MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE TRANSITION FROM CONVENTIONAL TO NUCLEAR WARFARE DURING AN OFFENSIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 15, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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Lor.111 I IPL 1r4 I GLL I LIIGII?re. T
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
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15 June 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Transition from
Conventional to Nuclear Warfare During an
Offensive
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Repor
is part of a series now in 'preparation based on the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles oi
the Journal "Military Thought." This article is based on CPX
and war games conducted by the Frunze Academy. It stresses the
necessity of conducting conventional military operations in a
manner which will afford the greatest advantages in the event
of transition to the use of nuclear weapons. The author states
thticalpproval of the use of nuclear _weapons by US
forces will take up to tli_Olii?--,--ind-that when indications of
CS-nUclear attack are detected, Soviet forces should carry out
a preemptive nuclear strike. The author also expresses concern
that a Sovi,ot commander will employ nuclear weapons without
_ -
aut4crizataon, and recommehds measures to prevent such action.
1'E-is article appeared in Issue No. 3 (91) for 1970.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensi-
tive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know
basis within recipient agencies.
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Depu Directo for Operations
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
:he Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U.S. Air Force
Office of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Scientific Intelligence
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Intelligence Information Special Report
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DIRXOTORATS Or
PLANS
COUNTRY
USSR
FIRDB-312/02892-73
DATE OF
Late
1970
DATE 15 June 1973
INFO.
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Transition to the Use of Nuclear
Weapons in the Course of an Offensive Operation
SOURCE Documentary
SUMMARY
The following report is a translation from Russian of an
article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (91) for 1970 of the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought." The author of this article is Colonel
A. Postovalov. This article is based on CPX and war games con-
ducted by the Frunze Academy. It stresses the necessity of con-
ducting conventional military operations in a manner which will
afford the greatest advantages in the event of transition to the
use of nuclear weapons. Reconnaissance of enemy targets for
nuclear strikes and the destruction of enemy nuclear capability
during the conventional phase are given as examples. The author
states that political approval of the use of nuclear weapons by US
forces will take up to two hours, and that when indications of US
nuclear attack are detected, Soviet forces should carry out a
preemptive nuclear strike. The author also expresses concern that
a Soviet commander will employ nuclear weapons withoutiza-
tion, and recommends measures to prevent such action.
50x1 HUM
END OF SUMMARY
COMMENT.
Colonel A. Postovalov authored an article in Military Hera ,
Issue No. 9 for 1955 titled "Thoughts on Control During Military
Training," and in Military Missile, Issue No. 3 for 1969--"Modeling
the Combat Operations of the Ground Forces." Military Thoupt has
been published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three verions in
the past--TOP SECRET, SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There is no infor-
mation as to whether or not the TOP SECRET version continues to be
published. The SECRET version is published three times annually
and is distributed down to the level of division commander.
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Transition to the Use of Nuclear Weapons in
the Course of an Offensive' Operation
by Colonel A. Postovalov -.?
Candidate of Military Sciences, Docent
The foundations for successful transition to the use of
nuclear weapons are laid down during the preparation for the
operation. During this period the decision is made on partici-
pation of the army in the initial nuclear strike of the front,
and on troop action to exploit the results of the strike. Tasks
are assigned to those who will carry them out. Coordinated action,
reconnaissance, and final reconnaissance are organized for the
initial nuclear strike; a reliable control system is established
with first priority for the nuclear weapons; constant readiness
is ensured for using these weapons; steps are taken to defend the
troops and rear services facilities in the event of surprise use
of nuclear weapons by the enemy; and finally, operational camou-
flage?particularly for nuclear weapons--and the radioelectronic
struggle are organized for the delivery of the initial nuclear
strike, and nuclear warhead reserves are echeloned.
From the beginning of an operation using conventional weapons,
work continues without interruption to maintain constant troop
readiness for the use of nuclear weapons. The reason for this is
to make it possible to deliver the initial strike in the shortest
possible time after the signal is received. To this end recon-
naissance and final reconnaissance are carried out on enemy
targets slated for destruction in the initial nuclear strike; the
mission of the nuclear weapons which will be used in the initial
strike is refined in good time; steps are taken to prevent the
loss of launchers and nuclear warheads and to preserve reliable
control over the means planned for delivering the initial nuclear
strike; a constant struggle is carried out against the enemy's
nuclear weapons; and checks are made on the readiness of the
troops for action under conditions of the use of weapons of mass
destruction.
