PUBLIC TESTIMONY OF CLANDESTINE SERVICES OFFICERS
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP89B00224R000200440004-3
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RIPPUB
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S
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 22, 2011
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 20, 1987
Content Type:
MEMO
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
sue~cT: (optianol)
Public Testimony of Clandestine Services Officers
FRAM; EXTENSION
David D. Gries
NO.
Director of Congressional Affairs
DATE
21 May 1987
TO: (OlRcor dasiynoYan, room number, and
bui )
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number ?ach comment to Chow from whom
REGEIVEO
FORWARDED
INITIALS
b whom. Draw o lino across column ahor comment.)
1.
A/DCI
For
your meetin
with
~?
..
g
Senators Boren and Cohen.
3.
~.
S.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
11.
1 S.
FORM
I-79
610 ~IT~
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20 May 1987
NOTE FOR: The Acting Director
FROM: Dave Grie$
SUBJECT: Public Testimony of Clandestine Services Officers
REFERENCES: Tab A - 30 April Memo recommending a strategy
Tab B - Your 4 May letter to Congressmen Inouye,
Rudman, Hamilton and Cheney
Tab C - My 20 May letter to Deputy Counsel Eggleston
As you know, we have been working hard since late April to
obtain Select Committee agreement not to require public
testimony from clandestine services officers. You have
telephoned key Congressmen, written a letter to Select Committee
leaders (tab B), and talked to Frank Carlucci. I have worked at
staff level and have responded to a letter from Deputy Chief
Counsel Eggleston (tab C).
On 19 May Robert Owen testified before the Select
Committees. His many references to Joe Fernandez have whetted
Committee interest in obtaining Fernandez' public testimony. We
understand from staff that a decision is imminent.
--I recommend that you call Carlucci, apprise him of current
developments and ask him to involve the White House,
especially Chief of Staff Baker. Baker is uniquely
qualified to telephone Senator Inouye, who was Chairman of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence during the
period wYien Baker was Vice Chairman of the Committee. Baker
will have his own ideas about others to call.
--You should also consider asking Colby, McMahon, Inman or
Helms to place telephone calls.
--I also recommend that you discuss this issue with Senators
Boren and Cohen in your upcoming meeting with them.
Attachments
References (a~ stated)
STAT
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30 April 1987
OCA 87-1830
NOTE FOR: The Acting Dir~~to-r
FROM: David D. Grie~
~~_ssr
Director of Co e onal Affairs
SUBJECT: Public Testimony of Agency Employees
As you are aware, the press is again reporting that the
Select Committees may require public testimony from Agency
employees. Staff level checks support these reports, though no
final decision has yet been made., They apparently are
considering calling Fernandez now
I believe we should respond incremently so as to make our
point, but without turning a generally helpful staff against us
and provoking a confrontation which we might lose.
Therefore, using the attached letter for talking points, I
recommend that you telephone Hamilton, Cheney and Inouye (you
have already talked to Rudman) today or tomorrow. That is all
we need to do for now.
Depending on the outcome of the telephone calls and other
developments, we may suggest that you send the letter on Friday
or Monday to some or all the Members of the two Select
Committees.
As a final step, held in reserve for next week, we may
recommend that you send copies of the letter_ to others who might
be willing to help us. Some names that come to mind are Colby,
McMahon, Inman, Helms, Schlesinger, Tower, Skowcroft, Brzezinski
and Kissinger.
However, for the moment we don't want to escalate beyond the
precautionary telephone calls.
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - ExDir
1 - ER
1 - OCA Record
D/OCA:DDGries:mdo (30 Apr 1987)
1 ~- D/OCA Chrono
~- OCA Chrono
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~cnUal hitclG~cn~r A~rny~
4 May 1987
OCA 87-1824
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance
to Iran & the :.Jicaraguan Opposition
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Press reports continue to circulate that the House and
Senate Select Committees on Secret Military Assistance to Iran
and the Nicaraguan Opposition may ask employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency's clandestine services to testify under oath
in public hearings. While I and other Agency officials in
discussions with your staff have already outlined the serious
problems this would pose for us, I believe this issue is so
critical that I want to make our great concern and the reasons
for objecting to public testimony absolutely clear. I also want
to apprise the Committee that I have consulted with National
Security Adviser Carlucci, and he has informed me that this is a
matter of importance to the President.
Let me emphasize at the outset that any Agency employee is
available to the Select Committees to testify under oath in a
closed session. As you know, CIA personnel have already given
sworn depositions to Committee staff. The Agency is fully
prepared to work with the Committees to produce expeditiously
for public release a declassified version of any such
testimony. Indeed, I am prepared to commit all necessary
resources to ensure that testimony taken in executive session is
sanitized and declassified for public use within 24 hours.
