MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS IN CONVENTIONAL WARFARE ON A MARITIME FRONT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100190001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 22, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
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22 June 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT ?
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Tactical Air
Operations in Conventional Warfare on a
Maritime Front
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report
is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of
the Journal "Military Thouqht." This article addresses most
aspects of tactical air operations in support of ground and
naval forces involved in conventional warfare on a maritime
front. These comments are based on games and exercises con-
ducted in the Odessa Military District, so they relate to the
wartime Southwestern Theater of Military Operations. The
primary mission of tactical air forces is identified as destruc-
tion of enemy nuclear capability, such as aircraft carriers and
their aircraft. Heavy emphasis is placed on coordination of
joint forces for specific types of operations. This article
appeared in Issue No. 3 (91) for 1970.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensi-
tive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know
basis within recipient agencies.,
50X1-HUM
Depu
W. E. Colblf
Director for lOperations
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U.S. Air Force
Office of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Scientific Intelligence
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF Late 1970
INFO.
intelligence Information Special Report
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SUBJECT
50X1-HUM
MCI 22 June 1973
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Combat Actions of Front Aviation
in an Offensive Operation on a Maritime Axis
Carried Out Without Nuclear Weapons
SOURCE Documentary
SUMMARY
The following report is a translation from Russian of an
article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (91) for 1970 of the
SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of
Articles of the Journal "Military Thought." The author of
this article is General-Mayor A. Bukhantsev. He addresses
most aspects of tactical air operations in support of ground
and naval forces involved in conventional warfare on a maritime
front. These comments are based on games and exercises conducted
in the Odessa Military District, so they relate to the wartime
Southwestern Theater of Military Operations. The primary mission
of tactical air forces is identified as destruction of enemy
nuclear capability, such as aircraft carriers and their aircraft.
Thirty to fifty percent of aircraft in various categories are
allocated to this mission and twenty to sixty percent to destruc-
tion of enemy aircraft on the ground, depending on the air
situation. A reserve of not less than ten percent of combat
aircraft is maintained. Heavy emphasis is placed on coordination
of joint forces for specific types of operations.
END OF SUMMARY
COMMENT: 50X1 HUM
There is no information in available reference materials
which can be firmly associated with the author. Military Thought
has been published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three
versions in the past--TOP SECRET, SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There
is no information as to whether or not the TOP SECRET version
continues to be published. The SECRET version is published
three times annually and is distributed down to the 15?X1 -HUNI!
division commander.
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Combat Actions of Front Aviation in an Offensive Operation
on a Maritime Axis Carried Out Without Nuclear Weapons
(From experience in exercises of the Red Banner
Odessa Military District)
by General-Mayor of Aviation A. Bukhantsev
The goal of combat actions for defeating enemy ground troops
and naval forces on maritime axes will be not only to capture
territory and important industrial and political centers in the
land sector of the theater of military operations, but also to
seize straits, islands, and naval bases. These circumstances also
affect the nature of combat actions of front aviation in such
operations. The extent and types of migFrEiis fulfilled by front
aviation vary; a different approach is required for controlling
large units and units and for coordinating their actions with
fnnt troops and naval forces.
?Besides those missions related to a land theater of military
operations, a front air army in an offensive operation on a mari-
time axis will fulfil a whole series of specific missions, namely,
the destruction in the air of enemy aircraft carrier aircraft;
the mounting of strikes against surface vessels in the coastal
zone and the disruption of troop transports in sea communication
lanes within the limits of the tactical radius of aircraft; the
destruction of amphibious landings; the protection of our own
naval bases, ports, and large units of ships; the support of our
amphibious landing forces during transport at sea and during their
landing on shore for combat; the support of naval aviation in the
front zone; the conduct of aerial reconnaissance for anti-
amphibious defense of the coastline; the mounting of air strikes ?
against enemy amphibious landings and other enemy targets; and
support of our own amphibious landings.