On the basis of the experience of command and staff exercises
and war games conducted at the M. V. Frunze Military Academy, this
article sets forth a number of considerations on the procedures
for transition from non-nuclear combat action to nuclear in an
army offensive operation, as applicable to the Western Theater of
Military Operations.
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In preparing an offensive operation, within the decision to
participate in the initial nuclear strike of a front, the army
commander determines the primary and reserve targets which must
be destroyed by the army's weapons (if these targets have not
been designated by the front troop commander), the yield of the
nuclear warheads to be used and the type of burst, the means of
delivery to be used, the tasks of the first echelon of troops in
exploiting the results of the first nuclear strike and the basic
problems of coordinated action in carrying them out, and the
organization of control over nuclear forces and weapons. In
addition, if appropriate orders have not been received from the
headquarters of the front, the most important integral part of
the decision the army commander makes on using nuclear weapons
is to establish degrees of readiness for missile troops, artillery,
and supporting aviation with regard to delivering the nuclear
strike. Also, he must determine procedures for echeloning nuclear
warheads.
The plan for the initial nuclear strike, which is worked out
in the course of preparation for the operation under peacetime
conditions, must take into consideration the possibility of war
being unleashed by the enemy with surprise massive use of all
combat-ready nuclear weapons. In other words, it must anticipate
the most difficult action variant. This initial nuclear strike
plah will be an integral part of the plan for the initial offen-
sive operation. When nuclear war breaks out, the initial strike
plan is put into effect right away. If the operation begins with
conventional weapons, the plan is subjected to continuing review
and amplification in accordance with changes in conditions.
The goal of the initial nuclear strike is the destruction of
the major portion of the enemy's means of nuclear attack, the
defeat of his main groupings of forces, and the disorganization
.o12control. The purpose of this is to frustrate a nuclear strike
and attack--or at the very least to weaken them as much as possible.
The primary targets which must be destroyed in the initial nuclear
strike are the means for delivery of nuclear warheads, with first
priority to those with the greatest range and whose nuclear charge
has the greatest yield. Further primary targets are storage and
supply points for special weapons; troops, aviation, and pilotless
weapon control points; and groupings of troops--especially tank
troops. In selecting targets for destruction it is essential to
take into consideration the fact that under peacetime conditions
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the disposition
it will be with
initial nuclear
aimed at mobile
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of troops and other enemy targets is different than
the onset of war. Therefore, in planning the
strike the epicenters (centers) of nuclear bursts
enemy targets must be worked out very carefully.
These are established following a final reconnaissance carried out
immediately before the strike. In the plan for the initial nuclear
strike the number and yield of nuclear warheads to be used, the
means of delivery, the type of burst, and the means of final recon-
naissance are shown for each mobile target.
The plan for participation in the initial nuclear strike is
worked out under the direct leadership of the commander and chief
of staff. The plan is usually drawn up as a separate document,
separate from the operations plan. It is prepared on a 1:200,000
map, and a chart of the initial nuclear strike is attached. The
map shows the groupings of enemy troops; the position of friendly
troops in broad outline; the grouping of means of delivery of
nuclear warheads; the Army Mobile Missile-Technical Base; the
airfields for aircraft designated to provide support for the army;
rnr_y_slAd_rgs..P.Xve enemy targets destroyed in the initiAl.APP1PAX
strike by .7e4.pons_J41,f_the Supreme High_Cammand,
.army; the yield of the warheads and the type of burst; and possible
zones of destruction, fire, flooding, and radioactive contamination
The chart for the initial nuclear strike shows the following:
the means of delivery; the targets for destruction; the yield of
the nuclear warheads; the types of bursts and the timing for the
strike; the forces and means to be used for final reconnaissance
of mobile targets; anticipated destruction to be achieved; duty
nuclear weapons; the echeloning of nuclear warheads designated
for the second and succeeding launches; procedures for relocating
nuclear weapons during non-nuclear action; signals for shifting
launchers to Readiness No. 2, No. 2A, and No. 1 for delivering
the initial nuclear strike, and for changes in orders on delivering
the strike; procedures for transmitting these signals; and the
system for authenticating them.
