LETTER TO WILLIAM J. CASEY FROM WILLIAM R. HARRIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R001102090022-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: April 14, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

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STAT
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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7700 MAIN STRUT
P.O. BOX 7176
SANTA MONICA. CA 90406.2776
April 14, 1986
Mr. William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
7-E-60 HQ
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Bill,
Exercutive Registry
86- 0091X/1
The HPSCI staff requested a set of specific suggestions on
ways to improve intelligence relating to arms control.
Enclosed is a copy of my submission, slightly trimmed in
the course of security review.
One issue that you and Bob Gates might consider is whether
it would be advisable for the Congress to broaden the charter
of the annual report on Soviet arms control noncompliance to
also report on apparent compliance, as well.
In the early 1980s, it has been prudent to report on
noncompliance, without purporting to certify apparent com-
pliance as well. But if the pattern of noncompliance is
not related to patterns of concurrent or restored compli-
ance, then future arms control initiatives are unlikely to
incorporate the lessons from the mixed record of past
Soviet treaty compliance.
Recent statements by State Department officials (not
cleared with the NSC or DOD staffs) have suggested that the
Soviet Union complies with the "substantial" or "overwhelming"
majority of the provisions of SALT agreements. Such h9Q
representations erode support for policy initiatives to
strengthen incentives for treaty compliance both at home
and abroad.
My preliminary review suggests: If one controls for SALT
provisions that are not operationally limiting or that are
only procedural, and if one uses a preponderance of the
evidence standard (appropriate for civil contracts and
treaties), the Soviets have materially breached [violations
+ fraudulent evasions defeating an essential object or
purpose] 55 to 60 percent of separable SALT treaty duties.
The rates of noncompliance are higher for the Biological
Weapons Convention and the ABM Treaty, and lower for
various accident limiting measures'and other arms control
agreements.
Some officials do not as yet trust that CIA will do a rigor-
ous job of assessing the state of both compliance and non-
compliance, together. But reminds us, the
CIA of the mid-1980s is not the CIA of the mid-70s. It is,
in my view, time for the government to begin the effort to
obtain a more comprehensive and clearer picture. Only
STAT
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through more comprehensive analysis is it possible to see
the types of arms limitations that have failed, those that
have accomplished their objectives, and those with a mixed
record.
You are in a position to implement at least some of these
suggestions.
Sincerely,
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Revised attachment to Ltr., W. R. Harris to the Hon. Dave McCurdy, HPSCI
14 April 1986
CANDIDATE INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND STRATEGY
INTEGRATIVE REQUIREMENTS
Several initiatives are proposed for the purpose of providing a
better understanding of the overall state of performance of arms
control obligations, bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union
and multilateral treaties (which generally involve significantly
higher rates of compliance by almost all parties). The U.S.
government has not as yet undertaken a systematic analysis of
the significance of performance under existing arms control
agreements for a performance-based strategy for arms control.
Initiative #1: The Congress could amend the annual duty of the
President to report to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance, so
as to include: statistical indicators of apparent compliance
and material breaches (violations + fraudulent evasions of spe-
cified duties) of all Soviet arms control agreements in force or
extended as political commitments.
Aggregate statistics for all operationally limiting duties of
arms control treaty instruments would place noncomplying conduct
within a broader perspective, as prelude to development of a
performance-based strategy for arms control initiatives. If the
Congress seeks to compare Soviet treaty violations by treaty, or
by type of treaty object or purpose, or by rate of compliance
with particular types of limits, aggregate and comparative stat-
istics may be helpful. But Members of Congress should not
expect that statistical indicators would support a "business-as-
usual" approach to new arms control agreements, or an excuse for
deferral of responsive measures to Soviet treaty violations that
are irreversible or that are correctable but stand uncorrected.
Contrary to testimony suggesting that the Soviets have complied
with the "overwhelming majority" of arms control provisions, my
preliminary review indicates that the Soviets have materially
breached (violated or engaged in fraudulent evasion that would
authorize treaty rescission) the majority of separable duties
within operationally limiting provisions of the the SALT I
Interim Agreement (1972), the ABM Treaty (1972), and the SALT II
Treaty (1979).
The Soviets have breached the substantial majority of specified
duties under the SALT I Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty of
1972. After controlling for provisions that are not operation-
ally limiting (about 2/3rds of the SALT II provisions), the
Soviet record of SALT II compliance indicates a higher rate of
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compliance than with the preceding SALT agreements. Neverthe-
less, the Soviet Union has engaged in material breaches of this
Treaty as well.
Regarding non-SALT arms control duties, the Soviet record is
mixed: they have violated all 15 separable duties under the
Biological Weapons Convention, but few of the separable duties
of the Nonproliferation Treaty, various accident-avoidance
agreements, and most other arms control commitments.
If the Congress seeks a comparative review of Soviet compliance
and noncompliance, it should be prepared to cope with a broader
pattern of Soviet arms control noncompliance than has been
suggested by witnesses whose assertions of Soviet compliance
with "the substantial majority" or the "overwhelming majority"
of treaty provisions reflect wishful and seriously understated
guesses regarding the rate of Soviet treaty violations. Statis-
tical indicators of Soviet compliance and noncompliance must not
be misapplied to excuse the utterly unacceptable policy of
selective compliance. A treaty is a solemn contract between
nations, taken as a whole. A material breach of any provision
allows another party to suspend or terminate the entire treaty.