In planning air army combat actions we must take into account
that the solution of many problems demands successive concentra-
tion of air efforts. At the beginning of an operation, the basic
forces of the air army are, as a rule, directed to the destruction
of enemy aircraft and npclear/missile means,.,a er w ic they
pr6iiide support and cover for our troops in their breakthrough of
enemy defenses; and, finally, they are concentrated to support
naval and air landing forces to seize straits areas in combined
attacks with front troops, the navy, long-range aviation, and
airborne troops
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Since the tactical and carrier aircraft of our probable
enemies are one of the main means of delivering nuclear weapons,
and also constitute their main 'ke force in non-nuclear
c. ac ?ns, e operational plan must, besi es t e missions
of seeking and destroying operational-tactical means of nuclear
attack, give primary attention to the participation of the air
army iraan air operation to defeat air groupings in the theater
of military operations:)
It is known that to fulfil the mission of destroying the
enemy means of nuclear attack during combat actions with conven-
tional weapons we must allot sufficient air resources which, as
is shown by calculations and by exercises conducted by many large
units, in the first days of an offensive operation will comprise
up to fifty percent of the6light resou$ of fighter-bombers,
up to forty percent of the bombers, and up to thirty percent of
the reconnaissance aircraft of the front. 50X1-HUM
In establishing air resources for the destruction of enemy
aircraft on airfields and in the air, we must first determille
what forces are Kgzuix2.-d_to neutralize enem air defense means
and to support our long-range and naval aviation in the front
zone.; and we must also determine the composition of the FITiai-ar
echelon. We must also proceed from the fact that front troops
in a non-nuclear offensive operation do not have the necessary
forces and means to destroy enemy aircraft on airfields. Nor is
there any basis for relying on them to give any appreciable assis-
tance to the air army in neutralizing the enemy air defense
system, since these are usually located beyond the firing range
of the means of front forces. Therefore, the problem of defeating
groupings of enemy tactical and carrier aircraft on a maritime
axis will be resolved through the joint efforts of the air army,
large units of long-range aviation, and naval aviation in close
coordination with front and naval air defense forces and means.
The destruction of tactical aircraft on their airfields and
carrier aircraft on their carriers is one of the main missions of
long-range and. naval aviation as part of an air operation. And
the role of the air army in an air operation will be to neutralize
enemy air defenses, mainly in support of long-range and naval
aviation; to cover their combat formations in the front zone; and,
if there are sufficient forces and means available, to destroy
tactical aircraft on the ground within the operating rzsoxi-Humf
fighter-bombers and front bombers.
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It is shown by calculations, as well as by strategic military
map games and a front command-staff exercise held in 1969, that of
all the resources in operation, the amount allotted for the
destruction of enemy aircraft groupings on the ground and in the
air may be sixty percent of fighter aircraft, txg'ilty_per_gent_of
fighter-bombers, thirty 1--6--r-dent of bombers, an twenty
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reconnaissance aircraft.
Thus, in our opinion, we must allot from our air resources
sixty to seventy percent of the fighters and fighter-bombers and
up to fifty percent of the front reconnaissance aircraft in order
o fulfil our combat missions in a non-nuclear offensive opera-
tion on a maritime axis against enemy operational-tactical means
of nuclear attack and against enemy air groupings (tactical and
carrier).
It should be noted here that, while participating in an air
operation to destroy aircraft groupings, an air army is not in a
position to allot significant forces for the destruction of enemy
tactical aircraft on their airfields. Thus, in a two-sided air
exercise in 1969, an air army consisting of three fighter aviation
regiments, one fighter-bomber regiment, and two separate aerial
reconnaissance regiments destroyed the enemy aircraft on only
three airfields located 120 to 150 kilometers from the front line.
One fighter-bomber regiment and one fighter aviation regiment were
used for this (there were two air squadrons at each enemy field).
The remaining fighter aircraft of the air army provided cover for
the troops and installations in the rear area of the front and the
fleet, support for combat actions of long-range aircraft, naval
aircraft and fighter-bomber strike groups, by covering their
combat formations along flight routes and in the target area,
destroying enemy surface-to-air missiles and blockading two air-
fields of enemy air defense fighters.
The exercise showed that the allotment of even such a limited
number of air army forces for the destruction of enemy aircraft
on their airfields is possible only by a surprise attack against
the enemy with the initial massive strike. Otherwise, if enemy
aircraft conduct aggressive combat actions, it will be impossible
to use our unit and subunit fighters against their aircraft on
their airfields. All front fighter aircraft will be compelled to
provide cover for their own troops and for front and naval rear
area installations, and to carry on aerial ETESit with enemy
aircraft.