In accordance with the decision, the army commander levies
tasks on the nuclear weapons for their part in the initial nuclear
strike. Experience gained from exercises and war games has shown
that tasking of troops to exploit the results of the strike is best
done not during the phase of preparation for the operation, but
while combat action is already under way and after the order for
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the initial nuclear strike has been received. This proceeds from
the fact that the conditions in which the transition to the use
of nuclear weapons takes place will be significantly different
from those which obtained during the planning of the operation.
It is impossible to foresee these later conditions in detail in
advance. Consequently, even if the troops are tasked during the
preparation phase of the operation to exploit the results of the
initial nuclear strike, at the time the nuclear weapons are
actually used tasking will still be necessary--and this not so
much in terms of refining existing tasking as in tasking again,-
Also, we must not lose sight of the fact that the troops have
combat tasks to carry out with conventional weapons and this will
require maximum effort from all forces. Full levying of combat
tasks for a situation of exploitation of nuclear weapons will to a
degree distract commanders and staffs from their combat action with
conventional weapons, and can sometimes even lead to confusion in
the troops understanding their tasks and carrying them out.
As the army commander levies agreed tasking--agreed with
respect to objective, location, and time--on the nuclear weapons
for their part in the initial nuclear strike, he also organizes
coordinated action for carrying out these tasks. After tasks have
been assigned, only brief supplementary instructions are needed on
such matters as procedures for receiving the order to carry out
the initial nuclear strike, and the degree of readiness of
launchers, delivery aircraft, and supporting air units. In addi-
tion, the commander may indicate the procedure for relocating
rocket troops and the Army Mobile Missile-Technical Base during
the attack. Also, he may provide signals for rocket troops and
air units to change from one degree of readiness to another, take
measures to prevent unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, take
steps to ensure the effective utilization of nuclear weapons in
delivering the second and succeeding massed and group nuclear
strikes, etc.
Action coordination of troops which will have the job of
completing the destruction of what remains of the enemy after the
initial nuclear strike is organized at the same time as the assign-
ment of tasks: after the order has been received to deliver the
initial nuclear strike.
v/7 One of the most important problems is the establishment and
continuing maintenance of optimum readiness of nuclear weapons
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to deliver the initial nuclear strike. The successful transition
from non-nuclear to nuclear action hinges to a large degree on
the correct resolution of this problem. A great deal of atten-
tion is devoted in our press to examination of this problem.* We
would like to draw attention only to the fact that for successful
transition from non-nuclear action to nuclear it is necessary not
only for the initial nuclear strike to be delivered at the proper
time, but also for it to be possible to employ nuclear weapons
quickly to destroy newly appearing important enemy targets after
the initial nuclear strike. This is ensured by organizing a
combat duty unit of rocket troops which does not take part in
delivering the initial nuclear strike, and which is in a state of
thirteen to fifteen minute readiness to launch. Appropriate
echeloning of nuclear warheads also helps to ensure this.
On the basis of the experience of exercises and war games,
the highest degree of nuclear weapons readiness for the second
launch and succeeding launches can be achieved if all transport
capabilities of the army's missile battalions, missile brigade,
and Army Missile-Technical Base are utilized to maintain and
transport nuclear missiles. Under the existing organization of
Al rocket troops pine ,rockets can be held and transported in a missile
\, brigade, nine missiles each in the missile-technical platoons
[vzvod] of the missile battalions of the division, and ten opera-
tional-tactical and thirt tactical missiles in the ArairRobile
Missile-Technical Base. Thus, not counting duty weapons which
did not participate in the initial nuclear strike, the army can
have nineteen operational-tactical missiles and up to sixty
tactical missiles for the second launch and succeeding launches.
