. Surface-to-air missile systems are required. It would
be desirable, for example, for a separate naval inf
Wtalion of missile systems with a range o operation of up to 10 to 12
kilometers and a destruction altitude of up to 5 kilometers, and for a
motorized rifle division to have a surface-to-air missile regiment _with
systems having a range of operation of 25 to 3-0 kilometers and a
destruction altitude of up to 10 kilometers. By locating these surface-
to-air missile systems (batteries) at intervals of 5 to 8 kilometers it is
possible to cover the entire offensive zone of the division and the
separate naval infantry regiment. Until these systems are introduced
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the TIE of divisions and separate naval infantry regiments, landing troops
will have to be reinforced by front means. Fighter aviation also must
provide cover from high altitudes in this case.
41-r
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Reconnaissance of an air enemy requires skilfully using the means of
reconnaissance and target designation available in surface-to-air missile
and antiaircraft artillery units and subunits, and the control of fighter
aviation requires assigning special means to the landing force.
As concerns other forces assigned to support the landing operation--
units (large units) of long-range aviation, front rocket troops, etc.--they
are covered in the system of Air Defense of the Countryor the front.
Thus, the reliable fulfilment of air defense tasks in an amphibious
landing operation requires assigning a whole complex of forces and means
belonging to the large units of the various branches of the armed forces:
the Air Defense Forces of the Country, the navy, and the front. Part of
these forces, especially the Air Defense Forces of the Country and front
along with carrying out a mission in support of the amphibious landing
operation, will continue completing previously assigned tasks. Therefore
the air defense system in an amphibious landing operation must not only
satisfy the specific requirements of this operation, but it must also be a
component part of the unified air defense system in the theater of military
operations, created to support the strategic operation as a whole. From
here, quite naturally, comes the need to precisely define the limits of air
defense responsibility of each branch of the armed forces during the period
when an amphibious landing operation is being conducted.
It seems to us that air defense in an amphibious landing operation
must be organized by zones, in each of which the responsibility for
protecting the landing from air strikes is carried by that branch of the
armed forces which has the greatest capabilities for carrying out air
defense tasks and controlling the forces in battle.
In the zone of responsibility of the Air Defense Forces of the Country
it is ?Uesirahle to include the departure areas of the amphibious and
airborne landing forces. The basis of air defense in this zone may be made
up of large units of the Air Defense Forces of the Country (air defense
divisions and corps); and these large units provide cover for the
amphibious and airborne landing troops and for the embarkation ship force
in the period of concentration and embarkation; they also provide fighter
aviation cover for the airborne landing troops in flight. In addition, air
defense large units allocate part of their fighter aviation forces to
reinforce the cover of the amphibious landing forces during the sea
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crossing in the naval air defense zone of responsibility.
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In the zone of responsibility of the front air defense forces and
means should include the departure area of the helicopter-borne land-lig
TEFET, and the landing area (area for conducting combat actions) of the
landing troops. If the amphibious landing force (or parts of it) will
embark in the refrontal area, the front air defense forces and means are
responsible also foirt1Tg the departure area of the amphibious landing
force. The main air defense force in this zone will be front air defense
units and front air army fighter aircraft covering the helicopter (and
sometimes the imphibious) landing in the period of concentration and
embarkation, and the landing troops while they are pressing the offensive
into the depth. The front air army in addition is responsible for covering
the airborne and helicopter-borne landing forces in flight (beyond the
limits of responsibility of the Air Defense Forces of the Country) and in
the landing area.
In the zone of responsibility of the naval air defense forces and
means it is necessary to include the water area which the landing forces
cross and within which groupings of supporting naval forces operate. The
basis of air defense in this zone may be made up of the air defense means.
of large units (groups, detachments) of ships and of long-range5
which bel9ng_tililaval_aviatign or which are detafled from the Air Defense
-Forces of the Country. Landing detachments with security forces on the sea
crossing and in the battle for the landing form the basic and most
important grouping of forces within the zone of responsibility of naval air
defense; and the navy is responsible for protecting this grouping from the
air.
The sum total of tasks performed by various groupings of forces in an
amphibious landing operation, and the coordination of their actions by
place and time, also predetermine the unity of the air defense system in
the operation; therefore, the allocation of tasks is only an element of
regulating control for the purpose of clear-cut continuity in adjoining
boundaries of responsibility, established on the basis of the combat
capabilities of the air defense forces and means of each branch of the
armed forces. In other words, the allocation of tasks is not equivalent to
division or delimitation. The distribution of efforts determines only the
amount of work of each element involved in fulfilling the unified mission.
For overall planning and operational control of the air defense forces
and means, it is desirable to have an air defense command in an amphibious
landing operation. In the conditions beingexamined, the fitht dit- defense
chief can perform this function. In other conditions, for example, when
the operation will be conducted in support of the navy, the command of air
defense may be charged to the chief of naval air defense, and, in
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individual cases, also to the commander of the air defense corps (division)
which may be attached to the fleet for the period of the operation.
In conclusion, we would like to note that the successful fulfilment of
air defense tasks in amphibious landing operations depends on haw much
requirements of air defense will be taken into account in the
organizational structure and in the system of arming the air defense forces
and means of the branches of the armed forces, especially in the navy.
Legend for Diagram on Page 19
KEoJ Landing detachment