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In the non-nuclear period of combat actions, as has been
corroborated by many exercises, the number of enemy airfields on
which aircraft must be destroyed in a single strike by our front
aircraft depends directly on the number of fighter-bomber and
bomberunits in the air army. We consider that to successfully
destroy enemy aircraft on the ground we must figure on one regi-
ment of three squadrons of fighter-bombers drid bombers per airfield.
An air army composed of three or four regiments of fighter-bombers
and bombers will permit successful air operations against enemy
aircraft on their airfields in the front zone without weakening
our fighter air cover for front and naval rear area installations
or our fighter air support?i5F?Eroops.
A vital factor influencing combat actions of front aviation
in fulfilling its mission of cover and support of troops on a
maritime axis is the fact that the front has an exposed coastal
flank which is vulnerable to enemy iTT.?ind naval forces and means.
This creates favorable conditions for mounting an air strike
first of all against rear area installations of the front. At
the same time, the use of front antiair defenses is made more
difficult, since enemy aircraft can deliver strikes against
objectives located on the coast without entering the fire zone
of antiaircraft missile troops. Therefore, the fighter aircraft
of the air army covering the coastal flank will conduct combat
actions over the water, extending the line of interception and"
duty zones in the air to a considerable distance from shore.
Having a coastal flank also requires an increase in the
number of front fighter aircraft and their close coordination with
front air defense forces and means. An important role in the
control and vectoring of fighter aircraft in the air, especially
at low altitudes, will be played by ships of our Navy, which are
specially equipped with radiotechnical means for detecting the
enemy in the air, reporting this, and directing our fighters to
aerial targets.
The basic method of fighter combat actions in carrying out
their mission to provide cover for front and naval troops and
installations is to intercept from a state of "duty on the air-
field" while maintaining periodic duty by small groups in the
air. However, upon activation of enemy aircraft and while
providing cover for installations located at an appreciable dis-
tance from the airfields, interception from a state of "duty in
the air" can be widely used.
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The selection of duty zones in the air depends on the types
of missions to be accomplished. Thus, in providing cover for
front troops, as exercises and theoretical calculations have
shown, it is advisable to have duty zones at altitudes of 1500
to 2,000 meters over the deployment areas of forward antiaircraft
missile battalions; and at 10,000 to 11,000 meters at a depth of
thirty to forty kilometers from the frontline over our territory,
i.e., beyond the kill zone of "Hawk" missiles deployed near the
frontline. Such a distribution of duty zones allows us to inter-
cept enemy air targets over his own territory. In building up
forces while repulsing an air raid, fighter aircraft will go
into combat from all zones and airfields; or they will have been
concentrated previously in duty zones located over enemy terri-
tory near the flight axis of his main forces, having established
a passage along stipulated corridors through our own antiaircraft
missile units.
In covering naval installations and amphibious and air
landings the determination of duty zones in the air will depend
on the situation (the location of the ship groupings and other
objectives to be covered, the axis of advance of amphibious landing
troops, and the routes and types of flights of military trans-
port aviation).
Since the majority of enemy low-flying targets may not be
detected in time by our front radar means, it is advisable to
take action against enemy iiTcraft at altitudes up to three
hundred meters by carrying out independent search and destroy
missions ("hunting"), in specially designated zones of combat
action for each fighter regiment. However, in the case of very
low-altitude enemy raids against targets more than twenty to
twenty-five kilometers from the front, the experience of air-
tactical exercises of fighter units of an air army has shown that
interception may be effected successfully from the state of "duty
in the air." Interception from a state of "duty on airfields"
under these conditions is applicable only while covering rear area
objectives of the front and fleet at airbases located in the
interior of the country.
Another important mission which the air army performs for
the front troops is air support, which will also have special
features on maritime axes. In the first place, the air army,
together with front army troops and naval large units and forma-
tions, will conduct combat operations for the destruction
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(neutralization) of naval as well as land targets hindering the
offensive operation. Second, in providing support, the air army
will have to operate against enemy landings, both air and sea,
while supporting our own naval, air, and tank landings.
In carrying out its mission of troop air support, front
aviation will attack primarily targets whose destructiotrali-
zation) by other means would be ineffective or difficult, in
particular against nuclear/missile means, reserves, control points,
and numerous mobile and small targets. However, while providing
support, front aviation may also attack heavily fortified defensive
lines and areas, strongpoints, bridges and crossings over water
barriers, ships in straits where our front troops are to force a
crossing, and subunits of surface-to-air missilesand antiaircraft
artillery which are preventing the fulfilment of missions by our
aircraft.