But statistical indicators may help to understand what types of
past arms control restrictions have or have not weathered the
test of opportunistic Soviet compliance and noncompliance
policies.
Initiative #2: The executive departments might task intelli-
gence to estimate the likely consequences of alternative policy
initiatives to strengthen incentives for arms control compliance.
This initiative could facilitate development of responsive and
anticipatory safeguards to strengthen incentives for arms
control compliance.
Initiative #3: The President or the executive departments might
commission an historical review of the performance of interna-
tional arms control obligations since World War II.
This study should be designed to place Soviet compliance issues
in a broader historical context. If well done, it should help
us to understand: why a great power, the Soviet Union, has
entered into some arms control commitments without intending
to comply fully with their terms; why U.S. responses to Soviet
noncompliance in 1972-75 preceded more extensive disregard of
Soviet arms control duties, as by exportation of lethal chemi-
cals for first use in Southeast Asia, expansion of an offensive
biological weapons program after treaty ratification in 1975,
and disregard of certain ABM and SALT II treaty duties well
before the Soviets had reason to expect delayed U.S. rati-
fication. Morever, an historical review might place the unusual
Soviet record within the broader pattern of general compliance
with arms control commitments.
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TAILORED REQUIREMENTS
Initiative #4: The President or Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs could direct the production of Semi-Annual SALT
Monitoring Reports by each appropriate U.S. intelligence agency
(e.g. CIA, DIA, NSA, INR) instead of the production of a single
coordinated report.
In the course of reviewing U.S. records concerning a quarter
century of Soviet conduct with arms control commitments, 1958-
1983, I found the semi-annual SALT monitoring reports of recur-
ring value. CIA is to be commended for recording U.S. intelli-
gence assessments in such convenient form, year after year.
Yet, the most helpful reporting for a retrospective and
integrative assessment involved that of the period 1973-1975,
when both CIA and DIA produced independent SALT monitoring
reports. These highlighted different factual patterns, and
differing assessments. DIA's assessments of concurrent Soviet
testing of SAM and ABM system components were particularly
helpful when separately reported. Thereafter, a common SALT
monitoring report tended to blur many of the differences, and
made it harder to retrieve -- years later -- alternative
explanations that would be more readily available if separate
agency reports were published. A coordinated monitoring report
might also be produced (if the policy community found it
useful), but the competitive vigor of the 1973-1975 period
should be encouraged.
Initiative #5: The President or Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs could request the production of Semi-Annual
Monitoring Reports on Non-SALT Arms Control Agreements.
The pattern of compliance, noncompliance, and selective restora-
tion of compliance with non-SALT arms control agreements would
be more readily apparent if there were an integrative intelli-
gence assessment. The Non-SALT Arms Control Monitoring Report
should include at least brief review of foreign arms control
compliance with treaties, such as the Conventional Weapons
Convention of 1981, and the Montreux Convention (whose limits on
movement of capital warships and aircraft carriers are carried
forward by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention), even though the
United States is not a party to these treaties. It is important
to understand, for example, why the Soviet Union moved an air-
craft carrier through the Turkish straits on exactly the 40th
anniversary of the signing of a treaty that, at the initiative
of the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs (Litvinov), prohibit-
ed exactly this conduct. If the U.S. is to develop a more
effective strategy for arms control, it must learn from all of
the pertinent experience, and not merely from treaties signed or
ratified by the United States.
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Initiative #6: The Congress should, in my judgment, make more
effective use of the Derwinski Amendment of 1977, Section 37 of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, by greater precision in
requests for and oversight of Section 37 reports.
This provision establishes as a duty of the Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency reporting to the Congress, upon
request, the verifiability of existing and proposed arms control
agreements of the United States. If the Committee is interested
in more effective utilization of the Derwinski Amendment, it
might direct its Staff to undertake a comparative review of all
of the requests (by both House and Senate) for Section 37
reports, and of all of the Section 37 reports received, reasons
for delay or failure to respond, and utility of information
obtained. How do past Section 37 reports square with
classified and unclassified Presidential reports on Soviet arms
control noncompliance in the period 1984-1985? How should
requests for Section 37 Reports be designed to elicit more
useful responses, taking into account limited resources within
ACDA to respond to legislative requests? Can Section 37 Reports
improve prospects for adequate verification (including informing
policy responses in event of noncompliance) of proposed arms
control agreements?
Under the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, as amended, both
the House and Senate Intelligence committees have oversight (and
concurrent budget) jurisdiction over the Verification and Intel-
ligence Bureau of ACDA. It is an intelligence entity, within
the meaning of this statute, irrespective of its residence with-
in a policy agency rather than within an intelligence agency.
Your committee has jurisdiction to hold oversight hearings if
it considers them helpful in assuring that ACDA receives and
produces the arms control intelligence that is needed.