Accordingly, the issue is not whether information from Agency
employees can be put before the public, but whether it is
necessary or appropriate for CIA clandestine services employees
to appear in open Committee proceedings?
First, there is the issue of precede=nt. As far as I can
determine, no active duty member of the CIA clandestine service
has ever testified under oath in a public hearing before the
Congress. Although the question of public testimony was
considered during the Church and Pike Committee hearings of the
1970x, both those Committees accepted the Agency's argument
against public exposure of its employees other than the
Director. Both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees
have also respected this principle through the years.
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It is also important to keep in mind that virtually any
staff employee the Committee may wish to call as a witness must
travel or live abroad to carry out his or her duties. Public
exposure could eliminate the possibility of future service
abroad because of personal and operational security problems and
reluctance of foreign governments to allow known Agency
employees to be stationed in their countries. Although it is
true that the names of some of these employees may have appeared
in the media, this does not necessarily confirm affiliation with
the Agency. On the other hand, gublic testimony before Congress
would confirm official CIA affiliation, and when linked with
photographs appearing in the media, would confirm identity as
well. I appreciate plans apparently under consideration by
Committee staff to prohibit television and still photography of
Agency employees, but I question r~hether these plans are
workable or seemly for an Agency official.
Apart from the public disclosure of the identities of our
personnel, we are deeply concerned about the kinds of
information our witnesses may be asked to furnish in open
session. Even with detailed advance preparation and
negotiations with staff, there is no way to ensure that a Member
will not press for an answer that would require the revelation
of highly sensitive information. In short, there would be no
way to control the course of an interrogation being played out
in public. In this regard, there are rules and safeguards built
into the Resolutions establishing the Committees themselves
(especially on the Senate side) that require Congressional
compliance with detailed procedures in connection with any
demand for open session disclosure of classified identities
and/or information.
Finally, the appearance of clandestine service employees in
public hearings would risk serious consequences for our
relationships overseas and our ability to conduct clandestine
operations.
For all these reasons, I urge your careful consideration of
this issue. I know that the Congress shares with the Executive
Branch the goal of making U.S. intelligence as strong as
possible. Die also share the belief that U.S. intelligence
should operate under vigorous Congressional scrutiny. At the
same time, an effective secret intelligence agency must remain
secret. I ask the Committees to join us in keeping it that way
and request an opportunity to discuss this matter further before
any final decision is made to call as a witness any member of
the Agency's clandestine service. A copy of this letter is also
being provided to Vice Chairman Rudman.
a~~
obert M. tes
Acting Director of Cen al Intelligence
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4 May 1987?
OCA 87-1825
The Honorable Warren Rudman, Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Secret Military Ass.istar~ce
to Iran & the Nicaraguan Opposition
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Press reports continue to circulate that the House and
Senate Select Committees on Secret Military Assistance to Iran
and the Nicaraguan Opposition may ask employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency's clandestine services to testify under oath
in public hearings. While I and other Agency officials in
discussions with your staff have already outlined the serious
problems this would pose for us, I believe this issue is so
critical that I want to make our great concern and the reasons
for objecting to public testimony absolutely clear. I also want
to apprise the Committee that I have consulted with National
Security Adviser Carlucci, and he has informed me that this is a
matter of importance to the President.
Let me emprasize at the outset that any Agency employee is
available to the Select Committees to testify under oath in a
closed session. As you know, CIA personnel have already given
sworn depositions to Committee staff. The Agency is fully
prepared to work with the Committees to produce expeditiously
for public release a declassified version of any such
testimony. Indeed, I am prepared to commit all necessary
resources to ensure that testimony taken in executive session is
sanitized and declassified for public use within 24 hours.
Accordingly, the issue is not whether information from Agency
employees can be put before the public, but whether it is
necessary or appropriate for CIA clandestine services employees
to appear in open Committee proceedings.
First, there is the issue of precedent. As far as I can
determine, no active duty member of the CIA clandestine service
has ever testified under oath in a public hearing before the
Congress. Although the question of public testimony was
considered during the Church and Pike Committee hearings of the
1970s, both those Committees accepted the Agency's argument
against public exposure of its employees other than the
Director. Both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees
have also respected this principle through the years.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/22 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000200440004-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/22 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000200440004-3
It is also important to keep in mind that virtually any
staff employee the Committee may wish to call as a witness mlast
travel or live abroad to carry ou.t his or her duties. Public
exposure could eliminate the possibility of future service
abroad because of personal and operational security problems and
reluctance of foreign governments to allow known Agency
employees to be stationed in their countries. Although it is
true that the names of some of these employees may have appeared
in the media, this does not necessarily confirm affiliation with
the Agency. On the other hand, public testimony before Congress
would confirm official CIA affiliation,e and when linked with
photographs appearing in the media, would confirm identity as
well. I appreciate plans apparently under consideration by
Committee staff to prohibit television and still photography of
Agency employees, but I question whether these plans are
workable or seemly for an Agency official.