Where only conventional means of destruction are used to
achieve superiority in firepower over the enemy and to bring
about conditions for a rapid offensive by troops of the first
echelon, front aviation may engage in preparatory fire for front
troops. However, only part of the fighter-bombers and fighters
may be used for this task. The main forces of the air army must
be held in reserve for air support of troops.
The air army carries out all troop support missions within
the limits of its allotted aircraft resources which, under condi-
tions of non-nuclear warfare, may comprise fifty to sixty percent
of the aircraft reserve for fighter-bomber operations, up to ten
percent of fighter resources, and up to twenty to twenty-five
percent of reconnaissance resources.
One of the important stages in the combat actions of an air
army in an offensive operation on a maritime axis is troop support
during the capture of a straits area. The capture of such a zone
has immense operational-strategic significance, since it creates
favorable conditions for developing the offensive deep into enemy
territory and for achieving the military-political goals of the
war in the theater of military operations. And it is in this
period that the enemy may decide to use nuclear weapons in a
massive strike against our troops. We consider, therefore, that
in the Southwestern Theater of Military Operations, under the
conditions of a nuclear/missile war, our front troops, urml_
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entering the straits area, will have to break through fortified
enemy areas in close coordination with naval forces, aviation and
airborne landing troops.
Different methods and variants of actions are possible for
these forces. In some cases, there will be a rapid breakthrough
by tank and mechanized groupings with simultaneous landings along
a wide front by naval, tank, and airborne landing forces, for
the purpose of capturing the most important islands and peninsulas
in the straits area, and areas on the opposite bank. In other
cases, the capture of the straits zone can be organized by naval
forces and airborne landing forces even before the arrival of the
offensive groupings in the straits zone, with a subsequent buildup
of landing forces and the consolidation of successes by approaching
troops.
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The importance of capturing a straits area requires consid-
erable effort by an air army in support of the combat actions of
front troops and of naval, tank, and airborne landing forces.
Thus, for example, to capture one straits area in the southeastern
part of the theater of military operations under consideration,
the planning, which was based on a strategic map game and on front
command-staff exercises of the Commander of the Odessa Military
District, called for upg five air army sorties and an allotment
of twelve o fifteen nuclear bO4377=014/1=Ing7etuhtft-ALta
-EcT,Tent ercent of the nuclear munitions _expeaad.edione air army,
_1.a1IJ2122g.EIELan, The use of such a quantity of-air-deft-1V
forces and means was necessary in order to effectively neutralize
the enemy troops and equipment located in the fortified zone and
its approaches, to destroy permanent enemy installations along
the straits, to neutralize the anti-landing defenses in areas
where we expect to land, and to support our own landings.
During exercises for the support of landings and combat
operations of naval, tank, and airborne landings, the air army
allotted up to eight nuclear bombs and planned for two or three
air army sorties from the resources designated for the capture
of the straits area.
We consider that the need for allotting these resources in
support of landings will be dictated by the great diversity of
missions to be performed by front aviation in this period of the
operation, such as covering landing forces crossing by sea (on
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alandings by destroying nuclear/missile mean's, coastal and fieldrtillery, and ship groupings in the coastal area; neutralizing
the flight routes) and in the debarkation zones; supporting
enemy antiaircraft missiles and antiaircraft artillery along the
routes of air transport flights and in landing areas; and conducting
aerial reconnaissance of landing areas and of enemy ground, naval,
and aviation groupings which could offer resistance to the landings.
During this period units of the air army will also fulfil a
series of missions in accord with the front offensive operation
plans, missions which at the same time are carried out in support
of landing forces. For example, the weakening of enemy aviation
groupings, accomplished during a front offensive operation, is
also important for successful landings and actions by landing
forces. Combat with enemy reserves to delay their move to the
main axis also has significance for our naval, tank, and airborne
landings. We took this into account in determining the resource
of the air army forces and means needed to support the crossing
by front troops of the straits area in the southeastern part of
the Southwestern Theater of Military Operations.
During an offensive operation on a maritime axis, front
aviation, together with large units and units of front ii5Eke-t
troops, will be drawn into participation in naval operations.