With such echeloning of nuclear warheads and the correct
organization of relocation of the Army Mobile Missile-Technical
Base, the second launch of operational-tactical missiles is
possible within one and a half to two hours, and of tactical
missiles within forty to sixty minutes. This is exclusive of
missiles which did not take part in the initial nuclear strike
*The article by General-Mayor A. Romashkin and Col. V. Ivanov
(Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought," 1970,
No. 1) IFIRDB-312/02796-7Th article by General-Leytenant of
Artillery L. Sapkov (Collection of Articles of the Journal "Mili-
tary Thought," 1970, No. 2)
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(duty launchers, and also launchers which were not used in the
initial nuclear strike because there were no targets for them or
for technical reasons).
Nuclear bombs for a second sortie should be kept at airfields,
and for succeeding flights at the Mobile Missile-Technical Base of
the air army. With nuclear bombs collected at the airfields, a
repeat flight by the gelivery aircraft which participated in ttaL
initial strike is possible within sixty to ninety minutes after
' they have landed.
During non-nuclear combat action the readiness of the nuclear
weapons of an army for the initial nuclear strike depends to a
large degree on the correct organization and execution of relocatin
them to new launch areas during the attack. Experience of exercise
shows that relocation of an army missile brigade and of tactical
missile battalions should be carried out in the same manner as unde
conditions of nuclear warfare. 'The purpose of this is so that the
major portion of the nuclear weapons will always be in readiness to
deliver the initial nuclear strike. Also, at the tensest moments
in rtaulz4ag ene Tjrstrikes, in the breach of intermediate
defense lines, in t e fMced crossing of water barriers, or in the
introduction of the second echelon into battle, all the rocket
troops of the army must be ready to use their nuclear warheads.
It is desirable for the planning for relocation of an army missile
brigade to be worked out on front scale, and for relocation of
battalions of tactical missiles and long-range artillery_ drawn on
for the initial nuclear strike on army scale. 50X1-HUM
Relocation of a missile brigade can be carried out by
battAlions and of tactical m ? ? How-
ever, the variant is not to be excluded of relocating a missile
brigade (tactical missile battalion) all at once, in toto. Cal-
culations show that with an average daily troop advance of forty
,to fifty kilometers, AlLanly_gtiggile br,iga4q_Qan_kagin_rgiQCAtion
to a new site area on D3-D4. Tactical missile battalions need to
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In firming up planning for the initial nuclear strike during
non-nuclear action it is essential to take into consideration the
rduction in cpmbat readiness of rocket troops which are being
Zglakaa. Thus, when the command to shift to the use of nuclear
weapons is received during relocation, a missile battalion of an
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army brigade cannot carry out this command in less than fifty to
sixty minutes, and a tactical missile battery in less than thirty
to thirty-five minutes.
In the organization and execution of relocation of rocket
troops during an operation, particular attention must be paid to
concealing their withdrawal from their positions, their movement
along roads, and their deployment in the new launch areas. With
this in mind it is desirable to make maximum use of night time
and of conditions of poor visibility (fog, rain, snow, low-lying
clouds, artificial fog and haze). In concealing the relocation
movement of rocket troops, broad use must be made of troop and
operational camouflage, and also of periodic shifting of launch
positions.
In the conduct of combat action using conventional weapons
it is extremely important to preclude the possibility of nuclear
weapons being used on the initiative of battery or battalion
commanders who have gotten into a difficult situation during
CUMbat-action, or as a result of a commander irresponsibly exceed-
ing his authority. It goes without saying that such a possibility
must be underestimated during highly mobile and decisive combat
action when _oss o communication with senior chiefs for 5 OX1-HUMI or
less lengthy period "of time is not to be excluded.
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To solve this problemia reliable system must be established
for authentication of the transmittal of the command to proceed
with the first nuclear strike. Also, readiness stage No. I must
not be imposed for tactical and operational-tactical missiles
earlier than necessary, taking into consideration the possible
time for the receipt of the command for the use of nuclear weapons.
In addition, it clearly is also necessary to haye a technical
solution to the problem by creating a device which would malie it
\impossible for a nuclear missile to be launched by anyone in a
battery, battalion, or brigade without the permission of the
senior chiefs: in the division--the division commander, and in
the army--the army commander.