Apart from the public disclosure of the identities of our
personnel, we are deeply concerned about the kinds of
information our witnesses may be asked to furnish in open
session. Even with detailed advance preparation and
negotiations with staff, there is no way to ensure that a Member
will not press for an answer that would require the revelation
of highly sensitive information. In short, there would be no
way to control the course of an interrogation being played out
in public. In this regard, there are rules and safeguards built
into the Resolutions establishing the Committees themselves
(especially on the Senate side) that require Congressional
compliance with detailed procedures in connection with any
demand for open session disclosure of classified identities
and/or information.
Finally, the appearance of clandestine service employees in
public hearings would risk serious consequences for our
relationships overseas and our ability to conduct clandestine
operations.
For all these reasons, I urge your careful consideration of
this issue. I know that the Congress shares with the Executive
Branch the goal of making U.S. intelligence as strong as
possible. We also share the belief that U.S. intelligence
should operate under vigorous Congressional scrutiny. At the
same time, an effective secret intelligence agency must remain
secret. I ask the Committees to join us in keeping it that way
and request an opportunity to discuss this matter further before
any final decision is made to call as a witness any member of
the Agency's clandestine service. A copy of this letter is also
being provided to Chairman Inouye.
Acting Director of Cenral Intelligence
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4 May 1987
, OCA 87-1826
The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman
Select Committee to Investigate Covert.
Arms Transactions with Iran
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Press reports continue to circulate that the House and
Senate Select Committees on Secret Military Assistance to Iran
and the Nicaraguan Opposition may ask employees, of the Central
Intelligence Agency's clandestine services to testify under oath
in public hearings. While I and other Agency officials in
discussions with your staff have already outlined the serious
problems this would pose for. us, I believe this issue is so
critical that I want to make our great concern and the reasons
for objecting to public testimony absolutely clear. I also want
to apprise the Committee that I have consulted with National
Security Adviser Carlucci, and he has informed me that this is a
matter of importance to the President.
Let me emphasize at the outset that any Agency employee is
available to the Select Committees to testify under oath in a
closed session. As you know, CIA personnel have already given
sworn depositions to Committee staff. The Agency is fully
prepared to work with the Committees to produce expeditiously
for public release a declassified version of any such
testimony. Indeed, I am prepared to commit all necessary
resources to ensure that testimony taken in executive session is
sanitized and declassified for public use within 24 hours.
Accordingly, the issue is not whether information from Agency
employees can be put before the public, but whether it is
necessary or appropriate for CIA clandestine services employees
to appear in open Committee proceedings.
First, there is the issue of precedent. As far as I can
determine, no active duty member of the CIA clandestine service
has ever testified under oath in a public hearing before the
Congress. Although the question of public testimony was
considered during the Church and Pike Committee hearings of the
1970s, both those Committees accepted the Agency's argument
against public exposure of its employees other than the
Director. Both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees
have also respected this principle through the years.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/22 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000200440004-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/22 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000200440004-3
It is also important to keep in mind that virtually any
staff employee the Committee may wish to call as a witness must
travel or live abroad to carry out his or her duties. Public
exposure could eliminate the possibility of future service
abroad because of personal and operational security problems and
reluctance of foreign governments to allow known Agency
employees to be stationed in their countries. Although it is
true that the names of some of these employees may have appeared
in the media, this does not necessarily confirm affiliation with
the Agency. On the other hand, public testimony before Congress
would confirm official CIA affiliation, and when linked with
photographs appearing in the media, would confirm identity as
well. I appreciate plans apparently under consideration by
Committee staff to prohibit television and still photography of
Agency employees, but I question whether these plans are
workable or seemly for an Agency official.
Apart from the public disclosure of the identities of our
personnel, we are deeply concerned about the kinds of
information our witnesses may be asked to furnish in open
session. Even with detailed advance preparation and
negotiations with staff, there is no way to ensure that a Member
will not press for an answer that would require the revelation
of highly sensitive information. In short, there would be no
way to control the course of an interrogation being played out
in public. In this regard, there are rules and safeguards built
into the Resolutions establishing the Committees themselves
(especially on the Senate side) that require Congressional
compliance with detailed procedures in connection with any
demand for open session disclosure of classified identities
and/or information.
Finally, the appearance of clandestine service employees in
public hearings would risk serious consequences for our
relationships overseas and our ability to conduct clandestine
operations.