Air army large units and units participating in naval operations
can assist the Navy by carrying out missions to neutralize enemy
air defense means within the flight zone of naval missile-carrying
aircraft; to destroy ship groupings at their bases and antisub-
marine aircraft on their airfields; to destroy enemy naval bases
and ports; to participate in the destruction of enemy landing
forces on the approaches to the coastal area; and to provide air
cover for our own ships, convoys, and landing detachments. Naval
support missions have specific characteristics of their own
require special special training for flight-personnel, particularly in
aircraft handling, location and recognition of targets from the
air, and methods of destroying them.
Combat actions of air army large units and units to destroy
enemy ships in a coastal zone, and his landings, will be carried
out under conditions of strong enemy antiaircraft defense activity,
particularly by surface ships armed with large quantities of anti-
aircraft means. Thus, in the Black Sea basin alone, for the
defense of the Black Sea straits our probable enemies are planning
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to maintain a permanent Turkish naval force of up to ten sub-
marines, five or six destroyers, fifteen torpedo-artillery boats,
and five or six mine and net barriers. In addition, they can be
reinforced with five to seven frigates and destroyers (of which two
or three are antiaircraft missile ships) from the US Sixth Fleet.
These ships have eight to twelve "Terrier" or "Tartar" launchers
and one hundred to one hundred thirty single- and dual-mounted
automatic weapons with calibers of 20, 40, 50, 60, and 76 mm.
Therefore, fli ht ?ersonnel of fro si ?- trained to
eff ive y overcomes ipAr_a_antlairgialt.24.gfenses and to
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deArloy-griipTS-Whife flying at quite ,law altitudes.
The destruction of enemy amphibious landings is carried out
within the general scope of anti-landing defense by means of
strikes against enemy concentration and embarkation points during
his crossings at sea, while the landings are being repelled, and
during combat with the troops which have landed. Front aviation,
in close coordination with_navAl foresjlopg7rangeaviatinland
carries out these strikes against-Lihding
4etachments and convoys during their crossing at sea, building up
its efforts against the landing force as it approaches the shore
and also against the landing areas.
However, it_muat_be,kept in mind that amphibious_and airborne
landing S- w14.i-most1ik1y take_ place during a period of intense_
actions by enemy ground, air, and navaI-r-odpings;- this requires
the commitment of the'basiC fighter and fighter-bomber forces to
repel massive enemy air strikes and decisive actions by his ground
forces. Under these conditions, he air arm will not be able to
commit sufficient forces to destroy e enemy amp 1 ious an sing
,foroe while it is in tranSit-iE-sea. -Thers, we consider that
th-e?It-a-D or -61"1"nrtz-or" -trh trunt-atT army in combat with landing
forces can be carried out only at the most critical moment, i.e.,
at the time the landing is made. We have provided for this in.
our plan for combat actions by al1tEin. a reserve o ? es and
mea o no ess anena e 1 t reserv
'fidaer-bombers and fighter aircra , is was Incorporated
inta-th-e-ex-ervi-s-es--far-ecertbart-irritir-elrertirl'aridtrigf
In carrying out combat missions to destroy enemy naval
vessels and landings, front aviation may apply all the methods of
combat actions: strikes against previously assigned targets,
strikes upon request, and independent search and destruction of
targets ("hunting"); although the principal method for fighters,
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fighter-bombers, and bombers must be strikes upon request, since
this method of combat actions is most expedient, particularly in
a complex and rapidly changing situation.
Fighter-bomber and fighter attacks from complicated types
of maneuvers correspond to a large degree to the conditions of
combat action against landing ships and forces in debarkation
areas. If nuclear bomb attacks are carried out by toss-bombing
(at a toss angle of 45 or 110 degrees) and by dive bombing from
a roll to a "zoom" (in an approach to the target from the lowest
possible altitude), then during actions with conventional weapons
the air attacks will take place from a gently sloping dive (at
angles of 10 to 25 degrees) to destroy targets with cannon fire
and rockets, and to drop high explosive bombs by the topmast
method.
The fulfilment of aerial reconnaissance missions will be
carried out under complex ground and air conditions of strong
counteractions by air defense means, swiftly maneuvering troop
actions, broad use of nighttime hours for the preparation and
conduct of combat actions, complex meteorological conditions, and
all types of camouflage. And both sides will have many groups of
aircraft and individual aircraft in the air at the same time.
Based on his combat actions in Vietnam and the Near East, the
enemy may make wide use of active and passive radar jamming.