As is well known, the forces and weapons designated for
delivering the initial nuclear strike will be first-order targets
for reconnaissance and destruction. Therefore it is very impor-
tant during non-nuclear combat action that all measures be taken
to conceal the relocation of rocket troops and the Army Mobile
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Missile-Technical Base, to camouflage the areas where they are
deployed, to provide reliable cover from air strikes, to organize
a watch for and defense against attack by enemy airborne assault
forces and sabotage detachments and groups, to ensure adequate
dispersal also of engineer equipment in the site areas, and to
provide for timely replacement of losses.
The successful transition from non-nuclear action to nuclear
depends in large measure on the degree of success in reducing the
effectiveness of the enemy's first nuclear strike. Stated
differently, this means the degree of success in preserving the
combat effectiveness of friendly troops. The most important way
to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's strikes is to forestall
his use of nuclear weapons. This depends basically on the timely
making of a decision on transition to nuclear war, and getting
the order (signal) to those who will carry it out. The troops
must be prepared at a moment's notice to carry out an order (signal)
to deliver the initial nuclear strike.
During non-nuclear warfare, reduction of the enemy's capa-
bilities to use nuclear weapons is achieved first and foremost
through unremitting struggle against his nuclear weapons and by
taking all measures to increase the survivability of friendly
troops, the control system, and rear services facilities. The
main purpose of the struggle against the enemy's nuclear weapons
during non-nuclear warfare is to disrupt his use of them or, at
the very least, to weaken his first nuclear strike as much as
possible. The principles of carrying on the struggle against
weapons of mass destruction remain the same as in a nuclear war:
struggle unremittingly, and forestall the delivery of fire strikes.
The organization and conduct of the struggle against the
enemy's nuclear weapons must be carried out by commanders at all
levels. The main efforts of reconnaissance and of means of
destruction should be concentrated on identifying and destroying
means of delivery in areas of concentration, on the march, and in
site areas; nuclear warheads in depots, supply and storage points;
and also nuclear weapons control points. In addition to destruc-
tive weapons, special d,ttsighmaaa_and airborne assault forces must
be applied to FEE?Struggle against the enemy's nuclear weapons.
And radioelectronic means must be applied to disrupt his control.
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The survivability of troops and rear services facilities is
increased through dispersal, maximum utilization of the defensive
and camouflage features of the terrain, as well as the engineer
equipment there, carefully thought out operational and troop
camouflage, and the conduct of fast-moving and highly mobile combat
action. In addition, the troops must be in a constant state of
readiness to eliminate the consequences of the use of nuclear and
chemical weapons by the enemy.
Dispersal of first echelon subunits and units, it would
appear, can be effected only to the point where they are still
able to carry out their combat tasks. _c_xlsequently,first echelon
troops Will Jaa_Qb11.gad_tco act in ...2.2,112Arat DECKIElb.u.5
.-Which will ensure the necessary supremacy over thi_!pemy and make
it?po-g-ibre----Eo count on neutralizing hig-TereiTies. fri?M5 doing,
certain procedures must be followed in order not to incur massive
losses in the event of a surprise nuclear attack by the enemy.
Along with ferreting out and reliably destroying his nuclear
1 weapons, it is essential to conduct combat action at a fast pace
I and secretly, and within a limited time span to concentrate the
forces and weapons necessary to carry out the combat mission.
! Then as soon as the need is passed, these forces and weapons must
be dispersed again right away. A significant increase in the sur-
ViY_a_b_i_gf_secand_schelans_4114_X_q_ggrves, control points, and
rear service facilities ? . clever dispersal,
utilization of the clef-, t e
terrain, an a so the engineer equipment-thae.
As indicated above,
conduct of a non-nuclear
transition to the use of
time. Therefore, in the
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control of the army's troops in the
operation must be such as to ensure
nuclear weapons in the shortest possible
or anization of contr
mast_b_e_siey_o_ter_dt_s_t_commusnizations, particu-
la 1 with the means for deliveri r warheads. For the
control of uni s an large units which will take part in the
delivery of a nuclear strike, it is best to set up special channels
of communications and anticipate the possibility of du of
communications facilities for some nets and axes.
f?