CAPABILITIES TO MEET CONTEMPORARY REQUIREMENTS: PERSONNEL
Having labored in the verification trenches, I am sensitive to
the recurring emphasis upon collection, when the most cost-
effective investment appears to be personnel for analysis.
One of the shortages that is apparent to me is of trained
international lawyers with an understanding of weapons tech-
nology and pertinent intelligence. There are more ambiguities of
verification relating to legal duties than those relating to
intelligence data. The salary structure within the government
does not encourage recruitment and retention of some of the more
able international lawyers who are skilled in verification
assessments. More extensive use of consultants for this purpose
is a realistic and needed initiative.
Similarly, there is a shortage of technical intelligence
personnel, with appropriate education and experience, assigned
to arms control verification. There are some treaties that are
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better staffed than others. At times, the availability or loss
of a single person makes the difference between a national
ability or inability to verify an arms control treaty. The
shortage could be remedied, I believe, were the House and Senate
Intelligence committees to apply their oversight authority to
assure appropriate staff, consultant, and advisory committee
support for arms control verification.
CAPABILITIES TO MEET CONTEMPORARY REQUIREMENTS: MULTILATERAL
VERIFICATION INITIATIVES
U.S. verification capabilities must be augmented by more exten-
sive U.S. participation in multilateral verification activities.
Many of the treaties involving material noncompliance are multi-
lateral. Even if the U.S. can adequately verify a treaty on its
own, the U.S. cannot guarantee effective multilateral responses
to treaty violations if other nations have not worked the veri-
fication issues to their own satisfaction. And some treaties,
such as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, require multilateral
cooperation for verification by any nation.
CAPABILITIES TO MEET CONTEMPORARY REQUIREMENTS: COLLECTION
OF PERTINENT DATA
Major changes in the intelligence investment program may be
unrealistic in an era of federal deficits. But if resources for
verification shrink (when measured in constant dollars), it
becomes more important than before to acquire those intelligence
systems that can help verify militarily significant parameters.
Unless the Soviets demonstrate a reduction in their counter-
measures to verification, new collection systems are likely to
be required if the U.S. is to verify compliance with the
precision and timeliness that are needed. At the request of
your staff, I have applied this principle to particular proposed
arms control limits and particular collection technologies, on a
classified basis.
To verify numbers of silo-launchers in the ground while there
are reserve missile inventories (some upon transporter-erector-
launchers), is both self-defeating and imprudent. If mobile
missiles are to be limited, intelligence must be prepared to
sample, with some reliability, deployments of even those mobile
systems that are designed for reduced observability. And if
there are to be numerical limits on deployed nuclear delivery
systems (both mobile and fixed-based), definition of criteria
for "rapid reload" and declaration of reserve inventories of
delivery vehicles would improve prospects for verification.
If the U.S. is to defer new arms control commitments until more
comprehensive Soviet remediation of treaty violations, then
new investments for arms control verification can be largely
deferred. But if the U.S. is prepared to embark upon new arms
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control agreements, the Congress must authorize and appropriate
funds for verification of compliance/noncompliance, and for
intelligence that more adequately supports effective responses
after detection of violations.
CAPABILITIES TO MEET CONTEMPORARY REQUIREMENTS: UNEXPECTED AND
ADAPTIVE COLLECTION
Soviet deliberate concealment measures impeding treaty verifica-
tion are illegal. Since U.S. complaints in the Standing Consulta-
tive Committee and elsewhere preceded expansion of Soviet mask-
r vk programs, it is imprudent to count upon Soviet self-
restraint to make verification economical. Accordingly, the
U.S. has both the need and the legal justification to attempt
overcoming Soviet concealment and deception programs by seeking
verification by unexpected national technical means, or by ex-
pected national technical means operating in unexpected modes.
The U.S. should unabashedly ask other nations to augment global
resources for arms control verification, by establishing or
modernizing facilities, including jointly-operated facilities,
for that purpose. Soviet denial and deception programs may
ultimately bring other nations together to strengthen verifica-
tion capabilities,
CAPABILITIES TO MEET CONTEMPORARY REQUIREMENTS: PUBLIC
INTELLIGENCE
Finally, it is important to build within the verification system
of the U.S. and foreign nations a larger component of what I
term "public intelligence." This is intelligence data or the
product of intelligence analysis that can be publicly released.
An unclassified photograph of a Soviet aircraft carrier transit-
ing the Turkish straits, a Backfire bomber with extended fuel
probe during in-flight refueling, or a child injured by a mine
disguised as a toy in Afghanistan, speaks to all who care about
the integrity of arms control commitments.
Much of the data that is required for verification cannot be
publicly released, particularly when public release is likely to
lead to further concealment efforts. But if a strategy for
future arms control initiatives is to be based upon learning
from past performance, it will be essential to share more fully
with the American and world publics information on the state of
performance of all contemporary arms control agreements. If too
much of the balance sheet remains secret, a failure to redirect
arms control initiatives will only result in the bankruptcy of
obsolete policies, perhaps earlier than some could imagine.
The preceding suggestions for better integrated intelligence
requirements, for coverage of oft-neglected treaties, and for
technical, institutional, and staff capabilities to produce
more helpful intelligence are just that -- suggestions.
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