Because of the dynamics of combat actions, as well as the
lack of information on specific targets when planning both initial
and monitoring reconnaissance flights in support of front troops
and the Navy, it will be necessary to make changes in the pertinent
plans. Exercises conducted in the past show that during combat
actions it is advisable to divide into two parts the aerial
reconnaissance flights being planned and placed on the planning
chart: one with the flight times and missions indicated; the
other (twenty to thirty percent), for requests by the air army
command post from Readiness No. 1 and No. 2.
Missions which are the least dependent on a change in the
situation are assigned to scheduled flights; while flights from
Readiness No. I are usually combat reconnaissance flights for
ships with nuclear/missile means and for other targets in support
of front and naval troops, and flights to monitor the combat
actions of front and naval troops. Crews on Readiness No. 1
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must be briefed in advance on their approximate targets and areas
of reconnaissance, with specific missions given priority to take
off or while in the air.
Reconnaissance aviation fulfils missions either in a simul-
taneous flight by entire reconnaissance units (when reconnaissance
and re-reconnaissance of a great many objectives must be made
within a limited period of time) or in periodic flights of single
crews or pairs in the front zone. The methods of aerial recon-
naissance are visual observation, photography of objectives at
various scales (depending mainly on weather conditions and flight
altitude), and radio and radar reconnaissance of ground and sea
objectives.
Since reconnaissance aircraft of front aviation do not have
systemsT/HTE7-ive accurate and current come_r_dkitatez_on.....t.lie_ili=
craft-, Visua recoragrigilT66-5:67E-MIT-Fonsists of indicating
-556-ninates on a large-scale map. This demands a high level of
flight personnel training and practice by crews in comparing
maps-with locations, especially on flights at low altitudes and
high speeds. We consider that with the growing demands for aerial
reconnaissance data in modern operations, especially on a maritime
axis, an urgent need has arisen to equip reconnaissance aircraft
of front aviation with the following: a system that gives accurat
and current coordinates; reconnaissance radiotechnical equipment
for locating operating radar stations; a shortwave radio for
communications at low altitudes; and secure communications equip-
ment to transmit reconnaissance data with onboard radios to
interested command posts.
Aerial reconnaissance on a maritime axis must be carried out
in close coordination with the reconnaissance forces and means of
naval formations. In planning aerial reconnaissance it is neces-
sary to provide for the distribution of efforts along the main
axes of naval and front troop actions; mutual exchag!-L2f informa-
tion_between naval aviation and the air army; and the supplying
of the naval amiiribizsz?7commanti-vri-tir-ttre-ireFessary photomosaics
and other data on the debarkitT6R-arZas,
air army reconnaissance aircraft in support of naval forces, an
important point in working out coordination is to ensure that
information from an aerial reconnaissance aircraft is received by
the reconnaissance directorates and by the ships of naval large
units and units in the preparatory period as well as during the
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course of the operation, particularly during amphibious landings,
reconnaissance of naval forces, and combat with enemy landing
forces.
We believe that even during peacetime, while working out
joint problems during combat training, it is necessary to provide
for unified coding of naval and land maps with a table of radio
signals for the transmission of data from aircraft to command
posts of naval forces and front troops.
In the majority of cases on maritime axes, the capture of
straits areasand the crossing of fortified lines and areas will
be accomplished by front troops. Since aerial reconnaissance is
a means of operational troopsupport, it is charged with photo-
graphing, at various scales, fortified areas and lines and
amphibious and airborne landing areas, and providing commands and
staffs with precise large-scale maps or photomosaics. For this
it is advisable to create a single center of operational
reconnaissance in the air regiment and to include in it front
cartographic subunits.
The need for strictly centralized control and precise
coordination of aviation with front troops and naval forces is
dictated by the broad scope of combat actions in an offensive
operation on a maritime axis; the participation by the forces
and means of all branches of the armed forces; the large number
of varied missions performed by the air army; and the direct
dependenceof the success of the operation on the degree of
success in destroiling enerily-riudlear/ffiisSile means, aircraft,
ships, and landings.
Control of air army large units and units in an operation
will be effected from command, forward and rear area control
points of the air army deployed near corresponding control
points. This control will be carried out as follows: through
operations groups located in the command (forward) posts of
combined-arms (tank) armies of the first echelon; at the command
post of the commanding officer of the front air defense troops
and at the command post of the fleet commander; and through the
aviation representatives assigned to naval, air, and tank landing
forces.