The experience of command-staff exercises and war games shows
that during the period of non-nuclear combat action it is essential'
to set up in the army's staff a special working organ--a planning
gp_Up_for-plan ' 'k This group is
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charged with various tasks: preparing data to permit an accurate
decision on the army's participation in the initial nuclear strike;
calculating the probable results of the strike in the zone of the
army's offensive; preparing proposals for taking advantage of
these results; effecting control over the transmittal of precise
(tasks to those who will carry them out and also control over the
ireadiness of the nuclear weapons; and maintaining the planning map
for the initial nuclear strike and the chart for carrying out the
strike and recording data from reconnaissance and final reconnais-
sance of targets hit in the initial nuclear strike.
Generally the deputy chief of staff of the army and officers
from the operations, intelligence, and chemical departments and
staff of the rocket troops, artillery, and air army operations
group are brought together to do all this work. Composed in this
fashion, the group can coordinate closely with the operations and
intelligence departments and staff of the rocket troops and artil-
lery and air army operations group and successfully carry out the
duties assigned to it. All the work of the group in planning the
initial nuclear strike is done under the direct leadership of the
commander and chief of staff of the army.
The data the group begins with in planning the initial nuclear
strike consists of the decision of the army commander for an offen-
sive operation, in which the delivery of the initial nuclear strike
figures prominently; data on objectives which may be targets for
destruction by the army's weapons; on the availability and grouping
of means of delivery of nuclear warheads in the army; the time of
the offensive; and the number of nuclear warheads.
One of the important questions in directing troops with regard
to ensuring rapid transition from non-nuclear action to nuclear is
that of efficient organization of reconnaissance and final recon-
naissance of initial nuclear strike targets, along with timely
disclosure of the enemy's preparations for the use of nuclear and
chemical weapons. In addition, reconnaissance must ensure that
the enemy's nuclear weapons are found so that they can be destroyed
during non-nuclear combat action. The solution of these tasks and
the necessary forces and weapons must be provided for in working
out the reconnaissance plan.
Discovery of the enemy's intentions with regard to using
nuclear weapons is rendered exceptionally difficult by the fact
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that his means for nuclear attack are maintained continually in
a high state of combat readiness. In addition, it must be kept
in mind that the enemy will take every possible measure to hide
his intentions.
As is seen from analysis of NATO troop exercises, between the
ctime the operational-tactical means of delivery receive_thawD5der
for an initial nuclear strike and the time the strike is carried
iout there is a total elapsed time of ' --? ? es.
This amount of time is clearly insufficient to learn about the
preparations of the means of delivery of nuclear warheads for the
V launch, report this to the command who can make a decision on
I the initial use of nuclear wea ons, get tg5-5-f75=a-n-girittrd. for
the initial nuc ear strike, an -- inally--carry out the strike.
Accordingly, it goes without saying that one cannot count on dis-
covering the enemy's intentions to shift to the use of nuclear
weapons gter the order to delive - en iven to
his means of delivery.
It is considered that for a decision-on-nuclear weapons_to
be. made by theFT5l_dent_of the_11.3.and for this decision to be
_'.9..1.ayedto the means of _delivery can. take between one and-iwo
hours. During this time interval the greatest opportunities for
vf discovering the enemy's intentions lie with agent_intallIgeAce./
Radio intelligence can also obtain some information through
intercept of orders related to preparation for the use of nuclear
weapons.
The possibility_is_ not to be excluded that such a responsible
step as a shift to nuclear war will be preceded by certain
mr_e_s_t-0 heighten the state f rpadineas of thp eneiTriluclear
weapons and troops. SpecificAlly, various developments may provide
evidence that the moment is approaching when the enemy will use
nuclear weapons, viz: an increase in the numbe
means; the delivery of_nuclear warlii-a-a-S from mobile supply points
to launch and firing positions for all means of delivery; the -
reinforcement of ensinggr_equipment in areas where second echelons/-
reserves, and rear service facilities are located; a changein
wrork_patterns at storage depots for special types of weapons; and
an increase activity-on-radi-e---ne_ts___providing communications for
control and for notification of means of delivery of nuclear war-
heads, and also on radar stations, radionavigation means, radio
remote control, etc.