For all these reasons, I urge your careful consideration of
this issue. I know that the Congress shares with the Executive
Branch the goal of making U.S. intelligence as strong as
possible. We also share the belief that U.S. intelligence
should operate under vigorous Congressional scrutiny. At the
same time, an effective secret intelligence agency must remain
secret. I ask the Committees to join us in keeping it that way
and request an opportunity to discuss this matter further before
any final decision is made to call as a witness any member of
the Agency's clandestine service. A copy of this letter is also
being provided to Ranking Minority Member Cheney.
erely,
~~
Bert M. tes
Acting Director of Cen al Intelligence
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Central Intellib~cnce~ Agency
4 May 1987
OCA 87-1827
The Honorable Dick Cheney
Ranking Minority Member
Select Committee to Investigate Covert
Arms Transactions with Iran
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Cheney:
Press reports continue to circulate that the House and
Senate Select Committees on Secret Military Assistance to Iran
and the Nicaraguan Opposition may ask employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency's clandestine services to testify under oath
in public hearings. While I and other Agency officials in
discussions with your staff have already outlined the serious
problems this would pose for us, I believe this issue is so
critical that I want to make our great concern and the reasons
for objecting to public testimony absolutely clear. I also want
to apprise the Committee that I have consulted with National
Security Adviser Carlucci, and he has informed me that this is a
matter of importance to the President.
Let me emphasize at the outset that any Agency employee is
available to the Select Committees to testify under oath in a
closed session. As you know, CIA personnel have already given
sworn depositions to Committee staff. The Agency is fully
prepared to work with the Committees to produce expeditiously
for public release a declassified version of any such
testimony. Indeed, I am prepared to commit all necessary
resources to ensure that testimony taken in executive session is
sanitized and declassified for public use within 24 hours.
Accordingly, the issue is not whether information from Agency
employees can be put before the public, but whether it is
necessary or appropriate for CIA clandestine services employees
to appear in open Committee proceedings.
First, there is the issue of precedent. P.s far as I can
determine, no active duty member of the CIA clandestine service
has ever testified under oath in a public hearing before the
Congress. Although the question of public testimony was
considered during the Church and Pike Committee hearings of the
1970s, both those Committees accepted the Agency's argument
against public exposure of its employees other than the
Director. Both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees
have also respected this principle through the years.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/22 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000200440004-3
bert M. (dates
Acting Director of Ce ral Intelligence
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It is also important to keep in mind that virtually any
staff employee the Committee may wish to call as a witness must
travel or live abroad to carry out his or her duties. Public
exposure could eliminate the possibility of future service
abroad because of personal and operational security problems and
reluctance of foreign governments to allow known Agency
employees to be stationed in their countries. Although it is
true that the names of some of these employees may have appeared
in the media, this does not necessarily confirm affiliation with
the Agency. On the other hand, public testimony before Congress
would confirm official CIA affiliation, and when linked with
photographs appearing in the media, would confirm identity as
well. I appreciate plans apparently under consideration by
Committee staff to prohibit television and still photography of
Agency employees, but I question whether these plans are
workable or seemly for an Agency official.
Apart from the public disclosure of the identities of our
personnel, we are deeply concerned about the kinds of
information our witnesses may be asked to furnish in open
session. Even with detailed advance preparation and
negotiations with staff, there is no way to ensure that a Member
will not press for an answer that. would require the revelation
of highly sensitive information. In short, there would be no
way to control the course of an interrogaticn being played out
in public. In this regard, there are rules and safeguards built
into the Resolutions establishing the Committees themselves
(especially on the Senate side) that require Congressional
compliance with detailed procedures in connection with any
demand for open session disclosure of classified identities
and/or information.
Finally, the appearance of clandestine service employees in
public hearings would risk serious consequences for our
relationships overseas and our ability to conduct clandestine
operations.
For all these reasons, I urge your careful consideration of
this issue. I know that the Congress shares with the Executive
Branch the goal of making U.S. intelligence as strong as
possible. We also share the belief that U.S. intelligence
should operate under vigorous Congressional scrutiny. At the
same time, an effective secret intelligence agency must remain
secret. I ask the Committees to join us in keeping it that way
and request an opportunity to discuss this matter further before
any final decision is made to call as a witness any member of
the Agency's clandestine service. A copy of this letter is also
being provided to Chairman Hamilton.
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Distribution:
Original - Addressee (Chinn Inouye - C1CA 87-1824)
1
- ExDir
(VClnrm Rudman - OCA 87-1825)
(C~mui Hamilton - OCA 87-1826)
(Ranking Min. Mbr Cheney - OCA 87-1827)
1
- ER
1
- IG
1
- DDO
1
- GC
1
- D/PAO
1
- OCA Record
1
- DD/SA
1
- DD/HA
1
- DD/Leg
1
- AO/OC:A
1
- D/OCA Orono
1 - OCA Orono
D/OCA:DDGries:mdo (4 May 1987)
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