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In exercises conducted in the past we included the following
in making up operations groups assigned the task of aviation
control: combat training officers, operations officers, navigators,
communications officers, reconnaissance officers, and officers from
the meteorological service. However, the existing regulation,
by which the air army headquarters assigns forces and means to
aviation control points, each time by administrative order, cannot
meet modern requirements. In our opinion it has become necessary
to include in the air army control organization a fighter aircraft
control point which is organizationally part of the operations
group designated to control fighter aircraft from the command post
of the commanding officer of the front air defense troops aircraft
control points, which are also responsible for coordination with
troops (according to the number of combined-arms and tank armies)
and naval forces, and which, even in maintained
and ?O 0.0 HM ? -.uipment
so that they will be able to carry out their assigned tasks imme-
diately upon the onset of combat actions.
..?? ?
? 41P."
?T
The organization of the coordination of an air army on a
maritime axis has several special features which are related to
the participation of naval forces in the operation and to the
fulfilment of missions which are characteristic for such an axis.
Under these conditions an air army coordinates closely with one or
two combined-arms armies attacking on the coastal flank, with
naval forces, air defense troops, long-range aviation, military-
transport aviation, and with amphibious forces.
Coordination of the forces and means participating in a front
offensive operation on a maritime axis is organized by the front
troop commander on tive basis of orders from the Supreme High
Command. Coordination directly along the maritime axis consists
mainly of destroying enemy ship groupings operating in the coastal
zone; supporting amphibious landings; providing air cover for
naval transports, ports, naval bases, and other naval installations;
conducting aerial reconnaissance over the water; and rescuing
aircraft crews downed at sea. Besides this, joint air and naval
actions are coordinated in combat with enemy amphibious forces in
their embarkation (loading) areas, during sea crossings, and in
landing on shore.
In our opinion, the ox.clanization?ca?ccuargaination of amphibious
landings _is most complicated. As was learned from exercises, the
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reason for this is that modern amphibious landings may be combined,
ones, consisting of naval, tank, and airborne forces. The use of
such landings has become an established part of joint exercises
of maritime military districts and fleets, but they are still not
single, organic units. During landings one often senses a certain
isolation in each group and a strong tendency toward independence.
In organizing the coordination of air army large units and
units with the forces and means assigned to a naval operation,
the following matters must, in our view, be reflected in a unified
plan of coordination of front troops and naval forces in an offen-
sive operation:
- the composition of naval and tank landing forces; the combat
formation of ships and tanks crossing the sea; the time and routes
for sea crossings by naval and tank landing forces; the time
required to reach debarkation areas, to seize a beachhead, and to
debark our landing forces;
- composition, combat formation, routes and type of military
air transport flights for airborne landings, as well as the time
for passing control landmarks and for debarkation;
- sectors of enemy air defense which our military air
transport must cross;
- forces and means allotted by the air army to provide cover
for landing forces in transit at sea (on air transport flight
routes) and in debarkation areas, to neutralize enemy anti-landing
defenses, to support combat actions after debarkation; and air army
forces and means allotted for combat against air defenses in
support of our military air transport;
- procedure for providing cover for landing forces in embar-
kation (loading) areas, in transit at sea (on flight routes), and
in debarkation areas;
- method of controlling fighter aircraft while providing
cover;
- procedure for mutual exchange of information concerning
the air, ground, and naval situation; 50X1-HUM
- organization of rescue operations for crews forced down
over water;
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- composition and location of operations groups (representa-
tives) from the air army, long-range aviation, transport aviation,
and the fleet during the debarkation of an amphibious landing.
A plan for the coordination of front troops and naval forces
in an offensive operation must be worked out parallel with the
preparation of an operational plan by the front staff and
representatives of the other staffs concerned. Lest such a _plan
bed- ? ? on
in basic outline only. In our opinion, the fttaila of coordina-
tion ust be tzgAtesLas_attachments to the basic plan in the form
of separate documents (for example, the debarkation of naval,
tank, and airborne landing forces, the capture of a straits area,
and the defense of the seacoast). This will greatly simplify the
working out of coordination problems by staffs and will facilitate
their subsequent refinement.
We have presented some special features of the combat use of
front aviation in a front offensive operation on a maritime axis,
-C-EHalicted without nuEre-iF weapons. The individual positions
presented in this article require further development, refinement,
and clarification during the application of practical measures in
the operational training of the staffs of other military districts.
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