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These signs which show evidence of an increasing threat of
the use of nuclear weapons by the enemy can be revealed through
various 2.1:my_lataaleigazae_mealo, or they can be obtained from
interrogation of prisoners and deserters. Since the aaly comman-
der does not have
? t
fp ? - ? - ? - #
4 $
e initial use of nuclear weapon, all intelligence information
obtained whidh relates to direct preparation by the enemy for the
use of means of mass destruction must be trimpdiAtply rpnnr.zed to
the headquarters of the front
On receipt of an order (signal) to deliver th?50x1 -Humal
nuclear strike, the commander and the whole army headquarters
concentrate their primary efforts on carrying it out as quickly
as possible, ensuring maximum effectiveness of the nuclear strikes
and organizing the immediate exploitation of the results of the
strikes by first echelon large units. 50X1-HUM
First of all the order (signal) to deliver the initial nuclear
strike must, in the shortest time possible and in a manner con-
cealed from the enemy, be transmitted to the missile brigade and
to the commanders of thf.i.rat_eslizzi.s.i.ou.. Any functioning
channels of communication are used to notify the troops of the
transition to the use of nuclear weapons; the use of duplicate
channels and a check to determine that the order has been cor-
rectly understood are mandatory. Aviation as a rule will receive
its orders on the initial nuclear strike directly from the head-
quarters of the front. 50X1-HUM
If it is not necessary to introduce any last minute changes
into the initial nuclear strike plan, then the order to carry out
the plan can consist only of the revipgAly-ax.ranged_lianal and
the time for the first missile aunch. However, it will appar-
ently often happen that it will be necessary to introduce further
recision into or even to change the tasks assigned to individual
uclear means Ot-er_the order has been received for transition to
uclear war. This will happen despite the fact that the plan for
he initial nuclear strike is continually being made more precise.
his is a function of the highly dynamic quality of combat action,
he mobility of troops and other targets, and the fact that as a
consequence intelligence data quickly become outdated.
After he receives the order (signal) to carry out the initial
nuclear strike, the army commander will have to specify the
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procedures for putting it into effect. In this regard there are
two possible courses of action.
First variant: Deliver the strike with all combat-ready
nuclear means in accordance with the last revision of the initial
nuclear strike plan and without additional target reconnaissance.
If the information on the initial nuclear strike objectives is
reliable right up to the moment of delivering the strike, then
this will ensure the quickest and most effective use of nuclear
weapons. On the other hand, if some of the information turns out
to be outdated or erroneous, then this will lead to the unproduc-
tive expenditure of a portion of the nuclear warheads. Conse-
quently, this variant is advisable only when there is no question
about the accuracy of the intelligence information on objectives
to be hit in the initial nuclear strike. 50X1?HUM
Second variant: Deliver the initial nuclear strike within
the established time (simultaneously with or following the strike
by strategic means), but only against objectives which are
definitely known at the time. This ensures not only rapid
delivery of the initial nuclear strike, but also the most effec-
tive use of the nuclear warheads. A strike by oaeration41-tactical
mg _tactical missiles against objectives whi.c.410-_ngt_T!.14-re fiJ
reconnande-c-ahlio carried out simultaneously siti the initial
_
b...9.2ar sffIre_by'strategic Means, with a strike by delivery air-
craft-EZ6M-fi:Ont aviation 6OMIng ten to fifteen minutes later.
In this way-a-J-enemy can be forestalled from using his operational-
tactical nuclear means. This in turn will lead to the weakening
of his nuclear strike and to the creation of favorable conditions
for completing the destruction of his. troops by a rapid advance by
large units of the army's first echelon. In this situation when-
ever there are at the moment of delivering the first nuclear strike
fewer objectives than the initial missile launch and air strike
are capable of hitting, the unexpended nuclear warheads are used
to hit enemy targets revealed by reconnaissance during the initial
nuclear strike.
v/ In determining the duration of the initial nuclear strike
it is essential to take into consideration the capabilities of
the delivery aircraft and their flight time to their objectives,
to ensure their safety from friendly nuclear bursts, and to keep
in mind the need for final reconnaissance of a number of targets.
Considering all these factors, the duration of the initial nuclear
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strike with one missile launch (not counting the time needed to
reestablish combat effectiveness) and one flight of delivery air-
craft will run not less than forty to sixty minutes. This time
figure is confirmed from the experience of a number of operational
command-staff exercises and war games.
If in order to achieve the element of surprise or because
of time limitations it should turn out to be impossible to notify
army commanders in advance, i.e., before the strike is delivered
by the strategic means, about the transition to nuclear action,
then the first use of operational-tactical and tactical missiles
and of strikes by front iatj&neiivery can be carried
out actually_lagins_Ibl_gnsetoof nuclear war. In these circum-
stances thp7-initial_nuclear strike of the front will take ori-the
character of a counterstrike or response sall-E. It will be
delivered by nuclear means in various stages of readiness, since
it is quite obvious that it is inappropriate to wait for all means
to be brought up to combat readiness No. 1 in order to deliver a
massive strike. Each minute of delay can lead to the destruction
of a portion of our means of delivery of nuclear warheads and to
massive losses of troops, control points, and rear services
facilities. Accordingly, in such a situation the most appropriate
course is to deliver individual and group nuclear strikes as
launchers and delivery aircraft are ready, in accordance with the
last revision of the nuclear strike plan and with the information
from final reconnaissance of those objectives where this was
needed.
Under these conditions the amount of time available for
carrying out the tasks of the initial nuclear strike depends on
the way the situation has specifically developed. The first
missile launches are ossible within twent to thi s v
after the eceived the comman . T e timing for
e succeeding nuclear missile-rarriae-a?aWgir strikes in
accordance with the initial nuclear strike plan will depend not
so much on the speed with which information is received from
final reconnaissance on objectives to be hit as on the losses
which our nuclear means may suffer and the possibility of restor-
ing_cpntrol over the nuclear means which remain.
A particularly difficult situation can arise if the enemy
forestalls us from using operational-tactical nuclear means.
In this event a number of actions will be necessary: control over
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the troops must be rapidly restored, with nuclear weapons as
first priority; strikes must be delivered against the enemy with
the remaining nuclear means; decisions on operations and the
organization of combat action for the remaining troops must be
reviewed; combat effectiveness must be restored in subunits, units,
and large units which have been subjected to nuclear attack by the
enemy; the enemy's airborne assault forces must be destroyed; his
sabotage and espionage groups and detachments must be eliminated;
his ground force attack must be repulsed; and a continuing struggle
must be waged against his aviation.
Along with taking all measures to inflict maximum losses on
the enemy, a most important task of the commander and of comman-
ders, staffs, and troops is to reduce the effectiveness of his
nuclear strikes. In this the ability of command personnel to
achieve their assigned battle and operational goals with minimum
losses will play a major role.
With the transition to the use of_ nuclear ideapon-s-14.1aglaalamtai
chan .n.. on. The
sharp increase in the opportunities to hit the enemy simultaneously
along the whole depth of his operational structure will lead to a
need to make new decisions, assign new tasks to the troops, apply
different methods, change the groupings of forces and means at both
operational and tactical levels, and develop different organization
for coordination and supply. The losses incurred from the enemy's
nuclear strikes and the resulting zones of destruction, fire,
radiation and chemical contamination, and flooding will have
decisive influence on the character of troop combat action. In
connection with the sharp change in conditions during the initial
nuclear strike, decisions with regard to exploiting the results of
the nuclear strikes may need to be reviewed and redrawn many
times over. 50X1-HUM
In those sectors where our nuclear strikes are delivered
against objectives located well back, yle_atta_ckin59,9?..aust
maintain contact with the enemy at as as close to
im as possi . g-vt11 -feaTic'4' the opportunity cif
to !fit-- ourtrorp'S:Tatriiiediurn? 'a-Kr Itifrep?talTe.
Personnel Of-subunits, diaEiT-iST-trilfgeiiiiiinriOacE7NE-Wriitle
of transition to the use of nuclear weapons are located in the
reserves or in the second echelon, as well as artillery crews who
at the moment arie_not engaged in fire activity, and personnel in
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control points, rear services organs and other installations,
must occupy their prepared shelters without delay. Antiaircraft
defense troops continue on combat duty ready to exert all forces
and means in the struggle against enemy aviation.
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